< draft-ietf-stir-certificates-13.txt		draft-ietf-stir-certificates-14.txt >
	Network Working Group J. Peterson		STIR J. Peterson
	Internet-Draft Neustar		Internet-Draft Neustar
	Intended status: Standards Track S. Turner		Intended status: Standards Track S. Turner
	Expires: September 27, 2017 sn3rd		Expires: November 10, 2017 sn3rd
	March 27, 2017		May 9, 2017
	Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates		Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates
	draft-ietf-stir-certificates-13.txt		draft-ietf-stir-certificates-14
	Abstract		Abstract
	In order to prevent the impersonation of telephone numbers on the		In order to prevent the impersonation of telephone numbers on the
	Internet, some kind of credential system needs to exist that		Internet, some kind of credential system needs to exist that
	cryptographically asserts authority over telephone numbers. This		cryptographically asserts authority over telephone numbers. This
	document describes the use of certificates in establishing authority		document describes the use of certificates in establishing authority
	over telephone numbers, as a component of a broader architecture for		over telephone numbers, as a component of a broader architecture for
	managing telephone numbers as identities in protocols like SIP.		managing telephone numbers as identities in protocols like SIP.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 27, 2017.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 10, 2017.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 22 ¶
	4. Certificate Usage with STIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Certificate Usage with STIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. Enrollment and Authorization using the TN Authorization List 6		5. Enrollment and Authorization using the TN Authorization List 6
	5.1. Constraints on Signing PASSporTs . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5.1. Constraints on Signing PASSporTs . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5.2. Certificate Extension Scope and Structure . . . . . . . . 8		5.2. Certificate Extension Scope and Structure . . . . . . . . 8
	6. Provisioning Private Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		6. Provisioning Private Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures . . . . . . . . . 9		7. Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures . . . . . . . . . 9
	8. JWT Claim Constraints Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8. JWT Claim Constraints Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	9. TN Authorization List Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		9. TN Authorization List Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	10. Certificate Freshness and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		10. Certificate Freshness and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	10.1. Acquiring TN Lists By Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		10.1. Acquiring TN Lists By Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] identifies the primary enabler		The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] identifies the primary enabler
	of robocalling, vishing, swatting and related attacks as the		of robocalling, vishing, swatting and related attacks as the
	capability to impersonate a calling party number. The starkest		capability to impersonate a calling party number. The starkest
	examples of these attacks are cases where automated callees on the		examples of these attacks are cases where automated callees on the
	skipping to change at page 10, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 11 ¶
	be multiple valid certificates that can sign a call setup request for		be multiple valid certificates that can sign a call setup request for
	a telephone number, and as a consequence, there needs to be some		a telephone number, and as a consequence, there needs to be some
	discriminator that the signer uses to identify their credentials.		discriminator that the signer uses to identify their credentials.
	The Identity header "info" parameter itself can serve as such a		The Identity header "info" parameter itself can serve as such a
	discriminator, provided implementations use that parameter as a key		discriminator, provided implementations use that parameter as a key
	when accessing certificates from caches or other sources.		when accessing certificates from caches or other sources.
	8. JWT Claim Constraints Syntax		8. JWT Claim Constraints Syntax
	The subjects of certificates containing the JWT Claim Constraints		Certificate subjects are limited to specific values for PASSporT
	certificate extension are specifies values for PASSporT claims that		claims with the JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension; issuers
	are permitted. The syntax of these claims is given in PASSporT;		permit all claims by omitting the JWT Claim Constraints certificate
	specifying new claims follows the procedures in		extension from the certificate's extension field [RFC5280]. The
	[I-D.ietf-stir-passport] (Section 8.3). When a verifier is		extension is non-critical, applicable only to end-entity
	validating PASSporT claims, the JWT claim MUST contain permitted		certificates, and defined with ASN.1 [X.680][X.681][X.682][X.683]
	values. The non-critical JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension		later in this section. The syntax of the claims is given in
	is included in the extension field of end entity certificates		PASSporT; specifying new claims follows the procedures in
	[RFC5280]. The extension is defined with ASN.1 [X.680][X.681][X.682]		[I-D.ietf-stir-passport] (Section 8.3).
	[X.683].
