< draft-msahli-ipwave-ieee1609-00.txt   draft-msahli-ipwave-ieee1609-01.txt >
IPWAVE Working Group M. Msahli, Ed. Network Working Group M. Msahli, Ed.
Internet-Draft Telecom ParisTech Internet-Draft Telecom ParisTech
Intended status: Informational P. Kampanakis, Ed. Intended status: Experimental P. Kampanakis, Ed.
Expires: September 30, 2019 Cisco Expires: November 29, 2019 Cisco
March 29, 2019 May 28, 2019
TLS Authentication using IEEE 1609.2 certificates TLS Authentication using IEEE 1609.2 certificates
draft-msahli-ipwave-ieee1609-00.txt draft-msahli-ipwave-ieee1609-01.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the use of a new certificate type to This document specifies the use of a new certificate type to
authenticate TLS entities. The first type enables the use of a authenticate TLS entities. The first type enables the use of a
certificate specified by the IEEE and the European Telecommunications certificate specified by the IEEE and the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI). Standards Institute (ETSI).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 30, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 29, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Extension Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. Extension Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. TLS Client and Server Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. TLS Client and Server Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Server Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. Server Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Certificate Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Certificate Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. TLS Server and TLS Client use the 1609Dot2 Certificate . 6 6.1. TLS Server and TLS Client use the 1609Dot2 Certificate . 6
6.2. TLS Client uses the IEEE 1609.2 certificate and TLS 6.2. TLS Client uses the IEEE 1609.2 certificate and TLS
Server uses the X 509 certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Server uses the X509 certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Co-Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix A. Co-Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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extension in the Server Hello for TLS 1.2 or in Encrypted extension in the Server Hello for TLS 1.2 or in Encrypted
Extension for TLS 1.3. Then, the server requests a certificate Extension for TLS 1.3. Then, the server requests a certificate
from the client (via the certificate_request message) from the client (via the certificate_request message)
It is worth to mention that the TLS client or server public keys are It is worth to mention that the TLS client or server public keys are
obtained from a certificate chain from a web page. obtained from a certificate chain from a web page.
5. Certificate Verification 5. Certificate Verification
Verification of an IEEE 1609.2/ ETSI TS 103097 certificates or Verification of an IEEE 1609.2/ ETSI TS 103097 certificates or
certificate chain is described in section 5.5.2 of [IEEE1609.2]. In certificate chain is described in section 5.1 of [IEEE1609.2]. In
the case where the certificate_type is 1609Dot2, the the case where the certificate_type is 1609Dot2, the
CertificateVerify message does not contain a raw signature but CertificateVerify message does not contain a raw signature but
instead contains a Canonical Octet Encoding Rules (COER)-encoded instead contains a Canonical Octet Encoding Rules (COER)-encoded
Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signed as specified in [1609.2b], with the Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signed as specified in [1609.2b], with the
pduFunctionalType field present and set to tlsHandshake. A full pduFunctionalType field present and set to tlsHandshake. A full
specification of the contents of this Ieee1609Dot2Data, including specification of the contents of this Ieee1609Dot2Data, including
optional fields, is given in [1609.2b]. The message input to the optional fields, is given in [1609.2b]. The message input to the
signature calculation is the usual message input for TLS 1.3, as signature calculation is the usual message input for TLS 1.3, as
specified in [RFC8446] section 4.4.3, consisting of pad, context specified in [RFC8446] section 4.4.3, consisting of pad, context
string, separator and content, where content is Transcript- string, separator and content, where content is Transcript-
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{CertificateVerify*} {CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} {Finished}
{Certificate*} <------- [Application Data*] {Certificate*} <------- [Application Data*]
{CertificateVerify*} {CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} --------> {Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data] [Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Figure 2: TLS Client and TLS Server use the IEEE 1609.2 certificate Figure 2: TLS Client and TLS Server use the IEEE 1609.2 certificate
6.2. TLS Client uses the IEEE 1609.2 certificate and TLS Server uses 6.2. TLS Client uses the IEEE 1609.2 certificate and TLS Server uses
the X 509 certificate the X509 certificate
This example shows the TLS authentication, where the TLS Client This example shows the TLS authentication, where the TLS Client
populates the server_certificate_type extension with the X509 populates the server_certificate_type extension with the X509
certificate and Raw Public Key type as presented in figure 3. the certificate and Raw Public Key type as presented in figure 3. the
client indicates its ability to receive and to validate an X509 client indicates its ability to receive and to validate an X509
certificate from the server. The server chooses the X509 certificate from the server. The server chooses the X509
certificateto make its authentication with the Client. certificateto make its authentication with the Client.
