< draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-02.txt   draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-03.txt >
S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Informational September 22, 2008 Intended Status: Informational October 22, 2008
Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved) Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved)
Expires: March 22, 2009 Expires: April 22, 2009
Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-02.txt draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-03.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The
ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the
exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition
of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for
digital signature, NIST SP800-56A for key agreement, RFC 3565 for key digital signature, NIST SP800-56A for key agreement, RFC 3565 and RFC
wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180-3 for message digest, and 3370 for key wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180-3 for message
RFCs 2104 and 4231 for message authentication code standards. digest, and RFC 2104 and RFC 4231 for message authentication code
standards. This document will obsolete RFC 3278.
Discussion Discussion
This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To
subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the
single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site
for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/>. for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/>.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3 1. Introduction...................................................2
1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................3 1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................3
1.2. Changes since RFC 3278....................................3 1.2. Changes since RFC 3278....................................3
2. SignedData using ECC...........................................5 2. SignedData using ECC...........................................5
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................5 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................6
3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................6 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................7
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............6 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............7
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................8 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................9
4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC.............11 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC.............12
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................11 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................12
4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................12 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................13
5. Certificates using ECC........................................13 5. Certificates using ECC........................................14
6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................13 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................14
7. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................16 7. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................17
7.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................16 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................17
7.2. Other Syntax.............................................19 7.2. Other Syntax.............................................20
8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................20 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................22
9. Security Considerations.......................................22 9. Security Considerations.......................................24
10. IANA Considerations..........................................27 10. IANA Considerations..........................................29
11. References...................................................27 11. References...................................................29
11.1. Normative...............................................27 11.1. Normative...............................................29
11.2. Informative.............................................29 11.2. Informative.............................................31
Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................30 Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................33
Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................30 Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................33
Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................37 Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................40
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm
independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS.
The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content
types: types:
- 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods - 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
(ECDSA) to sign content (ECDSA) to sign content;
- 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption
keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content
encryption encryption;
- 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt MAC keys used for content authentication and integrity. encrypt message authenticate code (MAC) keys used for content
authentication and integrity; and,
- 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement - 'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt MAC keys used for authenticated encryption modes. encrypt MAC keys used for authenticated encryption modes.
Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public- Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public-
key distribution in support of the specified techniques. key distribution in support of the specified techniques.
The document will obsolete [CMS-ECC].
1.1. Requirements Terminology 1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST]. document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].
1.2. Changes since RFC 3278 1.2. Changes since RFC 3278
The following summarizes the changes: The following summarizes the changes:
- Abstract: The basis of the document was change to refer to NIST - Abstract: The basis of the document was changed to refer to NIST
FIPP 186-3 and SP800-56A. FIPP 186-3 and SP800-56A.
- Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData. - Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData.
- Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate [FIPS180-3] is used - Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate FIPS180-3 is used
with ECDSA. Replaced reference to [X9.62] with [FIPS186-3]. with ECDSA. Replaced reference to ANSI X9.62 with FIPS186-3.
- Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from - Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from
SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was - Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was
deleted. deleted.
- Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not - Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not
included. included.
- Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from CMS to CMS- - Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from CMS to CMS-
ALG. Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are as ALG. Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are as
in CMS. in CMS.
- Section 3.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECDH - Section 3.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECDH
std and cofactor methods were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA- std and cofactor methods were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. Updated to include 224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. Updated to include
description of all KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields. Parameters for description of all KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields. Parameters for
id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to ABSENT or ECPoint. id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to absent or ECPoint.
Additional information about ukm was added.
- Section 3.2: The sentence describing the advantages of 1-Pass
ECMQV was rewritten.
- Section 3.2.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECMQV - Section 3.2.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECMQV
were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
and SHA-512. Updated to include description of all fields. and SHA-512. Updated to include description of all fields.
Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to ABSENT Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to absent
or ECPoint. or ECPoint.
- Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1.2: The re-use of ephemeral keys paragraph
was reworded.
- Section 4.1: The sentences describing the advantages of 1-Pass
ECMQV was moved to Section 4.
- Section 4.1.2: The note about the attack was moved to Section 4.
- Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData - Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData
with ECMQV. with ECMQV.
- Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st paragraph - Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st
was modified as the requirements are difficult to test. The paragraph was modified to require both SignedData and
requirements were updated for hash algorithms and EnvelopedData. The requirements were updated for hash
recommendations for matching curves and hash algorithms. Also algorithms and recommendations for matching curves and hash
expanded to indicate which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap algorithms. Also the requirements were expanded to indicate
algorithms, and content encryption algorithms are required for which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap algorithms, and content
each of the content types used in this document. encryption algorithms are required for each of the content types
used in this document.
- Section 5 (formerly 6): This section was updated to allow for
SMIMECapabilities to be present certificates.
- Section 6 (formerly 7): The S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA with - Section 6 (formerly 7): The S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA with
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 were added to the list of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 were added to the list of
S/MIME Capabilities. Also updated to include S/MIME capabilities S/MIME Capabilities. Also updated to include S/MIME
for ECDH and ECMQV using SHA2 algorithms as the KDF. capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using the SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF.
- Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest, - Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest,
signature, originator public key, key agreement, content signature, originator public key, key agreement, content
encryption, and message authentication code algorithms. SHA- encryption, and message authentication code algorithms. Pointed
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-256, to algorithms and parameters in appropriate docummments for:
SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA were added. Also added algorithm SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-
identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV with SHA2 256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. Also added algorithm
algorithms as the KDF. Message Authentication Code, Content identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV with SHA-224,
Encryption, Key Wrap. SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms as the KDF. Changed
id-ecPublicKey parameters to be absent, NULL, and ECParameters
and if present the originator's ECParameters must match the
recipient's ECParameters.
- Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData. - Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData.
Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed
and uncompressed keys, changed pointers to ANSI X9.61 to PKIX and uncompressed keys, changed pointers from ANSI X9.61 to PKIX
(where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported), changed pointers from SEC1 (where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported), changed pointers from SECG
to NIST specs, and updated example of suppPubInfo to be AES-256. to NIST specs, and updated example of suppPubInfo to be AES-256.
keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any associated keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any associated
parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters). parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters).
- Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an - Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an
updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to
definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is
deleted. deleted.
- Updated references.
- Added ASN.1 modules. - Added ASN.1 modules.
- Updated acknowledgements section. - Updated acknowledgements section.
2. SignedData using ECC 2. SignedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
SignedData format to sign data. SignedData format to sign data.
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA 2.1. SignedData using ECDSA
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In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the
following techniques and formats MUST be used. following techniques and formats MUST be used.
2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData 2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in
[CMS], but with the following restrictions: [CMS], but with the following restrictions:
- digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following: algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following:
id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256 identifies, id-sha384, and id- id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, or id-sha512.
sha512.
- signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier - signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier
(see Section 7.1): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa- (see Section 7.1): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-
with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512. with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512.
- signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a - signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a
value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2). value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2).
When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the
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In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the
integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received
message. message.
3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms 3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
EnvelopedData format. EnvelopedData format.
This document does not specify the static-static ECDH, method C(0,2,
ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Static-static ECDH is analogous to
static-static DH, which is specified in [CMS-ALG]. Ephemeral-static
ECDH and 1-Pass ECMQV were specified because they provide better
security due the originator's ephemeral contribution to the key
agreement scheme.
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH 3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH
This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData,
method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Ephemeral-static ECDH is method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A]. Ephemeral-static ECDH is
the elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key the elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key
agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and
[CMS-DH]. [CMS-DH].
In an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, the following If an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, then the
techniques and formats MUST be used. following techniques and formats MUST be used.
The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as ECDH is a key The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as ECDH is a key
agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When
using ECDH, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY include the using ECDH, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the
pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5. pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5.
3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows: KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows:
- version MUST be 3. - version MUST be 3.
- originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The - originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The
originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
object identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated object identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated
with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent or ECPoint. NOTE: The with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent or ECParameters. NOTE: The
previous version of this document required NULL be present, previous version of this document required NULL to be present,
support for this is OPTIONAL. The originatorKey publicKey field support for this legacy form is OPTIONAL. The originatorKey
MUST contain the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section publicKey field MUST contain the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint
7.2), which represents the sending agent's ephemeral EC public (see Section 7.2), which represents the sending agent's
key. The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST be supported. ephemeral EC public key. The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST
be supported.
- ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators SHOULD - ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators
include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS], implementations SHOULD include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS],
MUST support ukm message recipient processing, so implementations MUST support ukm message recipient processing,
interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or so interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or
absent. When present, the ukm is used to ensure that a absent. The ukm is placed in the entityUInfo field of the ECC-
different key-encryption key is generated, even when the CMS-SharedInfo structure. When present, the ukm is used to
ephemeral private key is improperly used more than once, by ensure that a different key-encryption key is generated, even
using the ECC-Shared-Info as input to in the key derivation when the ephemeral private key is improperly used more than
function (see Section 7.2). once, by using the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo as an input to the key
derivation function (see Section 7.2).
- keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm
object identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters field object identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters field
contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the
algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption
algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with
the key-encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters. the key-encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters.
Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8. Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8.
- recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted
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3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer
"keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The
receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit
string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type
ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if
present original supplied additional user key material from the ukm present, originally supplied additional user key material from the
field. The receiving agent performs the key agreement operation of ukm field. The receiving agent performs the key agreement operation
the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SP800-56A]. of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SP800-56A].
As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string
"K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the "K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the
CEK. CEK.
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV 3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method
C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA], C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA],
1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static
key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving
agent. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it can be used agent. Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for
with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData. knowledge of the message creator, this means that authentication can,
in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and
AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common
algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData,
while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData.
In an implementation uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData, the If an implementation uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData, then
following techniques and formats MUST be used. the following techniques and formats MUST be used.
The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a key The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a key
agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When
using 1-Pass ECMQV, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY using 1-Pass ECMQV, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY
include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in
Section 5. Section 5.
3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are: KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are:
- version MUST be 3. - version MUST be 3.
- originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It - originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It
SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or
subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's
certificates. certificates.
- ukm MUST be present. The ukm field MUST contain an octet string - ukm MUST be present. The ukm field is an octet string which MUST
which is the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see contain the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see
Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey Section 7.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object
identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated with id- identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated with
ecPublicKey MUST be abent or ECPoint. NOTE: The previous id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent or ECParameters. NOTE: The
version of this document required NULL be present, support is previous version of this document required NULL to be present,
OPTIONAL. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey support for this legacy form is OPTIONAL. The
publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST
ECPoint (see Section 7.2) representing the sending agent's contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section
ephemeral EC public key. The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm 7.2) representing the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key.
field, if present, SHOULD contain an octet string of additional The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, contains
user keying material of the sending agent. additional user keying material from the sending agent.
- keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm
identifier (see Section 7.1), with the parameters field identifier (see Section 7.1), with the parameters field
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated
parameters. Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8. parameters. Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8.
- recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted
key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey
KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the recipient's from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the
certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV public key. recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV
RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the content- public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the
encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated content-encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated
pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the
KeyWrapAlgorithm. KeyWrapAlgorithm.
3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g. obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g.
from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain
parameters are the same, as the sender's domain parameters. The parameters are the same as the sender's domain parameters. The
sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
"SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and Section 7.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified
in [SP800-56A]. As a result, the sending agent obtains: in [SP800-56A]. As a result, the sending agent obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type
ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed
in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field
(see Section 7.2), and (see Section 7.2), and
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS]. key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an AuthenticatedData for In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient,
greater efficiency. then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for
that recipient in each of the different layers.
3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen" ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen"
from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving
agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the
originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in
Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid
field and checks that the domain parameters are the same. The field and checks that the domain parameters are the same as the
receiving agent then performs the key agreement operation of the recipient's domain parameters. The receiving agent then performs the
Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme [SP800-56A]. As a result, the receiving key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme [SP800-56A].
agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string
pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK. "K" which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the
CEK.
4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC 4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation, AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example, and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example,
the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when
forwarded.) forwarded.)
This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV]. AuthEnvelopedData supports
authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to
signing and then encrypting data. signing and then encrypting data.
For both AuthentictedData and AuthEnvelopedData, data origin
authentication with 1-Pass ECMQV can only be provided when there is
one and only one recipient. When there are multiple recipients, an
attack is possible where one recipient modifies the content without
other recipients noticing [BON]. A sending agent who is concerned
with such an attack SHOULD use a separate AuthenticatedData or
AuthEnvelopedData for each recipient.
Using an algorithm with the sender static key pair allows for
knowledge of the message creator, this means that authentication can,
in some circumstances, be obtained for AuthEnvelopedData and
AuthenticatedData. This means that 1-Pass ECMQV can be a common
algorithm for EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData
while ECDH can only be used in EnvelopedData.
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV 4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is
method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. An advantage of using 1- method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A].
Pass ECMQV is that it can be used with EnvelopedData,
AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData.
When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of
AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following
restrictions: restrictions:
- macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message - macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message
authentication code algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be authentication code algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be
one of the following: id-hmacWithSHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id- one of the following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id-
hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, and id-hmacWITHSHA512. hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512.
- digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following: algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following:
id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id-sha512. id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id-sha512.
The fields of AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari
key agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When choice is used in the AuthenticatedData. When using 1-Pass ECMQV,
using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY include the
include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the
formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5.
Section 5.
4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent 4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.
The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient,
greater efficiency. then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for
that recipient in each of the different layers.
Note: if there are multiple recipients, an attack is possible where
one recipient modifies the content without other recipients noticing
[BON]. A sending agent who is concerned with such an attack SHOULD
use a separate AuthenticatedData for each recipient.
4.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent 4.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent
The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
Note: see Note in Section 4.1.2.
4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV 4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData. ECMQV is
method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A]. An advantage of using 1- method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A].
Pass ECMQV is that it can be used with EnvelopedData,
AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData.
The fields of AuthEnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a When using ECMQV with AuthEnvelopedData, the fields of
key agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used. When AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS-AUTHENV], but with the following
using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY restriction:
include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates are discussed in - macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message
Section 5. authentication code algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be
one of the following: hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id-
hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, or id-hmacWITHSHA512.
As 1-Pass ECMQV is a key agreement algorithm, the RecipientInfo kari
choice is used. When using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData
originatorInfo field MAY include the certificate(s) for the EC public
key(s) used in the formation of the pairwise key. ECC certificates
are discussed in Section 5.
4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent 4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1- The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1-
Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document. Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.
The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for In a single message, if there are multiple layers for a recipient,
greater efficiency. then the ephemeral public key can be reused by the originator for
that recipient in each of the different layers.
4.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent 4.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent
The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document. 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
5. Certificates using ECC 5. Certificates using ECC
Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with
this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of ECC this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of ECC
algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in [PKI-
[PKI-ALG]. ALG].
6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC 6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC
A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one
or more of the ECC algorithms in this document by using the or more of the ECC algorithms specified in this document by using the
SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG]. SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG] in either a signed message
or a certificate [CERTCAP].
The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for one of the ECDSA The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for one of the ECDSA
signature algorithms is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field signature algorithms is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field
containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA* object identifiers containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA* (where * is 1, 224,
(where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) and with NULL parameters. The 256, 384, or 512) with NULL parameters. The DER encodings are:
DER encodings are:
ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00 ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00
NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities indicates that parameters for ECDSA
with SHA-* are NULL (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512), however,
the parameters are absent when used to generate a digital signature.
The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for
a) the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm, a) the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm,
b) the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or b) the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or
c) the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm c) the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm
is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object
identifier identifier
a) dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme, a) dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme,
b) dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or b) dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or
c) mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme c) mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme
respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the
parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key- parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key-
encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier. encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.
