< draft-kivinen-ipsecme-oob-pubkey-07.txt		draft-kivinen-ipsecme-oob-pubkey-08.txt >
	IP Security Maintenance and Extensions T. Kivinen		IP Security Maintenance and Extensions (ipsecme) T. Kivinen
	(ipsecme) INSIDE Secure		Internet-Draft INSIDE Secure
	Internet-Draft P. Wouters		Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters
	Intended status: Standards Track Red Hat		Expires: September 12, 2015 Red Hat
	Expires: November 7, 2014 H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	May 6, 2014		March 2015
	More Raw Public Keys for IKEv2		More Raw Public Keys for IKEv2
	draft-kivinen-ipsecme-oob-pubkey-07.txt		draft-kivinen-ipsecme-oob-pubkey-08.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	The Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) protocol currently only		The Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) protocol currently only
	supports raw RSA keys. In some environments it is useful to make use		supports raw RSA keys. In some environments it is useful to make use
	of other types of public keys, such as those based on Elliptic Curve		of other types of public keys, such as those based on Elliptic Curve
	Cryptography. This documents adds support for other types of raw		Cryptography. This documents adds support for other types of raw
	public keys to IKEv2.		public keys to IKEv2.
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on November 7, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
	described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	3. Certificate Encoding Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Certificate Encoding Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	A.1. ECDSA Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		Appendix A.1. ECDSA Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	A.2. RSA Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Appendix A.2. RSA Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Secure DNS allows public keys to be associated with domain names for		Secure DNS allows public keys to be associated with domain names for
	usage with security protocols like Internet Key Exchange Version 2		usage with security protocols like Internet Key Exchange Version 2
	(IKEv2) [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis] and Transport Layer		(IKEv2) [RFC7296] and Transport Layer Security (TLS) but it relies on
	Security (TLS) but it relies on extensions in those protocols to be		extensions in those protocols to be specified.
	specified.
	In [RFC5996] IKEv2 had support for PKCS #1 encoded RSA keys, i.e., a		In [RFC5996] IKEv2 had support for PKCS #1 encoded RSA keys, i.e., a
	DER- encoded RSAPublicKey structure (see [RSA] and [RFC3447]). Other		DER- encoded RSAPublicKey structure (see [RSA] and [RFC3447]). Other
	raw public keys types are, however, not supported. In		raw public keys types are, however, not supported. In [RFC7296] this
	[I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis] this feature was removed, and		feature was removed, and this document adds support for raw public
	this document adds support for raw public keys back to IKEv2 in more		keys back to IKEv2 in more generic way.
	generic way.
	The TLS Out-of-Band Public Key Validation specification		The TLS Out-of-Band Public Key Validation specification ([RFC7250])
	([I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey]) adds generic support for raw public keys		adds generic support for raw public keys to TLS by re-using the
	to TLS by re-using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo format from the X.509		SubjectPublicKeyInfo format from the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
	Public Key Infrastructure Certificate profile [RFC5280].		Certificate profile [RFC5280].
	This document is similar than the TLS Out-of-Band Public Key		This document is similar than the TLS Out-of-Band Public Key
	Validation specification, and applies the concept to IKEv2 to support		Validation specification, and applies the concept to IKEv2 to support
	all public key formats defined by PKIX. This approach also allows		all public key formats defined by PKIX. This approach also allows
	future public key extensions to be supported without the need to		future public key extensions to be supported without the need to
	introduce further enhancements to IKEv2.		introduce further enhancements to IKEv2.
	To support new types of public keys in IKEv2 the following changes		To support new types of public keys in IKEv2 the following changes
	are needed:		are needed:
	o A new Certificate Encoding format needs to be defined for carrying		o A new Certificate Encoding format needs to be defined for carrying
	the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure. Section 3 specifies this new		the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure. [cert-encoding] specifies
	encoding format.		this new encoding format.
	o A new Certificate Encoding type needs to be allocated from the		o A new Certificate Encoding type needs to be allocated from the
	IANA registry. Section 5 contains this request to IANA.		IANA registry. [iana] contains this request to IANA.
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	3. Certificate Encoding Payload		3. Certificate Encoding Payload
	Section 3.6 of RFC 5996bis defines the Certificate payload format as		Section 3.6 of RFC 7296 defines the Certificate payload format as
	shown in Figure 1.		shown in [payload].
