< draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-04.txt >
	Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston		Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston
	Internet-Draft G. Michaelson		Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
	Intended status: Informational APNIC		Intended status: Informational APNIC
	Expires: February 7, 2010 August 6, 2009		Expires: September 4, 2010 March 3, 2010
	Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate		Validation of Route Origination using the Resource Certificate PKI and
	PKI and ROAs		ROAs
	draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-04.txt
			Abstract
			This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
			in terms of the context of an application of the Resource Public Key
			Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in
			the Border Gateway Protocol.
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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	skipping to change at page 1, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 40 ¶
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	The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at		The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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	This Internet-Draft will expire on February 7, 2010.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 4, 2010.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		publication of this document. Please review these documents
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			to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	Abstract		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
			the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key		described in the BSD License.
	Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in
	the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to
	fit within the requirement for adding security to inter-domain
	routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal
	deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of
	BGP.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . 4		3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection . . . . . . . . 5
	4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. Route Object Validation Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3. BGP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7.1. Changes -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7.2. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key		This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
	Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the		(ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource
			Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the
	origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)		origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
	[RFC4271].		[RFC4271].
	The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of Resource Certificates that are		The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of Resource Certificates that are
	aligned to the Internet number resource allocation structure.		aligned to the Internet number resource allocation structure.
	Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX		Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX
	profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS		profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS
	identifiers [RFC3779]. A Resource Certificate describes an action by		identifiers [RFC3779]. A Resource Certificate describes an action by
	an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous		an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous
	System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate, identified by		System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate, identified by
	the unique association of the Subject's private key with the public		the unique association of the Subject's private key with the public
	key contained in the Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured		key contained in the Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured
	such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current		such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current
	resource allocation or assignment. This is further described in		resource allocation or assignment. This is further described in
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].		[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
	Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that		ROAs are digitally signed objects that bind an address to an AS
	bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA		number, signed by the address holder. A ROA provides a means of
	provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has		verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized a particular
	authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain		AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain routing environment
	routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in		for that address block. ROAs are described in
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the		[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the
	requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing.		requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing.
	This document describes the semantic interpretation of a valid ROA,		This document describes the semantic interpretation of a ROA, with
	with particular reference to application in BGP relating to the		particular reference to application in inter-domain routing relating
	origination of route objects.		to the origination of route objects, and the intended scope of the
			authority that is conveyed in the ROA.
	This proposed application of validation of ROAs does not require any		2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route Object
	changes to the specification of BGP protocol elements. The outcomes
	of ROA validation may be used as part of BGP's local route selection
	procedure [RFC4271].
	2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object		A "route object" is an address prefix and an associated set of
			routing attributes. In terms of validation of the route object in
			the context of BGP [RFC4271]the address prefix value and the "origin
			AS" are used in the ROA validation operation. The route object's
			origin AS is the final element of the route object's AS_PATH
			attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an AS Set, indicating
			that the route object is an aggregate, then the origin AS is taken as
			the AS component of the AGGREGATOR attribute [RFC4271].
	A BGP "route object" is an address prefix and an associated set of		It is assumed here that a Relying Party (RP) has access to a local
	attributes. In terms of validation of the route object the address		cache of the complete set of valid ROAs when performing validation of
	prefix value and the "origin AS" are used in the ROA validation		a route object. (Valid ROAs are defined as ROAs that are determined
	operation. The route object's origin AS is the final element of the		to be syntactically correct and are signed using a signature that can
	route object's AS_PATH attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an		be verified using the RPKI, as described in
	AS Set, indicating that the route object is an aggregate, then the		[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format].) The RP needs to match a route object to
	origin AS is taken as the AS component of the AGGREGATOR attribute		one or more candidate valid ROAs in order to determine a validation
	[RFC4271].		outcome, which, in turn, can be used to determine the appropriate
			local actions to perform on the route object.