	The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension places constraints on		This certificate extension is optional, but if present, it constrains
	the values that are allowed in particular JWT claims. This		the claims that authentication services may include in the PASSporT
	certificate extension is optional, but if present, it constrains the		objects they sign. Constraints are applied by issuers and enforced
	claims that authentication services may included in the PASSporT		by verifiers when validating PASSporT claims as follows:
	objects they sign. For example, imagine a PASSporT extension claim
	called "confidence" with values "low", "medium", and "high". If a CA		1. mustInclude indicates claims that MUST appear in the PASSporT in
	issues to an authentication service a certificate that contains the		addition to iat, orig, and dest. The baseline claims of PASSporT
	value "confidence" in the "claim" field and "high" in the "permitted"		("iat", "orig", and "dest") are considered to be permitted by
	feild of the JWT Claim Constraints, then an authentication service		default and SHOULD NOT be included. If mustInclude is absent,
	MAY add a "high" "confidence" claim to any PASSporTs it generates. A		iat, orig, and dest MUST appear in the PASSporT.
	verification service MUST treat as invalid any PASSporT it receives
	with a PASSporT extension claim that is not included in JWT Claim		2. permittedValues indicates that if the claim name is present, the
	Constraints. The baseline claims of PASSporT ("orig", "dest", "iat"		claim MUST contain one of the listed values.
	and "mky") are considered to be permitted by default and SHOULD NOT
	be included in the "claim" field. The issuer of a certificate may		Consider two examples with a PASSporT claim called "confidence" with
	similarly explicitly allow the use of a particular claim by the		values "low", "medium", and "high":
	holder of the certificate. If a certificate contains no JWT Claim
	Constraints, the issuer of the certificate permits all claims.		o If a CA issues to an authentication service a certificate that
			contains the mustInclude JWTClaimName "confidence", then an
			authentication service MUST include the "confidence" claim in all
			PASSporTs it generates; a verification service will treat as
			invalid any PASSporT it receives with a PASSporT claim that does
			not include the "confidence" claim.
			o If a CA issues to an authentication service a certificate that
			contains the permittedValues JWTClaimName "confidence" and a
			permitted "high" value, then an authentication service will treat
			as invalid any PASSporT it receives with a PASSporT claim that
			does not include the "confidence" claim with a "high" value.
	The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension is identified by the		The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension is identified by the
	following object identifier (OID), which is defined under the id-pe		following object identifier (OID), which is defined under the id-pe
	OID arc defined in [RFC5280] and managed by IANA (see Section 11):		OID arc defined in [RFC5280] and managed by IANA (see Section 11):
	id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 25 }		id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 25 }
	The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension has the following		The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension has the following
	syntax:		syntax:
	JWTClaimConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JWTClaimConstraint		JWTClaimConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
			mustInclude [0] JWTClaimNames OPTIONAL,
			-- The listed claim names MUST appear in the PASSporT in addition
			-- to iat, orig, and dest. If absent, iat, orig, and dest MUST
			-- appear in the PASSporT.
			permittedValues [1] JWTClaimPermittedValuesList OPTIONAL }
			-- If the claim name is present, the claim MUST contain one of
			-- the listed values.
			( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., mustInclude PRESENT } |
			WITH COMPONENTS { ..., permittedValues PRESENT } )
	JWTClaimConstraint ::= SEQUENCE {		JWTClaimPermittedValuesList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	claim IA5String,		JWTClaimPermittedValues
	permitted SEQUENCE OF IA5String
	}		JWTClaimPermittedValues ::= SEQUENCE {
			claim JWTClaimName,
			permitted SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String }
			JWTClaimNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JWTClaimName
			JWTClaimName ::= IA5String
	9. TN Authorization List Syntax		9. TN Authorization List Syntax
	The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List		The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List
	extension are the administrative entities to whom numbers are		extension are the administrative entities to whom numbers are
	assigned or delegated. When a verifier is validating a caller's		assigned or delegated. When a verifier is validating a caller's
	identity, local policy always determines the circumstances under		identity, local policy always determines the circumstances under
	which any particular subject may be trusted, but the purpose of the		which any particular subject may be trusted, but the purpose of the
	TN Authorization List extension in particular is to allow a verifier		TN Authorization List extension in particular is to allow a verifier
	to ascertain when the CA has designated that the subject has		to ascertain when the CA has designated that the subject has
	skipping to change at page 12, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 19 ¶
	The Telephony Number (TN) Authorization List certificate extension is		The Telephony Number (TN) Authorization List certificate extension is
	identified by the following object identifier (OID), which is defined		identified by the following object identifier (OID), which is defined
	under the id-pe OID arc defined in [RFC5280] and managed by IANA (see		under the id-pe OID arc defined in [RFC5280] and managed by IANA (see
	Section 11):		Section 11):
	id-pe-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 26 }		id-pe-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 26 }
