| < draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-01.txt | draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-02.txt > | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| tls R. Housley | tls R. Housley | |||
| Internet-Draft Vigil Security | Internet-Draft Vigil Security | |||
| Intended status: Informational J. Hoyland | Intended status: Informational J. Hoyland | |||
| Expires: 6 May 2021 Cloudflare Ltd. | Expires: 24 August 2021 Cloudflare Ltd. | |||
| M. Sethi | M. Sethi | |||
| Ericsson | Ericsson | |||
| C.A. Wood | C.A. Wood | |||
| Cloudflare | Cloudflare | |||
| 2 November 2020 | 20 February 2021 | |||
| Guidance for External PSK Usage in TLS | Guidance for External PSK Usage in TLS | |||
| draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-01 | draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-guidance-02 | |||
| Abstract | Abstract | |||
| This document provides usage guidance for external Pre-Shared Keys | This document provides usage guidance for external Pre-Shared Keys | |||
| (PSKs) in TLS. It lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs | (PSKs) in Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.3 as defined in | |||
| under certain assumptions and demonstrates how violations of these | RFC 8446. It lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under | |||
| assumptions lead to attacks. This document also discusses PSK use | certain assumptions and demonstrates how violations of these | |||
| cases, provisioning processes, and TLS stack implementation support | assumptions lead to attacks. It discusses PSK use cases, | |||
| in the context of these assumptions. It provides advice for | provisioning processes, and TLS stack implementation support in the | |||
| applications in various use cases to help meet these assumptions. | context of these assumptions. It provides advice for applications in | |||
| Privacy and security properties not provided by PSKs are also | various use cases to help meet these assumptions. It also lists the | |||
| included. | privacy and security properties that are not provided by TLS when | |||
| external PSKs are used. | ||||
| Discussion Venues | Discussion Venues | |||
| This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. | This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. | |||
| Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at | Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at | |||
| https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team. | https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team. | |||
| Status of This Memo | Status of This Memo | |||
| skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶ | skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶ | |||
| Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | |||
| Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | |||
| working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | |||
| Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | |||
| Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | |||
| and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | |||
| time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | |||
| material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | |||
| This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2021. | This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 August 2021. | |||
| Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
| Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
| document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
| This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
| Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ | |||
| license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. | license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. | |||
| Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights | Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights | |||
| and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components | and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components | |||
| extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text | extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text | |||
| as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are | as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are | |||
| provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. | provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. | |||
| Table of Contents | Table of Contents | |||
| 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | |||
| 2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | 2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | |||
| 3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | 3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | |||
| 4. PSK Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | 4. PSK Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 | |||
| 5. Privacy Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | 4.1. Shared PSKs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | |||
| 6. External PSK Use Cases and Provisioning Processes . . . . . . 5 | 4.2. PSK Entropy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | |||
| 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | ||||
| 6. External PSK Use Cases and Provisioning Processes . . . . . . 6 | ||||
| 6.1. Provisioning Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 6.1. Provisioning Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | |||
| 6.2. Provisioning Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 6.2. Provisioning Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | |||
