< draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-13.txt		draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-14.txt >
	Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed.		Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed.
	Internet-Draft Cisco Systems		Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
	Intended status: Standards Track Y. Qu		Intended status: Standards Track Y. Qu
	Expires: July 23, 2017 Huawei		Expires: August 19, 2017 Huawei
	D. Yeung		D. Yeung
	Arrcus, Inc		Arrcus, Inc
	I. Chen		I. Chen
	Ericsson		Jabil
	J. Zhang		J. Zhang
	Juniper Networks		Juniper Networks
	Y. Yang		Y. Yang
	SockRate		SockRate
	January 19, 2017		February 15, 2017
	Routing Key Chain YANG Data Model		Routing Key Chain YANG Data Model
	draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-13.txt		draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-14.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain		This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain
	is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept		is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept
	lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly		lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly
	overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain		overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain
	elements, keys and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By		elements, keys and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By
	representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be		representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be
	automated. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol		automated. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol
	skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on July 23, 2017.		This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2017.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 33 ¶
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.2. Tree Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.2. Tree Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.2. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains . . . . . . . . . 4		2.2. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
			A.1. Simple Key Chain with Always Valid Single Key . . . . . . 20
			A.2. Key Chain with Keys having Different Lifetimes . . . . . 21
			A.3. Key Chain with Independent Send and Accept Lifetimes . . 22
			Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain		This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain
	is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept		is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept
	lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly		lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly
	overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain		overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain
	elements, keys and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By		elements, keys and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By
	representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be		representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be
	automated. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol		automated. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol
	authentication and other applications. In some applications, the		authentication and other applications. In some applications, the
	protocols do not use the key chain element key directly, but rather a		protocols do not use the key chain element key directly, but rather a
	key derivation function is used to derive a short-lived key from the		key derivation function is used to derive a short-lived key from the
	key chain element key (e.g., the Master Keys used in [TCP-AO]).		key chain element key (e.g., the Master Keys used in [TCP-AO]).
	1.1. Requirements Notation		1.1. Requirements Notation
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-KEYWORDS].		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
			[RFC-KEYWORDS].
	1.2. Tree Diagrams		1.2. Tree Diagrams
	A simplified graphical representation of the complete data tree is		A simplified graphical representation of the complete data tree is
	presented in Section 3.3. The following tree notation is used.		presented in Section 3.3. The following tree notation is used.
	o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.		o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
	o Curly braces "{" and "}" contain names of optional features that		o Curly braces "{" and "}" contain names of optional features that
	make the corresponding node conditional.		make the corresponding node conditional.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 50 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 9 ¶
	chains have been implemented and deployed by a large percentage of		chains have been implemented and deployed by a large percentage of
	network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will		network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will
	facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key		facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key
	rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core		rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core
	routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT].		routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT].
	A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a		A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a
	Key ID, key, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication		Key ID, key, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication
	or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by any service or		or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by any service or
	application requiring authentication or encryption. In essence, the		application requiring authentication or encryption. In essence, the
	key-chain is a reusable key policy that can be referenced where ever		key-chain is a reusable key policy that can be referenced whereever
	it is required. The key-chain construct has been implemented by most		it is required. The key-chain construct has been implemented by most
	networking vendors and deployed in many networks.		networking vendors and deployed in many networks.
	The module name was change from ietf-key-chain to ietf-routing-key-
	chain to avoid disambiguate it from the ietf-system-keychain module
	defined in [NETCONF-SERVER-CONF]. However, due to popular demand,
	the module name has been restored to simply ietf-key-chain.
	A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in		A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in
	[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table also includes keys as well		[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table also includes keys as well
	as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the		as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the
	key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment		key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment
	model where the details of the applications or services requiring		model where the details of the applications or services requiring
	authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The		authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The
	YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection		YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection
	criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does		criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does
	not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes		not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes
	augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection		augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection
	skipping to change at page 5, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 23 ¶
	domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the		domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the
	next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always		next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always
	include two keys; either the current and future key (during key		include two keys; either the current and future key (during key
	rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key		rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key
	rollovers).		rollovers).
	3. Design of the Key Chain Model		3. Design of the Key Chain Model
	The ietf-key-chain module contains a list of one or more keys indexed		The ietf-key-chain module contains a list of one or more keys indexed
	by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3 [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the		by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3 [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the
	Key-Id is used to identify the key chain entry to be used. In		Key ID is used to identify the key chain entry to be used. In
	addition to the Key-ID, each key chain entry includes a key-string		addition to the Key ID, each key chain entry includes a key-string
	and a cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain entries		and a cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain entries
	include send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime is		include send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime is
	unspecified, the key is always considered valid.		unspecified, the key is always considered valid.
	Note that asymmetric keys, i.e., a different key value used for		Note that asymmetric keys, i.e., a different key value used for
	transmission versus acceptance, may be supported with multiple key		transmission versus acceptance, may be supported with multiple key
	chain elements where the accept-lifetime or send-lifetime is not		chain elements where the accept-lifetime or send-lifetime is not
	valid (e.g., has an end-time equal to the start-time).		valid (e.g., has an end-time equal to the start-time).
	Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various		Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various
	vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Additionally, the		vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Finally, the crypto
	key-chain is made a grouping so that an implementation could support		algorithm identities are provided for reuse when configuring legacy
	scoping other than at the global level. Finally, the crypto-		authentication and encryption not using key-chains.
	algorithm-types grouping is provided for reuse when configuring
	legacy authentication and encryption not using key-chains.
