< draft-ietf-smime-3850bis-07.txt		draft-ietf-smime-3850bis-08.txt >
	S/MIME WG Blake Ramsdell, Brute Squad Labs		S/MIME WG Blake Ramsdell, Brute Squad Labs
	Internet Draft Sean Turner, IECA		Internet Draft Sean Turner, IECA
	Intended Status: Standard Track September 24, 2008		Intended Status: Standard Track October 2, 2008
	Obsoletes: 3850 (once approved)		Obsoletes: 3850 (once approved)
	Expires: March 24, 2009		Expires: April 2, 2009
	Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2		Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2
	Certificate Handling		Certificate Handling
	draft-ietf-smime-3850bis-07.txt		draft-ietf-smime-3850bis-08.txt
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any		By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
	applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware		applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
	have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes		have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
	aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.		aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that		Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
	skipping to change at page 1, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 35 ¶
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at		The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt		http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
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	This Internet-Draft will expire on March 24, 2008.		This Internet-Draft will expire on April 2, 2008.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).		Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document specifies conventions for X.509 certificate usage by		This document specifies conventions for X.509 certificate usage by
	Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) agents. S/MIME		Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) agents. S/MIME
	provides a method to send and receive secure MIME messages, and		provides a method to send and receive secure MIME messages, and
	skipping to change at page 2, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 40 ¶
	3. Using Distinguished Names For Internet Mail....................8		3. Using Distinguished Names For Internet Mail....................8
	4. Certificate Processing.........................................9		4. Certificate Processing.........................................9
	4.1. Certificate Revocation Lists.............................10		4.1. Certificate Revocation Lists.............................10
	4.2. Certificate Path Validation..............................10		4.2. Certificate Path Validation..............................10
	4.3. Certificate and CRL Signing Algorithms and Key Sizes.....11		4.3. Certificate and CRL Signing Algorithms and Key Sizes.....11
	4.4. PKIX Certificate Extensions..............................12		4.4. PKIX Certificate Extensions..............................12
	5. IANA Considerations...........................................14		5. IANA Considerations...........................................14
	6. Security Considerations.......................................14		6. Security Considerations.......................................14
	7. References....................................................16		7. References....................................................16
	7.1. Normative References.....................................16		7.1. Normative References.....................................16
	7.2. Informative References...................................17		7.2. Informative References...................................18
	Appendix A. Moving S/MIME v2 Certificate Handling to Historic		Appendix A. Moving S/MIME v2 Certificate Handling to Historic
	Status...............................................19		Status...............................................20
	Appendix B. Acknowledgements.....................................19		Appendix B. Acknowledgements.....................................20
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions), described in		S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions), described in
	[SMIME-MSG], provides a method to send and receive secure MIME		[SMIME-MSG], provides a method to send and receive secure MIME
	messages. Before using a public key to provide security services,		messages. Before using a public key to provide security services,
	the S/MIME agent MUST verify that the public key is valid. S/MIME		the S/MIME agent MUST verify that the public key is valid. S/MIME
	agents MUST use PKIX certificates to validate public keys as		agents MUST use PKIX certificates to validate public keys as
	described in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX)		described in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX)
	Certificate and CRL Profile [KEYM]. S/MIME agents MUST meet the		Certificate and CRL Profile [KEYM]. S/MIME agents MUST meet the
	certificate processing requirements documented in this document in		certificate processing requirements documented in this document in
	addition to those stated in [KEYM].		addition to those stated in [KEYM].
	This specification is compatible with the Cryptographic Message		This specification is compatible with the Cryptographic Message
	Syntax [CMS] in that it uses the data types defined by CMS. It also		Syntax (CMS) RFC 3852 and RFC 4853 [CMS] in that it uses the data
	inherits all the varieties of architectures for certificate-based key		types defined by CMS. It also inherits all the varieties of
	management supported by CMS.		architectures for certificate-based key management supported by CMS.
	1.1. Definitions		1.1. Definitions
	For the purposes of this document, the following definitions apply.		For the purposes of this document, the following definitions apply.