Example DER encodings that indicate some capabilities are as follows Example DER encodings that indicate some capabilities are as follows
(KA is key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key (KA is key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key
wrap algorithm): wrap algorithm):
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 1c 30 1c
06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02
30 0f 30 0f
06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
05 00 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01
30 0d 30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
05 00 05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256 KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02
30 0d 30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
05 00 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 1c 30 1c
06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03
30 0f 30 0f
06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
05 00 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01
30 0d 30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
05 00 05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256 KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02
30 0d 30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
05 00 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-1 Wrap=Triple-DES
30 1c 30 1c
06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10
30 0f 30 0f
06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
05 00 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-256 Wrap=AES-128
30 17 30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01
30 0d 30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
05 00 05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256 KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA-384 Wrap=AES-256
30 17 30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02 06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02
30 0d 30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
05 00 05 00
NOTE: The S/MIME Capabilities indicates that parameters for the key
wrap algorithm AES-* (where * is 128, 192, or 256) are NULL; however,
the parameters are absent when used to encrypt/decrypt a content
encryption key.
7. ASN.1 Syntax 7. ASN.1 Syntax
The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section
for reference purposes. for reference purposes.
7.1. Algorithm Identifiers 7.1. Algorithm Identifiers
This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used
in this document along with any associated parameters. in this document along with any associated parameters.
7.1.1. Digest Algorithms 7.1.1. Digest Algorithms
Digest algorithm object identifiers are used in the SignedData Digest algorithm object identifiers are used in the SignedData
digestAlgorithms and digestAlgorithm fields, the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithms and digestAlgorithm fields and the AuthenticatedData
digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthEnvelopedData digestAlgorithm digestAlgorithm field. The digest algorithms used in this document
field. The digest algorithms used in this document are: SHA-1, are: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The object
SHA224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The object identifiers and identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found
parameters associated with these algorithms are found in [SMIME- in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-SHA2].
SHA2].
7.1.2. Originator Public Key 7.1.2. Originator Public Key
The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator filed use the following object The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field use the following object
identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key: identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 } ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 }
where where
ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 } iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }
When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an
algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent
or ECPoint. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with the or ECParameters. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with
parameters field with absent, NULL, and ECPoint parameters. If absent, and ECParameters parameters. If ECParameters is present, its
ECPoint is present its value is ignored. Implementations SHOULD value MUST match the recipients ECParameters. Implementations SHOULD
generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object identifier generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object identifier
in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field. in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field.
NOTE: [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for NULL
parameters is OPTIONAL.
7.1.3. Signature Algorithms 7.1.3. Signature Algorithms
Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData
signatureAlgorithm and signature field. The signature algorithms signatureAlgorithm and signature field. The signature algorithms
used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA
with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object
identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found
in [PKI-ALG]. in [PKI-ALG].
NOTE: [CMS-ECC] indicated the parameters were NULL. Support for NULL
parameters is OPTIONAL.
7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms 7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms
Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData, Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData,
AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. The following object identifiers keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. The following object identifiers
indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document [SP800- indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document [SP800-
56A]: 56A]:
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 } x9-63-scheme 2 }
skipping to change at page 18, line 33 skipping to change at page 20, line 9
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) } iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
identifier, the associated parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm identifier, the associated parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm
to indicate the key wrap algorithm and any associated parameters. to indicate the key wrap algorithm and any associated parameters.
7.1.5. Key Wrap Algorithms 7.1.5. Key Wrap Algorithms
Key wrap algorithms are used as part of the parameters in the key Key wrap algorithms are used as part of the parameters in the key
agreement algorithm. The key wrap algorithms used in this document agreement algorithm. The key wrap algorithms used in this document
are Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256. The object identifier and are Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. The object
parameters for these algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES]. identifiers and parameters for these algorithms are found in [CMS-
ALG] and [CMS-AES].
7.1.6. Content Encryption Algorithms 7.1.6. Content Encryption Algorithms
Content encryption algorithms are used in EnvelopedData and Content encryption algorithms are used in EnvelopedData and
AuthEnvelopedData in the EncryptedContentInfo AuthEnvelopedData in the EncryptedContentInfo
contentEncryptionAlgorithm field. The content encryption algorithms contentEncryptionAlgorithm field. The content encryption algorithms
used with EnvelopedData in this document are AES-128 in CBC mode, used with EnvelopedData in this document are 3-Key Triple DES in CBC
AES-192 in CBC mode, and AES-256 in CBC mode. The object identifiers mode, AES-128 in CBC mode, AES-192 in CBC mode, and AES-256 in CBC
and parameters associated with these algorithms are found in [CMS- mode. The object identifiers and parameters associated with these
AES]. The content encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES]. The content
in this document are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES- encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData in this document
256 in CCM mode, AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES- are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES-256 in CCM mode,
256 in GCM mode. The object identifiers and parameters associated AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES-256 in GCM mode.
with these algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG]. The object identifiers and parameters associated with these
algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG].
7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms 7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms
Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData
and AuthEnvelopedData in the macAlgorithm field. The message and AuthEnvelopedData in the macAlgorithm field. The message
authentication code algorithms used in this document are HMAC with authentication code algorithms used in this document are HMAC with
SHA-1, HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-1, HMAC with SHA-1, and HMAC SHA-1, HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and
with SHA-1. The object identifiers and parameters associated with HMAC with SHA-512. The object identifiers and parameters associated
these algorithms are found in [HMAC-SHA1] and [HMAC-SHA2]. with these algorithms are found in [HMAC-SHA1] and [HMAC-SHA2].
7.2. Other Syntax 7.2. Other Syntax
The following additional syntax is used here. The following additional syntax is used here.