Client Server Client Server
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The "SessionTicket" [IANA value 35] extension for session The "SessionTicket" [IANA value 35] extension for session
resumption. resumption.
In addition, servers SHOULD not support renegotiation [RFC5746] In addition, servers SHOULD not support renegotiation [RFC5746]
which presented Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) type attacks over the which presented Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) type attacks over the
past years for TLS 1.2. past years for TLS 1.2.
8. Privacy Considerations 8. Privacy Considerations
For privacy considerations in a vehicular environment the use of EEE For privacy considerations in a vehicular environment the use of IEEE
1609.2/ETSI TS 103097 certificate is recommended for many reasons: 1609.2/ETSI TS 103097 certificate is recommended for many reasons:
In order to address the risk of a personal data leakage, messages In order to address the risk of a personal data leakage, messages
exchanged for V2V communications are signed using IEEE 1609.2/ETSI exchanged for V2V communications are signed using IEEE 1609.2/ETSI
TS 103097 pseudonym certificates TS 103097 pseudonym certificates
The purpose of these certificates is to provide privacy relying on The purpose of these certificates is to provide privacy relying on
geographical and/or temporal validity criteria, and minimizing the geographical and/or temporal validity criteria, and minimizing the
exchange of private data exchange of private data
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
Existing IANA references have not been updated yet to point to this Existing IANA references have not been updated yet to point to this
document. document.
10. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Eric Rescola and Ilari Liusvaara for their The authors wish to thank Eric Rescola and Ilari Liusvaara for their
feedback and suggestions on improving this document. Thanks are due feedback and suggestions on improving this document. Thanks are due
to Sean Turner for his valuable and detailed comments. Special to Sean Turner for his valuable and detailed comments. Special
thanks to Maik Seewald for their guidance and support in the early thanks to Jasja Tijink and Maik Seewald for their guidance and
stages of the draft. support of the draft.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[IEEE1609.2] [IEEE1609.2]
"IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments - Security Services for Applications and Environments - Security Services for Applications and
Management Messages", 2016. Management Messages", 2016.
[IEEE1609.2b] [IEEE1609.2a]
"Draft Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular "Draft Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments Security Services for Applications and for Environments Security Services for Applications and for
Management Messages", 2018. Management Messages", 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997. Requirement Levels", March 1997.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B. [RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", May 2006. for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", May 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", August 2008.
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Extension Definitions", January 2011. Extension Definitions", January 2011.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Tschofenig, H., Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, [RFC7250] Wouters, P., Tschofenig, H., Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen,
"Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", June 2014. and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", June 2014.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", August 2018. Version 1.3", August 2018.
[TS103097] [TS103097]
"ETSI TS 103 097 v1.3.1 (2017-10): Intelligent Transport "ETSI TS 103 097 : Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS);
Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and certificate Security; Security header and certificate formats".
formats", October 2017.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-00] [draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-00]
KAISER, A., LABIOD, H., LONC, B., MSAHLI, M., and A. KAISER, A., LABIOD, H., LONC, B., MSAHLI, M., and A.
SERHROUCHNI, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) SERHROUCHNI, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Authentication using ITS ETSI and IEEE certificates", Authentication using ITS ETSI and IEEE certificates",
august 2017. august 2017.
Appendix A. Co-Authors Appendix A. Co-Authors
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