< draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-04.txt   draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-05.txt >
TLS Working Group Y. Nir TLS Working Group Y. Nir
Internet-Draft Check Point Internet-Draft Check Point
Intended status: Standards Track S. Josefsson Obsoletes: 4492 (if approved) S. Josefsson
Expires: April 21, 2016 SJD AB Intended status: Standards Track SJD AB
M. Pegourie-Gonnard Expires: May 7, 2016 M. Pegourie-Gonnard
Independent / PolarSSL Independent / PolarSSL
October 19, 2015 November 4, 2015
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-04 draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-05
Abstract Abstract
This document describes key exchange algorithms based on Elliptic This document describes key exchange algorithms based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Curve Cryptography (ECC) for the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol. In particular, it specifies the use of Ephemeral Elliptic protocol. In particular, it specifies the use of Ephemeral Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key agreement in a TLS handshake and the Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key agreement in a TLS handshake and the
use of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) as a new use of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Edwards
authentication mechanism. Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) as new authentication mechanisms.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Key Exchange Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Key Exchange Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. ECDHE_ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. ECDHE_ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. ECDHE_RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. ECDHE_RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. ECDH_anon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. ECDH_anon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. ECDSA_sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. ECDSA_sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. TLS Extensions for ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. TLS Extensions for ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Data Structures and Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Data Structures and Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Client Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. Client Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.1. Supported Elliptic Curves Extension . . . . . . . . . 10 5.1.1. Supported Elliptic Curves Extension . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.2. Supported Point Formats Extension . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1.2. Supported Point Formats Extension . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Server Hello Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. Server Hello Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Server Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.3. Server Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4. Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.4. Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.5. Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.5. Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.6. Client Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.6. Client Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.7. Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.7. Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.8. Certificate Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.8. Certificate Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.9. Elliptic Curve Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.9. Elliptic Curve Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.10. ECDH, ECDSA, and RSA Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.10. ECDH, ECDSA, and RSA Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.11. Public Key Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.11. Public Key Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10. Version History for This Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10. Version History for This Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix A. Equivalent Curves (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . 28 Appendix A. Equivalent Curves (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix B. Differences from RFC 4492 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Appendix B. Differences from RFC 4492 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has emerged as an attractive Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has emerged as an attractive
public-key cryptosystem, in particular for mobile (i.e., wireless) public-key cryptosystem, in particular for mobile (i.e., wireless)
environments. Compared to currently prevalent cryptosystems such as environments. Compared to currently prevalent cryptosystems such as
RSA, ECC offers equivalent security with smaller key sizes. This is RSA, ECC offers equivalent security with smaller key sizes. This is
illustrated in the following table, based on [Lenstra_Verheul], which illustrated in the following table, based on [Lenstra_Verheul], which
gives approximate comparable key sizes for symmetric- and asymmetric- gives approximate comparable key sizes for symmetric- and asymmetric-
key cryptosystems based on the best-known algorithms for attacking key cryptosystems based on the best-known algorithms for attacking
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TLS. All of them use Ephemeral ECDH (ECDHE) to compute the TLS TLS. All of them use Ephemeral ECDH (ECDHE) to compute the TLS
premaster secret, and they differ only in the mechanism (if any) used premaster secret, and they differ only in the mechanism (if any) used
to authenticate them. The derivation of the TLS master secret from to authenticate them. The derivation of the TLS master secret from
the premaster secret and the subsequent generation of bulk the premaster secret and the subsequent generation of bulk
encryption/MAC keys and initialization vectors is independent of the encryption/MAC keys and initialization vectors is independent of the
key exchange algorithm and not impacted by the introduction of ECC. key exchange algorithm and not impacted by the introduction of ECC.
Table 2 summarizes the new key exchange algorithms. All of these key Table 2 summarizes the new key exchange algorithms. All of these key
exchange algorithms provide forward secrecy. exchange algorithms provide forward secrecy.
+-------------+------------------------------------------+ +-------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Algorithm | Description | | Algorithm | Description |
+-------------+------------------------------------------+ +-------------+------------------------------------------------+
| ECDHE_ECDSA | Ephemeral ECDH with ECDSA signatures. | | ECDHE_ECDSA | Ephemeral ECDH with ECDSA or EdDSA signatures. |
| ECDHE_RSA | Ephemeral ECDH with RSA signatures. | | ECDHE_RSA | Ephemeral ECDH with RSA signatures. |
| ECDH_anon | Anonymous ephemeral ECDH, no signatures. | | ECDH_anon | Anonymous ephemeral ECDH, no signatures. |
+-------------+------------------------------------------+ +-------------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 2: ECC Key Exchange Algorithms Table 2: ECC Key Exchange Algorithms
These key exchanges are analogous to DHE_DSS, DHE_RSA, and DH_anon, These key exchanges are analogous to DHE_DSS, DHE_RSA, and DH_anon,
respectively. respectively.
With ECDHE_RSA, a server can reuse its existing RSA certificate and With ECDHE_RSA, a server can reuse its existing RSA certificate and
easily comply with a constrained client's elliptic curve preferences easily comply with a constrained client's elliptic curve preferences
(see Section 4). However, the computational cost incurred by a (see Section 4). However, the computational cost incurred by a
server is higher for ECDHE_RSA than for the traditional RSA key server is higher for ECDHE_RSA than for the traditional RSA key
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The anonymous key exchange algorithm does not provide authentication The anonymous key exchange algorithm does not provide authentication
of the server or the client. Like other anonymous TLS key exchanges, of the server or the client. Like other anonymous TLS key exchanges,
it is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks. Implementations of this it is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks. Implementations of this
algorithm SHOULD provide authentication by other means. algorithm SHOULD provide authentication by other means.
Note that there is no structural difference between ECDH and ECDSA Note that there is no structural difference between ECDH and ECDSA
keys. A certificate issuer may use X.509 v3 keyUsage and keys. A certificate issuer may use X.509 v3 keyUsage and
extendedKeyUsage extensions to restrict the use of an ECC public key extendedKeyUsage extensions to restrict the use of an ECC public key
to certain computations. This document refers to an ECC key as ECDH- to certain computations. This document refers to an ECC key as ECDH-
capable if its use in ECDH is permitted. ECDSA-capable is defined capable if its use in ECDH is permitted. ECDSA-capable and EdDSA-
similarly. capable are defined similarly.