	A BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA that should be		This approach to route object origination validation uses a model of
	used by a Relying Party (RP) to validate the origination information		"positive" attestations, where route objects that cannot be validated
	contained in the route object. The RP needs to match a route object		within the RPKI framework would conventionally be treated by a RP as
	to one or more candidate valid ROAs in order to determine a		"invalid". However, the considerations of accommodating environments
	validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used to determine the		of partial adoption of the use of ROAs, where only a subset of
	appropriate local actions to perform on the route object. Valid ROAs		validly advertised address prefixes have associated published ROAs
	are defined as ROAs that are determined to be syntactically correct		within the structure of the RPKI, imply some modification to this
	and are signed using a signature that can be verified using the RPKI,		model of positive attestation. In the context of route object
	as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. The outcome of this ROA		validation it is assumed that once an address prefix is described in
	validation function is that either the RP has determined that the ROA		a ROA, then this ROA speifically encompasses all address prefixes
	is valid in the context of the RPKI, or the ROA is invalid, in which		that are more specific than that described in the ROA. Thus, any
	case the ROA is not to be used by the RP.		route object for more specific address prefix than that described by
			any valid ROA that does not itself have a matching valid ROA is
			considered to be "invalid". However, routes objects for address
			prefixes that are not fully described by any single ROA, i.e., those
			route objects whose address prefixes may be an aggregate of address
			prefixes described in a valid ROA, or have address prefixes where
			there is no intersection with any ROA, and are not matched by any ROA
			and are not a more specific of any ROA cannot be reliably classified
			as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario. Such route objects
			have a validation outcome of "unknown".
	It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed		The validation condition of a route object with a prefix and an
	independently of the operation of BGP itself, and that a local BGP		origin AS when using single ROA for validation is summarized in the
	speaker has access to a local cache of the complete set of valid ROAs		following table:
	when performing a route object validation operation.
			Prefix matching non-matching
			AS AS
			+---------+-------------+
			Covering | unknown | unknown |
			Aggregate | | |
			+---------+-------------+
			match ROA | valid | invalid |
			prefix | | |
			+---------+-------------+
			More | invalid | invalid |
			Specific | | |
			than ROA | | |
			+---------+-------------+
			In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is
			considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome. It
			is considered to be "invalid" if one (or more) ROAs provide an
			"invalid" outcome and no ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. It is
			considered to be "unknown" when no ROA produces either a "valid" or
			an "invalid" outcome.
	Route object validation is defined by the following procedure:		Route object validation is defined by the following procedure:
	1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that		1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that
	either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address		either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address
	prefix in the route object.		prefix in the route object.
	2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty then the validation		2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty then the validation
	procedure stops with an outcome of "unknown".		procedure stops with an outcome of "unknown".
	3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the origin AS in the		3. If any of the selected ROAs has an asID value that matches the
	route object, and either the route object's address prefix		origin AS in the route object, and either the route object's
	precisely matches a ROAIPAddress in the ROA, or the route		address prefix precisely matches a ROAIPAddress in the ROA, or
	object's address prefix is a more specific prefix of a		the route object's address prefix is a more specific prefix of
	ROAIPAddress and the route object's prefix length value is		a ROAIPAddress, and the route object's prefix length value is
	less than or equal to the ROAIPAddress' maxLength value, then		less than or equal to the ROAIPAddress' maxLength value, then
	the validation procedure stops with an outcome of "valid".		the validation procedure stops with an outcome of "valid".
	4. Otherwise, the validation procedure stops with an outcome of		4. Otherwise, the validation procedure stops with an outcome of
	"invalid".		"invalid".
	3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection		3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection
	Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a		Within the framework of the abstract model of the operation of inter-
	received prefix announcement from a BGP speaking peer is compared to		domain routing using BGP [RFC4271], a received prefix announcement
	all announcements for this prefix received from other BGP peers and a		from a routing peer is compared to all announcements for this prefix
	route selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object		received from other routing peers and a route selection procedure is
	from this candidate set. This route object is then used locally by		used to select the "best" route object from this candidate set.
	installing it in the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as
	the local "best" route.