	The TN Authorization List certificate extension has the following		The TN Authorization List certificate extension has the following
	syntax:		syntax:
	TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry		TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry
	TNEntry ::= CHOICE {		TNEntry ::= CHOICE {
	spc [0] ServiceProviderCodeList,		spc [0] ServiceProviderCode,
	range [1] TelephoneNumberRange,		range [1] TelephoneNumberRange,
	one E164Number		one [2] TelephoneNumber
	}		}
	ServiceProviderCodeList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..3) OF IA5String		ServiceProviderCode ::= IA5String
	-- Service Provider Codes may be OCNs, various SPIDs, or other		-- Service Provider Codes may be OCNs, various SPIDs, or other
	-- SP identifiers from the telephone network		-- SP identifiers from the telephone network
	TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE {		TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE {
	start E164Number,		start TelephoneNumber,
	count INTEGER		count INTEGER (2..MAX)
	}		}
	E164Number ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789#*"))		TelephoneNumber ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789#*"))
	The TN Authorization List certificate extension indicates the		The TN Authorization List certificate extension indicates the
	authorized phone numbers for the call setup signer. It indicates one		authorized phone numbers for the call setup signer. It indicates one
	or more blocks of telephone number entries that have been authorized		or more blocks of telephone number entries that have been authorized
	for use by the call setup signer. There are three ways to identify		for use by the call setup signer. There are three ways to identify
	the block:		the block:
	1. Service Provider Codes as described in this document are a		1. Service Provider Codes as described in this document are a
	generic term for the identifiers used to designate service		generic term for the identifiers used to designate service
	providers in the telepohone networks today. In North American		providers in the telepohone networks today. In North American
	skipping to change at page 12, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 4 ¶
	or more blocks of telephone number entries that have been authorized		or more blocks of telephone number entries that have been authorized
	for use by the call setup signer. There are three ways to identify		for use by the call setup signer. There are three ways to identify
	the block:		the block:
	1. Service Provider Codes as described in this document are a		1. Service Provider Codes as described in this document are a
	generic term for the identifiers used to designate service		generic term for the identifiers used to designate service
	providers in the telepohone networks today. In North American		providers in the telepohone networks today. In North American
	context, these would include Operating Company Numbers (OCNs) as		context, these would include Operating Company Numbers (OCNs) as
	specified in [ATIS-0300251], related Service Provide Identifiers		specified in [ATIS-0300251], related Service Provide Identifiers
	(SPIDs), or other similar identifiers for service providers.		(SPIDs), or other similar identifiers for service providers.
	SPCs can be used to indirectly name all of the telephone numbers		SPCs can be used to indirectly name all of the telephone numbers
	associated with that identifier for a service provider,		associated with that identifier for a service provider,
	2. Telephone numbers can be listed in a range (in the		2. Telephone numbers can be listed in a range (in the
	TelephoneNumberRange format), which consists of a starting		TelephoneNumberRange format), which consists of a starting
	telephone number and then an integer count of numbers within the		telephone number and then an integer count of numbers within the
	range, where the valid boundaries of ranges may vary according to		range, where the valid boundaries of ranges may vary according to
	national policies, or		national policies, or
	3. A single telephone number can be listed (as an E164Number).		3. A single telephone number can be listed (as a TelephoneNumber).
	Note that because large-scale service providers may want to associate		Note that because large-scale service providers may want to associate
	many numbers, possibly millions of numbers, with a particular		many numbers, possibly millions of numbers, with a particular
	certificate, optimizations are required for those cases to prevent		certificate, optimizations are required for those cases to prevent
	certificate size from becoming unmanageable. In these cases, the TN		certificate size from becoming unmanageable. In these cases, the TN
	Authorization List may be given by reference rather than by value,		Authorization List may be given by reference rather than by value,
	through the presence of a separate certificate extension that permits		through the presence of a separate certificate extension that permits
	verifiers to either securely download the list of numbers associated		verifiers to either securely download the list of numbers associated
	with a certificate, or to verify that a single number is under the		with a certificate, or to verify that a single number is under the
	authority of this certificate. For more on this optimization, see		authority of this certificate. For more on this optimization, see
	skipping to change at page 13, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 46 ¶
	verifier is validating. Dynamic changes to number assignments can		verifier is validating. Dynamic changes to number assignments can
	occur due to number portability, for example. So even if a verifier		occur due to number portability, for example. So even if a verifier
	has a valid cached certificate for a telephone number (or a range		has a valid cached certificate for a telephone number (or a range
	containing the number), the verifier must determine that the entity		containing the number), the verifier must determine that the entity
	that signed is still a proper authority for that number.		that signed is still a proper authority for that number.
