< draft-latour-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-02.txt   draft-latour-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-03.txt >
Network Working Group J. Latour Network Working Group J. Latour
Internet-Draft CIRA Internet-Draft CIRA
Intended status: Informational O. Gudmundsson Intended status: Informational O. Gudmundsson
Expires: August 15, 2016 Cloudflare, Inc. Expires: September 22, 2016 Cloudflare, Inc.
P. Wouters P. Wouters
Red Hat Red Hat
M. Pounsett M. Pounsett
Rightside Rightside Group, Ltd.
February 12, 2016 March 21, 2016
Third Party DNS operator to Registrars/Registries Protocol Third Party DNS operator to Registrars/Registries Protocol
draft-latour-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-02.txt draft-latour-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-03.txt
Abstract Abstract
There are several problems that arise in the standard There are several problems that arise in the standard
Registrant/Registrar/Registry model when the operator of a zone is Registrant/Registrar/Registry model when the operator of a zone is
neither the Registrant nor the Registrar for the delegation. neither the Registrant nor the Registrar for the delegation.
Historically the issues have been minor, and limited to difficulty Historically the issues have been minor, and limited to difficulty
guiding the Registrant through the initial changes to the NS records guiding the Registrant through the initial changes to the NS records
for the delegation. As this is usually a one time activity when the for the delegation. As this is usually a one time activity when the
operator first takes charge of the zone it has not been treated as a operator first takes charge of the zone it has not been treated as a
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Notional Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. RFC2119 Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. RFC2119 Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. What is the goal ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. What is the goal? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Why DNSSEC ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Why DNSSEC? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. How does a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Trust 3.2. How does a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Trust
Anchor ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Anchor? The child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. What checks are needed by parent ? . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. What checks are needed by parent? . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. OP-3-DNS-RR RESTful API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. OP-3-DNS-RR RESTful API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Base URL Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.3. Base URL Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. CDS resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.4. CDS resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4.1. Initial Trust Establishment (Turn on DNSSEC) . . . . 6 4.4.1. Initial Trust Establishment (Enable DNSSEC
validation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4.2. Removing a DS (turn off DNSSEC) . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4.2. Removing a DS (turn off DNSSEC) . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4.3. DS Maintenance (Key roll over) . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4.3. DS Maintenance (Key roll over) . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.5. Tokens resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.5. Tokens resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.5.1. Setup Initial Trust Establishment with Challenge . . 7 4.5.1. Setup Initial Trust Establishment with Challenge . . 8
4.6. Customized Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.6. Customized Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.7. How to react to 403 on POST cds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1. Version 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.2. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.2. Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.3. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.4. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Why is this needed ? DNS registration systems today are designed Why is this needed? DNS registration systems today are designed
around making registrations easy and fast. After the domain has been around making registrations easy and fast. After the domain has been
registered the there are really three options on who maintains the registered the there are really three options on who maintains the
DNS zone that is loaded on the "primary" DNS servers for the domain DNS zone that is loaded on the "primary" DNS servers for the domain
this can be the Registrant, Registrar, or a third party DNS Operator. this can be the Registrant, Registrar, or a third party DNS Operator.
Unfortunately the ease to make changes differs for each one of these Unfortunately the ease to make changes differs for each one of these
options. The Registrant needs to use the interface that the options. The Registrant needs to use the interface that the
registrar provides to update NS and DS records. The Registrar on the registrar provides to update NS and DS records. The Registrar on the
other hand can make changes directly into the registration system. other hand can make changes directly into the registration system.
The third party DNS Operator on the hand needs to go through the The third party DNS Operator on the hand needs to go through the
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perform action but tools proceed with key roll-over without checking perform action but tools proceed with key roll-over without checking
that the new DS is in place. Another common failure is the DS record that the new DS is in place. Another common failure is the DS record
is not removed when the DNS Operator changes from one that supports is not removed when the DNS Operator changes from one that supports
DNSSEC signing to one that does not. DNSSEC signing to one that does not.
