< draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-05.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-06.txt >
SIDR G. Huston SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans
Expires: August 28, 2007 APNIC Expires: October 12, 2007 APNIC
February 24, 2007 April 10, 2007
A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-05.txt draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-06.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 28, 2007. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2007.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use"
of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
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3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8
3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 17 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 18
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Example Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers.
These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to
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the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in
the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the
certificate's issuer. certificate's issuer.
In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number
resources within this context, it is intended that Resource resources within this context, it is intended that Resource
Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the
public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a
number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an
entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource
Certificate. This Certificate is issued by the number registry, and Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and
the subject's public key that is being certified by the Issuer the subject's public key that is being certified by the Issuer
corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair
that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the
number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the
certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or
assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public
number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI
structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one
'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificated from a 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a
"Root" Certificate Authority to a valid certificate. Certificate Authority operating at the apex of a resource
distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate.
Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can
be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject certificate be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject certificate
chain from a trust anchor certificate authority to the certificate chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor Certificate
[RFC4158], with the additional constraint of ensuring that each Authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional
subject's listed resources are fully encompassed by those of the constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully
issuer at each step in the issuer-subject chain. encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject
chain.
Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of
secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an
IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol,
to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related
use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects, use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects,
validation of routing requests, and detection of potential validation of routing requests, and detection of potential
unauthorised used of IP addresses. unauthorised used of IP addresses.
This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
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the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the
certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a
resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set") that must resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set") that must
encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this
context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be
the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set.
A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a
sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the
subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next
certificate in the sequence) from one, and only one, trust anchor to certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate
the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource
this certificate sequence from the trust anchor to the certificate extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's
form a sequence of encompassing relationships. issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence
of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in
the resource extension.
3. Resource Certificate Fields 3. Resource Certificate Fields
A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields
listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL,
all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST
NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value
is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource
Certificates. Certificates.
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The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per
Issuer. Issuer.
3.3. Signature Algorithm 3.3. Signature Algorithm
This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with
RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 11 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055].
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be
taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
3.4. Issuer 3.4. Issuer
This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
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with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the
CA's certificate. CA's certificate.
3.8. Subject Public Key Info 3.8. Subject Public Key Info
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and,
accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is
1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024
bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that
certificates that are intended to be used as root certificates, and the key size of keys that are intended to be used at the apex of a
their immediate subordinates SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 certificate issuance hierarchy, and their immediate subordinates,
bits. Immediate subordinates of these certificates, when used in the SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. Immediate subordinates
context of continued level of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key of these certificates, when used in the context of continued levels
size of 2048 bits. of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits.
In the application of this profile to certification of public number In the application of this profile to certification of public number
resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the
Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits, and that Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits, and that
their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key
size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key
size of 1024 bits. size of 1024 bits.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be
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The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280]. described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280].
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by
providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate
path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource
Certificates. The keyIdentifier subfield MUST be present in all Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all
Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-
signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and
authorityCertSerialNumber subfields MUST NOT be present. This authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This
extension is non-critical. extension is non-critical.
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].
3.9.4. Key Usage 3.9.4. Key Usage
This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical
extension, and it MUST be present. extension, and it MUST be present.
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3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points
This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile
uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access
mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.
In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
implying at the CRLIssuer subfield MUST be omitted, and the implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the
distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield distributionPoint sub field MUST be present. The Reasons sub field
MUST be omitted. MUST be omitted.
The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT
contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST
be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified
to be all certificates issued by this issuer. The sequence of to be all certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key
distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single pair. The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a
DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain single DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY
more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the contain more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the
DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of
this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs
MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI.
This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one
exception; where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a
"self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted.
3.9.6. Authority Information Access 3.9.6. Authority Information Access
This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the
certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA,
where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a
single reference object to publication location of the immediate single reference object to publication location of the immediate
superior certificate MUST be used. superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA
distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
certificate, the authority key identifier SHOULD be omitted.
This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred
URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST
reference the point of publication of the certificate where this reference the point of publication of the certificate where this
issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate).
Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension. included in the value sequence of this extension.