	To verify the status of such a certificate, the verifier needs to		To verify the status of such a certificate, the verifier needs to
	acquire the certificate if necessary (via the methods described in		acquire the certificate if necessary (via the methods described in
	Section 7), and then would need to either:		Section 7), and then would need to either:
	(a) Rely on short-lived certificates and not check the certificate's		a. Rely on short-lived certificates and not check the certificate's
	status, or		status, or
	(b) Rely on status information from the authority (e.g., OCSP)		b. Rely on status information from the authority (e.g., OCSP)
	The tradeoff between short lived certificates and using status		The tradeoff between short lived certificates and using status
	information is that the former's burden is on the front end (i.e.,		information is that the former's burden is on the front end (i.e.,
	enrollment) and the latter's burden is on the back end (i.e.,		enrollment) and the latter's burden is on the back end (i.e.,
	verification). Both impact call setup time, but some approaches to		verification). Both impact call setup time, but some approaches to
	generating a short-lived certificate, like requiring one for each		generating a short-lived certificate, like requiring one for each
	call, would incur a greater operational cost than acquiring status		call, would incur a greater operational cost than acquiring status
	information. This document makes no particular recommndation for a		information. This document makes no particular recommndation for a
	means of determinate certificate freshness for STIR, as this requires		means of determinate certificate freshness for STIR, as this requires
	further study and implementation experience. Acquiring online status		further study and implementation experience. Acquiring online status
	skipping to change at page 15, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 4 ¶
	13. Acknowledgments		13. Acknowledgments
	Anders Kristensen, Russ Housley, Brian Rosen, Cullen Jennings, Dave		Anders Kristensen, Russ Housley, Brian Rosen, Cullen Jennings, Dave
	Crocker, Tony Rutkowski, John Braunberger, and Eric Rescorla provided		Crocker, Tony Rutkowski, John Braunberger, and Eric Rescorla provided
	key input to the discussions leading to this document. Russ Housley		key input to the discussions leading to this document. Russ Housley
	provided some direct assistance and text surrounding the ASN.1		provided some direct assistance and text surrounding the ASN.1
	module.		module.
	14. References		14. References
	14.1. Normative References		14.1. Normative References
	[ATIS-0300251]		[ATIS-0300251]
	ATIS Recommendation 0300251, "Codes for Identification of		ATIS Recommendation 0300251, "Codes for Identification of
	Service Providers for Information Exchange", 2007.		Service Providers for Information Exchange", 2007.
	[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.		[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
	Department of Commerce | NIST FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital		Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard,
	Signature Standard, version 4", 2013.		version 4", NIST FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013.
	[I-D.ietf-stir-passport]		[I-D.ietf-stir-passport]
	Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token		Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token
	(PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-11 (work in		(PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-11 (work in
	progress), February 2017.		progress), February 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]		[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
	Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,		Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
	"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session		"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
	Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-16		Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-16
	skipping to change at page 16, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 44 ¶
	[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography		[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
	Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications		Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
	Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February		Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
	2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.		2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.
	[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform		[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
	Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,		Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
	RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,		RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
	[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
	Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
	Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
	2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
	[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the		[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
	Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,		Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
	[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,		[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
	[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
	Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
	Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
	RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
	[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer		[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
	Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",		Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
	RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,		RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
	[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an		[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
	Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May		Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
	2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.		2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
	[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,		(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
	[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (10/2012) | ISO/IEC 9594-8,		[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8, "Information
	"Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -		technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
	The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate		Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", 2012.
	frameworks", 2012.
	[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-1,		[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 | ISO/IEC 8824-1, "Information
	"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:		Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One: Specification
	Specification of basic notation".		of basic notation", 2015.
	[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-2,		[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 | ISO/IEC 8824-2, "Information
	"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:		Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One: Information
	Information Object Specification".		Object Specification", 2015.
	[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-2,		[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 | ISO/IEC 8824-2, "Information
	"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:		Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One: Constraint
	Constraint Specification".		Specification", 2015.
	[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (08/2015) | ISO/IEC 8824-3,		[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 | ISO/IEC 8824-3, "Information
	"Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:		Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
	Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications".		Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications", 2015.
	14.2. Informative References		14.2. Informative References
	[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail		[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
	Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,		Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
	[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.		[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
	Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate		Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
	skipping to change at page 18, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 18, line 20 ¶
	[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure		[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
	Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",		Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
	RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,		RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
	[RFC7375] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model",		[RFC7375] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model",
	RFC 7375, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014,		RFC 7375, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375>.
	[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (10/2012) | ISO/IEC 9594-6,		[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 | ISO/IEC 9594-6, "Information
	"Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -		technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
	The Directory: Selected Attribute Types", 2012.		Selected Attribute Types", 2012.