Client Server Client Server
------ ------ ------ ------
ClientHello --------> ClientHello -------->
ServerHello ServerHello
Certificate* Certificate*
ServerKeyExchange* ServerKeyExchange*
CertificateRequest*+ CertificateRequest*+
<-------- ServerHelloDone <-------- ServerHelloDone
Certificate*+ Certificate*+
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CertificateRequest, the client's Certificate message, and the CertificateRequest, the client's Certificate message, and the
CertificateVerify. Next, we describe the ECC key exchange algorithm CertificateVerify. Next, we describe the ECC key exchange algorithm
in greater detail in terms of the content and processing of these in greater detail in terms of the content and processing of these
messages. For ease of exposition, we defer discussion of client messages. For ease of exposition, we defer discussion of client
authentication and associated messages (identified with a + in authentication and associated messages (identified with a + in
Figure 1) until Section 3 and of the optional ECC-specific extensions Figure 1) until Section 3 and of the optional ECC-specific extensions
(which impact the Hello messages) until Section 4. (which impact the Hello messages) until Section 4.
2.1. ECDHE_ECDSA 2.1. ECDHE_ECDSA
In ECDHE_ECDSA, the server's certificate MUST contain an ECDSA- In ECDHE_ECDSA, the server's certificate MUST contain an ECDSA- or
capable public key and be signed with ECDSA. EdDSA-capable public key.
The server sends its ephemeral ECDH public key and a specification of The server sends its ephemeral ECDH public key and a specification of
the corresponding curve in the ServerKeyExchange message. These the corresponding curve in the ServerKeyExchange message. These
parameters MUST be signed with ECDSA using the private key parameters MUST be signed with ECDSA or EdDSA using the private key
corresponding to the public key in the server's Certificate. corresponding to the public key in the server's Certificate.
The client generates an ECDH key pair on the same curve as the The client generates an ECDH key pair on the same curve as the
server's ephemeral ECDH key and sends its public key in the server's ephemeral ECDH key and sends its public key in the
ClientKeyExchange message. ClientKeyExchange message.
Both client and server perform an ECDH operation Section 5.10 and use Both client and server perform an ECDH operation Section 5.10 and use
the resultant shared secret as the premaster secret. the resultant shared secret as the premaster secret.
2.2. ECDHE_RSA 2.2. ECDHE_RSA
This key exchange algorithm is the same as ECDHE_ECDSA except that This key exchange algorithm is the same as ECDHE_ECDSA except that
the server's certificate MUST contain an RSA public key authorized the server's certificate MUST contain an RSA public key authorized
for signing, and that the signature in the ServerKeyExchange message for signing, and that the signature in the ServerKeyExchange message
must be computed with the corresponding RSA private key. The server must be computed with the corresponding RSA private key.
certificate MUST be signed with RSA.
2.3. ECDH_anon 2.3. ECDH_anon
NOTE: Despite the name beginning with "ECDH_" (no E), the key used in NOTE: Despite the name beginning with "ECDH_" (no E), the key used in
ECDH_anon is ephemeral just like the key in ECDHE_RSA and ECDH_anon is ephemeral just like the key in ECDHE_RSA and
ECDHE_ECDSA. The naming follows the example of DH_anon, where the ECDHE_ECDSA. The naming follows the example of DH_anon, where the
key is also ephemeral but the name does not reflect it. TBD: Do we key is also ephemeral but the name does not reflect it. TBD: Do we
want to rename this so that it makes sense? want to rename this so that it makes sense?
In ECDH_anon, the server's Certificate, the CertificateRequest, the In ECDH_anon, the server's Certificate, the CertificateRequest, the
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parameters MUST NOT be signed. parameters MUST NOT be signed.
The client generates an ECDH key pair on the same curve as the The client generates an ECDH key pair on the same curve as the
server's ephemeral ECDH key and sends its public key in the server's ephemeral ECDH key and sends its public key in the
ClientKeyExchange message. ClientKeyExchange message.
Both client and server perform an ECDH operation and use the Both client and server perform an ECDH operation and use the
resultant shared secret as the premaster secret. All ECDH resultant shared secret as the premaster secret. All ECDH
calculations are performed as specified in Section 5.10. calculations are performed as specified in Section 5.10.
Note that while the ECDHE_ECDSA and ECDHE_RSA key exchange algorithms This specification does not impose restrictions on signature schemes
require the server's certificate to be signed with a particular used anywhere in the certificate chain. The previous version of this
signature scheme, this specification (following the similar cases of document required the signatures to match, but this restriction,
DHE_DSS, and DHE_RSA in the TLS base documents) does not impose originating in previous TLS versions is lifted here as it had been in
restrictions on signature schemes used elsewhere in the certificate RFC 5246.
chain. (Often such restrictions will be useful, and it is expected
that this will be taken into account in certification authorities'
signing practices. However, such restrictions are not strictly
required in general: Even if it is beyond the capabilities of a
client to completely validate a given chain, the client may be able
to validate the server's certificate by relying on a trusted
certification authority whose certificate appears as one of the
intermediate certificates in the chain.)
3. Client Authentication 3. Client Authentication
This document defines a client authentication mechanism, named after This document defines a client authentication mechanism, named after
the type of client certificate involved: ECDSA_sign. The ECDSA_sign the type of client certificate involved: ECDSA_sign. The ECDSA_sign
mechanism is usable with any of the non-anonymous ECC key exchange mechanism is usable with any of the non-anonymous ECC key exchange
algorithms described in Section 2 as well as other non-anonymous algorithms described in Section 2 as well as other non-anonymous
(non-ECC) key exchange algorithms defined in TLS. (non-ECC) key exchange algorithms defined in TLS.