When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate,the subordinate When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate
certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA
field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-
issuance in and of itself implies a requirement to re-issue all issuance in and of itself implies a requirement to re-issue all
subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a
persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies
that re-issued certificates overwrite prevously issued certificates that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates
to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously
issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can
maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due
solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers' solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers'
policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued
certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice
Statement. Statement.
Alternatively, if the certificate issuer does not maintain a Alternatively, if the certificate issuer does not maintain a
persistent URL for the must recent issued certificate for each persistent URL for the must recent issued certificate for each
subject, then the entity who is subject of a certificate MAY keep the subject, then the entity who is subject of a certificate MAY keep the
most recent copy of the superior's issued certificate in the most recent copy of the superior's issued certificate in the
subject's publication space, and set the AIA to reference this subject's publication space, and set the AIA to reference this
subject-maintained copy of the immediate superior certificate. subject-maintained copy of the immediate superior certificate.
In the case of self-signed certificates that undertake the role of a This extension is non-critical.
"root" trust anchor within a certificate hierarchy the AIA extension
field SHOULD be omitted. In all other cases this field MUST be
present, and is non-critical.
3.9.7. Subject Information Access 3.9.7. Subject Information Access
This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services
relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension
appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information
and service collection will include all current valid certificates and service collection will include all current valid certificates
that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
subject's corresponding private key. subject's corresponding private key.
This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The
preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be
specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the
subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an
object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a
trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the
same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this
extension. extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence reflect the
subject's relative preferences for access methods, with the first
method in the sequence being the most preferred.
This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-
critical. critical.
For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this
field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references
the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the
End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad- End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad-
signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity
and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a
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include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
extensions. extensions.
This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile
Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be
"all certificates issued by this CA". The contents of the CRL are a "all certificates issued by this CA using a given key pair". The
list of all non-expired certificates issued by the CA that have been contents of the CRL are a list of all non-expired certificates issued
revoked by the CA. by the CA using a given key pair that have been revoked by the CA.
An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
validity period. validity period.
This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.
The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with
different scope by a single CA. different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the
key pair used by the CA.
No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs
issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields
MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a
single CA are present in a certificate repository, the CRL with the single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the
highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA.
issued by this CA.
4.1. Version 4.1. Version
Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
integer value of this field is 1). integer value of this field is 1).
4.2. Issuer Name 4.2. Issuer Name
The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is
also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in
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4.4. Next Update 4.4. Next Update
This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued.
The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through
the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in
the year 2050 or later. the year 2050 or later.
4.5. Signature 4.5. Signature
This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. The This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This
signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA. This field MUST be profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
present. (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA-
512. This field MUST be present.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CRL Issuer and replying parties, indicating that care should
be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
4.6. Revoked Certificate List 4.6. Revoked Certificate List
When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
list MUST be absent. list MUST be absent.
For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST
be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile,
and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.
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identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier
method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].
This extension is non-critical. This extension is non-critical.
4.7.2. CRL Number 4.7.2. CRL Number
The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence
number of positive integers for a given CA. This extension allows number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension
users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes another allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes
CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs
by the CA within the scope of this profile. issued by the CA with the same scope.
This extension is non-critical. This extension is non-critical.
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile
A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). There is no requirement
for a CA Issuer to support both request formats, and the choice of
formats is a matter for the Issuer and Subject to resolve.
5.1. PCKS#10 Profile 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile
This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to
Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object,
formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority
as the initial step in issuing a certificate. as the initial step in issuing a certificate.
This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.
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The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest
attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3
Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate
requests is specified in Section 5.3. requests is specified in Section 5.3.
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:
signatureAlgorithm signatureAlgorithm
Must be SHA-256 with RSA encryption (sha256WithRSAEncryption). This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be the OID value (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 }
[RFC4055].
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive
for both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should
be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
5.2. CRMF Profile 5.2. CRMF Profile
This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in
issuing a certificate. issuing a certificate.
This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
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It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211]
is that the Authenticator Control field be used. is that the Authenticator Control field be used.