When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using
the type: the type:
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER, r INTEGER,
skipping to change at page 19, line 44 skipping to change at page 21, line 20
ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and
additional keying material are encoded using the type: additional keying material are encoded using the type:
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL } addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL }
The ECPoint syntax in used to represent the ephemeral public key and The ECPoint syntax is used to represent the ephemeral public key and
placed in the ephemeralPublicKey field. The additional user keying is placed in the ephemeralPublicKey.publicKey field. The additional
material is placed in the addedukm field. Then the user keying material is placed in the addedukm field. Then the
MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within a ukm MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within the ukm
field of EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData. field of EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData.
When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or
AuthEnvelopedData, the key-encryption keys are derived by using the AuthEnvelopedData, the key-encryption keys are derived by using the
type: type:
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING } suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING }
skipping to change at page 20, line 42 skipping to change at page 22, line 16
the key derivation function, as specified in [SP800-56A]. the key derivation function, as specified in [SP800-56A].
Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in
[CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field [CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field
because the key derivation function specified in [SP800-56A] ensures because the key derivation function specified in [SP800-56A] ensures
that sufficient keying data is provided. that sufficient keying data is provided.
8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves 8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves
It is RECOMMEND that implementations of this specification support It is RECOMMEND that implementations of this specification support
SignedData. Support for EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData is SignedData and EnvelopedData. Support for AuthenticatedData and
OPTIONAL. AuthEnvelopedData is OPTIONAL.
In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use
the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG]. the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG].
Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA: Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA:
- MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256. - MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256; and,
- MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with SHA- - MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with SHA-
384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. 384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. Other digital signature algorithms
MAY also be supported.
When using ECDSA, it is RECOMMENDED that the P-224 curve be used with When using ECDSA, it is RECOMMENDED that the P-224 curve be used with
SHA-224, the P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be SHA-224, the P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be
used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512. used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.
If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard
primitive MUST be supported. primitive MUST be supported. Support for ephemeral-static ECDH co-
factor is OPTIONAL and support for 1-Pass ECMQV is also OPTIONAL.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
ECDH standard primitive: ECDH standard primitive:
- MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and,
- MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- - MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms,
the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key
wrap algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content wrap algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc and id-
encryption algorithms. aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms. Other algorithms MAY
also be supported.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
ECDH cofactor primitive: ECDH cofactor primitive:
- MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key - MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm. the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and,
- MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme, - MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH- cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id- sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the id- aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the des-
aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms. ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content encryption
algorithms. Other algorithms MAY also be supported.
Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement
algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id- algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-
aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm. aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm; and,
- MAY support mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- - MAY support mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-
alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content algorithms and the des-ede3-cbc, id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc
encryption algorithms. content encryption algorithms. Other algorithms MAY also be
supported.
Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, and the id-aes128-cbc content the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-sha256 message digest, and
encryption, the id-sha256 message digest, and id-hmacWithSHA256 id-hmacWithSHA256 message authentication code algorithms; and,
message authentication code algorithms.
- MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-alg- sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-alg-
CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms, the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and id-sha512,
encryption algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and message digest algorithms, and the hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224,
id-sha512, message digest algorithms, and the id-hmacWithSHA1, id-hmacWithSHA384, id-hmacWithSHA512 message authentication code
id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA384, id-hmacWithSHA512 message algorithms. Other algorithms MAY also be supported.
authentication code algorithms.
Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV: Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:
- MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement, - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-aes128-ccm authenticated- the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-aes128-ccm authenticated-
content encryption, the id-sha256 message digest, and the id- content encryption, and the id-hmacWithSHA256 message
hmacWithSHA256 message authentication cod algorithms. authentication code algorithms; and,
- MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass- - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-
alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
algorithms, the id-aes192-ccm and id-aes256-ccm authenticated- algorithms, the id-aes192-ccm and id-aes256-ccm authenticated-
content encryption algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id- content encryption algorithms, and hmac-SHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224,
sha384, and id-sha512, message digest algorithms, and id- id-hmacWithSHA384, id-hmacWithSHA512 message authentication code
hmacWithSHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA384, id- algorithms. Other algorithms MAY also be supported.
hmacWithSHA512 message authentication code algorithms.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time. Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time.
Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic
algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected
level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents level of security. The IETF from time to time may issue documents
dealing with the current state of the art. dealing with the current state of the art.
Cryptographic algorithms rely on random number. See [RANDOM] for Cryptographic algorithms rely on random number. See [RANDOM] for
guidance on generation of random numbers. guidance on generation of random numbers.
Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that
encrypt messages, need to be cautious of cryptographic processing encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing
usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys
larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could
send certificates with keys which would result in excessive send keys and/or certificates with keys which would result in
cryptographic processing, for example keys larger than those mandated excessive cryptographic processing, for example keys larger than
in this specification, which could swamp the processing element. those mandated in this specification, which could swamp the
Agents which use such keys without first validating the certificate processing element. Agents which use such keys without first
to a trust anchor are advised to have some sort of cryptographic validating the certificate to a trust anchor are advised to have some
resource management system to prevent such attacks. sort of cryptographic resource management system to prevent such
attacks.
Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security
of a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For elliptic curve groups, the size of of a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For elliptic curve groups, the size of
the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group
generated by the point g). Using larger secret keys provides generated by the point g). Using larger secret keys provides
absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is
likely to result in dramatically less security. (See [SP800-56A] for likely to result in dramatically less security. (See [SP800-56A] for
more information on selecting secret keys.) more information on selecting secret keys.)
