< draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-10.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-11.txt >
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group S. Turner Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group S. Turner
Internet-Draft IECA, Inc. Internet-Draft IECA, Inc.
Updates: 6485 (if approved) July 20, 2015 Updates: 6485bis (if approved) August 6, 2015
Intended status: BCP Intended status: BCP
Expires: January 21, 2016 Expires: February 7, 2016
BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-10 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-11
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the algorithms, algorithms' parameters, This document specifies the algorithms, algorithms' parameters,
asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size and signature format used asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size and signature format used
in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document updates in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document updates
the Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource the Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6485). Public Key Infrastructure (draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis).
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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certificates [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], generating BGPsec Update certificates [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], generating BGPsec Update
messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and verifying BGPsec Update messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and verifying BGPsec Update
messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
This document is referenced by the BGPsec specification [ID.sidr- This document is referenced by the BGPsec specification [ID.sidr-
bgpsec-protocol] and the profile for BGPsec Router Certificates and bgpsec-protocol] and the profile for BGPsec Router Certificates and
Certification Requests [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]. Familiarity Certification Requests [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]. Familiarity
with these documents is assumed. Implementers are reminded, however, with these documents is assumed. Implementers are reminded, however,
that, as noted in Section 2 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], the that, as noted in Section 2 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], the
algorithms used to sign CA Certificates, BGPsec Router Certificates, algorithms used to sign CA Certificates, BGPsec Router Certificates,
and CRLs are found in [RFC6485]. and CRLs are found in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis].
This document updates [RFC6485] to add support for a) a different This document updates [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] to add support for a) a
algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are only issued by different algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are only
BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for issued by BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info
BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec format for BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified
signature algorithm; and, c) a different signature format for BGPsec BGPsec signature algorithm; and, c) a different signature format for
signatures, which is needed for the specified BGPsec signature BGPsec signatures, which is needed for the specified BGPsec signature
algorithm. The BGPsec certificate are differentiated from other RPKI algorithm. The BGPsec certificate are differentiated from other RPKI
certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage defined in certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage defined in
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]. [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
2. Algorithms 2. Algorithms
Four cryptographic algorithms are used to support BGPsec: Four cryptographic algorithms are used to support BGPsec:
o The signature algorithm used when issuing BGPsec certificates and o The signature algorithm used when issuing BGPsec certificates and
CRLs, which would revoke BGPsec certificates, MUST be as CRLs, which would revoke BGPsec certificates, MUST be as
specified in [RFC6485]. specified in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis].
o The signature algorithm used in certification requests and BGPsec o The signature algorithm used in certification requests and BGPsec
Update messages MUST be Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Update messages MUST be Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) [RFC6090]. Algorithm (ECDSA) [RFC6090].
o The hashing algorithm used when issuing certificates and CRLs o The hashing algorithm used when issuing certificates and CRLs
MUST be as specified in [RFC6485]. MUST be as specified in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis].
o The hashing algorithm use when generating certification requests o The hashing algorithm use when generating certification requests
and BGPsec Update messages MUST be SHA-256 [SHS]. Hash and BGPsec Update messages MUST be SHA-256 [SHS]. Hash
algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates, or algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates, or
BGPsec Update messages instead they are combined with the digital BGPsec Update messages instead they are combined with the digital
signature algorithm (see below). signature algorithm (see below).
NOTE: The exception to the above hashing algorithm is the use of NOTE: The exception to the above hashing algorithm is the use of
SHA-1 [SHS] when CAs generate authority and subject key SHA-1 [SHS] when CAs generate authority and subject key
identifiers [RFC6487]. identifiers [RFC6487].
To support BGPsec, the algorithms are identified as follows: To support BGPsec, the algorithms are identified as follows:
o In certificates and CRLs, an Object Identifier (OID) is used. o In certificates and CRLs, an Object Identifier (OID) is used.
The value and locations are as specified in section 2 of The value and locations are as specified in section 2 of
[RFC6485]. [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis].
o In certification request, an OID is used. The ecdsa-with-SHA256 o In certification request, an OID is used. The ecdsa-with-SHA256
OID [RFC5480] MUST appear in the PKCS #10 signatureAlgorithm OID [RFC5480] MUST appear in the PKCS #10 signatureAlgorithm
field [RFC2986] or in Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) field [RFC2986] or in Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
POPOSigningKey algoirthm field [RFC4211]. POPOSigningKey algoirthm field [RFC4211].
o In BGPsec Update messages, the ECDSA with SHA-256 Algorithm Suite o In BGPsec Update messages, the ECDSA with SHA-256 Algorithm Suite
Identifier from Section 7 is included in the Signature-Block Identifier from Section 7 is included in the Signature-Block
List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field. List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.
