< draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-00.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-01.txt >
Individual Submission G. Huston Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Informational APNIC Intended status: Informational APNIC
Expires: February 8, 2009 August 7, 2008 Expires: April 9, 2009 October 6, 2008
Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate
PKI PKI
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-00.txt draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-01.txt
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in
the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to
fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain
routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal
deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of
BGP. BGP.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Decoupled Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Decoupled Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Linked Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Linked Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . 6 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . 6
3.1. Using Validation Outcomes to reject BGP advertisements . . 7 3.1. Validation Outcomes and Rejection of BGP Route Objects . . 9
4. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 11 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origination of routes Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origination of routes
advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271]. advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271].
The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates
are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280],
and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]. and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779].
A Resource Certificate describes an action by an Issuer that binds a A Resource Certificate describes an action by an issuer that binds a
list of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the list of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the
Subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the Subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the
Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource
Certificate. The PKI is structured such that each current Resource Certificate. The PKI is structured such that each current Resource
Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment. Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment.
This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that
bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
skipping to change at page 4, line 40 skipping to change at page 4, line 40
the route object either exactly matches an ROAIPAddress (matching the route object either exactly matches an ROAIPAddress (matching
both the address prefix value and the prefix length), or where the both the address prefix value and the prefix length), or where the
route object spans a block of addresses that is included in the span route object spans a block of addresses that is included in the span
described by the ROA's address prefix value and length and where the described by the ROA's address prefix value and length and where the
route object's prefix length is less than the ROA's prefix length and route object's prefix length is less than the ROA's prefix length and
greater then or equal to the ROA's corresponding maxLength attribute. greater then or equal to the ROA's corresponding maxLength attribute.
The following outcomes are possible using the defined ROA validation The following outcomes are possible using the defined ROA validation
procedure for each ROA in this set: procedure for each ROA in this set:
o An "exact match" is a valid ROA where the address prefix in the Exact Match:
route object exactly matches a prefix listed in the ROA and the A valid ROA exists, where the address prefix in the route object
origin AS in the route object matches the origin AS listed in the exactly matches a prefix listed in the ROA, or the ROA contains a
ROA. covering aggregate and the prefix length of the route object is
smaller than or equal to the ROA's associated maxLength attribute,
and the origin AS in the route object matches the origin AS listed
in the ROA.
o A "covering match" is a valid ROA where the address prefix in the Covering Match:
ROA is a covering aggregate of the prefix in the route object, and A valid ROA exists, where an address prefix in the ROA is a
the prefix length of the route object is greater than or equal to covering aggregate of the prefix in the route object, and the
the ROA's maxLength attribute, and the origin AS in the route prefix length of the route object is greater than the ROA's
associated maxLength attribute, and the origin AS in the route
object matches the AS listed in the ROA. object matches the AS listed in the ROA.
o An "exact mismatch" is a ROA where the address prefix in the route Exact Mismatch:
object exactly matches a prefix listed in the ROA and the origin A valid ROA exists where the address prefix in the route object
AS of the route object does not match the AS listed in the ROA. exactly matches a prefix listed in the ROA, or the ROA contains a
covering aggregate and the prefix length of the route object is
smaller than or equal to the ROA's associated maxLength attribute,
and the origin AS of the route object does not match the AS listed
in the ROA.
o A "covering mismatch" is a ROA where the address prefix in the ROA Covering Mismatch:
is a covering aggregate of the prefix in the route object, the A valid ROA exists where an address prefix in the ROA is a
prefix length of the route object is greater than or equal to the covering aggregate of the prefix in the route object, the prefix
ROA's maxLength attribute, and the origin AS of the route object length of the route object is greater than the ROA's associated
does not match the AS listed in the ROA. maxLength attribute, and the origin AS of the route object does
not match the AS listed in the ROA.
o "ROA missing" is where there are no exact or covering matches, no No ROA:
exact or covering mismatches and no exact of covering failures in There are no Exact Matches, Covering Matches, no Exact Mismatches
the RPKI repository. or Covering Mismatches in the RPKI repository.
