< draft-keoh-dice-multicast-security-06.txt   draft-keoh-dice-multicast-security-07.txt >
DICE Working Group S. Keoh DICE Working Group S. Keoh
Internet-Draft University of Glasgow Singapore Internet-Draft University of Glasgow Singapore
Intended status: Standards Track S. Kumar, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track S. Kumar, Ed.
Expires: November 6, 2014 O. Garcia-Morchon Expires: November 10, 2014 O. Garcia-Morchon
E. Dijk E. Dijk
Philips Research Philips Research
A. Rahman A. Rahman
InterDigital InterDigital
May 5, 2014 May 9, 2014
DTLS-based Multicast Security in Constrained Environments DTLS-based Multicast Security in Constrained Environments
draft-keoh-dice-multicast-security-06 draft-keoh-dice-multicast-security-07
Abstract Abstract
The CoAP standard is fast emerging as a key protocol in the area of The CoAP standard is fast emerging as a key protocol in the area of
resource-constrained devices. Such IP-based systems are foreseen to resource-constrained devices. Such IP-based systems are foreseen to
be used for building and lighting control systems where devices be used for building and lighting control systems where devices
interconnect with each other, forming, for example, low-power and interconnect with each other, forming, for example, low-power and
lossy networks (LLNs). Both multicast and its security are key needs lossy networks (LLNs). Both multicast and its security are key needs
in these networks. This draft presents a method for securing IPv6 in these networks. This draft presents a method for securing IPv6
multicast communication based on the DTLS which is already supported multicast communication based on the DTLS which is already supported
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 6, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 10, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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4.2. Record layer adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. Record layer adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Sending Secure Multicast Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.3. Sending Secure Multicast Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Receiving Secure Multicast Messages . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Receiving Secure Multicast Messages . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Unicast Responses to Multicast Messages . . . . . . . . . 15 4.5. Unicast Responses to Multicast Messages . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6. Proxy Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.6. Proxy Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Group level security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.1. Group level security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Late joiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.2. Late joiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3. Uniqueness of SenderIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.3. Uniqueness of SenderIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4. Reduced sequence number space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.4. Reduced sequence number space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
There is an increased use of wireless control networks in There is an increased use of wireless control networks in
environmental monitoring, industrial automation, lighting controls environmental monitoring, industrial automation, lighting controls
and building management systems. This is mainly driven by the fact and building management systems. This is mainly driven by the fact
that the independence from physical control wires allows for freedom that the independence from physical control wires allows for freedom
of placement, portability and for reducing the cost of installation of placement, portability and for reducing the cost of installation
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4.5. Unicast Responses to Multicast Messages 4.5. Unicast Responses to Multicast Messages
In CoAP, responses to multicast messages are always sent back as In CoAP, responses to multicast messages are always sent back as
unicast. That is, the group members that receive a multicast message unicast. That is, the group members that receive a multicast message
may individually decide to send (or suppress) a unicast response as may individually decide to send (or suppress) a unicast response as
described in Section 2.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm]. The unicast described in Section 2.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm]. The unicast
responses to a DTLS-based multicast message may optionally be secure. responses to a DTLS-based multicast message may optionally be secure.
Specifically, the unicast response may be sent back as a unicast DTLS Specifically, the unicast response may be sent back as a unicast DTLS
as described in Section 9.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap]. This requires as described in Section 9.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap]. This requires
that a unicast DTLS handshake was previously initiated between the that a unicast DTLS handshake was previously initiated between the
multicast message sender and listener. In the extreme scenario, a multicast message sender and listener.
multicast sender may attempt to initiate the unicast DTLS handshake
with all or a subset of known listeners just before or just after it Either the multicast message sender or listener may initiate the
sends out the DTLS-based multicast message. This may result in the unicast DTLS handshake. If the DTLS handshake was initiated by the
multicast sender (i.e. unicast DTLS client) having to process unicast multicast message sender, it requires that the sender be aware of the
DTLS handshake messages from multiple multicast listeners (i.e. membership of the multicast group. This can be accomplished, for
unicast DTLS servers) in a short period. example, as described in Section 2.6 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap]. If the
listener initiated the DTLS handshake, it may have done so, for
example, after receiving a multicast message for the first time.
In the extreme scenario, a multicast sender may attempt to initiate
the unicast DTLS handshake with all, or a subset of, known listeners
just after it sends out the DTLS-based multicast message. This may
result in the multicast sender having to process unicast DTLS
handshake messages from multiple multicast listeners in a short
period.
Note: There is an obvious timing and processing load issue for the Note: There is an obvious timing and processing load issue for the
multicast sender in the scenario where it attempts to initiate the multicast sender in the scenario where it attempts to initiate the
unicast DTLS handshakes with all/some of its known listeners just unicast DTLS handshakes with all/some of its known listeners just
after it sends out the DTLS-based multicast message. In this case, after it sends out the DTLS-based multicast message. In this case,
the processing load in the multicast sender (i.e. unicast DTLS the processing load in the multicast sender (i.e. unicast DTLS
client) is reduced somewhat by the fact that CoAP requires a back-off client) is reduced somewhat by the fact that CoAP requires a back-off
and randomization of the unicast response by the Leisure timer and randomization of the unicast response by the Leisure timer
mechanism as described in Section 8.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap]. mechanism as described in Section 8.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap].
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