< draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07.txt >
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft IPSw Internet-Draft IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner
Intended Status: Standards Track IECA Intended Status: Standards Track IECA
Expires: March 21, 2014 S. Kent Expires: September 27, 2014 S. Kent
BBN BBN
September 17, 2013 March 27, 2014
A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper
operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under
development as a component to address the requirement to provide development as a component to address the requirement to provide
security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a
protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the System (AS) or ASes. The certificate asserts that the router(s)
private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on holding the private key are authorized to send out secure route
behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the advertisements on behalf of the specified AS(es). This document also
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format
certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate
validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore, path validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI;
this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC therefore, this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates
6487). Profile (RFC 6487).
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE) This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE)
certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of
Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security
(BGPSEC) protocol. Such certificates are termed "BGPSEC Router (BGPSEC) protocol. Such certificates are termed "BGPSEC Router
Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a
BGPSEC Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route BGPSEC Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route
advertisements (BGPSEC UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS named in the advertisements (BGPSEC UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) named in the
certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to
its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain the specified AS its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain one or more of the
number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key property specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key
that BGPSEC will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH can property that BGPSEC will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH
verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the can verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the
advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH). advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH).
This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of
[RFC5280], and it updates [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements [RFC5280], and it updates [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements
imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPSEC Router imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPSEC Router
Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and
extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This
document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and
certification requests. Finally, this document specifies the Relying certification requests. Finally, this document specifies the Relying
Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures. Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures.
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Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests
and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPSEC Router and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPSEC Router
Certificate is only ever used to verify the signature on the BGPSEC Certificate is only ever used to verify the signature on the BGPSEC
certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a
BGPSEC Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPSEC routers BGPSEC Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPSEC routers
process these). process these).
Only the differences between this profile and the profile in Only the differences between this profile and the profile in
[RFC6487] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router Certificates are EE [RFC6487] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router Certificates are EE
certificates and as such there is no impact on process described in certificates and as such there is no impact on process described in
[ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]. [RFC6916].
3. Updates to [RFC6487] 3. Updates to [RFC6487]
3.1 BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields 3.1 BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields
A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and
only the differences between this profile and the profile in only the differences between this profile and the profile in
[RFC6487] are listed. [RFC6487] are listed.
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This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been
issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed
in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the
only common name encoding options that are supported are only common name encoding options that are supported are
printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router Certificates, it printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router Certificates, it
is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal
string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded
as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute
contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID)
encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If the same certificate is encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If there is more than one AS
issued to more than one router (hence the private key is shared among number, the choice of which to include in the common name is at the
these routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at discretion of the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more
the discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not than one router (hence the private key is shared among these
guaranteed to be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at the
name in a BGPSEC Router Certificate issued using this convention also discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not guaranteed to
is not guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject name in a BGPSEC
each certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject Router Certificate issued using this convention also is not
name that is unique within that context. guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, each
certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name
that is unique within that context.
3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info
Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].
3.1.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.1.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent, The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent,
if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where
explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a
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3.1.3.4. IP Resources 3.1.3.4. IP Resources
This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUSt be This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUSt be
omitted. omitted.
3.1.3.5. AS Resources 3.1.3.5. AS Resources
Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource
Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of
[RFC6487]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST [RFC6487]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST
include exactly one AS number, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be include one or more AS numbers, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be
specified. specified.
3.2. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile 3.2. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile
Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487]. The only differences between this Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487]. The only differences between this
profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are: profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are:
o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA
MUST honor the request; MUST honor the request;
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A bgpsec certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in A bgpsec certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in
[RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a [RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a
RP needs to identify the EKU before applying the correspondent RP needs to identify the EKU before applying the correspondent
validation. validation.
A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to
encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger BGPSEC encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger BGPSEC
security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC Signature- security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC Signature-
Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec- Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-
protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the secure protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the secure
binding of an AS number to a public key, consistent with the RPKI binding of one or more AS numbers to a public key, consistent with
allocation/assignment hierarchy. the RPKI allocation/assignment hierarchy.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
None. None.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
We would like to thanks Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert We would like to thanks Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert
Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In
addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were
skipping to change at page 9, line 10 skipping to change at page 9, line 14
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012. (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012. (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012.
[ID.sidr-algorithm-agility] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
"Algorithm Agility Procedure for RPKI", draft-ietf-sidr- Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
algorithm-agility, work-in-progress. (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, April 2013.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPSEC Protocol [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPSEC Protocol
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in-
progress. progress.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }
skipping to change at page 10, line 8 skipping to change at page 10, line 8
END END
Appendix B. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Appendix B. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate
Appendix C. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Appendix C. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Request
Appendix D. Change Log Appendix D. Change Log
Please delete this section prior to publication. Please delete this section prior to publication.
D.1. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.1. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-07
Added text to multiple AS numbers in a single certificate. Updated
reference to RFC 6916.
D.2. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-05 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-06
Keep alive version.
D.3. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-04 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-05
Keep alive version.
D.4. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-04 profiles-04
In s2.1, removed the phrase "another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only In s2.1, removed the phrase "another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only
BGPSEC routers process these)" because the BGPSEC certificates are BGPSEC routers process these)" because the BGPSEC certificates are
only ever EE certificates and they're never used to verify another only ever EE certificates and they're never used to verify another
certificate only the PDUs that are signed. certificate only the PDUs that are signed.
Added new s3.1.3.1 to explicitly state that EE certificates are only Added new s3.1.3.1 to explicitly state that EE certificates are only
ever EE certs. ever EE certs.
D.2. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.5. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-03 profiles-03
Updated s3.3 to clarifify restrictions on path validation procedures Updated s3.3 to clarifify restrictions on path validation procedures
are in this specification (1st para was reworded). are in this specification (1st para was reworded).
Updated s3.3 to point to s3.1.3.1 for BGPSEC EKU (thanks Tom). Updated s3.3 to point to s3.1.3.1 for BGPSEC EKU (thanks Tom).
D.3. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.6. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-02 profiles-02
Updated references. Updated references.
D.4. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.7. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-01 profiles-01
Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1. Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1.
D.5. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.8. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-00 profiles-00
Added this change log. Added this change log.
Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms
in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr- in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr-
rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs. rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs.
Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier
Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779. Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779.
D.6. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02 D.9. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02
Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the
procedures defined in [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]. procedures defined in [RFC6916].
Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC
certificates will not pass RPKI validation [RFC6487] and that keying certificates will not pass RPKI validation [RFC6487] and that keying
off the EKU will help tremendously. off the EKU will help tremendously.
D.7. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01 D.10. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01
Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI
certificates. certificates.
Removed sections and text that was already in [RFC6487]. This will Removed sections and text that was already in [RFC6487]. This will
make it easier for reviewers to figure out what is different. make it easier for reviewers to figure out what is different.
Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language. Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language.
Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the
 End of changes. 20 change blocks. 
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