| 7. Recommendations for External PSK Usage . . . . . . . . . . . 7 | 7. Recommendations for External PSK Usage . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | |||
| 7.1. Stack Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 | 7.1. Stack Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 | |||
| 7.1.1. PSK Identity Encoding and Comparison . . . . . . . . 9 | 7.1.1. PSK Identity Encoding and Comparison . . . . . . . . 10 | |||
| 7.1.2. PSK Identity Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 7.1.2. PSK Identity Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | |||
| 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | |||
| 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | |||
| 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | |||
| 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 | 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | |||
| 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | |||
| Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
| Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
| 1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
| This document provides guidance on the use of external Pre-Shared | ||||
| Keys (PSKs) in Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.3 [RFC8446]. | ||||
| This document lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under | ||||
| certain assumptions and demonstrates how violations of these | ||||
| assumptions lead to attacks. This document discusses PSK use cases, | ||||
| provisioning processes, and TLS stack implementation support in the | ||||
| context of these assumptions. This document also provides advice for | ||||
| applications in various use cases to help meet these assumptions. | ||||
| There are many resources that provide guidance for password | There are many resources that provide guidance for password | |||
| generation and verification aimed towards improving security. | generation and verification aimed towards improving security. | |||
| However, there is no such equivalent for external Pre-Shared Keys | However, there is no such equivalent for external Pre-Shared Keys | |||
| (PSKs) in TLS. This document aims to reduce that gap. It lists TLS | (PSKs) in TLS. This document aims to reduce that gap. | |||
| security properties provided by PSKs under certain assumptions and | ||||
| demonstrates how violations of these assumptions lead to attacks. | ||||
| This document also discusses PSK use cases, provisioning processes, | ||||
| and TLS stack implementation support in the context of these | ||||
| assumptions. It provides advice for applications in various use | ||||
| cases to help meet these assumptions. | ||||
| The guidance provided in this document is applicable across TLS | The guidance provided in this document is applicable across TLS | |||
| [RFC8446], DTLS [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], and Constrained TLS | [RFC8446], DTLS [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], and Constrained TLS | |||
| [I-D.ietf-tls-ctls]. | [I-D.ietf-tls-ctls]. | |||
| 2. Conventions and Definitions | 2. Conventions and Definitions | |||
| The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", | The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", | |||
| "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and | "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and | |||
| "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP | "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in | |||
| 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all | BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all | |||
| capitals, as shown here. | capitals, as shown here. | |||
| 3. Notation | 3. Notation | |||
| For purposes of this document, a "logical node" is a computing | For purposes of this document, a "logical node" is a computing | |||
| presence that other parties can interact with via the TLS protocol. | presence that other parties can interact with via the TLS protocol. | |||
| A logical node could potentially be realized with multiple physical | A logical node could potentially be realized with multiple physical | |||
| instances operating under common administrative control, e.g., a | instances operating under common administrative control, e.g., a | |||
| server farm. An "endpoint" is a client or server participating in a | server farm. An "endpoint" is a client or server participating in a | |||
| connection. | connection. | |||
| 4. PSK Security Properties | 4. PSK Security Properties | |||
| External PSK authentication in TLS allows endpoints to authenticate | External PSK authentication in TLS allows endpoints to authenticate | |||
| connections using previously established keys. These keys do not | connections using previously established keys. These keys do not | |||
| provide protection of endpoint identities (see Section 5), nor do | provide protection of endpoint identities (see Section 5), nor do | |||
| they provide non-repudiation (one endpoint in a connection can deny | they provide non-repudiation (one endpoint in a connection can deny | |||
| the conversation). PSK authentication security implicitly assumes | the conversation). Protection of endpoint identities and protection | |||
| one fundamental property: each PSK is known to exactly one client and | against an endpoint denying the conversation are possible when a | |||
| one server, and that these never switch roles. If this assumption is | fresh TLS handshake is performed. | |||
| violated, then the security properties of TLS are severely weakened. | ||||
| PSK authentication security implicitly assumes one fundamental | ||||