In this case the ROA that would be used for the validation function The ROA to be used for the validation function is selected from the
is selected from the set such that the most specific valid ROA that set of ROAs in the order given above. In other words an Exact Match
matches or covers the route object address prefix and where the route is preferred over a Covering Match, which, in turn, is preferred over
object origin AS matches the ROA AS. If there is no such ROA in the an Exact Mismatch which is preferred over a Covering Mismatch.
set, then the most specific valid ROA is selected. If there is no
such ROA in the set then the most specific ROA is selected.
The set of BOAs that are used in validation are composed of the set The set of BOAs that are used for the validation function are
of valid BOAs where the origin AS matches an AS described in a BOA, composed of the set of valid BOAs where the origin AS of the route
or where the BOA's address prefix is an exact match or a covering object matches an AS described in a BOA, or where an address prefix
aggregate of the route object. In the case that the validation in a valid BOA that is an exact match or a covering aggregate of the
outcome using ROAs is one of ("exact mismatch", "covering mismatch" route object. In the case that the validation outcome using ROAs is
or "ROA missing"), then the validation outcome of the BOA changes the one of Exact Mismatch, Covering Mismatch or No ROA, then the
overall validation result to "bogon match". validation outcome of the BOA changes the overall validation result
to "Bogon".
Bogon:
A valid BOA exists where an address prefix in the BOA is a an
exact match for the prefix in the route object, or is a covering
aggregate of the prefix in the route object, or an AS in the BOA
matches the originating AS in the BOA. In addition, there is no
valid ROA that is an Exact Match or a Covering Match with the
route object.
2.2. Linked Validation 2.2. Linked Validation
The linked approach requires the route object to reference a ROA The linked approach requires the route object to reference a ROA
either by inclusion of the ROA as an attribute of the route object, either by inclusion of the ROA as an attribute of the route object,
or inclusion of a identity field in an attribute of the route object or inclusion of a identity field in an attribute of the route object
as a means of identifying a particular ROA. The relying party will as a means of identifying a particular ROA.
still need check for BOAs that refer to this route object in the case
that an exact match or a covering match is not present. The set of
possible outcomes of linked validation is as follows:
o "exact match"
o "covering match"
o "exact mismatch" If the ROA can be located is valid within the context of the RPKI
then the route object can be compared against the ROA, as per the
previous section, giving one of five possible results: Exact Match,
Covering Match, Exact Mismatch, Covering Mismatch, and No Match,
which is defined as:
o "covering mismatch" No Match:
o "bogon match" The valid ROA does not comtain any address prefix that exactly
matches the address prefix in the route object, or is a covering
aggregate of the address prefix in the route object.
o "ROA missing" In the case of a Mismatch or a No Match condition, the relying party
should check for the presence of valid BOAs where the origin AS of
the route object matches an AS described in a BOA, or where an
address prefix in a valid BOA that is an exact match or a covering
aggregate of the route object. If a valid BOA can be found that
matches either of these conditions that the overall route object
validation of a route object with a linked ROA is changed to "Bogon".
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection
Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a
received prefix announcement from a peer is compared to all received prefix announcement from a peer is compared to all
announcements for this prefix received from other peers and a route announcements for this prefix received from other peers and a route
selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object from selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object from
this candidate set which is then used locally by placing it in the this candidate set which is then used locally by placing it in the
loc-RIB, and is announced to peers as the local "best" route. loc-RIB, and is announced to peers as the local "best" route.
It is proposed that the validation outcome be used as part of the It is proposed here that the validation outcome be used as part of
determination of the local degree of preference as defined in section the determination of the local degree of preference as defined in
9.1.1 of the BGP specification [RFC4271]. section 9.1.1 of the BGP specification [RFC4271].