The server can request ECC-based client authentication by including The server can request ECC-based client authentication by including
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determining an appropriate certificate and proving possession is determining an appropriate certificate and proving possession is
different for each authentication mechanism and described below. different for each authentication mechanism and described below.
NOTE: It is permissible for a server to request (and the client to NOTE: It is permissible for a server to request (and the client to
send) a client certificate of a different type than the server send) a client certificate of a different type than the server
certificate. certificate.
3.1. ECDSA_sign 3.1. ECDSA_sign
To use this authentication mechanism, the client MUST possess a To use this authentication mechanism, the client MUST possess a
certificate containing an ECDSA-capable public key and signed with certificate containing an ECDSA- or EdDSA-capable public key.
ECDSA.
The client proves possession of the private key corresponding to the The client proves possession of the private key corresponding to the
certified key by including a signature in the CertificateVerify certified key by including a signature in the CertificateVerify
message as described in Section 5.8. message as described in Section 5.8.
4. TLS Extensions for ECC 4. TLS Extensions for ECC
Two new TLS extensions are defined in this specification: (i) the Two new TLS extensions are defined in this specification: (i) the
Supported Elliptic Curves Extension, and (ii) the Supported Point Supported Elliptic Curves Extension, and (ii) the Supported Point
Formats Extension. These allow negotiating the use of specific Formats Extension. These allow negotiating the use of specific
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Actions of the receiver: Actions of the receiver:
A server that receives a ClientHello containing one or both of these A server that receives a ClientHello containing one or both of these
extensions MUST use the client's enumerated capabilities to guide its extensions MUST use the client's enumerated capabilities to guide its
selection of an appropriate cipher suite. One of the proposed ECC selection of an appropriate cipher suite. One of the proposed ECC
cipher suites must be negotiated only if the server can successfully cipher suites must be negotiated only if the server can successfully
complete the handshake while using the curves and point formats complete the handshake while using the curves and point formats
supported by the client (cf. Section 5.3 and Section 5.4). supported by the client (cf. Section 5.3 and Section 5.4).
NOTE: A server participating in an ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange may use NOTE: A server participating in an ECDHE_ECDSA key exchange may use
different curves for the ECDSA key in its certificate, and for the different curves for the ECDSA or EdDSA key in its certificate, and
ephemeral ECDH key in the ServerKeyExchange message. The server MUST for the ephemeral ECDH key in the ServerKeyExchange message. The
consider the extensions in both cases. server MUST consider the extensions in both cases.
If a server does not understand the Supported Elliptic Curves If a server does not understand the Supported Elliptic Curves
Extension, does not understand the Supported Point Formats Extension, Extension, does not understand the Supported Point Formats Extension,
or is unable to complete the ECC handshake while restricting itself or is unable to complete the ECC handshake while restricting itself
to the enumerated curves and point formats, it MUST NOT negotiate the to the enumerated curves and point formats, it MUST NOT negotiate the
use of an ECC cipher suite. Depending on what other cipher suites use of an ECC cipher suite. Depending on what other cipher suites
are proposed by the client and supported by the server, this may are proposed by the client and supported by the server, this may
result in a fatal handshake failure alert due to the lack of common result in a fatal handshake failure alert due to the lack of common
cipher suites. cipher suites.
5.1.1. Supported Elliptic Curves Extension 5.1.1. Supported Elliptic Curves Extension
RFC 4492 defined 25 different curves in the NamedCurve registry for RFC 4492 defined 25 different curves in the NamedCurve registry for
use in TLS. Only three have seen any use. This specification is use in TLS. Only three have seen any use. This specification is
deprecating the rest (with numbers 1-22). This specification also deprecating the rest (with numbers 1-22). This specification also
deprecates the explicit curves with identifiers 0xFF01 and 0xFF02. deprecates the explicit curves with identifiers 0xFF01 and 0xFF02.
It also adds the new curves defined in [CFRG-Curves]. The end result It also adds the new curves defined in [CFRG-Curves] and
is as follows: [CFRG-EdDSA]. The end result is as follows:
enum { enum {
deprecated(1..22), deprecated(1..22),
secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25),
Curve25519(TBD1), Curve25519(TBD1),
Curve448(TBD2), Curve448(TBD2),
Ed25519(TBD3),
Ed448(TBD4),
reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF), reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF),
deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02), deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02),
(0xFFFF) (0xFFFF)
} NamedCurve; } NamedCurve;
Note that other specification have since added other values to this Note that other specification have since added other values to this
enumeration. enumeration.
secp256r1, etc: Indicates support of the corresponding named curve or secp256r1, etc: Indicates support of the corresponding named curve or
class of explicitly defined curves. The named curves secp256r1, class of explicitly defined curves. The named curves secp256r1,
secp384r1, and secp521r1 are specified in SEC 2 [SECG-SEC2]. These secp384r1, and secp521r1 are specified in SEC 2 [SECG-SEC2]. These
curves are also recommended in ANSI X9.62 [ANSI.X9-62.2005] and FIPS curves are also recommended in ANSI X9.62 [ANSI.X9-62.2005] and FIPS
186-4 [FIPS.186-4]. Curve25519 and Curve448 are defined in 186-4 [FIPS.186-4]. Curve25519 and Curve448 are defined in
[CFRG-Curves]. Ed25519 and Ed448 are signature-only curves defined
[CFRG-Curves]. Values 0xFE00 through 0xFEFF are reserved for private in [CFRG-EdDSA]. Values 0xFE00 through 0xFEFF are reserved for
use. private use.
The NamedCurve name space is maintained by IANA. See Section 8 for The NamedCurve name space is maintained by IANA. See Section 8 for
information on how new value assignments are added. information on how new value assignments are added.
struct { struct {
NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^16-1> NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^16-1>
} EllipticCurveList; } EllipticCurveList;
Items in elliptic_curve_list are ordered according to the client's Items in elliptic_curve_list are ordered according to the client's
preferences (favorite choice first). preferences (favorite choice first).