[Note - not for publication: The method of generation and [Note - not for publication: The method of generation and
authentication of this field is not specified in this document. authentication of this field is not specified in this document.
It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have
securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the
Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The
desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject
and the authenticity of the provided public key.] and the authenticity of the provided public key. An alternative
is to remove this control field from this profile and defer
Resource Class authentication of the request to some unspecified external
The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate mechanism.]
Requests, namely a Resource Class control.
The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by
the CA to which the request refers. The CA will issue a
certificate with the IP Address and AS Number resources that match
the subject's right-of-use of these resources within the class of
resources specified by the Resource Class control value.
[Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource
class is related the various forms of resource allocation which
imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing
validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the
entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single
'upstream' issuing registry. Due to this consideration it may not
be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing
resource set. Alternatively it is possible to define a structure
where there is no Resource Class specified and the issuer issues a
set of spanning certificates for all resources held by the subject
(i.e. all resources that fall under the subject's "right-of-use")]
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests
This profile allows the following extensions to appear in a PKCS#10 The following extensions may appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate
and CRMF Certificate Request: Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on
these extensions.:
BasicConstraints BasicConstraints
If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA. If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA.
The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource
Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit
is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
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This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
AuthorityKeyIdentifier AuthorityKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
KeyUsage KeyUsage
The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and
CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the
BasicConstraints SubjectType subfield, when specified. BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified.
SubjectInformationAccess SubjectInformationAccess
This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the field
issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to
set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the
Certificate Request.
If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single
RSYNC URI that references a single publication point that will be
used by the subject for all certificates that published by the
subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the
CA.
If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and
then the CA MUST generate a URI value for the services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the
SubjectInformationAccess field based on out-of-band information SIA extension appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile,
that has been passed between the CA and the requester. this information and service collection will include all current
valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that are
signed with the subject's corresponding private key.
[Note not for publication - if this field is missing than it is This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The
also an option for the Issuer to deny the request and not issue a preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST
certificate if the issued certificate was to have the CA bit set.] be specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository
when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI MUST
reference an object collection rather than an individual object
and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs
that reference the same location MAY also be included in the value
sequence of this extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence
reflect the subject's relative preferences for access methods,
with the first method in the sequence being the most preferred by
the Subject.
SubjectAlternateName SubjectAlternateName
This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the
SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate.
CRLDistributionPoints CRLDistributionPoints
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
AuthorityInformationAccess AuthorityInformationAccess
This field is assigned by the CA and MAY be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MAY be omitted in this
profile. If specified the CA MAY choose to use this value as the profile. If specified the CA MAY choose to use this value as the
AIA field. AIA field.
SubjectInformationAccess
This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA
issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit
set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning.
If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single
rsync URL that references a single publication point that will be
used by the subject for all certificates that published by the
subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the
CA.
If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning
then the CA MUST generate a SIA URL based on out-of-band
information that has been passed between the CA and the requester.
[Note not for publication - the same considerations with respect
to the CRL DistributionPoints apply to this field as well. i.e. if
this field is missing than it is also an option for the Issuer to
deny the request and not issue a certificate if the issued
certificate was to have the CA bit set.]
CertificatePolicies CertificatePolicies
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
SubjectAlternateName
This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the
SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate.
IPResources IPResources
This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and
shall be intereted as a request to certify all IP Resources shall be interpreted as a request to certify all IP Resources
assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If
present, this is to be interepreted as the maximal set of IP present, this is to be interpreted as the maximal span of IP
Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to
the the certified IP Resource set based on the IP Resources the certified IP Resource set based on the IP Resources assigned
assigned to the request under this CA. to the requestor under this CA.
ASResources ASResources
This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and
shall be intereted as a request to certify all AS Resources shall be interpreted as a request to certify all AS Resources
assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If
present, this is to be interepreted as the maximal set of AS present, this is to be interpreted as the maximal span of AS
Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to
the the certified IP Resource set based on the AS Resources the certified AS Resource set based on the AS Resources assigned
assigned to the request under this CA. to the requestor under this CA.
With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the
alter any requested field. SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any
requested field.
