< draft-shirey-secgloss-v2-01.txt   draft-shirey-secgloss-v2-02.txt >
INTERNET-DRAFT R. W. Shirey INTERNET-DRAFT R. W. Shirey
Obsoletes: RFC 2828, FYI 36 BBN Technologies Obsoletes: RFC 2828, FYI 36 BBN Technologies
Expiration Date: 9 September 2005 9 March 2005 Expiration Date: 10 May 2006 10 November 2005
Internet Security Glossary, Version 2 Internet Security Glossary, Version 2
<draft-shirey-secgloss-v2-01.txt> <draft-shirey-secgloss-v2-02.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may
not be created, except to publish it as an RFC and to translate it not be created, except to publish it as an RFC and to translate it
into languages other than English. into languages other than English.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
skipping to change at page 1, line 43 skipping to change at page 1, line 51
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html" http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html"
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract Abstract
This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, and explanations This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, and explanations
of terminology for information system security. The 288 pages of of terminology for information system security. The 291 pages of
listings offer recommendations to improve the clarity of Internet listings offer recommendations to improve the clarity of Internet
Standards documents (ISDs) and to make them more easily understood by Standards documents (ISDs) and to make them more easily understood by
international readers. The recommendations follow the principles that international readers. The recommendations follow the principles that
ISDs should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same ISDs should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same
concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary
sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open
publications; and (d) avoid terms that are proprietary, favor a publications; and (d) avoid terms that are proprietary, favor a
particular vendor, or create a bias toward a particular technology or particular vendor, or create a bias toward a particular technology or
mechanism versus other, competing techniques that already exist or mechanism versus other, competing techniques that already exist or
might be developed. might be developed.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
Section Page Section Page
------- ---- ------- ----
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Format of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Format of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Presentation Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 Order of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Capitalization and Abbreviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Capitalization and Abbreviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Support for Automated Searching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3 Support for Automated Searching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 Definition Type and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4 Definition Type and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.5 Explanatory Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.5 Explanatory Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6 Cross-References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.6 Cross-References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.7 Trademarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.7 Trademarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.8 The New Punctuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.8 The New Punctuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Types of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Types of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Type "I": Recommended Definitions of Internet Origin . . . 6 3.1 Type "I": Recommended Definitions of Internet Origin . . . 6
3.2 Type "N": Recommended Definitions of Non-Internet Origin . 7 3.2 Type "N": Recommended Definitions of Non-Internet Origin . 7
3.3 Type "O": Other Terms and Definitions to be Noted . . . . 7 3.3 Type "O": Other Terms and Definitions to be Noted . . . . 7
3.4 Type "D": Deprecated Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . 7 3.4 Type "D": Deprecated Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . 7
3.5 Definition Substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5 Definition Substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 5. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 6. Security Considerations and IANA Considertions . . . . . . . . 319
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
8. Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 8. Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
9. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 9. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This Glossary provides an internally consistent and self-contained This Glossary provides an internally consistent and self-contained
set of terms, abbreviations, and definitions -- supported by set of terms, abbreviations, and definitions -- supported by
explanations, recommendations, and references -- for terminology that explanations, recommendations, and references -- for terminology that
concerns information system security. The intent of this Glossary is concerns information system security. The intent of this Glossary is
to improve the comprehensibility of Internet Standards documents to improve the comprehensibility of Internet Standards documents
(ISDs) -- i.e., RFCs, Internet-Drafts, and other material produced as (ISDs) -- i.e., RFCs, Internet-Drafts, and other material produced as
part of the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026) -- and other part of the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026) -- and other
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$ *-property $ *-property
(N) Synonym for "confinement property" in the context of the Bell- (N) Synonym for "confinement property" in the context of the Bell-
LaPadula model. Pronunciation: star property. LaPadula model. Pronunciation: star property.
$ 3DES $ 3DES
(N) See: Triple Data Encryption Algorithm. (N) See: Triple Data Encryption Algorithm.
$ A1 computer system $ A1 computer system
(O) /TCSEC/ See: Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System (O) /TCSEC/ See: Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria". Evaluation Criteria". (Compare: beyond A1.)
$ AA $ AA
See: attribute authority. (D) See: "Deprecated Abbreviation" under "attribute authority".
$ ABA Guidelines $ ABA Guidelines
(N) "American Bar Association (ABA) Digital Signature Guidelines" (N) "American Bar Association (ABA) Digital Signature Guidelines"
[ABA], a framework of legal principles for using digital [DSG], a framework of legal principles for using digital
signatures and digital certificates in electronic commerce. signatures and digital certificates in electronic commerce.
$ Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) $ Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)
(N) A standard for describing data objects. [Larm, X680] (See: (N) A standard for describing data objects. [Larm, X680] (See:
CMS.) CMS.)
Deprecated Usage: The term "ASN.1" can be used narrowly to Deprecated Usage: The term "ASN.1" can be used narrowly to
describe the notation or language called "Abstract describe the notation or language called "Abstract
Syntax Notation One", or can be used more broadly to Syntax Notation One", or can be used more broadly to
encompass the notation, its associated encoding rules encompass the notation, its associated encoding rules
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"certificateRevocationList". "certificateRevocationList".
$ ACC $ ACC
(I) See: access control center. (I) See: access control center.
$ acceptable risk $ acceptable risk
(I) A risk that is understood and tolerated by a system's user, (I) A risk that is understood and tolerated by a system's user,
operator, owner, or accreditor, usually because the cost or operator, owner, or accreditor, usually because the cost or
difficulty of implementing an effective countermeasure for the difficulty of implementing an effective countermeasure for the
associated vulnerability exceeds the expectation of loss. (See: associated vulnerability exceeds the expectation of loss. (See:
adequate security, "second law" under "Courtney's laws".) adequate security, risk, "second law" under "Courtney's laws".)
$ access $ access
1. (I) The ability and means to communicate with or otherwise 1. (I) The ability and means to communicate with or otherwise
interact with a system to use system resources either to handle interact with a system to use system resources either to handle
information or to gain knowledge of the information the system information or to gain knowledge of the information the system
contains. (Compare: handle.) contains. (Compare: handle.)
Usage: The definition is intended to include all types of Usage: The definition is intended to include all types of
communication with a system, including one-way communication in communication with a system, including one-way communication in
either direction. In actual practice, however, passive users might either direction. In actual practice, however, passive users might
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entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according
to that policy. (See: access, access control service, computer to that policy. (See: access, access control service, computer
security, discretionary access control, mandatory access control, security, discretionary access control, mandatory access control,
role-based access control.) role-based access control.)
3. (I) /formal model/ Limitations on interactions between subjects 3. (I) /formal model/ Limitations on interactions between subjects
and objects in an information system. and objects in an information system.
4. (O) "The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, 4. (O) "The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource,
including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized
manner." [I7498 Part 2] manner." [I7498-2]
5. (O) /U.S. Government/ A system using physical, electronic, or 5. (O) /U.S. Government/ A system using physical, electronic, or
human controls to identify or admit personnel with properly human controls to identify or admit personnel with properly
authorized access to a SCIF. authorized access to a SCIF.
$ access control center (ACC) $ access control center (ACC)
(I) A computer that maintains a database (possibly in the form of (I) A computer that maintains a database (possibly in the form of
an access control matrix) defining the security policy for an an access control matrix) defining the security policy for an
access control service, and that acts as a server for clients access control service, and that acts as a server for clients
requesting access control decisions. requesting access control decisions.
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1. (O) /SET/ "The financial institution that establishes an 1. (O) /SET/ "The financial institution that establishes an
account with a merchant and processes payment card authorizations account with a merchant and processes payment card authorizations
and payments." [SET1] and payments." [SET1]
2. (O) /SET/ "The institution (or its agent) that acquires from 2. (O) /SET/ "The institution (or its agent) that acquires from
the card acceptor the financial data relating to the transaction the card acceptor the financial data relating to the transaction
and initiates that data into an interchange system." [SET2] and initiates that data into an interchange system." [SET2]
$ activation data $ activation data
(N) Secret data, other than keys, that is required to access a (N) Secret data, other than keys, that is required to access a
cryptographic module. cryptographic module. (See: CIK. Compare: initialization value.)
$ active attack $ active attack
(I) See: secondary definition under "attack". (I) See: secondary definition under "attack".
$ active content $ active content
(O) "Electronic documents that can carry out or trigger actions 1a. (I) Executable software that is bound to a document or other
automatically on a computer platform without the intervention of a data file and that executes automatically when a user accesses the
user. [This technology enables] mobile code associated with a file, without explicit initiation by the user. (Compare: mobile
document to execute as the document is rendered." [SP28] (See: code.)
mobile code.)
Tutorial: Active content can be mobile code when its associated
file is transferred across a network.
1b. (O) "Electronic documents that can carry out or trigger
actions automatically on a computer platform without the
intervention of a user. [This technology enables] mobile code
associated with a document to execute as the document is
rendered." [SP28]
$ active user $ active user
(I) See: secondary definition under "attack". (I) See: secondary definition under "attack".
$ active wiretapping $ active wiretapping
(I) A wiretapping attack that attempts to alter data being (I) A wiretapping attack that attempts to alter data being
communicated or otherwise affect data flow. (See: wiretapping. communicated or otherwise affect data flow. (See: wiretapping.
Compare: active attack, passive wiretapping.) Compare: active attack, passive wiretapping.)
$ add-on security $ add-on security
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$ American National Standards Institute (ANSI) $ American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
(N) A private, not-for-profit association that administers U.S. (N) A private, not-for-profit association that administers U.S.
private sector voluntary standards. private sector voluntary standards.
Tutorial: ANSI has approximately 1,000 member organizations, Tutorial: ANSI has approximately 1,000 member organizations,
including equipment users, manufacturers, and others. These including equipment users, manufacturers, and others. These
include commercial firms, government agencies, and other include commercial firms, government agencies, and other
institutions and international entities. institutions and international entities.
ANSI is the sole U.S. representative to (1) ISO and (2) (via the ANSI is the sole U.S. representative to (a) ISO and (b) (via the
U.S. National Committee) the International Electrotechnical U.S. National Committee) the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC), which are the two major, non-treaty, Commission (IEC), which are the two major, non-treaty,
international standards organizations. international standards organizations.
ANSI provides a forum for ANSI-accredited standards development ANSI provides a forum for ANSI-accredited standards development
groups. Among those groups, the following are especially relevant groups. Among those groups, the following are especially relevant
to Internet security: to Internet security:
- International Committee for Information Technology - International Committee for Information Technology
Standardization (INCITS) (formerly X3): Primary U.S. focus of Standardization (INCITS) (formerly X3): Primary U.S. focus of
standardization in information and communications technologies, standardization in information and communications technologies,
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- Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS): - Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS):
Develops standards, specifications, guidelines, requirements, Develops standards, specifications, guidelines, requirements,
technical reports, industry processes, and verification tests technical reports, industry processes, and verification tests
for interoperability and reliability of telecommunications for interoperability and reliability of telecommunications
networks, equipment, and software. Example: [A1523]. networks, equipment, and software. Example: [A1523].
$ American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) $ American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII)
(N) A scheme that encodes 128 specified characters -- the numbers (N) A scheme that encodes 128 specified characters -- the numbers
0-9, the letters a-z and A-Z, some basic punctuation symbols, some 0-9, the letters a-z and A-Z, some basic punctuation symbols, some
control codes that originated with Teletype machines, and a blank control codes that originated with Teletype machines, and a blank
space -- into the 7-bit binary numbers. Forms the basis of the space -- into the 7-bit binary integers. Forms the basis of the
character set representations used in most computers and many character set representations used in most computers and many
Internet standards. [FP001] (See: code.) Internet standards. [FP001] (See: code.)
$ Anderson report $ Anderson report
(O) A 1972 study of computer security that was written by James P. (O) A 1972 study of computer security that was written by James P.
Anderson for the U.S. Air Force [Ande]. Anderson for the U.S. Air Force [Ande].
Tutorial: Anderson collaborated with a panel of experts to study Tutorial: Anderson collaborated with a panel of experts to study
Air Force requirements for multilevel security. The study Air Force requirements for multilevel security. The study
recommended research and development that was urgently needed to recommended research and development that was urgently needed to
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can thus remain relatively anonymous, but can also accept the can thus remain relatively anonymous, but can also accept the
transaction as legitimate. Real names of the parties cannot be transaction as legitimate. Real names of the parties cannot be
easily determined by observers of the transaction, but an easily determined by observers of the transaction, but an
authorized third party may be able to map an alias to a real name, authorized third party may be able to map an alias to a real name,
such as by presenting the institution with a court order. In other such as by presenting the institution with a court order. In other
applications, anonymous entities may be completely untraceable. applications, anonymous entities may be completely untraceable.
$ anonymizer $ anonymizer
(I) A internetwork service, usually provided via a proxy server, (I) A internetwork service, usually provided via a proxy server,
that provides anonymity and privacy for clients. That is, the that provides anonymity and privacy for clients. That is, the
service enables a client to access servers without allowing the service enables a client to access servers (a) without allowing
anyone to gather information about which servers the client anyone to gather information about which servers the client
accesses and without allowing the accessed servers to gather accesses and (b) without allowing the accessed servers to gather
information about the client, such as its IP address. information about the client, such as its IP address.
$ anonymous credential $ anonymous credential
(D) /U.S. Government/ A credential that (a) can be used to (D) /U.S. Government/ A credential that (a) can be used to
authenticate a person as having a specific attribute or being a authenticate a person as having a specific attribute or being a
member of a specific group (e.g., military veterans or U.S. member of a specific group (e.g., military veterans or U.S.
citizens) but (b) does not reveal the individual identity of the citizens) but (b) does not reveal the individual identity of the
person that presents the credential. [M0404] (See: anonymity.) person that presents the credential. [M0404] (See: anonymity.)
Deprecated term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it mixes concepts Deprecated term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it mixes concepts
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is an X.509 certificate, the term could be misunderstood to mean is an X.509 certificate, the term could be misunderstood to mean
that the certificate was signed by a CA that has a persona that the certificate was signed by a CA that has a persona
certificate. Instead, use "attribute certificate", "organizational certificate. Instead, use "attribute certificate", "organizational
certificate", or "persona certificate" depending on what is meant, certificate", or "persona certificate" depending on what is meant,
and provide additional explanations as needed. and provide additional explanations as needed.
$ anonymous login $ anonymous login
(I) An access control feature (actually, an access control (I) An access control feature (actually, an access control
vulnerability) in many Internet hosts that enables users to gain vulnerability) in many Internet hosts that enables users to gain
access to general-purpose or public services and resources of a access to general-purpose or public services and resources of a
host (such as allowing any user to transfer data using File host (such as allowing any user to transfer data using FTP)
Transfer Protocol) without having a pre-established, identity- without having a pre-established, identity-specific account (i.e.,
specific account (i.e., user name and password). (See: anonymity.) user name and password). (See: anonymity.)
Tutorial: This feature exposes a system to more threats than when Tutorial: This feature exposes a system to more threats than when
all the users are known, pre-registered entities that are all the users are known, pre-registered entities that are
individually accountable for their actions. A user logs in using a individually accountable for their actions. A user logs in using a
special, publicly known user name (e.g., "anonymous", "guest", or special, publicly known user name (e.g., "anonymous", "guest", or
"ftp"). To use the public login name, the user is not required to "ftp"). To use the public login name, the user is not required to
know a secret password and may not be required to input anything know a secret password and may not be required to input anything
at all except the name. In other cases, to complete the normal at all except the name. In other cases, to complete the normal
sequence of steps in a login protocol, the system may require the sequence of steps in a login protocol, the system may require the
user to input a matching, publicly known password (such as user to input a matching, publicly known password (such as
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$ ATIS $ ATIS
(N) See: "Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions" (N) See: "Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions"
under "ANSI". under "ANSI".
$ attack $ attack
1. (I) An intentional act by which an entity attempts to evade 1. (I) An intentional act by which an entity attempts to evade
security services and violate the security policy of a system. security services and violate the security policy of a system.
That is, an actual assault on system security that derives from an That is, an actual assault on system security that derives from an
intelligent threat. (See: penetration, violation, vulnerability.) intelligent threat. (See: penetration, violation, vulnerability.)
2. (I) A method or technique used in an assault (e.g., 2. (I) A method or technique used in an assault (e.g.,
masquerade). (See: distributed attack.) masquerade). (See: blind attack, distributed attack.)
Tutorial: Attacks can be characterized according to intent: Tutorial: Attacks can be characterized according to intent:
- An "active attack" attempts to alter system resources or affect - An "active attack" attempts to alter system resources or affect
their operation. their operation.
- A "passive attack" attempts to learn or make use of information - A "passive attack" attempts to learn or make use of information
from the system but does not affect system resources. (E.g., from the system but does not affect system resources. (E.g.,
see: wiretapping.) see: wiretapping.)
The object of a passive attack might be to obtain data that is The object of a passive attack might be to obtain data that is
needed for an off-line attack. needed for an off-line attack.
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Tutorial: An authentication process consists of two steps: Tutorial: An authentication process consists of two steps:
- Identification step: Presenting an identifier to the security - Identification step: Presenting an identifier to the security
system. (Identifiers should be assigned carefully, because system. (Identifiers should be assigned carefully, because
authenticated identities are the basis for other security authenticated identities are the basis for other security
services, such as access control service.) services, such as access control service.)
- Verification step: Presenting or generating authentication - Verification step: Presenting or generating authentication
information that acts as evidence to prove the binding between information that acts as evidence to prove the binding between
the claimant and the identifier. (See: verification.) the claimant and the identifier. (See: verification.)
$ authentication code $ authentication code
(D) Synonym for a checksum based on cryptography. (Compare: (D) Synonym for a checksum based on cryptography. (Compare: Data
Message Authentication Code.) Authentication Code, Message Authentication Code.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this uncapitalized term as a
any form of checksum, cryptographic or not. Instead, use synonym for any kind of checksum, regardless of whether or not the
"checksum", "error detection code", "hash", "keyed hash", "Message checksum is cryptographic. Instead, use "checksum", "Data
Authentication Code", or "protected checksum", depending on what Authentication Code", "error detection code", "hash", "keyed
is meant. hash", "Message Authentication Code", "protected checksum", or
some other recomended term, depending on what is meant.
The term mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. The word The term mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. The word
"authentication" is misleading because the checksum may be used to "authentication" is misleading because the checksum may be used to
perform a data integrity function rather than a data origin perform a data integrity function rather than a data origin
authentication function. The word "code" is misleading because it authentication function.
suggests either that encoding or encryption is involved or that
the term refers to computer software.
$ authentication exchange $ authentication exchange
1. (I) A mechanism to verify the identity of an entity by means of 1. (I) A mechanism to verify the identity of an entity by means of
information exchange. information exchange.
2. (O) "A mechanism intended to ensure the identity of an entity 2. (O) "A mechanism intended to ensure the identity of an entity
by means of information exchange." [I7498 Part 2] by means of information exchange." [I7498-2]
$ Authentication Header (AH) $ Authentication Header (AH)
(I) An Internet protocol [R2402] designed to provide (I) An Internet protocol [R2402] designed to provide
connectionless data integrity service and connectionless data connectionless data integrity service and connectionless data
origin authentication service for IP datagrams, and (optionally) origin authentication service for IP datagrams, and (optionally)
to provide partial sequence integrity and protection against to provide partial sequence integrity and protection against
replay attacks. (See: IPsec. Compare: ESP.) replay attacks. (See: IPsec. Compare: ESP.)
