< draft-ietf-stir-certificates-09.txt		draft-ietf-stir-certificates-10.txt >
	Network Working Group J. Peterson		Network Working Group J. Peterson
	Internet-Draft Neustar		Internet-Draft Neustar
	Intended status: Standards Track S. Turner		Intended status: Standards Track S. Turner
	Expires: April 9, 2017 sn3rd		Expires: April 21, 2017 sn3rd
	October 6, 2016		October 18, 2016
	Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates		Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates
	draft-ietf-stir-certificates-09.txt		draft-ietf-stir-certificates-10.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	In order to prevent the impersonation of telephone numbers on the		In order to prevent the impersonation of telephone numbers on the
	Internet, some kind of credential system needs to exist that		Internet, some kind of credential system needs to exist that
	cryptographically asserts authority over telephone numbers. This		cryptographically asserts authority over telephone numbers. This
	document describes the use of certificates in establishing authority		document describes the use of certificates in establishing authority
	over telephone numbers, as a component of a broader architecture for		over telephone numbers, as a component of a broader architecture for
	managing telephone numbers as identities in protocols like SIP.		managing telephone numbers as identities in protocols like SIP.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on April 9, 2017.		This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2017.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 29 ¶
	9. TN Authorization List Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		9. TN Authorization List Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	10. Certificate Freshness and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		10. Certificate Freshness and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	10.1. Choosing a Verification Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		10.1. Choosing a Verification Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	10.2. Using OCSP with TN Auth List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		10.2. Using OCSP with TN Auth List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	10.2.1. OCSP Extension Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		10.2.1. OCSP Extension Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	10.3. Acquiring TN Lists By Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		10.3. Acquiring TN Lists By Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
			14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
			14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] identifies the primary enabler		The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] identifies the primary enabler
	of robocalling, vishing, swatting and related attacks as the		of robocalling, vishing, swatting and related attacks as the
	capability to impersonate a calling party number. The starkest		capability to impersonate a calling party number. The starkest
	examples of these attacks are cases where automated callees on the		examples of these attacks are cases where automated callees on the
	PSTN rely on the calling number as a security measure, for example to		PSTN rely on the calling number as a security measure, for example to
	skipping to change at page 6, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 9 ¶
	either trust the subject entirely or have some direct means of		either trust the subject entirely or have some direct means of
	determining whether or not a number falls under a subject's		determining whether or not a number falls under a subject's
	authority; and another where an extension to the certificate as		authority; and another where an extension to the certificate as
	described in Section 9 identifies the scope of authority of the		described in Section 9 identifies the scope of authority of the
	certificate.		certificate.
	4. The cryptographic algorithms required to validate the		4. The cryptographic algorithms required to validate the
	credentials: for this specification, that means the signature		credentials: for this specification, that means the signature
	algorithms used to sign certificates. This specification		algorithms used to sign certificates. This specification
	REQUIRES that implementations support both ECDSA with the P-256		REQUIRES that implementations support both ECDSA with the P-256
	curve (see [RFC4754]) and RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (see [RFC3447]		curve (see [DSS]) and RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (see [RFC3447] Section 8.2)
	Section 8.2) for certificate signatures. Implementers are		for certificate signatures. Implementers are advised that RS256
	advised that RS256 is mandated only as a transitional mechanism,		is mandated only as a transitional mechanism, due to its
	due to its widespread use in existing PKI, but we anticipate that		widespread use in existing PKI, but we anticipate that this
	this mechanism will eventually be deprecated.		mechanism will eventually be deprecated.
	5. Finally, note that all certificates compliant with this		5. Finally, note that all certificates compliant with this
	specification:		specification:
	* MUST provide cryptographic keying material sufficient to		* MUST provide cryptographic keying material sufficient to
	generate the ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 signatures		generate the ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 signatures
	necessary to support the ES256 hashed signatures required by		necessary to support the ES256 hashed signatures required by
	PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-passport], which in turn follows JSON		PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-passport], which in turn follows JSON
	Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519].		Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519].
	skipping to change at page 10, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 7 ¶
	verify a signature is for the certificate be conveyed in a SIP		verify a signature is for the certificate be conveyed in a SIP
	request along with the signature itself. In SIP, for example, a		request along with the signature itself. In SIP, for example, a
	certificate could be carried in a multipart MIME body [RFC2046], and		certificate could be carried in a multipart MIME body [RFC2046], and
	the URI in the Identity header "info" parameter could specify that		the URI in the Identity header "info" parameter could specify that
	body with a CID URI [RFC2392]. However, in many environments this is		body with a CID URI [RFC2392]. However, in many environments this is
	not feasible due to message size restrictions or lack of necessary		not feasible due to message size restrictions or lack of necessary
	support for multipart MIME.		support for multipart MIME.