	1 2 3		1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |		| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Cert Encoding | |		| Cert Encoding | |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
	~ Certificate Data ~		~ Certificate Data ~
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 1: Certificate Payload Format.
	o Certificate Encoding (1 octet) - This field indicates the type of		o Certificate Encoding (1 octet) - This field indicates the type of
	certificate or certificate-related information contained in the		certificate or certificate-related information contained in the
	Certificate Data field.		Certificate Data field.
	Certificate Encoding Value		Certificate Encoding Value
	----------------------------------------------------		----------------------------------------------------
	Raw Public Key TBD		Raw Public Key TBD
	o Certificate Data (variable length) - Actual encoding of the		o Certificate Data (variable length) - Actual encoding of the
	certificate data. The type of certificate is indicated by the		certificate data. The type of certificate is indicated by the
	Certificate Encoding field.		Certificate Encoding field.
	In order to provide a simple and standard way to indicate the key		In order to provide a simple and standard way to indicate the key
	type when the encoding type is 'Raw Public Key', the		type when the encoding type is 'Raw Public Key', the
	SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure of the PKIX certificate is used. This		SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure of the PKIX certificate is used. This
	is a a very simple encoding, as most of the ASN.1 part can be		is a a very simple encoding, as most of the ASN.1 part can be
	included literally, and recognized by block comparison. See		included literally, and recognized by block comparison. See
	[I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey] Appendix A for a detailed breakdown. In		[RFC7250] Appendix A for a detailed breakdown. In addition,
	addition, Appendix A has a few examples.		[examples] has a few examples.
	In the case of the Certificate Request payload the Certification		In the case of the Certificate Request payload the Certification
	Authority field MUST be empty if the "Raw Public Key" certificate		Authority field MUST be empty if the "Raw Public Key" certificate
	encoding is used.		encoding is used.
	Note, that we do follow public key processing rules of the section		Note, that we do follow public key processing rules of the section
	1.2 of the Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography		1.2 of the Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography
	for PKIX ([RFC4055]) even when the SubjectPublicKeyInfo is not part		for PKIX ([RFC4055]) even when the SubjectPublicKeyInfo is not part
	of the certificate, but sent here. This means RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-		of the certificate, but sent here. This means RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-
	PSS-params inside the SubjectPublicKeyInfo needs to be followed.		PSS-params inside the SubjectPublicKeyInfo needs to be followed.
	skipping to change at page 5, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 4 ¶
	authenticity of the keys being used. One such mechanism is to use a		authenticity of the keys being used. One such mechanism is to use a
	configuration mechanism for provisioning raw public keys into the		configuration mechanism for provisioning raw public keys into the
	IKEv2 software. A suitable deployment is likely to be found with		IKEv2 software. A suitable deployment is likely to be found with
	smart objects. Yet another approach is to rely on secure DNS to		smart objects. Yet another approach is to rely on secure DNS to
	associate public keys to be associated with domain names using the		associate public keys to be associated with domain names using the
	IPSECKEY DNS RRtype [RFC4025]. More information can be found in DNS-		IPSECKEY DNS RRtype [RFC4025]. More information can be found in DNS-
	Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [RFC6394].		Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [RFC6394].
	This document does not change the assumptions made by the IKEv2		This document does not change the assumptions made by the IKEv2
	specifications since "Raw RSA Key" support was already available in		specifications since "Raw RSA Key" support was already available in
	IKEv2. This document only generalizes the raw public key support.		IKEv2. This document only generalizes the raw public key support.
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	This document allocates a new value from the IKEv2 Certificate		This document allocates a new value from the IKEv2 Certificate
	Encodings registry:		Encodings registry:
	TBD Raw Public Key		TBD Raw Public Key
	6. Acknowledgements		6. Acknowledgements
	This document copies parts from the similar TLS document		This document copies parts from the similar TLS document ([RFC7250]).
	([I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey]).
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis]
	Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
	Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
	(IKEv2)", draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis-01 (work
	in progress), October 2013.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R. and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
	[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,		[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P. and T.
	"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",		Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
	RFC 5996, September 2010.		(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, October 2014.
	7.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey]
	Wouters, P., Tschofenig, H., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S., and
	T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer
	Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
	(DTLS)", draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-11 (work in progress),
	January 2014.
