< draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-01.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt >
	Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston		Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston
	Internet-Draft G. Michaelson		Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
	Intended status: Informational APNIC		Intended status: Informational APNIC
	Expires: April 9, 2009 October 6, 2008		Expires: February 5, 2010 August 4, 2009
	Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate		Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate
	PKI		PKI
	draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-01.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
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	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key		This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
	Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in		Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in
	the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to		the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to
	fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain		fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain
	routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal		routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal
	deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of		deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of
	BGP.		BGP.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Decoupled Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . . 4
	2.2. Linked Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . 6		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1. Validation Outcomes and Rejection of BGP Route Objects . . 9		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		7. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key		This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
	Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origination of routes		Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origination of routes
	advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271].		advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271].
	The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates		The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates
	are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280],		are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280],
	and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779].		and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779].
	skipping to change at page 3, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 27 ¶
	Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource		Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource
	Certificate. The PKI is structured such that each current Resource		Certificate. The PKI is structured such that each current Resource
	Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment.		Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment.
	This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].		This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
	Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that		Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that
	bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA		bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA
	provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has		provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
	authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain		authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain
	routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in		routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format].		[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the
			requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing, including
			the ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment.
	Bogon Origin Attestations (BOAs) are digitally signed objects that		This document describes the semantic interpretation of a valid ROA,
	describe a collection of address prefixes and AS numbers that are not		with particular reference to application in BGP relating to the
	authorised by the right-of-use holder to be advertised in the inter-		origination of route objects. The document does not describe any
	domain routing system [I-D.ietf-sidr-boa].		application of a ROA to validation of the AS Path.
	This document describes how ROA and BOA validation outcomes can be		This proposed application does not require any changes to the
	used in the BGP route selection process, and how the proposed		specification of BGP protocol elements. The application may be used
	application of ROAs and BOAs are intended to fit within the		as part of BGP's local route selection algorithm [RFC4271].
	requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing
	[ID.ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec], including the ability to support
	incremental and piecemeal deployment. This proposed application does
	not require any changes to the specification of BGP protocol
	elements. The application may be used as part of BGP's local route
	selection algorithm [RFC4271].
	2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object		2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object
	A BGP Route Object is an address prefix and a set of attributes. In		A BGP "Route Object" is an address prefix and a set of attributes.
	terms of ROA and BOA validation the prefix value and the origin AS		In terms of validation of the Route Object the prefix value and the
	are used in the validation operation.		origin AS attribute are used in the validation operation.
	If the route object is an aggregate and the AS Path contains an AS		If the route object is an aggregate and the AS Path contains an AS
	Set, then the origin AS is considered to be the AS described as the		Set, then the origin AS is considered to be the AS described as the
	AGGREGATOR [RFC4271] of the route object.		AGGREGATOR [RFC4271] of the route object.
	ROA validation is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and the		ROA validation is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and the
	outcome of the validation operation is that the ROA is valid in the		outcome of the validation operation is that the ROA is valid in the
	context of the RPKI, or validation has failed.		context of the RPKI, or validation has failed.
	BOA validation is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-boa], and the outcome		It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed
	of the validation operation is that the BOA is valid in the context		independently of the operation of BGP itself, and a local BGP speaker
	of the RPKI, or validation has failed.		has access to a local cache of the complete set of ROAs and the RPKI
			data set when performing a validation operation.
	There appears to be two means of matching a route object to a ROA:
	decoupled and linked.
	2.1. Decoupled Validation
	The decoupled approach is where the ROAs are managed and distributed
	independently of the operation of the routing protocol and a local
	BGP speaker has access to a local cache of the complete set of ROAs
	and the RPKI data set when performing a validation operation.
	In this case the BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA.		A BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA that should be
	The relying party to match a route object to one or more candidate		used by a Relying Party (RP) to validate the origination information
	valid ROAs and BOAs in order to determine the appropriate local		contained in the route object, nor does it refer to the set of
			certificates that the RP should use to validate the ROA's digital
			signature. The RP needs to match a route object to one or more
			candidate valid ROAs in order to determine the appropriate local
	actions to perform on the route object.		actions to perform on the route object.