3. Asymmetric Key Format 3. Asymmetric Key Format
The RSA key pairs used to compute signatures on CA certificates, The RSA key pairs used to compute signatures on CA certificates,
BGPsec Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in section 3 of BGPsec Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in section 3 of
[RFC6485]. The remainder of this section addresses key formats found [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]. The remainder of this section addresses key
in the BGPsec router certificate requests and in BGPsec Router formats found in the BGPsec router certificate requests and in BGPsec
Certificates. Router Certificates.
The ECDSA key pairs used to compute signatures for certificate The ECDSA key pairs used to compute signatures for certificate
requests and BGPsec Update messages MUST come from the P-256 curve requests and BGPsec Update messages MUST come from the P-256 curve
[RFC5480]. The public key pair MUST use the uncompressed form. [RFC5480]. The public key pair MUST use the uncompressed form.
3.1. Public Key Format 3.1. Public Key Format
The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
[RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey. [RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.
The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow: The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:
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certificate's subjectPublicKey field, as specified in Section 2.2 certificate's subjectPublicKey field, as specified in Section 2.2
of [RFC5480]. of [RFC5480].
3.2. Private Key Format 3.2. Private Key Format
Local Policy determines private key format. Local Policy determines private key format.
4. Signature Format 4. Signature Format
The structure for the certificate's and CRL's signature field MUST be The structure for the certificate's and CRL's signature field MUST be
as specified in Section 4 of [RFC6485]. The structure for the as specified in Section 4 of [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]. The structure for
certification request's and BGPsec Update message's signature field the certification request's and BGPsec Update message's signature
MUST be as specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279]. field MUST be as specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279].
5. Additional Requirements 5. Additional Requirements
It is anticipated that BGPsec will require the adoption of updated It is anticipated that BGPsec will require the adoption of updated
key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over
time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic
security to protect the integrity of BGPsec. This profile should be security to protect the integrity of BGPsec. This profile should be
updated to specify such future requirements, when appropriate. updated to specify such future requirements, when appropriate.
CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of supporting a transition to allow for CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of supporting a transition to allow for
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previously specified algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs previously specified algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs
SHOULD be capable of supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key SHOULD be capable of supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key
profiles simultaneously within the scope of such anticipated profiles simultaneously within the scope of such anticipated
transitions. The recommended procedures to implement such a transitions. The recommended procedures to implement such a
transition of key sizes and algorithms is not specified in this transition of key sizes and algorithms is not specified in this
document. document.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC5480], [RFC6090], The Security Considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC5480], [RFC6090],
[RFC6485], and [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certificates. [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis], and [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to
The security considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC6485], certificates. The security considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090],
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certification requests. The [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis], [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to
security considerations of [RFC3279], [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and certification requests. The security considerations of [RFC3279],
[RFC6090] apply to BGPsec Update messages. No new security [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and [RFC6090] apply to BGPsec Update
considerations are introduced as a result of this specification. messages. No new security considerations are introduced as a result
of this specification.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is requested to define The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is requested to define
the "BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry" described below. the "BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry" described below.
An algorithm suite consists of a digest algorithm and a signature An algorithm suite consists of a digest algorithm and a signature
algorithm. This specification creates an IANA registry of one-octet algorithm. This specification creates an IANA registry of one-octet
BGPsec algorithm suite identifiers. Additionally, this document BGPsec algorithm suite identifiers. Additionally, this document
registers a single algorithm suite which uses the digest algorithm registers a single algorithm suite which uses the digest algorithm
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+----------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------------------------------------+
Future assignments are to be made using either the Standards Action Future assignments are to be made using either the Standards Action
process defined in [RFC5226], or the Early IANA Allocation process process defined in [RFC5226], or the Early IANA Allocation process
defined in [RFC7120]. Assignments consist of a digest algorithm defined in [RFC7120]. Assignments consist of a digest algorithm
name, signature algorithm name, and the algorithm suite identifier name, signature algorithm name, and the algorithm suite identifier
value. value.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Geoff Huston for producing [RFC6485], The author wishes to thank Geoff Huston for producing [ID.sidr-
which this document is heavily based on. I'd also like to thank rfc6485bis], which this document is heavily based on. I'd also like
Roque Gagliano for his review and comments. to thank Roque Gagliano for his review and comments.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
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Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, March 2009. Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011. Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, February 2012.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012. X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.
[RFC7120] Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code [RFC7120] Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, January 2014. Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, January 2014.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "FIPS [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "FIPS
Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard", FIPS Publication Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard", FIPS Publication
180-3, October 2008. 180-3, October 2008.
[ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] Huston, G., and G. Michaelson, "The Profile for
Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis, work-in-
progress.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M., "BGPsec Protocol [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in-
progress. progress.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "A Profile [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "A Profile
for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation
Lists, and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec- Lists, and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
pki-profiles, work-in-progress. pki-profiles, work-in-progress.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
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