	[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography		[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
	Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications		Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
	Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.		Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
	[RFC4025] Richardson, M., "A Method for Storing IPsec Keying		[RFC4025] Richardson, M., "A Method for Storing IPsec Keying
	Material in DNS", RFC 4025, March 2005.		Material in DNS", RFC 4025, March 2005.
	[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional		[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B. and R. Housley, "Additional
	Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in		Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
	the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate		the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
	and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,		and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
	June 2005.		June 2005.
	[RFC4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using		[RFC4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using
	the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",		the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
	RFC 4754, January 2007.		RFC 4754, January 2007.
	[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,		[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R. and T. Polk,
	"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key		"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
	Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.		Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.
			[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y. and P. Eronen, "Internet
			Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 5996,
			September 2010.
	[RFC6394] Barnes, R., "Use Cases and Requirements for DNS-Based		[RFC6394] Barnes, R., "Use Cases and Requirements for DNS-Based
	Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)", RFC 6394,		Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)", RFC 6394,
	October 2011.		October 2011.
	[RSA] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, "A Method for		[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Tschofenig, H., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S. and
			T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer
			Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
			(DTLS)", RFC 7250, June 2014.
			[RSA] R. Rivest, , A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, "A Method for
	Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key		Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
	Cryptosystems", February 1978.		Cryptosystems", February 1978.
	Appendix A. Examples		Appendix A. Examples
	This appendix provides examples of the actual packets sent on the		This appendix provides examples of the actual packets sent on the
	wire.		wire.
	A.1. ECDSA Example		Appendix A.1. ECDSA Example
	This first example uses the 256-bit ECDSA private/public key pair		This first example uses the 256-bit ECDSA private/public key pair
	defined in the section 8.1. of the IKEv2 ECDSA document [RFC4754].		defined in the section 8.1. of the IKEv2 ECDSA document [RFC4754].
	The public key is as followed:		The public key is as followed:
	o Algorithm : id-ecPublicKey (1.2.840.10045.2.1)		o Algorithm : id-ecPublicKey (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
	o Fixed curve: secp256r1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)		o Fixed curve: secp256r1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)
	o Public key x coordinate : cb28e099 9b9c7715 fd0a80d8 e47a7707		o Public key x coordinate : cb28e099 9b9c7715 fd0a80d8 e47a7707
	9716cbbf 917dd72e 97566ea1 c066957c		9716cbbf 917dd72e 97566ea1 c066957c
	skipping to change at page 7, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 52 ¶
	000d : OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp256r1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)		000d : OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp256r1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)
	0017 : BIT STRING (66 bytes)		0017 : BIT STRING (66 bytes)
	00000000: 0004 cb28 e099 9b9c 7715 fd0a 80d8 e47a		00000000: 0004 cb28 e099 9b9c 7715 fd0a 80d8 e47a
	00000010: 7707 9716 cbbf 917d d72e 9756 6ea1 c066		00000010: 7707 9716 cbbf 917d d72e 9756 6ea1 c066
	00000020: 957c 2b57 c023 5fb7 4897 68d0 58ff 4911		00000020: 957c 2b57 c023 5fb7 4897 68d0 58ff 4911
	00000030: c20f dbe7 1e36 99d9 1339 afbb 903e e172		00000030: c20f dbe7 1e36 99d9 1339 afbb 903e e172
	00000040: 55dc		00000040: 55dc
	The first byte (00) of the bit string indicates that there is no		The first byte (00) of the bit string indicates that there is no
	"number of unused bits", and the second byte (04) indicates		"number of unused bits", and the second byte (04) indicates
	uncompressed form ([RFC5480]). Those two octets are followed by the		uncompressed form ([RFC5480]). Those two octets are followed by the
	values of X and Y.		values of X and Y.
