< draft-ietf-teep-protocol-01.txt		draft-ietf-teep-protocol-02.txt >
	TEEP H. Tschofenig		TEEP H. Tschofenig
	Internet-Draft Arm Ltd.		Internet-Draft Arm Ltd.
	Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei		Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei
	Expires: September 10, 2020 Broadcom		Expires: October 16, 2020 Broadcom
	D. Wheeler		D. Wheeler
	Intel		Intel
	D. Thaler		D. Thaler
	Microsoft		Microsoft
	March 9, 2020		A. Tsukamoto
			AIST
			April 14, 2020
	Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol		Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol
	draft-ietf-teep-protocol-01		draft-ietf-teep-protocol-02
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and		This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and
	deletes Trusted Applications (TAs) in a device with a Trusted		deletes Trusted Applications (TAs) in a device with a Trusted
	Execution Environment (TEE). This specification defines an		Execution Environment (TEE). This specification defines an
	interoperable protocol for managing the lifecycle of TAs.		interoperable protocol for managing the lifecycle of TAs.
	The protocol name is pronounced teepee. This conjures an image of a		The protocol name is pronounced teepee. This conjures an image of a
	wedge-shaped protective covering for one's belongings, which sort of		wedge-shaped protective covering for one's belongings, which sort of
	skipping to change at page 1, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 44 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020.		This Internet-Draft will expire on October 16, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.1. QueryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.2. QueryResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.3. TrustedAppInstall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.4. TrustedAppDelete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.2. QueryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.5. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4.3. QueryResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4.6. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4.4. TrustedAppInstall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4.5. TrustedAppDelete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		4.6. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		4.7. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	7.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels . . . . . . 15
	7.2. Error Code Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		6. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	7.3. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		8.2. Error Code Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		8.3. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	Appendix B. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		8.4. CBOR Tag Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
			9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
			9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
			A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
			B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
			C. Complete CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to		The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to
	separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich		separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich
	Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications.		Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications.
	In an TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating		In an TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating
	systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When		systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When
	application providers or device administrators use Trusted		application providers or device administrators use Trusted
	Application Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted		Application Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted
	skipping to change at page 3, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 30 ¶
	The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) architecture		The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) architecture
	document [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] has set to provide a design		document [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] has set to provide a design
	guidance for such an interoperable protocol and introduces the		guidance for such an interoperable protocol and introduces the
	necessary terminology. Note that the term Trusted Application may		necessary terminology. Note that the term Trusted Application may
	include more than code; it may also include configuration data and		include more than code; it may also include configuration data and
	keys needed by the TA to operate correctly.		keys needed by the TA to operate correctly.
	2. Requirements Language		2. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
			BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
			capitals, as shown here.
	This specification re-uses the terminology defined in		This specification re-uses the terminology defined in
	[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].		[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].
	3. Message Overview		3. Message Overview
	The TEEP protocol consists of a couple of messages exchanged between		The TEEP protocol consists of a couple of messages exchanged between
	a TAM and a TEEP Agent via a TEEP Broker. The messages are encoded		a TAM and a TEEP Agent via a TEEP Broker. The messages are encoded
	in CBOR and designed to provide end-to-end security. TEEP protocol		in CBOR and designed to provide end-to-end security. TEEP protocol
	messages are signed by the endpoints, i.e., the TAM and the TEEP		messages are signed by the endpoints, i.e., the TAM and the TEEP
	skipping to change at page 5, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 19 ¶
	TrustedAppDelete ---->		TrustedAppDelete ---->
	Success		Success
	<---- or		<---- or
	Error		Error
	4. Detailed Messages Specification		4. Detailed Messages Specification
	The CBOR-encoded messages are protected by COSE, as described in CDDL		TEEP messages are protected by the COSE_Sign1 structure. The TEEP
	format [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] below.		protocol messages are described in CDDL format [RFC8610] below.
	Outer_Wrapper = {
	msg-authenc-wrapper => bstr .cbor
	Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper / nil,
	teep-message => (QueryRequest /		teep-message => (QueryRequest /
	QueryResponse /		QueryResponse /
	TrustedAppInstall /		TrustedAppInstall /
	TrustedAppDelete /		TrustedAppDelete /
	Error /		Error /
	Success ),		Success ),
	}		}
	msg-authenc-wrapper = 1		4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages
	teep-message = 2
	Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper = [ * (COSE_Mac_Tagged /		4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message
	COSE_Sign_Tagged /
	COSE_Mac0_Tagged /
	COSE_Sign1_Tagged)]
	4.1. QueryRequest		To create a TEEP message, the following steps are performed.
	suite = int		1. Create a TEEP message according to the description below and
			populate it with the respective content.
	version = int		2. Create a COSE Header containing the desired set of Header
			Parameters. The COSE Header MUST be valid per the [RFC8152]
			specification.
	data_item = int		3. Create a COSE_Sign1 object using the TEEP message as the
			COSE_Sign1 Payload; all steps specified in [RFC8152] for creating
			a COSE_Sign1 object MUST be followed.
	QueryRequest = {		4. Prepend the COSE object with the TEEP CBOR tag to indicate that
	TYPE : int,		the CBOR-encoded message is indeed a TEEP message.
