< draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-13.txt >
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft IPSw Internet-Draft IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner
Intended status: BCP IECA Intended status: BCP IECA
Expires: April 16, 2016 S. Kent Expires: May 5, 2016 S. Kent
BBN BBN
October 14, 2015 November 2, 2015
A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-13
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
protocol known as BGPsec. BGP is a critical component for the proper known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPsec protocol is under Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec
development as a component to address the requirement to provide is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPsec is to design a requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to
protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure by this profile are issued (to routers within an Autonomous System).
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key
Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate.
System (AS) or ASes. The certificate asserts that the router(s) These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS
holding the private key are authorized to send out secure route Identifier Delegation extension. An EE certificate of this type
advertisements on behalf of the specified AS(es). This document also asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are
profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the
of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate AS(es) specified in the certificate. This document also profiles the
path validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP)
therefore, this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates.
Profile (RFC 6487). This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the
RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487).
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
skipping to change at page 2, line 47 skipping to change at page 2, line 48
3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE) This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE)
certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of
Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security
(BGPsec) protocol. Such certificates are termed "BGPsec Router protocol (BGPsec). Such certificates are termed "BGPsec Router
Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a
BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route
advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) named in the advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) named in the
certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to certificate. A router holding the private key is authorized to send
its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain one or more of the route advertisements (to its peers) that contain one or more of the
specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key
property that BGPsec will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH property provided by BGPsec is that every AS along the AS PATH can
can verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the
advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH). advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH).
This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of
[RFC5280], and it updates [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements [RFC5280]; thus this document [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements
imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPsec Router imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPsec Router
Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and
extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This
document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and document also profiles the certification requests used to acquire
certification requests. Finally, this document specifies the Relying BGPsec Router Certificates. Finally, this document specifies the
Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures. Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures for these
certificates.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates"
[RFC6487], "BGPsec Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], [RFC6487], "BGPsec Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol],
"A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security
Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating
the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4" the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4"
[RFC5492]. [RFC5492].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
2. Describing Resources in Certificates 2. Describing Resources in Certificates
Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the
products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification
Authority (CA) to a Regional Internet Registries (RIR). The RIR, in Authority (CA) certificate to each Regional Internet Registry (RIR).
turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service Providers (ISP). The RIR, in turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service
The ISP in turn issues End-Entity (EE) Certificates to itself as well Providers (ISP). The ISP in turn issues EE Certificates to itself to
as CRLs. These certificates are referred to as "Resource enable verification of signatures on RPKI signed objects. The CA also
Certificates", and are profiled in [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480] generate. The CA also generates CRLs. These CA and EE certificates
envisioned using Resource Certificates to generate Manifests are referred to as "Resource Certificates", and are profiled in
[RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. ROAs and [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480] envisioned using Resource Certificates to
Manifests also include the Resource Certificates used to sign them. enable verification of Manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. ROAs and Manifests include the
Resource Certificates used to verify them.
+---------+ +------+ +---------+ +------+
| CA Cert |---| IANA | | CA Cert |---| IANA |
+---------+ +------+ +---------+ +------+
\ \
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
| CA Cert |---| RIR | | CA Cert |---| RIR |
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
\ \
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
skipping to change at page 4, line 41 skipping to change at page 4, line 44
This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is
referred to as a "BGPsec Router Certificate". The purpose of this referred to as a "BGPsec Router Certificate". The purpose of this
certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of
appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPsec appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPsec
Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI
CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate
RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and
the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router
Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in
[ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]). The only impact is that the RPKI CAs will [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]). The only impact is that RPKI CAs will need to
need to be able to process a profiled certificate request (see be able to process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5)
Section 5) signed with algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. signed with algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of
The use of BGPsec Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that BGPsec Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process
process Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPsec Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPsec Router
Router Certificate is only ever used to verify the signature on the Certificate is used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec
BGPsec certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a
on a BGPsec Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec BGPsec Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers
routers process these). process these).
Only the differences between this profile and the profile in This document enumerates only the differences between this profile
[RFC6487] are listed. Note that BGPsec Router Certificates are EE and the profile in [RFC6487]. Note that BGPsec Router Certificates
certificates and as such there is no impact on process described in are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on process
[RFC6916]. described in [RFC6916].
3. Updates to [RFC6487] 3. Updates to [RFC6487]
3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields 3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields
A BGPsec Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, A BGPsec Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and
only the differences between this profile and the profile in only the differences between this profile and the profile in
[RFC6487] are listed. [RFC6487] are specified below.