Tutorial: Replay protection may be selected by the receiver when a Tutorial: Replay protection may be selected by the receiver when a
security association is established. AH authenticates the upper- security association is established. AH authenticates the upper-
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$ availability $ availability
1. (I) The property of a system or a system resource being 1. (I) The property of a system or a system resource being
accessible, or usable or operational upon demand, by an authorized accessible, or usable or operational upon demand, by an authorized
system entity, according to performance specifications for the system entity, according to performance specifications for the
system; i.e., a system is available if it provides services system; i.e., a system is available if it provides services
according to the system design whenever users request them. (See: according to the system design whenever users request them. (See:
critical, denial of service. Compare: precedence, reliability, critical, denial of service. Compare: precedence, reliability,
survivability.) survivability.)
2. (O) "The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by 2. (O) "The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by
an authorized entity." [I7498 Part 2] an authorized entity." [I7498-2]
Tutorial: This service addresses the security concerns raised by
denial-of-service attacks. It depends on proper management and
control of system resources, and thus depends on access control
service and other security services.
Availability requirements can be specified by quantitative Tutorial: Availability requirements can be specified by
metrics, but sometimes are stated qualitatively, such as in the quantitative metrics, but sometimes are stated qualitatively, such
following: as in the following:
- "Flexible tolerance for delay" may mean that brief system - "Flexible tolerance for delay" may mean that brief system
outages do not endanger mission accomplishment, but extended outages do not endanger mission accomplishment, but extended
outages may endanger the mission. outages may endanger the mission.
- "Minimum tolerance for delay" may mean that mission - "Minimum tolerance for delay" may mean that mission
accomplishment requires the system to provide requested accomplishment requires the system to provide requested
services in a short time. services in a short time.
$ availability service $ availability service
(I) A security service that protects a system to ensure its (I) A security service that protects a system to ensure its
availability. availability.
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service and other security services. service and other security services.
$ avoidance $ avoidance
(I) See: secondary definition under "security". (I) See: secondary definition under "security".
$ B1, B2, or B3 computer system $ B1, B2, or B3 computer system
(O) /TCSEC/ See: Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System (O) /TCSEC/ See: Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria". Evaluation Criteria".
$ back door $ back door
1. (I) /computer security/ A computer system feature -- which may 1. (I) /COMPUSEC/ A computer system feature -- which may be (a) an
be (a) an unintentional flaw, (b) a mechanism deliberately unintentional flaw, (b) a mechanism deliberately installed by the
installed by the system's creator, or (c) a mechanism system's creator, or (c) a mechanism surreptitiously installed by
surreptitiously installed by an intruder -- that provides access an intruder -- that provides access to a system resource by other
to a system resource by other than the usual procedure and usually than the usual procedure and usually is hidden or otherwise not
is hidden or otherwise not well-known. (See: maintenance hook. well-known. (See: maintenance hook. Compare: Trojan Horse.)
Compare: Trojan Horse.)
Example: A way to access a computer other than through a normal Example: A way to access a computer other than through a normal
login. Such an access path is not necessarily designed with login. Such an access path is not necessarily designed with
malicious intent; operating systems sometimes are shipped by the malicious intent; operating systems sometimes are shipped by the
manufacturer with hidden accounts intended for use by field manufacturer with hidden accounts intended for use by field
service technicians or the vendor's maintenance programmers. service technicians or the vendor's maintenance programmers.
2. (I) /cryptography/ A feature of a cryptographic system that 2. (I) /cryptography/ A feature of a cryptographic system that
makes it easily possible to break or circumvent the protection makes it easily possible to break or circumvent the protection
that the system is designed to provided. that the system is designed to provided.
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the object. The model defines the notion of a "secure state", in the object. The model defines the notion of a "secure state", in
which the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are which the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are
in accordance with a specified security policy. It is proven that in accordance with a specified security policy. It is proven that
each state transition preserves security by moving from secure each state transition preserves security by moving from secure
state to secure state, thereby proving that the system is secure. state to secure state, thereby proving that the system is secure.
In this model, a multilevel-secure system satisfies several rules, In this model, a multilevel-secure system satisfies several rules,
including the "confinement property" (a.k.a. the "*-property"), including the "confinement property" (a.k.a. the "*-property"),
the "simple security property", and the "tranquillity property". the "simple security property", and the "tranquillity property".
$ benign $ benign
(N) "Condition of cryptographic data [such] that [it] cannot be 1. (N) /COMSEC/ "Condition of cryptographic data [such] that [it]
compromised by human access [to the data]." [C4009] cannot be compromised by human access [to the data]." [C4009]
2. (O) /COMPUSEC/ See: secondary definition under "trust".
$ benign fill $ benign fill
(N) Process by which keying material is generated, distributed, (N) Process by which keying material is generated, distributed,
and placed into an ECU without exposure to any human or other and placed into an ECU without exposure to any human or other
system entity, except the cryptographic module that consumes and system entity, except the cryptographic module that consumes and
uses the material. uses the material. (See: benign.)
$ BER $ BER
(I) See: Basic Encoding Rules. (I) See: Basic Encoding Rules.
A1 $ beyond A1
1. (O) /formal/ A level of security assurance that is beyond the 1. (O) /formal/ A level of security assurance that is beyond the
highest level (level A1) of criteria specified by the TCSEC. (See: highest level (level A1) of criteria specified by the TCSEC. (See:
Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria".) Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria".)
2. (O) /informal/ A level of trust so high that it is beyond 2. (O) /informal/ A level of trust so high that it is beyond
state-of-the-art technology; i.e., it cannot be provided or state-of-the-art technology; i.e., it cannot be provided or
verified by currently available assurance methods, and especially verified by currently available assurance methods, and especially
not by currently available formal methods. not by currently available formal methods.
$ Biba integrity $ Biba integrity
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position, of which there is exactly one instance; but a "role" is position, of which there is exactly one instance; but a "role" is
functional position, of which there can be multiple instances. functional position, of which there can be multiple instances.
System entities are in one-to-one relationships with their System entities are in one-to-one relationships with their
billets, but may be in many-to-one and one-to-many relationships billets, but may be in many-to-one and one-to-many relationships
with their roles. with their roles.
$ BIN $ BIN
(O) See: bank identification number. (O) See: bank identification number.
$ bind $ bind
(I) To inseparably associate by applying some mechanism. (I) To inseparably associate by applying some security mechanism.
Example: A CA creates a public-key certificate by using a digital Example: A CA creates a public-key certificate by using a digital
signature to bind together (a) a subject name, (b) a public key, signature to bind together (a) a subject name, (b) a public key,
and usually (c) some additional data items (e.g., see "X.509 and usually (c) some additional data items (e.g., see "X.509
public-key certificate"). public-key certificate").
$ biometric authentication $ biometric authentication
(I) A method of generating authentication information for a person (I) A method of generating authentication information for a person
by digitizing measurements of a physical or behavioral by digitizing measurements of a physical or behavioral
characteristic, such as a fingerprint, hand shape, retina pattern, characteristic, such as a fingerprint, hand shape, retina pattern,
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$ BLACK $ BLACK
1. (I) Designation for data that consists only of cipher text, and 1. (I) Designation for data that consists only of cipher text, and
for information system equipment items or facilities that handle for information system equipment items or facilities that handle
only cipher text. Example: "BLACK key".(See: color change, only cipher text. Example: "BLACK key".(See: color change,
RED/BLACK separation. Compare: RED.) RED/BLACK separation. Compare: RED.)
2. (O) /U.S. Government/ "Designation applied to information 2. (O) /U.S. Government/ "Designation applied to information
systems, and to associated areas, circuits, components, and systems, and to associated areas, circuits, components, and
equipment, in which national security information is encrypted or equipment, in which national security information is encrypted or
is not processed. [C4009] is not processed." [C4009]
$ BLACK/Crypto/RED (BCR) $ BLACK/Crypto/RED (BCR)
(N) An experimental, end-to-end, network packet encryption system (N) An experimental, end-to-end, network packet encryption system
developed in a working prototype form by BBN and the Collins Radio developed in a working prototype form by BBN and the Collins Radio
division of Rockwell Corporation in the 1975-1980 time frame for division of Rockwell Corporation in the 1975-1980 time frame for
the U.S. DoD. BCR was the first network security system to support the U.S. DoD. BCR was the first network security system to support
TCP/IP traffic, and it incorporated the first DES chips that were TCP/IP traffic, and it incorporated the first DES chips that were
validated by the U.S. National Bureau of Standards (now called validated by the U.S. National Bureau of Standards (now called
NIST). BCR also was the first to use a KDC and an ACC to manage NIST). BCR also was the first to use a KDC and an ACC to manage
connections. connections.
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hosts. (b) The BLACKER components are trusted to separate hosts. (b) The BLACKER components are trusted to separate
datagrams of different security levels, so that each datagram of a datagrams of different security levels, so that each datagram of a
given security level can be received only by a host that is given security level can be received only by a host that is
authorized for that security level; and thus BLACKER can separate authorized for that security level; and thus BLACKER can separate
host communities that operate at different security levels. (c) host communities that operate at different security levels. (c)
The host side of a BFE is itself MLS and can recognize a security The host side of a BFE is itself MLS and can recognize a security
label on each packet, so that an MLS user host can be authorized label on each packet, so that an MLS user host can be authorized
to successively transmit datagrams that are labeled with different to successively transmit datagrams that are labeled with different
security levels. security levels.
$ blind attack
(I) A type of network-based attack method that does not require
the attacking entity to receive data traffic from the attacked
entity; i.e., the attacker does not need to "see" data packets
sent by the victim. Example: SYN flood.
Tutorial: If an attack method is blind, the attacker's packets can
carry (a) a false IP source address (making it difficult for the
victim to find the attacker) and (b) a different address on every
packet (making it difficult for the victim to block the attack).
If the attacker needs to receive traffic from the victim, the
attacker must either (c) reveal its own IP address to the victim
(which enables the victim to find the attacker or block the attack
by filtering) or (d) provide a false address and also subvert
network routing mechanisms to divert the returning packets to the
attacker (which makes the attack more complex, more difficult, or
more expensive). [R3552]
$ block $ block
(I) A bit string or bit vector of finite length. (See: block (I) A bit string or bit vector of finite length. (See: bit, block
cipher. Compare: byte, word.) cipher. Compare: byte, word.)
Usage: An "N-bit block" contains N bits, which usually are Usage: An "N-bit block" contains N bits, which usually are
numbered from left to right as 1, 2, 3, ..., N. numbered from left to right as 1, 2, 3, ..., N.
$ block cipher $ block cipher
(I) An encryption algorithm that breaks plain text into fixed-size (I) An encryption algorithm that breaks plain text into fixed-size
segments and uses the same key to transform each plaintext segment segments and uses the same key to transform each plaintext segment
into a fixed-size segment of cipher text. Examples: AES, Blowfish, into a fixed-size segment of cipher text. Examples: AES, Blowfish,
DEA, IDEA, RC2, and SKIPJACK. (See: block, mode. Compare: stream DEA, IDEA, RC2, and SKIPJACK. (See: block, mode. Compare: stream
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$ brand CRL identifier (BCI) $ brand CRL identifier (BCI)
(O) /SET/ A digitally signed list, issued by a BCA, of the names (O) /SET/ A digitally signed list, issued by a BCA, of the names
of CAs for which CRLs need to be processed when verifying of CAs for which CRLs need to be processed when verifying
signatures in SET messages. [SET2] signatures in SET messages. [SET2]
$ break $ break
(I) /cryptography/ To successfully perform cryptanalysis and thus (I) /cryptography/ To successfully perform cryptanalysis and thus
succeed in decrypting data or performing some other cryptographic succeed in decrypting data or performing some other cryptographic
function, without initially having knowledge of the key that the function, without initially having knowledge of the key that the
function requires. (See: penetrate.) function requires. (See: penetrate, strength.)
Usage: This term applies to encrypted data or, more generally, to Usage: This term applies to encrypted data or, more generally, to
a cryptographic algorithm or cryptographic system. a cryptographic algorithm or cryptographic system.
$ Brewer-Nash model $ Brewer-Nash model
(N) A security model [BN89] to enforce the Chinese wall policy. (N) A security model [BN89] to enforce the Chinese wall policy.
(Compare: Bell-LaPadula model, Clark-Wilson model.) (Compare: Bell-LaPadula model, Clark-Wilson model.)
Tutorial: All proprietary information in the set of commercial Tutorial: All proprietary information in the set of commercial
firms F(1), F(2), ..., F(N) is categorized into mutually exclusive firms F(1), F(2), ..., F(N) is categorized into mutually exclusive
conflict-of-interest classes I(1), I(2), ..., I(M) that apply conflict-of-interest classes I(1), I(2), ..., I(M) that apply
across all firms. Each firm belongs to exactly one class. The across all firms. Each firm belongs to exactly one class. The
Brewer-Nash model has the following mandatory rules: Brewer-Nash model has the following mandatory rules:
- Brewer-Nash Read Rule: Subject S can read information object O - Brewer-Nash Read Rule: Subject S can read information object O
from firm F(i) only if either (a) O is from the same firm as from firm F(i) only if either (a) O is from the same firm as
some object previously read by S *or* (b) O belongs to a class some object previously read by S *or* (b) O belongs to a class
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$ British Standard 7799 $ British Standard 7799
(N) Part 1 of the standard is a code of practice for how to secure (N) Part 1 of the standard is a code of practice for how to secure
an information system. Part 2 specifies the management framework, an information system. Part 2 specifies the management framework,
objectives, and control requirements for information security objectives, and control requirements for information security
management systems. [BS7799] (See: ISO 17799.) management systems. [BS7799] (See: ISO 17799.)
$ browser $ browser
(I) An client computer program that can retrieve and display (I) An client computer program that can retrieve and display
information from servers on the World Wide Web. Examples: information from servers on the World Wide Web. Examples:
Netscape's Navigator and Microsoft's Internet Explorer. Netscape's Navigator and Microsoft's Internet Explorer.
$ brute force $ brute force
(I) A cryptanalysis technique or other kind of attack method (I) A cryptanalysis technique or other kind of attack method
involving an exhaustive procedure that tries a large number of involving an exhaustive procedure that tries a large number of
possible solutions to the problem, one-by-one. possible solutions to the problem, one-by-one. (See: impossible,
strength, work factor.)
Tutorial: In some cases, brute force involves trying all of the Tutorial: In some cases, brute force involves trying all of the
possibilities. For example, for cipher text where the analyst possibilities. For example, for cipher text where the analyst
already knows the decryption algorithm, a brute force technique already knows the decryption algorithm, a brute force technique
for finding matching plain text is to decrypt the message with for finding matching plain text is to decrypt the message with
every possible key. In other cases, brute force involves trying a every possible key. In other cases, brute force involves trying a
large number of possibilities but substantially fewer than all of large number of possibilities but substantially fewer than all of
them. For example, given a hash function that produces a N-bit them. For example, given a hash function that produces a N-bit
hash result, the probability is greater than 1/2 that the analyst hash result, the probability is greater than 1/2 that the analyst
will find two inputs that have the same hash result after trying will find two inputs that have the same hash result after trying
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(I) An implementation approach that places a network security (I) An implementation approach that places a network security
mechanism outside of the system that is to be protected. (Compare: mechanism outside of the system that is to be protected. (Compare:
bump-in-the-stack.) bump-in-the-stack.)
Example: IPsec can be implemented outboard, in a physically Example: IPsec can be implemented outboard, in a physically
separate device, so that the system that receives the IPsec separate device, so that the system that receives the IPsec
protection does not need to be modified at all [R2401]. Military- protection does not need to be modified at all [R2401]. Military-
grade link encryption has mainly been implemented as bump-in-the- grade link encryption has mainly been implemented as bump-in-the-
wire devices. wire devices.
$ business case analysis $ business-case analysis
(N) An extended form of cost-benefit analysis that considers (N) An extended form of cost-benefit analysis that considers
factors beyond financial metrics, including security factors such factors beyond financial metrics, including security factors such
as the requirement for security services, their technical and as the requirement for security services, their technical and
programmatic feasibility, their qualitative benefits, and programmatic feasibility, their qualitative benefits, and
associated risks. (See: risk analysis.) associated risks. (See: risk analysis.)
$ byte $ byte
(I) A fundamental unit of computer storage; the smallest (I) A fundamental unit of computer storage; the smallest
addressable unit in a computer's architecture. Usually holds one addressable unit in a computer's architecture. Usually holds one
character of information and, today, usually means eight bits. character of information and, today, usually means eight bits.
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values that X.509 defines for that extension is "keyCertSign", to values that X.509 defines for that extension is "keyCertSign", to
indicate that the certificate may be used for verifying a CA's indicate that the certificate may be used for verifying a CA's
signature on certificates. If "keyCertSign" is present in a signature on certificates. If "keyCertSign" is present in a
certificate that also has a "basicConstraints" extension, than certificate that also has a "basicConstraints" extension, than
"cA" is set to "TRUE" in that extension. Alternatively, a CA could "cA" is set to "TRUE" in that extension. Alternatively, a CA could
be issued a certificate in which "keyCertSign" is asserted without be issued a certificate in which "keyCertSign" is asserted without
"basicConstraints" being present; and an entity that acts as a CA "basicConstraints" being present; and an entity that acts as a CA
could be issued a certificate with "keyUsage" set to other values, could be issued a certificate with "keyUsage" set to other values,
either with or without "keyCertSign". either with or without "keyCertSign".
$ CA domain
(N) /PKI/ A security policy domain that "consists of a CA and its
subjects [i.e., the entities named in the certificates issued by
the CA]. Sometimes referred to as a PKI domain." [PAG] (See:
domain.)
$ Caesar cipher $ Caesar cipher
(I) A cipher that, given an alphabet of N characters, A(1), A(2), (I) A cipher that, given an alphabet of N characters, A(1), A(2),
character A(i) by A(i+K, mod N) for some 0<K<N+1. [Schn] character A(i) by A(i+K, mod N) for some 0<K<N+1. [Schn]
Examples: (a) During the Gallic wars, Julius Caesar used a cipher Examples: (a) During the Gallic wars, Julius Caesar used a cipher
with K=3. In a Caesar cipher with K=3 for the English alphabet, A with K=3. In a Caesar cipher with K=3 for the English alphabet, A
is replaced by D, B by E, C by F, ..., W by Z, X by A, Y by B, Z is replaced by D, B by E, C by F, ..., W by Z, X by A, Y by B, Z
by C. (b) UNIX systems sometimes include "ROT13" software that by C. (b) UNIX systems sometimes include "ROT13" software that
implements a Caesar cipher with K=13 (i.e., ROTate by 13). implements a Caesar cipher with K=13 (i.e., ROTate by 13).
$ call back $ call back
(I) An authentication technique for terminals that remotely access (I) An authentication technique for terminals that remotely access
a computer via telephone lines; the host system disconnects the a computer via telephone lines; the host system disconnects the
caller and then reconnects on a telephone number that was caller and then reconnects on a telephone number that was
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$ card copy $ card copy
See: token copy. See: token copy.
$ card restore $ card restore
See: token restore. See: token restore.
$ cardholder $ cardholder
1. (I) An entity to whom or to which a card has been issued. 1. (I) An entity to whom or to which a card has been issued.
Usage: Usually refers to a living human being, but may refer to a Usage: Usually refers to a living human being, but might refer (a)
position (see: billet, role) in an organization or to an automated to a position (see: billet, role) in an organization or (b) to an
process. (See: user.) automated process. (See: user.)