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enum { uncompressed (0), ansiX962_compressed_prime (1), enum { uncompressed (0), ansiX962_compressed_prime (1),
ansiX962_compressed_char2 (2), reserved (248..255) ansiX962_compressed_char2 (2), reserved (248..255)
} ECPointFormat; } ECPointFormat;
struct { struct {
ECPointFormat ec_point_format_list<1..2^8-1> ECPointFormat ec_point_format_list<1..2^8-1>
} ECPointFormatList; } ECPointFormatList;
Three point formats were included in the definition of ECPointFormat Three point formats were included in the definition of ECPointFormat
above. This specification deprecates all but the uncompressed point above. This specification deprecates all but the uncompressed point
format. Implementations of this document MUST support the format. Implementations of this document MUST support the
uncompressed format for all of their supported curves, and MUST uncompressed format for all of their supported curves, and MUST NOT
support no other formats for curves defined in this specification. support other formats for curves defined in this specification. For
For backwards compatibility purposes, the point format list extension backwards compatibility purposes, the point format list extension
MUST still be included, and contain exactly one value: the MUST still be included, and contain exactly one value: the
uncomptessed point format (0). uncomptessed point format (0).
The ECPointFormat name space is maintained by IANA. See Section 8 The ECPointFormat name space is maintained by IANA. See Section 8
for information on how new value assignments are added. for information on how new value assignments are added.
Items in ec_point_format_list are ordered according to the client's Items in ec_point_format_list are ordered according to the client's
preferences (favorite choice first). preferences (favorite choice first).
A client compliant with this specification that supports no other A client compliant with this specification that supports no other
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public keys MUST be encoded in certificates as described in public keys MUST be encoded in certificates as described in
Section 5.9. Section 5.9.
NOTE: The server's Certificate message is capable of carrying a chain NOTE: The server's Certificate message is capable of carrying a chain
of certificates. The restrictions mentioned in Table 3 apply only to of certificates. The restrictions mentioned in Table 3 apply only to
the server's certificate (first in the chain). the server's certificate (first in the chain).
+-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Algorithm | Server Certificate Type | | Algorithm | Server Certificate Type |
+-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| ECDHE_ECDSA | Certificate MUST contain an ECDSA-capable public | | ECDHE_ECDSA | Certificate MUST contain an ECDSA- or EdDSA-capable |
| | key. It MUST be signed with ECDSA. | | | public key. |
| ECDHE_RSA | Certificate MUST contain an RSA public key | | ECDHE_RSA | Certificate MUST contain an RSA public key |
| | authorized for use in digital signatures. It MUST | | | authorized for use in digital signatures. |
| | be signed with RSA. |
+-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
Table 3: Server Certificate Types Table 3: Server Certificate Types
Structure of this message: Structure of this message:
Identical to the TLS Certificate format. Identical to the TLS Certificate format.
Actions of the sender: Actions of the sender:
skipping to change at page 15, line 11 skipping to change at page 15, line 4
RFC 4492 had a specification for an ECCurve structure and an RFC 4492 had a specification for an ECCurve structure and an
ECBasisType structure. Both of these are omitted now because they ECBasisType structure. Both of these are omitted now because they
were only used with the now deprecated explicit curves. were only used with the now deprecated explicit curves.
struct { struct {
opaque point <1..2^8-1>; opaque point <1..2^8-1>;
} ECPoint; } ECPoint;
This is the byte string representation of an elliptic curve point This is the byte string representation of an elliptic curve point
following the conversion routine in Section 4.3.6 of following the conversion routine in Section 4.3.6 of
[ANSI.X9-62.2005]. This byte string may represent an elliptic curve [ANSI.X9-62.2005]. This byte string may represent an elliptic curve
point in uncompressed or compressed format; it MUST conform to what point in uncompressed or compressed format; it MUST conform to what
the client has requested through a Supported Point Formats Extension the client has requested through a Supported Point Formats Extension
if this extension was used. For the Curve25519 and Curve448 curves, if this extension was used. For the Curve25519 and Curve448 curves,
the only valid representation is the one specified in [CFRG-Curves] - the only valid representation is the one specified in [CFRG-Curves] -
a 32- or 56-octet representation of the u value of the point. a 32- or 56-octet representation of the u value of the point. This
structure MUST NOT be used with Ed25519 and Ed448 public keys.
struct { struct {
ECCurveType curve_type; ECCurveType curve_type;
select (curve_type) { select (curve_type) {
case named_curve: case named_curve:
NamedCurve namedcurve; NamedCurve namedcurve;
}; };
} ECParameters; } ECParameters;
This identifies the type of the elliptic curve domain parameters. This identifies the type of the elliptic curve domain parameters.
Specifies a recommended set of elliptic curve domain parameters. All Specifies a recommended set of elliptic curve domain parameters. All
those values of NamedCurve are allowed that refer to a specific those values of NamedCurve are allowed that refer to a curve capable
curve. Values of NamedCurve that indicate support for a class of of Diffie-Hellman. With the deprecation of the explicit curves, this
explicitly defined curves are not allowed here (they are only now includes all values of NamedCurve except Ed25519(TBD3) and
permissible in the ClientHello extension); this applies to Ed448(TBD4).
arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves(0xFF01) and
arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves(0xFF02).
struct { struct {
ECParameters curve_params; ECParameters curve_params;
ECPoint public; ECPoint public;
} ServerECDHParams; } ServerECDHParams;
Specifies the elliptic curve domain parameters associated with the Specifies the elliptic curve domain parameters associated with the
ECDH public key. ECDH public key.