	A key-chain is identified by a unique name within the scope of the		A key-chain is identified by a unique name within the scope of the
	network device. The "key-chain-ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other		network device. The "key-chain-ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other
	YANG modules when they need to reference a configured key-chain.		YANG modules when they need to reference a configured key-chain.
	3.1. Key Chain Operational State		3.1. Key Chain Operational State
	The key chain operational state is maintained in a separate tree.		The key chain operational state is maintained in a separate tree.
	The key string itself is omitted from the operational state to		The key string itself is omitted from the operational state to
	minimize visibility similar to what was done with keys in SNMP MIBs.		minimize visibility similar to what was done with keys in SNMP MIBs.
	skipping to change at page 6, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 16 ¶
	Features are used to handle differences between vendor		Features are used to handle differences between vendor
	implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration		implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration
	an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in		an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in
	hexadecimal. They are also used to support of security requirements		hexadecimal. They are also used to support of security requirements
	(e.g., TCP-AO Algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not implemented by		(e.g., TCP-AO Algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not implemented by
	vendors or only a single vendor.		vendors or only a single vendor.
	3.3. Key Chain Model Tree		3.3. Key Chain Model Tree
	+--rw key-chain		+--rw key-chains
	| +--rw key-chain-list* [name]		| +--rw key-chain* [name]
	| | +--rw name string		| | +--rw name string
	| | +--rw description? string		| | +--rw description? string
	| | +--rw accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}?		| | +--rw accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}?
	| | | +--rw duration? uint32		| | | +--rw duration? uint32
	| | +--rw key-chain-entries* [key-id]		| | +--rw key-entry* [key-id]
	| | +--rw key-id uint64		| | +--rw key-id uint64
	| | +--rw lifetime		| | +--rw lifetime
	| | | +--rw (lifetime)?		| | | +--rw (lifetime)?
	| | | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime)		| | | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime)
	| | | | +--rw send-accept-lifetime		| | | | +--rw send-accept-lifetime
	| | | | +--rw (lifetime)?		| | | | +--rw (lifetime)?
	| | | | +--:(always)		| | | | +--:(always)
	| | | | | +--rw always? empty		| | | | | +--rw always? empty
	| | | | +--:(start-end-time)		| | | | +--:(start-end-time)
	| | | | +--rw start-date-time?		| | | | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
	| | | | | yang:date-and-time
	| | | | +--rw (end-time)?		| | | | +--rw (end-time)?
	| | | | +--:(infinite)		| | | | +--:(infinite)
	| | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty		| | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
	| | | | +--:(duration)		| | | | +--:(duration)
	| | | | | +--rw duration? uint32		| | | | | +--rw duration? uint32
	| | | | +--:(end-date-time)		| | | | +--:(end-date-time)
	| | | | +--rw end-date-time?		| | | | +--rw end-date-time?
	| | | | yang:date-and-time		| | | | yang:date-and-time
	| | | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime)		| | | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime)
	| | | | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}?		| | | | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}?
	| | | +--rw send-lifetime		| | | +--rw send-lifetime
	| | | | +--rw (lifetime)?		| | | | +--rw (lifetime)?
	| | | | +--:(always)		| | | | +--:(always)
	| | | | | +--rw always? empty		| | | | | +--rw always? empty
	| | | | +--:(start-end-time)		| | | | +--:(start-end-time)
	| | | | +--rw start-date-time?		| | | | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
	| | | | yang:date-and-time
	| | | | +--rw (end-time)?		| | | | +--rw (end-time)?
	| | | | +--:(infinite)		| | | | +--:(infinite)
	| | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty		| | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
	| | | | +--:(duration)		| | | | +--:(duration)
	| | | | | +--rw duration? uint32		| | | | | +--rw duration? uint32
	| | | | +--:(end-date-time)		| | | | +--:(end-date-time)
	| | | | +--rw end-date-time?		| | | | +--rw end-date-time?
	| | | | yang:date-and-time		| | | | yang:date-and-time
	| | | +--rw accept-lifetime		| | | +--rw accept-lifetime
	| | | +--rw (lifetime)?		| | | +--rw (lifetime)?
	| | | +--:(always)		| | | +--:(always)
	| | | | +--rw always? empty		| | | | +--rw always? empty
	| | | +--:(start-end-time)		| | | +--:(start-end-time)
	| | | +--rw start-date-time?		| | | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
	| | | yang:date-and-time
	| | | +--rw (end-time)?		| | | +--rw (end-time)?
	| | | +--:(infinite)		| | | +--:(infinite)
	| | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty		| | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
	| | | +--:(duration)		| | | +--:(duration)
	| | | | +--rw duration? uint32		| | | | +--rw duration? uint32
	| | | +--:(end-date-time)		| | | +--:(end-date-time)
	| | | +--rw end-date-time?		| | | +--rw end-date-time?
	| | | yang:date-and-time		| | | yang:date-and-time
	| | +--rw crypto-algorithm		| | +--rw crypto-algorithm identityref
	| | | +--rw (algorithm)?
	| | | +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}?
	| | | | +--rw hmac-sha1-12? empty
	| | | +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}?
	| | | | +--rw aes-cmac-prf-128? empty
	| | | +--:(md5)
	| | | | +--rw md5? empty
	| | | +--:(sha-1)
	| | | | +--rw sha-1? empty
	| | | +--:(hmac-sha-1)
	| | | | +--rw hmac-sha-1? empty
	| | | +--:(hmac-sha-256)
	| | | | +--rw hmac-sha-256? empty
	| | | +--:(hmac-sha-384)
	| | | | +--rw hmac-sha-384? empty
	| | | +--:(hmac-sha-512)
	| | | | +--rw hmac-sha-512? empty
	| | | +--:(clear-text) {clear-text}?