	The relying party selects the set of ROAs where the address prefix in		To validate a route object the RP would undertake the following
	the route object either exactly matches an ROAIPAddress (matching		steps:
	both the address prefix value and the prefix length), or where the
	route object spans a block of addresses that is included in the span
	described by the ROA's address prefix value and length and where the
	route object's prefix length is less than the ROA's prefix length and
	greater then or equal to the ROA's corresponding maxLength attribute.
	The following outcomes are possible using the defined ROA validation
	procedure for each ROA in this set:
	Exact Match:
	A valid ROA exists, where the address prefix in the route object
	exactly matches a prefix listed in the ROA, or the ROA contains a
	covering aggregate and the prefix length of the route object is
	smaller than or equal to the ROA's associated maxLength attribute,
	and the origin AS in the route object matches the origin AS listed
	in the ROA.
	Covering Match:
	A valid ROA exists, where an address prefix in the ROA is a
	covering aggregate of the prefix in the route object, and the
	prefix length of the route object is greater than the ROA's
	associated maxLength attribute, and the origin AS in the route
	object matches the AS listed in the ROA.
	Exact Mismatch:
	A valid ROA exists where the address prefix in the route object
	exactly matches a prefix listed in the ROA, or the ROA contains a
	covering aggregate and the prefix length of the route object is
	smaller than or equal to the ROA's associated maxLength attribute,
	and the origin AS of the route object does not match the AS listed
	in the ROA.
	Covering Mismatch:
	A valid ROA exists where an address prefix in the ROA is a
	covering aggregate of the prefix in the route object, the prefix
	length of the route object is greater than the ROA's associated
	maxLength attribute, and the origin AS of the route object does
	not match the AS listed in the ROA.
	No ROA:
	There are no Exact Matches, Covering Matches, no Exact Mismatches
	or Covering Mismatches in the RPKI repository.
	The ROA to be used for the validation function is selected from the
	set of ROAs in the order given above. In other words an Exact Match
	is preferred over a Covering Match, which, in turn, is preferred over
	an Exact Mismatch which is preferred over a Covering Mismatch.
	The set of BOAs that are used for the validation function are
	composed of the set of valid BOAs where the origin AS of the route
	object matches an AS described in a BOA, or where an address prefix
	in a valid BOA that is an exact match or a covering aggregate of the
	route object. In the case that the validation outcome using ROAs is
	one of Exact Mismatch, Covering Mismatch or No ROA, then the
	validation outcome of the BOA changes the overall validation result
	to "Bogon".
	Bogon:
	A valid BOA exists where an address prefix in the BOA is a an
	exact match for the prefix in the route object, or is a covering
	aggregate of the prefix in the route object, or an AS in the BOA
	matches the originating AS in the BOA. In addition, there is no
	valid ROA that is an Exact Match or a Covering Match with the
	route object.
	2.2. Linked Validation
	The linked approach requires the route object to reference a ROA
	either by inclusion of the ROA as an attribute of the route object,
	or inclusion of a identity field in an attribute of the route object
	as a means of identifying a particular ROA.
	If the ROA can be located is valid within the context of the RPKI
	then the route object can be compared against the ROA, as per the
	previous section, giving one of five possible results: Exact Match,
	Covering Match, Exact Mismatch, Covering Mismatch, and No Match,
	which is defined as:
	No Match:
	The valid ROA does not comtain any address prefix that exactly
	matches the address prefix in the route object, or is a covering
	aggregate of the address prefix in the route object.
	In the case of a Mismatch or a No Match condition, the relying party		1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that
	should check for the presence of valid BOAs where the origin AS of		either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address prefix
	the route object matches an AS described in a BOA, or where an		in the route object.
	address prefix in a valid BOA that is an exact match or a covering		2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty the validation process
	aggregate of the route object. If a valid BOA can be found that		stops with an outcome of "unknown".
	matches either of these conditions that the overall route object		3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the originating AS in
	validation of a route object with a linked ROA is changed to "Bogon".		the route object, and either the route object's address prefix
			precisely matches an address in the ROA, or the route object's
			address prefix is a more specific prefix of the address in the
			ROA and the prefix length value is less than or equal to the
			ROAIPAddress's maxLength value, then the validation process stops
			with an outcome of "valid".
