< draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-07.txt   draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-08.txt >
Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed. Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed.
Internet-Draft Y. Qu Internet-Draft Y. Qu
Intended status: Standards Track D. Yeung Intended status: Standards Track D. Yeung
Expires: February 18, 2017 Cisco Systems Expires: March 3, 2017 Cisco Systems
I. Chen I. Chen
Ericsson Ericsson
J. Zhang J. Zhang
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
Y. Yang Y. Yang
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
August 17, 2016 August 30, 2016
Routing Key Chain YANG Data Model Routing Key Chain YANG Data Model
draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-07.txt draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-08.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain
is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept
lifetime, and algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly
lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, keys and algorithms may be overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain
gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key elements, keys and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By
distribution can be automated. Key chains are commonly used for representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be
routing protocol authentication and other applications. In some automated. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol
applications, the protocols do not use the key chain element key authentication and other applications. In some applications, the
directly, but rather a key derivation function is used to derive a protocols do not use the key chain element key directly, but rather a
short-lived key from the key chain element key. key derivation function is used to derive a short-lived key from the
key chain element key (e.g., the Master Keys used in the TCP
Authentication Option.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 18, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 3, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Tree Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Relationship to other Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain
is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept
lifetime, and algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly
lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, keys and algorithms may be overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain
gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key elements, keys and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By
distribution can be automated. Key chains are commonly used for representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be
routing protocol authentication and other applications. In some automated. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol
applications, the protocols do not use the key chain element key authentication and other applications. In some applications, the
directly, but rather a key derivation function is used to derive a protocols do not use the key chain element key directly, but rather a
short-lived key from the key chain element key. key derivation function is used to derive a short-lived key from the
key chain element key (e.g., the Master Keys used in [TCP-AO]).
1.1. Requirements Notation 1.1. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-KEYWORDS]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-KEYWORDS].
1.2. Tree Diagrams
A simplified graphical representation of the complete data tree is
presented in Section 3.3. The following tree notation is used.
o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
o Curly braces "{" and "}" contain names of optional features that
make the corresponding node conditional.
o Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration
(read-write), "ro" state data (read-only), "-x" RPC operations,
and "-n" notifications.
o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" a
container with presence, and "*" denotes a "list" or "leaf-list".
o Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also
marked with a colon (":").
o Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not
shown.
2. Problem Statement 2. Problem Statement
This document describes a YANG [YANG] data model for key chains. Key This document describes a YANG [YANG] data model for key chains. Key
chains have been implemented and deployed by a large percentage of chains have been implemented and deployed by a large percentage of
network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will
facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key
rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core
routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT]. routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT].
A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a
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as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the
key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment
model where the details of the applications or services requiring model where the details of the applications or services requiring
authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The
YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection
criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does
not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes
augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection
criteria. criteria.
2.1. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains 2.1. Applicability
Other YANG modules may reference ietf-key-chain YANG module key-chain
names for authentication and encryption applications. A YANG type
has been provided to facilate reference to the key-chain name without
having to specify the complete YANG XML Path Language (XPath)
selector.
2.2. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains
Key chains may be used to gracefully update the key and/or algorithm Key chains may be used to gracefully update the key and/or algorithm
used by an application for authentication or encryption. This MAY be used by an application for authentication or encryption. This MAY be
accomplished by accepting all the keys that have a valid accept accomplished by accepting all the keys that have a valid accept
lifetime and sending the key with the most recent send lifetime. One lifetime and sending the key with the most recent send lifetime. One
scenario for facilitating key rollover is to: scenario for facilitating key rollover is to:
1. Distribute a key chain with a new key to all the routers or other 1. Distribute a key chain with a new key to all the routers or other
network devices in the domain of that key chain. The new key's network devices in the domain of that key chain. The new key's
accept lifetime should be such that it is accepted during the key accept lifetime should be such that it is accepted during the key
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type boolean; type boolean;
description "AES Key Wrap state."; description "AES Key Wrap state.";
} }
description "Status of AES Key Wrap."; description "Status of AES Key Wrap.";
} }
description "All configured key-chains for the device."; description "All configured key-chains for the device.";
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
5. Relationship to other Work 5. Security Considerations
6. Security Considerations
This document enables the automated distribution of industry standard This document enables the automated distribution of industry standard
key chains using the NETCONF [NETCONF] protocol. As such, the key chains using the NETCONF [NETCONF] protocol. As such, the
security considerations for the NETCONF protocol are applicable. security considerations for the NETCONF protocol are applicable.