In the case of partial deployment of ROAs there are a very limited In the case of partial deployment of ROAs there are a very limited
set of circumstances where the outcome of ROA validation can be used set of circumstances where the outcome of ROA validation can be used
as grounds to reject all consideration of the route object as an as grounds to reject all consideration of the route object as an
invalid advertisement. While the presence of a valid ROA that invalid advertisement. While the presence of a valid ROA that
matches the advertisement is a strong indication that an matches the advertisement is a strong indication that an
advertisement matches the authority provided by the prefix holder to advertisement matches the authority provided by the prefix holder to
advertise the prefix into the routing system, the absence of a ROA or advertise the prefix into the routing system, the absence of a ROA or
the invalidity of a covering ROA does not provide a conclusive the invalidity of a covering ROA does not provide a conclusive
indication that the advertisement has been undertaken without the indication that the advertisement has been undertaken without the
address holder's permission, unless the object is described in a BOA. address holder's permission, unless the object is described in a BOA.
In the case of a partial deployment scenario or RPKI route In the case of a partial deployment scenario of RPKI route
attestation objects, when some prefixes are described in ROAs or BOAs attestation objects, where some address prefixes and AS numbers are
and others are not, then the relative ranking of validation outcomes described in ROAs or BOAs and others are not, then the relative
from the highest (most preferred) to the lowest (least preferred) ranking of validation outcomes from the highest (most preferred) to
degree of preference are proposed as follows: the lowest (least preferred) degree of preference are proposed to be
as specified int he following list. The exact values to apply to a
Local Preference setting are left as a matter of local policy and
local configuration.
1. "exact match" 1. Exact Match
An exact match indicates that the prefix has been allocated and The prefix has been allocated and is routeable, and that the
is routeable, and that the prefix right-of-use holder has prefix right-of-use holder has authorized the originating AS to
authorized the originating AS to originate precisely this originate precisely this announcement.
announcement.
2. "covering match" 2. Covering Match
A covering match is slightly less preferred because it is This is slightly less preferred because it is possible that the
possible that the address holder of the aggregate has allocated address holder of the aggregate has allocated the prefix in
the prefix in question to a different party, and both the question to a different party. It is also possible that the
aggregate address holder and the prefix holder have signed ROAs originating AS is using more specific advertisements as part of a
and are advertising the prefix. traffic engineering scenario.
3. "ROA missing" 3. No ROA
In the case of partial deployment of ROAs the absence of In the case of partial deployment of ROAs, the absence of
validation credentials is neutral, in that there is no grounds to validation credentials is a neutral outcome, in that there is no
increase or decrease the relative degree of preference for the grounds to increase or decrease the relative degree of preference
prefix. for the route object.
4. "covering mismatch" 4. Covering Mismatch
A covering mismatch is considered to be less preferable than a A Covering Mismatch is considered to be less preferable than a
neutral position in that the address holder of a covering neutral position in that the address holder of a covering
aggregate has indicated an originating AS that is not the aggregate has indicated an originating AS that is not the
originating AS of this announcement. On the other hand it may be originating AS of this announcement. On the other hand it may be
the case that this prefix has been validly allocated to another the case that this prefix has been validly allocated to another
party who has not generated a ROA for this prefix even through party who has not generated a ROA for this prefix even through
the announcement is valid. the announcement is valid.
5. An "exact mismatch" 5. Exact Mismatch
Here the exact match prefix holder has validly provided an Here the exact match prefix holder has validly provided an
authority for origination by an AS that is not the AS that is authority for origination by an AS that is not the AS that is
originating this announcement. This would appear to be a bogus originating this announcement. This would appear to be a bogus
announcement by inference. announcement by inference.
6. "bogon match" 6. No Match
Here the route object has referenced a ROA that is not valid, or
does not include an address prefix that matcehs the route object,
or the referenced ROA could not be located. This could be an
attempt to create a false route object and use an invalid ROA.
7. Bogon
Here the right-of-use holder of the AS or address prefix has Here the right-of-use holder of the AS or address prefix has
explicitly tagged the address prefix or the AS as a "bogon". explicitly tagged the address prefix or the AS as a "bogon".
This implies that the announcement has been made without the This implies that the announcement has been made without the
appropriate authority, and the prefix should be ranked at a level appropriate authority, and the local preference of the route
commensurate with rejecting the route object. object should be ranked at a level commensurate with rejecting
the route object.