	| | | | +--rw clear-text? empty
	| | | +--:(replay-protection-only)
	| | | {replay-protection-only}?
	| | | +--rw replay-protection-only? empty
	| | +--rw key-string		| | +--rw key-string
	| | +--rw (key-string-style)?		| | +--rw (key-string-style)?
	| | +--:(keystring)		| | +--:(keystring)
	| | | +--rw keystring? string		| | | +--rw keystring? string
	| | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}?		| | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}?
	| | +--rw hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string		| | +--rw hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string
	| +--rw aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}?		| +--rw aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}?
	| +--rw enable? boolean		| +--rw enable? boolean
	+--ro key-chain-state		+--ro key-chains-state
	+--ro key-chain-list* [name]		+--ro key-chain-state* [name]
	| +--ro name string		| +--ro name string
	| +--ro description? string		| +--ro description? string
	| +--ro accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}?		| +--ro accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}?
	| | +--ro duration? uint32		| | +--ro duration? uint32
	| +--ro last-modified-timestamp? yang:date-and-time		| +--ro last-modified-timestamp? yang:date-and-time
	| +--ro key-chain-entries* [key-id]		| +--ro key-entry-state* [key-id]
	| +--ro key-id uint64		| +--ro key-id uint64
	| +--ro lifetime		| +--ro lifetime
	| | +--ro (lifetime)?		| | +--ro (lifetime)?
	| | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime)		| | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime)
	| | | +--ro send-accept-lifetime		| | | +--ro send-accept-lifetime
	| | | +--ro (lifetime)?		| | | +--ro (lifetime)?
	| | | +--:(always)		| | | +--:(always)
	| | | | +--ro always? empty		| | | | +--ro always? empty
	| | | +--:(start-end-time)		| | | +--:(start-end-time)
	| | | +--ro start-date-time?		| | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
	| | | yang:date-and-time
	| | | +--ro (end-time)?		| | | +--ro (end-time)?
	| | | +--:(infinite)		| | | +--:(infinite)
	| | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty		| | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty
	| | | +--:(duration)		| | | +--:(duration)
	| | | | +--ro duration? uint32		| | | | +--ro duration? uint32
	| | | +--:(end-date-time)		| | | +--:(end-date-time)
	| | | +--ro end-date-time?		| | | +--ro end-date-time?
	| | | yang:date-and-time		| | | yang:date-and-time
	| | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime)		| | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime)
	| | | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}?		| | | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}?
	| | +--ro send-lifetime		| | +--ro send-lifetime
	| | | +--ro (lifetime)?		| | | +--ro (lifetime)?
	| | | +--:(always)		| | | +--:(always)
	| | | | +--ro always? empty		| | | | +--ro always? empty
	| | | +--:(start-end-time)		| | | +--:(start-end-time)
	| | | +--ro start-date-time?		| | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
	| | | yang:date-and-time
	| | | +--ro (end-time)?		| | | +--ro (end-time)?
	| | | +--:(infinite)		| | | +--:(infinite)
	| | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty		| | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty
	| | | +--:(duration)		| | | +--:(duration)
	| | | | +--ro duration? uint32		| | | | +--ro duration? uint32
	| | | +--:(end-date-time)		| | | +--:(end-date-time)
	| | | +--ro end-date-time?		| | | +--ro end-date-time?
	| | | yang:date-and-time		| | | yang:date-and-time
	| | +--ro accept-lifetime		| | +--ro accept-lifetime
	| | +--ro (lifetime)?		| | +--ro (lifetime)?
	| | +--:(always)		| | +--:(always)
	| | | +--ro always? empty		| | | +--ro always? empty
	| | +--:(start-end-time)		| | +--:(start-end-time)
	| | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time		| | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
	| | +--ro (end-time)?		| | +--ro (end-time)?
	| | +--:(infinite)		| | +--:(infinite)
	| | | +--ro no-end-time? empty		| | | +--ro no-end-time? empty
	| | +--:(duration)		| | +--:(duration)
	| | | +--ro duration? uint32		| | | +--ro duration? uint32
	| | +--:(end-date-time)		| | +--:(end-date-time)
	| | +--ro end-date-time?		| | +--ro end-date-time?
	| | yang:date-and-time		| | yang:date-and-time
	| +--ro crypto-algorithm		| +--ro crypto-algorithm identityref
	| | +--ro (algorithm)?
	| | +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}?
	| | | +--ro hmac-sha1-12? empty
	| | +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}?
	| | | +--ro aes-cmac-prf-128? empty
	| | +--:(md5)
	| | | +--ro md5? empty
	| | +--:(sha-1)
	| | | +--ro sha-1? empty
	| | +--:(hmac-sha-1)
	| | | +--ro hmac-sha-1? empty
	| | +--:(hmac-sha-256)
	| | | +--ro hmac-sha-256? empty
	| | +--:(hmac-sha-384)
	| | | +--ro hmac-sha-384? empty
	| | +--:(hmac-sha-512)
	| | | +--ro hmac-sha-512? empty
	| | +--:(clear-text) {clear-text}?
	| | | +--ro clear-text? empty
	| | +--:(replay-protection-only)
	| | | {replay-protection-only}?
	| | +--ro replay-protection-only? empty
	| +--ro key-string		| +--ro key-string
	| +--ro (key-string-style)?		| | +--ro (key-string-style)?
	| +--:(keystring)		| | +--:(keystring)
	| | +--ro keystring? string		| | | +--ro keystring? string
	| +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}?		| | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}?
	| +--ro hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string		| | +--ro hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string
	| +--ro send-lifetime-active? boolean		| +--ro send-lifetime-active? boolean
	| +--ro accept-lifetime-active? boolean		| +--ro accept-lifetime-active? boolean
	+--ro aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}?		+--ro aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}?