| property: each PSK is known to exactly one client and one server, and | ||||
| that these never switch roles. If this assumption is violated, then | ||||
| the security properties of TLS are severely weakened as discussed | ||||
| below. | ||||
| 4.1. Shared PSKs | ||||
| As discussed in Section 6, there are use cases where it is desirable | As discussed in Section 6, there are use cases where it is desirable | |||
| for multiple clients or multiple servers to share a PSK. If this is | for multiple clients or multiple servers to share a PSK. If this is | |||
| done naively by having all members share a common key, then TLS only | done naively by having all members share a common key, then TLS | |||
| authenticates the entire group, and the security of the overall | authenticates only group membership, and the security of the overall | |||
| system is inherently rather brittle. There are a number of obvious | system is inherently rather brittle. There are a number of obvious | |||
| weaknesses here: | weaknesses here: | |||
| 1. Any group member can impersonate any other group member. | 1. Any group member can impersonate any other group member. | |||
| 2. If PSK with DH is used, then compromise of a group member that | 2. If PSK with DH is used, then compromise of a group member that | |||
| actively completes connections with other group members can read | actively completes connections with other group members can read | |||
| (and modify) traffic. | (and modify) traffic. | |||
| 3. If PSK without DH is used, then compromise of any group member | 3. If PSK without DH is used, then compromise of any group member | |||
| allows the attacker to passively read (and modify) all traffic. | allows the attacker to passively read (and modify) all traffic. | |||
| 4. If a group member is compromised, then the attacker can perform | 4. If a group member is compromised, then the attacker can perform | |||
| all of the above attacks. | all of the above attacks. | |||
| Additionally, a malicious non-member can reroute handshakes between | Additionally, a malicious non-member can reroute handshakes between | |||
| honest group members to connect them in unintended ways, as described | honest group members to connect them in unintended ways, as described | |||
| below. (Note that this class of attack is not possible if each | below. Note that this class of attack is not possible if each member | |||
| member uses the SNI extension [RFC6066] and terminates the connection | uses the SNI extension [RFC6066] and terminates the connection on | |||
| on mismatch. See [Selfie] for details.) Let the group of peers who | mismatch. See [Selfie] for details. | |||
| know the key be "A", "B", and "C". The attack proceeds as follows: | ||||
| To illustrate the rerouting attack, consider the group of peers who | ||||
| know the PSK be "A", "B", and "C". The attack proceeds as follows: | ||||
| 1. "A" sends a "ClientHello" to "B". | 1. "A" sends a "ClientHello" to "B". | |||
| 2. The attacker intercepts the message and redirects it to "C". | 2. The attacker intercepts the message and redirects it to "C". | |||
| 3. "C" responds with a "ServerHello" to "A". | 3. "C" responds with a "ServerHello" to "A". | |||
| 4. "A" sends a "Finished" message to "B". "A" has completed the | 4. "A" sends a "Finished" message to "B". "A" has completed the | |||
| handshake, ostensibly with "B". | handshake, ostensibly with "B". | |||
| skipping to change at page 4, line 40 ¶ | skipping to change at page 5, line 15 ¶ | |||
| This attack violates the peer authentication property, and if "C" | This attack violates the peer authentication property, and if "C" | |||
| supports a weaker set of cipher suites than "B", this attack also | supports a weaker set of cipher suites than "B", this attack also | |||
| violates the downgrade protection property. This rerouting is a type | violates the downgrade protection property. This rerouting is a type | |||
| of identity misbinding attack [Krawczyk][Sethi]. Selfie attack | of identity misbinding attack [Krawczyk][Sethi]. Selfie attack | |||
| [Selfie] is a special case of the rerouting attack against a group | [Selfie] is a special case of the rerouting attack against a group | |||
| member that can act both as TLS server and client. In the Selfie | member that can act both as TLS server and client. In the Selfie | |||
| attack, a malicious non-member reroutes a connection from the client | attack, a malicious non-member reroutes a connection from the client | |||
| to the server on the same endpoint. | to the server on the same endpoint. | |||
| Finally, in addition to these weaknesses, sharing a PSK across nodes | Finally, in addition to these weaknesses, sharing a PSK across nodes | |||
| may negatively affects deployments. For example, revocation of | may negatively affect deployments. For example, revocation of | |||
| individual group members is not possible without changing the | individual group members is not possible without changing | |||
| authentication key for all members. | establishing a new PSK for all of the non-revoked members. | |||
| 4.2. PSK Entropy | ||||
| Entropy properties of external PSKs may also affect TLS security | Entropy properties of external PSKs may also affect TLS security | |||
| properties. In particular, if a high entropy PSK is used, then PSK- | properties. In particular, if a high entropy PSK is used, then PSK- | |||
| only key establishment modes are secure against both active and | only key establishment modes are secure against both active and | |||
| passive attack. However, they lack forward security. Forward | passive attack. However, they lack forward security. Forward | |||