	The Identity header "info" parameter in a SIP request may contain a		The Identity header "info" parameter in a SIP request may contain a
	URI that the verifier dereferences. Implementations of this		URI that the verifier dereferences. Implementations of this
	specification are required to support the use of SIP for this		specification are REQUIRED to support the use of SIP for this
	function (via the SUBSCRIBE/NOTIFY mechanism), as well as HTTP, via		function (via the SUBSCRIBE/NOTIFY mechanism), as well as HTTP, via
	the Enrollment over Secure Transport mechanisms described in RFC 7030		the Enrollment over Secure Transport mechanisms described in RFC 7030
	[RFC7030].		[RFC7030].
	Note well that as an optimization, a verifier may have access to a		Note well that as an optimization, a verifier may have access to a
	service, a cache or other local store that grants access to		service, a cache or other local store that grants access to
	certificates for a particular telephone number. However, there may		certificates for a particular telephone number. However, there may
	be multiple valid certificates that can sign a call setup request for		be multiple valid certificates that can sign a call setup request for
	a telephone number, and as a consequence, there needs to be some		a telephone number, and as a consequence, there needs to be some
	discriminator that the signer uses to identify their credentials.		discriminator that the signer uses to identify their credentials.
	skipping to change at page 12, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 9 ¶
	E164Number ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789"))		E164Number ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789"))
	The TN Authorization List certificate extension indicates the		The TN Authorization List certificate extension indicates the
	authorized phone numbers for the call setup signer. It indicates one		authorized phone numbers for the call setup signer. It indicates one
	or more blocks of telephone number entries that have been authorized		or more blocks of telephone number entries that have been authorized
	for use by the call setup signer. There are three ways to identify		for use by the call setup signer. There are three ways to identify
	the block:		the block:
	1. A Service Provider Identifier (SPID, also known as an Operating		1. A Service Provider Identifier (SPID, also known as an Operating
	Company Number (OCN) or Carrier Identification Code (CIC), as		Company Number (OCN) as specified in [ATIS-0300251]) can be used
	specified in [ATIS-0300050]) can be used to indirectly name all		to indirectly name all of the telephone numbers associated with
	of the telephone numbers associated with that service provider,		that service provider,
	2. Telephone numbers can be listed in a range (in the		2. Telephone numbers can be listed in a range (in the
	TelephoneNumberRange format), or		TelephoneNumberRange format), or
	3. A single telephone number can be listed (as an E164Number).		3. A single telephone number can be listed (as an E164Number).
	Note that because large-scale service providers may want to associate		Note that because large-scale service providers may want to associate
	many numbers, possibly millions of numbers, with a particular		many numbers, possibly millions of numbers, with a particular
	certificate, optimizations are required for those cases to prevent		certificate, optimizations are required for those cases to prevent
	certificate size from becoming unmanageable. In these cases, the TN		certificate size from becoming unmanageable. In these cases, the TN
	skipping to change at page 18, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 18, line 35 ¶
	13. Acknowledgments		13. Acknowledgments
	Anders Kristensen, Russ Housley, Brian Rosen, Cullen Jennings, Dave		Anders Kristensen, Russ Housley, Brian Rosen, Cullen Jennings, Dave
	Crocker, Tony Rutkowski, John Braunberger, and Eric Rescorla provided		Crocker, Tony Rutkowski, John Braunberger, and Eric Rescorla provided
	key input to the discussions leading to this document. Russ Housley		key input to the discussions leading to this document. Russ Housley
	provided some direct assistance and text surrounding the ASN.1		provided some direct assistance and text surrounding the ASN.1
	module.		module.