The failures result either inability to use DNSSEC or in validation The failures result either inability to use DNSSEC or in validation
failures that case the domain to become invalid and all users that failures that case the domain to become invalid and all users that
are behind validating resolvers will not be able to to access the are behind validating resolvers will not be able to to access the
domain. domain.
2. Notational Conventions 2. Notional Conventions
2.1. Definitions 2.1. Definitions
For the purposes of this draft, a third-party DNS Operator is any DNS For the purposes of this draft, a third-party DNS Operator is any DNS
Operator responsible for a zone where the operator is neither the Operator responsible for a zone where the operator is neither the
Registrant nor the Registrar of record for the delegation. Registrant nor the Registrar of record for the delegation.
When we say Registrar that can in many cases be applied to a Reseller Uses of the word 'Registrar' in this document may also be applied to
i.e. an entity that sells delegations but registrations are processed resellers: an entity that sells delegations through a registrar with
through an Registrar the reseller has agreement with. whom the entity has a reseller agreement.
2.2. RFC2119 Keywords 2.2. RFC2119 Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. What is the goal ? 3. What is the goal?
The primary goal is to use the DNS protocol to provide information The primary goal is to use the DNS protocol to provide information
from child zone to the parent zone, to maintain the delegation from child zone to the parent zone, to maintain the delegation
information. The precondition for this to be practical is that the information. The precondition for this to be practical is that the
domain is DNSSEC signed. domain is DNSSEC signed.
In the general case there should be a way to find the right In the general case there should be a way to find the right
Registrar/Registry entity to talk to but that does not exist. Registrar/Registry entity to talk to but that does not exist.
Whois[] is the natural protocol to carry such information but that Whois[] is the natural protocol to carry such information but that
protocol is unreliable and hard to parse. Its proposed successor protocol is unreliable and hard to parse. Its proposed successor
RDAP [RFC7480] has yet be deployed on most TLD's. RDAP [RFC7480] has yet be deployed on most TLD's.
The preferred communication mechanism is to use is to use a REST The preferred communication mechanism is to use is to use a REST
[RFC6690] call to start processing of the requested delegation [RFC6690] call to start processing of the requested delegation
information. information.
3.1. Why DNSSEC ? 3.1. Why DNSSEC?
DNSSEC [RFC4035] provides data authentication for DNS answers, having DNSSEC [RFC4035] provides data authentication for DNS answers, having
DNSSEC enabled makes it possible to trust the answers. The biggest DNSSEC enabled makes it possible to trust the answers. The biggest
stumbling block is deploying DNSSEC is the initial configuration of stumbling block is deploying DNSSEC is the initial configuration of
the DNSSEC domain trust anchor in the parent, DS record. the DNSSEC domain trust anchor in the parent, DS record.
3.2. How does a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Trust Anchor ? 3.2. How does a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Trust Anchor?
The child
The child needs first to sign the domain, then the child can "upload" needs first to sign the domain, then the child can "upload" the DS
the DS record to its parent. The "normal" way to upload is to go record to its parent. The "normal" way to upload is to go through
through registration interface, but that fails frequently. The DNS registration interface, but that fails frequently. The DNS Operator
Operator may not have access to the interface thus the registrant may not have access to the interface thus the registrant needs to
needs to relay the information. For large operations this does not relay the information. For large operations this does not scale, as
scale, as evident in lack of Trust Anchors for signed deployments evident in lack of Trust Anchors for signed deployments that are
that are operated by third parties. operated by third parties.
The child can signal its desire to have DNSSEC validation enabled by The child can signal its desire to have DNSSEC validation enabled by
publishing one of the special DNS records CDS and/or CDNSKEY[RFC7344] publishing one of the special DNS records CDS and/or CDNSKEY[RFC7344]
and its proposed extension [I-D.ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds]. Once the and its proposed extension [I-D.ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds].
"parent" "sees" these records it SHOULD start acceptance processing.
This document will cover below how to make the CDS records visible to Once the "parent" "sees" these records it SHOULD start acceptance
the right parental agent. processing. This document will cover below how to make the CDS
records visible to the right parental agent.