	+--ro enable? boolean		+--ro enable? boolean
	4. Key Chain YANG Model		4. Key Chain YANG Model
	<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-key-chain@2017-01-20.yang"		<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-key-chain@2017-02-15.yang"
	module ietf-key-chain {		module ietf-key-chain {
	namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain";		yang-version 1.1;
	// replace with IANA namespace when assigned		namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain";
	prefix "key-chain";		prefix key-chain;
	import ietf-yang-types {
	prefix "yang";
	}
	import ietf-netconf-acm {
	prefix "nacm";
	}
	organization		import ietf-yang-types {
	"IETF RTG (Routing) Working Group";		prefix yang;
	contact		}
	"Acee Lindem - acee@cisco.com";		import ietf-netconf-acm {
			prefix nacm;
			}
	description		organization
	"This YANG module defines the generic configuration		"IETF RTG (Routing) Working Group";
			contact
			"Acee Lindem - acee@cisco.com";
			description
			"This YANG module defines the generic configuration
	data for key-chain. It is intended that the module		data for key-chain. It is intended that the module
	will be extended by vendors to define vendor-specific		will be extended by vendors to define vendor-specific
	key-chain configuration parameters.		key-chain configuration parameters.
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
	authors of the code. All rights reserved.		authors of the code. All rights reserved.
	Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or		Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
	without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject		without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
	to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License		to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
	set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions		set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
	Relating to IETF Documents		Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
	This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see		This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
	the RFC itself for full legal notices.";		the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
	revision 2017-01-20 {		revision 2017-02-15 {
	description		description
	"Add support of using NETCONF Access Control for		"Replace choice statement with identity for crypto-algorithm.
	key-string.";		Removed unneeded groupings.
	reference		Fixed indenations.";
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";		reference "RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
	}		}
	revision 2016-11-14 {
	description
	"Restore last-modified timestamp leaf.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
	}
	revision 2016-10-27 {
	description
	"Restructure into separate config and state trees to
	match YANG structure.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
	}
	revision 2016-08-17 {
	description
	"Add description and last-modified timestamp leaves.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
	}
	revision 2016-07-01 {
	description
	"Rename module back to ietf-key-chain.
	Added replay-protection-only feature and algorithm.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
	}
	revision 2016-03-15 {
	description
	"Rename module from ietf-key-chain to
	ietf-routing-key-chain.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Routing key-chain";
	}
	revision 2016-02-16 {
	description
	"Updated version. Added clear-text algorithm as a
	feature.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
	}
	revision 2015-10-15 {
	description
	"Updated version, organization, and copyright.
	Added aes-cmac-prf-128 and aes-key-wrap features.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
	}
	revision 2015-06-29 {
	description
	"Updated version. Added Operation State following
	draft-openconfig-netmod-opstate-00.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
	}
	revision 2015-02-24 {
	description
	"Initial revision.";
	reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
	}
	typedef key-chain-ref {		feature hex-key-string {
	type leafref {		description
	path "/key-chain:key-chain/key-chain:key-chain-list/"		"Support hexadecimal key string.";
	+ "key-chain:name";
	}
	description
	"This type is used by data models that need to reference
	configured key-chains.";
	}
	/* feature list */		}
	feature hex-key-string {
	description
	"Support hexadecimal key string.";
	}
	feature accept-tolerance {		feature accept-tolerance {
	description		description
	"To specify the tolerance or acceptance limit.";		"To specify the tolerance or acceptance limit.";
	}		}
	feature independent-send-accept-lifetime {		feature independent-send-accept-lifetime {
	description		description
	"Support for independent send and accept key lifetimes.";		"Support for independent send and accept key lifetimes.";
	}		}
	feature crypto-hmac-sha-1-12 {		feature crypto-hmac-sha-1-12 {
	description		description
	"Support for TCP HMAC-SHA-1 12 byte digest hack.";		"Support for TCP HMAC-SHA-1 12 byte digest hack.";
	}		}
	feature clear-text {		feature clear-text {
	description		description
	"Support for clear-text algorithm. Usage is		"Support for clear-text algorithm. Usage is
	NOT RECOMMENDED.";		NOT RECOMMENDED.";
			}
	}		feature aes-cmac-prf-128 {
			description
			"Support for AES Cipher based Message Authentication
			Code Pseudo Random Function.";
			}
	feature aes-cmac-prf-128 {		feature aes-key-wrap {
	description		description
	"Support for AES Cipher based Message Authentication		"Support for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap.";
	Code Pseudo Random Function.";		}
	}
	feature aes-key-wrap {		feature replay-protection-only {
	description		description
	"Support for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)		"Provide replay-protection without any authentication
	Key Wrap.";		as required by protocols such as Bidirectional
	}		Forwarding Detection (BFD).";
			}
	feature replay-protection-only {		identity crypto-algorithm {
	description		description
	"Provide replay-protection without any authentication		"Base identity of cryptographic algorithm options.";
	as required by protocols such as Bidirectional		}
	Forwarding Detection (BFD).";
	}
	/* groupings */		identity hmac-sha-1-12 {
	grouping lifetime {		base crypto-algorithm;
