< draft-kaliski-pkcs5-v2-01.txt   draft-kaliski-pkcs5-v2-02.txt >
RSA Laboratories B. Kaliski INTERNET-DRAFT B. Kaliski
Internet Draft Security Dynamics Expires: May 2000 RSA Laboratories
Expires December 1999 June 1999 Intended Category: Informational November 1999
Password-Based Cryptography Specification Password-Based Cryptography Specification
PKCS #5 v2.0 PKCS #5 v2.0
<draft-kaliski-pkcs5-v2-01.txt> <draft-kaliski-pkcs5-v2-02.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Abstract Abstract
This document provides recommendations for the implementation of This document provides recommendations for the implementation of
password-based cryptography, covering key derivation functions, password-based cryptography, covering key derivation functions,
encryption schemes, message-authentication schemes, and ASN.1 syntax encryption schemes, message-authentication schemes, and ASN.1 syntax
identifying the techniques. identifying the techniques.
The recommendations are intended for general application within The recommendations are intended for general application within
computer and communications systems, and as such include a fair computer and communications systems, and as such include a fair
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profiles based on these specifications may include additional profiles based on these specifications may include additional
constraints. constraints.
Other cryptographic techniques based on passwords, such as password- Other cryptographic techniques based on passwords, such as password-
based key entity authentication and key establishment protocols based key entity authentication and key establishment protocols
[4][5][26] are outside the scope of this document. Guidelines for the [4][5][26] are outside the scope of this document. Guidelines for the
selection of passwords are also outside the scope. selection of passwords are also outside the scope.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
Status of this Memo .............................................. 1 1 Introduction ................................................. 3
Abstract ......................................................... 1 2 Notation ..................................................... 3
Table of Contents ................................................ 2 3 Overview ..................................................... 4
1 Introduction ................................................. 3 4 Salt and Iteration Count ..................................... 6
2 Notation ..................................................... 3 4.1 Salt .................................................... 6
3 Overview ..................................................... 4 4.2 Iteration Count ......................................... 8
4 Salt and Iteration Count ..................................... 6 5 Key Derivation Functions ..................................... 8
4.1 Salt .................................................... 6 5.1 PBKDF1 .................................................. 9
4.2 Iteration Count ......................................... 8 5.2 PBKDF2 .................................................. 9
5 Key Derivation Functions ..................................... 8
5.1 PBKDF1 .................................................. 9
5.2 PBKDF2 .................................................. 10
6 Encryption Schemes ........................................... 11 6 Encryption Schemes ........................................... 11
6.1 PBES1 ................................................... 11 6.1 PBES1 ................................................... 12
6.1.1 Encryption Operation ............................. 12 6.1.1 Encryption Operation ............................. 12
6.1.2 Decryption Operation ............................. 13 6.1.2 Decryption Operation ............................. 13
6.2 PBES2 ................................................... 14 6.2 PBES2 ................................................... 14
6.2.1 Encryption Operation ............................. 14 6.2.1 Encryption Operation ............................. 14
6.2.2 Decryption Operation ............................. 14 6.2.2 Decryption Operation ............................. 15
7 Message Authentication Schemes ............................... 15 7 Message Authentication Schemes ............................... 15
7.1 PBMAC1 .................................................. 15 7.1 PBMAC1 .................................................. 15
7.1.1 MAC Generation ................................... 15 7.1.1 MAC Generation ................................... 16
7.1.2 MAC Verification ................................. 16 7.1.2 MAC Verification ................................. 16
8 Security Considerations ...................................... 17
9 Author's Address.............................................. 17
Appendices Appendices
A ASN.1 Syntax ................................................. 17 A ASN.1 Syntax ................................................. 18
A.1 PBKDF1 .................................................. 17 A.1 PBKDF1 .................................................. 18
A.2 PBKDF2 .................................................. 17 A.2 PBKDF2 .................................................. 18
A.3 PBES1 ................................................... 19 A.3 PBES1 ................................................... 20
A.4 PBES2 ................................................... 19 A.4 PBES2 ................................................... 20
A.5 PBMAC1 .................................................. 20 A.5 PBMAC1 .................................................. 21
B Supporting Techniques ........................................ 20 B Supporting Techniques ........................................ 22
B.1 Pseudorandom Functions .................................. 21 B.1 Pseudorandom Functions .................................. 22
B.1.1 HMAC-SHA-1 ....................................... 21 B.1.1 HMAC-SHA-1 ....................................... 22
B.2 Encryption Schemes ...................................... 22 B.2 Encryption Schemes ...................................... 23
B.2.1 DES-CBC-Pad ...................................... 22 B.2.1 DES-CBC-Pad ...................................... 23
B.2.2 DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad ................................. 22 B.2.2 DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad ................................. 24
B.2.3 RC2-CBC-Pad ...................................... 23 B.2.3 RC2-CBC-Pad ...................................... 24
B.2.4 RC5-CBC-Pad ...................................... 24 B.2.4 RC5-CBC-Pad ...................................... 25
B.3 Message Authentication Schemes .......................... 24 B.3 Message Authentication Schemes .......................... 26
B.3.1 HMAC-SHA-1 ....................................... 25 B.3.1 HMAC-SHA-1 ....................................... 26
C ASN.1 Module ................................................. 25 C ASN.1 Module ................................................. 26
D Intellectual Property Considerations ......................... 28 D Intellectual Property Considerations ......................... 30
E Revision History ............................................. 30
Table of Contents F References ................................................... 31
G Contact Information & About PKCS ............................. 33
E Revision History ............................................. 28
E.1 Versions 1.0-1.3 ........................................ 28
E.2 Version 1.4 ............................................. 28
E.3 Version 1.5 ............................................. 28
E.4 Version 2.0 ............................................. 29
F References ................................................... 29
G Contact Information & About PKCS ............................. 31
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document provides recommendations for the implementation of This document provides recommendations for the implementation of
password-based cryptography, covering the following aspects: password-based cryptography, covering the following aspects:
- key derivation functions - key derivation functions
- encryption schemes - encryption schemes
- message-authentication schemes - message-authentication schemes
- ASN.1 syntax identifying the techniques - ASN.1 syntax identifying the techniques
The recommendations are intended for general application within The recommendations are intended for general application within
computer and communications systems, and as such include a fair computer and communications systems, and as such include a fair
amount of flexibility. They are particularly intended for the amount of flexibility. They are particularly intended for the
protection of sensitive information such as private keys, as in PKCS protection of sensitive information such as private keys, as in PKCS
#8 [25]. It is expected that application standards and implementation #8 [25]. It is expected that application standards and implementation
profiles based on these specifications may include additional profiles based on these specifications may include additional
constraints. constraints.
Other cryptographic techniques based on passwords, such as Other cryptographic techniques based on passwords, such as password-
password-based key entity authentication and key establishment based key entity authentication and key establishment protocols
protocols [4][5][26] are outside the scope of this document. [4][5][26] are outside the scope of this document. Guidelines for the
Guidelines for the selection of passwords are also outside the scope. selection of passwords are also outside the scope.
This document supersedes PKCS #5 version 1.5 [24], but includes This document supersedes PKCS #5 version 1.5 [24], but includes
compatible techniques. compatible techniques.
2. Notation 2. Notation
C ciphertext, an octet string C ciphertext, an octet string
c iteration count, a positive integer c iteration count, a positive integer
DK derived key, an octet string DK derived key, an octet string
dkLen length in octets of derived key, a positive integer dkLen length in octets of derived key, a positive integer
EM encoded message, an octet string EM encoded message, an octet string
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Hash underlying hash function Hash underlying hash function
hLen length in octets of pseudorandom function output, a positive hLen length in octets of pseudorandom function output, a positive
integer integer
l length in blocks of derived key, a positive integer l length in blocks of derived key, a positive integer
IV initialization vector, an octet string IV initialization vector, an octet string
K encryption key, an octet string K encryption key, an octet string
KDF key derivation function KDF key derivation function
M message, an octet string M message, an octet string
P password, an octet string P password, an octet string
PRF underlying pseudorandom function PRF underlying pseudorandom function
PS padding string, an octet string PS padding string, an octet string
psLen length in octets of padding string, a positive integer psLen length in octets of padding string, a positive integer
S salt, an octet string S salt, an octet string
T message authentication code, an octet string T message authentication code, an octet string
T1, ..., Tl, U1, ..., Uc T_1, ..., T_l, U_1, ..., U_c
intermediate values, octet strings intermediate values, octet strings
01, 02, ..., 08 01, 02, ..., 08
octets with value 1, 2, ..., 8 octets with value 1, 2, ..., 8
\xor bit-wise exclusive-or of two octet strings \xor bit-wise exclusive-or of two octet strings
|| || octet length operator || || octet length operator
|| concatenation operator || concatenation operator
<i..j> substring extraction operator: extracts octets i through j, <i..j> substring extraction operator: extracts octets i through j,
0 <= i <= j 0 <= i <= j
3. Overview 3. Overview
In many applications of public-key cryptography, user security is In many applications of public-key cryptography, user security is
ultimately dependent on one or more secret text values or passwords. ultimately dependent on one or more secret text values or passwords.
Since a password is not directly applicable as a key to any Since a password is not directly applicable as a key to any
conventional cryptosystem, however, some processing of the password conventional cryptosystem, however, some processing of the password
is required to perform cryptographic operations with it. Moreover, as is required to perform cryptographic operations with it. Moreover, as
passwords are often chosen from a relatively small space, special passwords are often chosen from a relatively small space, special
care is required in that processing to defend against search attacks. care is required in that processing to defend against search attacks.
A general approach to password-based cryptography, as described by A general approach to password-based cryptography, as described by
Morris and Thompson [8] for the protection of password tables, is to Morris and Thompson [8] for the protection of password tables, is to
combine a password with a salt to produce a key. The salt can be combine a password with a salt to produce a key. The salt can be
viewed as an index into a large set of keys derived from the viewed as an index into a large set of keys derived from the
password, and need not be kept secret. Although it may be possible password, and need not be kept secret. Although it may be possible
for an opponent to construct a table of possible passwords (a for an opponent to construct a table of possible passwords (a so-
so-called "dictionary attack"), constructing a table of possible keys called "dictionary attack"), constructing a table of possible keys
will be difficult, since there will be many possible keys for each will be difficult, since there will be many possible keys for each
password. An opponent will thus be limited to searching through password. An opponent will thus be limited to searching through
passwords separately for each salt. passwords separately for each salt.