3.1.1.1. Subject 3.1.1.1. Subject
This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been
issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed
in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the
only common name encoding options that are supported are only common name encoding options that are supported are
printableString and UTF8String. For BGPsec Router Certificates, it printableString and UTF8String. For BGPsec Router Certificates, it
is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal
string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded
skipping to change at page 6, line 25 skipping to change at page 6, line 25
extension. As specified in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked extension. As specified in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked
as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPsec Router as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPsec Router
Certificates: Certificates:
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 } id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }
Relying Parties MUST require the extended key usage extension to be A BGPsec router MUST require the extended key usage extension to be
present in a BGPsec Router Certificate. If multiple KeyPurposeId present in a BGPsec Router Certificate it receives. If multiple
values are included, the relying parties need not recognize all of KeyPurposeId values are included, the BGPsec routers need not
them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is present. BGPsec recognize all of them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is
RPs MUST reject certificates that do not contain the BGPsec Router present. BGPsec routers MUST reject certificates that do not contain
EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in the BGPsec Router EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage
[RFC5280]. OID defined in [RFC5280].
3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access 3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access
This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be
omitted. omitted.
3.1.3.4. IP Resources 3.1.3.4. IP Resources
This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be
omitted. omitted.
skipping to change at page 7, line 23 skipping to change at page 7, line 23
o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and, [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and,
o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr- o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr-
bgpsec-algs]. bgpsec-algs].
3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation 3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation
The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is
identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of
[RFC6487]. The exception is that the constraints applied come from [RFC6487], but using the constraints applied come from this
this specification (e.g., in step 3: the certificate contains all the specification. For example, in step 3: "the certificate contains all
field that must be present - refers to the fields that are required the field that must be present" - refers to the fields that are
by this specification). required by this specification.
The differences are as follows: The differences are as follows:
o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the BGPsec EKU defined in o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the BGPsec EKU defined in
Section 3.1.3.1. Section 3.1.3.1.
o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension. o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension.
o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource
extension. extension.
skipping to change at page 7, line 48 skipping to change at page 7, line 48
o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier
Delegation extension. Delegation extension.
o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key
Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [ID.sidr- Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [ID.sidr-
rfc6485bis]. rfc6485bis].
NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPsec routers are found NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPsec routers are found
in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms specified in in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms specified in
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] are different. BGPsec [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] are different. BGPsec
RPs will need to support algorithms that are needed to validate RPs will need to support algorithms that are used to validate BGPsec
BGPsec signatures as well as the algorithms that are needed to signatures as well as the algorithms that are needed to validate
validate signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI
RPKI CRLs. CRLs.
4. Design Notes 4. Design Notes
The BGPsec Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource The BGPsec Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource
Certificate profile as specified in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]. As a Certificate profile as specified in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]. As a
result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of the result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of the
design choices that were taken in that prior work. The reader is design choices that were taken in that prior work. The reader is
referred to [RFC6484] for a fuller discussion of those choices. referred to [RFC6484] for a fuller discussion of those choices.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply. The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply.
A BGPsec certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in A BGPsec Router Certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in
[RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a [RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a
RP needs to identify the EKU before applying the correspondent RP needs to identify the EKU to determine the appropriate Validation
validation. constraint.
A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to
encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger BGPsec encompass routers. It is a building block BGPsec and is used to
security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPsec Signature- validate signatures on BGPsec Signature-Segment origination of
Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec- Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential
protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the secure security function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to
binding of one or more AS numbers to a public key, consistent with a public key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment
the RPKI allocation/assignment hierarchy. hierarchy.
Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two
key identifiers extension included in BGPsec certificates. However key identifiers extension included in BGPsec certificates. However
as noted in [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required as noted in [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required
property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key
identifiers. Regardless, hash collisions are possible and if identifiers. Regardless, hash collisions are possible and if
detected the operator should be alerted. detected an operator should be alerted.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry
for PKIX. One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes for PKIX. One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes
from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id- from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id-
mod-bgpsec-eku). The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in mod-bgpsec-eku). The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in
Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for
PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned
before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA
allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in
those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor. those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert We would like to thank Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert
Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In
addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were
instrumental in preparing this work. Additionally, we'd like to instrumental in preparing this work. Additionally, we'd like to
thank Roque Gagliano, Sandra Murphy, Geoff Huston, Richard Hansen, thank Roque Gagliano, Sandra Murphy, Geoff Huston, Richard Hansen,
and David Mandelberg for their reviews and comments. David Mandelberg, and Sam Weiller for their reviews and comments.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
skipping to change at page 9, line 34 skipping to change at page 9, line 34
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012. X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.