2. (O) /SET/ "The holder of a valid payment card account and user 2. (O) /SET/ "The holder of a valid payment card account and user
of software supporting electronic commerce." [SET2] A cardholder of software supporting electronic commerce." [SET2] A cardholder
is issued a payment card by an issuer. SET ensures that in the is issued a payment card by an issuer. SET ensures that in the
cardholder's interactions with merchants, the payment card account cardholder's interactions with merchants, the payment card account
information remains confidential. [SET1] information remains confidential. [SET1]
$ cardholder certificate $ cardholder certificate
(O) /SET/ A digital certificate that is issued to a cardholder (O) /SET/ A digital certificate that is issued to a cardholder
upon approval of the cardholder's issuing financial institution upon approval of the cardholder's issuing financial institution
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$ certificate expiration $ certificate expiration
(I) The event that occurs when a certificate ceases to be valid (I) The event that occurs when a certificate ceases to be valid
because its assigned lifetime has been exceeded. (See: certificate because its assigned lifetime has been exceeded. (See: certificate
revocation, validity period.) revocation, validity period.)
$ certificate extension $ certificate extension
(I) See: extension. (I) See: extension.
$ certificate holder $ certificate holder
(D) Synonym for "certificate subject". (See: certificate owner.) (D) Synonym for the "subject" of a digital certificate. (Compare:
certificate owner, certificate user.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
the subject of a digital certificate; the term is potentially for the subject of a digital certificate; the term is potentially
ambiguous. For example, the term could refer to a system entity or ambiguous. For example, the term could be misunderstood as
component, such as a repository, that simply has possession of a referring to a system entity or component, such as a repository,
copy of the certificate. that simply has possession of a copy of the certificate.
$ certificate management $ certificate management
(I) The functions that a CA may perform during the life cycle of a (I) The functions that a CA may perform during the life cycle of a
digital certificate, including the following: digital certificate, including the following:
- Acquire and verify data items to bind into the certificate. - Acquire and verify data items to bind into the certificate.
- Encode and sign the certificate. - Encode and sign the certificate.
- Store the certificate in a directory or repository. - Store the certificate in a directory or repository.
- Renew, rekey, and update the certificate. - Renew, rekey, and update the certificate.
- Revoke the certificate and issue a CRL. - Revoke the certificate and issue a CRL.
(See: archive management, certificate management, key management, (See: archive management, certificate management, key management,
security architecture, token management.) security architecture, token management.)
$ certificate management authority (CMA) $ certificate management authority (CMA)
(D) /U.S. DoD/ Used to mean either a CA or an RA. [DoD3, SP32] (D) /U.S. DoD/ Used to mean either a CA or an RA. [DoD7, SP32]
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is
potentially ambiguous, such as in a context involve ICRLs. potentially ambiguous, such as in a context involve ICRLs.
Instead, use CA, RA, or both, depending on what is meant. Instead, use CA, RA, or both, depending on what is meant.
$ certificate owner $ certificate owner
(D) Synonym for "certificate subject". (See: certificate holder.) (D) Synonym for the "subject" of a digital certificate. (Compare:
certificate holder, certificate user.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
the subject of a digital certificate; the term is potentially for the subject of a digital certificate; the term is potentially
ambiguous. For example, the term could refer to a system entity, ambiguous. For example, the term could refer to a system entity,
such as a corporation, that has acquired a certificate to operate such as a corporation, that has purchased a certificate to operate
equipment, such as a Web server. equipment, such as a Web server.
$ certificate path $ certificate path
(D) Synonym for "certification path". (D) Synonym for "certification path".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it suggests Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it suggests
careless use of "certification path", which is a term standardized careless use of "certification path", which is a term standardized
by X.509. A person who uses this term probably has never read the by X.509. A person who uses this term probably has never read the
basic technical standards for PKI [X509, R3280]. basic technical standards for PKI [X509, R3280].
$ certificate policy $ certificate policy
(I) "A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a (I) "A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a
certificate to a particular community and/or class of application certificate to a particular community and/or class of application
with common security requirements." [X509] (Compare: CPS.) with common security requirements." [X509] (Compare: CPS, security
policy.)
Example: The U.S. DoD's certificate policy [DoD3] defines four Example: U.S. DoD's certificate policy [DoD7] defined four classes
classes (i.e., assurance levels) for X.509 public-key certificates (i.e., assurance levels) for X.509 public-key certificates and
and defines the applicability of those classes. (See: class 2.) defines the applicability of those classes. (See: class 2.)
Tutorial: A certificate policy can help a certificate user to Tutorial: A certificate policy can help a certificate user to
decide whether a certificate should be trusted in a particular decide whether a certificate should be trusted in a particular
application. "For example, a particular certificate policy might application. "For example, a particular certificate policy might
indicate applicability of a type of certificate for the indicate applicability of a type of certificate for the
authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the
trading of goods within a given price range." [R3647] trading of goods within a given price range." [R3647]
A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "certificatePolicies" A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "certificatePolicies"
extension that lists certificate policies, recognized by the extension that lists certificate policies, recognized by the
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that of the SET root CA. SET uses certificate policy qualifiers to that of the SET root CA. SET uses certificate policy qualifiers to
point to the actual policy statement and to add qualifying point to the actual policy statement and to add qualifying
policies to the root policy. (See: SET qualifier.) policies to the root policy. (See: SET qualifier.)
$ certificate policy qualifier $ certificate policy qualifier
(I) Information that pertains to a certificate policy and is (I) Information that pertains to a certificate policy and is
included in a "certificatePolicies" extension in a v3 X.509 included in a "certificatePolicies" extension in a v3 X.509
public-key certificate. public-key certificate.
$ certificate profile $ certificate profile
(I) A specification (e.g., [DoD3, R3280]) of the format and (I) A specification (e.g., [DoD7, R3280]) of the format and
semantics of public-key certificates or attribute certificates, semantics of public-key certificates or attribute certificates,
constructed for use in a specific application context by selecting constructed for use in a specific application context by selecting
from among options offered by a broader standard. from among options offered by a broader standard. (Compare:
protection profile.)
$ certificate reactivation $ certificate reactivation
(I) The act or process by which a digital certificate, which a CA (I) The act or process by which a digital certificate, which a CA
has designated for revocation but not yet listed on a CRL, is has designated for revocation but not yet listed on a CRL, is
returned to the valid state. returned to the valid state.
$ certificate rekey $ certificate rekey
1. (I) The act or process by which an existing public-key 1. (I) The act or process by which an existing public-key
certificate has its key value changed by issuing a new certificate certificate has its key value changed by issuing a new certificate
with a different (usually new) public key. (See: certificate with a different (usually new) public key. (See: certificate
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2. (O) "An integer value, unique within the issuing CA, which is 2. (O) "An integer value, unique within the issuing CA, which is
unambiguously associated with a certificate issued by that CA." unambiguously associated with a certificate issued by that CA."
[X509] [X509]
$ certificate status authority $ certificate status authority
(D) /U.S. DoD/ "A trusted entity that provides on-line (D) /U.S. DoD/ "A trusted entity that provides on-line
verification to a Relying Party of a subject certificate's verification to a Relying Party of a subject certificate's
trustworthiness [should instead say 'validity'], and may also trustworthiness [should instead say 'validity'], and may also
provide additional attribute information for the subject provide additional attribute information for the subject
certificate." [DoD3] certificate." [DoD7]
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not
widely accepted; instead, use "certificate status responder" or widely accepted; instead, use "certificate status responder" or
"OCSP server", or otherwise explain what is meant. "OCSP server", or otherwise explain what is meant.
$ certificate status responder $ certificate status responder
(N) /FPKI/ A trusted on-line server that acts for a CA to provide (N) /FPKI/ A trusted on-line server that acts for a CA to provide
authenticated certificate status information to certificate users authenticated certificate status information to certificate users
[FPKI]. Offers an alternative to issuing a CRL, but is not [FPKI]. Offers an alternative to issuing a CRL, but is not
supported in X.509. (See: certificate revocation tree, OCSP.) supported in X.509. (See: certificate revocation tree, OCSP.)
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Usage: For an X.509 public-key certificate, the essence of this Usage: For an X.509 public-key certificate, the essence of this
process is that fundamental changes are made in the data that is process is that fundamental changes are made in the data that is
bound to the public key, such that it is necessary to revoke the bound to the public key, such that it is necessary to revoke the
old certificate. (Otherwise, the process is only a "certificate old certificate. (Otherwise, the process is only a "certificate
rekey" or "certificate renewal".) rekey" or "certificate renewal".)
$ certificate user $ certificate user
1. (I) A system entity that depends on the validity of information 1. (I) A system entity that depends on the validity of information
(such as another entity's public key value) provided by a digital (such as another entity's public key value) provided by a digital
certificate. (See: relying party.) certificate. (See: relying party. Compare: /digital certificate/
subject.)
2. (O) "An entity that needs to know, with certainty, the public 2. (O) "An entity that needs to know, with certainty, the public
key of another entity." [X509] key of another entity." [X509]
Usage: The system entity may be a human being or an organization, Usage: The system entity may be a human being or an organization,
or a device or process controlled by a human or organization. or a device or process controlled by a human or organization.
(See: user.) (See: user.)
3. (D) Synonym for "certificate subject". 3. (D) Synonym for "subject" of a digital certificate.
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with this Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
meaning; the term could be confused with one of the other two definition 3; the term could be confused with one of the other two
definitions given above. definitions given above.
$ certificate validation $ certificate validation
1. (I) An act or process by which a certificate user establishes 1. (I) An act or process by which a certificate user establishes
that the assertions made by a digital certificate can be trusted. that the assertions made by a digital certificate can be trusted.
(See: valid certificate, validate vs. verify.) (See: valid certificate, validate vs. verify.)
2. (O) "The process of ensuring that a certificate was valid at a 2. (O) "The process of ensuring that a certificate was valid at a
given time, including possibly the construction and processing of given time, including possibly the construction and processing of
a certification path, and ensuring that all certificates in that a certification path [R4158], and ensuring that all certificates
path were valid (i.e. were not expired or revoked) at that given in that path were valid (i.e. were not expired or revoked) at that
time." [X509] given time." [X509]
Tutorial: To validate a certificate, a certificate user checks Tutorial: To validate a certificate, a certificate user checks
that the certificate is properly formed and signed and is that the certificate is properly formed and signed and is
currently in force: currently in force:
- Checks the syntax and semantics: Parses the certificate's - Checks the syntax and semantics: Parses the certificate's
syntax and interprets its semantics, applying rules specified syntax and interprets its semantics, applying rules specified
for and by its data fields, such as for critical extensions in for and by its data fields, such as for critical extensions in
an X.509 certificate. an X.509 certificate.
- Checks the signature: Uses the issuer's public key to verify - Checks the signature: Uses the issuer's public key to verify
the digital signature of the CA who issued the certificate in the digital signature of the CA who issued the certificate in
question. If the verifier obtains the issuer's public key from question. If the verifier obtains the issuer's public key from
the issuer's own public-key certificate, that certificate the issuer's own public-key certificate, that certificate
should be validated, too. That validation may lead to yet should be validated, too. That validation may lead to yet
another certificate to be validated, and so on. Thus, in another certificate to be validated, and so on. Thus, in
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practice statement". practice statement".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
either of those terms; that would be duplicative and would mix either of those terms; that would be duplicative and would mix
concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, use either concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, use either
"certificate policy" or "certification practice statement", "certificate policy" or "certification practice statement",
depending on what is meant. depending on what is meant.
$ certification practice statement (CPS) $ certification practice statement (CPS)
(I) "A statement of the practices which a certification authority (I) "A statement of the practices which a certification authority
employs in issuing certificates." [ABA96, R3647] (See: certificate employs in issuing certificates." [DSG, R3647] (See: certificate
policy.) policy.)
Tutorial: A CPS is a published security policy that can help a Tutorial: A CPS is a published security policy that can help a
certificate user to decide whether a certificate issued by a certificate user to decide whether a certificate issued by a
particular CA can be trusted enough to use in a particular particular CA can be trusted enough to use in a particular
application. A CPS may be (a) a declaration by a CA of the details application. A CPS may be (a) a declaration by a CA of the details
of the system and practices it uses in its certificate management of the system and practices it uses in its certificate management
operations, (b) part of a contract between the CA and an entity to operations, (b) part of a contract between the CA and an entity to
whom a certificate is issued, (c) a statute or regulation whom a certificate is issued, (c) a statute or regulation
applicable to the CA, or (d) a combination of these types applicable to the CA, or (d) a combination of these types
involving multiple documents. [ABA] involving multiple documents. [DSG]
A CPS is usually more detailed and procedurally oriented than a A CPS is usually more detailed and procedurally oriented than a
certificate policy. A CPS applies to a particular CA or CA certificate policy. A CPS applies to a particular CA or CA
community, while a certificate policy applies across CAs or community, while a certificate policy applies across CAs or
communities. A CA with its single CPS may support multiple communities. A CA with its single CPS may support multiple
certificate policies, which may be used for different application certificate policies, which may be used for different application
purposes or by different user communities. On the other hand, purposes or by different user communities. On the other hand,
multiple CAs, each with a different CPS, may support the same multiple CAs, each with a different CPS, may support the same
certificate policy. [R3647] certificate policy. [R3647]
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plaintext segment (block length or less) to form the next plaintext segment (block length or less) to form the next
ciphertext segment. ciphertext segment.
$ cipher text $ cipher text
1. (I) /noun/ Data that has been transformed by encryption so that 1. (I) /noun/ Data that has been transformed by encryption so that
its semantic information content (i.e., its meaning) is no longer its semantic information content (i.e., its meaning) is no longer
intelligible or directly available. (See: ciphertext. Compare: intelligible or directly available. (See: ciphertext. Compare:
clear text, plain text.) clear text, plain text.)
2. (O) "Data produced through the use of encipherment. The 2. (O) "Data produced through the use of encipherment. The
semantic content of the resulting data is not available." [I7498 semantic content of the resulting data is not available." [I7498-
Part 2] 2]
$ ciphertext $ ciphertext
1. (I) /adjective/ Referring to cipher text. (See: cipher text, 1. (I) /adjective/ Referring to cipher text. (See: cipher text,
Compare: cleartext, plaintext.) Compare: cleartext, plaintext.)
2. (D) /noun/ A synonym for cipher text. 2. (D) /noun/ A synonym for cipher text.
Deprecated Usage: ISDs should not use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Usage: ISDs should not use this term as a synonym for
cipher text. ISDs SHOULD distinguish between the adjective cipher text. ISDs SHOULD distinguish between the adjective
"ciphertext" and the noun phrase "cipher text". "ciphertext" and the noun phrase "cipher text".
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$ CKL $ CKL
(I) See: compromised key list. (I) See: compromised key list.
$ Clark-Wilson model $ Clark-Wilson model
(N) A security model [Clark] to maintain data integrity in the (N) A security model [Clark] to maintain data integrity in the
commercial world. (Compare: Bell-LaPadula model.) commercial world. (Compare: Bell-LaPadula model.)
$ class 2, 3, 4, 5 $ class 2, 3, 4, 5
(O) /U.S. DoD/ Assurance levels for PKIs, and for X.509 public-key (O) /U.S. DoD/ Assurance levels for PKIs, and for X.509 public-key
certificates issued by a PKI. [DoD3] (See: "first law" under certificates issued by a PKI. [DoD7] (See: "first law" under
"Courtney's laws".) "Courtney's laws".)
- "Class 2": Intended for applications handling unclassified, - "Class 2": Intended for applications handling unclassified,
low-value data in minimally or moderately protected low-value data in minimally or moderately protected
environments. environments.
- "Class 3": Intended for applications handling unclassified, - "Class 3": Intended for applications handling unclassified,
medium-value data in moderately protected environments, or medium-value data in moderately protected environments, or
handling unclassified or high-value data in highly protected handling unclassified or high-value data in highly protected
environments, and for discretionary access control of environments, and for discretionary access control of
classified data in highly protected environments. classified data in highly protected environments.
- "Class 4": Intended for applications handling unclassified, - "Class 4": Intended for applications handling unclassified,
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definition; it could be confused with "clear text" in which definition; it could be confused with "clear text" in which
information is directly recoverable. information is directly recoverable.
$ clear text $ clear text
1. (I) /noun/ Data in which the semantic information content 1. (I) /noun/ Data in which the semantic information content
(i.e., the meaning) is intelligible or is directly available, (i.e., the meaning) is intelligible or is directly available,
i.e., not encrypted. (See: cleartext, in the clear. Compare: i.e., not encrypted. (See: cleartext, in the clear. Compare:
cipher text, plain text.) cipher text, plain text.)
2. (O) "Intelligible data, the semantic content of which is 2. (O) "Intelligible data, the semantic content of which is
available." [I7498 Part 2] available." [I7498-2]
3. (D) Synonym for "plain text". 3. (D) Synonym for "plain text".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "plain text", because the plain text that is input to an for "plain text", because the plain text that is input to an
encryption process may itself be cipher text that was output from encryption process may itself be cipher text that was output from
an encryption. (See: superencryption.) an encryption. (See: superencryption.)
$ clearance $ clearance
See: security clearance. See: security clearance.
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$ code book $ code book
1. (I) Document containing a systematically arranged list of 1. (I) Document containing a systematically arranged list of
plaintext units and their ciphertext equivalents. [C4009] plaintext units and their ciphertext equivalents. [C4009]
2. (I) An encryption algorithm that uses a word substitution 2. (I) An encryption algorithm that uses a word substitution
technique. [C4009] (See: code, ECB.) technique. [C4009] (See: code, ECB.)
$ code signing $ code signing
(I) A security mechanism that uses a digital signature to provide (I) A security mechanism that uses a digital signature to provide
data origin authentication for software that is being distributed data integrity and data origin authentication for software that is
for use. (See: mobile code, trusted distribution.) being distributed for use. (See: mobile code, trusted
distribution.)
$ COI $ COI
(I) See: community of interest. (I) See: community of interest.
$ cold start $ cold start
(N) /cryptographic module/ A procedure for initially keying (N) /cryptographic module/ A procedure for initially keying
cryptographic equipment. [C4009] cryptographic equipment. [C4009]
$ color change $ color change
(I) In a system being operated in periods processing mode, the act (I) In a system being operated in periods processing mode, the act
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$ Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program (CCEP) $ Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program (CCEP)
(O) "Relationship between NSA and industry in which NSA provides (O) "Relationship between NSA and industry in which NSA provides
the COMSEC expertise (i.e., standards, algorithms, evaluations, the COMSEC expertise (i.e., standards, algorithms, evaluations,
and guidance) and industry provides design, development, and and guidance) and industry provides design, development, and
production capabilities to produce a type 1 or type 2 product." production capabilities to produce a type 1 or type 2 product."
[C4009] [C4009]
$ commercially licensed evaluation facility (CLEF) $ commercially licensed evaluation facility (CLEF)
(N) An organization that has official approval to evaluate the (N) An organization that has official approval to evaluate the
security of products and systems in accordance with the Common security of products and systems in accordance with the Common
Criteria, ITSEC, or some other standard. Criteria, ITSEC, or some other standard. (Compare: KLIF.)
$ Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) $ Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS)
(O) A U.S. Government, interagency, standing committee of the (O) A U.S. Government, interagency, standing committee of the
President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. The CNSS is President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. The CNSS is
chaired by the Secretary of Defense and provides a forum for the chaired by the Secretary of Defense and provides a forum for the
discussion of policy issues, sets national policy, and promulgates discussion of policy issues, sets national policy, and promulgates
direction, operational procedures, and guidance for the security direction, operational procedures, and guidance for the security
of national security systems. The Secretary of Defense and the of national security systems. The Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence are responsible for developing Director of Central Intelligence are responsible for developing
and overseeing the implementation of Government-wide policies, and overseeing the implementation of Government-wide policies,
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security mode. Compare: category, classification.) security mode. Compare: category, classification.)
