< draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-00.txt		draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-01.txt >
	Network Working Group P. Saint-Andre		Network Working Group P. Saint-Andre
	Internet-Draft &yet		Internet-Draft &yet
	Updates: 6120 (if approved) T. Alkemade		Updates: 6120 (if approved) T. Alkemade
	Intended status: Standards Track		Intended status: Standards Track
	Expires: September 28, 2014 March 27, 2014		Expires: March 15, 2015 September 11, 2014
	Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and		Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and
	Presence Protocol (XMPP)		Presence Protocol (XMPP)
	draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-00		draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-01
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document provides recommendations for the use of Transport Layer		This document provides recommendations for the use of Transport Layer
	Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol		Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
	(XMPP). This document updates RFC 6120.		(XMPP). This document updates RFC 6120.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	skipping to change at page 1, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 34 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on March 15, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	3. Discussion Venue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3.1. Support for TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4.1. Support for TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3.2. Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4.2. Protocol Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3.3. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4.3. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3.4. Public Key Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4.4. Public Key Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3.5. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4.5. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3.6. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.6. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.7. Authenticated Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.7. Authenticated Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.8. Unauthenticated Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.8. Unauthenticated Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.9. Server Name Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.9. Server Name Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.10. Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.10. Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		Appendix A. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [RFC6120]		The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [RFC6120]
	(along with its precursor, the so-called "Jabber protocol") has used		(along with its precursor, the so-called "Jabber protocol") has used
	Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] (along with its precursor,		Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] (along with its precursor,
	Secure Sockets Layer or SSL) since 1999. Both [RFC6120] and its		Secure Sockets Layer or SSL) since 1999. Both [RFC6120] and its
	predecessor [RFC3920] provided recommendations regarding the use of		predecessor [RFC3920] provided recommendations regarding the use of
	TLS in XMPP. In order to address the evolving threat model on the		TLS in XMPP. In order to address the evolving threat model on the
	Internet today (see, for example, [I-D.trammell-perpass-ppa]), this		Internet today, this document provides stronger recommendations based
	document provides stronger recommendations (see also		on [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]. This document updates [RFC6120].
	[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]). This document updates [RFC6120].
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	Various security-related terms are to be understood in the sense		Various security-related terms are to be understood in the sense
	defined in [RFC4949].		defined in [RFC4949].
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
	[RFC2119].		[RFC2119].
	3. Discussion Venue		3. Recommendations
	The discussion venue for this document is the mailing list of the
	XMPP Working Group, for which archives and subscription information
	can be found at [1]. Discussion might also occur on the mailing list
	of the UTA Working Group, for which archives and subscription
	information can be found at [2].
	4. Recommendations
	4.1. Support for TLS		3.1. Support for TLS
	Support for TLS (specifically, the XMPP profile of STARTTLS) is		Support for TLS (specifically, the XMPP profile of STARTTLS) is
	mandatory for XMPP implementations, as already specified in [RFC6120]		mandatory for XMPP implementations, as already specified in [RFC6120]
	and its predecessor [RFC3920].		and its predecessor [RFC3920].
	If the server to which an XMPP client or peer server connects does		If the server to which a client or peer server connects does not
	not offer a stream feature of <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns		offer a stream feature of <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns
	:xmpp-tls'/> (thus indicating that it is an XMPP 1.0 server that		:xmpp-tls'/> (thus indicating that it is an XMPP 1.0 server that
	supports TLS), the initiating entity MUST NOT proceed with the stream		supports TLS), the initiating entity MUST NOT proceed with the stream
	negotiation and MUST instead abort the connection attempt. Although		negotiation and MUST instead abort the connection attempt. Although
	XMPP servers SHOULD include the <required/> child element to indicate		XMPP servers SHOULD include the <required/> child element to indicate
	that negotiation of TLS is mandatory, clients and peer servers MUST		that negotiation of TLS is mandatory, clients and peer servers MUST
	NOT depend on receiving the <required/> flag in determining whether		NOT depend on receiving the <required/> flag in determining whether
	TLS will be enforced for the stream.		TLS will be enforced for the stream.