			4. Otherwise, the validation outcome is "invalid".
	3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection		3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection
	Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a		Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a
	received prefix announcement from a peer is compared to all		received prefix announcement from a peer is compared to all
	announcements for this prefix received from other peers and a route		announcements for this prefix received from other peers and a route
	selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object from		selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object from
	this candidate set which is then used locally by placing it in the		this candidate set, which is then used locally by installing it in
	loc-RIB, and is announced to peers as the local "best" route.		the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as the local "best"
			route.
	It is proposed here that the validation outcome be used as part of
	the determination of the local degree of preference as defined in
	section 9.1.1 of the BGP specification [RFC4271].
	In the case of partial deployment of ROAs there are a very limited
	set of circumstances where the outcome of ROA validation can be used
	as grounds to reject all consideration of the route object as an
	invalid advertisement. While the presence of a valid ROA that
	matches the advertisement is a strong indication that an
	advertisement matches the authority provided by the prefix holder to
	advertise the prefix into the routing system, the absence of a ROA or
	the invalidity of a covering ROA does not provide a conclusive
	indication that the advertisement has been undertaken without the
	address holder's permission, unless the object is described in a BOA.
	In the case of a partial deployment scenario of RPKI route
	attestation objects, where some address prefixes and AS numbers are
	described in ROAs or BOAs and others are not, then the relative
	ranking of validation outcomes from the highest (most preferred) to
	the lowest (least preferred) degree of preference are proposed to be
	as specified int he following list. The exact values to apply to a
	Local Preference setting are left as a matter of local policy and
	local configuration.
	1. Exact Match
	The prefix has been allocated and is routeable, and that the
	prefix right-of-use holder has authorized the originating AS to
	originate precisely this announcement.
	2. Covering Match
	This is slightly less preferred because it is possible that the
	address holder of the aggregate has allocated the prefix in
	question to a different party. It is also possible that the
	originating AS is using more specific advertisements as part of a
	traffic engineering scenario.
	3. No ROA
	In the case of partial deployment of ROAs, the absence of
	validation credentials is a neutral outcome, in that there is no
	grounds to increase or decrease the relative degree of preference
	for the route object.
	4. Covering Mismatch
	A Covering Mismatch is considered to be less preferable than a
	neutral position in that the address holder of a covering
	aggregate has indicated an originating AS that is not the
	originating AS of this announcement. On the other hand it may be
	the case that this prefix has been validly allocated to another
	party who has not generated a ROA for this prefix even through
	the announcement is valid.
	5. Exact Mismatch
	Here the exact match prefix holder has validly provided an
	authority for origination by an AS that is not the AS that is
	originating this announcement. This would appear to be a bogus
	announcement by inference.
	6. No Match
	Here the route object has referenced a ROA that is not valid, or
	does not include an address prefix that matcehs the route object,
	or the referenced ROA could not be located. This could be an
	attempt to create a false route object and use an invalid ROA.
	7. Bogon
	Here the right-of-use holder of the AS or address prefix has
	explicitly tagged the address prefix or the AS as a "bogon".
	This implies that the announcement has been made without the
	appropriate authority, and the local preference of the route
	object should be ranked at a level commensurate with rejecting
	the route object.
	In the case of comprehensive deployment of RPKI route attestion
	objects the absence of a specific ROA origination authority for the
	route object should render it as an unusable for routing. In this
	case the local preference setting for the route object is as follows:
	1. Exact Match
	The prefix has been allocated and is routeable, and that the
	prefix right-of-use holder has authorized the originating AS to
	originate precisely this announcement.
	2. Covering Match, No ROA, Covering Mismatch, Exact Mismatch, No
	Match
	The local preference of the route object should be ranked at a
	level of least preferred, due to the constraints noted in the
	following section.
	3. Bogon
	Here the right-of-use holder of the AS or address prefix has		It is proposed here that the ROA validation outcome of "unknown",
	explicitly tagged the address prefix or the AS as a "bogon".		"valid" or "invalid" be used as part of the determination of the
	This implies that the announcement has been made without the		local degree of preference as defined in section 9.1.1 of the BGP
	appropriate authority, and the local preference of the route		specification [RFC4271].
	object should be ranked at a level commensurate with rejecting
	the route object.
	3.1. Validation Outcomes and Rejection of BGP Route Objects		The proposed addition to the local degree of preference is "valid" is
			to be preferred over "unknown" over "invalid".