Another approach to password-based cryptography is to construct key Another approach to password-based cryptography is to construct key
derivation techniques that are relatively expensive, thereby derivation techniques that are relatively expensive, thereby
increasing the cost of exhaustive search. One way to do this is to increasing the cost of exhaustive search. One way to do this is to
include an iteration count in the key derivation technique, include an iteration count in the key derivation technique,
indicating how many times to iterate some underlying function by indicating how many times to iterate some underlying function by
which keys are derived. A modest number of iterations, say 1000, is which keys are derived. A modest number of iterations, say 1000, is
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encryption in PKCS #5 v1.5, and adopted here as well for the various encryption in PKCS #5 v1.5, and adopted here as well for the various
cryptographic operations. Thus, password-based key derivation as cryptographic operations. Thus, password-based key derivation as
defined here is a function of a password, a salt, and an iteration defined here is a function of a password, a salt, and an iteration
count, where the latter two quantities need not be kept secret. count, where the latter two quantities need not be kept secret.
From a password-based key derivation function, it is straightforward From a password-based key derivation function, it is straightforward
to define password-based encryption and message authentication to define password-based encryption and message authentication
schemes. As in PKCS #5 v1.5, the password-based encryption schemes schemes. As in PKCS #5 v1.5, the password-based encryption schemes
here are based on an underlying, conventional encryption scheme, here are based on an underlying, conventional encryption scheme,
where the key for the conventional scheme is derived from the where the key for the conventional scheme is derived from the
password. Similarly, the password-based message authentication password. Similarly, the password-based message authentication scheme
scheme is based on an underlying conventional scheme. This two- is based on an underlying conventional scheme. This two- layered
layered approach makes the password-based techniques modular in terms approach makes the password-based techniques modular in terms of the
of the underlying techniques they can be based on. underlying techniques they can be based on.
It is expected that the password-based key derivation functions may It is expected that the password-based key derivation functions may
find other applications than just the encryption and message find other applications than just the encryption and message
authentication schemes defined here. For instance, one might derive authentication schemes defined here. For instance, one might derive a
a set of keys with a single application of a key derivation function, set of keys with a single application of a key derivation function,
rather than derive each key with a separate application of the rather than derive each key with a separate application of the
function. The keys in the set would be obtained as substrings of the function. The keys in the set would be obtained as substrings of the
output of the key derivation function. This approach might be output of the key derivation function. This approach might be
employed as part of key establishment in a session-oriented protocol. employed as part of key establishment in a session-oriented protocol.
Another application is password checking, where the output of the key Another application is password checking, where the output of the key
derivation function is stored (along with the salt and iteration derivation function is stored (along with the salt and iteration
count) for the purposes of subsequent verification of a password. count) for the purposes of subsequent verification of a password.
Throughout this document, a password is considered to be an octet Throughout this document, a password is considered to be an octet
string of arbitrary length whose interpretation as a text string is string of arbitrary length whose interpretation as a text string is
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Another application is password checking, where the output of the key Another application is password checking, where the output of the key
derivation function is stored (along with the salt and iteration derivation function is stored (along with the salt and iteration
count) for the purposes of subsequent verification of a password. count) for the purposes of subsequent verification of a password.
Throughout this document, a password is considered to be an octet Throughout this document, a password is considered to be an octet
string of arbitrary length whose interpretation as a text string is string of arbitrary length whose interpretation as a text string is
unspecified. In the interest of interoperability, however, it is unspecified. In the interest of interoperability, however, it is
recommended that applications follow some common text encoding rules. recommended that applications follow some common text encoding rules.
ASCII and UTF-8 [27] are two possibilities. (ASCII is a subset of ASCII and UTF-8 [27] are two possibilities. (ASCII is a subset of
UTF-8.) UTF-8.)
Although the selection of passwords is outside the scope of this Although the selection of passwords is outside the scope of this
document, guidelines have been published [17] that may well be taken document, guidelines have been published [17] that may well be taken
into account. into account.
4. Salt and iteration count 4. Salt and iteration count
Inasmuch as salt and iteration count are central to the techniques Inasmuch as salt and iteration count are central to the techniques
defined in this document, some further discussion is warranted. defined in this document, some further discussion is warranted.
4.1 Salt 4.1 Salt
A salt in password-based cryptography has traditionally served the A salt in password-based cryptography has traditionally served the
purpose of producing a large set of keys corresponding to a given purpose of producing a large set of keys corresponding to a given
password, among which one is selected at random according to the password, among which one is selected at random according to the
salt. An individual key in the set is selected by applying a key salt. An individual key in the set is selected by applying a key
derivation function KDF, as derivation function KDF, as
DK = KDF (P, S) DK = KDF (P, S)
where DK is the derived key, P is the password, and S is the salt. where DK is the derived key, P is the password, and S is the salt.
This has two benefits: This has two benefits:
1. It is difficult for an opponent to precompute all the keys 1. It is difficult for an opponent to precompute all the keys
corresponding to a dictionary of passwords, or even the corresponding to a dictionary of passwords, or even the
most likely keys. If the salt is 64 bits long, for most likely keys. If the salt is 64 bits long, for
instance, there will be as many as 2^64 keys for each instance, there will be as many as 2^64 keys for each
password. An opponent is thus limited to searching for password. An opponent is thus limited to searching for
passwords after a password-based operation has been passwords after a password-based operation has been
performed and the salt is known. performed and the salt is known.
2. It is unlikely that the same key will be selected twice. 2. It is unlikely that the same key will be selected twice.
Again, if the salt is 64 bits long, the chance of Again, if the salt is 64 bits long, the chance of
"collision" between keys does not become significant until "collision" between keys does not become significant until
about 2^32 keys have been produced, according to the about 2^32 keys have been produced, according to the
Birthday Paradox. This addresses some of the concerns about Birthday Paradox. This addresses some of the concerns about
interactions between multiple uses of the same key, which interactions between multiple uses of the same key, which
may apply for some encryption and authentication may apply for some encryption and authentication
techniques. techniques.
In password-based encryption, the party encrypting a message can gain In password-based encryption, the party encrypting a message can gain
assurance that these benefits are realized simply by selecting a assurance that these benefits are realized simply by selecting a
large and sufficiently random salt when deriving an encryption key large and sufficiently random salt when deriving an encryption key
from a password. A party generating a message authentication code from a password. A party generating a message authentication code can
can gain such assurance in a similar fashion. gain such assurance in a similar fashion.
The party decrypting a message or verifying a message authentication The party decrypting a message or verifying a message authentication
code, however, cannot be sure that a salt supplied by another party code, however, cannot be sure that a salt supplied by another party
has actually been generated at random. It is possible, for instance, has actually been generated at random. It is possible, for instance,
that the salt may have been copied from another password-based that the salt may have been copied from another password-based
operation, in an attempt to exploit interactions between multiple operation, in an attempt to exploit interactions between multiple
uses of the same key. For instance, suppose two legitimate parties uses of the same key. For instance, suppose two legitimate parties
exchange a encrypted message, where the encryption key is an 80-bit exchange a encrypted message, where the encryption key is an 80-bit
key derived from a shared password with some salt. An opponent could key derived from a shared password with some salt. An opponent could
take the salt from that encryption and provide it to one of the take the salt from that encryption and provide it to one of the
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To defend against such attacks, either the interaction between To defend against such attacks, either the interaction between
multiple uses of the same key should be carefully analyzed, or the multiple uses of the same key should be carefully analyzed, or the
salt should contain data that explicitly distinguishes between salt should contain data that explicitly distinguishes between
different operations. For instance, the salt might have an different operations. For instance, the salt might have an
additional, non-random octet that specifies whether the derived key additional, non-random octet that specifies whether the derived key
is for encryption, for message authentication, or for some other is for encryption, for message authentication, or for some other
operation. operation.
Based on this, the following is recommended for salt selection: Based on this, the following is recommended for salt selection:
1. If there is no concern about interactions between multiple 1. If there is no concern about interactions between multiple
uses of the same key (or a prefix of that key) with the uses of the same key (or a prefix of that key) with the
password-based encryption and authentication techniques password-based encryption and authentication techniques
supported for a given password, then the salt may be supported for a given password, then the salt may be
generated at random and need not be checked for a generated at random and need not be checked for a
particular format by the party receiving the salt. It particular format by the party receiving the salt. It
should be at least eight octets (64 bits) long. should be at least eight octets (64 bits) long.
2. Otherwise, the salt should contain data that explicitly 2. Otherwise, the salt should contain data that explicitly
distinguishes between different operations and different distinguishes between different operations and different
key lengths, in addition to a random part that is at least key lengths, in addition to a random part that is at least
eight octets long, and this data should be checked or eight octets long, and this data should be checked or
regenerated by the party receiving the salt. For instance, regenerated by the party receiving the salt. For instance,
the salt could have an additional non-random octet that the salt could have an additional non-random octet that
specifies the purpose of the derived key. Alternatively, specifies the purpose of the derived key. Alternatively,
it could be the encoding of a structure that specifies it could be the encoding of a structure that specifies
detailed information about the derived key, such as the detailed information about the derived key, such as the
encryption or authentication technique and a sequence encryption or authentication technique and a sequence
number among the different keys derived from the password. number among the different keys derived from the password.
The particular format of the additional data is left to the The particular format of the additional data is left to the
application. application.
Note. If a random number generator or pseudorandom generator is not Note. If a random number generator or pseudorandom generator is not
available, a deterministic alternative for generating the salt (or available, a deterministic alternative for generating the salt (or
the random part of it) is to apply a password-based key derivation the random part of it) is to apply a password-based key derivation
function to the password and the message M to be processed. For function to the password and the message M to be processed. For
instance, the salt could be computed with a key derivation function instance, the salt could be computed with a key derivation function
as S = KDF (P, M). This approach is not recommended if the message M as S = KDF (P, M). This approach is not recommended if the message M
is known to belong to a small message space (e.g., "Yes" or "No"), is known to belong to a small message space (e.g., "Yes" or "No"),
however, since then there will only be a small number of possible however, since then there will only be a small number of possible
salts. salts.
4.2 Iteration count 4.2 Iteration count
An iteration count has traditionally served the purpose of increasing An iteration count has traditionally served the purpose of increasing
the cost of producing keys from a password, thereby also increasing the cost of producing keys from a password, thereby also increasing
the difficulty of attack. For the methods in this document, a minimum the difficulty of attack. For the methods in this document, a minimum
of 1000 iterations is recommended. This will increase the cost of of 1000 iterations is recommended. This will increase the cost of
exhaustive search for passwords significantly, without a noticeable exhaustive search for passwords significantly, without a noticeable
impact in the cost of deriving individual keys. impact in the cost of deriving individual keys.