	4.2. Protocol Versions		3.2. Protocol Versions
	Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in		Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in
	[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] as to supporting various TLS versions and		[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] as to supporting various TLS versions and
	avoiding fallback to SSL.		avoiding fallback to SSL.
	4.3. Cipher Suites		3.3. Cipher Suites
	Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in		Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in
	[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].		[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].
	4.4. Public Key Length		3.4. Public Key Length
	Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in		Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in
	[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].		[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].
	4.5. Compression		3.5. Compression
	Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in		Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in
	[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].		[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].
	XMPP supports an application-layer compression technology [XEP-0138],		XMPP supports an application-layer compression technology [XEP-0138],
	which might have slightly stronger security properties than TLS (at		which might have slightly stronger security properties than TLS (at
	least because it is enabled after SASL authentication, as described		least because it is enabled after SASL authentication, as described
	in [XEP-0170]).		in [XEP-0170]).
	4.6. Session Resumption		3.6. Session Resumption
	Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in		Implementations MUST follow the recommendations in
	[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].		[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].
	Use of session IDs [RFC5246] is RECOMMENDED instead of session		Use of session IDs [RFC5246] is RECOMMENDED instead of session
	tickets [RFC5077], since XMPP does not in general use state		tickets [RFC5077], since XMPP does not in general use state
	management technologies such as tickets or "cookies" [RFC6265].		management technologies such as tickets or "cookies" [RFC6265].
	Note that, in XMPP, TLS session resumption can be used in concert		In XMPP, TLS session resumption can be used in concert with the XMPP
	with the XMPP Stream Management extension; see [XEP-0198] for further		Stream Management extension; see [XEP-0198] for further details.
	details.
	4.7. Authenticated Connections		3.7. Authenticated Connections
	Both the core XMPP specification [RFC6120] and the "CertID"		Both the core XMPP specification [RFC6120] and the "CertID"
	specification [RFC6125] provide recommendations and requirements for		specification [RFC6125] provide recommendations and requirements for
	certificate validation in the context of authenticated connections.		certificate validation in the context of authenticated connections.
	This document does not supersede those specifications. Wherever		This document does not supersede those specifications. Wherever
	possible, it is best to prefer authenticated connections (along with		possible, it is best to prefer authenticated connections (along with
	SASL [RFC4422]), as already stated in the core XMPP specification		SASL [RFC4422]), as already stated in the core XMPP specification
	[RFC6120]. In particular, clients MUST authenticate servers.		[RFC6120]. In particular, clients MUST authenticate servers.
	4.8. Unauthenticated Connections		3.8. Unauthenticated Connections
	Given the pervasiveness of passive eavesdropping, even an		Given the pervasiveness of passive eavesdropping, even an
	unauthenticated connection might be better than an unencrypted		unauthenticated connection might be better than an unencrypted
	connection (this is similar to the "better than nothing security"		connection (this is similar to the "better than nothing security"
	approach for IPsec [RFC5386]). In particular, because of current		approach for IPsec [RFC5386]). In particular, because of current
	deployment challenges for authenticated connections between XMPP		deployment challenges for authenticated connections between XMPP
	servers (see [I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna] for details), it might be reasonable		servers (see [I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna] for details), it might be reasonable
	for XMPP server implementations to accept unauthenticated connections		for XMPP server implementations to accept unauthenticated connections
	when the Server Dialback protocol [XEP-0220] is used for weak		when the Server Dialback protocol [XEP-0220] is used for weak
	identity verification; this will at least enable encryption of		identity verification; this will at least enable encryption of
	server-to-server connections. Unauthenticated connections include		server-to-server connections. Unauthenticated connections include
	connections negotiated using anonymous Diffie-Hellman algorithms or		connections negotiated using anonymous Diffie-Hellman algorithms or
	using self-signed certificates, among other scenarios.		using self-signed certificates, among other scenarios.