| security may be achieved by using a PSK-DH mode. | security may be achieved by using a PSK-DH mode. | |||
| In contrast, if a low entropy PSK is used, then PSK-only key | In contrast, if a low entropy PSK is used, then PSK-only key | |||
| establishment modes are subject to passive exhaustive search passive | establishment modes are subject to passive exhaustive search passive | |||
| attacks which will reveal the traffic keys. PSK-DH modes are subject | attacks which will reveal the traffic keys. PSK-DH modes are subject | |||
| to active attacks in which the attacker impersonates one side. The | to active attacks in which the attacker impersonates one side. The | |||
| exhaustive search phase of these attacks can be mounted offline if | exhaustive search phase of these attacks can be mounted offline if | |||
| the attacker captures a single handshake using the PSK, but those | the attacker captures a single handshake using the PSK, but those | |||
| attacks will not lead to compromise of the traffic keys for that | attacks will not lead to compromise of the traffic keys for that | |||
| connection because those also depend on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) | connection because those also depend on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) | |||
| exchange. Low entropy keys are only secure against active attack if | exchange. Low entropy keys are only secure against active attack if | |||
| a PAKE is used with TLS. The Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) is | a PAKE is used with TLS. The Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) is | |||
| currently working on specifying a standard PAKE (see | currently working on specifying a standard PAKE (see | |||
| [I-D.irtf-cfrg-cpace] and [I-D.irtf-cfrg-opaque]). | [I-D.irtf-cfrg-cpace] and [I-D.irtf-cfrg-opaque]). | |||
| 5. Privacy Properties | 5. Privacy Considerations | |||
| PSK privacy properties are orthogonal to security properties | PSK privacy properties are orthogonal to security properties | |||
| described in Section 4. Traditionally, TLS does little to keep PSK | described in Section 4. Traditionally, TLS does little to keep PSK | |||
| identity information private. For example, an adversary learns | identity information private. For example, an adversary learns | |||
| information about the external PSK or its identifier by virtue of it | information about the external PSK or its identifier by virtue of it | |||
| appearing in cleartext in a ClientHello. As a result, a passive | appearing in cleartext in a ClientHello. As a result, a passive | |||
| adversary can link two or more connections together that use the same | adversary can link two or more connections together that use the same | |||
| external PSK on the wire. Depending on the PSK identity, a passive | external PSK on the wire. Depending on the PSK identity, a passive | |||
| attacker may also be able to identify the device, person, or | attacker may also be able to identify the device, person, or | |||
| enterprise running the TLS client or TLS server. An active attacker | enterprise running the TLS client or TLS server. An active attacker | |||
| can also use the PSK identity to oppress handshakes or application | can also use the PSK identity to suppress handshakes or application | |||
| data from a specific device by blocking, delaying, or rate-limiting | data from a specific device by blocking, delaying, or rate-limiting | |||
| traffic. Techniques for mitigating these risks require analysis and | traffic. Techniques for mitigating these risks require analysis and | |||
| are out of scope for this document. | are out of scope for this document. | |||
| In addition to linkability in the network, external PSKs are | In addition to linkability in the network, external PSKs are | |||
| intrinsically linkable by PSK receivers. Specifically, servers can | intrinsically linkable by PSK receivers. Specifically, servers can | |||
| link successive connections that use the same external PSK together. | link successive connections that use the same external PSK together. | |||
| Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope. | Preventing this type of linkability is out of scope. | |||
| 6. External PSK Use Cases and Provisioning Processes | 6. External PSK Use Cases and Provisioning Processes | |||
| skipping to change at page 7, line 6 ¶ | skipping to change at page 7, line 30 ¶ | |||
| * Internet of Things (IoT) and devices with limited computational | * Internet of Things (IoT) and devices with limited computational | |||
| capabilities. Many PSK provisioning examples are possible in this | capabilities. Many PSK provisioning examples are possible in this | |||
| use-case. For example, in a given setting, IoT devices may all | use-case. For example, in a given setting, IoT devices may all | |||
| share the same PSK and use it to communicate with a central server | share the same PSK and use it to communicate with a central server | |||
| (one key for n devices), have their own key for communicating with | (one key for n devices), have their own key for communicating with | |||
| a central server (n keys for n devices), or have pairwise keys for | a central server (n keys for n devices), or have pairwise keys for | |||
| communicating with each other (n^2 keys for n devices). | communicating with each other (n^2 keys for n devices). | |||
| The exact provisioning process depends on the system requirements and | The exact provisioning process depends on the system requirements and | |||