	ASN.1: Abstract Syntax Notation One, as defined in ITU-T X.680		ASN.1: Abstract Syntax Notation One, as defined in ITU-T X.680
	[X.680].		[X.680].
	Attribute Certificate (AC): An X.509 AC is a separate structure from		Attribute Certificate (AC): An X.509 AC is a separate structure from
	a subject's public key X.509 Certificate. A subject may have		a subject's public key X.509 Certificate. A subject may have
	skipping to change at page 4, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 21 ¶
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [MUSTSHOULD].		document are to be interpreted as described in [MUSTSHOULD].
	We define some additional terms here:		We define some additional terms here:
	SHOULD+ This term means the same as SHOULD. However, the authors		SHOULD+ This term means the same as SHOULD. However, the authors
	expect that a requirement marked as SHOULD+ will be promoted at		expect that a requirement marked as SHOULD+ will be promoted at
	some future time to be a MUST.		some future time to be a MUST.
	SHOULD- This term means the same as SHOULD. However, the authors		SHOULD- This term means the same as SHOULD. However, the authors
	expect a requirement marked as SHOULD- will be demoted to a MAY		expect that a requirement marked as SHOULD- will be demoted to a
	in a future version of this document.		MAY in a future version of this document.
	MUST- This term means the same as MUST. However, the authors		MUST- This term means the same as MUST. However, the authors
	expect that this requirement will no longer be a MUST in a future		expect that this requirement will no longer be a MUST in a future
	document. Although its status will be determined at a later		document. Although its status will be determined at a later
	time, it is reasonable to expect that if a future revision of a		time, it is reasonable to expect that if a future revision of a
	document alters the status of a MUST- requirement, it will remain		document alters the status of a MUST- requirement, it will remain
	at least a SHOULD or a SHOULD-.		at least a SHOULD or a SHOULD-.
	1.3. Compatibility with Prior Practice S/MIME		1.3. Compatibility with Prior Practice S/MIME
	skipping to change at page 5, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 26 ¶
	that does not have the digitalSignature or nonRepudiation bit set.		that does not have the digitalSignature or nonRepudiation bit set.
	Clarifications for the interpretation of the key usage and extended		Clarifications for the interpretation of the key usage and extended
	key usage extensions.		key usage extensions.
	1.5. Changes Since S/MIME v3.1		1.5. Changes Since S/MIME v3.1
	Conventions Used in This Document: Moved to section 1.2. Added		Conventions Used in This Document: Moved to section 1.2. Added
	definitions for SHOULD+, SHOULD-, and MUST-.		definitions for SHOULD+, SHOULD-, and MUST-.
	Sec 1.2: Updated ASN.1 definition and reference.		Sec 1.1: Updated ASN.1 definition and reference.
	Sec 1.3: Added text about v3.1 RFCs.		Sec 1.3: Added text about v3.1 RFCs.
	Sec 3: Updated note to indicate emailAddress IA5String upper bound is		Sec 3: Updated note to indicate emailAddress IA5String upper bound is
	255 characters.		255 characters.
	Sec 4.2: Added text to indicate how S/MIME agents locate the correct		Sec 4.2: Added text to indicate how S/MIME agents locate the correct
	user certificate.		user certificate.
	Sec 4.3: RSA with SHA-256 (PKCS #1 v1.5) added as MUST, DSA with SHA-		Sec 4.3: RSA with SHA-256 (PKCS #1 v1.5) added as MUST, DSA with SHA-
	256 added as SHOULD+, RSA with SHA-1 changed to SHOULD-, DSA with		256 added as SHOULD+, RSA with SHA-1, DSA with SHA-1, and RSA with
	SHA-1, and RSA with MD5 changed to SHOULD-, and RSA-PSS with SHA-256		MD5 changed to SHOULD-, and RSA-PSS with SHA-256 added as SHOULD+.
	added as SHOULD+. Updated key sizes and changed pointer from [KEYM]		Updated key sizes and changed pointer to PKIX RFCs.
	to [KEYMALG].
	Sec 4.4.1: Aligned with PKIX on use of basic constraints extension in		Sec 4.4.1: Aligned with PKIX on use of basic constraints extension in
	CA certificates. Clarified which extension is used to constrain EEs		CA certificates. Clarified which extension is used to constrain EEs
	from using their keys to perform issuing authority operations.		from using their keys to perform issuing authority operations.