Given that the key chains themselves are sensitive data, it is Given that the key chains themselves are sensitive data, it is
RECOMMENDED that the NETCONF communication channel be encrypted. One RECOMMENDED that the NETCONF communication channel be encrypted. One
way to do accomplish this would be to invoke and run NETCONF over SSH way to do accomplish this would be to invoke and run NETCONF over SSH
as described in [NETCONF-SSH]. as described in [NETCONF-SSH].
When configured, the key-strings can be encrypted using the AES Key When configured, the key-strings can be encrypted using the AES Key
skipping to change at page 18, line 34 skipping to change at page 19, line 17
further discussion. further discussion.
The clear-text algorithm is included as a YANG feature. Usage is NOT The clear-text algorithm is included as a YANG feature. Usage is NOT
RECOMMENDED except in cases where the application and device have no RECOMMENDED except in cases where the application and device have no
other alternative (e.g., a legacy network device that must other alternative (e.g., a legacy network device that must
authenticate packets at intervals of 10 milliseconds or less for many authenticate packets at intervals of 10 milliseconds or less for many
peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used
with the clear-text algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT with the clear-text algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT
be reused with more secure algorithms. be reused with more secure algorithms.
7. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry
[XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in RFC 3688, the following [XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in [XML-REGISTRY], the
registration is requested to be made: following registration is requested to be made:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain
Registrant Contact: The IESG. Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers a YANG module in the YANG Module Names This document registers a YANG module in the YANG Module Names
registry [YANG]. registry [YANG].
name: ietf-acl namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key- name: ietf-key-chain namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-
chain prefix: ietf-key-chain reference: RFC XXXX key-chain prefix: ietf-key-chain reference: RFC XXXX
8. References 7. References
8.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[NETCONF] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. [NETCONF] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC
6241, June 2011. 6241, June 2011.
[NETCONF-SSH] [NETCONF-SSH]
Wasserman, M., "Using NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell Wasserman, M., "Using NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell
(SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011. (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011.
[RFC-KEYWORDS] [RFC-KEYWORDS]
skipping to change at page 19, line 29 skipping to change at page 20, line 13
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[XML-REGISTRY] [XML-REGISTRY]
Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004. January 2004.
[YANG] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the [YANG] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010. October 2010.
8.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[AES-KEY-WRAP] [AES-KEY-WRAP]
Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649, August (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649, August
2009. 2009.
[BFD] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, June 2010. (BFD)", RFC 5880, June 2010.
[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]
skipping to change at page 20, line 14 skipping to change at page 20, line 46
[NTP-PROTO] [NTP-PROTO]
Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[OSPFV3-AUTH] [OSPFV3-AUTH]
Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting
Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014. Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014.
[TCP-AO] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
[TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS] [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]
Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
June 2010. June 2010.
[YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]
Chen, I., "YANG Data Model for RFC 7210 Key Table", draft- Chen, I., "YANG Data Model for RFC 7210 Key Table", draft-
chen-rtg-key-table-yang-02.txt (work in progress), chen-rtg-key-table-yang-02.txt (work in progress),
November 2015. November 2015.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The RFC text was produced using Marshall Rose's xml2rfc tool. The RFC text was produced using Marshall Rose's xml2rfc tool.
Thanks to Brian Weis for fruitful discussions on security Thanks to Brian Weis for fruitful discussions on security
requirements. requirements.
Thanks to Ines Robles for Routing Directorate QA review comments.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Acee Lindem (editor) Acee Lindem (editor)
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
301 Midenhall Way 301 Midenhall Way
Cary, NC 27513 Cary, NC 27513
USA USA
Email: acee@cisco.com Email: acee@cisco.com
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