This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-ALG], This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AES], [CMS-AESCG], [CMS-
[CMS-AESCG], [X9.62], [SEC1], and [SEC2] and the appropriate security ALG], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-DH], [CMS_SHA2], [FIPS180-3], [FIPS186-3],
[HMAC-SHA1], and [HMAC-SHA2], and the appropriate security
considerations of those documents apply. considerations of those documents apply.
In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData should be aware of the In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData
concerns expressed in [BON] when using AuthenticatedData to send should be aware of the concerns expressed in [BON] when using
messages to more than one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData to send messages to more than
aware of the vulnerability in [K]. one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be aware of the
vulnerability in [K].
When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need
to be made: to be made:
1) What is the public key size? 1) What is the public key size?
2) What is the KDF? 2) What is the KDF?
3) What is the key wrap algorithm? 3) What is the key wrap algorithm?
4) What is the content encryption algorithm? 4) What is the content encryption algorithm?
5) What is the curve? 5) What is the curve?
skipping to change at page 24, line 11 skipping to change at page 26, line 9
security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
each are roughly equivalent. The following table provides comparable each are roughly equivalent. The following table provides comparable
minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes, minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes,
KDFs, key wrapping algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It KDFs, key wrapping algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It
also lists curves [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes. also lists curves [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes.
Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curves Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curves
Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption | Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption |
Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
80 | 160-223 | SHA1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | sect163k1 80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | sect163k1
| | SHA224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2 | | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2
| | SHA256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1 | | SHA-256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1
| | SHA384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | | | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC |
| | SHA512 | | | | | SHA-512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
112 | 224-255 | SHA1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1 112 | 224-255 | SHA-1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1
| | SHA224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | sect233k1 | | SHA-224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | sect233k1
| | SHA256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect233r1 | | SHA-256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect233r1
| | SHA384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | | | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC |
| | SHA512 | | | | | SHA-512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
128 | 256-383 | SHA1 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1 128 | 256-383 | SHA-1 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
| | SHA224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect283k1 | | SHA-224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect283k1
| | SHA256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect283r1 | | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect283r1
| | SHA384 | | | | | SHA-384 | | |
| | SHA512 | | | | | SHA-512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
192 | 384-511 | SHA224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp384r1 192 | 384-511 | SHA-224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp384r1
| | SHA256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect409k1 | | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect409k1
| | SHA384 | | | sect409r1 | | SHA-384 | | | sect409r1
| | SHA512 | | | | | SHA-512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
256 | 512+ | SHA256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1 256 | 512+ | SHA-256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
| | SHA384 | | | sect571k1 | | SHA-384 | | | sect571k1
| | SHA512 | | | sect571r1 | | SHA-512 | | | sect571r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+--------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED: To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED:
Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curve Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curve
Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption | Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption |
Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. | Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
80 | 192 | SHA256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp192r1 80 | 192 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp192r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
112 | 224 | SHA256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1 112 | 224 | SHA-256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
128 | 256 | SHA256 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
192 | 384 | SHA384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
256 | 512 | SHA512 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1 256 | 512 | SHA-512 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------- ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related
choices that need to be made: choices that need to be made:
1) What is the public key size? 1) What is the public key size?
2) What is the hash algorithm? 2) What is the hash algorithm?
3) What is the curve? 3) What is the curve?
Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each
skipping to change at page 26, line 9 skipping to change at page 28, line 9
security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
each choice are roughly equivalent. The following table provides each choice are roughly equivalent. The following table provides
comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDSA key comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDSA key
sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG] sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG]
for the key sizes. for the key sizes.
Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve
Bits of | Key Size | Digest | Bits of | Key Size | Digest |
Security | | Algorithm | Security | | Algorithm |
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
80 | 160-223 | SHA1 | sect163k1 80 | 160-223 | SHA-1 | sect163k1
| | SHA224 | secp163r2 | | SHA-224 | secp163r2
| | SHA256 | secp192r1 | | SHA-256 | secp192r1
| | SHA384 | | | SHA-384 |
| | SHA512 | | | SHA-512 |
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
112 | 224-255 | SHA224 | secp224r1 112 | 224-255 | SHA-224 | secp224r1
| | SHA256 | sect233k1 | | SHA-256 | sect233k1
| | SHA384 | sect233r1 | | SHA-384 | sect233r1
| | SHA512 | | | SHA-512 |
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
128 | 256-383 | SHA256 | secp256r1 128 | 256-383 | SHA-256 | secp256r1
| | SHA384 | sect283k1 | | SHA-384 | sect283k1
| | SHA512 | sect283r1 | | SHA-512 | sect283r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
192 | 384-511 | SHA384 | secp384r1 192 | 384-511 | SHA-384 | secp384r1
| | SHA512 | sect409k1 | | SHA-512 | sect409k1
| | | sect409r1 | | | sect409r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
256 | 512+ | SHA512 | secp521r1 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1
| | | sect571k1 | | | sect571k1
| | | sect571r1 | | | sect571r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED: To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED:
Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve
Bits of | Key Size | Digest | Bits of | Key Size | Digest |
Security | | Algorithm | Security | | Algorithm |
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
80 | 192 | SHA256 | sect192r1 80 | 192 | SHA-256 | sect192r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
112 | 224 | SHA256 | secp224r1 112 | 224 | SHA-256 | secp224r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
128 | 256 | SHA256 | secp256r1 128 | 256 | SHA-256 | secp256r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
192 | 384 | SHA384 | secp384r1 192 | 384 | SHA-384 | secp384r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
256 | 512+ | SHA512 | secp521r1 256 | 512+ | SHA-512 | secp521r1
---------+----------+-----------+----------- ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
None. This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register
originator public key types and algorithms. The algorithms object
identifiers are registered in the ANSI X9.62, ANSI X9.63, NIST, RSA,
and SECG arcs. Additionally, object identifiers are used to identify
the ASN.1 modules found in Appendix A. These are defined in an arc
delegated by IANA to the SMIME Working Group. No further action by
IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative 11.1. Normative
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC [CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC
3852, July 2004. 3852, July 2004.