	description		if-feature "crypto-hmac-sha-1-12";
	"Key lifetime specification.";		description
	choice lifetime {		"The HMAC-SHA1-12 algorithm.";
	default always;		}
	description
	"Options for specifying key accept or send		identity aes-cmac-prf-128 {
	lifetimes";		base crypto-algorithm;
	case always {		if-feature "aes-cmac-prf-128";
	leaf always {		description
	type empty;		"The AES-CMAC-PRF-128 algorithm - required by
	description		RFC 5926 for TCP-AO key derivation functions.";
	"Indicates key lifetime is always valid.";		}
	}
	}		identity md5 {
	case start-end-time {		base crypto-algorithm;
	leaf start-date-time {		description
	type yang:date-and-time;		"The MD5 algorithm.";
	description "Start time.";		}
	}
	choice end-time {		identity sha-1 {
	default infinite;		base crypto-algorithm;
	description		description
	"End-time setting.";		"The SHA-1 algorithm.";
	case infinite {		}
	leaf no-end-time {
	type empty;		identity hmac-sha-1 {
	description		base crypto-algorithm;
	"Indicates key lifetime end-time in		description
	infinite.";		"HMAC-SHA-1 authentication algorithm.";
	}		}
	}
	case duration {		identity hmac-sha-256 {
	leaf duration {		base crypto-algorithm;
	type uint32 {		description
	range "1..2147483646";		"HMAC-SHA-256 authentication algorithm.";
	}		}
	units seconds;
	description "Key lifetime duration,		identity hmac-sha-384 {
	in seconds";		base crypto-algorithm;
	}		description
	}		"HMAC-SHA-384 authentication algorithm.";
	case end-date-time {		}
	leaf end-date-time {
	type yang:date-and-time;		identity hmac-sha-512 {
	description "End time.";		base crypto-algorithm;
	}		description
	}		"HMAC-SHA-512 authentication algorithm.";
	}		}
	}		identity clear-text {
	}		base crypto-algorithm;
			if-feature "clear-text";
			description
			"Clear text.";
			}
			identity replay-protection-only {
			base crypto-algorithm;
			if-feature "replay-protection-only";
			description
			"Provide replay-protection without any authentication as
			required by protocols such as Bidirectional Forwarding
			Detection (BFD).";
			}
			typedef key-chain-ref {
			type leafref {
			path
			"/key-chain:key-chains/key-chain:key-chain/key-chain:name";
	}		}
			description
			"This type is used by data models that need to reference
			configured key-chains.";
			}
	grouping crypto-algorithm-types {		grouping lifetime {
	description "Cryptographic algorithm types.";		description
	choice algorithm {		"Key lifetime specification.";
	description		choice lifetime {
	"Options for cryptographic algorithm specification.";		default "always";
	case hmac-sha-1-12 {		description
	if-feature crypto-hmac-sha-1-12;		"Options for specifying key accept or send lifetimes";
	leaf hmac-sha1-12 {		case always {
	type empty;		leaf always {
	description "The HMAC-SHA1-12 algorithm.";		type empty;
	}		description
	}		"Indicates key lifetime is always valid.";
	case aes-cmac-prf-128 {		}
	if-feature aes-cmac-prf-128;		}
	leaf aes-cmac-prf-128 {		case start-end-time {
	type empty;		leaf start-date-time {
	description "The AES-CMAC-PRF-128 algorithm -		type yang:date-and-time;
	required by RFC 5926 for TCP-AO key		description
	derivation functions.";		"Start time.";
	}		}
	}		choice end-time {
	case md5 {		default "infinite";
	leaf md5 {		description
	type empty;		"End-time setting.";
	description "The MD5 algorithm.";		case infinite {
	}		leaf no-end-time {
	}		type empty;
	case sha-1 {		description
	leaf sha-1 {		"Indicates key lifetime end-time in infinite.";
	type empty;
	description "The SHA-1 algorithm.";
	}
	}
	case hmac-sha-1 {
	leaf hmac-sha-1 {
	type empty;
	description
	"HMAC-SHA-1 authentication algorithm.";
	}
	}
	case hmac-sha-256 {
	leaf hmac-sha-256 {
	type empty;
	description
	"HMAC-SHA-256 authentication algorithm.";
	}
	}
	case hmac-sha-384 {
	leaf hmac-sha-384 {
	type empty;
	description
	"HMAC-SHA-384 authentication algorithm.";
	}
	}
	case hmac-sha-512 {
	leaf hmac-sha-512 {
	type empty;
	description
	"HMAC-SHA-512 authentication algorithm.";
	}
	}		}
	case clear-text {		}
	if-feature clear-text;		case duration {
	leaf clear-text {		leaf duration {
	type empty;		type uint32 {
	description "Clear text.";		range "1..2147483646";
	}		}
			units "seconds";
			description
			"Key lifetime duration, in seconds";
	}		}
	case replay-protection-only {		}
	if-feature replay-protection-only;		case end-date-time {
	leaf replay-protection-only {		leaf end-date-time {
	type empty;		type yang:date-and-time;
	description		description
	"Provide replay-protection without any		"End time.";
	authentication as required by protocols
	such as Bidirectional Forwarding
	Detection (BFD).";
	}
	}		}
			}
	}		}
			}
	}		}
			}
	grouping key-chain-common-entry {		grouping key-common-entry {
	description "Key-chain entry data nodes common to		description
	configuration and state.";		"Key-chain entry data nodes common to
	container lifetime {		configuration and state.";
	description "Specify a key's lifetime.";		container lifetime {
	choice lifetime {		description
	description		"Specify a key's lifetime.";
	"Options for specification of send and accept		choice lifetime {
	lifetimes.";		description
	case send-and-accept-lifetime {		"Options for specification of send and accept lifetimes.";
	description		case send-and-accept-lifetime {
	"Send and accept key have the same		description
	lifetime.";		"Send and accept key have the same lifetime.";
	container send-accept-lifetime {		container send-accept-lifetime {
	uses lifetime;		description
	description		"Single lifetime specification for both
	"Single lifetime specification for both		send and accept lifetimes.";
	send and accept lifetimes.";
	}
	}
	case independent-send-accept-lifetime {
	if-feature independent-send-accept-lifetime;
	description
	"Independent send and accept key lifetimes.";
	container send-lifetime {
	uses lifetime;
	description
	"Separate lifetime specification for send
	lifetime.";
	}
	container accept-lifetime {
	uses lifetime;
	description
	"Separate lifetime specification for
	accept lifetime.";
	}		uses lifetime;
	}		}
	}
	}		}
	container crypto-algorithm {		case independent-send-accept-lifetime {
	uses crypto-algorithm-types;		if-feature "independent-send-accept-lifetime";
			description
			"Independent send and accept key lifetimes.";
			container send-lifetime {
	description		description