	In the case of comprehensive deployment of ROAs, the use of a		It is a matter of local BGP selection policy in setting whether
	validation outcome other than an Exact Match as sufficient grounds to		"invalid" route objects are discarded from further consideration in
	reject a route object should be undertaken with care.		the route selection process, however the following consideration
			should be taken into account in such a situation.
	The consideration here is one of potential circularity of dependence.		The consideration here is one of potential circularity of dependence.
	If the authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs or		If the authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs or
	any certificates used in relation to an address prefix is stored at a		any certificates used in relation to an address prefix is stored at a
	location that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then		location that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then
	the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has		the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has
	been accepted by the local routing domain. It is also noted that the		been accepted by the local routing domain. It is also noted that the
	propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation		propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation
	time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may be received		time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may be received
	before the relying party's local repository cache picks up the		before the relying party's local repository cache picks up the
	associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.		associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.
	For these reasons it is proposed that, even in the case of		For these reasons it is advised that local policy settings should not
	comprehensive deployment of ROAs, a missing ROA or a mismatch should		result in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as
	not be considered as sufficient grounds to reject a route		sufficient grounds to reject a route object outright from
	advertisement outright. Alternate approaches may involve the use of		consideration as a local "best" route.
	a local timer to accept the route for an interim period of time until
			A local policy setting may be considered such that "invalid"
			validation outcomes would be sufficient grounds to reject the route
			object. However, due to the considerations of circular dependence
			and differing propagation times as noted above, a local policy
			setting may be considered that would involve the use of a local timer
			to accept the route as feasible for an interim period of time until
	there is an acceptable level of assurance that all reasonable efforts		there is an acceptable level of assurance that all reasonable efforts
	to local a valid ROA have been undertaken.		to obtain a valid ROA for the object have been undertaken.
	4. Further Considerations		4. Further Considerations
	This document provides a description of how ROAs and BOAs could be		This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a
	used by a BGP speaker.		BGP speaker.
	It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the		It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the
	operation of BGP.		operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations
			about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to
	It is also noted that the decoupled and linked approach are not		the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here.
	mutually exclusive, and the same procedure can be applied to route
	objects that contain an explicit pointer to the associated ROA and
	route objects where the local BGP speaker has to create a set of
	candidate ROAs that could be applied to a route object. However,
	there are a number of considerations about this approach to
	origination validation that are not specified here.
	These considerations include:		These considerations include:
	o It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix should		o It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix should
	be performed by a BGP speaker. Is is considered to be a matter of		be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a matter of
	local policy whether it is considered to be strictly necessary to		local policy whether it is strictly required to perform validation
	perform validation at a point prior to loading the object into the		at a point prior to loading the object into the Adj-RIB-In
	Adj-RIB-In structure, or once the object has been loaded into Adj-		structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been loaded into Adj-
	RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined by a local		RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined by a local
	configuration setting. It is also not specified whether		configuration setting. It is also not specified whether
	origination validation should be performed each time a route		origination validation should be performed each time a route
	object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has not		object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has not
	altered.		altered.
	o The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. This		o The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. This
	specifically refers to the time period during which the original		specifically refers to the time period during which the original
	validation outcome can be still applied, and the time when the		validation outcome can be still applied, at the expiration of
	routing object be revalidated. It is a matter of local policy		which the routing object should be re-tested for validity. It is
	setting as to whether a validation outcome be regarded as valid		a matter of local policy setting as to whether a validation
	until the route object is withdrawn or further updated, or whether		outcome be regarded as valid until the route object is withdrawn
	validation of a route object should occur at more frequent		or further updated, or whether validation of a route object should
	intervals?		occur at more frequent intervals.
	o It is a matter of local policy as to whther there are
	circumstances that would allow a route object to be removed from
	further consideration in route selection upon a validation
	failure, similar to the actions of Route Flap Damping.
	o It is a matter of local configuration as to whther ROA validation		o It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA validation
	is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP speaker, and		is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP speaker, and
	the appropriate BGP mechanisms to support such a per-AS iBGP route		the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled framework of
	validation service are not considered here.		validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes into BGP speakers
			are not considered here.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	This approach to orgination validation does not allow for		This approach to origination validation uses a model of positive
	'deterministic' validation in terms of the ability of a BGP speker to		security, where information that cannot be validated within the RPKI
	accept or reject an advertised route object outright, given that		framework is intended to interpreted by a RP as invalid.
	there remains some issues of potential circularity of dependence and
	time lags between the propagation of information in the routing
	system and propagation of information in the RPKI.