[CMS-AES] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard [CMS-AES] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003. Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.
[CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated [CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007. (CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007.
[CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS-AUTHENV] Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083, Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
November 2007. November 2007.
[CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", [CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, June 1999. RFC 2631, June 1999.
[CMS-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", work-in-progress.
[FIPS180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology [FIPS180-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, (NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard,
June 2003. (draft) June 2003.
[FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology [FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature (NIST), FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature
Standard, March 2006. Standard, (draft) March 2006.
[HMAC-SHA1] Krawczyk, M., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: [HMAC-SHA1] Krawczyk, M., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997. February 1997.
[HMAC-SHA2] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC- [HMAC-SHA2] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-
SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA- SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
512", RFC 4231, December 2005. 512", RFC 4231, December 2005.
[MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate [MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 28, line 22 skipping to change at page 30, line 30
[PKI] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S. [PKI] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W. [PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W.
Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-subpubkeyinfo, Information", draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-subpubkeyinfo,
work-in-progress. work-in-progress.
[PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[RANDOM] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, [RANDOM] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller,
"Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086,
June 2005. June 2005.
[RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for
use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.
[SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for
Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Available from
www.secg.org/collateral/sec1.pdf.
[SEC2] SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
Available from www.secg.org/collateral/sec2.pdf.
[SMIME-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", work-in-progress.
[SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology [SP800-56A] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation (NIST), Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007. Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007.
[X9.62] American National Standards Institute (ANSI), ANS
X9.62-2005: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005.
[X.208] ITU-T Recommendation X.208 (1988) | ISO/IEC 8824- [X.208] ITU-T Recommendation X.208 (1988) | ISO/IEC 8824-
1:1988. Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One 1:1988. Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1). (ASN.1).
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
1 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One.
[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
2 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Information Object Specification.
[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
3 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Constraint Specification.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1
Specifications, 2002.
11.2. Informative 11.2. Informative
[BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC", [BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC",
Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000, Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000,
Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University
of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps
[CERTCAP] Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005.
[CMS-ECC] Blake-Wilson, S., Brown, D., and P. Lambert, "Use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3278, April
2002.
[CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC [CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC
2876, July 2000. 2876, July 2000.
[CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1 [K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1
and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998. and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998.
[PKI-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology [SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation (NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation
for Key Management, August 2005. for Key Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
1 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One.
[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
2 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Information Object Specification.
[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
3 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Constraint Specification.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1
Specifications, 2002.
Appendix A ASN.1 Modules Appendix A ASN.1 Modules
Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.208]. [X.208].
Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680], [X.681], [X.682], [X.683]. This appendix contains the same [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683]. This appendix contains the
information as Appendix A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 same information as Appendix A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1
notation, however Appendix A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict. notation, however Appendix A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.
Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module
SMIMEECCAlgs-1988 SMIMEECCAlgs-1988
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) TBD } smime(16) modules(0) TBA }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- From [PKI] -- From [PKI]
AlgorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier
skipping to change at page 31, line 10 skipping to change at page 34, line 10
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) } id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) }
-- From [PKI-ALG] -- From [PKI-ALG]
id-sha1, ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, id-sha1, ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224,
ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, ecdsa-with-SHA512, ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, ecdsa-with-SHA512,
id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint
FROM PKIXAlgs-1988 FROM PKIXAlgs-2008
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA }
-- From [CMS] -- From [CMS]
OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- From [CMS-ALG] -- From [CMS-ALG]
skipping to change at page 31, line 45 skipping to change at page 35, line 4
-- From [CMS-AESCG] -- From [CMS-AESCG]
id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters
id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) } smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }
; ;
-- --
-- ECDSA with SHA-2 Algorithms -- ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
-- Algorithms.