	14. References		14. References
	[ATIS-0300050]		14.1. Normative References
	ATIS Recommendation 0300050, "Carrier Identification Code
	(CIC) Assignment Guidelines", 2012.		[ATIS-0300251]
			ATIS Recommendation 0300251, "Codes for Identification of
			Service Providers for Information Exchange", 2007.
			[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
			Department of Commerce | NIST FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital
			Signature Standard, version 4", 2013.
	[I-D.ietf-stir-passport]		[I-D.ietf-stir-passport]
	Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token		Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token
	(PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-08 (work in		(PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-08 (work in
	progress), September 2016.		progress), September 2016.
	[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]		[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
	Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,		Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
	"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session		"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
	Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-13		Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-13
	(work in progress), September 2016.		(work in progress), September 2016.
	[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
	Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC2392] Levinson, E., "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource		[RFC2392] Levinson, E., "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource
	Locators", RFC 2392, DOI 10.17487/RFC2392, August 1998,		Locators", RFC 2392, DOI 10.17487/RFC2392, August 1998,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2392>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2392>.
	[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography		[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
	Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications		Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
	Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February		Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
	2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.		2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.
	[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
	Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
	Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC3647, November 2003,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.
	[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional		[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
	Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in		Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
	the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate		the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
	and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,		and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
	[RFC4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using
	the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
	RFC 4754, DOI 10.17487/RFC4754, January 2007,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4754>.
	[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online		[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
	Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume		Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
	Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September		Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
	2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.		2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
	[RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
	Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
	(SCVP)", RFC 5055, DOI 10.17487/RFC5055, December 2007,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5055>.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
	[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the		[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
	Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,		Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
	skipping to change at page 20, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 11 ¶
	[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,		[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
	[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,		[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
	Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key		Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
	Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",		Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
	RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,		RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
	[RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
	Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6961>.
	[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,		[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
	"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,		"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
	[RFC7093] Turner, S., Kent, S., and J. Manger, "Additional Methods		[RFC7093] Turner, S., Kent, S., and J. Manger, "Additional Methods
	for Generating Key Identifiers Values", RFC 7093,		for Generating Key Identifiers Values", RFC 7093,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7093, December 2013,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7093, December 2013,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7093>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7093>.
	[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
	Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
	RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
	[RFC7375] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model",
	RFC 7375, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375>.
	[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,		(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
	[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (10/2012) | ISO/IEC 9594-8,		[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (10/2012) | ISO/IEC 9594-8,
	"Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -		"Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
	The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate		The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
	frameworks", 2012.		frameworks", 2012.
	[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (10/2012) | ISO/IEC 9594-6,
	"Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
	The Directory: Selected Attribute Types", 2012.
	[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-1,		[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-1,
	"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:		"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
	Specification of basic notation".		Specification of basic notation".
	[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-2,		[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-2,
	"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:		"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
	Information Object Specification".		Information Object Specification".
	[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-2,		[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-2,
	"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:		"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
	Constraint Specification".		Constraint Specification".
	[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-3,		[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-3,
	"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:		"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
	Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications".		Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications".
			14.2. Informative References
			[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
			Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
			[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
			Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
			Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3647, November 2003,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.
			[RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
			Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
			(SCVP)", RFC 5055, DOI 10.17487/RFC5055, December 2007,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5055>.
			[RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
			Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6961>.
			[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
			Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
			RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
			[RFC7375] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model",
			RFC 7375, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375>.
			[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (10/2012) | ISO/IEC 9594-6,
			"Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
			The Directory: Selected Attribute Types", 2012.
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
	This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 [X.680] definitions for		This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 [X.680] definitions for
	the structures described in this specification using ASN.1, as		the structures described in this specification using ASN.1, as
	defined in [X.680] through [X.683].		defined in [X.680] through [X.683].
	The modules defined in this document are compatible with the most		The modules defined in this document are compatible with the most
	current ASN.1 specification published in 2015 (see [X.680], [X.681],		current ASN.1 specification published in 2015 (see [X.680], [X.681],
	[X.682], [X.683]). None of the newly defined tokens in the 2008		[X.682], [X.683]). None of the newly defined tokens in the 2008
	ASN.1 (DATE, DATE-TIME, DURATION, NOT-A-NUMBER, OID-IRI, RELATIVE-		ASN.1 (DATE, DATE-TIME, DURATION, NOT-A-NUMBER, OID-IRI, RELATIVE-
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