The ephemeral ECDH public key. The ephemeral ECDH public key.
skipping to change at page 16, line 18 skipping to change at page 16, line 12
Signature signed_params; Signature signed_params;
} ServerKeyExchange; } ServerKeyExchange;
params: Specifies the ECDH public key and associated domain params: Specifies the ECDH public key and associated domain
parameters. parameters.
signed_params: A hash of the params, with the signature appropriate signed_params: A hash of the params, with the signature appropriate
to that hash applied. The private key corresponding to the to that hash applied. The private key corresponding to the
certified public key in the server's Certificate message is used certified public key in the server's Certificate message is used
for signing. for signing.
enum { ecdsa } SignatureAlgorithm; enum { ecdsa(3), eddsa(TBD5) } SignatureAlgorithm;
select (SignatureAlgorithm) { select (SignatureAlgorithm) {
case ecdsa: case ecdsa:
digitally-signed struct { digitally-signed struct {
opaque sha_hash[sha_size]; opaque sha_hash[sha_size];
}; };
case eddsa:
digitally-signed struct {
opaque rawdata[rawdata_size];
};
} Signature; } Signature;
ServerKeyExchange.signed_params.sha_hash ServerKeyExchange.signed_params.sha_hash
SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random + SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random +
ServerKeyExchange.params); ServerKeyExchange.params);
ServerKeyExchange.signed_params.rawdata
ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random +
ServerKeyExchange.params;
NOTE: SignatureAlgorithm is "rsa" for the ECDHE_RSA key exchange NOTE: SignatureAlgorithm is "rsa" for the ECDHE_RSA key exchange
algorithm and "anonymous" for ECDH_anon. These cases are defined in algorithm and "anonymous" for ECDH_anon. These cases are defined in
TLS. SignatureAlgorithm is "ecdsa" for ECDHE_ECDSA. ECDSA TLS. SignatureAlgorithm is "ecdsa" or "eddsa" for ECDHE_ECDSA.
signatures are generated and verified as described in Section 5.10, ECDSA signatures are generated and verified as described in
and SHA in the above template for sha_hash accordingly may denote a Section 5.10, and SHA in the above template for sha_hash accordingly
hash algorithm other than SHA-1. As per ANSI X9.62, an ECDSA may denote a hash algorithm other than SHA-1. As per ANSI X9.62, an
signature consists of a pair of integers, r and s. The digitally- ECDSA signature consists of a pair of integers, r and s. The
signed element is encoded as an opaque vector <0..2^16-1>, the digitally-signed element is encoded as an opaque vector <0..2^16-1>,
contents of which are the DER encoding corresponding to the following the contents of which are the DER encoding corresponding to the
ASN.1 notation. following ASN.1 notation.
Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER, r INTEGER,
s INTEGER s INTEGER
} }
EdDSA signatures are generated and verified according to
[CFRG-EdDSA]. The digitally-signed element is encoded as an opaque
vector<0..2^16-1>, the contents of which is the octet string output
of the EdDSA signing algorithm.
Actions of the sender: Actions of the sender:
The server selects elliptic curve domain parameters and an ephemeral The server selects elliptic curve domain parameters and an ephemeral
ECDH public key corresponding to these parameters according to the ECDH public key corresponding to these parameters according to the
ECKAS-DH1 scheme from IEEE 1363 [IEEE.P1363.1998]. It conveys this ECKAS-DH1 scheme from IEEE 1363 [IEEE.P1363.1998]. It conveys this
information to the client in the ServerKeyExchange message using the information to the client in the ServerKeyExchange message using the
format defined above. format defined above.
Actions of the receiver: Actions of the receiver:
skipping to change at page 18, line 37 skipping to change at page 18, line 41
NOTE: The client's Certificate message is capable of carrying a chain NOTE: The client's Certificate message is capable of carrying a chain
of certificates. The restrictions mentioned in Table 4 apply only to of certificates. The restrictions mentioned in Table 4 apply only to
the client's certificate (first in the chain). the client's certificate (first in the chain).
+------------------+------------------------------------------------+ +------------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Client | Client Certificate Type | | Client | Client Certificate Type |
| Authentication | | | Authentication | |
| Method | | | Method | |
+------------------+------------------------------------------------+ +------------------+------------------------------------------------+
| ECDSA_sign | Certificate MUST contain an ECDSA-capable | | ECDSA_sign | Certificate MUST contain an ECDSA- or EdDSA- |
| | public key and be signed with ECDSA. | | | capable public key. |
| ECDSA_fixed_ECDH | Certificate MUST contain an ECDH-capable | | ECDSA_fixed_ECDH | Certificate MUST contain an ECDH-capable |
| | public key on the same elliptic curve as the | | | public key on the same elliptic curve as the |
| | server's long-term ECDH key. This certificate | | | server's long-term ECDH key. |
| | MUST be signed with ECDSA. | | RSA_fixed_ECDH | The same as ECDSA_fixed_ECDH. The codepoints |
| RSA_fixed_ECDH | Certificate MUST contain an ECDH-capable | | | meant different things, but due to changes in |
| | public key on the same elliptic curve as the | | | TLS 1.2, both mean the same thing now. |
| | server's long-term ECDH key. This certificate |
| | MUST be signed with RSA. |
+------------------+------------------------------------------------+ +------------------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 4: Client Certificate Types Table 4: Client Certificate Types
Structure of this message: Structure of this message:
Identical to the TLS client Certificate format. Identical to the TLS client Certificate format.
Actions of the sender: Actions of the sender:
skipping to change at page 19, line 46 skipping to change at page 20, line 4
enum { implicit, explicit } PublicValueEncoding; enum { implicit, explicit } PublicValueEncoding;
implicit, explicit: For ECC cipher suites, this indicates whether implicit, explicit: For ECC cipher suites, this indicates whether
the client's ECDH public key is in the client's certificate the client's ECDH public key is in the client's certificate
("implicit") or is provided, as an ephemeral ECDH public key, in ("implicit") or is provided, as an ephemeral ECDH public key, in
the ClientKeyExchange message ("explicit"). (This is "explicit" the ClientKeyExchange message ("explicit"). (This is "explicit"
in ECC cipher suites except when the client uses the in ECC cipher suites except when the client uses the
ECDSA_fixed_ECDH or RSA_fixed_ECDH client authentication ECDSA_fixed_ECDH or RSA_fixed_ECDH client authentication
mechanism.) mechanism.)
