< draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-06.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-07.txt >
	Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston		Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston
	Internet-Draft G. Michaelson		Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
	Intended status: Informational APNIC		Intended status: Informational APNIC
	Expires: November 9, 2010 May 8, 2010		Expires: April 13, 2011 October 10, 2010
	Validation of Route Origination using the Resource Certificate PKI and		Validation of Route Origination using the Resource Certificate PKI and
	ROAs		ROAs
	draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-06.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-07.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization		This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
	in terms of the context of an application of the Resource Public Key		(ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource
	Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in		Public Key Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes
	the Border Gateway Protocol.		advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol.
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on November 9, 2010.		This Internet-Draft will expire on April 13, 2011.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 10 ¶
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection . . . . . . . . 6		3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection . . . . . . . . 6
	4. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. Route Validation Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. Route Validation Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization		This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
	(ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource		(ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource
	Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the		Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the
	origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)		origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
	[RFC4271].		[RFC4271].
	skipping to change at page 4, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 20 ¶
	It is assumed here that a Relying Party (RP) has access to a local		It is assumed here that a Relying Party (RP) has access to a local
	cache of the complete set of valid ROAs when performing validation of		cache of the complete set of valid ROAs when performing validation of
	a route. (Valid ROAs are defined as ROAs that are determined to be		a route. (Valid ROAs are defined as ROAs that are determined to be
	syntactically correct and are signed using a signature that can be		syntactically correct and are signed using a signature that can be
	verified using the RPKI, as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format].)		verified using the RPKI, as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format].)
	The RP needs to match a route to one or more candidate valid ROAs in		The RP needs to match a route to one or more candidate valid ROAs in
	order to determine a validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used		order to determine a validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used
	to determine the appropriate local actions to perform on the route.		to determine the appropriate local actions to perform on the route.
	This approach to route origination validation uses a model of		This approach to route origination validation uses a generic model of
	"positive" attestations, with an associated inference that route that		"positive" attestation that has an associated inference that routes
	cannot be validated within the RPKI framework would conventionally be		that cannot be validated within the RPKI framework would
	interpreted by a RP as "invalid". However, the considerations of		conventionally be interpreted by a RP as "invalid". However, the
	accommodating environments of partial adoption of the use of ROAs,		considerations of accommodating environments of partial adoption of
	where only a subset of validly advertised address prefixes have		the use of ROAs, where only a subset of validly advertised address
	associated published ROAs within the structure of the RPKI, imply		prefixes have associated published ROAs within the structure of the
	some modification to this model of positive attestation. In the		RPKI, imply some modification to this model of positive attestation.
	context of route validation it is assumed that once an address prefix		In the context of route validation it is assumed that once an address
	is described in a ROA, then this ROA specifically encompasses all		prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA specifically encompasses
	address prefixes that are more specific than that described in the		all address prefixes that are more specific than that described in
	ROA. Thus, any route for more specific address prefix than that		the ROA. Thus, any route for a more specific address prefix than
	described by any valid ROA that does not itself have a matching valid		that described by any valid ROA that does not itself have a matching
	ROA is considered to be "invalid". However, routes objects for		valid ROA can be considered to be "invalid". However, routes objects
	address prefixes that are not fully described by any single ROA,		for address prefixes that are not fully described by any single ROA,
	i.e., those route objects whose address prefixes may be an aggregate		i.e., those route objects whose address prefixes may be an aggregate
	of address prefixes described in a valid ROA, or have address		of address prefixes described in a valid ROA, or have address
	prefixes where there is no intersection with any ROA, and are not		prefixes where there is no intersection with any ROA, and are not
	matched by any ROA and are not a more specific of any ROA, cannot be		matched by any ROA and are not a more specific of any ROA, cannot be
	reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario.		reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario.
	Such routes have a validation outcome of "unknown".		Such routes have a validation outcome of "unknown".