	TOKEN : bstr,
	REQUEST : [+data_item],
	? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],
	? NONCE : bstr,
	? VERSION : [+version],
	? OCSP_DATA : bstr,
	* $$extensions
	}
	A QueryRequest message is signed by the TAM and has the following		4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message
	fields:
	TYPE TYPE = 1 corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from the		When validating a TEEP message, the following steps are performed.
	TAM to the TEEP Agent.		If any of the listed steps fail, then the TEEP message MUST be
			rejected.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		1. Verify that the received message is a valid CBOR object.
	responses.
	REQUEST The REQUEST field indicates what information the TAM		2. Remove the TEEP message CBOR tag and verify that one of the COSE
	requests from the TEEP Agent in form of a list of integer values.		CBOR tags follows it.
	Each integer value corresponds to an IANA registered information
	element. This specification defines the initial set of		3. Verify that the message contains a COSE_Sign1 structure.
	information elements:
			4. Verify that the resulting COSE Header includes only parameters
			and values whose syntax and semantics are both understood and
			supported or that are specified as being ignored when not
			understood.
			5. Follow the steps specified in Section 4 of [RFC8152] ("Signing
			Objects") for validating a COSE_Sign1 object. The COSE_Sign1
			payload is the content of the TEEP message.
			6. Verify that the TEEP message is a valid CBOR map and verify the
			fields of the TEEP message according to this specification.
			4.2. QueryRequest
			A QueryRequest message is used by the TAM to learn information from
			the TEEP Agent. The TAM can learn the features supported by the TEEP
			Agent, including ciphersuites, and protocol versions. Additionally,
			the TAM can selectively request data items from the TEEP Agent via
			the request parameter. Currently, the following features are
			supported:
			o Request for attestation information,
			o Listing supported extensions,
			o Querying installed software (trusted apps), and
			o Listing supporting SUIT commands.
			Like other TEEP messages, the QueryRequest message is signed, and the
			relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
			shown in [CDDL].
			query-request = [
			type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request,
			token: uint,
			options: {
			? supported-cipher-suites => suite,
			? nonce => bstr .size (8..64),
			? version => [ + version ],
			? oscp-data => bstr,
			* $$query-request-extensions
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			},
			data-item-requested
			]
			The message has the following fields:
			type
			The value of (1) corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from
			the TAM to the TEEP Agent.
			token
			The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
			requests. This is particualrly useful when a TAM issues multiple
			concurrent requests to a TEEP Agent.
			request
			The request parameter indicates what information the TAM requests
			from the TEEP Agent in form of a bitmap. Each value in the bitmap
			corresponds to an IANA registered information element. This
			specification defines the following initial set of information
			elements:
	attestation (1) With this value the TAM requests the TEEP Agent		attestation (1) With this value the TAM requests the TEEP Agent
	to return an entity attestation token (EAT) in the response.		to return an entity attestation token (EAT) in the response.
			If the TAM requests an attestation token to be returned by the
			TEEP Agent then it MUST also include the nonce in the message.
			The nonce is subsequently placed into the EAT token for replay
			protection.
	trusted_apps (2) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent		trusted_apps (2) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent
	for all installed TAs.		for all installed TAs.
	extensions (3) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for		extensions (4) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for
	supported capabilities and extensions, which allows a TAM to		supported capabilities and extensions, which allows a TAM to
	discover the capabilities of a TEEP Agent implementation.		discover the capabilities of a TEEP Agent implementation.
	suit_commands (4) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent		suit_commands (8) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent
	for supported commands offered by the SUIT manifest		for supported commands offered by the SUIT manifest
	implementation.		implementation.
	Further values may be added in the future via IANA registration.		Further values may be added in the future via IANA registration.
	CIPHER_SUITE The CIPHER_SUITE field lists the ciphersuite(s)		cipher-suites
	supported by the TAM. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can		The cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s) supported by
	be found in Section 5.		the TAM. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can be found in
			Section 6.
	NONCE NONCE is an optional field used for ensuring the refreshness		nonce
	of the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) contained in the response.		The none field is an optional parameter used for ensuring the
			refreshness of the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) returned with a
			QueryResponse message. When a nonce is provided in the
			QueryRequest and an EAT is returned with the QueryResponse message
			then the nonce contained in this request MUST be copied into the
			nonce claim found in the EAT token.
	VERSION The VERSION field lists the version(s) supported by the TAM.		version
			The version field parameter the version(s) supported by the TAM.
	For this version of the specification this field can be omitted.		For this version of the specification this field can be omitted.
	OCSP_DATA The OCSP_DATA field contains a list of OCSP stapling data		ocsp_data
			The ocsp_data parameter contains a list of OCSP stapling data
	respectively for the TAM certificate and each of the CA		respectively for the TAM certificate and each of the CA
	certificates up to the root certificate. The TAM provides OCSP		certificates up to the root certificate. The TAM provides OCSP
	data so that the TEEP Agent can validate the status of the TAM		data so that the TEEP Agent can validate the status of the TAM
	certificate chain without making its own external OCSP service		certificate chain without making its own external OCSP service
	call. OCSP data MUST be conveyed as a DER-encoded OCSP response		call. OCSP data MUST be conveyed as a DER-encoded OCSP response
	(using the ASN.1 type OCSPResponse defined in [RFC2560]). The use		(using the ASN.1 type OCSPResponse defined in [RFC2560]). The use
	of OCSP is optional to implement for bo th the TAM and the TEEP		of OCSP is optional to implement for both the TAM and the TEEP
	Agent. A TAM can query the TEEP Agent for the support of this		Agent. A TAM can query the TEEP Agent for the support of this
	functionality via the capability discovery exchange, as described		functionality via the capability discovery exchange, as described
	above.		above.