We and [I-D.ogud-dnsop-maintain-ds] argue that the publication of We and [I-D.ogud-dnsop-maintain-ds] argue that the publication of
CDS/CDNSKEY record is sufficient for the parent to start acceptance CDS/CDNSKEY record is sufficient for the parent to start the
processing. The main point is to provide authentication thus if the acceptance processing. The main point is to provide authentication
child is in "good" state then the DS upload should be simple to thus if the child is in "good" state then the DS upload should be
accept and publish. If there is a problem the parent has ability to simple to accept and publish. If there is a problem the parent has
not add the DS. ability to not add the DS.
3.3. What checks are needed by parent ? 3.3. What checks are needed by parent?
The parent upon receiving a signal that it check the child for desire The parent upon receiving a signal that it check the child for desire
for DS record publication. The basic tests include, for DS record publication. The basic tests include,
1. All the nameservers for the zone agree on zone contents 1. The zone is signed
2. The zone is signed 2. The zone has a CDS signed by a KSK referenced in the current DS,
3. The zone has a CDS signed by the KSK referenced in the CDS referring to a at least one key in the current DNSKEY RRset
3. All the name-servers for the zone agree on the CDS RRset contents
Parents can have additional tests, defined delays, queries over TCP, Parents can have additional tests, defined delays, queries over TCP,
and even ask the DNS Operator to prove they can add data to the zone, and even ask the DNS Operator to prove they can add data to the zone,
or provide a code that is tied to the affected zone. The protocol is or provide a code that is tied to the affected zone. The protocol is
partially-synchronus, i.e. the server can elect to hold connection partially-synchronous, i.e. the server can elect to hold connection
open until the operation has concluded or it can return that it open until the operation has concluded or it can return that it
received the request. It is up to the child to monitor the parent received the request. It is up to the child to monitor the parent
for completion of the operation and issue possible follow-up calls. for completion of the operation and issue possible follow-up calls.
4. OP-3-DNS-RR RESTful API 4. OP-3-DNS-RR RESTful API
The specification of this API is minimalistic, but a realistic one. The specification of this API is minimalist, but a realistic one.
Question: How to respond if the party contacted is not ALLOWED to
make the requested change?
4.1. Authentication 4.1. Authentication
The API does not impose any unique server authentication The API does not impose any unique server authentication
requirements. The server authentication provided by TLS fully requirements. The server authentication provided by TLS fully
addresses the needs. In general, transports for the API must provide addresses the needs. In general, for the API SHOULD be provided over
a TLS-protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) TLS-protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or VPN.
4.2. Authorization 4.2. Authorization
Authorization is out of scope of this document. The CDS records Authorization is out of scope of this document. The CDS records
present in the zone file are indications of intention to sign/unsign/ present in the zone file are indications of intention to sign/unsign/
update the DS records of the domain in the parent zone. This means update the DS records of the domain in the parent zone. This means
the proceeding of the action is not determined by who issued the the proceeding of the action is not determined by who issued the
request. Therefore, authorization is out of the scope. Registries request. Therefore, authorization is out of the scope. Registries
and registars who plan to provide this service can, however, and registrars who plan to provide this service can, however,
implement their own policy such as IP white listing, API key, etc. implement their own policy such as IP white listing, API key, etc.
4.3. Base URL Locator 4.3. Base URL Locator
The base URL for registries or registrars who want to provide this The base URL for registries or registrars who want to provide this
service to DNS Operators can be made auto-discoverable as an RDAP service to DNS Operators can be made auto-discoverable as an RDAP
extension. extension.