	Sec 6: Updated security considerations.		Sec 6: Updated security considerations.
	Sec 7: Moved references from Appendix B to section 7. Updated the		Sec 7: Moved references from Appendix B to section 7. Updated the
	references.		references.
	skipping to change at page 11, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 8 ¶
	CRL retrieval mechanisms. Certificates and CRLs in incoming messages		CRL retrieval mechanisms. Certificates and CRLs in incoming messages
	are not required to be in any particular order nor are they required		are not required to be in any particular order nor are they required
	to be in any way related to the sender or recipient of the message		to be in any way related to the sender or recipient of the message
	(although in most cases they will be related to the sender). Incoming		(although in most cases they will be related to the sender). Incoming
	certificates and CRLs SHOULD be cached for use in path validation and		certificates and CRLs SHOULD be cached for use in path validation and
	optionally stored for later use. This temporary certificate and CRL		optionally stored for later use. This temporary certificate and CRL
	cache SHOULD be used to augment any other certificate and CRL		cache SHOULD be used to augment any other certificate and CRL
	retrieval mechanisms for path validation on incoming signed messages.		retrieval mechanisms for path validation on incoming signed messages.
	When verifying a signature and the certificates are included in the		When verifying a signature and the certificates are included in the
	message, if a signingCertificate or a signingCertificateV2 attribute		message, if a signingCertificate attribute from RFC 2634 [ESS] or a
	is found in an S/MIME message, it SHALL be used to identify the		signingCertificateV2 attribute from RFC 5035 [ESS] is found in an
	signer's certificate. Otherwise, the certificate is identified in an		S/MIME message, it SHALL be used to identify the signer's
	S/MIME message, either using the issuerAndSerialNumber which		certificate. Otherwise, the certificate is identified in an S/MIME
	identifies the signer's certificate by the issuer's distinguished		message, either using the issuerAndSerialNumber which identifies the
	name and the certificate serial number, or the subjectKeyIdentifier		signer's certificate by the issuer's distinguished name and the
	which identifies the signer's certificate by a key identifier.		certificate serial number, or the subjectKeyIdentifier which
			identifies the signer's certificate by a key identifier.
	When decrypting an encrypted message, if a		When decrypting an encrypted message, if a
	SMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference attribute is found in an encapsulating		SMIMEEncryptionKeyPreference attribute is found in an encapsulating
	SignedData, it SHALL be used to identify the originator's certificate		SignedData, it SHALL be used to identify the originator's certificate
	found in OriginatorInfo. See [CMS] for the CMS fields that reference		found in OriginatorInfo. See [CMS] for the CMS fields that reference
	the originator's and recipient's certificates.		the originator's and recipient's certificates.
	4.3. Certificate and CRL Signing Algorithms and Key Sizes		4.3. Certificate and CRL Signing Algorithms and Key Sizes
	Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are signed by		Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are signed by
	the certificate issuer. Receiving agents:		the certificate issuer. Receiving agents:
	- MUST support RSA with SHA-256, as specified in [CMS-SHA2]		- MUST support RSA with SHA-256
	- SHOULD+ support DSA with SHA-256, as specified in [CMS-SHA2]		- SHOULD+ support DSA with SHA-256
	- SHOULD+ support RSA-PSS with SHA-256, as specified in [RSAPSS]		- SHOULD+ support RSA-PSS with SHA-256
	- SHOULD- support RSA with SHA-1, as specified in [CMSALG]		- SHOULD- support RSA with SHA-1
	- SHOULD- support DSA with SHA-1, as specified in [CMSALG]		- SHOULD- support DSA with SHA-1
	- SHOULD- support RSA with MD5, as specified in [CMSALG]		- SHOULD- support RSA with MD5
	The following are the RSA key size requirements for S/MIME receiving		The following are the RSA key size requirements for S/MIME receiving
	agents during certificate and CRL signature verification:		agents during certificate and CRL signature verification:
	0 < key size < 512 : MAY (see Section 6)		0 < key size < 512 : MAY (see Section 6)
	512 <= key size <= 4096 : MUST (see Section 6)		512 <= key size <= 4096 : MUST (see Section 6)