	The route object validation outcome, described in Section 2, of		The route object validation outcome, described in Section 2, of
	"unknown", "valid" or "invalid" may be used as part of the		"unknown", "valid" or "invalid" may be used as part of the
	determination of the local degree of preference as defined in section		determination of the local degree of preference, in which case the
	9.1.1 of the BGP specification [RFC4271]. The local degree of		local order of preference is as follows:
	preference is as follows:
	"valid" is to be preferred over		"valid" is to be preferred over
	"unknown", which itself is to be preferred over		"unknown", which itself is to be preferred over
	"invalid".		"invalid".
	This preference ranking is performed prior to the steps described in		It is a matter of local routing policy as to the actions to be
	section 9.1.1 of [RFC4271].		undertaken by a routing entity in processing route objects with
	It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to the actions to be
	undertaken by a BGP instance in processing route objects with
	"unknown" validation outcomes. Due to considerations of partial use		"unknown" validation outcomes. Due to considerations of partial use
	of ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public		of ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public
	Internet, it is advised that local policy settings should not result		Internet, it is advised that local policy settings should not result
	in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as sufficient		in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as sufficient
	grounds to reject a route object outright from further consideration		grounds to reject a route object outright from further consideration
	as a local "best" route.		as a local "best" route.
	It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to whether "invalid"		It is a matter of local routing policy as to whether "invalid" route
	route objects are considered to be ineligible for further		objects are considered to be ineligible for further consideration in
	consideration in the route selection process. The consideration here		a route selection process. A possible consideration here is one of
	is one of potential circularity of dependence. If the authoritative		potential circularity of dependence. If the authoritative
	publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of any		publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of any
	certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at an		certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at an
	address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then		address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then
	the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has		the repository can only be accessed by the RP once a route for the
	been accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is also noted		prefix has been accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is
	that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the		also noted that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different
	propagation time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may		to the propagation time of route objects, and that route objects may
	be received before the RP's local repository cache picks up the		be received before the RP's local repository cache picks up the
	associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.		associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.
	A local policy setting may be considered such that "invalid"		4. Disavowal of Routing Origination
	validation outcomes would be sufficient grounds to reject the route
	object. However, due to these considerations of circular dependence
	and differing propagation times of ROAs and route objects, an
	alternate local policy setting may be considered that would involve
	the use of a local timer to accept the route object as feasible for
	an interim period of time, until there is an acceptable level of
	assurance that all reasonable efforts to obtain a valid ROA for the
	route object have been undertaken.
	4. Further Considerations
	4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations
	This approach to route object origination validation uses a model of
	"positive security" attestations, where information that cannot be
	validated within the RPKI framework is intended to interpreted by a
	RP as invalid information.
	However, the considerations of accommodating environments of partial
	adoption, where only a subset of valid route objects have associated
	ROAs within the structure of the RPKI, imply some modification to
	this model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an
	address prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA encompasses all
	address prefixes that are more specific than that described in the
	ROA. Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS
	combination of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA
	is considered to be "invalid".
	Routes objects that describe address prefixes that are not fully
	described by any single ROA, i.e., those address prefixes that may be
	an aggregate of a ROA, or have no intersection with any ROA, and are
	not matched by any ROA and are not a more specific of any ROA cannot
	be reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario,
	and are therefore described as "unknown".
	The match condition of a route object against a single ROA is
	summarized in the following table:
	Prefix matching non-matching
	AS AS
	+---------+-------------+
	Covering | unknown | unknown |
	Aggregate | | |
	+---------+-------------+
	match ROA | valid | invalid |
	prefix | | |
	+---------+-------------+
	More | invalid | invalid |
	Specific | | |
	than ROA | | |
	+---------+-------------+
	In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is
	considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and
	"invalid" if one or more ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no
	ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. The "unknown" outcome occurs when no
	ROA produces either a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome.
	4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination
	A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized		A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized
	an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain		an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain
	routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to attest that no		routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to construct an
	AS has been granted any such authority by using a ROA where the ROA'S		authorization where no valid AS has been granted any such authority
	subject AS is one that will not be used in a routing context.		to originate a route object for an address prefix. This is acheived
	Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA such that it "may be use		by using a ROA where the ROA's subject AS is one that must never be
	[sic] to identify non-routed networks" [IANA.AS-Registry].		used in any routing context. Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the
			IANA such that it "may be use [sic] to identify non-routed networks"
			[IANA.AS-Registry].