	4.9. Server Name Indication		3.9. Server Name Indication
	Although there is no harm in supporting the TLS Server Name		Although there is no harm in supporting the TLS Server Name
	Indication (SNI) extension [RFC6066], this is not necessary since the		Indication (SNI) extension [RFC6066], this is not necessary since the
	same function is served in XMPP by the 'to' address of the initial		same function is served in XMPP by the 'to' address of the initial
	stream header as explained in Section 4.7.2 of [RFC6120].		stream header as explained in Section 4.7.2 of [RFC6120].
	4.10. Human Factors		3.10. Human Factors
	It is RECOMMENDED that XMPP clients provide ways for end users (and		It is RECOMMENDED that XMPP clients provide ways for end users (and
	that XMPP servers provide ways for administators) to complete the		that XMPP servers provide ways for administrators) to complete the
	following tasks:		following tasks:
	o Determine if a client-to-server or server-to-server connection is		o Determine if a client-to-server or server-to-server connection is
	encrypted and authenticated.		encrypted and authenticated.
	o Determine the version of TLS used for a client-to-server or		o Determine the version of TLS used for a client-to-server or
	server-to-server connection.		server-to-server connection.
	o Inspect the certificate offered by an XMPP server.		o Inspect the certificate offered by an XMPP server.
	o Determine the cipher suite used to encrypt a connection.		o Determine the cipher suite used to encrypt a connection.
	o Be warned if the certificate changes for a given server.		o Be warned if the certificate changes for a given server.
	5. Implementation Notes		4. IANA Considerations
	Some governments enforce legislation prohibiting the export of strong
	cryptographic technologies. Nothing in this document ought to be
	taken as advice to violate such prohibitions.
	6. IANA Considerations
	This document requests no actions of the IANA.		This document requests no actions of the IANA.
	7. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	As noted in "A Threat Model for Pervasive Passive Surveillance"		The use of TLS can help limit the information available for
	[I-D.trammell-perpass-ppa]), the use of TLS can help limit the		correlation to the network and transport layer headers as opposed to
	information available for correlation to the network and transport		the application layer. As typically deployed, XMPP technologies do
	layer headers as opposed to the application layer. As typically		not leave application-layer routing data (such as XMPP 'to' and
	deployed, XMPP technologies do not leave application-layer routing		'from' addresses) at rest on intermediate systems, since there is
	data (such as XMPP 'to' and 'from' addresses) at rest on intermediate		only one hop between any two given XMPP servers. As a result,
	systems, since there is only one hop between any two given XMPP		encrypting all hops (sending client to sender's server, sender's
	servers. As a result, encrypting all hops (sending client to		server to recipient's server, recipient's server to recipient's
	sender's server, sender's server to recipient's server, recipient's		client) can help to limit the amount of "metadata" that might leak.
	server to recipient's client) can help to limit the amount of
	"metadata" that might leak.
	It is possible that XMPP servers themselves might be compromised. In		It is possible that XMPP servers themselves might be compromised. In
	that case, per-hop encryption would not protect XMPP communications,		that case, per-hop encryption would not protect XMPP communications,
	and even end-to-end encryption of (parts of) XMPP stanza payloads		and even end-to-end encryption of (parts of) XMPP stanza payloads
	would leave addressing information and XMPP roster data in the clear.		would leave addressing information and XMPP roster data in the clear.
	By the same token, it is possible that XMPP clients (or the end-user		By the same token, it is possible that XMPP clients (or the end-user
	devices on which such clients are installed) could also be		devices on which such clients are installed) could also be
	compromised, leaving users utterly at the mercy of an adversary.		compromised, leaving users utterly at the mercy of an adversary.
