| < draft-ietf-savi-mix-09.txt | draft-ietf-savi-mix-10.txt > | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SAVI J. Bi | SAVI J. Bi | |||
| Internet-Draft Tsinghua Univ. | Internet-Draft Tsinghua Univ. | |||
| Intended status: Standards Track G. Yao | Intended status: Standards Track G. Yao | |||
| Expires: January 20, 2016 Baidu | Expires: May 18, 2016 Baidu | |||
| J. Halpern | J. Halpern | |||
| Newbridge | Newbridge | |||
| E. Levy-Abegnoli, Ed. | E. Levy-Abegnoli, Ed. | |||
| Cisco | Cisco | |||
| July 19, 2015 | November 15, 2015 | |||
| SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario | SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario | |||
| draft-ietf-savi-mix-09 | draft-ietf-savi-mix-10 | |||
| Abstract | Abstract | |||
| In case that multiple IP address assignment methods are allowed in a | In networks that use multiple techniques for address assignment, the | |||
| network, the corresponding SAVI methods should be enabled to prevent | appropriate Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) methods must | |||
| spoofing in the network. This document reviews how multiple SAVI | be used to prevent spoofing of addresses assigned by each such | |||
| methods can coexist in a single SAVI device and collisions are | technique. This document reviews how multiple SAVI methods can | |||
| resolved when the same binding entry is discovered by two or more | coexist in a single SAVI device and collisions are resolved when the | |||
| methods. | same binding entry is discovered by two or more methods. | |||
| Status of This Memo | Status of This Memo | |||
| This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the | This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the | |||
| provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. | provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. | |||
| Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | |||
| Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | |||
| working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | |||
| Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | |||
| Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | |||
| and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | |||
| time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | |||
| material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | |||
| This Internet-Draft will expire on January 20, 2016. | This Internet-Draft will expire on May 18, 2016. | |||
| Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
| Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
| document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
| This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
| Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | |||
| (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | |||
| publication of this document. Please review these documents | publication of this document. Please review these documents | |||
| skipping to change at page 2, line 16 ¶ | skipping to change at page 2, line 16 ¶ | |||
| to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must | to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must | |||
| include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of | include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of | |||
| the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as | the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as | |||
| described in the Simplified BSD License. | described in the Simplified BSD License. | |||
| Table of Contents | Table of Contents | |||
| 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | |||
| 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | |||
| 3. Problem Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | 3. Problem Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | |||
| 4. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | 4. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | |||
| 5. Recommendations for preventing collisions . . . . . . . . . . 5 | 5. Recommendations for preventing collisions . . . . . . . . . . 5 | |||
| 6. Resolving binding collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | 6. Resolving binding collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | |||
| 6.1. Same Address on Different Binding Anchors . . . . . . . . 5 | 6.1. Same Address on Different Binding Anchors . . . . . . . . 6 | |||
| 6.1.1. Basic preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | 6.1.1. Basic preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | |||
| 6.1.2. Overwritten preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | 6.1.2. Overwritten preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | |||
| 6.1.3. Multiple SAVI Device Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 6.1.3. Multiple SAVI Device Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | |||