5. Key derivation functions 5. Key derivation functions
A key derivation function produces a derived key from a base key and A key derivation function produces a derived key from a base key and
other parameters. In a password-based key derivation function, the other parameters. In a password-based key derivation function, the
base key is a password and the other parameters are a salt value and base key is a password and the other parameters are a salt value and
an iteration count, as outlined in Section 3. an iteration count, as outlined in Section 3.
The primary application of the password-based key derivation The primary application of the password-based key derivation
functions defined here is in the encryption schemes in Section 6 and functions defined here is in the encryption schemes in Section 6 and
the message authentication scheme in Section 7. Other applications the message authentication scheme in Section 7. Other applications
are certainly possible, hence the independent definition of these are certainly possible, hence the independent definition of these
functions. functions.
Two functions are specified in this section: PBKDF1 and PBKDF2. Two functions are specified in this section: PBKDF1 and PBKDF2.
PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications; PBKDF1 is included only PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications; PBKDF1 is included only
for compatibility with existing applications, and is not recommended for compatibility with existing applications, and is not recommended
for new applications. for new applications.
A typical application of the key derivation functions defined here A typical application of the key derivation functions defined here
might include the following steps: might include the following steps:
1. Select a salt S and an iteration count c, as outlined in 1. Select a salt S and an iteration count c, as outlined in
Section 4. Section 4.
2. Select a length in octets for the derived key, dkLen. 2. Select a length in octets for the derived key, dkLen.
3. Apply the key derivation function to the password, the 3. Apply the key derivation function to the password, the
salt, the iteration count and the key length to produce a salt, the iteration count and the key length to produce a
derived key. derived key.
4. Output the derived key. 4. Output the derived key.
Any number of keys may be derived from a password by varying the Any number of keys may be derived from a password by varying the
salt, as described in Section 3. salt, as described in Section 3.
5.1 PBKDF1 5.1 PBKDF1
PBKDF1 applies a hash function, which shall be MD2 [6], MD5 [19] or PBKDF1 applies a hash function, which shall be MD2 [6], MD5 [19] or
SHA-1 [18], to derive keys. The length of the derived key is bounded SHA-1 [18], to derive keys. The length of the derived key is bounded
by the length of the hash function output, which is 16 octets for MD2 by the length of the hash function output, which is 16 octets for MD2
and MD5 and 20 octets for SHA-1. PBKDF1 is compatible with the key and MD5 and 20 octets for SHA-1. PBKDF1 is compatible with the key
derivation process in PKCS #5 v1.5. derivation process in PKCS #5 v1.5.
PBKDF1 is recommended only for compatibility with existing PBKDF1 is recommended only for compatibility with existing
applications since the keys it produces may not be large enough for applications since the keys it produces may not be large enough for
some applications. some applications.
PBKDF1 (P, S, c, dkLen) PBKDF1 (P, S, c, dkLen)
Options: Hash underlying hash function Options: Hash underlying hash function
Input: P password, an octet string Input: P password, an octet string
S salt, an eight-octet string S salt, an eight-octet string
c iteration count, a positive integer c iteration count, a positive integer
dkLen intended length in octets of derived key, a dkLen intended length in octets of derived key,
positive integer, at most 16 for MD2 or MD5 a positive integer, at most 16 for MD2 or
and 20 for SHA-1 MD5 and 20 for SHA-1
Output: DK derived key, a dkLen-octet string Output: DK derived key, a dkLen-octet string
Steps: Steps:
1. If dkLen > 16 for MD2 and MD5, or dkLen > 20 for SHA-1, output 1. If dkLen > 16 for MD2 and MD5, or dkLen > 20 for SHA-1,
"derived key too long" and stop. output "derived key too long" and stop.
2. Apply the underlying hash function Hash for c iterations to 2. Apply the underlying hash function Hash for c iterations to
the concatenation of the password P and the salt S, then the concatenation of the password P and the salt S, then
extract the first dkLen octets to produce a derived key DK: extract the first dkLen octets to produce a derived key DK:
T1 = Hash (P || S) , T_1 = Hash (P || S) ,
T2 = Hash (T1) , T_2 = Hash (T_1) ,
... ...
Tc = Hash (Tc-1) , T_c = Hash (T_{c-1}) ,
DK = Tc<0..dkLen-1> DK = Tc<0..dkLen-1>
3. Output the derived key DK. 3. Output the derived key DK.
5.2 PBKDF2 5.2 PBKDF2
PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function (see Appendix B.1 for an PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function (see Appendix B.1 for an
example) to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially example) to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially
unbounded. (However, the maximum effective search space for the unbounded. (However, the maximum effective search space for the
derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying
pseudorandom function. See Appendix B.1 for further discussion.) pseudorandom function. See Appendix B.1 for further discussion.)
PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications. PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications.
PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen) PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen)
Options: PRF underlying pseudorandom function (hLen Options: PRF underlying pseudorandom function (hLen
denotes the length in octets of the denotes the length in octets of the
pseudorandom function output) pseudorandom function output)
Input: P password, an octet string Input: P password, an octet string
S salt, an octet string S salt, an octet string
c iteration count, a positive integer c iteration count, a positive integer
dkLen intended length in octets of the derived key, dkLen intended length in octets of the derived
a positive integer, at most key, a positive integer, at most
(2^32 - 1) * hLen (2^32 - 1) * hLen
Output: DK derived key, a dkLen-octet string Output: DK derived key, a dkLen-octet string
Steps: Steps:
1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * hLen, output "derived key too long" 1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * hLen, output "derived key too long"
and stop. and stop.
2. Let l be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key, 2. Let l be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key,
rounding up, and let r be the number of octets in the last rounding up, and let r be the number of octets in the last
block: block:
l = [dkLen / hLen] , l = CEIL (dkLen / hLen) ,
r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen . r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen .
3. For each block of the derived key apply the function F defined Here, CEIL (x) is the "ceiling" function, i.e. the smallest
below to the password P, the salt S, the iteration count c, integer greater than, or equal to, x.
and the block index to compute the block:
T1 = F (P, S, c, 1) , 3. For each block of the derived key apply the function F
T2 = F (P, S, c, 2) , defined below to the password P, the salt S, the iteration
... count c, and the block index to compute the block:
Tl = F (P, S, c, l) ,
where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of the T_1 = F (P, S, c, 1) ,
first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function PRF T_2 = F (P, S, c, 2) ,
applied to the password P and the concatenation of the salt S ...
and the block index i: T_l = F (P, S, c, l) ,
F (P, S, c, i) = U1 \xor U2 \xor ... \xor Uc where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of
the first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function
PRF applied to the password P and the concatenation of the
salt S and the block index i:
where F (P, S, c, i) = U_1 \xor U_2 \xor ... \xor U_c
U1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) , where
U2 = PRF (P, U1) ,
...
Uc = PRF (P, Uc-1) .
Here, INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most U_1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) ,
significant octet first. U_2 = PRF (P, U_1) ,
...
U_c = PRF (P, U_{c-1}) .
4. Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dkLen octets to Here, INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most
produce a derived key DK: significant octet first.
DK = T1 || T2 || ... || Tl<0..r-1> 4. Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dkLen octets to
produce a derived key DK:
5. Output the derived key DK. DK = T_1 || T_2 || ... || T_l<0..r-1>
5. Output the derived key DK.
Note. The construction of the function F follows a "belt-and- Note. The construction of the function F follows a "belt-and-
suspenders" approach. The iterates Ui are computed recursively to suspenders" approach. The iterates U_i are computed recursively to
remove a degree of parallelism from an opponent; they are remove a degree of parallelism from an opponent; they are exclusive-
exclusive-ored together to reduce concerns about the recursion ored together to reduce concerns about the recursion degenerating
degenerating into a small set of values. into a small set of values.
6. Encryption schemes 6. Encryption schemes
An encryption scheme, in the symmetric setting, consists of an An encryption scheme, in the symmetric setting, consists of an
encryption operation and a decryption operation, where the encryption encryption operation and a decryption operation, where the encryption
operation produces a ciphertext from a message under a key, and the operation produces a ciphertext from a message under a key, and the
decryption operation recovers the message from the ciphertext under decryption operation recovers the message from the ciphertext under
the same key. In a password-based encryption scheme, the key is a the same key. In a password-based encryption scheme, the key is a
password. password.
A typical application of a password-based encryption scheme is a A typical application of a password-based encryption scheme is a
private-key protection method, where the message contains private-key private-key protection method, where the message contains private-key
information, as in PKCS #8. The encryption schemes defined here would information, as in PKCS #8. The encryption schemes defined here would
be suitable encryption algorithms in that context. be suitable encryption algorithms in that context.
Two schemes are specified in this section: PBES1 and PBES2. PBES2 is Two schemes are specified in this section: PBES1 and PBES2. PBES2 is
recommended for new applications; PBES1 is included only for recommended for new applications; PBES1 is included only for
compatibility with existing applications, and is not recommended compatibility with existing applications, and is not recommended for
for new applications. new applications.
6.1 PBES1 6.1 PBES1
PBES1 combines the PBKDF1 function (Section 5.1) with an underlying PBES1 combines the PBKDF1 function (Section 5.1) with an underlying
block cipher, which shall be either DES [15] or RC2TM [21] in CBC block cipher, which shall be either DES [15] or RC2(tm) [21] in CBC
mode [16]. PBES1 is compatible with the encryption scheme in PKCS #5 mode [16]. PBES1 is compatible with the encryption scheme in PKCS #5
v1.5. v1.5.
PBES1 is recommended only for compatibility with existing PBES1 is recommended only for compatibility with existing
applications, since it supports only two underlying encryption applications, since it supports only two underlying encryption
schemes, each of which has a key size (56 or 64 bits) that may not be schemes, each of which has a key size (56 or 64 bits) that may not be
large enough for some applications. large enough for some applications.
6.1.1 Encryption operation 6.1.1 Encryption operation
The encryption operation for PBES1 consists of the following steps, The encryption operation for PBES1 consists of the following steps,
which encrypt a message M under a password P to produce a ciphertext which encrypt a message M under a password P to produce a ciphertext
C: C:
1. Select an eight-octet salt S and an iteration count c, as 1. Select an eight-octet salt S and an iteration count c, as
outlined in Section 4. outlined in Section 4.
2. Apply the PBKDF1 key derivation function (Section 5.1) to the 2. Apply the PBKDF1 key derivation function (Section 5.1) to the
password P, the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a password P, the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce
derived key DK of length 16 octets: at derived key DK of length 16 octets:
DK = PBKDF1 (P, S, c, 16) . DK = PBKDF1 (P, S, c, 16) .