	4.2. QueryResponse		4.3. QueryResponse
	ext_info = int		The QueryResponse message is the successful response by the TEEP
			Agent after receiving a QueryRequest message.
	QueryResponse = {		Like other TEEP messages, the QueryResponse message is signed, and
	TYPE : int,		the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL
	TOKEN : bstr,		structure is shown in [CDDL].
	? SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE : suite,
	? SELECTED_VERSION : version,
	? EAT : bstr,
	? TA_LIST : [+bstr],
	? EXT_LIST : [+ext_info],
	* $$extensions
	}
	The QueryResponse message is signed and encrypted by the TEEP Agent		query-response = [
	and returned to the TAM. It has the following fields:		type: TEEP-TYPE-query-response,
			token: uint,
			options: {
			? selected-cipher-suite => suite,
			? selected-version => version,
			? eat => bstr,
			? ta-list => [ + bstr ],
			? ext-list => [ + ext-info ],
			* $$query-response-extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			]
	TYPE TYPE = 2 corresponds to a QueryResponse message sent from the		The message has the following fields:
	TEEP Agent to the TAM.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		type
	responses. The value MUST correspond to the value received with		The value of (2) corresponds to a QueryResponse message sent from
	the QueryRequest.		the TEEP Agent to the TAM.
	SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE The SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE field indicates the		token
	selected ciphersuite. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can		The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
	be found in Section 5.		requests. The value MUST correspond to the value received with
			the QueryRequest message.
	SELECTED_VERSION The SELECTED_VERSION field indicates the protocol		selected-cipher-suite
	version selected by the TEEP Agent.		The selected-cipher-suite parameter indicates the selected
			ciphersuite. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can be found
			in Section 6.
	EAT The EAT field contains an Entity Attestation Token following the		selected-version
	encoding defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat].		The selected-version parameter indicates the protocol version
			selected by the TEEP Agent.
	TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the trusted applications		eat
	installed on the device in form of TA ID strings.		The eat parameter contains an Entity Attestation Token following
			the encoding defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat].
	EXT_LIST The EXT_LIST field lists the supported extensions. This		ta-list
			The ta-list parameter enumerates the trusted applications
			installed on the device in form of TA_ID byte strings.
			ext-list
			The ext-list parameter lists the supported extensions. This
	document does not define any extensions.		document does not define any extensions.
	4.3. TrustedAppInstall		4.4. TrustedAppInstall
	TrustedAppInstall = {
	TYPE : int,
	TOKEN : bstr,
	? MANIFEST_LIST : [+ SUIT_Outer_Wrapper],
	* $$extensions
	}
	The TrustedAppInstall message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and		The TrustedAppInstall message is used by the TAM to install software
	has the following fields:		(trusted apps) via the TEEP Agent.
	TYPE TYPE = 3 corresponds to a TrustedAppInstall message sent from		Like other TEEP messages, the TrustedAppInstall message is signed,
	the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, an		and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL
	Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an		structure is shown in [CDDL].
			trusted-app-install = [
			type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install,
			token: uint,
			option: {
			? manifest-list => [ + SUIT-envelope ],
			* $$trusted-app-install-extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			]
			The TrustedAppInstall message has the following fields:
			type
			The value of (3) corresponds to a TrustedAppInstall message sent
			from the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing,
			an Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an
	error, an Error message is returned. Note that the		error, an Error message is returned. Note that the
	TrustedAppInstall message is used for initial TA installation but		TrustedAppInstall message is used for initial TA installation but
	also for TA updates.		also for TA updates.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		token
	responses.		The value in the token field is used to match responses to
			requests.
	TA The MANIFEST_LIST field is used to convey one or multiple SUIT		manifest-list
			The manifest-list field is used to convey one or multiple SUIT
	manifests. A manifest is a bundle of metadata about the trusted		manifests. A manifest is a bundle of metadata about the trusted
	app, where to find the code, the devices to which it applies, and		app, where to find the code, the devices to which it applies, and
	cryptographic information protecting the manifest. The manifest		cryptographic information protecting the manifest. The manifest
	may also convey personalization data. TA binaries and		may also convey personalization data. TA binaries and
	personalization data is typically signed and encrypted by the SP.		personalization data is typically signed and encrypted by the SP.
	Other combinations are, however, possible as well. For example,		Other combinations are, however, possible as well. For example,
	it is also possible for the TAM to sign and encrypt the		it is also possible for the TAM to sign and encrypt the
	personalization data and to let the SP sign and/or encrypt the TA		personalization data and to let the SP sign and/or encrypt the TA
	binary.		binary.
	4.4. TrustedAppDelete		4.5. TrustedAppDelete
	TrustedAppDelete = {		The TrustedAppDelete message is used by the TAM to remove software
	TYPE : int,		(trust apps) from the device.