| 6.2. Same Address on the Same Binding Anchor . . . . . . . . . 7 | 6.2. Same Address on the Same Binding Anchor . . . . . . . . . 8 | |||
| 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | |||
| 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | |||
| 9. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 9. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | |||
| 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | |||
| 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | |||
| 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | |||
| Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | |||
| 1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
| There are currently several SAVI documents ([RFC6620], [RFC7513] and | There are currently several Source Address Validaiton Improvement | |||
| [RFC7219]) that describe the different methods by which a switch can | (SAVI) documents ([RFC6620], [RFC7513] and [RFC7219]) that describe | |||
| discover and record bindings between a node's IP address and a | the different methods by which a switch can discover and record | |||
| binding anchor and use that binding to perform source address | bindings between a node's IP address and a binding anchor and use | |||
| validation. Each of these documents specifies how to learn on-link | that binding to perform source address validation. Each of these | |||
| addresses, based on the method used for their assignment, | documents specifies how to learn on-link addresses, based on the | |||
| respectively: StateLess Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), Dynamic Host | technique used for their assignment, respectively: StateLess | |||
| Control Protocol (DHCP) and Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND). Each | Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) and | |||
| of these documents describes separately how one particular method | Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND). Each of these documents describes | |||
| deals with address collisions (same address, different binding | separately how one particular SAVI method deals with address | |||
| anchor). | collisions (same address, different binding anchor). | |||
| While multiple IP assignment methods can be used in the same layer-2 | While multiple IP assignment techniques can be used in the same | |||
| domain, a SAVI device might have to deal with a mix of SAVI methods. | layer-2 domain, this means that a single SAVI device might have to | |||
| The purpose of this document is to provide recommendations to avoid | deal with a combination or mix of SAVI methods. The purpose of this | |||
| collisions and to review collisions handling when two or more such | document is to provide recommendations to avoid collisions and to | |||
| methods come up with competing bindings. | review collisions handling when two or more such methods come up with | |||
| competing bindings. | ||||
| 2. Requirements Language | 2. Requirements Language | |||
| The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", | The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", | |||
| "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this | "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this | |||
| document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. | document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. | |||
| 3. Problem Scope | 3. Problem Scope | |||
| Three different IP address assignment methods have been analyzed for | Three different IP address assignment techniques have been analyzed | |||
| SAVI: | for SAVI: | |||
| 1. StateLess Address AutoConfiguration (SLAAC) - analyzed in SAVI- | 1. StateLess Address AutoConfiguration (SLAAC) - analyzed in SAVI- | |||
| FCFS[RFC6620] | FCFS[RFC6620] | |||
| 2. Dynamic Host Control Protocol address assignment (DHCP) - | 2. Dynamic Host Control Protocol address assignment (DHCP) - | |||
| analyzed in SAVI-DHCP[RFC7513] | analyzed in SAVI-DHCP[RFC7513] | |||
| 3. Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) address assignment, analyzed in | 3. Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) address assignment, analyzed in | |||
| SAVI-SEND[RFC7219] | SAVI-SEND[RFC7219] | |||
| In addition, there is a fourth method for managing (i.e., creation, | In addition, there is a fourth technique for managing (i.e., | |||
| management, deletion) a binding on the switch, referred to as | creation, management, deletion) a binding on the switch, referred to | |||
| "manual". It is based on manual binding configuration and is | as "manual". It is based on manual binding configuration and is | |||
| analyzed in [RFC6620] and [RFC7039]. | analyzed in [RFC6620] and [RFC7039]. | |||
