< draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-06.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-07.txt >
SIDR G. Huston SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans
Expires: October 12, 2007 APNIC Expires: December 31, 2007 APNIC
April 10, 2007 June 29, 2007
A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-06.txt draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-07.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
skipping to change at page 1, line 35 skipping to change at page 1, line 35
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2007. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2007.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use"
of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization
of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-
use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the
associated Resource Certificate. issued Resource Certificate.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8
3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 18 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 18
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers.
These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to
the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and also conform to the constraints the PKIX profile [RFC3280], and also conform to the constraints
specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the
issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of
IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers. IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers.
A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer
that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject
of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of
the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in
the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the
certificate's issuer. certificate's issuer.
In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number
resources within this context, it is intended that Resource resources within this context, it is intended that Resource
Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the
public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a
number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an
entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource
Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and
the subject's public key that is being certified by the Issuer the subject's public key that is being certified by the issuer
corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair
that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the
number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the
certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or
assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public
number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI
structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one
'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a
Certificate Authority operating at the apex of a resource certificate authority operating at the apex of a resource
distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate. distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate.
Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can
be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject certificate be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate
chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor Certificate chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certificate
Authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional
constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully
encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject
chain. certificate chain.
Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of
secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an
IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol,
to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of
use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects, routing information. Related use contexts include validation of
validation of routing requests, and detection of potential Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests,
unauthorised used of IP addresses. and detection of potential unauthorised use of IP addresses.
This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to
this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
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2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource
set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix
masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile
MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in
the resource extension field. the resource extension field.
3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate
validity includes the condition that the resources described in validity includes the condition that the resources described in
the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the
certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a
resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set") that must resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set") that must
encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this
context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be
the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set.
A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a
sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the
subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next
certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate
authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource
extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's
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3.3. Signature Algorithm 3.3. Signature Algorithm
This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with
RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055].
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken
taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
3.4. Issuer 3.4. Issuer
This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of
the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the
issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the
immediate superior certificate. immediate superior certificate.
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In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information
that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
other than the current time. other than the current time.
Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a
certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity
interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the
issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is
anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate anticipated that a CA may have valid grounds to issue a certificate
with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the
CA's certificate. CA's certificate.
3.8. Subject Public Key Info 3.8. Subject Public Key Info
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and,
accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is
1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024
bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that
the key size of keys that are intended to be used at the apex of a the key size of keys that are intended to be used at the apex of a
certificate issuance hierarchy, and their immediate subordinates, certificate issuance hierarchy, and their immediate subordinates,
SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. Immediate subordinates SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. Immediate subordinates
of these certificates, when used in the context of continued levels of these certificates, when used in the context of continued levels
of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits.
In the application of this profile to certification of public number In the application of this profile to certification of public number
resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the
Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits, and that Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits in their
their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key issued certificates, and that their immediate subordinate certificate
size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key authorities also use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate
size of 1024 bits. certificates MAY use a key size of 1024 bits.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken
taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate
is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate-
using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical
extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension
MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280]. MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280].
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
Resource Certificate. Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise.
3.9.1. Basic Constraints 3.9.1. Basic Constraints
The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
paths that include this certificate. paths that include this certificate.
The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit
is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue
resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the
subject is permitted be a CA). subject is permitted be a CA).
The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
NOT be present. NOT be present.
The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present. Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is
a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise.
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate
certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all
Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical.
The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in
the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
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3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points
This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile
uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access
mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.
In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the
distributionPoint sub field MUST be present. The Reasons sub field distributionPoint sub-field MUST be present. The Reasons sub-field
MUST be omitted. MUST be omitted.
The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT
contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST
be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified
to be all certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key to be all certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key
pair. The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a pair. The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a
single DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY single DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY
contain more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the contain more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the
DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of
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URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST
reference the point of publication of the certificate where this reference the point of publication of the certificate where this
issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate).
Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension. included in the value sequence of this extension.
When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate
certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA
field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-
issuance in and of itself implies a requirement to re-issue all issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all
subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a
persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies
that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates
to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously
issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can
maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due
solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers' solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers'
policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued
certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice
Statement. Statement.
Alternatively, if the certificate issuer does not maintain a
persistent URL for the must recent issued certificate for each
subject, then the entity who is subject of a certificate MAY keep the
most recent copy of the superior's issued certificate in the
subject's publication space, and set the AIA to reference this
subject-maintained copy of the immediate superior certificate.