6. Resource Certificate Validation 6. Resource Certificate Validation
This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
This refines the generic procedure described insection 6 of This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of
[RFC3280]: [RFC3280]:
To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions: certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
issuer of certificate x+1; issuer of certificate x+1;
2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;
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down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from
a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct
recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these
recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform
further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in
that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has
only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e.
there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and
corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct
or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in
question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The only exception to the question (i.e. no loops in the model).
"no loop" condition would be where a putative trust anchor may issue
a self-signed root certificate.
The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor is The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor CA
a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the resource is a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the
certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of trust resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of
models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional caveat on trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional
the general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX
that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor, the sequence of frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust
certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource
property, as described in Section 6.2. extension validation property, as described in Section 6.2, and the
validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only
involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust
anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the
certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource
set, as described in Section 6.2.
The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust
anchor, includes the following:
1. the trusted issuer name,
2. the trusted public key algorithm,
3. the trusted public key,
4. optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the
public key, and
5. a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6
resources and AS number resources.
The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing
procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate.
6.2. Resource Extension Validation 6.2. Resource Extension Validation
The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical
extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded
representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a
prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set.
Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS
number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource
Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This
validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource
sets: sets:
more specific Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A more specific: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges,
and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP
addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is
larger than range A. larger than range A.
equal Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, equal: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B,
A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same
collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B.
The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this
"equality" comparison. "equality" comparison.
encompass Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X encompass: Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X
"encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or
AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more
specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the
set X. set X.
Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an
ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is a trust ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is issued by
anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the subject of a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the
certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, implies that subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1,
the resources described in certificate 'x', for 'x' is greater than implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass"
1, "encompass" the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1. the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources
described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources
described in certificate 1.
6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation
Validation of signed resource data using a target resource Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or
'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a
anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the
following conditions hold: target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions
hold:
1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and
the signature algorithm the signature algorithm
2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and
To values. To values.
3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and
contains field values as specified in this profile for all field contains field values as specified in this profile for all field
values that MUST be present. values that MUST be present.
4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the
certificate. certificate.
5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the
certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate
Revocation List, and the CRL is itself valid. Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself
valid.
6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource
extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer
is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence)
7. The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there 7. The Certificate Path originates with a certificate issued by a
exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the
Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the Certificate Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the
Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path. Certificate Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the
Certificate Path.
A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any
chosen order. chosen order.
Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally
maintained repository, maintained by a regular top-down maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization
synchronization pass from the Root Trust Anchors via reference to pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource
Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus distribution hierarchy, via reference to Issued certificates and
the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed using a their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively,
bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the AIA and validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line
CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process. certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the
certificate retrieval process.
There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator.
Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation
process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts
to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of
Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if
the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration
parameter. parameter.
7. Example Use Cases 7. Security Considerations
[1 - signing a Route Registry Object] [2 - signing a Route
Origination Authority - note validity time] [3 - performing a
resource (sub) allocation - An example of this in situations where
there are contractual period differences between the entity and its
resource supplier, and the entity and its resource allocation
subjects.]
8. Security Considerations The Security Considerations of [RFC3280] and [RFC3779]apply to
Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use.
[To be completed] A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms
of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in
the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same
resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the
status of resource allocations and assignments then the information
conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the
allocation and assignment databases.
9. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
considerations stated in this version of the document.] considerations stated in this version of the document.]
10. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo
Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of
this document. this document.
11. Normative References 10. Normative References
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981. September 1981.
[RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
skipping to change at page 26, line 38 skipping to change at page 26, line 39
92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03: 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03:
d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87: d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87:
24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27: 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27:
03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7
RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537 RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537
Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE
Subject Info Access: Subject Info Access:
caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ/
Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign
CRL Distribution Points: CRL Distribution Points:
rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
Authority Info Access: caIssuers - Authority Info Access: caIssuers -
rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.cer
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02: ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02:
51:c2:a9:1c 51:c2:a9:1c
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24, IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24,
203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23 203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23
IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32 IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32
ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370 ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370
Signature: Signature:
c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b: c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b:
4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59: 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59:
0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2: 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2:
 End of changes. 72 change blocks. 
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