< draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-02.txt   draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-03.txt >
TLS H. Tschofenig, Ed. TLS H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Internet-Draft T. Fossati Internet-Draft T. Fossati, Ed.
Updates: 6347 (if approved) Arm Limited Updates: 6347 (if approved) Arm Limited
Intended status: Standards Track 26 November 2021 Intended status: Standards Track December 21, 2021
Expires: 30 May 2022 Expires: June 24, 2022
Return Routability Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3 Return Routability Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-02 draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-03
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a return routability check for use in context This document specifies a return routability check for use in context
of the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer of the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3. Security (DTLS) protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer
Security Working Group mailing list (tls@ietf.org), which is archived
at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-rrc.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 May 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 24, 2022.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RRC Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RRC Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. The Return Routability Check Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. The Return Routability Check Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Path Validation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Path Challenge Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Path Response Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. Timer Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In "classical" DTLS, selecting a security context of an incoming DTLS In "classical" DTLS, selecting a security context of an incoming DTLS
record is accomplished with the help of the 5-tuple, i.e. source IP record is accomplished with the help of the 5-tuple, i.e. source IP
address, source port, transport protocol, destination IP address, and address, source port, transport protocol, destination IP address, and
destination port. Changes to this 5 tuple can happen for a variety destination port. Changes to this 5 tuple can happen for a variety
reasons over the lifetime of the DTLS session. In the IoT context, reasons over the lifetime of the DTLS session. In the IoT context,
NAT rebinding is common with sleepy devices. Other examples include NAT rebinding is common with sleepy devices. Other examples include
end host mobility and multi-homing. Without CID, if the source IP end host mobility and multi-homing. Without CID, if the source IP
skipping to change at page 3, line 31 skipping to change at page 3, line 28
willing to receive and process DTLS records is left open. This willing to receive and process DTLS records is left open. This
document standardizes a return routability check (RRC) as part of the document standardizes a return routability check (RRC) as part of the
DTLS protocol itself. DTLS protocol itself.
The return routability check is performed by the receiving peer The return routability check is performed by the receiving peer
before the CID-to-IP address/port binding is updated in that peer's before the CID-to-IP address/port binding is updated in that peer's
session state database. This is done in order to provide more session state database. This is done in order to provide more
confidence to the receiving peer that the sending peer is reachable confidence to the receiving peer that the sending peer is reachable
at the indicated address and port. at the indicated address and port.
Note however that, irrespective of CID, if RRC has been successfully
negotiated by the peers, path validation can be used at any time by
either endpoint. For instance, an endpoint might use RRC to check
that a peer is still in possession of its address after a period of
quiescence.
2. Conventions and Terminology 2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
This document assumes familiarity with the CID format and protocol This document assumes familiarity with the CID format and protocol
defined for DTLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] and for DTLS defined for DTLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] and for DTLS
1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]. The presentation language used in this 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]. The presentation language used in this
document is described in Section 4 of [RFC8446]. document is described in Section 4 of [RFC8446].
This document reuses the definition of "anti-amplification limit"
from [RFC9000] to mean three times the amount of data received from
an unvalidated address. This includes all DTLS records originating
from that source address, excluding discarded ones.
3. RRC Extension 3. RRC Extension
The use of RRC is negotiated via the rrc DTLS-only extension. On The use of RRC is negotiated via the "rrc" DTLS-only extension. On
connecting, the client includes the rrc extension in its ClientHello connecting, the client includes the "rrc" extension in its
if it wishes to use RRC. If the server is capable of meeting this ClientHello if it wishes to use RRC. If the server is capable of
requirement, it responds with a rrc extension in its ServerHello. meeting this requirement, it responds with a "rrc" extension in its
The extension_type value for this extension is TBD1 and the ServerHello. The "extension_type" value for this extension is TBD1
extension_data field of this extension is empty. The client and and the "extension_data" field of this extension is empty. The
server MUST NOT use RRC unless both sides have successfully exchanged client and server MUST NOT use RRC unless both sides have
rrc extensions. successfully exchanged "rrc" extensions.
Note that the RRC extension applies to both DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3. Note that the RRC extension applies to both DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3.
4. The Return Routability Check Message 4. The Return Routability Check Message
When a record with CID is received that has the source address of the When a record with CID is received that has the source address of the
enclosing UDP datagram different from the one previously associated enclosing UDP datagram different from the one previously associated
with that CID, the receiver MUST NOT update its view of the peer's IP with that CID, the receiver MUST NOT update its view of the peer's IP
address and port number with the source specified in the UDP datagram address and port number with the source specified in the UDP datagram
before cryptographically validating the enclosed record(s) but before cryptographically validating the enclosed record(s) but
skipping to change at page 4, line 43 skipping to change at page 5, line 4
reserved(2..255) reserved(2..255)
} rrc_msg_type; } rrc_msg_type;
struct { struct {
rrc_msg_type msg_type; rrc_msg_type msg_type;
select (return_routability_check.msg_type) { select (return_routability_check.msg_type) {
case path_challenge: Cookie; case path_challenge: Cookie;
case path_response: Cookie; case path_response: Cookie;
}; };
} return_routability_check; } return_routability_check;
The newly introduced "return_routability_check" message contains a
The newly introduced return_routability_check message contains a
cookie. The cookie is a 8-byte field containing arbitrary data. cookie. The cookie is a 8-byte field containing arbitrary data.