3. Separate the derived key DK into an encryption key K 3. Separate the derived key DK into an encryption key K
consisting of the first eight octets of DK and an consisting of the first eight octets of DK and an
initialization vector IV consisting of the next eight octets: initialization vector IV consisting of the next eight octets:
K = DK<0..7> , K = DK<0..7> ,
IV = DK<8..15> . IV = DK<8..15> .
4. Concatenate M and a padding string PS to form an encoded 4. Concatenate M and a padding string PS to form an encoded
message EM: message EM:
EM = M || PS , EM = M || PS ,
where the padding string PS consists of 8-(||M|| mod 8) where the padding string PS consists of 8-(||M|| mod 8)
octets each with value 8-(||M|| mod 8). The padding string PS octets each with value 8-(||M|| mod 8). The padding string PS
will satisfy one of the following statements: will satisfy one of the following statements:
PS = 01, if ||M|| mod 8 = 7 ; PS = 01, if ||M|| mod 8 = 7 ;
PS = 02 02, if ||M|| mod 8 = 6 ; PS = 02 02, if ||M|| mod 8 = 6 ;
... ...
PS = 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08, if ||M|| mod 8 = 0. PS = 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 08, if ||M|| mod 8 = 0.
The length in octets of the encoded message will be a multiple The length in octets of the encoded message will be a
of eight and it will be possible to recover the message M multiple of eight and it will be possible to recover the
unambiguously from the encoded message. (This padding rule is message M unambiguously from the encoded message. (This
taken from RFC 1423 [3].) padding rule is taken from RFC 1423 [3].)
5. Encrypt the encoded message EM with the underlying block 5. Encrypt the encoded message EM with the underlying block
cipher (DES or RC2) in cipher block chaining mode under the cipher (DES or RC2) in cipher block chaining mode under the
encryption key K with initialization vector IV to produce the encryption key K with initialization vector IV to produce the
ciphertext C. For DES, the key K shall be considered as a ciphertext C. For DES, the key K shall be considered as a
64-bit encoding of a 56-bit DES key with parity bits ignored 64-bit encoding of a 56-bit DES key with parity bits ignored
(see [9]). For RC2, the "effective key bits" shall be 64 bits. (see [9]). For RC2, the "effective key bits" shall be 64
bits.
6. Output the ciphertext C. 6. Output the ciphertext C.
The salt S and the iteration count c may be conveyed to the party The salt S and the iteration count c may be conveyed to the party
performing decryption in an AlgorithmIdentifier value (see Appendix performing decryption in an AlgorithmIdentifier value (see Appendix
A.3). A.3).
6.1.2 Decryption operation 6.1.2 Decryption operation
The decryption operation for PBES1 consists of the following steps, The decryption operation for PBES1 consists of the following steps,
which decrypt a ciphertext C under a password P to recover a message which decrypt a ciphertext C under a password P to recover a message
M: M:
1. Obtain the eight-octet salt S and the iteration count c. 1. Obtain the eight-octet salt S and the iteration count c.
2. Apply the PBKDF1 key derivation function (Section 5.1) to the
password P, the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a
derived key DK of length 16 octets:
DK = PBKDF1 (P, S, c, 16) 2. Apply the PBKDF1 key derivation function (Section 5.1) to the
password P, the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce
a derived key DK of length 16 octets:
3. Separate the derived key DK into an encryption key K DK = PBKDF1 (P, S, c, 16)
consisting of the first eight octets of DK and an
initialization vector IV consisting of the next eight octets:
K = DK<0..7> , 3. Separate the derived key DK into an encryption key K
IV = DK<8..15> . consisting of the first eight octets of DK and an
initialization vector IV consisting of the next eight octets:
4. Decrypt the ciphertext C with the underlying block cipher (DES K = DK<0..7> ,
or RC2) in cipher block chaining mode under the encryption key IV = DK<8..15> .
K with initialization vector IV to recover an encoded message
EM. If the length in octets of the ciphertext C is not a
multiple of eight, output "decryption error" and stop.
5. Separate the encoded message EM into a message M and a padding 4. Decrypt the ciphertext C with the underlying block cipher
string PS: (DES or RC2) in cipher block chaining mode under the
encryption key K with initialization vector IV to recover an
encoded message EM. If the length in octets of the ciphertext
C is not a multiple of eight, output "decryption error" and
stop.
EM = M || PS , 5. Separate the encoded message EM into a message M and a
padding string PS:
where the padding string PS consists of some number psLen EM = M || PS ,
octets each with value psLen, where psLen is between 1 and 8.
If it is not possible to separate the encoded message EM in
this manner, output "decryption error" and stop.
6. Output the recovered message M. where the padding string PS consists of some number psLen
octets each with value psLen, where psLen is between 1 and 8.
If it is not possible to separate the encoded message EM in
this manner, output "decryption error" and stop.
6.2 PBES2 6. Output the recovered message M.
6.2 PBES2
PBES2 combines a password-based key derivation function, which shall PBES2 combines a password-based key derivation function, which shall
be PBKDF2 (Section 5.2) for this version of PKCS #5, with an be PBKDF2 (Section 5.2) for this version of PKCS #5, with an
underlying encryption scheme (see Appendix B.2 for examples). The key underlying encryption scheme (see Appendix B.2 for examples). The key
length and any other parameters for the underlying encryption scheme length and any other parameters for the underlying encryption scheme
depend on the scheme. depend on the scheme.
PBES2 is recommended for new applications. PBES2 is recommended for new applications.
6.2.1 Encryption operation 6.2.1 Encryption operation
The encryption operation for PBES2 consists of the following steps, The encryption operation for PBES2 consists of the following steps,
which encrypt a message M under a password P to produce a ciphertext which encrypt a message M under a password P to produce a ciphertext
C, applying a selected key derivation function KDF and a selected C, applying a selected key derivation function KDF and a selected
underlying encryption scheme: underlying encryption scheme:
1. Select a salt S and an iteration count c, as outlined in 1. Select a salt S and an iteration count c, as outlined in
Section 4. Section 4.
2. Select the length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key for 2. Select the length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key for
the underlying encryption scheme. the underlying encryption scheme.
3. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P, 3. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P,
the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived
DK of length dkLen octets: key DK of length dkLen octets:
DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) . DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) .
4. Encrypt the message M with the underlying encryption scheme 4. Encrypt the message M with the underlying encryption scheme
under the derived key DK to produce a ciphertext C. (This under the derived key DK to produce a ciphertext C. (This
step may involve selection of parameters such as an step may involve selection of parameters such as an
initialization vector and padding, depending on the underlying initialization vector and padding, depending on the
scheme.) underlying scheme.)
5. Output the ciphertext C. 5. Output the ciphertext C.
The salt S, the iteration count c, the key length dkLen, and The salt S, the iteration count c, the key length dkLen, and
identifiers for the key derivation function and the underlying identifiers for the key derivation function and the underlying
encryption scheme may be conveyed to the party performing decryption encryption scheme may be conveyed to the party performing decryption
in an AlgorithmIdentifier value (see Appendix A.4). in an AlgorithmIdentifier value (see Appendix A.4).
6.2.2 Decryption operation 6.2.2 Decryption operation
The decryption operation for PBES2 consists of the following steps, The decryption operation for PBES2 consists of the following steps,
which decrypt a ciphertext C under a password P to recover a message which decrypt a ciphertext C under a password P to recover a message
M: M:
1. Obtain the salt S for the operation. 1. Obtain the salt S for the operation.
2. Obtain the iteration count c for the key derivation function. 2. Obtain the iteration count c for the key derivation function.
3. Obtain the key length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key 3. Obtain the key length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key
for the underlying encryption scheme. for the underlying encryption scheme.
4. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P, 4. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P,
the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived
DK of length dkLen octets: key DK of length dkLen octets:
DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) . DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) .
5. Decrypt the ciphertext C with the underlying encryption scheme 5. Decrypt the ciphertext C with the underlying encryption
under the derived key DK to recover a message M. If the scheme under the derived key DK to recover a message M. If
decryption function outputs "decryption error," then output the decryption function outputs "decryption error," then
"decryption error" and stop. output "decryption error" and stop.
6. Output the recovered message M. 6. Output the recovered message M.
7. Message authentication schemes 7. Message authentication schemes
A message authentication scheme consists of a MAC (message A message authentication scheme consists of a MAC (message
authentication code) generation operation and a MAC verification authentication code) generation operation and a MAC verification
operation, where the MAC generation operation produces a message operation, where the MAC generation operation produces a message
authentication code from a message under a key, and the MAC authentication code from a message under a key, and the MAC
verification operation verifies the message authentication code verification operation verifies the message authentication code under
under the same key. In a password-based message authentication the same key. In a password-based message authentication scheme, the
scheme, the key is a password. key is a password.
One scheme is specified in this section: PBMAC1. One scheme is specified in this section: PBMAC1.
7.1 PBMAC1 7.1 PBMAC1
PBMAC1 combines a password-based key derivation function, which PBMAC1 combines a password-based key derivation function, which shall
shall be PBKDF2 (Section 5.2) for this version of PKCS #5, with an be PBKDF2 (Section 5.2) for this version of PKCS #5, with an
underlying message authentication scheme (see Appendix B.3 for an underlying message authentication scheme (see Appendix B.3 for an
example). The key length and any other parameters for the underlying example). The key length and any other parameters for the underlying
message authentication scheme depend on the scheme. message authentication scheme depend on the scheme.
7.1.1 MAC generation 7.1.1 MAC generation
The MAC generation operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following The MAC generation operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following
steps, which process a message M under a password P to generate a steps, which process a message M under a password P to generate a
message authentication code T, applying a selected key derivation message authentication code T, applying a selected key derivation
function KDF and a selected underlying message authentication scheme: function KDF and a selected underlying message authentication scheme:
1. Select a salt S and an iteration count c, as outlined in 1. Select a salt S and an iteration count c, as outlined in
Section 4. Section 4.
2. Select a key length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key for 2. Select a key length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key for
the underlying message authentication function. the underlying message authentication function.
3. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P, 3. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P,
the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived
DK of length dkLen octets: key DK of length dkLen octets:
DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) . DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) .
4. Process the message M with the underlying message 4. Process the message M with the underlying message
authentication scheme under the derived key DK to generate a authentication scheme under the derived key DK to generate a
message authentication code T. message authentication code T.