	This document, along with actions currently being taken to strenthen		This document and related actions to strengthen the security of the
	the security of the XMPP network, do not assume widespread compromise		XMPP network are based on the assumption that XMPP servers and
	of XMPP servers and clients or their underlying operating systems or		clients have not been subject to widespread compromise. If this
	hardware. Thus it is assumed that ubiquitous use of per-hop TLS		assumption is valid, then ubiquitous use of per-hop TLS channel
	channel encryption and more significant deployment of end-to-end		encryption and more significant deployment of end-to-end object
	object encryption technologies will serve to protect XMPP		encryption technologies will serve to protect XMPP communications to
	communications to a measurable degree, compared to the alternatives.		a measurable degree, compared to the alternatives.
	8. References		6. References
	8.1. Normative References		6.1. Normative References
			[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]
			Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
			"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
			ietf-uta-tls-bcp-02 (work in progress), August 2014.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC		[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
	4949, August 2007.		4949, August 2007.
	[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,		[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
	"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without		"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
	Server-Side State", RFC 5077, January 2008.		Server-Side State", RFC 5077, January 2008.
	skipping to change at page 6, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 38 ¶
	[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence		[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
	Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, March 2011.		Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, March 2011.
	[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and		[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
	Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity		Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
	within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509		within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
	(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer		(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
	Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.		Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
	8.2. Informative References		6.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]
	Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
	"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
	ietf-uta-tls-bcp-00 (work in progress), March 2014.
	[I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna]		[I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna]
	Saint-Andre, P. and M. Miller, "Domain Name Associations		Saint-Andre, P. and M. Miller, "Domain Name Associations
	(DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol		(DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
	(XMPP)", draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-05 (work in progress),		(XMPP)", draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-06 (work in progress), June
	February 2014.		2014.
	[I-D.trammell-perpass-ppa]
	Trammell, B., Borkmann, D., and C. Huitema, "A Threat
	Model for Pervasive Passive Surveillance", draft-trammell-
	perpass-ppa-01 (work in progress), November 2013.
	[RFC3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence		[RFC3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
	Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, October 2004.		Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, October 2004.
	[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and		[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
	Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.		Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
	[RFC5386] Williams, N. and M. Richardson, "Better-Than-Nothing		[RFC5386] Williams, N. and M. Richardson, "Better-Than-Nothing
	Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec", RFC 5386,		Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec", RFC 5386,
	November 2008.		November 2008.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 32 ¶
	[XEP-0198]		[XEP-0198]
	Karneges, J., Saint-Andre, P., Hildebrand, J., Forno, F.,		Karneges, J., Saint-Andre, P., Hildebrand, J., Forno, F.,
	Cridland, D., and M. Wild, "Stream Management", XSF XEP		Cridland, D., and M. Wild, "Stream Management", XSF XEP
	0198, June 2011.		0198, June 2011.
	[XEP-0220]		[XEP-0220]
	Miller, J., Saint-Andre, P., and P. Hancke, "Server		Miller, J., Saint-Andre, P., and P. Hancke, "Server
	Dialback", XSF XEP 0220, September 2013.		Dialback", XSF XEP 0220, September 2013.
	8.3. URIs		Appendix A. Implementation Notes
	[1] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/xmpp
	[2] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta		Some governments enforce legislation prohibiting the export of strong
			cryptographic technologies. Nothing in this document ought to be
			taken as advice to violate such prohibitions.
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements		Appendix B. Acknowledgements
	Thanks to the following individuals for their input: Dave Cridland,		Thanks to the following individuals for their input: Dave Cridland,
	Philipp Hancke, Olle Johansson, Steve Kille, Tobias Markmann, Matt		Philipp Hancke, Olle Johansson, Steve Kille, Tobias Markmann, Matt
	Miller, and Rene Treffer.		Miller, and Rene Treffer.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Peter Saint-Andre		Peter Saint-Andre
	&yet		&yet
			P.O. Box 787
			Parker, CO 80134
			USA
	Email: ietf@stpeter.im		Email: peter@andyet.net
	Thijs Alkemade		Thijs Alkemade
	Email: me@thijsalkema.de		Email: me@thijsalkema.de
End of changes. 32 change blocks.
	100 lines changed or deleted		77 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/