In the case of comprehensive deployment of ROAs the absence of a In the case of comprehensive deployment of RPKI route attestion
specific origination authority for the route object should render it objects the absence of a specific ROA origination authority for the
as an unusable for routing. In this case the relative degree of route object should render it as an unusable for routing. In this
preference the relative local degree of preference can be adjusted case the local preference setting for the route object is as follows:
such that cases 3 through 5 of the above list have an equal level of
lesser preference.
3.1. Using Validation Outcomes to reject BGP advertisements 1. Exact Match
The use of a validation outcome of a missing ROA, or a covering or The prefix has been allocated and is routeable, and that the
exact mismatch as sufficient grounds to reject a route object should prefix right-of-use holder has authorized the originating AS to
be undertaken with care. The consideration here is one of potential originate precisely this announcement.
circularity of dependence. If the authoritative publication point of
the repository of ROAs or any certificates used to related to an
address prefix is stored at a location that lies within the address
prefix described in a ROA, then the repository can only be accessed
once a route for the prefix has been accepted. It is also noted that
the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the
propagation time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may
be received before the relying party's local repository cache picks
up the associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.
For these reasons it is proposed that even in the case of 2. Covering Match, No ROA, Covering Mismatch, Exact Mismatch, No
comprehensive deployment of ROAs a missing ROA or a mismatch should Match
The local preference of the route object should be ranked at a
level of least preferred, due to the constraints noted in the
following section.
3. Bogon
Here the right-of-use holder of the AS or address prefix has
explicitly tagged the address prefix or the AS as a "bogon".
This implies that the announcement has been made without the
appropriate authority, and the local preference of the route
object should be ranked at a level commensurate with rejecting
the route object.
3.1. Validation Outcomes and Rejection of BGP Route Objects
In the case of comprehensive deployment of ROAs, the use of a
validation outcome other than an Exact Match as sufficient grounds to
reject a route object should be undertaken with care.
The consideration here is one of potential circularity of dependence.
If the authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs or
any certificates used in relation to an address prefix is stored at a
location that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then
the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has
been accepted by the local routing domain. It is also noted that the
propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation
time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may be received
before the relying party's local repository cache picks up the
associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.
For these reasons it is proposed that, even in the case of
comprehensive deployment of ROAs, a missing ROA or a mismatch should
not be considered as sufficient grounds to reject a route not be considered as sufficient grounds to reject a route
advertisement. advertisement outright. Alternate approaches may involve the use of
a local timer to accept the route for an interim period of time until
there is an acceptable level of assurance that all reasonable efforts
to local a valid ROA have been undertaken.
4. Open Issues 4. Further Considerations
This document provides a description of how ROAs and BOAs could be This document provides a description of how ROAs and BOAs could be
used by a BGP speaker. used by a BGP speaker.
It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the
operation of BGP. operation of BGP.
It is also noted that the decoupled and linked approach are not It is also noted that the decoupled and linked approach are not
mutually exclusive, and the same procedure can be applied to route mutually exclusive, and the same procedure can be applied to route
objects that contain an explicit pointer to the associated ROA and objects that contain an explicit pointer to the associated ROA and
route objects where the local BGP speaker has to create a set of route objects where the local BGP speaker has to create a set of
candidate ROAs that could be applied to a route object. However, candidate ROAs that could be applied to a route object. However,
there are a number of questions about this approach that are not there are a number of considerations about this approach to
resolved here. origination validation that are not specified here.
Some open issues at this point are:
o When should validation of an advertised prefix be performed by a These considerations include:
BGP speaker? Is it strictly necessary to perform validation at a
point prior to loading the object into the Adj-RIB-In structure,
or once the object has been loaded into Adj-RIB-In, or at a later
time that is determined by a local configuration setting? Should
validation be performed each time a route object is updated by a
peer even when the origin AS has not altered?
o What is the lifetime of a validation outcome? When should the o It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix should
routing object be revalidated? Should the validation outcome be be performed by a BGP speaker. Is is considered to be a matter of
regarded as valid until the route object is withdrawn or further local policy whether it is considered to be strictly necessary to
updated, or should validation occur at more frequent intervals? perform validation at a point prior to loading the object into the
Adj-RIB-In structure, or once the object has been loaded into Adj-
RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined by a local
configuration setting. It is also not specified whether
origination validation should be performed each time a route
object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has not
altered.