	TOKEN : bstr,
	? TA_LIST : [+bstr],
	* $$extensions
	}
	The TrustedAppDelete message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and		Like other TEEP messages, the TrustedAppDelete message is signed, and
	has the following fields:		the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL
			structure is shown in [CDDL].
	TYPE TYPE = 4 corresponds to a TrustedAppDelete message sent from		trusted-app-delete = [
	the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, an		type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete,
	Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an		token: uint,
			option: {
			? ta-list => [ + bstr ],
			* $$trusted-app-delete-extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			]
			The TrustedAppDelete message has the following fields:
			type
			The value of (4) corresponds to a TrustedAppDelete message sent
			from the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing,
			an Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an
	error, an Error message is returned.		error, an Error message is returned.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		token
	responses.		The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
			requests.
	TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the TAs to be deleted.		ta-list
			The ta-list parameter enumerates the TAs to be deleted.
	4.5. Success		4.6. Success
	Success = {		The TEEP protocol defines two implicit success messages and this
	TYPE : int,		explicit Success message for the cases where the TEEP Agent cannot
	TOKEN : bstr,		return another reply, such as for the TrustedAppInstall and the
	? MSG : tstr,		TrustedAppDelete messages.
	* $$extensions
	}
	The Success message is MACed and encrypted by the TEEP Agent and has		Like other TEEP messages, the Success message is signed, and the
	the following fields:		relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
			shown in [CDDL].
	TYPE TYPE = 5 corresponds to a Error message sent from the TEEP		teep-success = [
	Agent to the TAM.		type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-success,
			token: uint,
			option: {
			? msg => text,
			* $$teep-success-extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			]
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		The Success message has the following fields:
	responses.
	MSG The MSG field contains optional diagnostics information encoded		type
	in UTF-8 [RFC3629] returned by the TEEP Agent.		The value of (5) corresponds to corresponds to a Success message
			sent from the TEEP Agent to the TAM.
	4.6. Error		token
			The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
			requests.
	Error = {		msg
	TYPE : int,		The msg parameter contains optional diagnostics information
	TOKEN : bstr,		encoded in UTF-8 [RFC3629] returned by the TEEP Agent.
	ERR_CODE : int,
	? ERR_MSG : tstr,
	? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],
	? VERSION : [+version],
	* $$extensions
	}
	If possible, the Error message is MACed and encrypted by the TEEP		4.7. Error
	Agent. Unprotected Error messages MUST be handled with care by the
	TAM due to possible downgrading attacks. It has the following
	fields:
	TYPE TYPE = 6 corresponds to a Error message sent from the TEEP		The Error message is used by the TEEP Agent to return an error.
	Agent to the TAM.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		Like other TEEP messages, the Error message is signed, and the
	responses.		relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
			shown in [CDDL].
	ERR_CODE The ERR_CODE field is populated with values listed in a		teep-error = [
			type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-error,
			token: uint,
			err-code: uint,
			options: {
			? err-msg => text,
			? cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
			? versions => [ + version ],
			* $$teep-error--extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			]
			The Error message has the following fields:
			type
			The value of (6) corresponds to an Error message sent from the
			TEEP Agent to the TAM.
			token
			The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
			requests.
			err-code
			The err-code parameter is populated with values listed in a
	registry (with the initial set of error codes listed below). Only		registry (with the initial set of error codes listed below). Only
	selected messages are applicable to each message.		selected messages are applicable to each message.
	ERR_MSG The ERR_MSG message is a human-readable diagnostic message		err-msg
	that MUST be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form		The err-msg parameter is a human-readable diagnostic text that
			MUST be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form
	[RFC5198].		[RFC5198].
	VERSION The VERSION field enumerates the protocol version(s)		cipher-suites
	supported by the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be		The cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s) supported by
			the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be returned with
			the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG error message.
			versions
			The version parameter enumerates the protocol version(s) supported
			by the TEEP Agent. This otherwise optional parameter MUST be
	returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION error message.		returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION error message.
	CIPHER_SUITE The CIPHER_SUITE field lists the ciphersuite(s)		This specification defines the following initial error messages:
	supported by the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be
	returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG error message.
	This specification defines the following initial error messages.		ERR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER (1)
	Additional error code can be registered with IANA.		The TEEP Agent sends this error message when a request contains
			incorrect fields or fields that are inconsistent with other
			fields.
	ERR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER (1) The TEEP Agent sends this error message		ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION (2)
	when a request contains incorrect fields or fields that are		The TEEP Agent sends this error message when it recognizes an
	inconsistent with other fields.		unsupported extension or unsupported message.
	ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION (2) The TEEP Agent sends this error		ERR_REQUEST_SIGNATURE_FAILED (3)
	message when it recognizes an unsupported extension or unsupported		The TEEP Agent sends this error message when it fails to verify
	message.		the signature of the message.
	ERR_REQUEST_SIGNATURE_FAILED (3) The TEEP Agent sends this error		ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION (4)
	message when it fails to verify the signature of the message.		The TEEP Agent receives a message but does not support the
			indicated version.
	ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION (4) The TEEP Agent receives a message		ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG (5)
	but does not support the indicated version.		The TEEP Agent receives a request message encoded with an
			unsupported cryptographic algorithm.
	ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG (5) The TEEP Agent receives a request		ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE (6)
	message encoded with an unsupported cryptographic algorithm.		The TEEP Agent returns this error when processing of a certificate
			failed. For diagnosis purposes it is RECOMMMENDED to include
			information about the failing certificate in the error message.
	ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE (6) The TEEP Agent returns this error when		ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE (7)
	processing of a certificate failed. For diagnosis purposes it is		The TEEP Agent returns this error when a certificate was of an
	RECOMMMENDED to include information about the failing certificate		unsupported type.
	in the error message.
	ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE (7) The TEEP Agent returns this error		ERR_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED (8)
	when a certificate was of an unsupported type.		The TEEP Agent returns this error when a certificate was revoked
			by its signer.
	ERR_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED (8) The TEEP Agent returns this error when a		ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED (9)
	certificate was revoked by its signer.		The TEEP Agent returns this error when a certificate has expired
			or is not currently valid.
	ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED (9) The TEEP Agent returns this error when a		ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR (10)
	certificate has expired or is not currently valid.		The TEEP Agent returns this error when a miscellaneous internal
			error occurred while processing the request.
	ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR (10) The TEEP Agent returns this error when a		ERR_RESOURCE_FULL (11)
	miscellaneous internal error occurred while processing the		This error is reported when a device resource isn't available
	request.		anymore, such as storage space is full.
	ERR_RESOURCE_FULL (11) This error is reported when a device resource		ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND (12)
	isn't available anymore, such as storage space is full.		This error will occur when the target TA does not exist. This
			error may happen when the TAM has stale information and tries to
			delete a TA that has already been deleted.
	ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND (12) This error will occur when the target TA does		ERR_TA_ALREADY_INSTALLED (13)
	not exist. This error may happen when the TAM has stale		While installing a TA, a TEE will return this error if the TA has
	information and tries to delete a TA that has already been		already been installed.
	deleted.
	ERR_TA_ALREADY_INSTALLED (13) While installing a TA, a TEE will		ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT (14)
	return this error if the TA has already been installed.		The TEEP Agent returns this error when it does not recognize the
			format of the TA binary.
	ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT (14) The TEEP Agent returns this error when it		ERR_TA_DECRYPTION_FAILED (15)
	does not recognize the format of the TA binary.		The TEEP Agent returns this error when it fails to decrypt the TA
			binary.
	ERR_TA_DECRYPTION_FAILED (15) The TEEP Agent returns this error when		ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED (16)
	it fails to decrypt the TA binary.		The TEEP Agent returns this error when it fails to decompress the
			TA binary.
	ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED (16) The TEEP Agent returns this error		ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED (17)
	when it fails to decompress the TA binary.		The TEEP Agent returns this error when manifest processing
			failures occur that are less specific than ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT,
			ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, and ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED.
	ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED (17) The TEEP Agent returns this		ERR_PD_PROCESSING_FAILED (18)
	error when manifest processing failures occur that are less		The TEEP Agent returns this error when it fails to process the
	specific than ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, and		provided personalization data.
	ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED.
	ERR_PD_PROCESSING_FAILED (18) The TEEP Agent returns this error when		Additional error code can be registered with IANA.
	it fails to process the provided personalization data.
	5. Ciphersuites		5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels
			In COSE, arrays and maps use strings, negative integers, and unsigned
			integers as their keys. Integers are used for compactness of
			encoding. Since the word "key" is mainly used in its other meaning,
			as a cryptographic key, this specification uses the term "label" for
			this usage as a map key.
			This specification uses the following mapping:
			+-----------------------+-------+
			| Name | Label |
			+-----------------------+-------+
			| cipher-suites | 1 |
			| nonce | 2 |
			| version | 3 |
			| ocsp-data | 4 |
			| selected-cipher-suite | 5 |
			| selected-version | 6 |
			| eat | 7 |
			| ta-list | 8 |
			| ext-list | 9 |
			| manifest-list | 10 |
			| msg | 11 |
			| err-msg | 12 |
			+-----------------------+-------+
			6. Ciphersuites
	A ciphersuite consists of an AEAD algorithm, a HMAC algorithm, and a		A ciphersuite consists of an AEAD algorithm, a HMAC algorithm, and a
	signature algorithm. Each ciphersuite is identified with an integer		signature algorithm. Each ciphersuite is identified with an integer
	value, which corresponds to an IANA registered ciphersuite. This		value, which corresponds to an IANA registered ciphersuite. This
	document specifies two ciphersuites.		document specifies two ciphersuites.
	Value | Ciphersuite		+-------+------------------------------------------------+
	------+------------------------------------------------		| Value | Ciphersuite |
	0 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, X25519, EdDSA		+-------+------------------------------------------------+
	1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, P-256, ES256		| 1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, X25519, EdDSA |
			| 2 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, P-256, ES256 |
			+-------+------------------------------------------------+
	6. Security Consideration		7. Security Considerations
	This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this		This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this
	specification:		specification:
	Cryptographic Algorithms TEEP protocol messages exchanged between		Cryptographic Algorithms
	the TAM and the TEEP Agent are protected using COSE. This		TEEP protocol messages exchanged between the TAM and the TEEP
	specification relies on the cryptographic algorithms provided by		Agent are protected using COSE. This specification relies on the
	COSE. Public key based authentication is used to by the TEEP		cryptographic algorithms provided by COSE. Public key based
	Agent to authenticate the TAM and vice versa.		authentication is used to by the TEEP Agent to authenticate the
			TAM and vice versa.