4.4. CDS resource 4.4. CDS resource
Path: /domains/{domain}/cds {domain}: is the domain name to be Path: /domains/{domain}/cds {domain}: is the domain name to be
operated on operated on
4.4.1. Initial Trust Establishment (Turn on DNSSEC) 4.4.1. Initial Trust Establishment (Enable DNSSEC validation)
4.4.1.1. Request 4.4.1.1. Request
Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/cds Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/cds
A DS record based on the CDS record in the child zone file will be A DS record based on the CDS record in the child zone file will be
inserted into the registry and the parent zone file upon the inserted into the registry and the parent zone file upon the
successful completion of such request. If there are multiple CDS successful completion of such request. If there are multiple CDS
records in the child zone file, multiple DS records will be added. records in the CDS RRset, multiple DS records will be added.
Either the CDS/CDNSKEY or the DNSKEY can be used to create the DS Either the CDS/CDNSKEY or the DNSKEY can be used to create the DS
record. record. Note: entity expecting CDNSKEY is still expected accept the
/cds command.
4.4.1.2. Response 4.4.1.2. Response
o HTTP Status code 201 indicates a success. o HTTP Status code 201 indicates a success.
o HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation. o HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.
o HTTP Status code 403 indicates a failure due to an invalid o HTTP Status code 403 indicates a failure due to an invalid
challenge token. challenge token.
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4.5.1.1. Request 4.5.1.1. Request
Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/tokens Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/tokens
A random token to be included as a _delegate TXT record prior A random token to be included as a _delegate TXT record prior
establishing the DNSSEC initial trust. establishing the DNSSEC initial trust.
4.5.1.2. Response 4.5.1.2. Response
o HTTP Status code 201 indicates a success. o HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success. Token included in the
body of the response, as a valid TXT record
o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist. o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.
o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable
reasons. reasons.
4.6. Customized Error Messages 4.6. Customized Error Messages
Service providers can provide a customized error message in the Service providers can provide a customized error message in the
response body in addition to the HTTP status code defined in the response body in addition to the HTTP status code defined in the
previous section. previous section.
This can include an Identifiying number/string that can be used to
track the requests.
#Using the definitions This section at the moment contains comments
from early implementers
4.7. How to react to 403 on POST cds
The basic reaction to a 403 on POST /domains/{domain}/cds is to issue
POST /domains/{domain}/tokens command to fetch the challenge to
insert into the zone.
5. Security considerations 5. Security considerations
TBD This will hopefully get more zones to become validated thus TBD This will hopefully get more zones to become validated thus
overall the security gain out weights the possible drawbacks. overall the security gain out weights the possible drawbacks.
risk of takeover ? risk of validation errors < declines transfer
issues
6. IANA Actions 6. IANA Actions
URI ??? TBD URI ??? TBD
7. Internationalization Considerations 7. Internationalization Considerations
This protcol is designed for machine to machine communications This protocol is designed for machine to machine communications
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds] [I-D.ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds]
Gu[eth]mundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS records Gu[eth]mundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS records
from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain- from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-
ds-00 (work in progress), December 2015. ds-00 (work in progress), December 2015.
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Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012, Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.
[RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the [RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480, DOI Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480, DOI
10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015, 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
Appendix A. Document History Appendix A. Document History
A.1. Version 01 A.1. Version 03
Clarified based on comments and questions from early implementors
A.2. Version 02
Reflected comments on mailing lists
A.3. Version 01
This version adds a full REST definition this is based on suggestions This version adds a full REST definition this is based on suggestions
from Jakob Schlyter. from Jakob Schlyter.
A.2. Version 00 A.4. Version 00
First rough version First rough version
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jacques Latour Jacques Latour
CIRA CIRA
Email: jacques.latour@cira.ca Email: jacques.latour@cira.ca
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Jacques Latour Jacques Latour
CIRA CIRA
Email: jacques.latour@cira.ca Email: jacques.latour@cira.ca
Olafur Gudmundsson Olafur Gudmundsson
Cloudflare, Inc. Cloudflare, Inc.
Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com
Paul Wouters Paul Wouters
Red Hat Red Hat
Email: paul@nohats.ca Email: paul@nohats.ca
Matthew Pounsett Matthew Pounsett
Rightside Rightside Group, Ltd.
Email: matt@conundrum.com Email: matt@conundrum.com
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