5. Output the message authentication code T. 5. Output the message authentication code T.
The salt S, the iteration count c, the key length dkLen, and The salt S, the iteration count c, the key length dkLen, and
identifiers for the key derivation function and underlying message identifiers for the key derivation function and underlying message
authentication scheme may be conveyed to the party performing authentication scheme may be conveyed to the party performing
verification in an AlgorithmIdentifier value (see Appendix A.5). verification in an AlgorithmIdentifier value (see Appendix A.5).
7.1.2 MAC verification 7.1.2 MAC verification
The MAC verification operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following The MAC verification operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following
steps, which process a message M under a password P to verify a steps, which process a message M under a password P to verify a
message authentication code T: message authentication code T:
1. Obtain the salt S and the iteration count c. 1. Obtain the salt S and the iteration count c.
2. Obtain the key length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key 2. Obtain the key length in octets, dkLen, for the derived key
for the underlying message authentication scheme. for the underlying message authentication scheme.
3. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P, 3. Apply the selected key derivation function to the password P,
the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived key the salt S, and the iteration count c to produce a derived
DK of length dkLen octets: key DK of length dkLen octets:
DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) . DK = KDF (P, S, c, dkLen) .
4. Process the message M with the underlying message 4. Process the message M with the underlying message
authentication scheme under the derived key DK to verify the authentication scheme under the derived key DK to verify the
message authentication code T. message authentication code T.
5. If the message authentication code verifies, output "correct"; 5. If the message authentication code verifies, output
else output "incorrect." "correct"; else output "incorrect."
8. Security Considerations
Password-based cryptography is generally limited in the security that
it can provide, particularly for methods such as those defined in
this document where off-line password search is possible. While the
use of salt and iteration count can increase the complexity of attack
(see Section 4 for recommendations), it is essential that passwords
are selected well, and relevant guidelines (e.g., [17]) should be
taken into account. It is also important that passwords be protected
well if stored.
In general, different keys should be derived from a password for
different uses to minimize the possibility of unintended
interactions. For password-based encryption with a single algorithm,
a random salt is sufficient to ensure that different keys will be
produced. In certain other situations, as outlined in Section 4, a
structured salt is necessary. The recommendations in Section 4 should
thus be taken into account when selecting the salt value.
9. Author's Address
Burt Kaliski
RSA Laboratories
20 Crosby Drive
Bedford, MA 01730 USA
Email: bkaliski@rsasecurity.com
APPENDICES APPENDICES
A. ASN.1 syntax A. ASN.1 syntax
This section defines ASN.1 syntax for the key derivation functions, This section defines ASN.1 syntax for the key derivation functions,
the encryption schemes, the message authentication scheme, and the encryption schemes, the message authentication scheme, and
supporting techniques. The intended application of these definitions supporting techniques. The intended application of these definitions
includes PKCS #8 and other syntax for key management, encrypted data, includes PKCS #8 and other syntax for key management, encrypted data,
and integrity-protected data. (Various aspects of ASN.1 are specified and integrity-protected data. (Various aspects of ASN.1 are specified
in several ISO/IEC standards [9][10][11][12][13][14].) in several ISO/IEC standards [9][10][11][12][13][14].)
The object identifier pkcs-5 identifies the arc of the OID tree from The object identifier pkcs-5 identifies the arc of the OID tree from
which the PKCS #5-specific OIDs in this section are derived: which the PKCS #5-specific OIDs in this section are derived:
rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549}
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549} pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 1}
pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 1} pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs 5}
pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs 5}
A.1 PBKDF1 A.1 PBKDF1
No object identifier is given for PBKDF1, as the object identifiers No object identifier is given for PBKDF1, as the object identifiers
for PBES1 are sufficient for existing applications and PBKDF2 is for PBES1 are sufficient for existing applications and PBKDF2 is
recommended for new applications. recommended for new applications.
A.2 PBKDF2 A.2 PBKDF2
The object identifier id-PBKDF2 identifies the PBKDF2 key derivation The object identifier id-PBKDF2 identifies the PBKDF2 key derivation
function (Section 5.2). function (Section 5.2).
id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12} id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12}
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBKDF2-params: AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBKDF2-params:
PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE { PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
salt CHOICE { salt CHOICE {
specified OCTET STRING, specified OCTET STRING,
otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-SaltSources}} otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-SaltSources}}
}, },
iterationCount INTEGER (1..MAX), iterationCount INTEGER (1..MAX),
keyLength INTEGER (1..MAX) OPTIONAL, keyLength INTEGER (1..MAX) OPTIONAL,
prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} DEFAULT prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} DEFAULT
algid-hmacWithSHA1 } algid-hmacWithSHA1 }
The fields of type PKDF2-params have the following meanings: The fields of type PKDF2-params have the following meanings:
- salt specifies the salt value, or the source of the salt value. - salt specifies the salt value, or the source of the salt value.
It shall either be an octet string or an algorithm ID with an OID It shall either be an octet string or an algorithm ID with an OID
in the set PBKDF2-SaltSources, which is reserved for future in the set PBKDF2-SaltSources, which is reserved for future
versions of PKCS #5. versions of PKCS #5.
The salt-source approach is intended to indicate how the salt The salt-source approach is intended to indicate how the salt
value is to be generated as a function of parameters in the value is to be generated as a function of parameters in the
algorithm ID, application data, or both. For instance, it may algorithm ID, application data, or both. For instance, it may
indicate that the salt value is produced from the encoding of indicate that the salt value is produced from the encoding of
a structure that specifies detailed information about the derived a structure that specifies detailed information about the derived
key as suggested in Section 4.1. Some of the information may be key as suggested in Section 4.1. Some of the information may be
carried elsewhere, e.g., in the encryption algorithm ID. However, carried elsewhere, e.g., in the encryption algorithm ID. However,
such facilities are deferred to a future version of PKCS #5. such facilities are deferred to a future version of PKCS #5.
In this version, an application may achieve the benefits In this version, an application may achieve the benefits
mentioned in Section 4.1 by choosing a particular interpretation mentioned in Section 4.1 by choosing a particular interpretation
of the salt value in the specified alternative. of the salt value in the specified alternative.
PBKDF2-SaltSources ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... } PBKDF2-SaltSources ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }
- iterationCount specifies the iteration count. The maximum - iterationCount specifies the iteration count. The maximum
iteration count allowed depends on the implementation. It is iteration count allowed depends on the implementation. It is
expected that implementation profiles may further constrain the expected that implementation profiles may further constrain the
bounds. bounds.
- keyLength, an optional field, is the length in octets of the - keyLength, an optional field, is the length in octets of the
derived key. The maximum key length allowed depends on the derived key. The maximum key length allowed depends on the
implementation; it is expected that implementation profiles may implementation; it is expected that implementation profiles may
further constrain the bounds. The field is provided for further constrain the bounds. The field is provided for
skipping to change at page 18, line 47 skipping to change at page 19, line 42
protected. If there is concern about interaction between protected. If there is concern about interaction between
operations with different key lengths for a given salt (see operations with different key lengths for a given salt (see
Section 4.1), the salt should distinguishes among the different Section 4.1), the salt should distinguishes among the different
key lengths. key lengths.
- prf identifies the underlying pseudorandom function. It shall be - prf identifies the underlying pseudorandom function. It shall be
an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PBKDF2-PRFs, which for an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PBKDF2-PRFs, which for
this version of PKCS #5 shall consist of id-hmacWithSHA1 (see this version of PKCS #5 shall consist of id-hmacWithSHA1 (see
Appendix B.1.1) and any other OIDs defined by the application. Appendix B.1.1) and any other OIDs defined by the application.
PBKDF2-PRFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= PBKDF2-PRFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA1}, ... } { {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA1}, ... }
The default pseudorandom function is HMAC-SHA-1: The default pseudorandom function is HMAC-SHA-1:
algid-hmacWithSHA1 AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} ::= algid-hmacWithSHA1 AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} ::=
{algorithm id-hmacWithSHA1, parameters NULL : NULL} {algorithm id-hmacWithSHA1, parameters NULL : NULL}
A.3 PBES1 A.3 PBES1
Different object identifiers identify the PBES1 encryption scheme Different object identifiers identify the PBES1 encryption scheme
(Section 6.1) according to the underlying hash function in the key (Section 6.1) according to the underlying hash function in the key
derivation function and the underlying block cipher, as summarized derivation function and the underlying block cipher, as summarized in
in the following table: the following table:
Hash Function Block Cipher OID Hash Function Block Cipher OID
MD2 DES pkcs-5.1 MD2 DES pkcs-5.1
MD2 RC2 pkcs-5.4 MD2 RC2 pkcs-5.4
MD5 DES pkcs-5.3 MD5 DES pkcs-5.3
MD5 RC2 pkcs-5.6 MD5 RC2 pkcs-5.6
SHA-1 DES pkcs-5.10 SHA-1 DES pkcs-5.10
SHA-1 RC2 pkcs-5.11 SHA-1 RC2 pkcs-5.11
pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1} pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1}
pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4} pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4}
pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3} pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3}
pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6} pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6}
pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10} pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10}
pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11} pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11}
For each OID, the parameters field associated with the OID in an For each OID, the parameters field associated with the OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBEParameter: AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBEParameter:
PBEParameter ::= SEQUENCE { PBEParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)), salt OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)),
iterationCount INTEGER } iterationCount INTEGER }
The fields of type PBEParameter have the following meanings: The fields of type PBEParameter have the following meanings:
- salt specifies the salt value, an eight-octet string. - salt specifies the salt value, an eight-octet string.
- iterationCount specifies the iteration count. - iterationCount specifies the iteration count.
A.4 PBES2 A.4 PBES2
The object identifier id-PBES2 identifies the PBES2 encryption The object identifier id-PBES2 identifies the PBES2 encryption scheme
scheme (Section 6.2). (Section 6.2).
id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13} id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13}
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBES2-params: AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBES2-params:
PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE { PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}}, keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}},
encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}} } encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}} }
The fields of type PBES2-params have the following meanings: The fields of type PBES2-params have the following meanings:
- keyDerivationFunc identifies the underlying key derivation - keyDerivationFunc identifies the underlying key derivation
function. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set function. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set
PBES2-KDFs, which for this version of PKCS #5 shall consist of PBES2-KDFs, which for this version of PKCS #5 shall consist of
id-PBKDF2 (Appendix A.2). id-PBKDF2 (Appendix A.2).
PBES2-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= PBES2-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... } { {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... }
- encryptionScheme identifies the underlying encryption scheme. It - encryptionScheme identifies the underlying encryption scheme. It
shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PBES2-Encs, whose shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PBES2-Encs, whose
definition is left to the application. Example underlying definition is left to the application. Example underlying
encryption schemes are given in Appendix B.2. encryption schemes are given in Appendix B.2.