| All combinations of address assignment methods can coexist within a | All combinations of address assignment techniques can coexist within | |||
| layer-2 domain. A SAVI device MUST implement the corresponding | a layer-2 domain. A SAVI device MUST implement the corresponding | |||
| binding setup methods (referred to as a "SAVI method") to enable | binding setup methods (referred to as a "SAVI method") for each such | |||
| Source Address Validation. If more than one SAVI method is enabled | technique that is in use if it is to provide Source Address | |||
| on a SAVI device, the method is referred to as "mix address | Validation. If more than one SAVI method is enabled on a SAVI | |||
| assignment method" in this document. | device, the method is referred to as "mix address assignment method" | |||
| in this document. | ||||
| SAVI methods are independent from each other, each one handling its | SAVI methods are normally viewed as independent from each other, each | |||
| own entries. In the absence of reconciliation, each method will | one handling its own entries. If multiple methods are used in the | |||
| reject packets sourced with an address it did not discovered. To | same device without coordination, each method will attempt to reject | |||
| prevent addresses discovered by one method to be filtered out by | packets sourced with any addresses that method did not discover. To | |||
| another, the binding table should be shared by all the solutions. | prevent addresses discovered by one SAVI method from being filtered | |||
| However this could create some conflict when the same entry is | out by another method, the SAVI binding table should be shared by all | |||
| discovered by two different methods. The purpose of this document is | the SAVI methods in use in the device. This in turn could create | |||
| of two folds: provide recommendations and methods to avoid conflicts, | some conflict when the same entry is discovered by two different | |||
| and resolve conflicts if and when they happen. Collisions happening | methods. The purpose of this document is of two folds: provide | |||
| within a given method are outside the scope of this document. | recommendations and methods to avoid conflicts, and to resolve | |||
| conflicts when they happen. Collisions happening within a given | ||||
| method are outside the scope of this document. | ||||
| 4. Architecture | 4. Architecture | |||
| A SAVI device may enable multiple SAVI methods. This mechanism, | A SAVI device may implement ant use multiple SAVI methods. This | |||
| called SAVI-MIX, is proposed as a arbiter of the binding generation | mechanism, called SAVI-MIX, is proposed as a arbiter of the binding | |||
| algorithms, generating the final binding entries as illustrated in | generation algorithms from these multiple methods, generating the | |||
| Figure 1. Once a SAVI method generates a candidate binding, it will | final binding entries as illustrated in Figure 1. Once a SAVI method | |||
| request SAVI-MIX to set up a corresponding entry in the binding | generates a candidate binding, it will request SAVI-MIX to set up a | |||
| table. Then SAVI-MIX will check if there is any conflict in the | corresponding entry in the binding table. Then SAVI-MIX will check | |||
| binding table. A new binding will be generated if there is no | if there is any conflict in the binding table. A new binding will be | |||
| conflict. If there is a conflict, SAVI-MIX will determine whether to | generated if there is no conflict. If there is a conflict, SAVI-MIX | |||
| replace the existing binding or reject the candidate binding based on | will determine whether to replace the existing binding or reject the | |||
| the policies specified in Section 6. | candidate binding based on the policies specified in Section 6. | |||
| The packet filtering will not be performed by each SAVI method | As a result of this, the packet filtering in the SAVI device will not | |||
| separately. Instead, SAVI-MIX will perform filtering based on the | be performed by each SAVI method separately. Instead, the table | |||
| entries in the binding table. | resulting from applying SAVI-MIX will be used to perform filtering. | |||
| Thus the filtering is based on the combined results of the differents | ||||
| SAVI mechanisms. | ||||
| +--------------------------------------------------------+ | +--------------------------------------------------------+ | |||
| | | | | | | |||
| | SAVI Device | | | SAVI Device | | |||
| | | | | | | |||
| | | | | | | |||
| | +------+ +------+ +------+ | | | +------+ +------+ +------+ | | |||
| | | SAVI | | SAVI | | SAVI | | | | | SAVI | | SAVI | | SAVI | | | |||
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |||
| | | FCFS | | DHCP | | SEND | | | | | FCFS | | DHCP | | SEND | | | |||