	The final encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo object is as follows:		The final encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo object is as follows:
	00000000: 3059 3013 0607 2a86 48ce 3d02 0106 082a		00000000: 3059 3013 0607 2a86 48ce 3d02 0106 082a
	00000010: 8648 ce3d 0301 0703 4200 04cb 28e0 999b		00000010: 8648 ce3d 0301 0703 4200 04cb 28e0 999b
	00000020: 9c77 15fd 0a80 d8e4 7a77 0797 16cb bf91		00000020: 9c77 15fd 0a80 d8e4 7a77 0797 16cb bf91
	00000030: 7dd7 2e97 566e a1c0 6695 7c2b 57c0 235f		00000030: 7dd7 2e97 566e a1c0 6695 7c2b 57c0 235f
	00000040: b748 9768 d058 ff49 11c2 0fdb e71e 3699		00000040: b748 9768 d058 ff49 11c2 0fdb e71e 3699
	00000050: d913 39af bb90 3ee1 7255 dc		00000050: d913 39af bb90 3ee1 7255 dc
	This will result the final IKEv2 Certificate Payload to be:		This will result the final IKEv2 Certificate Payload to be:
	00000000: NN00 0060 XX30 5930 1306 072a 8648 ce3d		00000000: NN00 0060 XX30 5930 1306 072a 8648 ce3d
	00000010: 0201 0608 2a86 48ce 3d03 0107 0342 0004		00000010: 0201 0608 2a86 48ce 3d03 0107 0342 0004
	00000020: cb28 e099 9b9c 7715 fd0a 80d8 e47a 7707		00000020: cb28 e099 9b9c 7715 fd0a 80d8 e47a 7707
	00000030: 9716 cbbf 917d d72e 9756 6ea1 c066 957c		00000030: 9716 cbbf 917d d72e 9756 6ea1 c066 957c
	00000040: 2b57 c023 5fb7 4897 68d0 58ff 4911 c20f		00000040: 2b57 c023 5fb7 4897 68d0 58ff 4911 c20f
	00000050: dbe7 1e36 99d9 1339 afbb 903e e172 55dc		00000050: dbe7 1e36 99d9 1339 afbb 903e e172 55dc
	Where the NN will be the next payload type (i.e. that value depends		Where the NN will be the next payload type (i.e. that value depends
	on what is the next payload after this certificate payload).		on what is the next payload after this certificate payload).
	Note to the RFC editor / IANA, replace the XX above with the newly		Note to the RFC editor / IANA, replace the XX above with the newly
	allocated Raw Public Key number, and remove this note.		allocated Raw Public Key number, and remove this note.
	A.2. RSA Example		Appendix A.2. RSA Example
	This second example uses random 1024-bit RSA key.		This second example uses random 1024-bit RSA key.
	The public key is as followed:		The public key is as followed:
	o Algorithm : rsaEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)		o Algorithm : rsaEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
	o Modulus n (1024 bits, decimal):		o Modulus n (1024 bits, decimal):
	1323562071162740912417075551025599045700		1323562071162740912417075551025599045700
	3972512968992059076067098474693867078469		3972512968992059076067098474693867078469
	7654066339302927451756327389839253751712		7654066339302927451756327389839253751712
	skipping to change at page 9, line 6 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 25 ¶
	00000050: 39ae 49ed 6ebc 30f8 d9b5 2e23 385a 4019		00000050: 39ae 49ed 6ebc 30f8 d9b5 2e23 385a 4019
	00000060: 1585 8c59 be72 f343 fb1e b87b 16ff c5ab		00000060: 1585 8c59 be72 f343 fb1e b87b 16ff c5ab
	00000070: 0f8f 8fe9 f7cb 3e66 3d8f e9f9 ecfa 1230		00000070: 0f8f 8fe9 f7cb 3e66 3d8f e9f9 ecfa 1230
	00000080: 66f3 6835 8cea efd3 0203 0100 01		00000080: 66f3 6835 8cea efd3 0203 0100 01
	The first byte (00) of the bit string indicates that there is no		The first byte (00) of the bit string indicates that there is no
	"number of unused bits". Inside that bit string there is an ASN.1		"number of unused bits". Inside that bit string there is an ASN.1
	sequence having 2 integers. The second byte (30) indicates that this		sequence having 2 integers. The second byte (30) indicates that this
	is beginning of the sequence, and then next byte (81) indicates the		is beginning of the sequence, and then next byte (81) indicates the
	length does not fit in 7-bits, but requires one byte, so the length		length does not fit in 7-bits, but requires one byte, so the length
	is in the next byte (89). Then starts the first integer with tag		is in the next byte (89). Then starts the first integer with tag (02)
	(02) and length (81 81). After that we have the modulus (prefixed		and length (81 81). After that we have the modulus (prefixed with 0
	with 0 so it will not be negative number). After the modulus there		so it will not be negative number). After the modulus there is new
	is new tag (02) and length (03) of the exponent, and the last 3 bytes		tag (02) and length (03) of the exponent, and the last 3 bytes are
	are the exponent.		the exponent.