[RFC6818] Yee, P., "Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC6818] Yee, P., "Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 6818, January 2013. (CRL) Profile", RFC 6818, January 2013.
[ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] G. Huston, "The Profile for Algorithms and Key [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] G. Huston and G. Michaelson, "The Profile for
Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key
draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis, work-in-progress. Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis, work-in-
progress.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, &
Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs, work-in- Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs, work-in-
progress. progress.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
RFC 4272, January 2006. RFC 4272, January 2006.
[RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the
Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008. Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008.
skipping to change at page 11, line 9 skipping to change at page 12, line 9
-- BGPsec Router Extended Key Usage -- -- BGPsec Router Extended Key Usage --
id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 } id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }
END END
Appendix B. Change Log Appendix B. Change Log
Please delete this section prior to publication. Please delete this section prior to publication.
B.0 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-11 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.0 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-13
Minor modifications to address WGLC comments.
B.1 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-11 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-12 profiles-12
Added security consideration to address SKI collisions. Also updated Added security consideration to address SKI collisions. Also updated
the IANA considerations section. the IANA considerations section.
B.1 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-10 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.2 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-10 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-11 profiles-11
Removed text in s3.1.3. Consistently used BGPsec to refer to BGP Removed text in s3.1.3. Consistently used BGPsec to refer to BGP
Security. Fixed typos. Refer to RFC6485bis instead of RFC6485. Security. Fixed typos. Refer to RFC6485bis instead of RFC6485.
Included OIDs. Included OIDs.
B.2. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-09 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.3. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-09 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-10 profiles-10
Updated dates. Updated dates.
B.3. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-08 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.4. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-08 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-09 profiles-09
Editorial fixes for the sake of brevity. Editorial fixes for the sake of brevity.
B.4. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.5. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-08 profiles-08
Fixed section numbering. Fixed section numbering.
B.5. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.6. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-07 profiles-07
Added text to multiple AS numbers in a single certificate. Updated Added text to multiple AS numbers in a single certificate. Updated
reference to RFC 6916. reference to RFC 6916.
B.6. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-05 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.7. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-05 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-06 profiles-06
Keep alive version. Keep alive version.
B.7. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-04 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.8. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-04 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-05 profiles-05
Keep alive version. Keep alive version.
B.8. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.9. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-04 profiles-04
In s2.1, removed the phrase "another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only In s2.1, removed the phrase "another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only
BGPSEC routers process these)" because the BGPSEC certificates are BGPSEC routers process these)" because the BGPSEC certificates are
only ever EE certificates and they're never used to verify another only ever EE certificates and they're never used to verify another
certificate only the PDUs that are signed. certificate only the PDUs that are signed.
Added new s3.1.3.1 to explicitly state that EE certificates are only Added new s3.1.3.1 to explicitly state that EE certificates are only
ever EE certs. ever EE certs.
B.9. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.10. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-03 profiles-03
Updated s3.3 to clarify restrictions on path validation procedures Updated s3.3 to clarify restrictions on path validation procedures
are in this specification (1st para was reworded). are in this specification (1st para was reworded).
Updated s3.3 to point to s3.1.3.1 for BGPSEC EKU (thanks Tom). Updated s3.3 to point to s3.1.3.1 for BGPSEC EKU (thanks Tom).
B.10. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.11. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-02 profiles-02
Updated references. Updated references.
B.11. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.12. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-01 profiles-01
Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1. Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1.
B.12. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- B.13. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-00 profiles-00
Added this change log. Added this change log.
Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms
in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr- in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr-
rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs. rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs.
Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier
Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779. Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779.
B.13. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02 B.14. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02
Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the
procedures defined in [RFC6916]. procedures defined in [RFC6916].
Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC
certificates will not pass RPKI validation [RFC6487] and that keying certificates will not pass RPKI validation [RFC6487] and that keying
off the EKU will help tremendously. off the EKU will help tremendously.
B.14. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01 B.15. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01
Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI
certificates. certificates.
Removed sections and text that was already in [RFC6487]. This will Removed sections and text that was already in [RFC6487]. This will
make it easier for reviewers to figure out what is different. make it easier for reviewers to figure out what is different.
Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language. Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language.
Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the
skipping to change at page 13, line 37 skipping to change at page 14, line 42
Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com
Sean Turner Sean Turner
IECA, Inc. IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031 Fairfax, VA 22031
USA USA
EMail: turners@ieca.com EMail: turners@ieca.com
Steve Kent Stephen Kent
Raytheon BBN Technologies Raytheon BBN Technologies
10 Moulton St. 10 Moulton St.
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138
Email: kent@bbn.com Email: kent@bbn.com
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