struct { struct {
select (PublicValueEncoding) { select (PublicValueEncoding) {
case implicit: struct { }; case implicit: struct { };
case explicit: ECPoint ecdh_Yc; case explicit: ECPoint ecdh_Yc;
} ecdh_public; } ecdh_public;
} ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic; } ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic;
ecdh_Yc: Contains the client's ephemeral ECDH public key as a byte ecdh_Yc: Contains the client's ephemeral ECDH public key as a byte
string ECPoint.point, which may represent an elliptic curve point string ECPoint.point, which may represent an elliptic curve point
in uncompressed or compressed format. Here, the format MUST in uncompressed or compressed format. Curves Ed25519 and Ed448
conform to what the server has requested through a Supported Point MUST NOT be used. Here, the format MUST conform to what the
Formats Extension if this extension was used, and MUST be server has requested through a Supported Point Formats Extension
uncompressed if this extension was not used. if this extension was used, and MUST be uncompressed if this
extension was not used.
struct { struct {
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case ec_diffie_hellman: ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic; case ec_diffie_hellman: ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic;
} exchange_keys; } exchange_keys;
} ClientKeyExchange; } ClientKeyExchange;
Actions of the sender: Actions of the sender:
The client selects an ephemeral ECDH public key corresponding to the The client selects an ephemeral ECDH public key corresponding to the
skipping to change at page 20, line 49 skipping to change at page 21, line 7
Meaning of the message: Meaning of the message:
This message contains a signature that proves possession of the This message contains a signature that proves possession of the
private key corresponding to the public key in the client's private key corresponding to the public key in the client's
Certificate message. Certificate message.
Structure of this message: Structure of this message:
The TLS CertificateVerify message and the underlying Signature type The TLS CertificateVerify message and the underlying Signature type
are defined in the TLS base specifications, and the latter is are defined in the TLS base specifications, and the latter is
extended here in Section 5.4. For the ecdsa case, the signature extended here in Section 5.4. For the ecdsa and eddsa cases, the
field in the CertificateVerify message contains an ECDSA signature signature field in the CertificateVerify message contains an ECDSA or
computed over handshake messages exchanged so far, exactly similar to EdDSA (respectively) signature computed over handshake messages
CertificateVerify with other signing algorithms: exchanged so far, exactly similar to CertificateVerify with other
signing algorithms:
CertificateVerify.signature.sha_hash CertificateVerify.signature.sha_hash
SHA(handshake_messages); SHA(handshake_messages);
CertificateVerify.signature.rawdata
handshake_messages;
ECDSA signatures are computed as described in Section 5.10, and SHA ECDSA signatures are computed as described in Section 5.10, and SHA
in the above template for sha_hash accordingly may denote a hash in the above template for sha_hash accordingly may denote a hash
algorithm other than SHA-1. As per ANSI X9.62, an ECDSA signature algorithm other than SHA-1. As per ANSI X9.62, an ECDSA signature
consists of a pair of integers, r and s. The digitally-signed consists of a pair of integers, r and s. The digitally-signed
element is encoded as an opaque vector <0..2^16-1>, the contents of element is encoded as an opaque vector <0..2^16-1>, the contents of
which are the DER encoding [CCITT.X690] corresponding to the which are the DER encoding [CCITT.X690] corresponding to the
following ASN.1 notation [CCITT.X680]. following ASN.1 notation [CCITT.X680].
Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER, r INTEGER,
s INTEGER s INTEGER
} }
EdDSA signatures are generated and verified according to
[CFRG-EdDSA]. The digitally-signed element is encoded as an opaque
vector<0..2^16-1>, the contents of which is the octet string output
of the EdDSA signing algorithm.
Actions of the sender: Actions of the sender:
The client computes its signature over all handshake messages sent or The client computes its signature over all handshake messages sent or
received starting at client hello and up to but not including this received starting at client hello and up to but not including this
message. It uses the private key corresponding to its certified message. It uses the private key corresponding to its certified
public key to compute the signature, which is conveyed in the format public key to compute the signature, which is conveyed in the format
defined above. defined above.
Actions of the receiver: Actions of the receiver:
The server extracts the client's signature from the CertificateVerify The server extracts the client's signature from the CertificateVerify
message, and verifies the signature using the public key it received message, and verifies the signature using the public key it received
in the client's Certificate message. in the client's Certificate message.
5.9. Elliptic Curve Certificates 5.9. Elliptic Curve Certificates
X.509 certificates containing ECC public keys or signed using ECDSA X.509 certificates containing ECC public keys or signed using ECDSA
MUST comply with [RFC3279] or another RFC that replaces or extends MUST comply with [RFC3279] or another RFC that replaces or extends
it. Clients SHOULD use the elliptic curve domain parameters it. X.509 certificates containing ECC public keys or signed using
recommended in ANSI X9.62, FIPS 186-4, and SEC 2 [SECG-SEC2]. EdDSA MUST comply with [PKIX-EdDSA]. Clients SHOULD use the elliptic
curve domain parameters recommended in ANSI X9.62, FIPS 186-4, and
SEC 2 [SECG-SEC2] or in [CFRG-EdDSA].
EdDSA keys using Ed25519 and Ed25519ph algorithms MUST use the
Ed25519 curve, and Ed448 and Ed448ph keys MUST use the Ed448 curve.
Curves Curve25519, Curve448, Ed25519 and Ed448 MUST NOT be used for
ECDSA.