The return_routability_check message MUST be authenticated and The "return_routability_check" message MUST be authenticated and
encrypted using the currently active security context. encrypted using the currently active security context.
The receiver that observes the peer's address and or port update MUST 5. Path Validation Procedure
The receiver that observes the peer's address or port update MUST
stop sending any buffered application data (or limit the data sent to stop sending any buffered application data (or limit the data sent to
a TBD threshold) and initiate the return routability check that the unvalidated address to the anti-amplification limit) and initiate
proceeds as follows: the return routability check that proceeds as follows:
1. A cookie is placed in a return_routability_check message of type 1. An unpredictable cookie is placed in a "return_routability_check"
path_challenge; message of type path_challenge;
2. The message is sent to the observed new address and a timeout T 2. The message is sent to the observed new address and a timer T
is started; (see Section 5.3) is started;
3. The peer endpoint, after successfully verifying the received 3. The peer endpoint, after successfully verifying the received
return_routability_check message echoes the cookie value in a "return_routability_check" message responds by echoing the cookie
return_routability_check message of type path_response; value in a "return_routability_check" message of type
path_response;
4. When the initiator receives and verifies the 4. When the initiator receives and verifies the
return_routability_check message contains the sent cookie, it "return_routability_check" message contains the sent cookie, it
updates the peer address binding; updates the peer address binding;
5. If T expires, or the address confirmation fails, the peer address 5. If T expires, or the address confirmation fails, the peer address
binding is not updated. binding is not updated.
After this point, any pending send operation is resumed to the bound After this point, any pending send operation is resumed to the bound
peer address. peer address.
5. Example Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 contain the requirements for the
initiator and responder roles, broken down per protocol phase.
5.1. Path Challenge Requirements
- The initiator MAY send multiple "return_routability_check"
messages of type path_challenge to cater for packet loss on the
probed path.
o Each path_challenge SHOULD go into different transport packets.
(Note that the DTLS implementation may not have control over
the packetization done by the transport layer.)
o The transmission of subsequent path_challenge messages SHOULD
be paced to decrease the chance of loss.
o Each path_challenge message MUST contain random data.
- The initiator MAY use padding using the record padding mechanism
available in DTLS 1.3 (and in DTLS 1.2, when CID is enabled on the
sending direction) up to the anti-amplification limit to probe if
the path MTU (PMTU) for the new path is still acceptable.
5.2. Path Response Requirements
- The responder MUST NOT delay sending an elicited path_response
message.
- The responder MUST send exactly one path_response messages for
each received path_request.
- The responder MUST send the path_response on the network path
where the corresponding path_challenge has been received, so that
validation succeeds only if the path is functional in both
directions.
o The initiator MUST NOT enforce this behaviour
- The initiator MUST silently discard any invalid path_response it
receives.
Note that RRC does not cater for PMTU discovery on the reverse path.
If the responder wants to do PMTU discovery using RRC, it should
initiate a new path validation procedure.
5.3. Timer Choice
When setting T, implementations are cautioned that the new path could
have a longer round-trip time (RTT) than the original.
In settings where there is external information about the RTT of the
active path, implementations SHOULD use T = 3xRTT.
If an implementation has no way to obtain information regarding the
RTT of the active path, a value of 1s SHOULD be used.
Profiles for specific deployment environments - for example,
constrained networks [I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile] - MAY specify a
different, more suitable value.
6. Example
The example TLS 1.3 handshake shown in Figure 1 shows a client and a The example TLS 1.3 handshake shown in Figure 1 shows a client and a
server negotiating the support for CID and for the RRC extension. server negotiating the support for CID and for the RRC extension.
Client Server Client Server
Key ^ ClientHello Key ^ ClientHello
Exch | + key_share Exch | + key_share
| + signature_algorithms | + signature_algorithms
| + rrc | + rrc
skipping to change at page 6, line 40 skipping to change at page 7, line 45
* Indicates optional or situation-dependent * Indicates optional or situation-dependent
messages/extensions that are not always sent. messages/extensions that are not always sent.
{} Indicates messages protected using keys {} Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from a [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret. derived from a [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret.
[] Indicates messages protected using keys [] Indicates messages protected using keys
derived from [sender]_application_traffic_secret_N. derived from [sender]_application_traffic_secret_N.
Figure 1: Message Flow for Full TLS Handshake Figure 1: Message Flow for Full TLS Handshake
Once a connection has been established the client and the server Once a connection has been established the client and the server
exchange application payloads protected by DTLS with an unilaterally exchange application payloads protected by DTLS with an unilaterally
used CIDs. In our case, the client is requested to use CID 100 for used CIDs. In our case, the client is requested to use CID 100 for
records sent to the server. records sent to the server.
At some point in the communication interaction the IP address used by At some point in the communication interaction the IP address used by
the client changes and, thanks to the CID usage, the security context the client changes and, thanks to the CID usage, the security context
to interpret the record is successfully located by the server. to interpret the record is successfully located by the server.