	"Cryptographic algorithm associated with key.";		"Separate lifetime specification for send lifetime.";
	}		uses lifetime;
	container key-string {		}
	description "The key string.";		container accept-lifetime {
	nacm:default-deny-all;		description
	choice key-string-style {		"Separate lifetime specification for accept lifetime.";
	description		uses lifetime;
	"Key string styles";		}
	case keystring {
	leaf keystring {
	type string;
	description
	"Key string in ASCII format.";
	}
	}
	case hexadecimal {
	if-feature hex-key-string;
	leaf hexadecimal-string {
	type yang:hex-string;
	description
	"Key in hexadecimal string format.";
	}
	}
	}
	}		}
			}
	}		}
			leaf crypto-algorithm {
	grouping key-chain-config-entry {		type identityref {
	description "Key-chain configuration entry.";		base crypto-algorithm;
	uses key-chain-common-entry;		}
			mandatory true;
			description
			"Cryptographic algorithm associated with key.";
	}		}
	grouping key-chain-state-entry {		container key-string {
	description "Key-chain state entry.";		description
	uses key-chain-common-entry;		"The key string.";
	leaf send-lifetime-active {		nacm:default-deny-all;
	type boolean;		choice key-string-style {
	config false;		description
			"Key string styles";
			case keystring {
			leaf keystring {
			type string;
	description		description
	"Indicates if the send lifetime of the		"Key string in ASCII format.";
	key-chain entry is currently active.";		}
	}		}
	leaf accept-lifetime-active {		case hexadecimal {
	type boolean;		if-feature "hex-key-string";
	config false;		leaf hexadecimal-string {
			type yang:hex-string;
	description		description
	"Indicates if the accept lifetime of the		"Key in hexadecimal string format. When compared
	key-chain entry is currently active.";		to ASCII, specification in hexadecimal affords
			greater key entropy with the same number of
			octets. Additionally, it discourages usage of
			well-known words or numbers.";
			}
	}		}
			}
	}		}
			}
	grouping key-chain-common {		grouping key-state-entry {
	description		description
	"key-chain common grouping.";		"Key state entry.";
	leaf name {		uses key-common-entry;
	type string;		leaf send-lifetime-active {
	description "Name of the key-chain.";		type boolean;
	}		config false;
	leaf description {		description
	type string;		"Indicates if the send lifetime of the
	description "A description of the key-chain";		key-chain entry is currently active.";
	}
	container accept-tolerance {
	if-feature accept-tolerance;
	description
	"Tolerance for key lifetime acceptance (seconds).";
	leaf duration {
	type uint32;
	units seconds;
	default "0";
	description
	"Tolerance range, in seconds.";
	}
	}
	}		}
			leaf accept-lifetime-active {
			type boolean;
			config false;
			description
			"Indicates if the accept lifetime of the
			key-chain entry is currently active.";
			}
			}
	grouping key-chain-config {		grouping key-chain-common {
	description		description
	"key-chain configuration grouping.";		"key-chain common grouping.";
	uses key-chain-common;		leaf name {
	list key-chain-entries {		type string;
	key "key-id";		description
	description "One key.";		"Name of the key-chain.";
	leaf key-id {
	type uint64;
	description "Key ID.";
	}
	uses key-chain-config-entry;
	}
	}		}
	grouping key-chain-state {		leaf description {
			type string;
			description
			"A description of the key-chain";
			}
			container accept-tolerance {
			if-feature "accept-tolerance";
			description
			"Tolerance for key lifetime acceptance (seconds).";
			leaf duration {
			type uint32;
			units "seconds";
			default "0";
	description		description
	"key-chain state grouping.";		"Tolerance range, in seconds.";
	uses key-chain-common;		}
	leaf last-modified-timestamp {
	type yang:date-and-time;
	description "Timestamp of the most recent update
	to the key-chain";
	}
	list key-chain-entries {
	key "key-id";
	description "One key.";
	leaf key-id {
	type uint64;
	description "Key ID.";
	}
	uses key-chain-state-entry;
	}
	}		}
			}
	container key-chain {		grouping key-chain-config {
	list key-chain-list {		description
	key "name";		"key-chain configuration grouping.";
	description		uses key-chain-common;
	"List of key-chains.";		list key-entry {
	uses key-chain-config;		key "key-id";
	}		description
			"One key.";
	container aes-key-wrap {		leaf key-id {
	if-feature aes-key-wrap;		type uint64;
	description		description
	"AES Key Wrap password encryption.";		"Key ID.";
	leaf enable {		}
	type boolean;		uses key-common-entry;
	default false;
	description
	"Enable AES Key Wrap encryption.";
	}
	}
	description "All configured key-chains
	on the device.";
	}		}
			}
	container key-chain-state {		grouping key-chain-state {
	config false;		description
	list key-chain-list {		"key-chain state grouping.";
	key "name";		uses key-chain-common;
	description		leaf last-modified-timestamp {
	"List of key-chains and operational state.";		type yang:date-and-time;
	uses key-chain-state;		description
	}		"Timestamp of the most recent update to the key-chain";
	container aes-key-wrap {		}
	if-feature aes-key-wrap;		list key-entry-state {
	description		key "key-id";
	"AES Key Wrap password encryption.";		description
	leaf enable {		"One key.";
	type boolean;		leaf key-id {
	description		type uint64;
	"Indicates whether AES Key Wrap encryption		description
	is enabled.";		"Key ID.";
	}		}
	}		uses key-state-entry;
	description "State for all configured key-chains		}
	on the device.";		}
			container key-chains {
			description
			"All configured key-chains on the device.";
			list key-chain {
			key "name";
			description
			"List of key-chains.";
			uses key-chain-config;
			}
			container aes-key-wrap {
			if-feature "aes-key-wrap";
			description
			"AES Key Wrap password encryption.";
			leaf enable {
			type boolean;
			default "false";
			description
			"Enable AES Key Wrap encryption.";
			}
			}
			}
			container key-chains-state {
			config false;
			description
			"State for all configured key-chains on the device.";
			list key-chain-state {
			key "name";
			description
			"List of key-chains and operational state.";
			uses key-chain-state;
			}
			container aes-key-wrap {
			if-feature "aes-key-wrap";
			description
			"AES Key Wrap password encryption.";
			leaf enable {
			type boolean;
			description
			"Indicates whether AES Key Wrap encryption is enabled.";
			}
	}		}
			}
	}		}