| threat model. Generally, use of a single PSK shared between more | threat model. Whenever possible, avoid sharing a PSK between nodes; | |||
| than one node is not recommended, even if other accommodations are | however, sharing a PSK among several node is sometimes unavoidable. | |||
| made, such as client certificate authentication after PSK-based | When PSK sharing happens, other accommodations SHOULD be used as | |||
| connection establishment. See Section 7. | discussed in Section 7. | |||
| 6.1. Provisioning Examples | 6.1. Provisioning Examples | |||
| * Many industrial protocols assume that PSKs are distributed and | * Many industrial protocols assume that PSKs are distributed and | |||
| assigned manually via one of the following approaches: typing the | assigned manually via one of the following approaches: typing the | |||
| PSK into the devices, or via web server masks (using a Trust On | PSK into the devices, or via web server masks (using a Trust On | |||
| First Use (TOFU) approach with a device completely unprotected | First Use (TOFU) approach with a device completely unprotected | |||
| before the first login did take place). Many devices have very | before the first login did take place). Many devices have very | |||
| limited UI. For example, they may only have a numeric keypad or | limited UI. For example, they may only have a numeric keypad or | |||
| even less number of buttons. When the TOFU approach is not | even less number of buttons. When the TOFU approach is not | |||
| skipping to change at page 8, line 33 ¶ | skipping to change at page 9, line 15 ¶ | |||
| 3. Nodes using TLS 1.3 SHOULD use external PSK importers | 3. Nodes using TLS 1.3 SHOULD use external PSK importers | |||
| [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for a | [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] when configuring PSKs for a | |||
| client-server pair. Importers make provisioning external PSKs | client-server pair. Importers make provisioning external PSKs | |||
| easier and less error prone by deriving a unique, imported PSK | easier and less error prone by deriving a unique, imported PSK | |||
| from the external PSK for each key derivation function a node | from the external PSK for each key derivation function a node | |||
| supports. See the Security Considerations in | supports. See the Security Considerations in | |||
| [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] for more information. | [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] for more information. | |||
| 4. Where possible the main PSK (that which is fed into the importer) | 4. Where possible the main PSK (that which is fed into the importer) | |||
| SHOULD be deleted after the imported keys have been generated. | SHOULD be deleted after the imported keys have been generated. | |||
| This protects an attacker from bootstrapping a compromise of one | This prevents an attacker from bootstrapping a compromise of one | |||
| node into the ability to attack connections between any node; | node into the ability to attack connections between any node; | |||
| otherwise the attacker can recover the main key and then re-run | otherwise the attacker can recover the main key and then re-run | |||
| the importer itself. | the importer itself. | |||
| 7.1. Stack Interfaces | 7.1. Stack Interfaces | |||
| Most major TLS implementations support external PSKs. Stacks | Most major TLS implementations support external PSKs. Stacks | |||
| supporting external PSKs provide interfaces that applications may use | supporting external PSKs provide interfaces that applications may use | |||
| when supplying them for individual connections. Details about | when configuring PSKs for individual connections. Details about | |||
| existing stacks at the time of writing are below. | existing stacks at the time of writing are below. | |||
| * OpenSSL and BoringSSL: Applications can specify support for | * OpenSSL and BoringSSL: Applications can specify support for | |||
| external PSKs via distinct ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 and below. | external PSKs via distinct ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 and below. | |||
| They also then configure callbacks that are invoked for PSK | They also then configure callbacks that are invoked for PSK | |||
| selection during the handshake. These callbacks must provide a | selection during the handshake. These callbacks must provide a | |||
| PSK identity and key. The exact format of the callback depends on | PSK identity and key. The exact format of the callback depends on | |||
| the negotiated TLS protocol version, with new callback functions | the negotiated TLS protocol version, with new callback functions | |||
| added specifically to OpenSSL for TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK support. | added specifically to OpenSSL for TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] PSK support. | |||
| The PSK length is validated to be between [1, 256] bytes. The PSK | The PSK length is validated to be between [1, 256] bytes. The PSK | |||
| skipping to change at page 9, line 35 ¶ | skipping to change at page 10, line 13 ¶ | |||
| OpenSSL. | OpenSSL. | |||
| 7.1.1. PSK Identity Encoding and Comparison | 7.1.1. PSK Identity Encoding and Comparison | |||
| Section 5.1 of [RFC4279] mandates that the PSK identity should be | Section 5.1 of [RFC4279] mandates that the PSK identity should be | |||
| first converted to a character string and then encoded to octets | first converted to a character string and then encoded to octets | |||
| using UTF-8. This was done to avoid interoperability problems | using UTF-8. This was done to avoid interoperability problems | |||