	A ROA with a subject of AS 0 is an attestation by the holder of a		A ROA with a subject of AS 0 is an attestation by the holder of a
	prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific		prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific
	prefix, should not be used in a routing context.		prefix, SHOULD NOT be used in a routing context.
	The route object validation procedure, described in Section 2, will		The route object validation procedure, described in Section 2, will
	provide a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and		provide a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and
	origin AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid"		origin AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid"
	validation outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS0 ROA		validation outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS 0 ROA
	has a lower preference than any other ROA that has a routeable AS as		has a lower preference than any other ROA that has a routeable AS as
	its subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS0 ROA to		its subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS 0 ROA to
	declare a default condition that any route object that is equal to,		declare a default condition that any route object that is equal to,
	or more specific than the prefix to be considered to be invalid,		or more specific than the prefix to be considered to be invalid,
	while also allowing other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid		while also allowing other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid
	origination authorizations for more specific prefixes.		origination authorizations for more specific prefixes.
	For example, the holder of prefix 203.0.113.0/24 may wish to		By convention, an AS 0 ROA SHOULD have a maxLength value of 32 for
	authorise the origination of a route object of 203.0.113.196/26 by
	64496, and explicitly declare that all other use of prefixes from
	this block should be considered invalid. This could be achieved
	through the issuing of a ROA for Address=203.0.113.0/24,
	maxLength=32, AS = 0 and a second ROA for Address=203.0.113.196/26,
	maxLength=26, AS=64496.
	By convention, an AS 0 ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for
	IPv4 addresses and 128 for IPv6 addresses, although in terms of route		IPv4 addresses and 128 for IPv6 addresses, although in terms of route
	object validation the same outcome would be achieved with any valid		object validation the same outcome would be achieved with any valid
	maxLength value, or even if the maxLength element were to be omitted		maxLength value, or even if the maxLength element were to be omitted
	from the ROA. Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA should be the only ROA		from the ROA.
	issued for a given address prefix, although again this is not a
	strict requirement. An AS 0 ROA can coexist with ROAs that have
	different subject AS values, although in such cases the presence of
	the AS 0 ROA does not alter the route object validation outcome in
	any way.
	4.3. BGP Considerations
	This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a
	BGP speaker.
	It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the
	operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations
	about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to
	the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here.
	These considerations include:		Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA SHOULD be the only ROA issued for a
			given address prefix, although again this is not a strict
			requirement. An AS 0 ROA can coexist with ROAs that have different
			subject AS values, although in such cases the presence of the AS 0
			ROA does not alter the route object validation outcome in any way.
	* It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix		5. Route Object Validation Lifetime
	should be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a
	matter of local policy whether it is strictly required to
	perform validation at a point prior to loading the object into
	the Adj-RIB-In structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been
	loaded into Adj-RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined
	by a local configuration setting. It is also not specified
	whether origination validation should be performed each time a
	route object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has
	not altered.
	* The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here.		The "lifetime" of a validation outcome refers to the time period
	This specifically refers to the time period during which the		during which the original validation outcome can be still applied.
	original validation outcome can be still applied, at the		The implicit assumption here is that when the validation lifetime
	expiration of which the routing object should be re-tested for		expires the routing object SHOULD be re-tested for validity.
	validity. It is a matter of local policy setting as to whether
	a validation outcome be regarded as valid until the route
	object is withdrawn or further updated, or whether validation
	of a route object should occur at more frequent intervals.
	* It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA		The validation lifetime for a ROA is controlled by the Valid times
	validation is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP		specified in the End Entity (EE) Certificate used to sign the ROA,
	speaker, and the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled		and the valid times of those certificates in the certification path
	framework of validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes		used to validate the EE Certificate. A ROA validation "expires" at
	into BGP speakers are not considered here.		the Validity To field of the signing EE certificate, or at such a
			time when there is no certification path that can validate the ROA.