	4096 < key size : MAY (see Section 6)		4096 < key size : MAY (see Section 6)
	The following are the DSA key size requirements for S/MIME receiving		The following are the DSA key size requirements for S/MIME receiving
	agents during certificate and CRL signature verification:		agents during certificate and CRL signature verification:
	512 <= key size <= 1024 : MAY (see Section 6)		512 <= key size <= 1023 : MAY (see Section 6)
			1024 = key size : SHOULD- (see Section 6)
			For 512-bit RSA with SHA-1 see [KEYMALG] and [FIPS186-2] without
			Change Notice 1, for 512-bit RSA with SHA-256 see [RSAOAEP] and
			[FIPS186-2] without Change Notice 1, for 1024-bit through 3072-bit
			RSA with SHA-256 see [RSAOAEP] and [FIPS186-2] with Change Notice 1,
			and for 4096-bit RSA with SHA-256 see [RSAOAEP] and [PKCS1]. The
			first reference provides the signature algorithm's object identifier
			and the second provides the signature algorithm's definition.
			For 512-bit DSA with SHA-1 see [KEYMALG] and [FIPS186-2] without
			Change Notice 1, for 512-bit DSA with SHA-256 see [KEYMALG2] and
			[FIPS186-2] without Change Notice 1, for 1024-bit DSA with SHA-1 see
			[KEYMALG] and [FIPS186-2] with Change Notice 1, for 1024-bit DSA with
			SHA-256 see [KEYMALG2] and [FIPS186-3]. The first reference provides
			the signature algorithm's object identifier and the second provides
			the signature algorithm's definition.
			For 512-4096-bit RSA-PSS with SHA-256 see [RSAPSS].
	4.4. PKIX Certificate Extensions		4.4. PKIX Certificate Extensions
	PKIX describes an extensible framework in which the basic certificate		PKIX describes an extensible framework in which the basic certificate
	information can be extended and describes how such extensions can be		information can be extended and describes how such extensions can be
	used to control the process of issuing and validating certificates.		used to control the process of issuing and validating certificates.
	The PKIX Working Group has ongoing efforts to identify and create		The PKIX Working Group has ongoing efforts to identify and create
	extensions which have value in particular certification environments.		extensions which have value in particular certification environments.
	Further, there are active efforts underway to issue PKIX certificates		Further, there are active efforts underway to issue PKIX certificates
	for business purposes. This document identifies the minimum required		for business purposes. This document identifies the minimum required
	skipping to change at page 16, line 13 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 32 ¶
	Point (CRLDP) and/or Authority Information Access (AIA) addresses		Point (CRLDP) and/or Authority Information Access (AIA) addresses
	could be included in fake certificates to allow the originator to		could be included in fake certificates to allow the originator to
	detect receipt of the message even if signature verification fails.		detect receipt of the message even if signature verification fails.
	The 4096-bit RSA key size requirement for certificate and CRL		The 4096-bit RSA key size requirement for certificate and CRL
	verification is larger than the 2048-bit RSA key sizes for message		verification is larger than the 2048-bit RSA key sizes for message
	signature generation/verification or message encryption/decryption in		signature generation/verification or message encryption/decryption in
	[SMIME-MSG] because many Root CAs included in certificate stores have		[SMIME-MSG] because many Root CAs included in certificate stores have
	already issued Root certificates with 4096-bit key. The standard		already issued Root certificates with 4096-bit key. The standard
	that defines comparable key sizes for DSA is not yet available. In		that defines comparable key sizes for DSA is not yet available. In
	particular, [FIPS186-3] only defines DSA key sizes up to 1024 bits.		particular, [FIPS186-2] without Change Notice 1 allowed DSA key sizes
	A revision to support larger key sizes is being developed, and once		between 512 and 1024 bits and [FIPS186-2] with Change Notice 1 only
	it is available, implementors ought to support DSA key sizes		allowed DSA key sizes of 1024 bits. A revision to support larger key
	comparable to the RSA key sizes recommended in this specification.		sizes is being developed, and once it is available, implementors
			ought to support DSA key sizes comparable to the RSA key sizes
			recommended in this specification.