	Attestation A TAM may rely on the attestation information provided		Attestation
	by the TEEP Agent and the Entity Attestation Token is re-used to		A TAM may rely on the attestation information provided by the TEEP
	convey this information. To sign the Entity Attestation Token it		Agent and the Entity Attestation Token is re-used to convey this
	is necessary for the device to possess a public key (usually in		information. To sign the Entity Attestation Token it is necessary
	the form of a certificate) along with the corresponding private		for the device to possess a public key (usually in the form of a
	key. Depending on the properties of the attestation mechanism it		certificate) along with the corresponding private key. Depending
	is possible to uniquely identify a device based on information in		on the properties of the attestation mechanism it is possible to
	the attestation information or in the certificate used to sign the		uniquely identify a device based on information in the attestation
	attestation token. This uniqueness may raise privacy concerns.		information or in the certificate used to sign the attestation
	To lower the privacy implications the TEEP Agent MUST present its		token. This uniqueness may raise privacy concerns. To lower the
	attestation information only to an authenticated and authorized		privacy implications the TEEP Agent MUST present its attestation
	TAM.		information only to an authenticated and authorized TAM.
	TA Binaries TA binaries are provided by the SP.It is the		TA Binaries
	responsibility of the TAM to relay only verified TAs from		TA binaries are provided by the SP. It is the responsibility of
	authorized SPs. Delivery of that TA to the TEEP Agent is then the		the TAM to relay only verified TAs from authorized SPs. Delivery
	responsibility of the TAM and the TEEP Broker, using the security		of that TA to the TEEP Agent is then the responsibility of the TAM
	mechanisms provided by the TEEP protocol. To protect the TA		and the TEEP Broker, using the security mechanisms provided by the
	binary the SUIT manifest is re-used and it offers a varity of		TEEP protocol. To protect the TA binary the SUIT manifest is re-
	security features, including digitial signatures and symmetric		used and it offers a varity of security features, including
	encryption.		digitial signatures and symmetric encryption.
	Personalization Data An SP or a TAM can supply personalization data		Personalization Data
	along with a TA. This data is also protected by a SUIT manifest.		An SP or a TAM can supply personalization data along with a TA.
	The personalization data may be opaque to the TAM.		This data is also protected by a SUIT manifest. The
			personalization data may be opaque to the TAM.
	TEEP Broker The TEEP protocol relies on the TEEP Broker to relay		TEEP Broker
	messages between the TAM and the TEEP Agent. When the TEEP Broker		The TEEP protocol relies on the TEEP Broker to relay messages
	is compromised it can drop messages, delay the delivery of		between the TAM and the TEEP Agent. When the TEEP Broker is
	messages, and replay messages but it cannot modify those messages.		compromised it can drop messages, delay the delivery of messages,
	(A replay would be, however, detected by the TEEP Agent.) A		and replay messages but it cannot modify those messages. (A
			replay would be, however, detected by the TEEP Agent.) A
	compromised TEEP Broker could reorder messages in an attempt to		compromised TEEP Broker could reorder messages in an attempt to
	install an old version of a TA. Information in the manifest		install an old version of a TA. Information in the manifest
	ensures that the TEEP Agents are protected against such		ensures that the TEEP Agents are protected against such
	downgrading attacks based on features offered by the manifest		downgrading attacks based on features offered by the manifest
	itself.		itself.
	CA Compromise The QueryRequest message from a TAM to the TEEP Agent		CA Compromise
	may include OCSP stapling data for the TAM's signer certificate		The QueryRequest message from a TAM to the TEEP Agent may include
	and for intermediate CA certificates up to the root certificate so		OCSP stapling data for the TAM's signer certificate and for
	that the TEEP Agent can verify the certificate's revocation		intermediate CA certificates up to the root certificate so that
	status.		the TEEP Agent can verify the certificate's revocation status. A
			certificate revocation status check on a TA signer certificate is
	A certificate revocation status check on a TA signer certificate		OPTIONAL by a TEEP Agent. A TAM is responsible for vetting a TA
	is OPTIONAL by a TEEP Agent. A TAM is responsible for vetting a		and before distributing them to TEEP Agents. TEEP Agents will
	TA and before distributing them to TEEP Agents. TEEP Agents will
	trust a TA signer certificate's validation status done by a TAM.		trust a TA signer certificate's validation status done by a TAM.
	CA Compromise The CA issuing certificates to a TAM or an SP may get		CA Compromise
	compromised. A compromised intermediate CA certificates can be		The CA issuing certificates to a TAM or an SP may get compromised.
	detected by a TEEP Agent by using OCSP information, assuming the		A compromised intermediate CA certificates can be detected by a
	revocation information is available. Additionally, it is		TEEP Agent by using OCSP information, assuming the revocation
	RECOMMENDED to provide a way to update the trust anchor store used		information is available. Additionally, it is RECOMMENDED to
	by the device, for example using a firmware update mechanism.		provide a way to update the trust anchor store used by the device,
			for example using a firmware update mechanism. If the CA issuing
	If the CA issuing certificates to devices gets compromised then		certificates to devices gets compromised then these devices might
	these devices might be rejected by a TAM, if revocation is		be rejected by a TAM, if revocation is available to the TAM.
	available to the TAM.