| skipping to change at page 5, line 4 ¶ | skipping to change at page 5, line 38 ¶ | |||
| | | Table | | | | | Table | | | |||
| | +--------------+ | | | +--------------+ | | |||
| | | | | | | |||
| +--------------------------------------------------------+ | +--------------------------------------------------------+ | |||
| Figure 1: SAVI-Mix Architecture | Figure 1: SAVI-Mix Architecture | |||
| Each entry in the binding table will contain the following fields: | Each entry in the binding table will contain the following fields: | |||
| 1. IP source address | 1. IP source address | |||
| 2. Binding anchor | 2. Binding anchor | |||
| 3. Lifetime | 3. Lifetime | |||
| 4. Creation time | 4. Creation time | |||
| 5. Binding methods: the methods which request the binding setup. | 5. Binding methods: the SAVI method used for this entry. | |||
| 5. Recommendations for preventing collisions | 5. Recommendations for preventing collisions | |||
| If each solution has a dedicated address space, collisions won't | If each address assignment technique uses a separate portion of the | |||
| happen. Using non overlapping address space across SAVI solutions is | IP address space, collisions won't happen. Using non overlapping | |||
| therefore recommended. To that end, one should: | address space across address assignment techniques, and thus across | |||
| SAVI methods is therefore recommended. To that end, one should: | ||||
| 1. DHCP/SLAAC: use non-overlapping prefix for DHCP and SLAAC. Set | 1. DHCP/SLAAC: use non-overlapping prefix for DHCP and SLAAC. Set | |||
| the A bit in Prefix information option of Router Advertisement | the A bit in Prefix information option of Router Advertisement | |||
| for SLAAC prefix, and set the M bit in Router Advertisement for | for SLAAC prefix, and set the M bit in Router Advertisement for | |||
| DHCP prefix. For detail explanations on these bits, refer to | DHCP prefix. For detail explanations on these bits, refer to | |||
| [RFC4861][RFC4862]. | [RFC4861][RFC4862]. | |||
| 2. SeND/non-SeND: avoid mixed environment (where SeND and non-SeND | 2. SeND/non-SeND: avoid mixed environment (where SeND and non-SeND | |||
| nodes are deployed) or separate the prefixes announced to SeND | nodes are deployed) or separate the prefixes announced to SeND | |||
| and non-SenD nodes. One way to separate the prefixes is to have | and non-SenD nodes. One way to separate the prefixes is to have | |||
| the router(s) announcing different (non-overlapping) prefixes to | the router(s) announcing different (non-overlapping) prefixes to | |||
| SeND and to non-SeND nodes, using unicast Router | SeND and to non-SeND nodes, using unicast Router | |||
| Advertisements[RFC6085], in response to SeND/non-SeND Router | Advertisements[RFC6085], in response to SeND/non-SeND Router | |||
| Solicit. | Solicit. | |||
| 6. Resolving binding collisions | 6. Resolving binding collisions | |||
| In situations where collisions could not be avoided, two cases should | In situations where collisions can not be avoided by assignment | |||
| be considered: | separation, two cases should be considered: | |||
| 1. The same address is bound on two different binding anchors by | 1. The same address is bound on two different binding anchors by | |||
| different SAVI methods. | different SAVI methods. | |||
| 2. The same address is bound on the same binding anchor by different | 2. The same address is bound on the same binding anchor by different | |||
| SAVI methods. | SAVI methods. | |||
| 6.1. Same Address on Different Binding Anchors | 6.1. Same Address on Different Binding Anchors | |||
| This would typically occur in case assignment address spaces could | This would typically occur in case assignment address spaces could | |||
| not be separated. For instance, an address is assigned by SLAAC on | not be separated. For instance, an address is assigned by SLAAC on | |||
| node X, installed in the binding table using SAVI-FCFS, anchored to | node X, installed in the binding table using SAVI-FCFS, anchored to | |||
| "anchor-X". Later, the same address is assigned by DHCP to node Y, | "anchor-X". Later, the same address is assigned by DHCP to node Y, | |||
| and SAVI-DHCP will generate a candidate binding entry, anchored to | and SAVI-DHCP will generate a candidate binding entry, anchored to | |||
| "anchor-Y". | "anchor-Y". | |||
| 6.1.1. Basic preference | 6.1.1. Basic preference | |||
| The SAVI device must decide whom the address should be bound with | The SAVI device must decide to whom the address should be bound | |||
| (anchor-X or anchor-Y in this example). Current standard documents | (anchor-X or anchor-Y in this example). Current standard documents | |||
| of address assignment methods have implied the prioritization | of address assignment methods have implied the prioritization | |||