Usage: The term is usually understood to include the special Usage: The term is usually understood to include the special
handling procedures to be used for the information. handling procedures to be used for the information.
2. (I) Synonym for "category". 2. (I) Synonym for "category".
Deprecated Usage: This Glossary defines "category" with a slightly Deprecated Usage: This Glossary defines "category" with a slightly
narrower meaning than "compartment". That is, a security label is narrower meaning than "compartment". That is, a security label is
assigned to a category because the data owner needs to handle the assigned to a category because the data owner needs to handle the
data as compartment. However, a compartment could receive special data as a compartment. However, a compartment could receive
protection in a system without being assigned a category label. special protection in a system without being assigned a category
label.
$ compartmented security mode $ compartmented security mode
(N) A mode of system operation wherein all users having access to (N) A mode of system operation wherein all users having access to
the system have the necessary security clearance for the single, the system have the necessary security clearance for the single,
hierarchical classification level of all data handled by the hierarchical classification level of all data handled by the
system, but some users do not have the clearance for a non- system, but some users do not have the clearance for a non-
hierarchical category of some data handled by the system. (See: hierarchical category of some data handled by the system. (See:
category, /system operation/ under "mode", protection level, category, /system operation/ under "mode", protection level,
security clearance.) security clearance.)
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$ COMSEC $ COMSEC
(I) See: communication security. (I) See: communication security.
$ COMSEC account $ COMSEC account
(O) /U.S. Government/ "Administrative entity, identified by an (O) /U.S. Government/ "Administrative entity, identified by an
account number, used to maintain accountability, custody, and account number, used to maintain accountability, custody, and
control of COMSEC material." [C4009] (See: COMSEC custodian.) control of COMSEC material." [C4009] (See: COMSEC custodian.)
$ COMSEC accounting $ COMSEC accounting
(I) /U.S. Government/ The process of creating, collecting, and (O) /U.S. Government/ The process of creating, collecting, and
maintaining data records that describe the status and custody of maintaining data records that describe the status and custody of
designated items of COMSEC material. (See: accounting legend designated items of COMSEC material. (See: accounting legend
code.) code.)
Tutorial: Almost any secure information system needs to record a Tutorial: Almost any secure information system needs to record a
security audit trail, but a system that manages COMSEC material security audit trail, but a system that manages COMSEC material
needs to record additional data about the status and custody of needs to record additional data about the status and custody of
COMSEC items. COMSEC items.
- COMSEC tracking: The process of automatically collecting, - COMSEC tracking: The process of automatically collecting,
recording, and managing information that describes the status recording, and managing information that describes the status
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key generation and key handling and storage." [C4009] [Compare: key generation and key handling and storage." [C4009] [Compare:
cryptographic boundary.] cryptographic boundary.]
$ COMSEC custodian $ COMSEC custodian
(O) /U.S. Government/ "Individual designated by proper authority (O) /U.S. Government/ "Individual designated by proper authority
to be responsible for the receipt, transfer, accounting, to be responsible for the receipt, transfer, accounting,
safeguarding, and destruction of COMSEC material assigned to a safeguarding, and destruction of COMSEC material assigned to a
COMSEC account." [C4009] COMSEC account." [C4009]
$ COMSEC material $ COMSEC material
(N) /U.S. Government/ "Item designed to secure or authenticate (N) /U.S. Government/ Items designed to secure or authenticate
communications. [It] includes but is not limited to key, communications or information in general; these items include (but
equipment, devices, documents, firmware, or software that embodies are not limited to) keys; equipment, devices, documents, firmware,
or describes cryptographic logic and other items that perform and software that embodies or describes cryptographic logic; and
COMSEC functions." [C4009] (Compare: keying material.) other items that perform COMSEC functions. [C4009] (Compare:
keying material.)
$ COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS) $ COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS)
(O) /U.S. Government/ "Logistics and accounting system through (O) /U.S. Government/ "Logistics and accounting system through
which COMSEC material marked 'CRYPTO' is distributed, controlled, which COMSEC material marked 'CRYPTO' is distributed, controlled,
and safeguarded." [C4009] (See: COMSEC account, COMSEC custodian.) and safeguarded." [C4009] (See: COMSEC account, COMSEC custodian.)
$ confidentiality $ confidentiality
See: data confidentiality. See: data confidentiality.
$ configuration control $ configuration control
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$ controlled cryptographic item (CCI) $ controlled cryptographic item (CCI)
(O) /U.S. Government/ "Secure telecommunications or information (O) /U.S. Government/ "Secure telecommunications or information
handling equipment, or associated cryptographic component, that is handling equipment, or associated cryptographic component, that is
unclassified but governed by a special set of control unclassified but governed by a special set of control
requirements." [C4009] (Compare: EUCI.) requirements." [C4009] (Compare: EUCI.)
Tutorial: This category of equipment was established in 1985 to Tutorial: This category of equipment was established in 1985 to
promote broad use of secure equipment for protecting both promote broad use of secure equipment for protecting both
classified and unclassified information in the national interest. classified and unclassified information in the national interest.
CCI equipment uses a classified cryptographic logic, but the CCI equipment uses a classified cryptographic logic, but the
hardware or firmware embodiment of that logic is unclassified. hardware or firmware embodiment of that logic is unclassified.
Drawings, software implementations, and other descriptions of that Drawings, software implementations, and other descriptions of that
logic remain classified. [N4001] logic remain classified. [N4001]
$ controlled interface $ controlled interface
(I) A mechanism that facilitates the adjudication of the different (I) A mechanism that facilitates the adjudication of the different
security policies of interconnected systems. (See: domain, guard.) security policies of interconnected systems. (See: domain, guard.)
$ controlled security mode $ controlled security mode
(D) A mode of system operation wherein (a) two or more security (D) /U.S. DoD/ A mode of system operation wherein (a) two or more
levels of information are allowed to be handled concurrently security levels of information are allowed to be handled
within the same system when some users having access to the system concurrently within the same system when some users having access
have neither a security clearance nor need-to-know for some of the to the system have neither a security clearance nor need-to-know
data handled by the system, but (b) separation of the users and for some of the data handled by the system, but (b) separation of
the classified material on the basis, respectively, of clearance the users and the classified material on the basis, respectively,
and classification level are not dependent only on operating of clearance and classification level are not dependent only on
system control (like they are in multilevel security mode). (See: operating system control (like they are in multilevel security
/system operation/ under "mode", protection level.) mode). (See: /system operation/ under "mode", protection level.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. It was defined in Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. It was defined in
a Government policy regarding system accreditation but was a Government policy regarding system accreditation and was
subsumed by "partitioned security mode" in a later policy. subsumed by "partitioned security mode" in a later policy. Both
terms were dropped in still later policies.
Tutorial: Controlled mode was intended to encourage ingenuity in Tutorial: Controlled mode was intended to encourage ingenuity in
meeting data confidentiality requirements in ways less restrictive meeting data confidentiality requirements in ways less restrictive
than "dedicated security mode" and "system-high security mode", than "dedicated security mode" and "system-high security mode",
but at a level of risk lower than that generally associated with but at a level of risk lower than that generally associated with
the true "multilevel security mode". This was intended to be true "multilevel security mode". This was intended to be
accomplished by implementation of explicit augmenting measures to accomplished by implementation of explicit augmenting measures to
reduce or remove a substantial measure of system software reduce or remove a substantial measure of system software
vulnerability together with specific limitation of the security vulnerability together with specific limitation of the security
clearance levels of users having concurrent access to the system. clearance levels of users having concurrent access to the system.
$ controlling authority $ controlling authority
(O) /U.S. Government/ "Official responsible for directing the (O) /U.S. Government/ "Official responsible for directing the
operation of a cryptonet and for managing the operational use and operation of a cryptonet and for managing the operational use and
control of keying material assigned to the cryptonet." [C4009, control of keying material assigned to the cryptonet." [C4009,
N4006] N4006]
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may include a description of the range of URLs for which the state may include a description of the range of URLs for which the state
is valid. Future requests made by the client in that range will is valid. Future requests made by the client in that range will
also send the current value of the cookie to the server. Cookies also send the current value of the cookie to the server. Cookies
can be used to generate profiles of web usage habits, and thus may can be used to generate profiles of web usage habits, and thus may
infringe on personal privacy. infringe on personal privacy.
2. (I) /IPsec/ Data objects exchanged by ISAKMP to prevent certain 2. (I) /IPsec/ Data objects exchanged by ISAKMP to prevent certain
denial-of-service attacks during the establishment of a security denial-of-service attacks during the establishment of a security
association. association.
3. (D) /access control/ Synonym for "capability token" or "ticket. 3. (D) /access control/ Synonym for "capability token" or
"ticket".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with this Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
definition; that would duplicate the meaning of better-established definition 3; that would duplicate the meaning of better-
terms and mix concepts in a potentially misleading way. established terms and mix concepts in a potentially misleading
way.
$ Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) $ Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)
(N) UTC is derived from International Atomic Time (TAI) by adding (N) UTC is derived from International Atomic Time (TAI) by adding
a number of leap seconds. The International Bureau of Weights and a number of leap seconds. The International Bureau of Weights and
Measures computes TAI once each month by averaging data from many Measures computes TAI once each month by averaging data from many
laboratories. (See: GeneralizedTime, UTCTime.) laboratories. (See: GeneralizedTime, UTCTime.)
$ copy $ copy
See: card copy. See: card copy.
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certificate. (See: anonymous credential.) certificate. (See: anonymous credential.)
2. (I) /access control/ "authorization credential": A data object 2. (I) /access control/ "authorization credential": A data object
that is a portable representation of the association between an that is a portable representation of the association between an
identifier and one or more access authorizations, and that can be identifier and one or more access authorizations, and that can be
presented for use in verifying those authorizations for an entity presented for use in verifying those authorizations for an entity
that attempts such access. Example: X.509 attribute certificate. that attempts such access. Example: X.509 attribute certificate.
(See: capability token, ticket.) (See: capability token, ticket.)
3. (D) /OSIRM/ "Data that is transferred to establish the claimed 3. (D) /OSIRM/ "Data that is transferred to establish the claimed
identity of an entity." [I7498 Part 2] identity of an entity." [I7498-2]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term with this Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term with
definition. As explained in the tutorial below, an authentication definition 3. As explained in the tutorial below, an
process can involve the transfer of multiple data objects, and not authentication process can involve the transfer of multiple data
all of those are credentials. objects, and not all of those are credentials.
4. (D) /U.S. Government/ "An object that is verified when 4. (D) /U.S. Government/ "An object that is verified when
presented to the verifier in an authentication transaction." presented to the verifier in an authentication transaction."
[M0404] [M0404]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term with this Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term with
definition; it mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. For definition 4; it mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way.
example, in an authentication process, it is the identity that is For example, in an authentication process, it is the identity that
"verified", not the credential; the credential is "validated". is "verified", not the credential; the credential is "validated".
(See: validate vs. verify.) (See: validate vs. verify.)
Tutorial: In general English, "credentials" are evidence or Tutorial: In general English, "credentials" are evidence or
testimonials that (a) support a claim of identity or authorization testimonials that (a) support a claim of identity or authorization
and (b) usually are intended to be used more than once (i.e., a and (b) usually are intended to be used more than once (i.e., a
credential's life is long compared to the time needed for one credential's life is long compared to the time needed for one
use). Some examples are a policeman's badge, an automobile use). Some examples are a policeman's badge, an automobile
driver's license, and a national passport. An authentication or driver's license, and a national passport. An authentication or
access control process that uses a badge, license, or passport is access control process that uses a badge, license, or passport is
outwardly simple: the holder just shows the thing. outwardly simple: the holder just shows the thing.
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addressed by the local certificate policy and CPS. addressed by the local certificate policy and CPS.
$ cryptanalysis $ cryptanalysis
1. (I) The mathematical science that deals with analysis of a 1. (I) The mathematical science that deals with analysis of a
cryptographic system in order to gain knowledge needed to break or cryptographic system in order to gain knowledge needed to break or
circumvent the protection that the system is designed to provide. circumvent the protection that the system is designed to provide.
(See: cryptology.) (See: cryptology.)
2. (O) "The analysis of a cryptographic system and/or its inputs 2. (O) "The analysis of a cryptographic system and/or its inputs
and outputs to derive confidential variables and/or sensitive data and outputs to derive confidential variables and/or sensitive data
including cleartext." [I7498 Part 2] including cleartext." [I7498-2]
Tutorial: Definition 2 states the traditional goal of Tutorial: Definition 2 states the traditional goal of
cryptanalysis, i.e. convert cipher text to plain text (which cryptanalysis, i.e. convert cipher text to plain text (which
usually is clear text) without knowing the key; but that usually is clear text) without knowing the key; but that
definition applies only to encryption systems. Today, the term is definition applies only to encryption systems. Today, the term is
used with reference to all kinds of cryptographic algorithms and used with reference to all kinds of cryptographic algorithms and
key management, and definition 1 reflects that. In all cases, key management, and definition 1 reflects that. In all cases,
however, a cryptanalyst tries to uncover or reproduce someone however, a cryptanalyst tries to uncover or reproduce someone
else's sensitive data, such as clear text, a key, or an algorithm. else's sensitive data, such as clear text, a key, or an algorithm.
The basic cryptanalytic attacks on encryption systems are The basic cryptanalytic attacks on encryption systems are
ciphertext-only, known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, and chosen- ciphertext-only, known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, and chosen-
ciphertext; and these generalize to the other kinds of ciphertext; and these generalize to the other kinds of
cryptography. cryptography.
$ crypto, CRYPTO $ crypto, CRYPTO
1. (N) A prefix ("crypto-") that means "cryptographic". 1. (N) A prefix ("crypto-") that means "cryptographic".
Usage: ISDs MAY use this prefix when it part of a term listed in Usage: ISDs MAY use this prefix when it part of a term listed in
this Glossary. Otherwise, ISDs SHOULD avoid this prefix; instead, this Glossary. Otherwise, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this prefix;
use the adjective "cryptographic". instead, use the unabbreviated adjective, "cryptographic".
2. (D) In lower case, "crypto" is an abbreviation for the 2. (D) In lower case, "crypto" is an abbreviation for the
adjective "cryptographic", or for the nouns "cryptography" or adjective "cryptographic", or for the nouns "cryptography" or
"cryptographic component". "cryptographic component".
Deprecated Abbreviation: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it Deprecated Abbreviation: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this abbreviation
could easily be misunderstood. because it could easily be misunderstood in some technical sense.
3. (O) /U.S. Government/ In upper case, "CRYPTO" is a marking or 3. (O) /U.S. Government/ In upper case, "CRYPTO" is a marking or
designator that identifies "COMSEC keying material used to secure designator that identifies "COMSEC keying material used to secure
or authenticate telecommunications carrying classified or or authenticate telecommunications carrying classified or
sensitive U.S. Government or U.S. Government-derived information." sensitive U.S. Government or U.S. Government-derived information."
[C4009] [C4009]
$ cryptographic $ cryptographic
(I) An adjective that refers to cryptography. (I) An adjective that refers to cryptography.
$ cryptographic algorithm $ cryptographic algorithm
(I) An algorithm that uses the science of cryptography, including (I) An algorithm that uses the science of cryptography, including
(a) encryption algorithms, (b) cryptographic hash algorithms, (c) (a) encryption algorithms, (b) cryptographic hash algorithms, (c)
digital signature algorithms, and (d) key-agreement algorithms. digital signature algorithms, and (d) key-agreement algorithms.
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$ cryptographic component $ cryptographic component
(I) A generic term for any system component that involves (I) A generic term for any system component that involves
cryptography. (See: cryptographic module.) cryptography. (See: cryptographic module.)
$ cryptographic hash $ cryptographic hash
(I) See: secondary definition under "hash function". (I) See: secondary definition under "hash function".
$ cryptographic ignition key (CIK) $ cryptographic ignition key (CIK)
1. (I) A physical (usually electronic) token used to store, 1. (I) A physical (usually electronic) token used to store,
transport, and protect cryptographic keys. Usage: Sometimes transport, and protect cryptographic keys and activation data.
abbreviated as "crypto-ignition key". (Compare: fill device.) Usage: Sometimes abbreviated as "crypto-ignition key". (Compare:
Tutorial: A typical use is to divide a split key between a CIK and fill device.)
a cryptographic module, so that it is necessary to combine the two
to regenerate a key-encrypting key and thus activate the module Tutorial: A key-encrypting key could be divided (see: split key)
and other keys it contains. between a CIK and a cryptographic module, so that it would be
necessary to combine the two to regenerate the key, use it to
decrypt other keys and data contained in the module, and thus
activate the module.
2. (O) "Device or electronic key used to unlock the secure mode of 2. (O) "Device or electronic key used to unlock the secure mode of
cryptographic equipment." [C4009] cryptographic equipment." [C4009]
$ cryptographic key $ cryptographic key
(I) See: key. Usage: Usually shortened to just "key". (I) See: key. Usage: Usually shortened to just "key".
$ Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) $ Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
(I) An encapsulation syntax (RFC 3852) for digital signatures, (I) An encapsulation syntax (RFC 3852) for digital signatures,
hashes, and encryption of arbitrary messages. hashes, and encryption of arbitrary messages.
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to render its meaning unintelligible (i.e., to hide its semantic to render its meaning unintelligible (i.e., to hide its semantic
content), prevent its undetected alteration, or prevent its content), prevent its undetected alteration, or prevent its
unauthorized use. If the transformation is reversible, unauthorized use. If the transformation is reversible,
cryptography also deals with restoring encrypted data to cryptography also deals with restoring encrypted data to
intelligible form. (See: cryptology, steganography.) intelligible form. (See: cryptology, steganography.)
2. (O) "The discipline which embodies principles, means, and 2. (O) "The discipline which embodies principles, means, and
methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its
information content, prevent its undetected modification and/or information content, prevent its undetected modification and/or
prevent its unauthorized use ... . Cryptography determines the prevent its unauthorized use ... . Cryptography determines the
methods used in encipherment and decipherment." [I7498 Part 2] methods used in encipherment and decipherment." [I7498-2]
Tutorial: Comprehensive coverage of applied cryptographic Tutorial: Comprehensive coverage of applied cryptographic
protocols and algorithms is provided by Schneier [Schn]. protocols and algorithms is provided by Schneier [Schn].
Businesses and governments use cryptography to make data Businesses and governments use cryptography to make data
incomprehensible to outsiders; to make data incomprehensible to incomprehensible to outsiders; to make data incomprehensible to
both outsiders and insiders, the data is sent to lawyers for a both outsiders and insiders, the data is sent to lawyers for a
rewrite. rewrite.
$ Cryptoki $ Cryptoki
(N) A CAPI defined in PKCS #11. Pronunciation: "CRYPTO-key". (N) A CAPI defined in PKCS #11. Pronunciation: "CRYPTO-key".
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sequence of symbols that have meaning. sequence of symbols that have meaning.
Usage: Refers to both (a) representations that can be recognized, Usage: Refers to both (a) representations that can be recognized,
processed, or produced by a computer or other type of machine, and processed, or produced by a computer or other type of machine, and
(b) representations that can be handled by a human. (b) representations that can be handled by a human.