	The validation condition of a route with a prefix and an origin AS		An abstract attribute of a route can be determined as the outcome of
	when using single ROA for validation is summarized in the following		this validation procedure, namely a "validity state"
	table:		[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. The "validity state" of a route, with
			a prefix and an origin AS as defined above, when using single ROA for
			determining this validity state is summarized in the following table:
	Prefix matching non-matching		Route matching non-matching
	AS AS		Prefix AS-> AS AS
	+---------+-------------+		V +---------+---------+
	Covering | unknown | unknown |		Non- | unknown | unknown |
	Aggregate | | |		Intersecting | | |
	+---------+-------------+		+---------+---------+
	match ROA | valid | invalid |		Covering | unknown | unknown |
	prefix | | |		Aggregate | | |
	+---------+-------------+		+---------+---------+
	More | invalid | invalid |		match ROA | valid | invalid |
	Specific | | |		prefix | | |
	than ROA | | |		+---------+---------+
	+---------+-------------+		More | | |
			Specific | invalid | invalid |
			than ROA | | |
			+---------+---------+
	In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route is considered to		Route's Validity State
	be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome. It is considered
	to be "invalid" if one (or more) ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome		In an environment of a collection of valid ROAs, a route's validity
	and no ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. It is considered to be		state is considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid"
	"unknown" when no ROA produces either a "valid" or an "invalid"		outcome. It's validity state is considered to be "invalid" if one
			(or more) ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no ROAs provide a
			"valid" outcome. Its validity state is considered to be "unknown"
			(or, synonymously, "not found" [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] when no
			valid ROA can produce either a "valid" or an "invalid" validity state
	outcome.		outcome.
	Route validation is defined by the following procedure:		A route validity state is defined by the following procedure:
	1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that		1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that
	either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address		either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address
	prefix in the route. This selection forms the set of		prefix in the route. This selection forms the set of
	"candidate ROAs."		"candidate ROAs."
	2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty, then the validation		2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty, then the procedure
	procedure stops with an outcome of "unknown".		stops with an outcome of "unknown" (or, synonymously, "not
			found", as used in [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]).
	3. If the route's origin AS can be determined and any of the set		3. If the route's origin AS can be determined and any of the set
	of candidate ROAs has an asID value that matches the origin AS		of candidate ROAs has an asID value that matches the origin AS
	in the route, and the route object's address prefix matches a		in the route, and the route's address prefix matches a
	ROAIPAddress in the ROA (where "match" is defined as where the		ROAIPAddress in the ROA (where "match" is defined as where the
	route object's address precisely matches the ROAIPAddress, or		route's address precisely matches the ROAIPAddress, or where
	where the ROAIPAddress includes a maxLength element, and the		the ROAIPAddress includes a maxLength element, and the route's
	route's address prefix is a more specific prefix of the		address prefix is a more specific prefix of the ROAIPAddress,
	ROAIPAddress, and the route's address prefix length value is		and the route's address prefix length value is less than or
	less than or equal to the ROAIPAddress maxLength value) then		equal to the ROAIPAddress maxLength value) then the procedure
	the validation procedure stops with an outcome of "valid".		halts with an outcome of "valid".
	4. Othewise, the validation procedure stops with an outcome of		4. Otherwise, the procedure halts with an outcome of "invalid".
	"invalid".
	3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection		3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection
	Within the framework of the abstract model of the operation of inter-		Within the framework of the abstract model of the operation of inter-
	domain routing using BGP [RFC4271], a received prefix announcement		domain routing using BGP [RFC4271], a received prefix announcement
	from a routing peer is compared to all announcements for this prefix		from a routing peer is compared to all announcements for this prefix
	received from other routing peers and a route selection procedure is		received from other routing peers and a route selection procedure is
	used to select the "best" route from this candidate set.		used to select the "best" route from this candidate set.
	The route validation outcome, described in Section 2, of "unknown",		The route's validity state, described in Section 2, of "valid",
	"valid" or "invalid" may be used as part of the determination of the		"invalid" or "unknown" may be used as part of the determination of
	local degree of preference, in which case the local order of		the local degree of preference, in which case the local order of
	preference is as follows:		preference is as follows:
	"valid" is to be preferred over		"valid" is to be preferred over
	"unknown", which itself is to be preferred over		"unknown", which is to be preferred over
	"invalid".		"invalid".