PBES2-Encs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... } PBES2-Encs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }
A.5 PBMAC1 A.5 PBMAC1
The object identifier id-PBMAC1 identifies the PBMAC1 message The object identifier id-PBMAC1 identifies the PBMAC1 message
authentication scheme (Section 7.1). authentication scheme (Section 7.1).
id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14} id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14}
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBMAC1-params: AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBMAC1-params:
PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE { PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE {
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-KDFs}}, keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-KDFs}},
messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-MACs}} } messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-MACs}} }
The keyDerivationFunc field has the same meaning as the corresponding The keyDerivationFunc field has the same meaning as the corresponding
field of PBES2-params (Appendix A.4) except that the set of OIDs is field of PBES2-params (Appendix A.4) except that the set of OIDs is
PBMAC1-KDFs. PBMAC1-KDFs.
PBMAC1-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= PBMAC1-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... } { {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... }
The messageAuthScheme field identifies the underlying message The messageAuthScheme field identifies the underlying message
authentication scheme. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the authentication scheme. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the
set PBMAC1-MACs, whose definition is left to the application. Example set PBMAC1-MACs, whose definition is left to the application. Example
underlying encryption schemes are given in Appendix B.3. underlying encryption schemes are given in Appendix B.3.
PBMAC1-MACs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... } PBMAC1-MACs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }
B. Supporting techniques B. Supporting techniques
This section gives several examples of underlying functions and This section gives several examples of underlying functions and
schemes supporting the password-based schemes in Sections 5, 6 and 7. schemes supporting the password-based schemes in Sections 5, 6 and 7.
While these supporting techniques are appropriate for applications to While these supporting techniques are appropriate for applications to
implement, none of them is required to be implemented. It is implement, none of them is required to be implemented. It is
expected, however, that profiles for PKCS #5 will be developed that expected, however, that profiles for PKCS #5 will be developed that
specify particular supporting techniques. specify particular supporting techniques.
This section also gives object identifiers for the supporting This section also gives object identifiers for the supporting
techniques. The object identifiers digestAlgorithm and techniques. The object identifiers digestAlgorithm and
encryptionAlgorithm identify the arcs from which certain algorithm encryptionAlgorithm identify the arcs from which certain algorithm
OIDs referenced in this section are derived: OIDs referenced in this section are derived:
digestAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 2} digestAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 2}
encryptionAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 3} encryptionAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 3}
B.1 Pseudorandom functions B.1 Pseudorandom functions
An example pseudorandom function for PBKDF2 (Section 5.2) is An example pseudorandom function for PBKDF2 (Section 5.2) is HMAC-
HMAC-SHA-1. SHA-1.
B.1.1 HMAC-SHA-1 B.1.1 HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-1 is the pseudorandom function corresponding to the HMAC HMAC-SHA-1 is the pseudorandom function corresponding to the HMAC
message authentication code [7] based on the SHA-1 hash function message authentication code [7] based on the SHA-1 hash function
[18]. The pseudorandom function is the same function by which the [18]. The pseudorandom function is the same function by which the
message authentication code is computed, with a full-length output. message authentication code is computed, with a full-length output.
(The first argument to the pseudorandom function PRF serves as HMACĘs (The first argument to the pseudorandom function PRF serves as HMAC's
"key," and the second serves as HMACĘs "text." In the case of PBKDF2, "key," and the second serves as HMAC's "text." In the case of PBKDF2,
the "key" is thus the password and the "text" is the salt.) the "key" is thus the password and the "text" is the salt.) HMAC-
HMAC-SHA-1 has a variable key length and a 20-octet (160-bit) output SHA-1 has a variable key length and a 20-octet (160-bit) output
value. value.
Although the length of the key to HMAC-SHA-1 is essentially Although the length of the key to HMAC-SHA-1 is essentially
unbounded, the effective search space for pseudorandom function unbounded, the effective search space for pseudorandom function
outputs may be limited by the structure of the function. In outputs may be limited by the structure of the function. In
particular, when the key is longer than 512 bits, HMAC-SHA-1 will particular, when the key is longer than 512 bits, HMAC-SHA-1 will
first hash it to 160 bits. Thus, even if a long derived key first hash it to 160 bits. Thus, even if a long derived key
consisting of several pseudorandom function outputs is produced from consisting of several pseudorandom function outputs is produced from
a key, the effective search space for the derived key will be at most a key, the effective search space for the derived key will be at most
160 bits. Although the specific limitation for other key sizes 160 bits. Although the specific limitation for other key sizes
skipping to change at page 22, line 5 skipping to change at page 23, line 10
conservative, that the effective search space is limited to 160 bits conservative, that the effective search space is limited to 160 bits
for other key sizes as well. for other key sizes as well.
(The 160-bit limitation should not generally pose a practical (The 160-bit limitation should not generally pose a practical
limitation in the case of password-based cryptography, since the limitation in the case of password-based cryptography, since the
search space for a password is unlikely to be greater than 160 bits.) search space for a password is unlikely to be greater than 160 bits.)
The object identifier id-hmacWithSHA1 identifies the HMAC-SHA-1 The object identifier id-hmacWithSHA1 identifies the HMAC-SHA-1
pseudorandom function: pseudorandom function:
id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 7} id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 7}
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type NULL. This object identifier is AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type NULL. This object identifier is
employed in the object set PBKDF2-PRFs (Appendix A.2). employed in the object set PBKDF2-PRFs (Appendix A.2).
Note. Although HMAC-SHA-1 was designed as a message authentication Note. Although HMAC-SHA-1 was designed as a message authentication
code, its proof of security is readily modified to accommodate code, its proof of security is readily modified to accommodate
requirements for a pseudorandom function, under stronger assumptions. requirements for a pseudorandom function, under stronger assumptions.
A hash function may also meet the requirements of a pseudorandom A hash function may also meet the requirements of a pseudorandom
function under certain assumptions. For instance, the direct function under certain assumptions. For instance, the direct
application of a hash function to to the concatenation of the "key" application of a hash function to to the concatenation of the "key"
and the "text" may be appropriate, provided that "text" has and the "text" may be appropriate, provided that "text" has
appropriate structure to prevent certain attacks. HMAC-SHA-1 is appropriate structure to prevent certain attacks. HMAC-SHA-1 is
preferable, however, because it treats "key" and "text" as separate preferable, however, because it treats "key" and "text" as separate
arguments and does not require "text" to have any structure. arguments and does not require "text" to have any structure.
B.2 Encryption schemes B.2 Encryption schemes
Example pseudorandom functions for PBES2 (Section 6.2) are Example pseudorandom functions for PBES2 (Section 6.2) are DES-CBC-
DES-CBC-Pad, DES-EDE2-CBC-Pad, RC2-CBC-Pad, and RC5-CBC-Pad. Pad, DES-EDE2-CBC-Pad, RC2-CBC-Pad, and RC5-CBC-Pad.
The object identifiers given in this section are intended to be The object identifiers given in this section are intended to be
employed in the object set PBES2-Encs (Appendix A.4). employed in the object set PBES2-Encs (Appendix A.4).
B.2.1 DES-CBC-Pad B.2.1 DES-CBC-Pad
DES-CBC-Pad is single-key DES [15] in CBC mode [16] with the RFC 1423 DES-CBC-Pad is single-key DES [15] in CBC mode [16] with the RFC 1423
padding operation (see Section 6.1.1). DES-CBC-Pad has an padding operation (see Section 6.1.1). DES-CBC-Pad has an eight-octet
eight-octet encryption key and an eight-octet initialization vector. encryption key and an eight-octet initialization vector. The key is
The key is considered as a 64-bit encoding of a 56-bit DES key with considered as a 64-bit encoding of a 56-bit DES key with parity bits
parity bits ignored. ignored.
The object identifier desCBC (defined in the NIST/OSI ImplementorsĘ The object identifier desCBC (defined in the NIST/OSI Implementors'
Workshop agreements) identifies the DES-CBC-Pad encryption scheme: Workshop agreements) identifies the DES-CBC-Pad encryption scheme:
desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
algorithms(2) 7} algorithms(2) 7}
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)), AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)),
specifying the initialization vector for CBC mode. specifying the initialization vector for CBC mode.
B.2.2 DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad B.2.2 DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad
DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad is three-key triple-DES in CBC mode [1] with the DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad is three-key triple-DES in CBC mode [1] with the RFC
RFC 1423 padding operation. DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad has a 24-octet 1423 padding operation. DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad has a 24-octet encryption
encryption key and an eight-octet initialization vector. The key is key and an eight-octet initialization vector. The key is considered
considered as the concatenation of three eight-octet keys, each of as the concatenation of three eight-octet keys, each of which is a
which is a 64-bit encoding of a 56-bit DES key with parity bits 64-bit encoding of a 56-bit DES key with parity bits ignored.
ignored.
The object identifier des-EDE3-CBC identifies the DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad The object identifier des-EDE3-CBC identifies the DES-EDE3-CBC-Pad
encryption scheme: encryption scheme:
des-EDE3-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 7} des-EDE3-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 7}
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)), AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)),
specifying the initialization vector for CBC mode. specifying the initialization vector for CBC mode.
Note. An OID for DES-EDE3-CBC without padding is given in ANSI X9.52 Note. An OID for DES-EDE3-CBC without padding is given in ANSI X9.52
[1]; the one given here is preferred since it specifies padding. [1]; the one given here is preferred since it specifies padding.
B.2.3 RC2-CBC-Pad B.2.3 RC2-CBC-Pad
RC2-CBC-Pad is the RC2TM encryption algorithm [21] in CBC mode with RC2-CBC-Pad is the RC2(tm) encryption algorithm [21] in CBC mode with
the RFC 1423 padding operation. RC2-CBC-Pad has a variable key the RFC 1423 padding operation. RC2-CBC-Pad has a variable key
length, from one to 128 octets, a separate "effective key bits" length, from one to 128 octets, a separate "effective key bits"
parameter from one to 1024 bits that limits the effective search parameter from one to 1024 bits that limits the effective search
space independent of the key length, and an eight-octet space independent of the key length, and an eight-octet
initialization vector. initialization vector.