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Module		Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
	This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 [X.680] definitions for		This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 [X.680] definitions for
	the structures described in this specification using ASN.1, as		the structures described in this specification using ASN.1, as
	defined in [X.680] through [X.683].		defined in [X.680] through [X.683].
	The modules defined in this document are compatible with the most		The modules defined in this document are compatible with the most
	current ASN.1 specification published in 2015 (see [X.680], [X.681],		current ASN.1 specification published in 2015 (see [X.680], [X.681],
	[X.682], [X.683]). None of the newly defined tokens in the 2008		[X.682], [X.683]). None of the newly defined tokens in the 2008
	ASN.1 (DATE, DATE-TIME, DURATION, NOT-A-NUMBER, OID-IRI, RELATIVE-		ASN.1 (DATE, DATE-TIME, DURATION, NOT-A-NUMBER, OID-IRI, RELATIVE-
	OID-IRI, TIME, TIME-OF-DAY)) are currently used in any of the ASN.1		OID-IRI, TIME, TIME-OF-DAY)) are currently used in any of the ASN.1
	specifications referred to here.		specifications referred to here.
	This ASN.1 module imports ASN.1 from [RFC5912].		This ASN.1 module imports ASN.1 from [RFC5912].
	TN-Module-2016		TN-Module-2016
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tn-module(88) }		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tn-module(88) }
	DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN		DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
	IMPORTS		IMPORTS
	id-ad, id-pe		id-ad, id-pe
	FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]		FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
	EXTENSION		EXTENSION
	FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]		FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
	;		;
	--		--
	-- JWT Claim Constraints Certificate Extension		-- JWT Claim Constraints Certificate Extension
	--		--
	ext-jwtClaimConstraints EXTENSION ::= {		ext-jwtClaimConstraints EXTENSION ::= {
	SYNTAX JWTClaimConstraints IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints		SYNTAX JWTClaimConstraints IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints
	}		}
	id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 25 }		id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 25 }
	JWTClaimConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JWTClaimConstraint		JWTClaimConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
			mustInclude [0] JWTClaimNames OPTIONAL,
			-- The listed claim names MUST appear in the PASSporT in addition
			-- to iat, orig, and dest. If absent, iat, orig, and dest MUST
			-- appear in the PASSporT.
			permittedValues [1] JWTClaimPermittedValuesList OPTIONAL }
			-- If the claim name is present, the claim MUST contain one of
			-- the listed values.
			( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., mustInclude PRESENT } |
			WITH COMPONENTS { ..., permittedValues PRESENT } )
	JWTClaimConstraint ::= SEQUENCE {		JWTClaimPermittedValuesList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) Of
	claim IA5String,		JWTClaimPermittedValues
	permitted SEQUENCE OF IA5String
	}
	--		JWTClaimPermittedValues ::= SEQUENCE {
	-- Telephone Number Authorization List Certificate Extension		claim JWTClaimName,
	--		permitted SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String }
	ext-tnAuthList EXTENSION ::= {		JWTClaimNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JWTClaimName
	SYNTAX TNAuthorizationList IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-TNAuthList
	}
	id-pe-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 26 }		JWTClaimName ::= IA5String
	TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry		--
			-- Telephone Number Authorization List Certificate Extension
			--
	TNEntry ::= CHOICE {		ext-tnAuthList EXTENSION ::= {
	spc [0] ServiceProviderCodeList,		SYNTAX TNAuthorizationList IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-TNAuthList
	range [1] TelephoneNumberRange,		}
	one E164Number
	}
	ServiceProviderCodeList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..3) OF IA5String		id-pe-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 26 }
			TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry
	-- Service Provider Codes may be OCNs, various SPIDs, or other		TNEntry ::= CHOICE {
	-- SP identifiers from the telephone network		spc [0] ServiceProviderCode,
			range [1] TelephoneNumberRange,
			one [2] TelephoneNumber
			}
	TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE {		ServiceProviderCode ::= IA5String
	start E164Number,
	count INTEGER
	}
	E164Number ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789"))		-- Service Provider Codes may be OCNs, various SPIDs, or other
			-- SP identifiers from the telephone network
	-- TN Access Descriptor		TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE {
			start TelephoneNumber,
			count INTEGER (2..MAX)
			}
	id-ad-stirTNList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 14 }		TelephoneNumber ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789"))
	END		-- TN Access Descriptor
			id-ad-stirTNList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 14 }
			END
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Jon Peterson		Jon Peterson
	Neustar, Inc.		Neustar, Inc.
	Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz		Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
	Sean Turner		Sean Turner
	sn3rd		sn3rd
End of changes. 53 change blocks.
	141 lines changed or deleted		168 lines changed or added
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