< draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-19.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-20.txt >
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft IPSw Internet-Draft IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner
Intended status: Standard Track sn3rd Intended status: Standard Track sn3rd
Expires: July 3, 2017 S. Kent Expires: July 8, 2017 S. Kent
BBN BBN
December 30, 2016 January 4, 2017
A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-19 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-20
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec
is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to
provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued (to routers within an Autonomous System). by this profile are issued to routers within an Autonomous System.
Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate. Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate.
These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS
Identifier Delegation extension. An EE certificate of this type Identifier Delegation extension. An EE certificate of this type
asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are
authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the
AS(es) specified in the certificate. This document also profiles the AS(es) specified in the certificate. This document also profiles the
format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP) format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP)
certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates. certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates.
This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the
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working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . 6 3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . 5
3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.4. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.4. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.5. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.5. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI . . 8 3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI . . 7
4. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE) This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE)
certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of
Autonomous System (AS) paths in the BGPsec. Such certificates are Autonomous System (AS) paths in the BGPsec. Such certificates are
termed "BGPsec Router Certificates". The holder of the private key termed "BGPsec Router Certificates". The holder of the private key
associated with a BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send associated with a BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send
secure route advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) secure route advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es)
named in the certificate. A router holding the private key is named in the certificate. A router holding the private key is
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certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of
appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPsec appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPsec
Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI
CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate
RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and
the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router
Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in
[RFC7935]). The only impact is that RPKI CAs will need to be able to [RFC7935]). The only impact is that RPKI CAs will need to be able to
process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) signed with process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) signed with
algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of BGPsec Router algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. BGPsec Router
Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests and Certificates are used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec
ROAs because the public key found in the BGPsec Router Certificate is certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a
used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec certificate request BGPsec Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers
(only CAs process these) and the signature on a BGPsec Update Message process these); BGPsec Router Certificates are not used to process
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers process these). Manifests and ROAs or verify signatures on Certificates or CRLs.
This document enumerates only the differences between this profile This document enumerates only the differences between this profile
and the profile in [RFC6487]. Note that BGPsec Router Certificates and the profile in [RFC6487]. Note that BGPsec Router Certificates
are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on process are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on process
described in [RFC6916]. described in [RFC6916].
3. Updates to [RFC6487] 3. Updates to [RFC6487]
3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields 3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields
A BGPsec Router Certificate is consistent with the profile in A BGPsec Router Certificate is consistent with the profile in
[RFC6487] as modified by the specifications in this section. As [RFC6487] as modified by the specifications in this section. As
such, it is a valid X.509 public key certificate and consistent with such, it is a valid X.509 public key certificate and consistent with
the PKIX profile [RFC5280]. The differences between this profile and the PKIX profile [RFC5280]. The differences between this profile and
the profile in [RFC6487] are specified in this section. the profile in [RFC6487] are specified in this section.
3.1.1. Subject 3.1.1. Subject
This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been Common name encoding options that are supported are printableString
issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed and UTF8String. For BGPsec Router Certificates, it is RECOMMENDED
in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the that the common name attribute contain the literal string "ROUTER-"
only common name encoding options that are supported are followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded as eight
printableString and UTF8String. For BGPsec Router Certificates, it hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute contain the
is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) encoded as
string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded eight hexadecimal digits. If there is more than one AS number, the
as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute choice of which to include in the common name is at the discretion of
contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more than one router
encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If there is more than one AS (hence the private key is shared among these routers), the choice of
number, the choice of which to include in the common name is at the the router ID used in this name is at the discretion of the Issuer.
discretion of the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more
than one router (hence the private key is shared among these
routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at the
discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not guaranteed to
be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject name in a BGPsec
Router Certificate issued using this convention also is not
guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, each
certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name
that is unique to that CA context.
3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info
Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].
3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints
BGPsec speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension BGPsec speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension
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extension. extension.
o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier
Delegation extension. Delegation extension.
o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the subjectPublicKeyInfo o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the subjectPublicKeyInfo
described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].
NOTE: BGPsec RPs will need to support the algorithms in [ID.sidr- NOTE: BGPsec RPs will need to support the algorithms in [ID.sidr-
bgpsec-algs], which are used to validate BGPsec signatures, as well bgpsec-algs], which are used to validate BGPsec signatures, as well
as the algorithms in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis], which are needed to as the algorithms in [RFC7935], which are needed to validate
validate signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI
RPKI CRLs. CRLs.
3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI 3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI
As described in Section 1, the primary function of BGPsec route As described in Section 1, the primary function of BGPsec route
certificates in the RPKI is for use in the context of certification certificates in the RPKI is for use in the context of certification
of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the BGPsec protocol. of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the BGPsec protocol.
The private key associated with a router EE certificate may be used The private key associated with a router EE certificate may be used
multiple times in generating signatures in multiple instances of the multiple times in generating signatures in multiple instances of the
BGPsec_Path Attribute Signature Segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. BGPsec_Path Attribute Signature Segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
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A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to
encompass routers. It is a building block BGPsec and is used to encompass routers. It is a building block BGPsec and is used to
validate signatures on BGPsec Signature-Segment origination of validate signatures on BGPsec Signature-Segment origination of
Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential
security function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to security function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to
a public key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment a public key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment
hierarchy. hierarchy.
Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two
key identifier extensions included in BGPsec certificates. However key identifier extensions (i.e., Subject Key Identifier and Issuer
as noted in [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required Key Identifier) included in BGPsec certificates. However as noted in
property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required property of one-way
identifiers. Regardless, hash collisions are unlikely, but they are hash functions when used to generate key identifiers. Regardless,
possible and if detected an operator should be alerted. A subject hash collisions are unlikely, but they are possible and if detected
key identifier collision might cause the incorrect certificate to be an operator should be alerted. A subject key identifier collision
selected from the cache, resulting in a failed signature validation. might cause the incorrect certificate to be selected from the cache,
resulting in a failed signature validation.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry
for PKIX. One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes for PKIX. One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes
from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id- from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id-
mod-bgpsec-eku). The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in mod-bgpsec-eku). The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in
Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for
PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned
before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA
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