$ Data Authentication Algorithm, data authentication algorithm $ Data Authentication Algorithm, data authentication algorithm
(N) /capitalized/ The ANSI standard for a keyed hash function that (N) /capitalized/ The ANSI standard for a keyed hash function that
is equivalent to DES cipher block chaining with IV = 0. [A9009] is equivalent to DES cipher block chaining with IV = 0. [A9009]
(D) /not capitalized/ Synonym for "checksum". (D) /not capitalized/ Synonym for some kind of "checksum".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the uncapitalized form, "data Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the uncapitalized form "data
authentication algorithm", as a synonym for other kinds of authentication algorithm" as a synonym for any kind of checksum,
checksums. regardless of whether or not the checksum is based on a hash.
Instead, use "checksum", "Data Authentication Code", "error
detection code", "hash", "keyed hash", "Message Authentication
Code", "protected checksum", or some other specific term,
depending on what is meant.
The uncapitalized term can be confused with the Data Authenticaton
Code and also mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. The
word "authentication" is misleading because the checksum may be
used to perform a data integrity function rather than a data
origin authentication function.
$ Data Authentication Code, data authentication code $ Data Authentication Code, data authentication code
1. (N) /capitalized/ A specific U.S. Government standard [FP113] 1. (N) /capitalized/ A specific U.S. Government standard [FP113]
for a checksum that is computed by the Data Authentication for a checksum that is computed by the Data Authentication
Algorithm. Usage: a.k.a. Message Authentication Code [A9009].) Algorithm. Usage: a.k.a. Message Authentication Code [A9009].)
(See: DAC.) (See: DAC.)
2. (D) /not capitalized/ Synonym for checksum. 2. (D) /not capitalized/ Synonym for some kind of "checksum".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use "data authentication code" as Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the uncapitalized form "data
a synonym for other kinds of checksums; that usage would mix authentication code" as a synonym for any kind of checksum,
concepts in a potentially misleading way (see: authentication regardless of whether or not the checksum is based on the Data
code). Instead, use "checksum", "error detection code", "hash", Authentication Algorithm. The uncapitalized term can be confused
"keyed hash", "Message Authentication Code", or "protected with the Data Authentication Code and also mixes concepts in a
checksum", depending on what is meant. potentially misleading way (see: authentication code).
$ data compromise $ data compromise
(I) A security incident in which information is exposed to (I) A security incident in which information is exposed to
potential unauthorized access, such that unauthorized disclosure, potential unauthorized access, such that unauthorized disclosure,
alteration, or use of the information may have occurred. (Compare: alteration, or use of the information might have occurred.
security compromise.) (Compare: security compromise.)
(O) A "compromise" is a "communication or physical transfer of (O) A "compromise" is a "communication or physical transfer of
information to an unauthorized recipient." [DoD5] information to an unauthorized recipient." [DoD5]
$ data confidentiality $ data confidentiality
(I) The property that data is not disclosed to system entities (I) The property that data is not disclosed to system entities
unless they have been authorized to know the data. (See: Bell- unless they have been authorized to know the data. (See: Bell-
LaPadula model, classification, data confidentiality service. LaPadula model, classification, data confidentiality service.
Compare: privacy.) Compare: privacy.)
(D) "The property that information is not made available or (D) "The property that information is not made available or
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes
[i.e., to any unauthorized system entity]." [I7498 Part 2]. [i.e., to any unauthorized system entity]." [I7498-2].
Deprecated Definition: The phrase "made available" might be Deprecated Definition: The phrase "made available" might be
interpreted to mean that the data could be altered, and that would interpreted to mean that the data could be altered, and that would
confuse this term with the concept of "data integrity". confuse this term with the concept of "data integrity".
$ data confidentiality service $ data confidentiality service
(I) A security service that protects data against unauthorized (I) A security service that protects data against unauthorized
disclosure. (See: access control, data confidentiality, datagram disclosure. (See: access control, data confidentiality, datagram
confidentiality service, flow control, inference control.) confidentiality service, flow control, inference control.)
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(N) A U.S. Government standard [FP046] that specifies the DEA and (N) A U.S. Government standard [FP046] that specifies the DEA and
states policy for using the algorithm to protect unclassified, states policy for using the algorithm to protect unclassified,
sensitive data. (See: AES.) sensitive data. (See: AES.)
$ data integrity $ data integrity
1. (I) The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or 1. (I) The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or
lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner. (See: data integrity lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner. (See: data integrity
service. Compare: correctness integrity, source integrity.) service. Compare: correctness integrity, source integrity.)
2. (O) "The property that information has not been modified or 2. (O) "The property that information has not been modified or
destroyed in an unauthorized manner." [I7498 Part 2] destroyed in an unauthorized manner." [I7498-2]
Usage: Deals with (a) constancy of and confidence in data values, Usage: Deals with (a) constancy of and confidence in data values,
and not with either (b) information that the values represent and not with either (b) information that the values represent
(see: correctness integrity) or (c) the trustworthiness of the (see: correctness integrity) or (c) the trustworthiness of the
source of the values (see: source integrity). source of the values (see: source integrity).
$ data integrity service $ data integrity service
(I) A security service that protects against unauthorized changes (I) A security service that protects against unauthorized changes
to data, including both intentional change or destruction and to data, including both intentional change or destruction and
accidental change or loss, by ensuring that changes to data are accidental change or loss, by ensuring that changes to data are
detectable. (See: data integrity, checksum, datagram integrity detectable. (See: data integrity, checksum, datagram integrity
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integrity services. Data origin authentication service provides integrity services. Data origin authentication service provides
verification that the identity of the original source of a verification that the identity of the original source of a
received data unit is as claimed; there can be no such received data unit is as claimed; there can be no such
verification if the data unit has been altered. Peer entity verification if the data unit has been altered. Peer entity
authentication service provides verification that the identity of authentication service provides verification that the identity of
a peer entity in a current association is as claimed; there can be a peer entity in a current association is as claimed; there can be
no such verification if the claimed identity has been altered. no such verification if the claimed identity has been altered.
$ data origin authentication $ data origin authentication
(I) "The corroboration that the source of data received is as (I) "The corroboration that the source of data received is as
claimed." [I7498 Part 2] (See: authentication.) claimed." [I7498-2] (See: authentication.)
$ data origin authentication service $ data origin authentication service
(I) A security service that verifies the identity of a system (I) A security service that verifies the identity of a system
entity that is claimed to be the original source of received data. entity that is claimed to be the original source of received data.
(See: authentication, authentication service.) (See: authentication, authentication service.)
Tutorial: This service is provided to any system entity that Tutorial: This service is provided to any system entity that
receives or holds the data. Unlike peer entity authentication receives or holds the data. Unlike peer entity authentication
service, this service is independent of any association between service, this service is independent of any association between
the originator and the recipient, and the data in question may the originator and the recipient, and the data in question may
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but unauthorized. but unauthorized.
Tutorial: Both data confidentiality service and data integrity Tutorial: Both data confidentiality service and data integrity
service are needed to achieve data security. service are needed to achieve data security.
$ datagram $ datagram
(I) "A self-contained, independent entity of data [i.e., a packet] (I) "A self-contained, independent entity of data [i.e., a packet]
carrying sufficient information to be routed from the source carrying sufficient information to be routed from the source
[computer] to the destination computer without reliance on earlier [computer] to the destination computer without reliance on earlier
exchanges between this source and destination computer and the exchanges between this source and destination computer and the
transporting network." Example: A PDU of IP. [R1983] transporting network." [R1983] Example: A PDU of IP.
$ datagram confidentiality service $ datagram confidentiality service
(I) A data confidentiality service that preserves the (I) A data confidentiality service that preserves the
confidentiality of data in a single, independent, packet; i.e., confidentiality of data in a single, independent, packet; i.e.,
the service applies to datagrams one-at-a-time. Example: ESP. the service applies to datagrams one-at-a-time. Example: ESP.
(See: data confidentiality.) (See: data confidentiality.)
Usage: When a protocol is said to provide data confidentiality Usage: When a protocol is said to provide data confidentiality
service, this is usually understood to mean that only the SDU is service, this is usually understood to mean that only the SDU is
protected in each packet. ISDs that use the term to mean that the protected in each packet. ISDs that use the term to mean that the
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connectionless confidentiality. The IPS need not make that connectionless confidentiality. The IPS need not make that
distinction, because those services are just instances of the same distinction, because those services are just instances of the same
service (i.e., datagram confidentiality) being offered in two service (i.e., datagram confidentiality) being offered in two
different protocol contexts. (For data integrity service, however, different protocol contexts. (For data integrity service, however,
additional effort is needed to protect a stream, and the IPS does additional effort is needed to protect a stream, and the IPS does
need to distinguish between "datagram integrity service" and need to distinguish between "datagram integrity service" and
"stream integrity service".) "stream integrity service".)
$ datagram integrity service $ datagram integrity service
(I) A data integrity service that preserves the integrity of data (I) A data integrity service that preserves the integrity of data
in a single, independent, data packet (i.e., the service applies in a single, independent, packet; i.e., the service applies to
to datagrams one-at-a-time). (See: data integrity. Compare: stream datagrams one-at-a-time. (See: data integrity. Compare: stream
integrity service.) integrity service.)
Tutorial: The ability to provide appropriate data integrity is Tutorial: The ability to provide appropriate data integrity is
important in many Internet security situations, and so there are important in many Internet security situations, and so there are
different kinds of data integrity services suited to different different kinds of data integrity services suited to different
applications. This service is the simplest kind; it is suitable applications. This service is the simplest kind; it is suitable
for connectionless data transfers. for connectionless data transfers.
Datagram integrity service usually is designed only to attempt to Datagram integrity service usually is designed only to attempt to
detect changes to the SDU in each packet, but it might also detect changes to the SDU in each packet, but it might also
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Users' own data and application software are not considered part Users' own data and application software are not considered part
of the DII. of the DII.
$ Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) $ Defense Information Systems Network (DISN)
(O) /U.S. DoD/ The U.S. DoD's consolidated, worldwide, enterprise (O) /U.S. DoD/ The U.S. DoD's consolidated, worldwide, enterprise
level telecommunications infrastructure that provides end-to-end level telecommunications infrastructure that provides end-to-end
information transfer for supporting military operations; a part of information transfer for supporting military operations; a part of
the DII. (Compare: GIG.) the DII. (Compare: GIG.)
$ degauss $ degauss
1a. (N) Apply a magnetic field to permanently remove, erase, or 1a. (N) Apply a magnetic field to permanently remove data from a
clear data from a magnetic storage medium, such as a tape or disk magnetic storage medium, such as a tape or disk [NCS25]. (Compare:
[NCS25]. erase, purge, sanitize.)
1b. (N) Reduce magnetic flux density to zero by applying a 1b. (N) Reduce magnetic flux density to zero by applying a
reversing magnetic field. (See: magnetic remanence.) reversing magnetic field. (See: magnetic remanence.)
$ degausser $ degausser
(N) An electrical device that can degauss magnetic storage media. (N) An electrical device that can degauss magnetic storage media.
$ DEK $ DEK
(I) See: data encryption key. (I) See: data encryption key.
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$ Digital ID(service mark) $ Digital ID(service mark)
(D) Synonym for "digital certificate". (D) Synonym for "digital certificate".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. It is a service Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. It is a service
mark of a commercial firm, and it unnecessarily duplicates the mark of a commercial firm, and it unnecessarily duplicates the
meaning of a better-established term. (See: credential.) meaning of a better-established term. (See: credential.)
$ digital key $ digital key
(D) A synonym for an input parameter of a cryptographic algorithm (D) A synonym for an input parameter of a cryptographic algorithm
or other process. or other process. (See: key.)
Deprecated Usage: The adjective "digital" need not be used with Deprecated Usage: The adjective "digital" need not be used with
"key" or "cryptographic key", unless the context is insufficient "key" or "cryptographic key", unless the context is insufficient
to distinguish the digital key from another kind of key, such as a to distinguish the digital key from another kind of key, such as a
metal key for a door lock. metal key for a door lock.
$ digital notary $ digital notary
(I) An electronic functionary analogous to a notary public. (I) An electronic functionary analogous to a notary public.
Provides a trusted time stamp for a digital document, so that Provides a trusted time stamp for a digital document, so that
someone can later prove that the document existed at that point in someone can later prove that the document existed at that point in
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1. (I) A value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and 1. (I) A value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and
appended to a data object in such a way that any recipient of the appended to a data object in such a way that any recipient of the
data can use the signature to verify the data's origin and data can use the signature to verify the data's origin and
integrity. (See: data origin authentication service, data integrity. (See: data origin authentication service, data
integrity service, signer. Compare: digitized signature, integrity service, signer. Compare: digitized signature,
electronic signature.) electronic signature.)
2. (I) "Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a 2. (I) "Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a
data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the
source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery, source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery,
e.g. by the recipient." [I7498 Part 2] e.g. by the recipient." [I7498-2]
Tutorial: A digital signature should have these properties: Tutorial: A digital signature should have these properties:
- Uniquely identify a system entity as being the signer. - Uniquely identify a system entity as being the signer.
- Be under the signer's sole control, so that it cannot be - Be under the signer's sole control, so that it cannot be
created by any other entity. created by any other entity.
- Be capable of being verified. (See: validate vs. verify.) - Be capable of being verified. (See: validate vs. verify.)
- Be bound to the signed data object in such a way that if the - Be bound to the signed data object in such a way that if the
data is changed, then when an attempt is made to verify the data is changed, then when an attempt is made to verify the
signature, it will be seen as not authentic. signature, it will be seen as not authentic.
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$ Digital Signature Standard (DSS) $ Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
(N) The U.S. Government standard [FP186] that specifies the DSA. (N) The U.S. Government standard [FP186] that specifies the DSA.
$ digital watermarking $ digital watermarking
(I) Computing techniques for inseparably embedding unobtrusive (I) Computing techniques for inseparably embedding unobtrusive
marks or labels as bits in digital data -- text, graphics, images, marks or labels as bits in digital data -- text, graphics, images,
video, or audio -- and for detecting or extracting the marks video, or audio -- and for detecting or extracting the marks
later. later.
Tutorial: The set of embedded bits (the digital watermark) is Tutorial: A "digital watermark", i.e., the set of embedded bits,
sometimes hidden, usually imperceptible, and always intended to be is sometimes hidden, usually imperceptible, and always intended to
unobtrusive. Depending on the particular technique that is used, be unobtrusive. Depending on the particular technique that is
digital watermarking can assist in proving ownership, controlling used, digital watermarking can assist in proving ownership,
duplication, tracing distribution, ensuring data integrity, and controlling duplication, tracing distribution, ensuring data
performing other functions to protect intellectual property integrity, and performing other functions to protect intellectual
rights. [ACM] property rights. [ACM]
$ digitized signature $ digitized signature
(D) Denotes various forms of digitized images of handwritten (D) Denotes various forms of digitized images of handwritten
signatures. (Compare: digital signature). signatures. (Compare: digital signature).
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without including Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without including
this definition. This term suggests careless use of "digital this definition. This term suggests careless use of "digital
signature", which is the term standardized by [I7498 Part 2]. signature", which is the term standardized by [I7498-2]. (See:
(See: electronic signature.) electronic signature.)
$ DII $ DII
(O) See: Defense Information Infrastructure. (O) See: Defense Information Infrastructure.
$ directory, Directory $ directory, Directory
1. (I) /not capitalized/ Refers generically to a database server 1. (I) /not capitalized/ Refers generically to a database server
or other system that stores and provides access to values of or other system that stores and provides access to values of
descriptive or operational data items that are associated with the descriptive or operational data items that are associated with the
components of a system. (Compare: repository.) components of a system. (Compare: repository.)
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legitimately produce different octet strings for the same ASN.1 legitimately produce different octet strings for the same ASN.1
definition. However, some applications require all encodings of a definition. However, some applications require all encodings of a
structure to be the same, so that encodings can be compared for structure to be the same, so that encodings can be compared for
equality. Therefore, DER is used in applications in which unique equality. Therefore, DER is used in applications in which unique
encoding is needed, such as when a digital signature is computed encoding is needed, such as when a digital signature is computed
on a structure defined by ASN.1. on a structure defined by ASN.1.
$ distinguished name (DN) $ distinguished name (DN)
(N) An identifier that uniquely represents an object in the X.500 (N) An identifier that uniquely represents an object in the X.500
Directory Information Tree (DIT) [X501]. (Compare: domain name, Directory Information Tree (DIT) [X501]. (Compare: domain name,
identity.) identity, naming authority.)
Tutorial: A DN is a set of attribute values that identify the path Tutorial: A DN is a set of attribute values that identify the path
leading from the base of the DIT to the object that is named. An leading from the base of the DIT to the object that is named. An
X.509 public-key certificate or CRL contains a DN that identifies X.509 public-key certificate or CRL contains a DN that identifies
its issuer, and an X.509 attribute certificate contains a DN or its issuer, and an X.509 attribute certificate contains a DN or
other form of name that identifies its subject. other form of name that identifies its subject.
$ distributed attack $ distributed attack
1a. (I) An attack that is implemented with distributed computing. 1a. (I) An attack that is implemented with distributed computing.
(See: zombie.) (See: zombie.)
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this abbreviation only with a national qualifier (e.g., U.S. DoD). this abbreviation only with a national qualifier (e.g., U.S. DoD).
$ DOI $ DOI
(I) See: Domain of Interpretation. (I) See: Domain of Interpretation.
$ domain $ domain
1a. (I) /general security/ An environment or context that (a) 1a. (I) /general security/ An environment or context that (a)
includes a set of system resources and a set of system entities includes a set of system resources and a set of system entities
that have the right to access the resources and (b) usually is that have the right to access the resources and (b) usually is
defined by a security policy, security model, or security defined by a security policy, security model, or security
architecture. (See: domain of interpretation, security perimeter. architecture. (See: CA domain, domain of interpretation, security
Compare: COI, enclave.) perimeter. Compare: COI, enclave.)
Tutorial: A "controlled interface" or "guard" is required to Tutorial: A "controlled interface" or "guard" is required to
transfer information between network domains that operate under transfer information between network domains that operate under
different security policies. different security policies.
1b. (O) /security policy/ A set of users, their information 1b. (O) /security policy/ A set of users, their information
objects, and a common security policy. [DGSA, SP33] objects, and a common security policy. [DGSA, SP33]
1c. (O) /security policy/ A system or collection of systems that 1c. (O) /security policy/ A system or collection of systems that
(a) belongs to a community of interest that implements a (a) belongs to a community of interest that implements a
consistent security policy and (b) is administered by a single consistent security policy and (b) is administered by a single
authority. authority.
2. (O) /computer security/ A operating state or mode of a set of 2. (O) /COMPUSEC/ A operating state or mode of a set of computer
computer hardware. hardware.
Tutorial: Most computers have at least two hardware operating Tutorial: Most computers have at least two hardware operating
modes [Gass]: modes [Gass]:
- "Privileged" mode: Also called "executive", "master", "system", - "Privileged" mode: Also called "executive", "master", "system",
kernel", or "supervisor" mode. In this mode, software can kernel", or "supervisor" mode. In this mode, software can
execute all machine instructions and access all storage execute all machine instructions and access all storage
locations. locations.
- "Unprivileged" mode: Also called "user", "application", or - "Unprivileged" mode: Also called "user", "application", or
"problem" mode. In this mode, software is restricted to a "problem" mode. In this mode, software is restricted to a
subset of the instructions and a subset of the storage subset of the instructions and a subset of the storage
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tree-structured domain name space, and data associated with the tree-structured domain name space, and data associated with the
names. names.