-- --
-- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Parameters are ABSENT -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Parameters are absent
-- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Parameters are absent
-- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Parameters are ABSENT -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Parameters are absent
-- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Parameters are ABSENT
-- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Parameters are absent -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Parameters are absent
-- ECDSA Signature Value -- ECDSA Signature Value
-- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING
-- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { -- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
-- r INTEGER, -- r INTEGER,
-- s INTEGER -- s INTEGER
-- } -- }
skipping to change at page 34, line 12 skipping to change at page 37, line 12
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 3 } secg-scheme 15 3 }
-- --
-- Key Wrap Algorithms -- Key Wrap Algorithms
-- --
KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-alg-CMS3DESwrap Parameters are NULL -- id-alg-CMS3DESwrap Parameters are NULL
-- id-aes128-wrap Parameters are ABSENT -- id-aes128-wrap Parameters are absent
-- id-aes192-wrap Parameters are ABSENT -- id-aes192-wrap Parameters are absent
-- id-aes256-wrap Parameters are ABSENT -- id-aes256-wrap Parameters are absent
-- --
-- Content Encryption Algorithms -- Content Encryption Algorithms
-- --
-- des-ede3-cbc Parameters are CBCParameter -- des-ede3-cbc Parameters are CBCParameter
-- id-aes128-CBC Parameters are AES-IV -- id-aes128-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
-- id-aes192-CBC Parameters are AES-IV -- id-aes192-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
-- id-aes256-CBC Parameters are AES-IV -- id-aes256-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
-- id-aes128-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters -- id-aes128-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
-- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters -- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
-- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters -- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
-- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters -- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
-- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters -- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
-- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters -- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
-- --
-- Message Digest Algorithms -- Message Digest Algorithms
-- --
-- HMAC with SHA-1
-- Parameters SHOULD be absent, MAY be NULL
-- hMAC-SHA1
-- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, -- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384,
-- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA2] -- and HMAC with SHA-512
-- Parameters are ABSENT
-- hMACWithSHA1 -- Parameters are absent
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
skipping to change at page 35, line 13 skipping to change at page 38, line 21
digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
-- --
-- Originator Public Key Algorithms -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
-- --
-- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are NULL -- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are absent, NULL, or ECParameters
-- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys
-- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
-- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
-- ECMQV -- ECMQV
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
skipping to change at page 35, line 35 skipping to change at page 39, line 4
} }
-- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with
-- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier, keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
} }
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities -- S/MIME Capabilities
-- --
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA1 and SHA2 Algorithms -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
-- and SHA-512 Algorithms
-- --
-- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type NULL
-- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type NULL -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type NULL
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard
-- --
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
skipping to change at page 37, line 9 skipping to change at page 40, line 9
-- mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
-- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm -- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
END END
Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module
SMIMEECCAlgs-2008 SMIMEECCAlgs-2008
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) TBD } smime(16) modules(0) TBA }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS IMPORTS
-- FROM [PKI-ASN] -- FROM [PKI-ASN]
KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE
FROM AlgorithmInformation FROM AlgorithmInformation
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithInformation(TBD)} id-mod-algorithInformation(TBA) }
-- From [PKI-ASN] -- From [PKI-ALG]
id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint
FROM PKIXAlgIDs-2008
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA }
-- From [PKI-ALG]
mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256, mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256,
sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, id-ecPublicKey, sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, ECParameters
ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint
FROM PKIXAlgs-2008 FROM PKIXAlgs-2008
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA }
-- From [PKI-ASN] -- From [PKI-ASN]
mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512 mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA }
-- From [CMS] -- From [CMS]
OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- From [CMS-ASN] -- From [CMS-ASN]
skipping to change at page 39, line 11 skipping to change at page 42, line 11
-- mda-sha512, -- mda-sha512,
-- ... -- Extensible -- ... -- Extensible
-- } -- }
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field
-- SignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- SignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 | -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 |
-- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 , -- sa-ecdsaWithSHA512,
-- ... -- Extensible -- ... -- Extensible
-- } -- }
-- ECDSA Signature Value -- ECDSA Signature Value
-- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { -- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER, -- r INTEGER,
s INTEGER -- s INTEGER
} -- }
-- --
-- Key Agreement Algorithms -- Key Agreement Algorithms
-- --
-- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
-- keyEncryption Algorithm field -- keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
skipping to change at page 45, line 4 skipping to change at page 47, line 43
-- cea-aes128-gcm | -- cea-aes128-gcm |
-- cea-aes192-gcm | -- cea-aes192-gcm |
-- cea-aes256-gcm, -- cea-aes256-gcm,
-- ... -- Extensible -- ... -- Extensible
-- } -- }
-- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and -- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and
-- EncryptedData -- EncryptedData
-- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData -- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
-- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData -- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
-- (where * is 128, 192, and 256)
-- --
-- Message Digest Algorithms -- Message Digest Algorithms
-- --
-- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384,
-- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA2]
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
maca-sha1 | maca-sha1 |
maca-sha224 | maca-sha224 |
maca-sha256 | maca-sha256 |
maca-sha384 | maca-sha384 |
maca-sha512, maca-sha512,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
-- Would love to import the HMAC224-512 OIDS but they're not in a
-- module (that I could find)
maca-sha224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { maca-sha224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA224 IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA224
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
} }
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
maca-sha256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { maca-sha256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
skipping to change at page 46, line 40 skipping to change at page 49, line 31
-- PARAMS are NULL -- PARAMS are NULL
OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= { OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
opka-ec, opka-ec,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={ opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={
IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey
KEY ECPoint KEY ECPoint
PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECPoint } ARE preferredAbsent PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECParameters } ARE preferredAbsent
} }
-- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys
-- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
-- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
-- ECMQV -- ECMQV
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE { MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey, ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
} }
-- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with
-- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithm }, keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithm },
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
} }
-- --
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cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf | cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf | cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf | cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf | cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf | cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf, cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
... -- Extensible ... -- Extensible
} }
-- --
-- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA2 Algorithms -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
-- and SHA-512 Algorithms
-- --
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA1.&id } TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA1.&id }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA224.&id } TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA224.&id }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= { cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA256.&id } TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA256.&id }
skipping to change at page 51, line 14 skipping to change at page 54, line 14
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The methods described in this document are based on work done by the The methods described in this document are based on work done by the
ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to
ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter
de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of
Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions. Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions.
Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake- Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake-
Wilson and Paul Lambert. Without the initial version of RFC3278 this Wilson and Paul Lambert. Without RFC 3278 this version wouldn't
version wouldn't exist. exist.
The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Paul Hoffman, Russ The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Paul Hoffman, Russ
Housley, and Jim Schaad for their valuable input. Housley, and Jim Schaad for their valuable input.
Author's Addresses Author's Addresses
Sean Turner Sean Turner
IECA, Inc. IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
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