| relationship, i.e., first-come. | relationship based on order in time, i.e., first-come first-served. | |||
| 1. SLAAC: s5.4.5 of [RFC4862] | 1. SLAAC: s5.4.5 of [RFC4862] | |||
| 2. DHCPv4: s3.1-p5 of [RFC2131] | 2. DHCPv4: s3.1-p5 of [RFC2131] | |||
| 3. DHCPv6: s18.1.8 of [RFC3315] | 3. DHCPv6: s18.1.8 of [RFC3315] | |||
| 4. SeND: s8 of [RFC3971] | 4. SeND: s8 of [RFC3971] | |||
| In the absence of any configuration or protocol hint (see | In the absence of any configuration or protocol hint (see | |||
| Section 6.1.2) the SAVI device should choose the first-come binding | Section 6.1.2) the SAVI device should choose the first-come binding | |||
| anchor, whether it was learnt from SLAAC, SeND or DHCP. | anchor, whether it was learnt from SLAAC, SeND or DHCP. | |||
| 6.1.2. Overwritten preference | 6.1.2. Overwritten preference | |||
| skipping to change at page 6, line 43 ¶ | skipping to change at page 7, line 31 ¶ | |||
| should be given to the anchor that carries the CGA credentials once | should be given to the anchor that carries the CGA credentials once | |||
| they are verified, in particular the CGA parameters and the RSA | they are verified, in particular the CGA parameters and the RSA | |||
| options. Note that if an attacker was trying to replay CGA | options. Note that if an attacker was trying to replay CGA | |||
| credentials, he would then compete on the base of "First-Come, First- | credentials, he would then compete on the base of "First-Come, First- | |||
| Served" (FCFS) principle. | Served" (FCFS) principle. | |||
| 6.1.2.2. configuration preference | 6.1.2.2. configuration preference | |||
| For configuration driven exceptions, the SAVI device may allow the | For configuration driven exceptions, the SAVI device may allow the | |||
| configuration of a triplet ("prefix", "anchor", "method") or | configuration of a triplet ("prefix", "anchor", "method") or | |||
| ("address", "anchor", "method"), where at least one of ("anchor", | ("address", "anchor", "method"). The "prefix" or "address" | |||
| "method") should be specified. Later, if a DAD message is received | represents the address or address prefix to which this preference | |||
| with the following conditions verified: | entry applies. The "anchor" is the value of a know binding anchor | |||
| that this device expects to see using this address or addresses from | ||||
| this prefix. The "method" is the SAVI method that this device | ||||
| expects to use in validating address binding entries from the address | ||||
| or prefix. At least one of "anchor" and "method" MUST be specified. | ||||
| Later, if a DAD message is received with the following conditions | ||||
| verified: | ||||
| 1. The target in the DAD message does not exist in the binding table | 1. The target in the DAD message does not exist in the binding table | |||
| 2. The target is within configured "prefix" (or equal to "address") | 2. The target is within configured "prefix" (or equal to "address") | |||
| 3. The anchor bound to target is different from the configured | 3. The anchor bound to target is different from the configured | |||
| anchor, when specified | anchor, when specified | |||
| 4. The configured method, if any, is different from SAVI-FCFS | 4. The configured method, if any, is different from SAVI-FCFS | |||
| the switch should defend the address by responding to the DAD | The switch should defend the address by responding to the DAD | |||
| message, with a NA message or an ARP response, on behalf of the | message, with a NA message, on behalf of the target node. SeND nodes | |||
| target node. Plain NA will be replied to SeND DAD. SeND accepts | in the network MUST disable the option to ignore unsecured | |||
| plain NA for the first time (see s8 of [RFC3971]). The probability | advertisements (see s8 of [RFC3971]). If the option is enabled, the | |||
| for a SeND node to generate a colliding address more than one time is | case is outside the scope of this document. | |||
| trivial in practice, thus the response can effectively protect an | ||||
| existing binding. | ||||
| It should not at this point install the entry into the binding table. | It should not install the entry into the binding table. It will | |||
| It will simply prevent the node to assign the address, and will de- | simply prevent the node to assign the address, and will de-facto | |||
| facto prioritize the configured anchor. This is especially useful to | prioritize the configured anchor. This is especially useful to | |||
| protect well known bindings such as a static address of a server over | protect well known bindings such as a static address of a server over | |||
| anybody, even when the server is down. It is also a way to give | anybody, even when the server is down. It is also a way to give | |||