	The final encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo object is as follows:		The final encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo object is as follows:
	00000000: 3081 9f30 0d06 092a 8648 86f7 0d01 0101		00000000: 3081 9f30 0d06 092a 8648 86f7 0d01 0101
	00000010: 0500 0381 8d00 3081 8902 8181 00bc 7b43		00000010: 0500 0381 8d00 3081 8902 8181 00bc 7b43
	00000020: 4749 c7b3 8600 bfa8 4b44 f881 879a 2dda		00000020: 4749 c7b3 8600 bfa8 4b44 f881 879a 2dda
	00000030: 08d1 f014 5af5 806c 2aed 6a61 72ff 0dc3		00000030: 08d1 f014 5af5 806c 2aed 6a61 72ff 0dc3
	00000040: d4cd 6016 38e8 ca34 8ebd ca57 4231 cadc		00000040: d4cd 6016 38e8 ca34 8ebd ca57 4231 cadc
	00000050: 9712 e209 b1fd dba5 8a8c 62b3 6903 8a3d		00000050: 9712 e209 b1fd dba5 8a8c 62b3 6903 8a3d
	00000060: 1eaa 727c 1f39 ae49 ed6e bc30 f8d9 b52e		00000060: 1eaa 727c 1f39 ae49 ed6e bc30 f8d9 b52e
	skipping to change at page 9, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 4 ¶
	00000010: f70d 0101 0105 0003 818d 0030 8189 0281		00000010: f70d 0101 0105 0003 818d 0030 8189 0281
	00000020: 8100 bc7b 4347 49c7 b386 00bf a84b 44f8		00000020: 8100 bc7b 4347 49c7 b386 00bf a84b 44f8
	00000030: 8187 9a2d da08 d1f0 145a f580 6c2a ed6a		00000030: 8187 9a2d da08 d1f0 145a f580 6c2a ed6a
	00000040: 6172 ff0d c3d4 cd60 1638 e8ca 348e bdca		00000040: 6172 ff0d c3d4 cd60 1638 e8ca 348e bdca
	00000050: 5742 31ca dc97 12e2 09b1 fddb a58a 8c62		00000050: 5742 31ca dc97 12e2 09b1 fddb a58a 8c62
	00000060: b369 038a 3d1e aa72 7c1f 39ae 49ed 6ebc		00000060: b369 038a 3d1e aa72 7c1f 39ae 49ed 6ebc
	00000070: 30f8 d9b5 2e23 385a 4019 1585 8c59 be72		00000070: 30f8 d9b5 2e23 385a 4019 1585 8c59 be72
	00000080: f343 fb1e b87b 16ff c5ab 0f8f 8fe9 f7cb		00000080: f343 fb1e b87b 16ff c5ab 0f8f 8fe9 f7cb
	00000090: 3e66 3d8f e9f9 ecfa 1230 66f3 6835 8cea		00000090: 3e66 3d8f e9f9 ecfa 1230 66f3 6835 8cea
	000000a0: efd3 0203 0100 01		000000a0: efd3 0203 0100 01
			Where the NN will be the next payload type (i.e. that value depends
	Where the NN will be the next payload type (i.e. that value depends
	on what is the next payload after this certificate payload).		on what is the next payload after this certificate payload).
	Note to the RFC editor / IANA, replace the XX above with the newly		Note to the RFC editor / IANA, replace the XX above with the newly
	allocated Raw Public Key number, and remove this note.		allocated Raw Public Key number, and remove this note.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Tero Kivinen		Tero Kivinen
	INSIDE Secure		INSIDE Secure
	Eerikinkatu 28		Eerikinkatu 28
	HELSINKI FI-00180		HELSINKI, FI-00180
	FI		FI
	Email: kivinen@iki.fi		Email: kivinen@iki.fi
	Paul Wouters		Paul Wouters
	Red Hat		Red Hat
	Email: pwouters@redhat.com		Email: pwouters@redhat.com
	Hannes Tschofenig		Hannes Tschofenig
End of changes. 33 change blocks.
	91 lines changed or deleted		79 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/