< draft-merkle-ikev2-ke-brainpool-05.txt		draft-merkle-ikev2-ke-brainpool-06.txt >
	Network Working Group J. Merkle		Network Working Group J. Merkle
	Internet-Draft secunet Security Networks		Internet-Draft secunet Security Networks
	Intended status: Informational M. Lochter		Intended status: Informational M. Lochter
	Expires: October 25, 2013 Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der		Expires: October 25, 2013 Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der
	Informationstechnik (BSI)		Informationstechnik (BSI)
	April 23, 2013		April 23, 2013
	Using the ECC Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange		Using the ECC Brainpool Curves for IKEv2 Key Exchange
	draft-merkle-ikev2-ke-brainpool-05		draft-merkle-ikev2-ke-brainpool-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document specifies the use of ECC Brainpool elliptic curve		This document specifies the use of ECC Brainpool elliptic curve
	groups for key exchange in the Internet Key Exchange version 2		groups for key exchange in the Internet Key Exchange version 2
	(IKEv2) protocol.		(IKEv2) protocol.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	skipping to change at page 6, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 11 ¶
	coordinate of the Diffie-Hellman common value using the FieldElement-		coordinate of the Diffie-Hellman common value using the FieldElement-
	to-OctetString conversion method specified in [SEC1] and MUST have		to-OctetString conversion method specified in [SEC1] and MUST have
	bit length as indicated in the Table 2.		bit length as indicated in the Table 2.
	3. Security Considerations		3. Security Considerations
	The security considerations of [RFC5996] apply accordingly.		The security considerations of [RFC5996] apply accordingly.
	In order to thwart certain active attacks, the validity of the other		In order to thwart certain active attacks, the validity of the other
	peer's public Diffie-Hellmann value (x,y) recovered from the received		peer's public Diffie-Hellmann value (x,y) recovered from the received
	key exchange payload needs to be verified. In particular, it must be		key exchange payload needs to be verified. In particular, it MUST be
	verified that the coordinates x and y of the public value satisfy the		verified that the coordinates x and y of the public value satisfy the
	curve equation.		curve equation. For additional information we refer to [IKE_DH_Req].
	The confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of a secure		The confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of a secure
	communication based on IKEv2 is limited by the weakest cryptographic		communication based on IKEv2 is limited by the weakest cryptographic
	primitive applied. In order to achieve a maximum security level when		primitive applied. In order to achieve a maximum security level when
	using one of the elliptic curves from Table 1 for key exchange, the		using one of the elliptic curves from Table 1 for key exchange, the
	key derivation function, the algorithms and key lengths of symmetric		key derivation function, the algorithms and key lengths of symmetric
	encryption and message authentication as well as the algorithm, bit		encryption and message authentication as well as the algorithm, bit
	length and hash function used for signature generation should be		length and hash function used for signature generation should be
	chosen according to the recommendations of [NIST800-57] and		chosen according to the recommendations of [NIST800-57] and
	[RFC5639]. Furthermore, the private Diffie-Hellman keys should be		[RFC5639]. Furthermore, the private Diffie-Hellman keys should be
	skipping to change at page 8, line 47 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 47 ¶
	Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve Implementations",		Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve Implementations",
	July 2011.		July 2011.
	[FIPS] National Institute of Standards and Technology,		[FIPS] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
	"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-2,		"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-2,
	December 1998.		December 1998.
	[HMV] Hankerson, D., Menezes, A., and S. Vanstone, "Guide to		[HMV] Hankerson, D., Menezes, A., and S. Vanstone, "Guide to
	Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Springer Verlag, 2004.		Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Springer Verlag, 2004.
			[IKE_DH_Req] Sheffer, Y. and S. Fluhrer, "Additional Diffie-Hellman
			Tests for IKEv2 (work in progress)",
			draft-ietf-ipsecme-dh-checks-00 (work in progress),
			January 2013.
	[ISO1] International Organization for Standardization,		[ISO1] International Organization for Standardization,
	"Information Technology - Security Techniques - Digital		"Information Technology - Security Techniques - Digital
	Signatures with Appendix - Part 3: Discrete Logarithm		Signatures with Appendix - Part 3: Discrete Logarithm
	Based Mechanisms", ISO/IEC 14888-3, 2006.		Based Mechanisms", ISO/IEC 14888-3, 2006.
	[ISO2] International Organization for Standardization,		[ISO2] International Organization for Standardization,
	"Information Technology - Security Techniques -		"Information Technology - Security Techniques -
	Cryptographic Techniques Based on Elliptic Curves -		Cryptographic Techniques Based on Elliptic Curves -
	Part 2: Digital signatures", ISO/IEC 15946-2, 2002.		Part 2: Digital signatures", ISO/IEC 15946-2, 2002.
End of changes. 4 change blocks.
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