	Compromised TAM The TEEP Agent SHOULD use OCSP information to verify		Compromised TAM
	the validity of the TAM-provided certificate (as well as the		The TEEP Agent SHOULD use OCSP information to verify the validity
	validity of intermediate CA certificates). The integrity and the		of the TAM-provided certificate (as well as the validity of
	accuracy of the clock within the TEE determines the ability to		intermediate CA certificates). The integrity and the accuracy of
	determine an expired or revoked certificate since OCSP stapling		the clock within the TEE determines the ability to determine an
	includes signature generation time, certificate validity dates are		expired or revoked certificate since OCSP stapling includes
	compared to the current time.		signature generation time, certificate validity dates are compared
			to the current time.
	7. IANA Considerations		8. IANA Considerations
	7.1. Media Type Registration		8.1. Media Type Registration
	IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor.		IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor.
	Type name: application		Type name: application
	Subtype name: teep+cbor		Subtype name: teep+cbor
	Required parameters: none		Required parameters: none
	Optional parameters: none		Optional parameters: none
	Encoding considerations: Same as encoding considerations of		Encoding considerations: Same as encoding considerations of
	application/cbor		application/cbor
	Security considerations: See Security Considerations Section of this		Security considerations: See Security Considerations Section of this
	document.		document.
	Interoperability considerations: Same as interoperability		Interoperability considerations: Same as interoperability
	considerations of application/cbor as specified in [RFC7049]		considerations of application/cbor as specified in [RFC7049]
	Published specification: This document.		Published specification: This document.
	Applications that use this media type: TEEP protocol implementations		Applications that use this media type: TEEP protocol implementations
	Fragment identifier considerations: N/A		Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
	Additional information:		Additional information:
	Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A		Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
	Magic number(s): N/A		Magic number(s): N/A
	File extension(s): N/A		File extension(s): N/A
	Macintosh file type code(s): N/A		Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
	Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org		Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org
	Intended usage: COMMON		Intended usage: COMMON
	Restrictions on usage: none		Restrictions on usage: none
	Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document		Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document
	Change controller: IETF		Change controller: IETF
	7.2. Error Code Registry		8.2. Error Code Registry
	IANA is also requested to create a new registry for the error codes		IANA is also requested to create a new registry for the error codes
	defined in Section 4.		defined in Section 4.
	Registration requests are evaluated after a three-week review period		Registration requests are evaluated after a three-week review period
	on the teep-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or		on the teep-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or
	more Designated Experts [RFC8126]. However, to allow for the		more Designated Experts [RFC8126]. However, to allow for the
	allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may		allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may
	approve registration once they are satisfied that such a		approve registration once they are satisfied that such a
	specification will be published.		specification will be published.
	skipping to change at page 15, line 17 ¶		skipping to change at page 19, line 25 ¶
	Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes		Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
	determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing		determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
	functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or		functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or
	whether it is useful only for a single extension, and whether the		whether it is useful only for a single extension, and whether the
	registration description is clear.		registration description is clear.
	IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts		IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
	and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing		and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
	list.		list.
	7.3. Ciphersuite Registry		8.3. Ciphersuite Registry
	IANA is also requested to create a new registry for ciphersuites, as		IANA is also requested to create a new registry for ciphersuites, as
	defined in Section 5.		defined in Section 6.
	8. References		8.4. CBOR Tag Registry
	8.1. Normative References		IANA is requested to register a CBOR tag in the "CBOR Tags" registry
			for use with TEEP messages.
			The registry contents is:
			o CBOR Tag: TBD1
			o Data Item: TEEP Message
			o Semantics: TEEP Message, as defined in [[TBD: This RFC]]
			o Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]
			o Point of Contact: TEEP working group (teep@ietf.org)
			9. References
			9.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]		[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
	Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.		Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.
	O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft-		O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft-
	ietf-rats-eat-03 (work in progress), February 2020.		ietf-rats-eat-03 (work in progress), February 2020.
	[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]		[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
	Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., and H. Birkholz, "A Concise		Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., and K. Zandberg,
	Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based Serialization		"A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based
	Format for the Software Updates for Internet of Things		Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet
	(SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-03 (work in		of Things (SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-04
	progress), February 2020.		(work in progress), March 2020.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.		[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
	Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online		Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
	Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,		Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>.
	[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO		[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
	10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November		10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
	2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.		2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
	[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
	Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
	[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network		[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
	Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,		Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.
	[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object		[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,		Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
	October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.		October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
	[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",		[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
	RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,		RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
	8.2. Informative References		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
			2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
			May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]		9.2. Informative References
	Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data
	definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
	express CBOR and JSON data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-
	cddl-08 (work in progress), March 2019.
	[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]		[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
	Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,		Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
	"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)		"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
	Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-07 (work in		Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-08 (work in
	progress), March 2020.		progress), April 2020.