However, the server wants to test the reachability of the client at However, the server wants to test the reachability of the client at
skipping to change at page 7, line 47 skipping to change at page 9, line 47
Src-IP=B Src-IP=B
Dst-IP=Z Dst-IP=Z
<<< IP Address B <<< IP Address B
Verified >> Verified >>
<======== Application Data <======== Application Data
Src-IP=Z Src-IP=Z
Dst-IP=B Dst-IP=B
Figure 2: Return Routability Example Figure 2: Return Routability Example
6. Security and Privacy Considerations 7. Security and Privacy Considerations
Note that the return routability checks do not protect against Note that the return routability checks do not protect against
flooding of third-parties if the attacker is on-path, as the attacker flooding of third-parties if the attacker is on-path, as the attacker
can redirect the return routability checks to the real peer (even if can redirect the return routability checks to the real peer (even if
those datagrams are cryptographically authenticated). On-path those datagrams are cryptographically authenticated). On-path
adversaries can, in general, pose a harm to connectivity. adversaries can, in general, pose a harm to connectivity.
7. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to allocate an entry to the TLS ContentType IANA is requested to allocate an entry to the TLS "ContentType"
registry, for the return_routability_check(TBD2) defined in this registry, for the "return_routability_check(TBD2)" defined in this
document. The return_routability_check content type is only document. The "return_routability_check" content type is only
applicable to DTLS 1.2 and 1.3. applicable to DTLS 1.2 and 1.3.
IANA is requested to allocate the extension code point (TBD1) for the IANA is requested to allocate the extension code point (TBD1) for the
rrc extension to the TLS ExtensionType Values registry as described "rrc" extension to the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry as
in Table 1. described in Table 1.
+=======+===========+=====+===========+=============+===========+ +-------+-------------+-------+-----------+-------------+-----------+
| Value | Extension | TLS | DTLS-Only | Recommended | Reference | | Value | Extension | TLS | DTLS-Only | Recommended | Reference |
| | Name | 1.3 | | | | | | Name | 1.3 | | | |
+=======+===========+=====+===========+=============+===========+ +-------+-------------+-------+-----------+-------------+-----------+
| TBD1 | rrc | CH, | Y | N | RFC-THIS | | TBD1 | rrc | CH, | Y | N | RFC-THIS |
| | | SH | | | | | | | SH | | | |
+-------+-----------+-----+-----------+-------------+-----------+ +-------+-------------+-------+-----------+-------------+-----------+
Table 1: rrc entry in the TLS ExtensionType Values registry Table 1: rrc entry in the TLS ExtensionType Values registry
8. Open Issues 9. Open Issues
Issues against this document are tracked at https://github.com/tlswg/ Issues against this document are tracked at https://github.com/tlswg/
dtls-rrc/issues dtls-rrc/issues
9. Acknowledgments 10. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Achim Kraus, Hanno Becker, Hanno Boeck, Manuel We would like to thank Achim Kraus, Hanno Becker, Hanno Boeck, Manuel
Pegourie-Gonnard, Mohit Sahni and Rich Salz for their input to this Pegourie-Gonnard, Mohit Sahni and Rich Salz for their input to this
document. document.
10. Normative References 11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and A. Kraus, RTFM, Inc., Arm Limited, Arm Limited, and Bosch.IO GmbH,
"Connection Identifiers for DTLS 1.2", Work in Progress, "Connection Identifiers for DTLS 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-13, 22 dtls-connection-id-13 (work in progress), June 2021.
June 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-13>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls- 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43 (work in progress), April
dtls13-43, 30 April 2021, 2021.
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
dtls13-43>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile]
Arm Limited and Arm Limited, "TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for
the Internet of Things", draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-
profile-03 (work in progress), October 2021.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
Appendix A. History Appendix A. History
// RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION [[CREF1: RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION]]
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-02 draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-02
* Undo the TLS flags extension for negotiating RRC, use a new - Undo the TLS flags extension for negotiating RRC, use a new
extension type extension type
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-01 draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-01
* Use the TLS flags extension for negotiating RRC - Use the TLS flags extension for negotiating RRC
* Enhanced IANA consideration section - Enhanced IANA consideration section
* Expanded example section - Expanded example section
* Revamp message layout: - Revamp message layout:
- Use 8-byte fixed size cookies o Use 8-byte fixed size cookies
- Explicitly separate path challenge from response o Explicitly separate path challenge from response
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-00 draft-ietf-tls-dtls-rrc-00
* Draft name changed after WG adoption - Draft name changed after WG adoption
* Removed text that overlapped with draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-
draft-tschofenig-tls-dtls-rrc-01
- Removed text that overlapped with draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-
id id
draft-tschofenig-tls-dtls-rrc-00 draft-tschofenig-tls-dtls-rrc-00
* Initial version - Initial version
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig (editor) Hannes Tschofenig (editor)
Arm Limited Arm Limited
Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com EMail: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
Thomas Fossati Thomas Fossati (editor)
Arm Limited Arm Limited
Email: thomas.fossati@arm.com EMail: thomas.fossati@arm.com
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