- Name servers: Programs that hold information about a subset of - Name servers: Programs that hold information about a subset of
the tree's structure and data holdings, and also hold pointers the tree's structure and data holdings, and also hold pointers
to other name servers that can provide information from any to other name servers that can provide information from any
part of the tree. part of the tree.
- Resolvers: Programs that extract information from name servers - Resolvers: Programs that extract information from name servers
in response to client requests; typically, system routines in response to client requests; typically, system routines
directly accessible to user programs. directly accessible to user programs.
Extensions to the DNS [R2535, R2536, R3007] support (a) key Extensions to the DNS [R4033, R4034, R4035] support (a) key
distribution for public keys needed for the DNS and for other distribution for public keys needed for the DNS and for other
protocols, (b) data origin authentication service and data protocols, (b) data origin authentication service and data
integrity service for resource records, (c) data origin integrity service for resource records, (c) data origin
authentication service for transactions between resolvers and authentication service for transactions between resolvers and
servers, and (d) access control of records. servers, and (d) access control of records.
$ domain of interpretation (DOI) $ domain of interpretation (DOI)
(I) /IPsec/ An DOI for ISAKMP or IKE defines payload formats, (I) /IPsec/ An DOI for ISAKMP or IKE defines payload formats,
exchange types, and conventions for naming security-relevant exchange types, and conventions for naming security-relevant
information such as security policies or cryptographic algorithms information such as security policies or cryptographic algorithms
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for "encrypt". However, see Usage note under "encryption". for "encrypt". However, see Usage note under "encryption".
$ encipherment $ encipherment
(D) Synonym for "encryption". (D) Synonym for "encryption".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "encryption". However, see Usage note under "encryption". for "encryption". However, see Usage note under "encryption".
$ enclave $ enclave
1. (I) A set of system resources that operate in the same security 1. (I) A set of system resources that operate in the same security
domain and that share the protection of a common, continuous domain and that share the protection of a single, common,
security perimeter. (Compare: domain.) continuous security perimeter. (Compare: domain.)
2. (O) /U.S. Government/ "Collection of computing environments 2. (D) /U.S. Government/ "Collection of computing environments
connected by one or more internal networks under the control of a connected by one or more internal networks under the control of a
single authority and security policy, including personnel and single authority and security policy, including personnel and
physical security." [C4009] physical security." [C4009]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
definition 2, because this definition applies to what is usually
called a "security domain". That is, a security domain is set of
of one or more security enclaves.
$ encode $ encode
1. (I) Use a system of symbols to represent information, which 1. (I) Use a system of symbols to represent information, which
might originally have some other representation. Example: Morse might originally have some other representation. Example: Morse
code. (See: ASCII, BER.) (See: code, decode.) code. (See: ASCII, BER.) (See: code, decode.)
2. (D) Synonym for "encrypt". 2. (D) Synonym for "encrypt".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "encrypt"; encoding is not always meant to conceal meaning. for "encrypt"; encoding is not always meant to conceal meaning.
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$ encryption $ encryption
1. (I) Cryptographic transformation of data (called "plain text") 1. (I) Cryptographic transformation of data (called "plain text")
into a different form (called "cipher text") that conceals the into a different form (called "cipher text") that conceals the
data's original meaning and prevents the original form from being data's original meaning and prevents the original form from being
used. If the transformation is reversible, the corresponding used. If the transformation is reversible, the corresponding
reversal process is called "decryption", which is a transformation reversal process is called "decryption", which is a transformation
that restores encrypted data to its original state. (See: that restores encrypted data to its original state. (See:
cryptography.) cryptography.)
2. (O) "The cryptographic transformation of data to produce 2. (O) "The cryptographic transformation of data to produce
ciphertext." [I7498 Part 2] ciphertext." [I7498-2]
Usage: For this concept, ISDs SHOULD use the verb "to encrypt" Usage: For this concept, ISDs SHOULD use the verb "to encrypt"
(and related variations: encryption, decrypt, and decryption). (and related variations: encryption, decrypt, and decryption).
However, because of cultural biases involving human burial, some However, because of cultural biases involving human burial, some
international documents (particularly ISO and CCITT standards) international documents (particularly ISO and CCITT standards)
avoid "to encrypt" and instead use the verb "to encipher" (and avoid "to encrypt" and instead use the verb "to encipher" (and
related variations: encipherment, decipher, decipherment). related variations: encipherment, decipher, decipherment).
Tutorial: Usually, the plaintext input to an encryption operation Tutorial: Usually, the plaintext input to an encryption operation
is clear text. But in some cases, the plain text may be cipher is clear text. But in some cases, the plain text may be cipher
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$ end entity $ end entity
1. (I) A system entity that is the subject of a public-key 1. (I) A system entity that is the subject of a public-key
certificate and that is using, or is permitted and able to use, certificate and that is using, or is permitted and able to use,
the matching private key only for purposes other than signing a the matching private key only for purposes other than signing a
digital certificate; i.e., an entity that is not a CA. digital certificate; i.e., an entity that is not a CA.
2. (O) "A certificate subject which uses its public [sic] key for 2. (O) "A certificate subject which uses its public [sic] key for
purposes other than signing certificates." [X509] purposes other than signing certificates." [X509]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the X.509 definition, Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2, which is
which is misleading and incomplete. First, that definition should misleading and incomplete. First, that definition should have said
have said "private key" rather than "public key" because "private key" rather than "public key" because certificates are
certificates are not usefully signed with a public key. Second, not usefully signed with a public key. Second, the X.509
the X.509 definition is ambiguous regarding whether an end entity definition is ambiguous regarding whether an end entity may or may
may or may not use the private key to sign a certificate, i.e., not use the private key to sign a certificate, i.e., whether the
whether the subject may be a CA. The intent of X.509's authors was subject may be a CA. The intent of X.509's authors was that an end
that an end entity certificate is not valid for use in verifying a entity certificate is not valid for use in verifying a signature
signature on an X.509 certificate or X.509 CRL. Thus, it would on an X.509 certificate or X.509 CRL. Thus, it would have been
have been better for the X.509 definition to have said "only for better for the X.509 definition to have said "only for purposes
purposes other than signing certificates". other than signing certificates".
Usage: Despite the problems in the X.509 definition, the term Usage: Despite the problems in the X.509 definition, the term
itself is useful in describing applications of asymmetric itself is useful in describing applications of asymmetric
cryptography. The way the term is used in X.509 implies that it cryptography. The way the term is used in X.509 implies that it
was meant to be defined, as we have done here, relative to roles was meant to be defined, as we have done here, relative to roles
that an entity (which is associated with an OSI end system) is that an entity (which is associated with an OSI end system) is
playing or is permitted to play in applications of asymmetric playing or is permitted to play in applications of asymmetric
cryptography other than the PKI that supports applications. cryptography other than the PKI that supports applications.
Tutorial: Whether a subject can play both CA and non-CA roles, Tutorial: Whether a subject can play both CA and non-CA roles,
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- A "CRL extension": X.509 defines extensions that may be - A "CRL extension": X.509 defines extensions that may be
included in v2 CRLs to provide additional issuer key and name included in v2 CRLs to provide additional issuer key and name
information, revocation reasons and constraints, and information, revocation reasons and constraints, and
information about distribution points and delta CRLs. information about distribution points and delta CRLs.
- A "private extension": Additional extensions, each named by an - A "private extension": Additional extensions, each named by an
OID, can be locally defined as needed by applications or OID, can be locally defined as needed by applications or
communities. (See: Authority Information Access extension, SET communities. (See: Authority Information Access extension, SET
private extensions.) private extensions.)
$ external controls $ external controls
(I) /computer security/ Refers to administrative security, (I) /COMPUSEC/ Refers to administrative security, personnel
personnel security, and physical security. (Compare: internal security, and physical security. (Compare: internal controls.)
controls.)
$ extranet $ extranet
(I) A computer network that an organization uses for application (I) A computer network that an organization uses for application
data traffic between the organization and its business partners. data traffic between the organization and its business partners.
(Compare: intranet.) (Compare: intranet.)
Tutorial: An extranet can be implemented securely, either on the Tutorial: An extranet can be implemented securely, either on the
Internet or using Internet technology, by constructing the Internet or using Internet technology, by constructing the
extranet as a VPN. extranet as a VPN.
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$ financial institution $ financial institution
(N) "An establishment responsible for facilitating customer- (N) "An establishment responsible for facilitating customer-
initiated transactions or transmission of funds for the extension initiated transactions or transmission of funds for the extension
of credit or the custody, loan, exchange, or issuance of money." of credit or the custody, loan, exchange, or issuance of money."
[SET2] [SET2]
$ fingerprint $ fingerprint
1. (I) A pattern of curves formed by the ridges on a fingertip. 1. (I) A pattern of curves formed by the ridges on a fingertip.
(See: biometric authentication. Compare: thumbprint.) (See: biometric authentication. Compare: thumbprint.)
2. (D) /PGP/ A hash result ("key fingerprint") used to 2. (D) /PGP/ A hash result ("key fingerprint") used to
authenticate a public key or other data. [PGP] authenticate a public key or other data. [PGP]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with the Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
specific PGP definition, and SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym definition 2, and SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "hash
for "hash result" of *any* kind. Either use would mix concepts in result" of *any* kind. Either use would mix concepts in a
a potentially misleading way. potentially misleading way.
$ FIPS $ FIPS
(N) See: Federal Information Processing Standards. (N) See: Federal Information Processing Standards.
$ FIPS PUB 140-1 $ FIPS PUB 140-1
(N) The U.S. Government standard [FP140] for security requirements (N) The U.S. Government standard [FP140] for security requirements
to be met by a cryptographic module when the module is used to to be met by a cryptographic module when the module is used to
protect unclassified information in computer and communication protect unclassified information in computer and communication
systems. (See: Common Criteria, FIPS, Federal Standard 1027.) systems. (See: Common Criteria, FIPS, Federal Standard 1027.)
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(O) See: Federal Public-Key Infrastructure. (O) See: Federal Public-Key Infrastructure.
$ frequency hopping $ frequency hopping
(N) "Repeated switching of frequencies during radio transmission (N) "Repeated switching of frequencies during radio transmission
according to a specified algorithm." [C4009] (See: spread according to a specified algorithm." [C4009] (See: spread
spectrum.) spectrum.)
Tutorial: Frequency hopping is a TRANSEC technique to minimize the Tutorial: Frequency hopping is a TRANSEC technique to minimize the
potential for unauthorized interception or jamming. potential for unauthorized interception or jamming.
$ fresh
(I) Original; not yet processed.
Usage: Describes data contained in a PDU that is received for the
first time. (See: liveness, nonce, replay attack.)
$ FTP $ FTP
(I) See: File Transfer Protocol. (I) See: File Transfer Protocol.
$ gateway $ gateway
(I) An intermediate system (interface, relay) that attaches to two (I) An intermediate system (interface, relay) that attaches to two
(or more) computer networks that have similar functions but (or more) computer networks that have similar functions but
dissimilar implementations and that enables either one-way or two- dissimilar implementations and that enables either one-way or two-
way communication between the networks. (See: bridge, firewall, way communication between the networks. (See: bridge, firewall,
guard, internetwork, proxy server, router, and subnetwork.) guard, internetwork, proxy server, router, and subnetwork.)
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NOT use "cute" synonyms. No matter how clearly understood or NOT use "cute" synonyms. No matter how clearly understood or
popular a nickname may be in one community, it is likely to cause popular a nickname may be in one community, it is likely to cause
confusion or offense in others. For example, several other confusion or offense in others. For example, several other
information system standards also are called "the Green Book"; the information system standards also are called "the Green Book"; the
following are some examples: following are some examples:
- Each volume of 1992 ITU-T (known at that time as CCITT) - Each volume of 1992 ITU-T (known at that time as CCITT)
standards. standards.
- "PostScript Language Program Design", Adobe Systems, Addison- - "PostScript Language Program Design", Adobe Systems, Addison-
Wesley, 1988. Wesley, 1988.
- IEEE 1003.1 POSIX Operating Systems Interface. - IEEE 1003.1 POSIX Operating Systems Interface.
- "Smalltalk-80: Bits of History, Words of Advice", Glenn - "Smalltalk-80: Bits of History, Words of Advice", Glenn
Krasner, Addison-Wesley, 1983. Krasner, Addison-Wesley, 1983.
- "X/Open Compatibility Guide". - "X/Open Compatibility Guide".
- A particular CD-ROM format developed by Phillips. - A particular CD-ROM format developed by Phillips.
$ GRIP
(I) A contraction of "Guidelines and Recommendations for Security
Incident Processing", the name of the IETF working group that
seeks to facilitate consistent handling of security incidents in
the Internet community. (See: security incident.)
Tutorial: Guidelines to be produced by the WG will address
technology vendors, network service providers, and response teams
in their roles assisting organizations in resolving security
incidents. These relationships are functional and can exist within
and across organizational boundaries.
$ Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) $ Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI)
(I) An ISAMKP/IKE domain of interpretation for group key (I) An ISAMKP/IKE domain of interpretation for group key
management; i.e., a phase 2 protocol in ISAKMP. [R3547] (See: management; i.e., a phase 2 protocol in ISAKMP. [R3547] (See:
secure multicast.) secure multicast.)
Tutorial: In this group key management model that extends the Tutorial: In this group key management model that extends the
ISAKMP standard, the protocol is run between a group member and a ISAKMP standard, the protocol is run between a group member and a
"group controller/key server", which establishes security "group controller/key server", which establishes security
associations [R2401] among authorized group members. The GDOI associations [R2401] among authorized group members. The GDOI
protocol is itself protected by an ISAKMP phase 1 association. protocol is itself protected by an ISAKMP phase 1 association.
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function may be a candidate for use in a security mechanism to function may be a candidate for use in a security mechanism to
detect accidental changes in data, but not necessarily for a detect accidental changes in data, but not necessarily for a
mechanism to detect changes made by active wiretapping (See: mechanism to detect changes made by active wiretapping (See:
Tutorial under "checksum".) Tutorial under "checksum".)
Security mechanisms require a "cryptographic hash function" (e.g., Security mechanisms require a "cryptographic hash function" (e.g.,
MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, Snefru), i.e., a good hash function that MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, Snefru), i.e., a good hash function that
also has the one-way property and one of the two collision-free also has the one-way property and one of the two collision-free
properties: properties:
- "One-way property": Given H and a hash result h = H(s), it is - "One-way property": Given H and a hash result h = H(s), it is
hard (i.e., computationally infeasible) to find s. (Of course, hard (i.e., computationally infeasible, "impossible") to find
given H and an input s, it must be relatively easy to compute s. (Of course, given H and an input s, it must be relatively
the hash result H(s).) easy to compute the hash result H(s).)
- "Weakly collision-free property": Given H and an input s, it is - "Weakly collision-free property": Given H and an input s, it is
hard to find a different input, s', such that H(s) = H(s'). hard (i.e., computationally infeasible, "impossible") to find a
different input, s', such that H(s) = H(s').
- "Strongly collision-free property": Given H, it is hard to find - "Strongly collision-free property": Given H, it is hard to find
any pair of inputs s and s' such that H(s) = H(s'). any pair of inputs s and s' such that H(s) = H(s').
If H produces a hash result N bits long, then to find an s' where If H produces a hash result N bits long, then to find an s' where
H(s') = H(s) for a specific given s, the amount of computation H(s') = H(s) for a specific given s, the amount of computation
required is O(2**n); i.e., it is necessary to try on the order of required is O(2**n); i.e., it is necessary to try on the order of
2 to the power n values of s' before finding a collision. However, 2 to the power n values of s' before finding a collision. However,
to simply find any pair of values s and s' that collide, the to simply find any pair of values s and s' that collide, the
amount of computation required is only O(2**(n/2)); i.e., after amount of computation required is only O(2**(n/2)); i.e., after
computing H(s) for 2 to the power n/2 randomly chosen values of s, computing H(s) for 2 to the power n/2 randomly chosen values of s,
the probability is greater than 1/2 that two of those values have the probability is greater than 1/2 that two of those values have
the same hash result. (See: birthday attack.) the same hash result. (See: birthday attack.)
$ hash result $ hash result
1. (I) The output of a hash function. (See: hash code, hash value. 1. (I) The output of a hash function. (See: hash code, hash value.
Compare: hash value.) Compare: hash value.)
2. (O) "The output produced by a hash function upon processing a 2. (O) "The output produced by a hash function upon processing a
message" (where "message" is broadly defined as "a digital message" (where "message" is broadly defined as "a digital
representation of data"). [ABA] representation of data"). [DSG]
Usage: ISDs SHOULD avoid the unusual usage of "message" that is Usage: ISDs SHOULD avoid the unusual usage of "message" that is
seen in the "O" definition. seen in the "O" definition.
$ hash value $ hash value
(D) Synonym for "hash result". (D) Synonym for "hash result".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term for the output of a Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term for the output of a
hash function; the term could easily be confused with "hashed hash function; the term could easily be confused with "hashed
value", which means the input to a hash function. (See: hash code, value", which means the input to a hash function. (See: hash code,
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2. (D) Synonym for "signature certificate". 2. (D) Synonym for "signature certificate".
Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it
because the term is used in many ways and could easily be because the term is used in many ways and could easily be
misunderstood. misunderstood.
$ identity $ identity
(I) The collective aspect of a set of attribute values (i.e., (I) The collective aspect of a set of attribute values (i.e.,
characteristics) by which a system entity is recognizable or characteristics) by which a system entity is recognizable or
known, and which is sufficient to (1) distinguish the entity from known, and which is sufficient to (a) distinguish the entity from
all other entities in the system and (2) distinguish the identity all other entities in the system and (b) distinguish the identity
from any other identities of the same entity. (See: authenticate, from any other identities of the same entity. (See: authenticate,
registration. Compare: identifier.) registration. Compare: identifier.)
Tutorial: At the time when a user's identity is being registered Tutorial: At the time when a user's identity is being registered
in a system, the system may require presentation of evidence that in a system, the system may require presentation of evidence that
proves both the user's eligibility to register and the identity's proves both the user's eligibility to register and the identity's
authenticity (i.e., that the user has the right to claim the authenticity (i.e., that the user has the right to claim the
identity). identity).
The set of attributes used to recognize identities must, of The set of attributes used to recognize identities must, of
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|+-------+| | | | Information | | is system-unique | | | |+-------+| | | | Information | | is system-unique | | |
|| a set || | | +--------------+ +-----------------------+ | | || a set || | | +--------------+ +-----------------------+ | |
|| of || | | Identifier Credential that associates unit of | | || of || | | Identifier Credential that associates unit of | |
|| either|| | | Authentication Information with the Identifier | | || either|| | | Authentication Information with the Identifier | |
|+-------+| | +------------------------------------------------+ | |+-------+| | +------------------------------------------------+ |
+ - - - - + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+ + - - - - + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+
$ identity-based security policy $ identity-based security policy
(I) "A security policy based on the identities and/or attributes (I) "A security policy based on the identities and/or attributes
of users, a group of users, or entities acting on behalf of the of users, a group of users, or entities acting on behalf of the
users and the resources/objects being accessed." [I7498 Part 2] users and the resources/objects being accessed." [I7498-2] (See:
(See: rule-based security policy.) rule-based security policy.)
$ identity proofing $ identity proofing
(I) A process that vets and verifies the information that is used (I) A process that vets and verifies the information that is used
to establish the identity of a system entity. (See: registration.) to establish the identity of a system entity. (See: registration.)
$ IDS $ IDS
(I) See: intrusion detection system. (I) See: intrusion detection system.