	<CODE ENDS>		<CODE ENDS>
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	This document enables the automated distribution of industry standard		This document enables the automated distribution of industry standard
	key chains using the NETCONF [NETCONF] protocol. As such, the		key chains using the NETCONF [NETCONF] protocol. As such, the
	security considerations for the NETCONF protocol are applicable.		security considerations for the NETCONF protocol are applicable. The
	Given that the key chains themselves are sensitive data, it is		NETCONF protocol mandates confidentiality (section 2.2 of [NETCONF].
	RECOMMENDED that the NETCONF communication channel be encrypted. One		Similarily, the RESTCONF protocol also mandates confidentiality
	way to do accomplish this would be to invoke and run NETCONF over SSH		(section 1.1 of [RESTCONF]). If a transport not mandating
	as described in [NETCONF-SSH].		confidentiality is used, it is RECOMMENDED that the transport
			communication channel be encrypted.
	When configured, the key-strings can be encrypted using the AES Key		When configured, the key-strings can be encrypted using the AES Key
	Wrap algorithm [AES-KEY-WRAP]. The AES key-encryption key (KEK) is		Wrap algorithm [AES-KEY-WRAP]. The AES key-encryption key (KEK) is
	not included in the YANG model and must be set or derived independent		not included in the YANG model and must be set or derived independent
	of key-chain configuration.		of key-chain configuration.
	The key strings are not accessible by default and NETCONF Access		The key strings are not accessible by default and NETCONF Access
	Control Mode [NETCONF-ACM] rules are required to configure or		Control Mode [NETCONF-ACM] rules are required to configure or
	retrieve them.		retrieve them.
	The clear-text algorithm is included as a YANG feature. Usage is NOT		The clear-text algorithm is included as a YANG feature. Usage is NOT
	RECOMMENDED except in cases where the application and device have no		RECOMMENDED except in cases where the application and device have no
	other alternative (e.g., a legacy network device that must		other alternative (e.g., a legacy network device that must
	authenticate packets at intervals of 10 milliseconds or less for many		authenticate packets at intervals of 10 milliseconds or less for many
	peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used		peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used
	with the clear-text algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT		with the clear-text algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT
	be reused with more secure algorithms.		be reused with more secure algorithms.
			It is RECOMMENDED that keys be encrypted or otherwise obfuscated when
			stored internally on a network device supporting this specification.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry		This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry
	[XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in [XML-REGISTRY], the		[XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in [XML-REGISTRY], the
	following registration is requested to be made:		following registration is requested to be made:
	URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain		URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain
	Registrant Contact: The IESG.		Registrant Contact: The IESG.
	skipping to change at page 21, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 19, line 18 ¶
	[NETCONF] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.		[NETCONF] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
	Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC		Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC
	6241, June 2011.		6241, June 2011.
	[NETCONF-ACM]		[NETCONF-ACM]
	Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration		Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
	Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536, March		Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536, March
	2012.		2012.
	[NETCONF-SSH]
	Wasserman, M., "Using NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell
	(SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011.
	[RFC-KEYWORDS]		[RFC-KEYWORDS]
	Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFC's to Indicate		Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFC's to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[XML-REGISTRY]		[XML-REGISTRY]
	Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,		Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
	January 2004.		January 2004.
	[YANG] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the		[YANG] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
	Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,		Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
	skipping to change at page 22, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 19, line 49 ¶
	[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]		[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]
	Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang,		Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang,
	"Table of Cryptographic Keys", RFC 7210, April 2014.		"Table of Cryptographic Keys", RFC 7210, April 2014.
	[IAB-REPORT]		[IAB-REPORT]
	Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the		Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
	IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC		IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC
	4948, August 2007.		4948, August 2007.
	[NETCONF-SERVER-CONF]
	Watsen, K. and J. Schoenwaelder, "NETCONF Server and
	RESTCONF Server Configuration Models", draft-ietf-netconf-
	server-model-08.txt (work in progress), October 2015.
	[NTP-PROTO]		[NTP-PROTO]
	Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network		Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
	Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms		Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
	Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.		Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
	[OSPFV3-AUTH]		[OSPFV3-AUTH]
	Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting		Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting
	Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014.		Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014.
