< draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-00.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-01.txt >
	Network Working Group T. King		Network Working Group T. King
	Internet-Draft D. Kopp		Internet-Draft D. Kopp
	Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX		Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX
	Expires: December 10, 2016 A. Lambrianidis		Expires: June 11, 2017 A. Lambrianidis
	AMS-IX		AMS-IX
	A. Fenioux		A. Fenioux
	France-IX		France-IX
	June 8, 2016		December 8, 2016
	Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers		Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers
	draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-00		draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-01
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation		This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
	State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]		State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
	to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its		to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its
	peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can		peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can
	use this information in their local routing decision process.		use this information in their local routing decision process.
	Requirements Language		Requirements Language
	skipping to change at page 1, line 46 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 46 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 10, 2016.		This Internet-Draft will expire on June 11, 2017.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 34 ¶
	Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation		3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
	State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not		3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not
	Available at a Route-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		Available at a Route-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.4. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.4. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant		RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant
	operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to		operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to
	boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately		boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately
	increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may		increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may
	provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route-server		provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route-server
	[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this prefix origin		[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this prefix origin
	validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin		validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin
	skipping to change at page 4, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 40 ¶
	None.		None.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	A route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix origin		A route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix origin
	validation results. However, peers have to trust the route-server		validation results. However, peers have to trust the route-server
	anyway as it collects and redistributes BGP routing information to		anyway as it collects and redistributes BGP routing information to
	other peers.		other peers.
			To countermeasure DDoS attacks, it is widespread to provide
			blackholing services at IXPs (see RFC 7999 [RFC7999]). Peers are
			using blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing smaller
			subnets, which are unter attack. Assuming, for practical reasons,
			peers will not reflect these announcements in their ROAs. In such
			situations, the RPKI validation status for a prefixes, providing a
			ROA, would be "Invalid". Given that other peers evaluating the RPKI
			status, this leads to a degradation of prefixes being blackholed.
			It's recommended that peers validating the RPKI status use a adopted
			classification for such prefixes.
	The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not		The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not
	pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route-		pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route-
	servers and peers.		servers and peers.
	6. References		6. References
	6.1. Normative References		6.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	skipping to change at page 5, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 27 ¶
	[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended		[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
	Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,		Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
	February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.		February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
	[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.		[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
	Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,		Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,		DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
			[RFC7999] King, T., Dietzel, C., Snijders, J., Doering, G., and G.
			Hankins, "BLACKHOLE Community", RFC 7999,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7999>.
	6.2. Informative References		6.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]		[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]
	Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,		Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
	"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-		"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-
	bgp-route-server-10 (work in progress), April 2016.		bgp-route-server-12 (work in progress), June 2016.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
	Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.		Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
	Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended		Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
	Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07		Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07
	(work in progress), November 2015.		(work in progress), November 2015.
	[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support		[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
	Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,		Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
	February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.		February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
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