	It is a matter of local routing policy as to the actions to be		It is a matter of local routing policy as to the actions to be
	undertaken by a routing entity in processing routes with "unknown"		undertaken by a routing entity in processing those routes with
	validation outcomes. Due to considerations of partial use of ROAs in		"unknown" validity states. Due to considerations of partial use of
	heterogeneous environments, such as in the public Internet, it is		ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public Internet,
	advised that local policy settings should not result in "unknown"		it is advised that local policy settings should not result in
	validation outcomes being considered as sufficient grounds to reject		"unknown" validity state outcomes being considered as sufficient
	a route outright from further consideration as a local "best" route.		grounds to reject a route outright from further consideration as a
			local "best" route.
	It is a matter of local routing policy as to whether "invalid" routes		It is a matter of local routing policy as to whether routes with an
	are considered to be ineligible for further consideration in a route		"invalid" validity state are considered to be ineligible for further
	selection process. A possible consideration here is one of potential		consideration in a route selection process. A possible consideration
	circularity of dependence. If the authoritative publication point of		here is one of potential circularity of dependence: If the
	the repository of ROAs, or that of any certificate used in relation		authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of
	to an address prefix, is located at an address that lies within the		any certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at
	address prefix described in a ROA, then the repository can only be		an address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA,
	accessed by the RP once a route for the prefix has been accepted by		then the repository can only be accessed by the RP once a route for
	the RP's local routing domain. It is also noted that the propagation		the prefix has been accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is
	time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation time of		also noted that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different
	routes, and that routes may be learned by an RP's routing system		to the propagation time of routes, and that routes may be learned by
	before the RP's local RPKI repository cache picks up the associated		an RP's routing system before the RP's local RPKI repository cache
	ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.		picks up the associated ROAs and recognises them as having a validity
			state of "valid" within the RPKI.
	4. Disavowal of Routing Origination		4. Disavowal of Routing Origination
	A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized		A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized
	an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain		an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain
	routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to construct an		routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to construct an
	authorization where no valid AS has been granted any such authority		authorization where no valid AS has been granted any such authority
	to originate a route for an address prefix. This is achieved by		to originate a route for an address prefix. This is achieved by
	using a ROA where the ROA's subject AS is one that must never be used		using a ROA where the ROA's subject AS is one that must not be used
	in any routing context. Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA		in any routing context. Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA
	such that it may be used to identify non-routed networks		such that it may be used to identify non-routed networks
	[IANA.AS-Registry].		[IANA.AS-Registry].
	A ROA with a subject of AS 0 is an attestation by the holder of a		A ROA with a subject of AS 0 (AS0-ROA) is an attestation by the
	prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific		holder of a prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more
	prefix, SHOULD NOT be used in a routing context.		specific prefix, should not be used in a routing context.
	The route validation procedure, described in Section 2, will provide		The route validation procedure, described in Section 2, will provide
	a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and origin		a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and origin
	AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid" validation		AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid" validation
	outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS 0 ROA has a lower		outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS0-ROA has a lower
	preference than any other ROA that has a routeable AS as its subject.		relative preference than any other ROA that has a routable AS as its
	This allows a prefix holder to use an AS 0 ROA to declare a default		subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS0-ROA to declare a
	condition that any route that is equal to, or more specific than the		default condition that any route that is equal to, or more specific
	prefix to be considered to be invalid, while also allowing other		than the prefix to be considered to be invalid, while also allowing
	concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid origination authorizations		other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid origination
	for more specific prefixes.		authorizations for more specific prefixes.
	By convention, an AS 0 ROA SHOULD have a maxLength value of 32 for		By convention, an AS0-ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for
	IPv4 addresses and a maxlength value of 128 for IPv6 addresses,		IPv4 addresses and a maxlength value of 128 for IPv6 addresses,
	although in terms of route validation the same outcome would be		although in terms of route validation the same outcome would be
	achieved with any valid maxLength value, or even if the maxLength		achieved with any valid maxLength value, or even if the maxLength
	element were to be omitted from the ROA.		element were to be omitted from the ROA.
	Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA SHOULD be the only ROA issued for a		Also by convention, an AS0-ROA should be the only ROA issued for a
	given address prefix, although again this is not a strict		given address prefix, although again this is not a strict
	requirement. An AS 0 ROA MAY coexist with ROAs that have different		requirement. An AS0-ROA MAY coexist with ROAs that have different
	subject AS values, although in such cases the presence of the AS 0		subject AS values, although in such cases the presence or otherwise
	ROA does not alter the route validation outcome in any way.		of the AS0-ROA does not alter the route's validity state in any way.