| priority to a binding learnt from SAVI-DHCP over a binding for the | priority to a binding learnt from SAVI-DHCP over a binding for the | |||
| same address, learnt from SAVI-FCFS. | same address, learnt from SAVI-FCFS. | |||
| 6.1.3. Multiple SAVI Device Scenario | 6.1.3. Multiple SAVI Device Scenario | |||
| A single SAVI device doesn't have the information of all bound | A single SAVI device doesn't have the information of all bound | |||
| addresses on the perimeter. Therefore it is not enough to lookup | addresses on the perimeter. Therefore it is not enough to lookup | |||
| local bindings to identify a collision. However, assuming DAD is | local bindings to identify a collision. However, assuming DAD is | |||
| skipping to change at page 8, line 6 ¶ | skipping to change at page 8, line 48 ¶ | |||
| 7. Security Considerations | 7. Security Considerations | |||
| SAVI MIX does not eliminate the security problems of each SAVI | SAVI MIX does not eliminate the security problems of each SAVI | |||
| method. Thus, the potential attacks, e.g., the DoS attack against | method. Thus, the potential attacks, e.g., the DoS attack against | |||
| the SAVI device resource, can still happen. In deployment, the | the SAVI device resource, can still happen. In deployment, the | |||
| security threats from each enabled SAVI methods should be prevented | security threats from each enabled SAVI methods should be prevented | |||
| by the corresponding proposed solutions in each document. | by the corresponding proposed solutions in each document. | |||
| SAVI MIX is only a binding setup/removal arbitration mechanism. It | SAVI MIX is only a binding setup/removal arbitration mechanism. It | |||
| does not introduce additional security threats only if the principle | does not introduce additional security threats if the principle of | |||
| of decision is reasonable. However, there is a slight problem. SAVI | decision is reasonable. However, there is a slight problem. SAVI | |||
| MIX is more tolerant about binding establish than each SAVI method | MIX is more tolerant about binding establishment than each SAVI | |||
| alone. As long as one of the enabled SAVI method generates a | method alone. As long as one of the enabled SAVI methods generates a | |||
| binding, the binding will be applied. As a result, the allowed | binding, the binding will be applied. As a result, the allowed | |||
| binding number limitation or allowed binding setup rate limitation | number of SAVI bindings or allowed SAVI binding setup rate will be | |||
| will be the sum of all the enabled SAVI methods. In deployment, | the sum of that of all the enabled SAVI methods. In deployment, | |||
| whether a SAVI device is capable to support that resource requirement | whether a SAVI device is capable of supporting the resulting resource | |||
| should be evaluated. | requirements should be evaluated. | |||
| 8. IANA Considerations | 8. IANA Considerations | |||
| This memo asks the IANA for no new parameters. | This memo asks the IANA for no new parameters. | |||
| 9. Acknowledgment | 9. Acknowledgment | |||
| Thanks to Christian Vogt, Eric Nordmark, Marcelo Bagnulo Braun and | Thanks to Christian Vogt, Eric Nordmark, Marcelo Bagnulo Braun and | |||
| Jari Arkko for their valuable contributions. | Jari Arkko for their valuable contributions. | |||
| 10. References | 10. References | |||
| 10.1. Normative References | 10.1. Normative References | |||
| [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate | [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate | |||
| Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. | Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, | ||||
| <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. | ||||
| [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", | [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", | |||
| RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997, | RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997, | |||
| <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>. | <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>. | |||
| [RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, | [RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, | |||
| C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol | C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol | |||
| for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July | for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July | |||
| 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>. | 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>. | |||
| End of changes. 29 change blocks. | ||||
| 104 lines changed or deleted | 117 lines changed or added | |||
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