o Are there circumstances that would allow a route object to be o The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. This
removed from further consideration in route selection upon a specifically refers to the time period during which the original
validation failure, similar to the actions of Route Flap Damping? validation outcome can be still applied, and the time when the
routing object be revalidated. It is a matter of local policy
setting as to whether a validation outcome be regarded as valid
until the route object is withdrawn or further updated, or whether
validation of a route object should occur at more frequent
intervals?
o Can ROA validation be performed on a per-AS basis rather than a o It is a matter of local policy as to whther there are
per-BGP speaker? What BGP mechanisms would be appropriate to circumstances that would allow a route object to be removed from
support such a mode of operation? further consideration in route selection upon a validation
failure, similar to the actions of Route Flap Damping.
o If a relying party had access to RPKI signed objects with o It is a matter of local configuration as to whther ROA validation
comparable semantics to a Route Registry's Route Object (RRRO), is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP speaker, and
namely the acknowledgement by an AS holder that it intends to the appropriate BGP mechanisms to support such a per-AS iBGP route
originate an advertisement for a specified address prefix, how validation service are not considered here.
would this validation procedure be altered. Presumably these
signed RRROs would need to describe the complete set of address
prefixes that may be announced by this originating AS in order to
be of use in this context. Failure to match a valid RPKI RRRO
would then be commensurate with a "bogon match", namely rejection
of the route object, in a manner similar to the operation of a
filter list constructed from a Route Registry.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
[To be Completed - the intent of this validation approach is to This approach to orgination validation does not allow for
improve the level of confidence in route objects in the IDR domain. 'deterministic' validation in terms of the ability of a BGP speker to
It is noted that this approach does not allow for 'comprehensive' accept or reject an advertised route object outright, given that
validation given that there remains some issues of potential there remains some issues of potential circularity of dependence and
circularity of dependence and time lags between the propagation of time lags between the propagation of information in the routing
information in the routing system and propagation of information in system and propagation of information in the RPKI.
the RPKI, and issues of treatment of unauthorised route objects in
the scenario of partial use of the RPKI. The consequence is that There are also issues of the most appropirate interpretation of
ROAs can increase the confidence in the validity of route objects outcomes where validation of the authenticity of the route object has
that match a valid ROA, but cannot perform the opposite of explicitly not been possible in the context of partial adoption of the RPKI,
rejecting invalid route objects. To assist in the case of rejecting where the absense of validation information does not necessarily
invalid route objects the BOA has been used as a means of explicit constitute sufficient grounds to interpret the route object as an
rejection of certain classes route objects. The implication is that invalidly originated object.
RRs should issue both ROAs and BOAs in order to provide the greatest
level of information that will allow relying parties to make The consequence of these considerations is that while the use of ROAs
appropriate choices in terms of route preference selection.] can increase the confidence in the validity of origination of route
objects that match a valid ROA, ROAs cannot perform the opposite,
namely the rejection of route objects that cannot be validated by
ROAs. To assist in the case of rejecting some forms of route objects
that cannot be explicitly validated, the BOA has been used as a means
of explicit rejection of certain classes route objects. The
implication is that publishers in the RPKI should publish both ROAs
and BOAs in order to provide the greatest level of information that
will allow relying parties to make appropriate choices in terms of
route preference selection.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
[There are no IANA considerations in this document at this stage. [There are no IANA considerations in this document.]
Later iterations of this draft may propose to add a ROA identifier
into the BGP attribute set]
7. Normative References 7. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and R. Barnes, "An Infrastructure Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and R. Barnes, "An Infrastructure
to Support Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch to Support Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch
(work in progress), February 2008. (work in progress), February 2008.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-boa] [I-D.ietf-sidr-boa]
Huston, G., Manderson, T., and G. Michaelson, "Profile for Huston, G., Manderson, T., and G. Michaelson, "Profile for
skipping to change at page 10, line 39 skipping to change at page 12, line 11
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
George Michaelson George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: ggm@apnic.net Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr. http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org. ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
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