			[RESTCONF]
			Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
			Protocol", RFC 8040, January 2017.
	[TCP-AO] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP		[TCP-AO] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
	Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.		Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
	[TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]		[TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]
	Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms		Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
	for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,		for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
	June 2010.		June 2010.
	[YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]		[YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]
	Chen, I., "YANG Data Model for RFC 7210 Key Table", draft-		Chen, I., "YANG Data Model for RFC 7210 Key Table", draft-
	chen-rtg-key-table-yang-02.txt (work in progress),		chen-rtg-key-table-yang-00.txt (work in progress),
	November 2015.		November 2015.
	Appendix A. Acknowledgments		Appendix A. Examples
			A.1. Simple Key Chain with Always Valid Single Key
			<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
			<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
			<key-chains xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain">
			<key-chain>
			<name>keychain-no-end-time</name>
			<description>
			A key chain with a single key that is always valid for tx/rx
			</description>
			<key-entry>
			<key-id>100</key-id>
			<lifetime>
			<send-accept-lifetime>
			<always/>
			</send-accept-lifetime>
			</lifetime>
			<crypto-algorithm>md5</crypto-algorithm>
			<key-string>
			<keystring>keystring_in_ascii_100</keystring>
			</key-string>
			</key-entry>
			</key-chain>
			</key-chains>
			</data>
			A.2. Key Chain with Keys having Different Lifetimes
			<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
			<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
			<key-chains xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain">
			<key-chain>
			<name>keychain2</name>
			<description>
			A key chain where each key contains different send time
			and accept time
			</description>
			<key-entry>
			<key-id>35</key-id>
			<lifetime>
			<send-lifetime>
			<start-date-time>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time>
			<end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
			</send-lifetime>
			<accept-lifetime>
			<start-date-time>2016-12-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time>
			<end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time>
			</accept-lifetime>
			</lifetime>
			<crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-1</crypto-algorithm>
			<key-string>
			<keystring>keystring_in_ascii_35</keystring>
			</key-string>
			</key-entry>
			<key-entry>
			<key-id>36</key-id>
			<lifetime>
			<send-lifetime>
			<start-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time>
			<end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
			</send-lifetime>
			<accept-lifetime>
			<start-date-time>2017-01-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time>
			<end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time>
			</accept-lifetime>
			</lifetime>
			<crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-1</crypto-algorithm>
			<key-string>
			<hexadecimal-string>fe:ed:be:af:36</hexadecimal-string>
			</key-string>
			</key-entry>
			</key-chain>
			</key-chains>
			</data>
			A.3. Key Chain with Independent Send and Accept Lifetimes
			<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
			<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
			<key-chains xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain">
			<key-chain>
			<name>keychain2</name>
			<description>
			A key chain where each key contains different send time
			and accept time
			</description>
			<key-entry>
			<key-id>35</key-id>
			<lifetime>
			<send-lifetime>
			<start-date-time>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time>
			<end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
			</send-lifetime>
			<accept-lifetime>
			<start-date-time>2016-12-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time>
			<end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time>
			</accept-lifetime>
			</lifetime>
			<crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-1</crypto-algorithm>
			<key-string>
			<keystring>keystring_in_ascii_35</keystring>
			</key-string>
			</key-entry>
			<key-entry>
			<key-id>36</key-id>
			<lifetime>
			<send-lifetime>
			<start-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time>
			<end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
			</send-lifetime>
			<accept-lifetime>
			<start-date-time>2017-01-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time>
			<end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time>
			</accept-lifetime>
			</lifetime>
			<crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-1</crypto-algorithm>
			<key-string>
			<hexadecimal-string>fe:ed:be:af:36</hexadecimal-string>
			</key-string>
			</key-entry>
			</key-chain>
			</key-chains>
			</data>
			Appendix B. Acknowledgments
	The RFC text was produced using Marshall Rose's xml2rfc tool.		The RFC text was produced using Marshall Rose's xml2rfc tool.
	Thanks to Brian Weis for fruitful discussions on security		Thanks to Brian Weis for fruitful discussions on security
	requirements.		requirements.
	Thanks to Ines Robles for Routing Directorate QA review comments.		Thanks to Ines Robles for Routing Directorate QA review comments.
			Thanks to Ladislav Lhotka for YANG Doctor comments.
			Thanks to Martin Bjorklund for additional YANG Doctor comments.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Acee Lindem (editor)		Acee Lindem (editor)
	Cisco Systems		Cisco Systems
	301 Midenhall Way		301 Midenhall Way
	Cary, NC 27513		Cary, NC 27513
	USA		USA
	Email: acee@cisco.com		Email: acee@cisco.com
	skipping to change at page 23, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 23, line 39 ¶
	Huawei		Huawei
	Email: yingzhen.qu@huawei.com		Email: yingzhen.qu@huawei.com
	Derek Yeung		Derek Yeung
	Arrcus, Inc		Arrcus, Inc
	Email: derek@arrcus.com		Email: derek@arrcus.com
	Ing-Wher Chen		Ing-Wher Chen
	Ericsson		Jabil
	Email: ichen@kuatrotech.com
			Email: ing-wher_chen@jabil.com
	Jeffrey Zhang		Jeffrey Zhang
	Juniper Networks		Juniper Networks
	10 Technology Park Drive		10 Technology Park Drive
	Westford, MA 01886		Westford, MA 01886
	USA		USA
	Email: zzhang@juniper.net		Email: zzhang@juniper.net
	Yi Yang		Yi Yang
	SockRate		SockRate
	Email: yi.yang@sockrate.com		Email: yi.yang@sockrate.com
End of changes. 82 change blocks.
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