This extension is non-critical. This extension is non-critical.
3.9.7. Subject Information Access 3.9.7. Subject Information Access
This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services
relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension
appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information
and service collection will include all current valid certificates and service collection will include all current valid certificates
that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
subject's corresponding private key. subject's corresponding private key.
This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The
preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be
specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the
subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an
object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a
trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the trailing '/' in the URI.
same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this
extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence reflect the Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be
subject's relative preferences for access methods, with the first included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of
method in the sequence being the most preferred. URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for
access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most
preferred.
This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-
critical. critical.
For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this
field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references
the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the
End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad- End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad-
signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity
and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a
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An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
validity period. validity period.
This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.
The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with
different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the
key pair used by the CA. key pair used by the CA.
No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs
issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields
MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a
single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the
"CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA. "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA.
4.1. Version 4.1. Version
Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
integer value of this field is 1). integer value of this field is 1).
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the year 2050 or later. the year 2050 or later.
4.5. Signature 4.5. Signature
This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This
profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
(sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA- (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA-
512. This field MUST be present. 512. This field MUST be present.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CRL Issuer and replying parties, indicating that care should both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should
be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
4.6. Revoked Certificate List 4.6. Revoked Certificate List
When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
list MUST be absent. list MUST be absent.
For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST
be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile,
and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.
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This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:
signatureAlgorithm signatureAlgorithm
This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA
(sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 }
[RFC4055]. [RFC4055].
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive
for both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should
be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
5.2. CRMF Profile 5.2. CRMF Profile
This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in
issuing a certificate. issuing a certificate.
This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a subject. (RA), acting under the direction of a subject.
With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
certificate.. certificate.
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:
Version Version
This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version
3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted.
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securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the
Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The
desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject
and the authenticity of the provided public key. An alternative and the authenticity of the provided public key. An alternative
is to remove this control field from this profile and defer is to remove this control field from this profile and defer
authentication of the request to some unspecified external authentication of the request to some unspecified external
mechanism.] mechanism.]
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests
The following extensions may appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate
Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate
Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on
these extensions.: these extensions.:
BasicConstraints BasicConstraints
If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA. If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity
certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the
issued certificate.
The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource
Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit
is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
resource certificates within this overall framework. resource certificates within this overall framework.
The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity
certificate request). certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity
certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension.
SubjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
AuthorityKeyIdentifier AuthorityKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
KeyUsage KeyUsage
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SubjectAlternateName SubjectAlternateName
This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the
SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate.
CRLDistributionPoints CRLDistributionPoints
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
AuthorityInformationAccess AuthorityInformationAccess
This field is assigned by the CA and MAY be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. If specified the CA MAY choose to use this value as the profile.
AIA field.
CertificatePolicies CertificatePolicies
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
IPResources
This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and
shall be interpreted as a request to certify all IP Resources
assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If
present, this is to be interpreted as the maximal span of IP
Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to
the certified IP Resource set based on the IP Resources assigned
to the requestor under this CA.
ASResources
This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and
shall be interpreted as a request to certify all AS Resources
assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If
present, this is to be interpreted as the maximal span of AS
Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to
the certified AS Resource set based on the AS Resources assigned
to the requestor under this CA.
With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the
SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any
requested field. requested field.
6. Resource Certificate Validation 6. Resource Certificate Validation
This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of
[RFC3280]: [RFC3280]:
To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions: certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
issuer of certificate x+1; issuer of certificate x+1;
2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;
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1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and
the signature algorithm the signature algorithm
2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and
To values. To values.
3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and
contains field values as specified in this profile for all field contains field values as specified in this profile for all field
values that MUST be present. values that MUST be present.
4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is
certificate. present in the certificate.
5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the
certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate
Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself
valid. valid.
6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource
extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer
is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence)
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pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource
distribution hierarchy, via reference to Issued certificates and distribution hierarchy, via reference to Issued certificates and
their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively,
validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line
certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the
certificate retrieval process. certificate retrieval process.
There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator.
Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certificate path
process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated
to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that
Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a
the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration validation failure if the certificate path length exceeds a pre-
parameter. determined configuration parameter.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC3280] and [RFC3779]apply to The Security Considerations of [RFC3280] and [RFC3779]apply to
Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use. Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use.
A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms
of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in
the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same
resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the
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