5.10. ECDH, ECDSA, and RSA Computations 5.10. ECDH, ECDSA, and RSA Computations
All ECDH calculations for the NIST curves (including parameter and All ECDH calculations for the NIST curves (including parameter and
key generation as well as the shared secret calculation) are key generation as well as the shared secret calculation) are
performed according to [IEEE.P1363.1998] using the ECKAS-DH1 scheme performed according to [IEEE.P1363.1998] using the ECKAS-DH1 scheme
with the identity map as key derivation function (KDF), so that the with the identity map as key derivation function (KDF), so that the
premaster secret is the x-coordinate of the ECDH shared secret premaster secret is the x-coordinate of the ECDH shared secret
elliptic curve point represented as an octet string. Note that this elliptic curve point represented as an octet string. Note that this
octet string (Z in IEEE 1363 terminology) as output by FE2OSP, the octet string (Z in IEEE 1363 terminology) as output by FE2OSP, the
skipping to change at page 22, line 28 skipping to change at page 23, line 4
corresponding public key x = Curve25519(d, G). Parties exchange corresponding public key x = Curve25519(d, G). Parties exchange
their public keys and compute a shared secret as x_S = Curve25519(d, their public keys and compute a shared secret as x_S = Curve25519(d,
x_peer). ECDHE for Curve448 works similarily, replacing Curve25519 x_peer). ECDHE for Curve448 works similarily, replacing Curve25519
with Curve448. The derived shared secret is used directly as the with Curve448. The derived shared secret is used directly as the
premaster secret, which is always exactly 32 bytes when ECDHE with premaster secret, which is always exactly 32 bytes when ECDHE with
Curve25519 is used and 56 bytes when ECDHE with Curve448 is used. Curve25519 is used and 56 bytes when ECDHE with Curve448 is used.
All ECDSA computations MUST be performed according to ANSI X9.62 or All ECDSA computations MUST be performed according to ANSI X9.62 or
its successors. Data to be signed/verified is hashed, and the result its successors. Data to be signed/verified is hashed, and the result
run directly through the ECDSA algorithm with no additional hashing. run directly through the ECDSA algorithm with no additional hashing.
The default hash function is SHA-1 [FIPS.180-2], and sha_size (see The default hash function is SHA-1 [FIPS.180-2], and sha_size (see
Section 5.4 and Section 5.8) is 20. However, an alternative hash Section 5.4 and Section 5.8) is 20. However, an alternative hash
function, such as one of the new SHA hash functions specified in FIPS function, such as one of the new SHA hash functions specified in FIPS
180-2 [FIPS.180-2], may be used instead. 180-2 [FIPS.180-2], SHOULD be used instead.
All EdDSA computations MUST be performed according to [CFRG-EdDSA] or
its succesors. Data to be signed/verified is run through the EdDSA
algorithm wih no hashing (EdDSA will internally run the data through
the PH function).
RFC 4492 anticipated the standardization of a mechanism for RFC 4492 anticipated the standardization of a mechanism for
specifying the required hash function in the certificate, perhaps in specifying the required hash function in the certificate, perhaps in
the parameters field of the subjectPublicKeyInfo. Such the parameters field of the subjectPublicKeyInfo. Such
standardization never took place, and as a result, SHA-1 is used in standardization never took place, and as a result, SHA-1 is used in
TLS 1.1 and earlier. TLS 1.2 added a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm TLS 1.1 and earlier (except for EdDSA, which uses identity function).
parameter to the DigitallySigned struct, thus allowing agility in TLS 1.2 added a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm parameter to the
choosing the signature hash. DigitallySigned struct, thus allowing agility in choosing the
signature hash. EdDSA signatures MUST have HashAlgorithm of 0
(None).
All RSA signatures must be generated and verified according to All RSA signatures must be generated and verified according to
[PKCS1] block type 1. [PKCS1] block type 1.
5.11. Public Key Validation 5.11. Public Key Validation
With the NIST curves, each party must validate the public key sent by With the NIST curves, each party must validate the public key sent by
its peer before performing cryptographic computations with it. its peer before performing cryptographic computations with it.
Failing to do so allows attackers to gain information about the Failing to do so allows attackers to gain information about the
private key, to the point that they may recover the entire private private key, to the point that they may recover the entire private
key in a few requests, if that key is not really ephemeral. key in a few requests, if that key is not really ephemeral.
Curve25519 was designed in a way that the result of Curve25519(x, d) Curve25519 was designed in a way that the result of Curve25519(x, d)
will never reveal information about d, provided it was chosen as will never reveal information about d, provided it was chosen as
prescribed, for any value of x. prescribed, for any value of x (the same holds true for Curve448).
Let's define legitimate values of x as the values that can be Let's define legitimate values of x as the values that can be
obtained as x = Curve25519(G, d') for some d, and call the other obtained as x = Curve25519(G, d') for some d, and call the other
values illegitimate. The definition of the Curve25519 function shows values illegitimate. The definition of the Curve25519 function shows
that legitimate values all share the following property: the high- that legitimate values all share the following property: the high-
order bit of the last byte is not set. order bit of the last byte is not set (for Ed448, any bit can be
set).
Since there are some implementation of the Curve25519 function that Since there are some implementation of the Curve25519 function that
impose this restriction on their input and others that don't, impose this restriction on their input and others that don't,
implementations of Curve25519 in TLS SHOULD reject public keys when implementations of Curve25519 in TLS SHOULD reject public keys when
the high-order bit of the last byte is set (in other words, when the the high-order bit of the last byte is set (in other words, when the
value of the leftmost byte is greater than 0x7F) in order to prevent value of the leftmost byte is greater than 0x7F) in order to prevent
implementation fingerprinting. implementation fingerprinting.
Ed25519 and Ed448 internally do public key validation as part of
signature verification.
Other than this recommended check, implementations do not need to Other than this recommended check, implementations do not need to
ensure that the public keys they receive are legitimate: this is not ensure that the public keys they receive are legitimate: this is not
necessary for security with Curve25519. necessary for security with Curve25519.
6. Cipher Suites 6. Cipher Suites
The table below defines new ECC cipher suites that use the key The table below defines new ECC cipher suites that use the key
exchange algorithms specified in Section 2. exchange algorithms specified in Section 2.