| (especially when the identity is configured by human users). On the | (especially when the identity is configured by human users). On the | |||
| other hand, [RFC7925] advises implementations against assuming any | other hand, [RFC7925] advises implementations against assuming any | |||
| structured format for PSK identities and recommends byte-by-byte | structured format for PSK identities and recommends byte-by-byte | |||
| comparison for any operation. When PSK identites are configured | comparison for any operation. When PSK identities are configured | |||
| manually it is important to be aware that due to encoding issues | manually it is important to be aware that due to encoding issues | |||
| visually identical strings may, in fact, differ. | visually identical strings may, in fact, differ. | |||
| TLS version 1.3 [RFC8446] follows the same practice of specifying the | TLS version 1.3 [RFC8446] follows the same practice of specifying the | |||
| PSK identity as a sequence of opaque bytes (shown as opaque | PSK identity as a sequence of opaque bytes (shown as opaque | |||
| identity<1..2^16-1> in the specification). [RFC8446] also requires | identity<1..2^16-1> in the specification). [RFC8446] also requires | |||
| that the PSK identities are at least 1 byte and at the most 65535 | that the PSK identities are at least 1 byte and at the most 65535 | |||
| bytes in length. Although [RFC8446] does not place strict | bytes in length. Although [RFC8446] does not place strict | |||
| requirements on the format of PSK identities, we do however note that | requirements on the format of PSK identities, we do however note that | |||
| the format of PSK identities can vary depending on the deployment: | the format of PSK identities can vary depending on the deployment: | |||
| * The PSK identity MAY be a user configured string when used in | * The PSK identity MAY be a user configured string when used in | |||
| protocols like Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748]. | protocols like Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748]. | |||
| gnuTLS for example treats PSK identities as usernames. | gnuTLS for example treats PSK identities as usernames. | |||
| * PSK identities MAY have a domain name suffix for roaming and | * PSK identities MAY have a domain name suffix for roaming and | |||
| federation. | federation. In applications and settings where the domain name | |||
| suffix is privacy sensitive, this practice is NOT RECOMMENDED. | ||||
| * Deployments should take care that the length of the PSK identity | * Deployments should take care that the length of the PSK identity | |||
| is sufficient to avoid collisions. | is sufficient to avoid collisions. | |||
| 7.1.2. PSK Identity Collisions | 7.1.2. PSK Identity Collisions | |||
| It is possible, though unlikely, that an external PSK identity may | It is possible, though unlikely, that an external PSK identity may | |||
| clash with a resumption PSK identity. The TLS stack implementation | clash with a resumption PSK identity. The TLS stack implementation | |||
| and sequencing of PSK callbacks influences the application's | and sequencing of PSK callbacks influences the application's behavior | |||
| behaviour when identity collisions occur. When a server receives a | when identity collisions occur. When a server receives a PSK | |||
| PSK identity in a TLS 1.3 ClientHello, some TLS stacks execute the | identity in a TLS 1.3 ClientHello, some TLS stacks execute the | |||
| application's registered callback function before checking the | application's registered callback function before checking the | |||
| stack's internal session resumption cache. This means that if a PSK | stack's internal session resumption cache. This means that if a PSK | |||
| identity collision occurs, the application will be given precedence | identity collision occurs, the application will be given precedence | |||
| over how to handle the PSK. | over how to handle the PSK. | |||
| 8. Security Considerations | 8. Security Considerations | |||
| It is NOT RECOMMENDED to share the same PSK between more than one | It is NOT RECOMMENDED to share the same PSK between more than one | |||
| client and server. However, as discussed in Section 6, there are | client and server. However, as discussed in Section 6, there are | |||
| application scenarios that may rely on sharing the same PSK among | application scenarios that may rely on sharing the same PSK among | |||
| skipping to change at page 11, line 9 ¶ | skipping to change at page 11, line 37 ¶ | |||
| This document makes no IANA requests. | This document makes no IANA requests. | |||
| 10. References | 10. References | |||
| 10.1. Normative References | 10.1. Normative References | |||
| [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] | [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] | |||
| Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The | Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The | |||
| Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version | Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version | |||
| 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls- | 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls- | |||
| dtls13-38, 29 May 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet- | dtls13-41, 7 February 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/ | |||
| drafts/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38.txt>. | internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-41.txt>. | |||
| [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] | [I-D.ietf-tls-external-psk-importer] | |||