$ IEEE $ IEEE
(N) See: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (N) See: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
skipping to change at page 129, line 51 skipping to change at page 131, line 51
mechanism to an IMAP4 server to authenticate the client to the mechanism to an IMAP4 server to authenticate the client to the
server and provide other security services. (See: POP3.) server and provide other security services. (See: POP3.)
Tutorial: If the server accepts the proposal, the command is Tutorial: If the server accepts the proposal, the command is
followed by performing a challenge-response authentication followed by performing a challenge-response authentication
protocol and, optionally, negotiating a protection mechanism for protocol and, optionally, negotiating a protection mechanism for
subsequent POP3 interactions. The security mechanisms that are subsequent POP3 interactions. The security mechanisms that are
used by IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE -- including Kerberos, GSSAPI, and used by IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE -- including Kerberos, GSSAPI, and
S/Key -- are described in [R1731]. S/Key -- are described in [R1731].
$ impossible
(O) Cannot be done in any reasonable amount of time. (See: break,
brute force, strength, work factor.)
$ in the clear $ in the clear
(I) Not encrypted. (See: clear text.) (I) Not encrypted. (See: clear text.)
$ Ina Jo $ Ina Jo
(O) A methodology, language, and integrated set of software tools (O) A methodology, language, and integrated set of software tools
developed at the System Development Corporation for specifying, developed at the System Development Corporation for specifying,
coding, and verifying software to produce correct and reliable coding, and verifying software to produce correct and reliable
programs. Usage: a.k.a. the Formal Development Methodology. [Cheh] programs. Usage: a.k.a. the Formal Development Methodology. [Cheh]
$ incapacitation $ incapacitation
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exists within either B or some other network C. In ingress exists within either B or some other network C. In ingress
filtering, the ISP's router blocks all inbound packet that arrive filtering, the ISP's router blocks all inbound packet that arrive
from B with a source address that is not within the range of from B with a source address that is not within the range of
legitimately advertised addresses for B. This method does not legitimately advertised addresses for B. This method does not
prevent all attacks that can originate from B, but the actual prevent all attacks that can originate from B, but the actual
source of such attacks can be more easily traced because the source of such attacks can be more easily traced because the
originating network is known. originating network is known.
$ initialization value (IV) $ initialization value (IV)
(I) /cryptography/ An input parameter that sets the starting state (I) /cryptography/ An input parameter that sets the starting state
of a cryptographic algorithm or mode. of a cryptographic algorithm or mode. (Compare: activation data.)
Usage: Sometimes called "initialization vector" or "message Usage: Sometimes called "initialization vector" or "message
indicator", but ISDs SHOULD NOT use these synonyms because they indicator", but ISDs SHOULD NOT use these synonyms because they
mix concepts in potentially confusing ways. mix concepts in potentially confusing ways.
Tutorial: An IV can be used to synchronize one cryptographic Tutorial: An IV can be used to synchronize one cryptographic
process with another; e.g., CBC, CFB, and OFB use IVs. An IV also process with another; e.g., CBC, CFB, and OFB use IVs. An IV also
can be used to introduce cryptographic variance (see: salt) in can be used to introduce cryptographic variance (see: salt) in
addition to that provided by a key. addition to that provided by a key.
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widely known and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. widely known and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way.
For example, suppose that end entity 1 ("EE1) is in one PKI For example, suppose that end entity 1 ("EE1) is in one PKI
("PKI1"), end entity 2 ("EE2) is in another PKI ("PKI2"), and the ("PKI1"), end entity 2 ("EE2) is in another PKI ("PKI2"), and the
root in PKI1 ("CA1") cross-certifies the root CA in PKI2 ("CA2"). root in PKI1 ("CA1") cross-certifies the root CA in PKI2 ("CA2").
Then if EE1 constructs the certification path CA1-to-CA2-to-EE2 to Then if EE1 constructs the certification path CA1-to-CA2-to-EE2 to
validate a certificate of EE2, conventional English usage would validate a certificate of EE2, conventional English usage would
describe CA2 as being in the "intermediate" position in that path, describe CA2 as being in the "intermediate" position in that path,
not CA1. not CA1.
$ internal controls $ internal controls
(I) /computer security/ Functions, features, and technical (I) /COMPUSEC/ Functions, features, and technical characteristics
characteristics of computer hardware and software, especially of of computer hardware and software, especially of operating
operating systems. Includes mechanisms to regulate the operation systems. Includes mechanisms to regulate the operation of a
of a computer system with regard to access control, flow control, computer system with regard to access control, flow control, and
and inference control. (Compare: external controls.) inference control. (Compare: external controls.)
$ International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) $ International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)
(N) A patented, symmetric block cipher that uses a 128-bit key and (N) A patented, symmetric block cipher that uses a 128-bit key and
operates on 64-bit blocks. [Schn] (See: symmetric cryptography.) operates on 64-bit blocks. [Schn] (See: symmetric cryptography.)
$ International Standard $ International Standard
(N) See: secondary definition under "ISO". (N) See: secondary definition under "ISO".
$ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) $ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
(O) Rules issued by the U.S. State Department, by authority of the (O) Rules issued by the U.S. State Department, by authority of the
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Tutorial: If IP were used in an OSIRM stack, IP would be placed at Tutorial: If IP were used in an OSIRM stack, IP would be placed at
the top of Layer 3, above other Layer 3 protocols in the stack. the top of Layer 3, above other Layer 3 protocols in the stack.
In any IPS stack, IP is always present in the Internet Layer and In any IPS stack, IP is always present in the Internet Layer and
is always placed at the top of that layer, on top of any other is always placed at the top of that layer, on top of any other
protocols that are used in that layer. In some sense, IP is the protocols that are used in that layer. In some sense, IP is the
only protocol specified for the IPS Internet Layer; other only protocol specified for the IPS Internet Layer; other
protocols used there, such as AH and ESP, are just IP variations. protocols used there, such as AH and ESP, are just IP variations.
$ Internet Protocol security $ Internet Protocol security
See: IPsec. See: IP Security Protocol.
$ Internet Protocol Security Option (IPSO) $ Internet Protocol Security Option (IPSO)
(I) Refers to one of three types of IP security options, which are (I) Refers to one of three types of IP security options, which are
fields that may be added to an IP datagram for the purpose of fields that may be added to an IP datagram for the purpose of
carrying security information about the datagram. (Compare: carrying security information about the datagram. (Compare:
IPsec.) IPsec.)
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without a modifier Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without a modifier
to indicate which of the following three types is meant. to indicate which of the following three types is meant:
- "DoD Basic Security Option" (IP option type 130): Defined for - "DoD Basic Security Option" (IP option type 130): Defined for
use on U.S. DoD common-use data networks. Identifies the DoD use on U.S. DoD common-use data networks. Identifies the DoD
classification level at which the datagram is to be protected classification level at which the datagram is to be protected
and the protection authorities whose rules apply to the and the protection authorities whose rules apply to the
datagram. (A "protection authority" is a National Access datagram. (A "protection authority" is a National Access
Program (e.g., GENSER, SIOP-ESI, SCI, NSA, Department of Program (e.g., GENSER, SIOP-ESI, SCI, NSA, Department of
Energy) or Special Access Program that specifies protection Energy) or Special Access Program that specifies protection
rules for transmission and processing of the information rules for transmission and processing of the information
contained in the datagram.) [R1108] contained in the datagram.) [R1108]
- "DoD Extended Security Option" (IP option type 133): Permits - "DoD Extended Security Option" (IP option type 133): Permits
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$ IP Security Option $ IP Security Option
(I) See: Internet Protocol Security Option. (I) See: Internet Protocol Security Option.
$ IP Security Protocol (IPsec) $ IP Security Protocol (IPsec)
1a. (I) The name of the IETF working group that is specifying an 1a. (I) The name of the IETF working group that is specifying an
architecture [R2401] and set of protocols to provide security architecture [R2401] and set of protocols to provide security
services for IP traffic. (See: AH, ESP, IKE, SAD, SPD. Compare: services for IP traffic. (See: AH, ESP, IKE, SAD, SPD. Compare:
IPSO.) IPSO.)
1b. (I) A collective name for the IP security architecture and 1b. (I) A collective name for the IP security architecture [R2401]
associated set of protocols (primarily AH, ESP, and IKE). and associated set of protocols (primarily AH, ESP, and IKE).
Usage: Note that the letters "sec" are in lower case in "IPsec". Usage: In ISDs that use the abbreviation "IPsec", the letters "IP"
SHOULD be in upper case, and the letters "sec" SHOULD NOT.
Tutorial: The security services provided by IPsec include access Tutorial: The security services provided by IPsec include access
control service, connectionless data integrity service, data control service, connectionless data integrity service, data
origin authentication service, protection against replays origin authentication service, protection against replays
(detection of the arrival of duplicate datagrams, within a (detection of the arrival of duplicate datagrams, within a
constrained window), data confidentiality service, and limited constrained window), data confidentiality service, and limited
traffic-flow confidentiality. IPsec specifies (a) security traffic-flow confidentiality. IPsec specifies (a) security
protocols (AH and ESP), (b) security associations (what they are, protocols (AH and ESP), (b) security associations (what they are,
how they work, how they are managed, and associated processing), how they work, how they are managed, and associated processing),
(c) key management (IKE), and (d) algorithms for authentication (c) key management (IKE), and (d) algorithms for authentication
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(N) An International Standard that is a code of practice, derived (N) An International Standard that is a code of practice, derived
from Part 1 of British Standard 7799, for managing the security of from Part 1 of British Standard 7799, for managing the security of
information systems in an organization. This standard does not information systems in an organization. This standard does not
provide definitive or specific material on any security topic. It provide definitive or specific material on any security topic. It
provides general guidance on a wide variety of topics, but provides general guidance on a wide variety of topics, but
typically does not go into depth. (See: IATF, [SP14].) typically does not go into depth. (See: IATF, [SP14].)
$ ISOC $ ISOC
(I) See: Internet Society. (I) See: Internet Society.
$ issue (a digital certificate or CRL) $ issue
(I) Generate and sign a digital certificate (or CRL) and, usually, (I) /PKI/ Generate and sign a digital certificate (or a CRL) and,
distribute it and make it available to potential certificate users usually, distribute it and make it available to potential
(or CRL users). (See: certificate creation.) certificate users (or CRL users). (See: certificate creation.)
Usage: The ABA Guidelines [ABA] explicitly limit this term to Usage: The term "issuing" is usually understood to refer not only
certificate creation, and exclude the act of publishing. In to creating a digital certificate (or a CRL) but also to making it
general usage, however, "issuing" a digital certificate (or CRL)
includes not only certificate creation but also making it
available to potential users, such as by storing it in a available to potential users, such as by storing it in a
repository or other directory or otherwise publishing it. repository or other directory or otherwise publishing it. However,
the ABA [DSG] explicitly limits this term to the creation process
and excludes any related publishing or distribution process.
$ issuer $ issuer
1. (I) /certificate, CRL/ The CA that signs a digital certificate 1. (I) /certificate, CRL/ The CA that signs a digital certificate
or CRL. or CRL.
Tutorial: An X.509 certificate always includes the issuer's name. Tutorial: An X.509 certificate always includes the issuer's name.
The name may include a common name value. The name may include a common name value.
2. (O) /payment card, SET/ "The financial institution or its agent 2. (O) /payment card, SET/ "The financial institution or its agent
that issues the unique primary account number to the cardholder that issues the unique primary account number to the cardholder
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secure replacement for UNIX Version 6, and consisting of a secure replacement for UNIX Version 6, and consisting of a
security kernel, non-kernel security-related utility programs, and security kernel, non-kernel security-related utility programs, and
optional UNIX application development and support environments. optional UNIX application development and support environments.
[Perr] [Perr]
Tutorial: KSOS-6 was the implementation on a SCOMP. KSOS-11 was Tutorial: KSOS-6 was the implementation on a SCOMP. KSOS-11 was
the implementation by Ford Aerospace and Communications the implementation by Ford Aerospace and Communications
Corporation on the DEC PDP-11/45 and PDP-111/70 computers. Corporation on the DEC PDP-11/45 and PDP-111/70 computers.
$ key $ key
1. (I) /cryptography/ An input parameter used to vary a 1a. (I) /cryptography/ An input parameter used to vary a
transformation function performed by a cryptographic algorithm. transformation function performed by a cryptographic algorithm.
(See: private key, public key, storage key, symmetric key, traffic (See: private key, public key, storage key, symmetric key, traffic
key. Compare: initialization value.) key. Compare: initialization value.)
1b. (O) /cryptography/ Used in singular form as a collective noun
referring to keys or keying material. Example: A fill device can
be used transfer key between two cryptographic devices.
2. (I) /anti-jam/ An input parameter used to vary a process that 2. (I) /anti-jam/ An input parameter used to vary a process that
determines patterns for an anti-jam measure. (See: frequency determines patterns for an anti-jam measure. (See: frequency
hopping, spread spectrum.) hopping, spread spectrum.)
Tutorial: A key is usually specified as a sequence of bits or Tutorial: A key is usually specified as a sequence of bits or
other symbols. If a key value needs to be kept secret, the other symbols. If a key value needs to be kept secret, the
sequence of symbols that comprise it should be random, or at least sequence of symbols that comprise it should be random, or at least
pseudorandom, because that makes the key harder for an adversary pseudorandom, because that makes the key harder for an adversary
to guess. (See: brute force attack, cryptanalysis, strength.) to guess. (See: brute force attack, cryptanalysis, strength.)
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key with (b) a bit string representation of the plaintext). key with (b) a bit string representation of the plaintext).
$ key length $ key length
(I) The number of symbols (usually stated as a number of bits) (I) The number of symbols (usually stated as a number of bits)
needed to be able to represent any of the possible values of a needed to be able to represent any of the possible values of a
cryptographic key. (See: key space.) cryptographic key. (See: key space.)
$ key lifetime $ key lifetime
1. (D) Synonym for "cryptoperiod". 1. (D) Synonym for "cryptoperiod".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with this Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
definition because a key's cryptoperiod may be only a part of the definition 1 because a key's cryptoperiod may be only a part of
key's lifetime. A key could be generated at some time prior to the key's lifetime. A key could be generated at some time prior to
when its cryptoperiod begins and might not be destroyed (i.e., when its cryptoperiod begins and might not be destroyed (i.e.,
zeroized) until some time after its cryptoperiod ends. zeroized) until some time after its cryptoperiod ends.
2. (O) /MISSI/ An attribute of a MISSI key pair that specifies a 2. (O) /MISSI/ An attribute of a MISSI key pair that specifies a
time span that bounds the validity period of any MISSI X.509 time span that bounds the validity period of any MISSI X.509
public-key certificate that contains the public component of the public-key certificate that contains the public component of the
pair. (See: cryptoperiod.) pair. (See: cryptoperiod.)
$ key loader $ key loader
(N) Synonym for "fill device". (N) Synonym for "fill device".
$ key loading and initialization facility (KLIF)
(N) A place where ECU hardware is activated after being
fabricated. (Compare: CLEF.)
Tutorial: Before going to its KLIF, an ECU is not ready to be
fielded, usually because it is not yet able to receive DEKs. The
KLIF employs trusted processes to complete the ECU by installing
needed data such as KEKs, seed values, and, in some cases,
cryptographic software. After KLIF processing, the ECU is ready
for deployment.
$ key management $ key management
1a. (I) The process of handling keying material during its life 1a. (I) The process of handling keying material during its life
cycle in a cryptographic system; and the supervision and control cycle in a cryptographic system; and the supervision and control
of that process. (See: key distribution, key escrow, keying of that process. (See: key distribution, key escrow, keying
material, public-key infrastructure.) material, public-key infrastructure.)
Usage: Usually understood to include ordering, generating, Usage: Usually understood to include ordering, generating,
storing, archiving, escrowing, distributing, loading, destroying, storing, archiving, escrowing, distributing, loading, destroying,
auditing, and accounting for the material. auditing, and accounting for the material.
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Usage: Usually understood to include ordering, generating, Usage: Usually understood to include ordering, generating,
storing, archiving, escrowing, distributing, loading, destroying, storing, archiving, escrowing, distributing, loading, destroying,
auditing, and accounting for the material. auditing, and accounting for the material.
1b. (O) /NIST/ "The activities involving the handling of 1b. (O) /NIST/ "The activities involving the handling of
cryptographic keys and other related security parameters (e.g., cryptographic keys and other related security parameters (e.g.,
IVs, counters) during the entire life cycle of the keys, including IVs, counters) during the entire life cycle of the keys, including
their generation, storage, distribution, entry and use, deletion their generation, storage, distribution, entry and use, deletion
or destruction, and archiving." [FP140, SP57] or destruction, and archiving." [FP140, SP57]
2. (O) /OSIRM/ "The generation, storage, distribution, deletion, 2. (O) /OSIRM/ "The generation, storage, distribution, deletion,
archiving and application of keys in accordance with a security archiving and application of keys in accordance with a security
policy." [I7498 Part 2] policy." [I7498-2]
$ Key Management Protocol (KMP) $ Key Management Protocol (KMP)
(N) A protocol to establish a shared symmetric key between a pair (N) A protocol to establish a shared symmetric key between a pair
(or a group) of users. (One version of KMP was developed by SDNS, (or a group) of users. (One version of KMP was developed by SDNS,
and another by SILS.) Superseded by ISAKMP and IKE. and another by SILS.) Superseded by ISAKMP and IKE.
$ key material $ key material
(D) A synonym for "keying material". (D) A synonym for "keying material".
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
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$ Khufu $ Khufu
(N) A patented, symmetric block cipher designed by Ralph C. Merkle (N) A patented, symmetric block cipher designed by Ralph C. Merkle
as a plug-in replacement for DES. [Schn] as a plug-in replacement for DES. [Schn]
Tutorial: Khufu was designed for fast encryption of large amounts Tutorial: Khufu was designed for fast encryption of large amounts
of data. However, because Khufu precomputes tables used in of data. However, because Khufu precomputes tables used in
encryption, it is less efficient that Khafre for small amounts of encryption, it is less efficient that Khafre for small amounts of
data. data.
$ KLIF
(N) See: key loading and initialization facility.
$ KMID $ KMID
(I) See: keying material identifier. (I) See: keying material identifier.
$ known-plaintext attack $ known-plaintext attack
(I) A cryptanalysis technique in which the analyst tries to (I) A cryptanalysis technique in which the analyst tries to
determine the key from knowledge of some plaintext-ciphertext determine the key from knowledge of some plaintext-ciphertext
pairs (although the analyst may also have other clues, such as pairs (although the analyst may also have other clues, such as
knowing the cryptographic algorithm). knowing the cryptographic algorithm).
$ KSOS, KSOS-6, KSOS-11 $ KSOS, KSOS-6, KSOS-11
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$ legal non-repudiation $ legal non-repudiation
(I) See: secondary definition under "non-repudiation". (I) See: secondary definition under "non-repudiation".
$ level of concern $ level of concern
(N) /U.S. DoD/ A rating assigned to an information system that (N) /U.S. DoD/ A rating assigned to an information system that
indicates the extent to which protective measures, techniques, and indicates the extent to which protective measures, techniques, and
procedures must be applied. (See: critical, sensitive, level of procedures must be applied. (See: critical, sensitive, level of
robustness.) robustness.)
$ level of robustness $ level of robustness
(N) /U.S. DoD/ A characterization of the strength of a security (N) /U.S. DoD/ A characterization of (a) the strength of a
function, mechanism, service, or solution, and the assurance (or security function, mechanism, service, or solution and (b) the
confidence) that is implemented and functioning. [Cons, IATF] assurance (or confidence) that it is implemented and functioning.