The object identifier rc2CBC identifies the RC2-CBC-Pad encryption The object identifier rc2CBC identifies the RC2-CBC-Pad encryption
scheme: scheme:
rc2CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 2} rc2CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 2}
The parameters field associated with OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier The parameters field associated with OID in an AlgorithmIdentifier
shall have type RC2-CBC-Parameter: shall have type RC2-CBC-Parameter:
RC2-CBC-Parameter ::= SEQUENCE { RC2-CBC-Parameter ::= SEQUENCE {
rc2ParameterVersion INTEGER OPTIONAL, rc2ParameterVersion INTEGER OPTIONAL,
iv OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) } iv OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) }
The fields of type RC2-CBCParameter have the following meanings: The fields of type RC2-CBCParameter have the following meanings:
- rc2ParameterVersion is a proprietary RSA Data Security, Inc. - rc2ParameterVersion is a proprietary RSA Security Inc. encoding
encoding of the "effective key bits" for RC2. The following of the "effective key bits" for RC2. The following encodings are
encodings are defined: defined:
Effective Key Bits Encoding Effective Key Bits Encoding
40 160 40 160
64 120 64 120
128 58 128 58
b >= 256 b b >= 256 b
If the rc2ParameterVersion field is omitted, the "effective key bits" If the rc2ParameterVersion field is omitted, the "effective key bits"
defaults to 32. (This is for backward compatibility with certain very defaults to 32. (This is for backward compatibility with certain very
old implementations.) old implementations.)
- iv is the eight-octet initialization vector. - iv is the eight-octet initialization vector.
B.2.4 RC5-CBC-Pad B.2.4 RC5-CBC-Pad
RC5-CBC-Pad is the RC5TM encryption algorithm [20] in CBC mode with a RC5-CBC-Pad is the RC5(tm) encryption algorithm [20] in CBC mode with
generalization of the RFC 1423 padding operation . This scheme is a generalization of the RFC 1423 padding operation. This scheme is
fully specified in [2]. RC5-CBC-Pad has a variable key length, from 0 fully specified in [2]. RC5-CBC-Pad has a variable key length, from 0
to 256 octets, and supports both a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit to 256 octets, and supports both a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit
block size. For the former, it has an eight-octet initialization block size. For the former, it has an eight-octet initialization
vector, and for the latter, a 16-octet initialization vector. vector, and for the latter, a 16-octet initialization vector. RC5-
RC5-CBC-Pad also has a variable number of "rounds" in the encryption CBC-Pad also has a variable number of "rounds" in the encryption
operation, from 8 to 127. operation, from 8 to 127.
Note: The generalization of the padding operation is as follows. For
RC5 with a 64-bit block size, the padding string is as defined in RFC
1423. For RC5 with a 128-bit block size, the padding string consists
of 16-(||M|| mod 16) octets each with value 16-(||M|| mod 16).
The object identifier rc5-CBC-PAD [2] identifies RC5-CBC-Pad The object identifier rc5-CBC-PAD [2] identifies RC5-CBC-Pad
encryption scheme: encryption scheme:
rc5-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 9} rc5-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 9}
The parameters field associated with this OID in an The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type RC5-CBC-Parameters: AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type RC5-CBC-Parameters:
RC5-CBC-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE { RC5-CBC-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER {v1-0(16)} (v1-0), version INTEGER {v1-0(16)} (v1-0),
rounds INTEGER (8..127), rounds INTEGER (8..127),
blockSizeInBits INTEGER (64 | 128), blockSizeInBits INTEGER (64 | 128),
iv OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } iv OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
The fields of type RC5-CBC-Parameters have the following meanings: The fields of type RC5-CBC-Parameters have the following meanings:
- version is the version of the algorithm, which shall be v1-0. - version is the version of the algorithm, which shall be v1-0.
- rounds is the number of rounds in the encryption operation, - rounds is the number of rounds in the encryption operation,
which shall be between 8 and 127. which shall be between 8 and 127.
- blockSizeInBits is the block size in bits, which shall be 64 or - blockSizeInBits is the block size in bits, which shall be 64 or
128. 128.
- iv is the initialization vector, an eight-octet string for 64-bit - iv is the initialization vector, an eight-octet string for 64-bit
RC5 and a 16-octet string for 128-bit RC5. The default is a RC5 and a 16-octet string for 128-bit RC5. The default is a
string of the appropriate length consisting of zero octets. string of the appropriate length consisting of zero octets.
B.3 Message authentication schemes B.3 Message authentication schemes
An example message authentication scheme for PBMAC1 (Section 7.1) is An example message authentication scheme for PBMAC1 (Section 7.1) is
HMAC-SHA-1. HMAC-SHA-1.
B.3.1 HMAC-SHA-1 B.3.1 HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-1 is the HMAC message authentication scheme [7] based on the HMAC-SHA-1 is the HMAC message authentication scheme [7] based on the
SHA-1 hash function [18]. HMAC-SHA-1 has a variable key length and a SHA-1 hash function [18]. HMAC-SHA-1 has a variable key length and a
20-octet (160-bit) message authentication code. 20-octet (160-bit) message authentication code.
The object identifier id-hmacWithSHA1 (see Appendix B.1.1) identifies The object identifier id-hmacWithSHA1 (see Appendix B.1.1) identifies
the HMAC-SHA-1 message authentication scheme. (The object identifier the HMAC-SHA-1 message authentication scheme. (The object identifier
is the same for both the pseudorandom function and the message is the same for both the pseudorandom function and the message
authentication scheme; the distinction is to be understood by authentication scheme; the distinction is to be understood by
context.) This object identifier is intended to be employed in the context.) This object identifier is intended to be employed in the
object set PBMAC1-Macs (Appendix A.5). object set PBMAC1-Macs (Appendix A.5).
C. ASN.1 module C. ASN.1 module
For reference purposes, the ASN.1 syntax in the preceding sections For reference purposes, the ASN.1 syntax in the preceding sections is
is presented as an ASN.1 module here. presented as an ASN.1 module here.
-- PKCS #5 v2.0 ASN.1 Module
-- Revised March 25, 1999
-- This module has been checked for conformance with the
-- ASN.1 standard by the OSS ASN.1 Tools
PKCS5v2-0 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) PKCS5v2-0 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) modules(16) pkcs5v2-0(1)} pkcs(1) pkcs-5(5) modules(16) pkcs5v2-0(1)}
DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
-- Basic object identifiers
rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549}
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549} pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 1}
pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 1} pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs 5}
pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs 5}
-- Basic types and classes
AlgorithmIdentifier { ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER:InfoObjectSet } ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER:InfoObjectSet } ::=
SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE {
algorithm ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER.&id({InfoObjectSet}), algorithm ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER.&id({InfoObjectSet}),
parameters ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER.&Type({InfoObjectSet} parameters ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER.&Type({InfoObjectSet}
{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL } {@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
}
ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
-- PBKDF2
PBKDF2Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= PBKDF2Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ...} { {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ...}
id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12} id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12}
algid-hmacWithSHA1 AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} ::= algid-hmacWithSHA1 AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} ::=
{algorithm id-hmacWithSHA1, parameters NULL : NULL} {algorithm id-hmacWithSHA1, parameters NULL : NULL}
PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE { PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
salt CHOICE { salt CHOICE {
specified OCTET STRING, specified OCTET STRING,
otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-SaltSources}} otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-SaltSources}}
}, },
iterationCount INTEGER (1..MAX), iterationCount INTEGER (1..MAX),
keyLength INTEGER (1..MAX) OPTIONAL, keyLength INTEGER (1..MAX) OPTIONAL,
prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} DEFAULT prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}} DEFAULT
algid-hmacWithSHA1 } algid-hmacWithSHA1
}
PBKDF2-SaltSources ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... } PBKDF2-SaltSources ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }
PBKDF2-PRFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= PBKDF2-PRFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA1}, ... } { {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA1}, ... }
-- PBES1 -- PBES1
PBES1Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= PBES1Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ {PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC} | {PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC} |
{PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC} | {PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC} |
{PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC} | {PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC} |
{PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC} | {PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC} |
{PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC} | {PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC} |
{PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC}, ...} {PBEParameter IDENTIFIED BY pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC},
...
}
pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1} pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1}
pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4} pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4}
pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3} pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3}
pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6} pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6}
pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10} pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10}
pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11} pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11}
PBEParameter ::= SEQUENCE { PBEParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)), salt OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)),
iterationCount INTEGER } iterationCount INTEGER
}
-- PBES2
PBES2Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= PBES2Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {PBES2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBES2}, ...} { {PBES2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBES2}, ...}
id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13} id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13}
PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}},
encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}} }
PBES2-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
{ {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... } keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}},
encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}}
}
PBES2-Encs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... } PBES2-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... }
PBES2-Encs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }
PBMAC1Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= -- PBMAC1
{ {PBMAC1-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBMAC1}, ...}
id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14} PBMAC1Algorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {PBMAC1-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBMAC1}, ...}
PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE { id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14}
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-KDFs}},
messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-MACs}} }
PBMAC1-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE {
{ {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... } keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-KDFs}},
messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBMAC1-MACs}}
}
PBMAC1-MACs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... } PBMAC1-KDFs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::=
{ {PBKDF2-params IDENTIFIED BY id-PBKDF2}, ... }
PBMAC1-MACs ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { ... }
digestAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 2} -- Supporting techniques
encryptionAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 3}
SupportingAlgorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= digestAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 2}
{ {NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA1} | encryptionAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 3}
{OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) IDENTIFIED BY desCBC} |
{OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) IDENTIFIED BY des-EDE3-CBC} |
{RC2-CBC-Parameter IDENTIFIED BY rc2CBC} |
{RC5-CBC-Parameters IDENTIFIED BY rc5-CBC-PAD}, ... }
id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 7} SupportingAlgorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA1} |
{OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) IDENTIFIED BY desCBC} |
{OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) IDENTIFIED BY des-EDE3-CBC} |
{RC2-CBC-Parameter IDENTIFIED BY rc2CBC} |
{RC5-CBC-Parameters IDENTIFIED BY rc5-CBC-PAD},
...
}
desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 7}
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
algorithms(2) 7} -- from OIW
des-EDE3-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 7} desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
algorithms(2) 7} -- from OIW
rc2CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 2} des-EDE3-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 7}
RC2-CBC-Parameter ::= SEQUENCE { rc2CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 2}
rc2ParameterVersion INTEGER OPTIONAL,
iv OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) }
rc5-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 9} RC2-CBC-Parameter ::= SEQUENCE {
rc2ParameterVersion INTEGER OPTIONAL,
iv OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))
}
RC5-CBC-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE { rc5-CBC-PAD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {encryptionAlgorithm 9}
version INTEGER {v1-0(16)} (v1-0),
rounds INTEGER (8..127),
blockSizeInBits INTEGER (64 | 128),
iv OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
END RC5-CBC-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER {v1-0(16)} (v1-0),
rounds INTEGER (8..127),
blockSizeInBits INTEGER (64 | 128),
iv OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
END
D. Intellectual property considerations D. Intellectual property considerations
RSA Data Security makes no patent claims on the general constructions RSA Security makes no patent claims on the general constructions
described in this document, although specific underlying techniques described in this document, although specific underlying techniques
may be covered. Among the underlying techniques, the RC5 encryption may be covered. Among the underlying techniques, the RC5 encryption
algorithm (Appendix B.2.4) is protected by U.S. Patents 5,724,428 algorithm (Appendix B.2.4) is protected by U.S. Patents 5,724,428
[22] and 5,835,600 [23]. [22] and 5,835,600 [23].