			A ROA issuer may prematurely invalidate a ROA by revoking the EE
			certificate that was used to sign the ROA.
	5. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing		ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing
	a ROA, in that a ROA will implicitly invalidate all route objects for		a ROA, in that a ROA implicitly invalidates all route objects that
	more specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than maxLength,		have more specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than
	and all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the collection		maxLength, and all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the
	of ROAs.		collection of ROAs for this prefix.
	A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of		A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of
	ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's		ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's
	prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks,		prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks,
	in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid route objects		in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid route objects
	during ROA generation.		during ROA generation.
	ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one		ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one
	origin AS, then if the prefix is authorised by multiple AS's then		origin AS, then if the prefix holder authorises multiple AS's to
	ROAs should be generated for all such authorized AS's.		originate route objects it is necessary for a ROA be generated for
			every such authorized AS.
	6. IANA Considerations
	Dear IANA,
	The AS number registry [IANA.AS-Registry] contains the following
	annotation against AS 0: "may be use to identify non-routed
	networks." Could you please add a 'd' as appropriate to this text?
	Thank you,
	the authors.
	7. Change Log
	Note: This section is NOT to be included in final version of this
	document.
	7.1. Changes -02 to -03
	Further Considerations section now has a subsection describing the
	assumptions that ROA validation is making about the precise nature of
	partial deployment, noting that a ROA has an implicit scope of
	application for all prefixes that are equal to or more specific than
	the prefix listed in the ROA
	Moved the table of validation outcomes from the Security
	Considerations section to the section on Further Considerations.
	Added consideration about disavowal and the use of an AS 0 ROA and
	its interpretation in the context of validation of route objects, and
	proposed conventions of use of an AS 0 ROA.
	Noted hierarchical dependence of ROA issuance in the Security
	Considerations section.
	7.2. Changes -01 to -02
	Following WG review of the means of specification of denial in		7. IANA Considerations
	routing authorizations in the context of the RPKI at IETF 74 and IETF
	75, it appears that there is no general WG support for the use of an
	explicit denial object (termed a 'BOA'). The alternative approach,
	explored in previous iterations of this draft, used a more restricted
	interpretation of a ROA that yielded only "valid" or "unknown"
	outcomes (by using "unknown" where "invalid" is used in this revision
	of the document). To allow for "invalid" outcomes the draft used the
	BOA to undertake the role of a 'disavow' constraint, where a route
	object was considered to be "invalid" if it was the subject of a
	valid BOA and was not considered to be "valid" by any valid ROA. The
	reasons advanced to support the dropping of the BOA was the increased
	complexity of RP systems through the use of a second object in route
	validation, a potentially confusing mismatch in the interpretation
	scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROAs scope was limited
	to set of prefixes described in the ROA, while the BOA's scope
	included all possible more specifics of the prefixes listed in the
	BOA, and the ability to reconstruct the semantic equivalent of a BOA
	through the use of a ROA that used a restricted-use AS as its asID.
	Accordingly, this draft has been revised to remove all references to
	the use of an explicit denial object and uses the implicit semantics
	of denial in a ROA object.
	There appears to be no WG interest in consideration of validation in		[There are no IANA Considerations.]
	a "linked" model, where a ROA is bound to the route object that it is
	intended to validate. Accordingly this section of the text has also
	been dropped from this version.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
	Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support		Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
	Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in		Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
	progress), July 2009.		progress), October 2009.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
	Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to		Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to
	Support Secure Internet Routing",		Support Secure Internet Routing",
	draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2009.		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress),
			October 2009.
	[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP		[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
	Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.		Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
	Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.		Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[IANA.AS-Registry]		[IANA.AS-Registry]
	IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry",		IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry",
	August 2009.		March 2010.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Geoff Huston		Geoff Huston
	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre		Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
	Email: gih@apnic.net		Email: gih@apnic.net
	George Michaelson		George Michaelson
	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre		Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
	Email: ggm@apnic.net		Email: ggm@apnic.net
End of changes. 41 change blocks.
	295 lines changed or deleted		175 lines changed or added
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