	Today, 512-bit RSA and DSA keys are considered by many experts to be		Today, 512-bit RSA and DSA keys are considered by many experts to be
	cryptographically insecure.		cryptographically insecure.
			If an implementation is concerned about compliance with NIST key size
			recommendations, then see [SP800-57].
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[ACAUTH] Farrell, S. and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute		[ACAUTH] Farrell, S. and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute
	Certificate Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281, April		Certificate Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281, April
	2002.		2002.
	[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC		[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
	3852, July 2004.		3852, July 2004.
	Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)		Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
	Multiple Signer Clarification", RFC 4852, April 2007.		Multiple Signer Clarification", RFC 4853, April 2007.
	[CMSALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)		[ESS] Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",
	Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.		RFC 2634, June 1999.
	[CMS-SHA2] Turner. S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic		Schaad, J., "ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm
	Message Syntax", draft-ietf-smime-sha2, work-in-		Agility", RFC 5035, August 2007.
	progress.
	[FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),		[FIPS186-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
	"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS Publication		"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS Publication
	186-3, March 2006.		186-3, January 2000. [With Change Notice 1]
			[FIPS186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
			FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature Standard,
			(draft) March 2006.
	[KEYM] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.		[KEYM] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
	List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
	[KEYMALG] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and		[KEYMALG] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
	Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key		Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
	List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.		List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
			[KEYMALG2] Dang, Q., Santesson, S., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., and
			T. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
			Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and
			ECDSA", draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa, work-in-
			progress.
	[MUSTSHOULD] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[MUSTSHOULD] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
			[PKCS1] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliki, "Public-Key Cryptography
			Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
			Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
	[PKCS9] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object		[PKCS9] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
	Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,		Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
	November 2000.		November 2000.
	[IMF] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", work-in-		[IMF] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
	progress.		October 2008.
	[RSAPSS] Schaad, J., "Use of RSASA-PSS Signature Algorithm in		[RSAPSS] Schaad, J., "Use of RSASA-PSS Signature Algorithm in
	Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4056, June		Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4056, June
	2005.		2005.
			[RSAOAEP] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
			Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use
			in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
			Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
			Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.
	[SMIME-MSG] Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2		[SMIME-MSG] Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2
	Message Specification", draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-		Message Specification", draft-ietf-smime-3851bis-
	07.txt, work-in-progress.		07.txt, work-in-progress.
	[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-		[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
	1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax		1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
	Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.		Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.
	7.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
	skipping to change at page 18, line 47 ¶		skipping to change at page 19, line 41 ¶
	Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3.1 Message		Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3.1 Message
	Specification", RFC 3851, July 2004.		Specification", RFC 3851, July 2004.
	Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",		Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",
	RFC 2634, June 1999.		RFC 2634, June 1999.
	Schaad, J., "ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm		Schaad, J., "ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm
	Agility", RFC 5035, August 2007.		Agility", RFC 5035, August 2007.
			[SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
			Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
			Management, August 2005.
	[X.500] ITU-T Recommendation X.500 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-		[X.500] ITU-T Recommendation X.500 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-
	1:1997, Information technology - Open Systems		1:1997, Information technology - Open Systems
	Interconnection - The Directory: Overview of concepts,		Interconnection - The Directory: Overview of concepts,
	models and services.		models and services.
	Appendix A. Moving S/MIME v2 Certificate Handling to Historic Status		Appendix A. Moving S/MIME v2 Certificate Handling to Historic Status
	The S/MIME v3 [SMIMEv3], v3.1 [SMIMEv3.1], and v3.2 (this document)		The S/MIME v3 [SMIMEv3], v3.1 [SMIMEv3.1], and v3.2 (this document)
	are backwards compatible with the S/MIME v2 Certificate Handling		are backwards compatible with the S/MIME v2 Certificate Handling
	Specification [SMIMEv2], with the exception of the algorithms		Specification [SMIMEv2], with the exception of the algorithms
End of changes. 29 change blocks.
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