| Benjamin, D. and C. Wood, "Importing External PSKs for | Benjamin, D. and C. A. Wood, "Importing External PSKs for | |||
| TLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls- | TLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls- | |||
| external-psk-importer-05, 19 May 2020, | external-psk-importer-06, 3 December 2020, | |||
| <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls- | <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls- | |||
| external-psk-importer-05.txt>. | external-psk-importer-06.txt>. | |||
| [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate | [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate | |||
| Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, | Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, | DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. | |||
| [RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) | [RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) | |||
| Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, | Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, | |||
| DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011, | DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011, | |||
| <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>. | <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>. | |||
| skipping to change at page 12, line 8 ¶ | skipping to change at page 12, line 33 ¶ | |||
| PSK", 2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/421.pdf>. | PSK", 2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/421.pdf>. | |||
| [GAA] "TR33.919 version 12.0.0 Release 12", n.d., | [GAA] "TR33.919 version 12.0.0 Release 12", n.d., | |||
| <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/ | <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/ | |||
| etsi_tr/133900_133999/133919/12.00.00_60/ | etsi_tr/133900_133999/133919/12.00.00_60/ | |||
| tr_133919v120000p.pdf>. | tr_133919v120000p.pdf>. | |||
| [I-D.ietf-tls-ctls] | [I-D.ietf-tls-ctls] | |||
| Rescorla, E., Barnes, R., and H. Tschofenig, "Compact TLS | Rescorla, E., Barnes, R., and H. Tschofenig, "Compact TLS | |||
| 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls- | 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls- | |||
| ctls-01, 2 November 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet- | ctls-01, 2 November 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/internet- | |||
| drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ctls-01.txt>. | drafts/draft-ietf-tls-ctls-01.txt>. | |||
| [I-D.irtf-cfrg-cpace] | [I-D.irtf-cfrg-cpace] | |||
| Abdalla, M., Haase, B., and J. Hesse, "CPace, a balanced | Abdalla, M., Haase, B., and J. Hesse, "CPace, a balanced | |||
| composable PAKE", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- | composable PAKE", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- | |||
| irtf-cfrg-cpace-00, 28 July 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/ | irtf-cfrg-cpace-01, 24 January 2021, | |||
| internet-drafts/draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace-00.txt>. | <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-irtf-cfrg- | |||
| cpace-01.txt>. | ||||
| [I-D.irtf-cfrg-opaque] | [I-D.irtf-cfrg-opaque] | |||
| Krawczyk, H., Lewi, K., and C. Wood, "The OPAQUE | Krawczyk, H., Lewi, K., and C. A. Wood, "The OPAQUE | |||
| Asymmetric PAKE Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet- | Asymmetric PAKE Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet- | |||
| Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-00, 28 September 2020, | Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-02, 5 February 2021, | |||
| <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-irtf-cfrg- | <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-irtf-cfrg- | |||
| opaque-00.txt>. | opaque-02.txt>. | |||
| [I-D.mattsson-emu-eap-tls-psk] | [I-D.mattsson-emu-eap-tls-psk] | |||
| Mattsson, J., Sethi, M., Aura, T., and O. Friel, "EAP-TLS | Mattsson, J. P., Sethi, M., Aura, T., and O. Friel, "EAP- | |||
| with PSK Authentication (EAP-TLS-PSK)", Work in Progress, | TLS with PSK Authentication (EAP-TLS-PSK)", Work in | |||
| Internet-Draft, draft-mattsson-emu-eap-tls-psk-00, 9 March | Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mattsson-emu-eap-tls-psk- | |||
| 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mattsson- | 00, 9 March 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ | |||
| emu-eap-tls-psk-00.txt>. | draft-mattsson-emu-eap-tls-psk-00.txt>. | |||
| [Krawczyk] Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA: The ‘SIGn-and-MAc’ Approach to | [Krawczyk] Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA: The ‘SIGn-and-MAc’ Approach to | |||
| Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE | Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE | |||
| Protocols", Annual International Cryptology Conference. | Protocols", Annual International Cryptology Conference. | |||
| Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg , 2003, | Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg , 2003, | |||
| <https://link.springer.com/content/ | <https://link.springer.com/content/ | |||
| pdf/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_24.pdf>. | pdf/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_24.pdf>. | |||
| [LwM2M] "Lightweight Machine to Machine Technical Specification", | [LwM2M] "Lightweight Machine to Machine Technical Specification", | |||
| n.d., | n.d., | |||
| End of changes. 32 change blocks. | ||||
| 78 lines changed or deleted | 97 lines changed or added | |||
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