RC2 and RC5 are trademarks of RSA Data Security. RC2 and RC5 are trademarks of RSA Security.
License to copy this document is granted provided that it is License to copy this document is granted provided that it is
identified as RSA Data Security, Inc. Public-Key Cryptography identified as RSA Security Inc. Public-Key Cryptography Standards
Standards (PKCS) in all material mentioning or referencing this (PKCS) in all material mentioning or referencing this document.
document.
RSA Data Security makes no representations regarding intellectual RSA Security makes no representations regarding intellectual property
property claims by other parties. Such determination is the claims by other parties. Such determination is the responsibility of
responsibility of the user. the user.
E. Revision history E. Revision history
Versions 1.0-1.3 Versions 1.0-1.3
Versions 1.0-1.3 were distributed to participants in RSA Data Versions 1.0-1.3 were distributed to participants in RSA Data
Security, Inc.Ęs Public-Key Cryptography Standards meetings in Security Inc.'s Public-Key Cryptography Standards meetings in
February and March 1991. February and March 1991.
Version 1.4 Version 1.4
Version 1.4 was part of the June 3, 1991 initial public release of Version 1.4 was part of the June 3, 1991 initial public release of
PKCS. Version 1.4 was published as NIST/OSI ImplementorsĘ Workshop PKCS. Version 1.4 was published as NIST/OSI Implementors' Workshop
document SEC-SIG-91-20. document SEC-SIG-91-20.
Version 1.5 Version 1.5
Version 1.5 incorporated several editorial changes, including updates Version 1.5 incorporated several editorial changes, including
to the references and the addition of a revision history. updates to the references and the addition of a revision history.
Version 2.0 Version 2.0
Version 2.0 incorporates major editorial changes in terms of the Version 2.0 incorporates major editorial changes in terms of the
document structure, and introduces the PBES2 encryption scheme, the document structure, and introduces the PBES2 encryption scheme,
PBMAC1 message authentication scheme, and independent password-based the PBMAC1 message authentication scheme, and independent
key derivation functions. This version continues to support the password-based key derivation functions. This version continues to
encryption process in version 1.5. support the encryption process in version 1.5.
F. References F. References
[1] American National Standard X9.52 - 1998, Triple Data Encryption [1] American National Standard X9.52 - 1998, Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm Modes of Operation. Working draft, Accredited Standards Algorithm Modes of Operation. Working draft, Accredited Standards
Committee X9, July 27, 1998. Committee X9, July 27, 1998.
[2] R. Baldwin and R. Rivest. RFC 2040: The RC5, RC5-CBC, RC5-CBC-Pad, [2] R. Baldwin and R. Rivest. RFC 2040: The RC5, RC5-CBC, RC5-CBC-
and RC5-CTS Algorithms. IETF, October 1996. Pad, and RC5-CTS Algorithms. IETF, October 1996.
[3] D. Balenson. RFC 1423: Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic [3] D. Balenson. RFC 1423: Privacy Enhancement for Internet
Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers. IETF, February Electronic Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers. IETF,
1993. February 1993.
[4] S.M. Bellovin and M. Merritt. Encrypted key exchange: Password-based [4] S.M. Bellovin and M. Merritt. Encrypted key exchange: Password-
protocols secure against dictionary attacks. In Proceedings of the based protocols secure against dictionary attacks. In Proceedings of
1992 IEEE Computer Society Conference on Research in Security and the 1992 IEEE Computer Society Conference on Research in Security and
Privacy, pages 72-84, IEEE Computer Society, 1992. Privacy, pages 72-84, IEEE Computer Society, 1992.
[5] D. Jablon. Strong password-only authenticated key exchange. ACM [5] D. Jablon. Strong password-only authenticated key exchange. ACM
Computer Communications Review, October 1996. Computer Communications Review, October 1996.
[6] B. Kaliski. RFC 1319: The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm. IETF, April [6] B. Kaliski. RFC 1319: The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm. IETF,
1992. April 1992.
[7] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti. RFC 2104: HMAC: [7] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti. RFC 2104: HMAC: Keyed-
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication. IETF, February 1997. Hashing for Message Authentication. IETF, February 1997.
[8] Robert Morris and Ken Thompson. Password security: A case history. [8] Robert Morris and Ken Thompson. Password security: A case
Communications of the ACM, 22(11):594-597, November 1979. history. Communications of the ACM, 22(11):594-597, November 1979.
[9] ISO/IEC 8824-1:1995: Information technology - Abstract Syntax [9] ISO/IEC 8824-1:1995: Information technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of basic notation. 1995. Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of basic notation. 1995.
[10] ISO/IEC 8824-1:1995/Amd.1:1995 Information technology - Abstract [10] ISO/IEC 8824-1:1995/Amd.1:1995 Information technology - Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of basic notation - Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of basic notation -
Amendment 1 - Rules of extensibility. 1995. Amendment 1 - Rules of extensibility. 1995.
[11] ISO/IEC 8824-2:1995 Information technology - Abstract Syntax [11] ISO/IEC 8824-2:1995 Information technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One (ASN.1) - Information object specification. 1995. Notation One (ASN.1) - Information object specification. 1995.
[12] ISO/IEC 8824-2:1995/Amd.1:1995 Information technology - Abstract [12] ISO/IEC 8824-2:1995/Amd.1:1995 Information technology - Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Information object specification - Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Information object specification -
Amendment 1 - Rules of extensibility. 1995. Amendment 1 - Rules of extensibility. 1995.
[13] ISO/IEC 8824-3:1995 Information technology - Abstract Syntax [13] ISO/IEC 8824-3:1995 Information technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One (ASN.1) - Constraint specification. 1995. Notation One (ASN.1) - Constraint specification. 1995.
[14] ISO/IEC 8824-4:1995 Information technology - Abstract Syntax [14] ISO/IEC 8824-4:1995 Information technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One (ASN.1) - Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications. Notation One (ASN.1) - Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications.
1995. 1995.
[15] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS PUB [15] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS PUB
46-2: Data Encryption Standard. December 30, 1993. 46-2: Data Encryption Standard. December 30, 1993.
[16] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS PUB [16] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS PUB
81: DES Modes of Operation. December 2, 1980. 81: DES Modes of Operation. December 2, 1980.
[17] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS PUB [17] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS PUB
112: Password Usage. May 30, 1985. 112: Password Usage. May 30, 1985.
[18] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS PUB [18] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS PUB
180-1: Secure Hash Standard. April 1994. 180-1: Secure Hash Standard. April 1994.
[19] R. Rivest. RFC 1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm. IETF, April [19] R. Rivest. RFC 1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm. IETF,
1992. April 1992.
[20] R.L. Rivest. The RC5 encryption algorithm. In Proceedings of the [20] R.L. Rivest. The RC5 encryption algorithm. In Proceedings of the
Second International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, pages Second International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, pages 86-
86-96, Springer-Verlag, 1994. 96, Springer-Verlag, 1994.
[21] R. Rivest. RFC 2268: A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption [21] R. Rivest. RFC 2268: A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption
Algorithm. IETF, March 1998. Algorithm. IETF, March 1998.
[22] R.L. Rivest. Block-Encryption Algorithm with Data-Dependent [22] R.L. Rivest. Block-Encryption Algorithm with Data-Dependent
Rotations. U.S. Patent No. 5,724,428, March 3, 1998. Rotations. U.S. Patent No. 5,724,428, March 3, 1998.
[23] R.L. Rivest. Block Encryption Algorithm with Data-Dependent [23] R.L. Rivest. Block Encryption Algorithm with Data-Dependent
Rotations. U.S. Patent No. 5,835,600, November 10, 1998. Rotations. U.S. Patent No. 5,835,600, November 10, 1998.
[24] RSA Laboratories. PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption Standard. [24] RSA Laboratories. PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption Standard.
Version 1.5, November 1993. Version 1.5, November 1993.
[25] RSA Laboratories. PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard. [25] RSA Laboratories. PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax
Version 1.2, November 1993. Standard. Version 1.2, November 1993.
[26] T. Wu. The Secure Remote Password protocol. In Proceedings of the [26] T. Wu. The Secure Remote Password protocol. In Proceedings of
1998 Internet Society Network and Distributed System Security the 1998 Internet Society Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium, pages 97-111, Internet Society, 1998. Symposium, pages 97-111, Internet Society, 1998.
[27] F. Yergeau. RFC 2279: UTF-8, a Transformation Format of ISO 10646. [27] F. Yergeau. RFC 2279: UTF-8, a Transformation Format of ISO
IETF, January 1998. 10646. IETF, January 1998.
G. Contact Information & About PKCS G. Contact Information & About PKCS
The Public-Key Cryptography Standards are specifications produced by The Public-Key Cryptography Standards are specifications produced by
RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers
worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-
public-key cryptography. First published in 1991 as a result of key cryptography. First published in 1991 as a result of meetings
meetings with a small group of early adopters of public-key with a small group of early adopters of public-key technology, the
technology, the PKCS documents have become widely referenced and PKCS documents have become widely referenced and implemented.
implemented. Contributions from the PKCS series have become part of Contributions from the PKCS series have become part of many formal
many formal and de facto standards, including ANSI X9 documents, and de facto standards, including ANSI X9 documents, PKIX, SET,
PKIX, SET, S/MIME, and SSL. S/MIME, and SSL.
Further development of PKCS occurs through mailing list discussions Further development of PKCS occurs through mailing list discussions
and occasional workshops, and suggestions for improvement are and occasional workshops, and suggestions for improvement are
welcome. For more information, contact: welcome. For more information, contact:
PKCS Editor PKCS Editor
RSA Laboratories RSA Laboratories
20 Crosby Drive 20 Crosby Drive
Bedford, MA 01730 USA Bedford, MA 01730 USA
pkcs-editor@rsa.com pkcs-editor@rsasecurity.com
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pubs/PKCS http://www.rsalabs.com/pkcs/
Expires December 1999
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