+---------------------------------------+----------------+ +---------------------------------------+----------------+
| CipherSuite | Identifier | | CipherSuite | Identifier |
+---------------------------------------+----------------+ +---------------------------------------+----------------+
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x06 } | | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x06 } |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x07 } |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x08 } | | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x08 } |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x09 } | | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x09 } |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x0A } | | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x0A } |
| | | | | |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x10 } | | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x10 } |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x11 } |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x12 } | | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x12 } |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x13 } | | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x13 } |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x14 } | | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x14 } |
| | | | | |
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x15 } | | TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x15 } |
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x16 } |
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x17 } | | TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x17 } |
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x18 } | | TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x18 } |
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x19 } | | TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | { 0xC0, 0x19 } |
+---------------------------------------+----------------+ +---------------------------------------+----------------+
Table 5: TLS ECC cipher suites Table 5: TLS ECC cipher suites
The key exchange method, cipher, and hash algorithm for each of these The key exchange method, cipher, and hash algorithm for each of these
cipher suites are easily determined by examining the name. Ciphers cipher suites are easily determined by examining the name. Ciphers
(other than AES ciphers) and hash algorithms are defined in [RFC2246] (other than AES ciphers) and hash algorithms are defined in [RFC2246]
skipping to change at page 26, line 9 skipping to change at page 26, line 19
values (ECPointFormat and ECCurveType) reserved for Private Use. Any values (ECPointFormat and ECCurveType) reserved for Private Use. Any
additional assignments require IETF Review. additional assignments require IETF Review.
NOTE: IANA, please update the registries to reflect the new policy NOTE: IANA, please update the registries to reflect the new policy
name. name.
NOTE: RFC editor please delete these two notes prior to publication. NOTE: RFC editor please delete these two notes prior to publication.
IANA, please update these two registries to refer to this document. IANA, please update these two registries to refer to this document.
IANA is requested to assign two values from the NamedCurve registry IANA is requested to assign four values from the NamedCurve registry
with names Curve25519(TBD1) and Curve448(TBD2) with this document as with names Curve25519(TBD1), Curve448(TBD2), Ed25519(TBD3) and
reference. Ed448(TBD4) with this document as reference.
IANA is requested to assign one value from SignatureAlgorithm
Registry with name eddsa(TBD5) with this document as reference.
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
Most of the text is this document is taken from [RFC4492], the Most of the text is this document is taken from [RFC4492], the
predecessor of this document. The authors of that document were: predecessor of this document. The authors of that document were:
o Simon Blake-Wilson o Simon Blake-Wilson
o Nelson Bolyard o Nelson Bolyard
o Vipul Gupta o Vipul Gupta
o Chris Hawk o Chris Hawk
o Bodo Moeller o Bodo Moeller
In the predecessor document, the authors acknowledged the In the predecessor document, the authors acknowledged the
contributions of Bill Anderson and Tim Dierks. contributions of Bill Anderson and Tim Dierks.
10. Version History for This Draft 10. Version History for This Draft
NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION
Changes from draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-03 to draft-nir-tls-
rfc4492bis-05:
o Add support for CFRG curves and signatures work.
Changes from draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-01 to draft-nir-tls- Changes from draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-01 to draft-nir-tls-
rfc4492bis-03: rfc4492bis-03:
o Removed unused curves. o Removed unused curves.
o Removed unused point formats (all but uncompressed) o Removed unused point formats (all but uncompressed)
Changes from draft-nir-tls-rfc4492bis-00 and draft-ietf-tls- Changes from draft-nir-tls-rfc4492bis-00 and draft-ietf-tls-
rfc4492bis-00 to draft-nir-tls-rfc4492bis-01: rfc4492bis-00 to draft-nir-tls-rfc4492bis-01:
o Merged errata o Merged errata
skipping to change at page 27, line 12 skipping to change at page 27, line 27
o Moved RFC 4492 authors to acknowledgements. o Moved RFC 4492 authors to acknowledgements.
o Removed list of required reading for ECC. o Removed list of required reading for ECC.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[ANSI.X9-62.2005] [ANSI.X9-62.2005]
American National Standards Institute, "Public Key American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", ANSI Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
X9.62, 2005. ANSI X9.62, 2005.
[CCITT.X680] [CCITT.X680]
International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative
Committee, "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Committee, "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1):
Specification of basic notation", CCITT Recommendation Specification of basic notation", CCITT Recommendation
X.680, July 2002. X.680, July 2002.
[CCITT.X690] [CCITT.X690]
International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative
Committee, "ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of basic Committee, "ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of basic
encoding Rules (BER), Canonical encoding rules (CER) and encoding Rules (BER), Canonical encoding rules (CER) and
Distinguished encoding rules (DER)", CCITT Recommendation Distinguished encoding rules (DER)", CCITT Recommendation
X.690, July 2002. X.690, July 2002.
[CFRG-Curves] [CFRG-Curves]
Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", draft-irtf-cfrg-curves-11 (work in for Security", draft-irtf-cfrg-curves-11 (work in
progress), October 2015. progress), October 2015.
[CFRG-EdDSA]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa-00
(work in progress), October 2015.
[FIPS.186-4] [FIPS.186-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard", FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013, Signature Standard", FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/ <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>. NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.
[PKCS1] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 1.5", [PKCS1] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 1.5",
PKCS 1, November 1993. PKCS 1, November 1993.
[PKIX-EdDSA]
Josefsson, S. and N. Mavrogiannopoulos, "Using EdDSA in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", draft-
josefsson-pkix-eddsa-03 (work in progress), September
2015.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999. RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002. (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
skipping to change at page 28, line 16 skipping to change at page 28, line 42
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J., [RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006. Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[SECG-SEC2] [SECG-SEC2]
CECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", SEC CECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
2, 2000. SEC 2, 2000.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[FIPS.180-2] [FIPS.180-2]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002, Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/ <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/
fips180-2.pdf>. fips180-2.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
skipping to change at page 30, line 7 skipping to change at page 31, line 7
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
All the other RC4 ciphersuites
Removed unused curves and all but the uncompressed point format. Removed unused curves and all but the uncompressed point format.
Added Curve25519 and Curve448. Added Curve25519 and Curve448.
Deprecated explicit curves. Deprecated explicit curves.
Removed restriction on signature algorithm in certificate.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Yoav Nir Yoav Nir
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
5 Hasolelim st. 5 Hasolelim st.
Tel Aviv 6789735 Tel Aviv 6789735
Israel Israel
Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com
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