	There are also issues of the most appropirate interpretation of		However, the considerations of accommodating environments of partial
	outcomes where validation of the authenticity of the route object has		adoption, where only a subset of valid route objects have associated
	not been possible in the context of partial adoption of the RPKI,		ROAs within the structure of the RPKI imply some modification to the
	where the absense of validation information does not necessarily		model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an address
	constitute sufficient grounds to interpret the route object as an		prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA "protects" all address
	invalidly originated object.		prefixes that are more specific than that described in the ROA.
			Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS combination
			of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA is considered
			to be "invalid".
	The consequence of these considerations is that while the use of ROAs		The match condition of a route object against a single ROA is
	can increase the confidence in the validity of origination of route		summarized in the following table:
	objects that match a valid ROA, ROAs cannot perform the opposite,
	namely the rejection of route objects that cannot be validated by		Prefix match AS mismatch AS
	ROAs. To assist in the case of rejecting some forms of route objects		+---------+-------------+
	that cannot be explicitly validated, the BOA has been used as a means		Covering | unknown | unknown |
	of explicit rejection of certain classes route objects. The		Aggregate | | |
	implication is that publishers in the RPKI should publish both ROAs		+---------+-------------+
	and BOAs in order to provide the greatest level of information that		match ROA | valid | invalid |
	will allow relying parties to make appropriate choices in terms of		prefix | | |
	route preference selection.		+---------+-------------+
			More | invalid | invalid |
			Specific | | |
			than ROA +---------+-------------+
			In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is
			considered "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and
			"invalid" if one or more ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no
			ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. The "unknown" outcome occurs when no
			ROA produces a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	[There are no IANA considerations in this document.]		[There are no IANA considerations in this document.]
	7. Normative References		7. Changes -01 to -02
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]		Following WG review of the means of specification of denial in
	Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and R. Barnes, "An Infrastructure		routing authorizations in the context of the RPKI at IETF 74 and IETF
	to Support Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch		75, it appears that there is no general WG support for the use of an
	(work in progress), February 2008.		explicit denial object (termed a 'BOA'). The alternative approach,
			explored in previous iterations of this draft, used a more restricted
			interpretation of a ROA that yielded only "valid" or "unknown"
			outcomes (by using "unknown" where "invalid" is used in this revision
			of the document). To allow for "invalid" outcomes the draft used the
			BOA to undertake the role of a 'disavow' constraint, where a route
			object was considered to be "invalid" if it was the subject of a
			valid BOA and was not considered to be "valid" by any valid ROA. The
			reasons advanced to support the dropping of the BOA was the increased
			complexity of RP systems through the use of a second object in route
			validation, a potentially confusing mismatch in the interpretation
			scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROA's scope was limited
			to set of prefixes described in the ROA, while the BOA's scope
			included all possible more specifics of the prefixes listed in the
			BOA, and the ability to reconstruct the semantic equivalent of a BOA
			through the use of a ROA that used a restricted-use AS as its asID.
			Accordingly, this draft has been revised to remove all references to
			the use of an explicit denial object and uses the implicit semantics
			of denial in a ROA object.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-boa]		There appears to be no WG interest in consideration of validation in
	Huston, G., Manderson, T., and G. Michaelson, "Profile for		a "linked" model, where a ROA is bound to the route object that it is
	Bogon Origin Attestations (BOAs)", draft-ietf-sidr-bogons		intended to validate. Accordingly this section of the text has also
	(work in progress), August 2008.		been dropped from this version.
			8. Normative References
			[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
			Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
			Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
			progress), July 2009.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
	Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to		Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to
	Support Secure Internet Routing",		Support Secure Internet Routing",
	draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2008.		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2009.
	[ID.ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec]
	Christian, B. and T. Tauber, "BGP Security Requirements",
	draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress),
	November 2007.
	[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP		[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
	Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.		Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
	Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.		Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	skipping to change at page 13, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at line 337 ¶
	Geoff Huston		Geoff Huston
	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre		Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
	Email: gih@apnic.net		Email: gih@apnic.net
	George Michaelson		George Michaelson
	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre		Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
	Email: ggm@apnic.net		Email: ggm@apnic.net
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