	[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol]
	Pei, M., Atyeo, A., Cook, N., Yoo, M., and H. Tschofenig,
	"The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)", draft-ietf-teep-
	opentrustprotocol-03 (work in progress), May 2019.
	[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for		[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
	Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,		Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
	RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,		RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements		[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
			Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
			Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
			JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
			June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
	This work is based on the initial version of OTrP		A. Contributors
	[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol] and hence credits go to those who
	have contributed to it.		We would like to thank Brian Witten (Symantec), Tyler Kim (Solacia),
			Nick Cook (Arm), and Minho Yoo (IoTrust) for their contributions to
			the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP), which influenced the design of this
			specification.
			B. Acknowledgements
	We would like to thank Eve Schooler for the suggestion of the		We would like to thank Eve Schooler for the suggestion of the
	protocol name.		protocol name.
	We would like to thank Akira Tsukamoto, Isobe Kohei, Kohei Isobe,		We would like to thank Kohei Isobe (TRASIO/SECOM), Kuniyasu Suzaki
	Tsukasa Ooi, and Yuichi Takita for their valuable implementation		(TRASIO/AIST), Tsukasa Oi (TRASIO), and Yuichi Takita (SECOM) for
	feedback.		their valuable implementation feedback.
	Appendix B. Contributors		We would also like to thank Carsten Bormann and Henk Birkholz for
			their help with the CDDL.
	We would like to thank the following individuals for their		C. Complete CDDL
	contributions to an initial version of this specification.
	- Brian Witten		teep-message = $teep-message-type .within teep-message-framework
	Symantec
	brian_witten@symantec.com
	- Tyler Kim		SUIT-envelope = bstr ; placeholder
	Solacia
	tylerkim@iotrust.kr
	- Nick Cook		teep-message-framework = [
	Arm Ltd.		type: 0..23 / $teep-type-extension,
	nicholas.cook@arm.com		token: uint,
			options: { * teep-option },
			* int; further integers, e.g. for data-item-requested
			]
	- Minho Yoo		teep-option = (uint => any)
	IoTrust
	minho.yoo@iotrust.kr		; messages defined below:
			$teep-message-type /= query-request
			$teep-message-type /= query-response
			$teep-message-type /= trusted-app-install
			$teep-message-type /= trusted-app-delete
			$teep-message-type /= teep-error
			$teep-message-type /= teep-success
			; message type numbers
			TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1
			TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2
			TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install = 3
			TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete = 4
			TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 5
			TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 6
			version = uint .size 4
			ext-info = uint
			; data items as bitmaps
			data-item-requested = $data-item-requested .within uint .size 8
			attestation = 1
			$data-item-requested /= attestation
			trusted-apps = 2
			$data-item-requested /= trusted-apps
			extensions = 4
			$data-item-requested /= extensions
			suit-commands = 8
			$data-item-requested /= suit-commands
			query-request = [
			type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request,
			token: uint,
			options: {
			? supported-cipher-suites => suite,
			? nonce => bstr .size (8..64),
			? version => [ + version ],
			? oscp-data => bstr,
			* $$query-request-extensions
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			},
			data-item-requested
			]
			; ciphersuites as bitmaps
			suite = $TEEP-suite .within uint .size 8
			TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA = 1
			TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-P-256-ES256 = 2
			$TEEP-suite /= TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA
			$TEEP-suite /= TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-P-256-ES256
			query-response = [
			type: TEEP-TYPE-query-response,
			token: uint,
			options: {
			? selected-cipher-suite => suite,
			? selected-version => version,
			? eat => bstr,
			? ta-list => [ + bstr ],
			? ext-list => [ + ext-info ],
			* $$query-response-extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			]
			trusted-app-install = [
			type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install,
			token: uint,
			option: {
			? manifest-list => [ + SUIT-envelope ],
			* $$trusted-app-install-extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			]
			trusted-app-delete = [
			type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete,
			token: uint,
			option: {
			? ta-list => [ + bstr ],
			* $$trusted-app-delete-extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			]
			teep-success = [
			type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-success,
			token: uint,
			option: {
			? msg => text,
			* $$teep-success-extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			]
			teep-error = [
			type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-error,
			token: uint,
			options: {
			? err-msg => text,
			? cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
			? versions => [ + version ],
			* $$teep-error--extensions,
			* $$teep-option-extensions
			}
			err-code: uint,
			]
			cipher-suites = 1
			nonce = 2
			versions = 3
			oscp-data = 4
			selected-cipher-suite = 5
			selected-version = 6
			eat = 7
			ta-list = 8
			ext-list = 9
			manifest-list = 10
			msg = 11
			err-msg = 12
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Hannes Tschofenig		Hannes Tschofenig
	Arm Ltd.		Arm Ltd.
	Absam, Tirol 6067		Absam, Tirol 6067
	Austria		Austria
	Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com		Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
	skipping to change at line 808 ¶		skipping to change at page 25, line 15 ¶
	Intel		Intel
	US		US
	Email: david.m.wheeler@intel.com		Email: david.m.wheeler@intel.com
	Dave Thaler		Dave Thaler
	Microsoft		Microsoft
	US		US
	Email: dthaler@microsoft.com		Email: dthaler@microsoft.com
			Akira Tsukamoto
			AIST
			JP
			Email: akira.tsukamoto@aist.go.jp
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