< draft-nir-tls-eap-10.txt		draft-nir-tls-eap-11.txt >
	TLS Working Group Y. Nir		TLS Working Group Y. Nir
	Internet-Draft Check Point		Internet-Draft Check Point
	Intended status: Standards Track Y. Sheffer		Intended status: Standards Track Y. Sheffer
	Expires: September 1, 2011 Independent		Expires: September 11, 2011 Independent
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	NSN		NSN
	P. Gutmann		P. Gutmann
	University of Auckland		University of Auckland
	February 28, 2011		March 10, 2011
	TLS using EAP Authentication		TLS using EAP Authentication
	draft-nir-tls-eap-10		draft-nir-tls-eap-11
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes an extension to the TLS protocol to allow TLS		This document describes an extension to the TLS protocol to allow TLS
	clients to authenticate with legacy credentials using the Extensible		clients to authenticate with non-certificate credentials using the
	Authentication Protocol (EAP).		Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP).
	This work follows the example of IKEv2, where EAP has been added to		This work follows the example of IKEv2, where EAP has been added to
	the protocol to allow clients to use different credentials such as		the protocol to allow clients to use different credentials such as
	passwords, token cards, and shared secrets.		passwords, token cards, and shared secrets.
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 1, 2011.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2011.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 3, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 15 ¶
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document describes a new extension to [TLS]. This extension		This document describes a new extension to [TLS]. This extension
	allows a TLS client to authenticate using [EAP] instead of performing		allows a TLS client to authenticate using [EAP] instead of performing
	the authentication at the application level. The extension follows		the authentication at the application level. The extension follows
	[TLS-EXT]. For the remainder of this document we will refer to this		[TLS-EXT]. For the remainder of this document we will refer to this
	extension as TEE (TLS with EAP Extension).		extension as TEE (TLS with EAP Extension).
	TEE extends the TLS handshake beyond the regular setup, to allow the		TEE extends the TLS handshake beyond the regular setup, to allow the
	EAP protocol to run between the TLS server (called an "authenticator"		EAP protocol to run between the TLS server (called an "authenticator"
	in EAP) and the TLS client (called a "supplicant"). This allows the		in EAP) and the TLS client (called either a "supplicant" or a
	TLS architecture to handle client authentication before exposing the		"peer"). This allows the TLS architecture to handle client
	server application software to an unauthenticated client. In doing		authentication before exposing the server application software to an
	this, we follow the approach taken for IKEv2 in [RFC5996]. However,		unauthenticated client. In doing this, we follow the approach taken
	similar to regular TLS, we protect the user identity by only sending		for IKEv2 in [RFC5996]. However, similar to regular TLS, we protect
	the client identity after the server has authenticated. In this our		the user identity by only sending the client identity after the
	solution differs from that of IKEv2.		server has authenticated. In this our solution differs from that of
			IKEv2.
	Currently used applications that rely on non-certificate user		Currently used applications that rely on non-certificate user
	credentials use TLS to authenticate the server only. After that, the		credentials use TLS to authenticate the server only. After that, the
	application takes over, and presents a login screen where the user is		application takes over, and presents a login screen where the user is
	expected to present their credentials.		expected to present their credentials.
	This creates several problems. It allows a client to access the		This creates several problems. It allows a client to access the
	application before authentication, thus creating a potential for		application before authentication, thus creating a potential for
	anonymous attacks on non-hardened applications. Additionally, web		anonymous attacks on non-hardened applications. Additionally, web
	pages are not particularly well suited for long shared secrets and		pages are not particularly well suited for long shared secrets and
	skipping to change at page 18, line 17 ¶		skipping to change at page 18, line 17 ¶
	11.1. Normative References		11.1. Normative References
	[EAP] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.		[EAP] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
	Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",		Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
	RFC 3748, June 2004.		RFC 3748, June 2004.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[TLS] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[TLS] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
	[TLS-EXT] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,		[TLS-EXT] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
	and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)		and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
	Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006.		Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006.
	11.2. Informative References		11.2. Informative References
	[Compound-Authentication]		[Compound-Authentication]
	Puthenkulam, J., Lortz, V., Palekar, A., and D. Simon,		Puthenkulam, J., Lortz, V., Palekar, A., and D. Simon,
	"The Compound Authentication Binding Problem",		"The Compound Authentication Binding Problem",
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