	5. Route Validation Lifetime		5. Route Validation Lifetime
	The "lifetime" of a validation outcome refers to the time period		The "lifetime" of a validation outcome refers to the time period
	during which the original validation outcome can be still applied.		during which the original validation outcome can be still applied.
	The implicit assumption here is that when the validation lifetime		The implicit assumption here is that when the validation lifetime
	expires the routing object SHOULD be re-tested for validity.		expires the routing object should be re-tested for validity.
	The validation lifetime for a ROA is controlled by the Valid times		The validation lifetime for a ROA is controlled by the Valid times
	specified in the End Entity (EE) Certificate used to sign the ROA,		specified in the End Entity (EE) Certificate used to sign the ROA,
	and the valid times of those certificates in the certification path		and the valid times of those certificates in the certification path
	used to validate the EE Certificate. A ROA validation "expires" at		used to validate the EE Certificate. A ROA validation "expires" at
	the Validity To field of the signing EE certificate, or at such a		the Validity To field of the signing EE certificate, or at such a
	time when there is no certification path that can validate the ROA.		time when there is no certification path that can validate the ROA.
	A ROA issuer may elect to prematurely invalidate a ROA by revoking		A ROA issuer may elect to prematurely invalidate a ROA by revoking
	the EE certificate that was used to sign the ROA.		the EE certificate that was used to sign the ROA.
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing		ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing
	a ROA, in that a ROA implicitly invalidates all route objects that		a ROA, in that a ROA implicitly invalidates all routes that have more
	have more specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than		specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than maxLength, and
	maxLength, and all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the		all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the collection of
	collection of ROAs for this prefix.		ROAs for this prefix.
	A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of		A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of
	ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's		ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's
	prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks,		prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks,
	in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid routes during ROA		in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid routes during ROA
	generation.		generation.
	ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one		ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one
	origin AS, then if the address prefix holder authorises multiple AS's		origin AS, then if the address prefix holder authorises multiple AS's
	to originate routes for a given address prefix, then is necessary for		to originate routes for a given address prefix, then is necessary for
	skipping to change at page 8, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 44 ¶
	8. Acknowledgements		8. Acknowledgements
	The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful contributions of		The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful contributions of
	John Scudder and Stephen Kent in preparing this document, and also		John Scudder and Stephen Kent in preparing this document, and also
	the contributions of many members of the SIDR Working Group in		the contributions of many members of the SIDR Working Group in
	response to presentations of this material in SIDR WG sessions. The		response to presentations of this material in SIDR WG sessions. The
	authors also acknowledge prior work undertaken by Tony Bates, Randy		authors also acknowledge prior work undertaken by Tony Bates, Randy
	Bush, Tony Li, and Yakov Rekhter as the validation outcomes described		Bush, Tony Li, and Yakov Rekhter as the validation outcomes described
	here reflect the authentication outcomes and semantics of origin AS		here reflect the authentication outcomes and semantics of origin AS
	verification described in [exI-D.bates].		verification described in [exI-D.bates]. A number of validation
			concepts relating to a route's "validity state" presented in
			[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate], edited by Pradosh Mohapatra et al, have
			be used in this document.
	9. References		9. References
	9.1. Normative References		9.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
	Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support		Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
	Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in		Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
	progress), October 2009.		progress), October 2009.
	skipping to change at page 9, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 33 ¶
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
	Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.		Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
	9.2. Informative References		9.2. Informative References
			[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
			Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
			Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
			draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-00 (work in progress),
			July 2010.
	[IANA.AS-Registry]		[IANA.AS-Registry]
	IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry",		IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry",
	March 2010.		March 2010.
	[exI-D.bates]		[exI-D.bates]
	Bates, T., Bush, R., Li, T., and Y. Rekhter, "DNS-based		Bates, T., Bush, R., Li, T., and Y. Rekhter, "DNS-based
	NLRI origin AS verification in BGP",		NLRI origin AS verification in BGP",
	draft-bates-bgp4-nlri-orig-verif-00.txt (work in		draft-bates-bgp4-nlri-orig-verif-00.txt (work in
	progress), January 1998.		progress), January 1998.
End of changes. 29 change blocks.
	102 lines changed or deleted		122 lines changed or added
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