(See: level of concern.) [Cons, IATF] (See: level of concern.)
$ Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) $ Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
(I) An Internet client-server protocol (RFC 3377) that supports (I) An Internet client-server protocol (RFC 3377) that supports
basic use of the X.500 Directory (or other directory servers) basic use of the X.500 Directory (or other directory servers)
without incurring the resource requirements of the full Directory without incurring the resource requirements of the full Directory
Access Protocol (DAP). Access Protocol (DAP).
Tutorial: Designed for simple management and browser applications Tutorial: Designed for simple management and browser applications
that provide simple read/write interactive directory service. that provide simple read/write interactive directory service.
Supports both simple authentication and strong authentication of Supports both simple authentication and strong authentication of
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or subnetwork relay and decrypting when it arrives at the next or subnetwork relay and decrypting when it arrives at the next
host or relay. Each link may use a different key or even a host or relay. Each link may use a different key or even a
different algorithm. [R1455] (Compare: end-to-end encryption.) different algorithm. [R1455] (Compare: end-to-end encryption.)
$ liveness $ liveness
(I) A property of a communication association or a feature of a (I) A property of a communication association or a feature of a
communication protocol that provides assurance to the recipient of communication protocol that provides assurance to the recipient of
data that the data is being freshly transmitted by its originator, data that the data is being freshly transmitted by its originator,
i.e., that the data is not being replayed, by either the i.e., that the data is not being replayed, by either the
originator or a third party, from a previous transmission. (See: originator or a third party, from a previous transmission. (See:
nonce, replay attack.) fresh, nonce, replay attack.)
$ logic bomb $ logic bomb
(I) Malicious logic that activates when specified conditions are (I) Malicious logic that activates when specified conditions are
met. Usually intended to cause denial of service or otherwise met. Usually intended to cause denial of service or otherwise
damage system resources. (See: Trojan horse, virus, worm.) damage system resources. (See: Trojan horse, virus, worm.)
$ login $ login
(I) The act by which a system entity establishes a session in (I) The act by which a system entity establishes a session in
which the entity can use system resources. (See: principal, which the entity can use system resources. (See: principal,
session.) session.)
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$ marking $ marking
See: time stamp, security marking. See: time stamp, security marking.
$ MARS $ MARS
(O) A symmetric, 128-bit block cipher with variable key length (O) A symmetric, 128-bit block cipher with variable key length
(128 to 448 bits), developed by IBM as a candidate for the AES. (128 to 448 bits), developed by IBM as a candidate for the AES.
$ Martian $ Martian
(D) /slang/ A packet that arrives unexpectedly at the wrong (D) /slang/ A packet that arrives unexpectedly at the wrong
address or on the wrong network because of incorrect routing or address or on the wrong network because of incorrect routing or
because it has a non-registered or ill-formed IP address. because it has a non-registered or ill-formed IP address. [R1208]
Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different
metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated
Usage under "Green Book".) Usage under "Green Book".)
$ masquerade $ masquerade
(I) A type of threat action whereby an unauthorized entity gains (I) A type of threat action whereby an unauthorized entity gains
access to a system or performs a malicious act by illegitimately access to a system or performs a malicious act by illegitimately
posing as an authorized entity. (See: deception.) posing as an authorized entity. (See: deception.)
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indicate the actions to be taken to achieve it. indicate the actions to be taken to achieve it.
$ mission critical $ mission critical
(I) A condition of a system service or other system resource such (I) A condition of a system service or other system resource such
that denial of access to, or lack of availability of, the resource that denial of access to, or lack of availability of, the resource
would jeopardize a system user's ability to perform a primary would jeopardize a system user's ability to perform a primary
mission function or would result in other serious consequences. mission function or would result in other serious consequences.
(See: Critical. Compare: mission essential.) (See: Critical. Compare: mission essential.)
$ mission essential $ mission essential
(O) /DoD/ Refers to materiel that is authorized and available to (O) /U.S. DoD/ Refers to materiel that is authorized and available
combat, combat support, combat service support, and combat to combat, combat support, combat service support, and combat
readiness training forces to accomplish their assigned missions. readiness training forces to accomplish their assigned missions.
[JCSP1] (Compare: mission critical.) [JCSP1] (Compare: mission critical.)
$ misuse $ misuse
1. (I) The intentional use (by authorized users) of system 1. (I) The intentional use (by authorized users) of system
resources for other than authorized purposes. Example: An resources for other than authorized purposes. Example: An
authorized system administrator creates an unauthorized account authorized system administrator creates an unauthorized account
for a friend. for a friend.
2. (I) A type of threat action that causes a system component to 2. (I) A type of threat action that causes a system component to
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$ misuse detection $ misuse detection
(I) An intrusion detection method that is based on rules that (I) An intrusion detection method that is based on rules that
specify system events, sequences of events, or observable specify system events, sequences of events, or observable
properties of a system that are believed to be symptomatic of properties of a system that are believed to be symptomatic of
security incidents. (See: IDS. Compare: anomaly detection.) security incidents. (See: IDS. Compare: anomaly detection.)
$ MLS $ MLS
(I) See: multilevel secure (I) See: multilevel secure
$ mobile code $ mobile code
1a. (I) Software that originates from a remote server or is 1a. (I) Software that originates from a remote server, is
embedded in a document or other application file, is transmitted transmitted across a network, and is loaded onto and executed on a
across a network, and is loaded onto and executed on a local local client system without explicit initiation by the client's
client system. user and, in some cases, without that user's knowledge. (Compare:
active content.)
Tutorial: One form of mobile code is active content in a file that
is transferred across a network.
1b. (O) /U.S. DoD/ "Software obtained from remote systems outside 1b. (O) /U.S. DoD/ "Software obtained from remote systems outside
the enclave boundary, transferred across a network, and then the enclave boundary, transferred across a network, and then
downloaded and executed on a local system without explicit downloaded and executed on a local system without explicit
installation or execution by the recipient." installation or execution by the recipient."
2a. (O) /U.S. DoD/ "Technology that enables the creation of 2a. (O) /U.S. DoD/ "Technology that enables the creation of
executable information that can be delivered to an information executable information that can be delivered to an information
system and directly executed on any hardware/software architecture system and directly executed on any hardware/software architecture
that has an appropriate host execution environment." that has an appropriate host execution environment."
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following statements are true: (a) Some authorized users do not following statements are true: (a) Some authorized users do not
have a security clearance for all the information handled in the have a security clearance for all the information handled in the
system. (b) All authorized users have the proper security system. (b) All authorized users have the proper security
clearance and appropriate specific access approval for the clearance and appropriate specific access approval for the
information to which they have access. (c) All authorized users information to which they have access. (c) All authorized users
have a need-to-know only for information to which they have have a need-to-know only for information to which they have
access. [C4009] (See: formal access approval, protection level.) access. [C4009] (See: formal access approval, protection level.)
$ Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) $ Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)
(I) An Internet protocol (RFC 2045) that enhances the basic format (I) An Internet protocol (RFC 2045) that enhances the basic format
of Internet electronic mail messages (RFC 822) (1) to enable of Internet electronic mail messages (RFC 822) (a) to enable
character sets other than U.S. ASCII to be used for textual character sets other than U.S. ASCII to be used for textual
headers and content and (2) to carry non-textual and multi-part headers and content and (b) to carry non-textual and multi-part
content. (See: S/MIME.) content. (See: S/MIME.)
$ mutual suspicion $ mutual suspicion
(I) The state that exists between two interacting system entities (I) The state that exists between two interacting system entities
in which neither entity can trust the other to function correctly in which neither entity can trust the other to function correctly
with regard to some security requirement. with regard to some security requirement.
$ name $ name
(I) Synonym for "identifier". (I) Synonym for "identifier".
$ naming authority
(O) /U.S. DoD/ An organizational entity responsible for assigning
DNs and for assuring that each DN is meaningful and unique within
its domain. [DoD9]
$ National Computer Security Center (NCSC) $ National Computer Security Center (NCSC)
(O) A U.S. DoD organization, housed in NSA, that has (O) A U.S. DoD organization, housed in NSA, that has
responsibility for encouraging widespread availability of trusted responsibility for encouraging widespread availability of trusted
computer systems throughout the Federal Government. It has computer systems throughout the Federal Government. It has
established criteria for, and performed evaluations of, computer established criteria for, and performed evaluations of, computer
and network systems that have a TCB. (See: Evaluated Products and network systems that have a TCB. (See: Evaluated Products
List, Rainbow Series, TCSEC.) List, Rainbow Series, TCSEC.)
$ National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) $ National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
(N) An joint initiative of NIST and NSA to enhance the quality of (N) An joint initiative of NIST and NSA to enhance the quality of
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information. (See: ANSI, DES, DSA, DSS, FIPS, NIAP, NSA.) information. (See: ANSI, DES, DSA, DSS, FIPS, NIAP, NSA.)
$ National Security Agency (NSA) $ National Security Agency (NSA)
(N) A U.S. DoD organization that has primary Government (N) A U.S. DoD organization that has primary Government
responsibility for INFOSEC standards for classified information responsibility for INFOSEC standards for classified information
and for sensitive unclassified information handled by national and for sensitive unclassified information handled by national
security systems. (See: FORTEZZA, KEA, MISSI, national security security systems. (See: FORTEZZA, KEA, MISSI, national security
system, NIAP, NIST, SKIPJACK.) system, NIAP, NIST, SKIPJACK.)
$ national security information $ national security information
(N) /U.S. Government/ Information that has been determined, (O) /U.S. Government/ Information that has been determined,
pursuant to Executive Order 12958 or any predecessor order, to pursuant to Executive Order 12958 or any predecessor order, to
require protection against unauthorized disclosure. [C4009] require protection against unauthorized disclosure. [C4009]
$ national security system $ national security system
(O) /U.S. Government/ Any Government-operated information system (O) /U.S. Government/ Any Government-operated information system
for which the function, operation, or use (a) involves for which the function, operation, or use (a) involves
intelligence activities; (b) involves cryptologic activities intelligence activities; (b) involves cryptologic activities
related to national security; (c) involves command and control of related to national security; (c) involves command and control of
military forces; (d) involves equipment that is an integral part military forces; (d) involves equipment that is an integral part
of a weapon or weapon system; or (e) is critical to the direct of a weapon or weapon system; or (e) is critical to the direct
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user's FORTEZZA PC card. user's FORTEZZA PC card.
$ node $ node
(I) A collection of related subsystems located on one or more (I) A collection of related subsystems located on one or more
computer platforms at a single system site. computer platforms at a single system site.
$ nonce $ nonce
(I) A random or non-repeating value that is included in data (I) A random or non-repeating value that is included in data
exchanged by a protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing exchanged by a protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing
liveness and thus detecting and protecting against replay attacks. liveness and thus detecting and protecting against replay attacks.
(See: fresh.)
$ non-critical $ non-critical
See: critical. See: critical.
$ non-repudiation service $ non-repudiation service
1. (I) A security service that provide protection against false 1. (I) A security service that provide protection against false
denial of involvement in a communication. (See: repudiation, time denial of involvement in an association (especially a
stamp.) communication association that transfers data). (See: repudiation,
time stamp.)
Tutorial: Two separate types of denial are possible -- an entity
can deny that it sent a data object, or it can deny that it
received a data object -- and, therefore, two separate types of
non-repudiation service are possible. (See: non-repudiation with
proof of origin, non-repudiation with proof of receipt.)
2. (D) "Assurance [that] the sender of data is provided with proof 2. (D) "Assurance [that] the sender of data is provided with proof
of delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the of delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the
sender's identity, so neither can later deny having processed the sender's identity, so neither can later deny having processed the
data." [NS4009] data." [C4009]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this definition because Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2 because it
it bundles two security services -- non-repudiation with proof of bundles two security services -- non-repudiation with proof of
origin, and non-repudiation with proof of receipt -- that can be origin, and non-repudiation with proof of receipt -- that can be
provided independently of each other. provided independently of each other.
Usage: ISDs SHOULD distinguish between the technical aspects and Usage: ISDs SHOULD distinguish between the technical aspects and
the legal aspects of a non-repudiation service: the legal aspects of a non-repudiation service:
- "Technical non-repudiation": Refers to the assurance a relying - "Technical non-repudiation": Refers to the assurance a relying
party has that if a public key is used to validate a digital party has that if a public key is used to validate a digital
signature, then that signature had to have been made by the signature, then that signature had to have been made by the
corresponding private signature key. [SP32] corresponding private signature key. [SP32]
- "Legal non-repudiation": Refers to how well possession or - "Legal non-repudiation": Refers to how well possession or
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of information without an external power supply. (Compare: of information without an external power supply. (Compare:
permanent storage, volatile media.) permanent storage, volatile media.)
$ NORA $ NORA
(O) See: no-PIN ORA. (O) See: no-PIN ORA.
$ notarization $ notarization
(I) Registration of data under the authority or in the care of a (I) Registration of data under the authority or in the care of a
trusted third party, thus making it possible to provide subsequent trusted third party, thus making it possible to provide subsequent
assurance of the accuracy of characteristics claimed for the data, assurance of the accuracy of characteristics claimed for the data,
such as content, origin, time of existence, and delivery. [I7498 such as content, origin, time of existence, and delivery. [I7498-
Part 2] (See: digital notary.) 2] (See: digital notary.)
$ NSA $ NSA
(N) See: National Security Agency (N) See: National Security Agency
$ null $ null
(N) /encryption/ "Dummy letter, letter symbol, or code group (N) /encryption/ "Dummy letter, letter symbol, or code group
inserted into an encrypted message to delay or prevent its inserted into an encrypted message to delay or prevent its
decryption or to complete encrypted groups for transmission or decryption or to complete encrypted groups for transmission or
transmission security purposes." [C4009] transmission security purposes." [C4009]
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2. (I) /capitalized/ "One-Time Password" is an Internet protocol 2. (I) /capitalized/ "One-Time Password" is an Internet protocol
[R1938] that is based on S/KEY and uses a cryptographic hash [R1938] that is based on S/KEY and uses a cryptographic hash
function to generate one-time passwords for use as authentication function to generate one-time passwords for use as authentication
information in system login and in other processes that need information in system login and in other processes that need
protection against replay attacks. protection against replay attacks.
$ one-way encryption $ one-way encryption
(I) Irreversible transformation of plain text to cipher text, such (I) Irreversible transformation of plain text to cipher text, such
that the plain text cannot be recovered from the cipher text by that the plain text cannot be recovered from the cipher text by
other than exhaustive procedures even if the cryptographic key is other than exhaustive procedures even if the cryptographic key is
known. (See: encryption.) known. (See: brute force, encryption.)
$ one-way function $ one-way function
(I) "A (mathematical) function, f, which is easy to compute, but (I) "A (mathematical) function, f, which is easy to compute, but
which for a general value y in the range, it is computationally which for a general value y in the range, it is computationally
difficult to find a value x in the domain such that f(x) = y. difficult to find a value x in the domain such that f(x) = y.
There may be a few values of y for which finding x is not There may be a few values of y for which finding x is not
computationally difficult." [X509] computationally difficult." [X509]
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"cryptographic hash". "cryptographic hash".
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law" under "Courtney's laws". Compare: closed security law" under "Courtney's laws". Compare: closed security
environment.) environment.)
$ open storage $ open storage
(N) /U.S. Government/ "Storage of classified information within an (N) /U.S. Government/ "Storage of classified information within an
accredited facility, but not in General Services Administration accredited facility, but not in General Services Administration
approved secure containers, while the facility is unoccupied by approved secure containers, while the facility is unoccupied by
authorized personnel." [C4009] authorized personnel." [C4009]
$ Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model (OSIRM) $ Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model (OSIRM)
(N) A joint ISO/ITU-T standard [I7498 Part 1] for a seven-layer, (N) A joint ISO/ITU-T standard [I7498-1] for a seven-layer,
architectural communication framework for interconnection of architectural communication framework for interconnection of
computers in networks. (See: OSIRM Security Architecture. Compare: computers in networks. (See: OSIRM Security Architecture. Compare:
Internet Protocol Suite.) Internet Protocol Suite.)
Tutorial: OSIRM-based standards include communication protocols Tutorial: OSIRM-based standards include communication protocols
that are mostly incompatible with the IPS, but also include that are mostly incompatible with the IPS, but also include
security models, such as X.509, that are used in the Internet. security models, such as X.509, that are used in the Internet.
The OSIRM layers, from highest to lowest, are (7) Application, (6) The OSIRM layers, from highest to lowest, are (7) Application, (6)
Presentation, (5) Session, (4) Transport, (3) Network, (2) Data Presentation, (5) Session, (4) Transport, (3) Network, (2) Data
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authentication" and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading authentication" and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading
way. way.
$ OSI, OSIRM $ OSI, OSIRM
(N) See: Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model. (N) See: Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model.
$ OSIRM Security Architecture $ OSIRM Security Architecture
(N) The part of the OSIRM [I7498-2] that specifies the security (N) The part of the OSIRM [I7498-2] that specifies the security
services and security mechanisms that can be applied to protect services and security mechanisms that can be applied to protect
communications between two systems. (See: security architecture.) communications between two systems. (See: security architecture.)
Tutorial: This part of the OSIRM includes an allocation of Tutorial: This part of the OSIRM includes an allocation of
security services to protocol layers. The following table show security services to protocol layers. The following table show
which security services (see definitions in this Glossary) are which security services (see definitions in this Glossary) are
permitted by the OSIRM in each of its layer. (Also, an application permitted by the OSIRM in each of its layer. (Also, an application
process that operates above the Application Layer may itself process that operates above the Application Layer may itself
provide security services.) Similarly, the table suggests which provide security services.) Similarly, the table suggests which
services are suitable for each IPS layer. However, explaining and services are suitable for each IPS layer. However, explaining and
justifying these allocations is beyond the scope of this Glossary. justifying these allocations is beyond the scope of this Glossary.
Legend for Table Entries: Legend for Table Entries:
O = Yes, [IS7498-2] permits the service in this OSIRM layer. O = Yes, [IS7498-2] permits the service in this OSIRM layer.
I = Yes, the service can be incorporated in this IPS layer. I = Yes, the service can be incorporated in this IPS layer.
* = This layer subsumed by Application Layer in IPS.
IPS Protocol Layers +-----------------------------------------+ IPS Protocol Layers +-----------------------------------------+
|Network| Net |In-| Trans | Application | |Network| Net |In-| Trans | Application |
| H/W |Inter|ter| -port | | | H/W |Inter|ter| -port | |
| |-face|net| | | | |-face|net| | |
OSIRM Protocol Layers +-----------------------------------------+ OSIRM Protocol Layers +-----------------------------------------+
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 # | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
Confidentiality +-----------------------------------------+ Confidentiality +-----------------------------------------+
- Datagram | O I | O I | O I | O I | | O * | O I | - Datagram | O I | O I | O I | O I | | O * | O I |
- Selective Field | | | I | | | O * | O I | - Selective Field | | | I | | | O * | O I |
- Traffic Flow | O | | O | | | | O | - Traffic Flow | O | | O | | | | O |
-- Full | I | | | | | | | -- Full | I | | | | | | |
-- Partial | | I | I | | | | I | -- Partial | | I | I | | | | I |
Integrity +-----------------------------------------+ Integrity +-----------------------------------------+
- Datagram | I | I | O I | O I | | | O I | - Datagram | I | I | O I | O I | | | O I |
- Selective Field | | | I | | | | O I | - Selective Field | | | I | | | | O I |
- Stream | | | O I | O I | | | O I | - Stream | | | O I | O I | | | O I |
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that relies on transmission of static (i.e., repetitively used) that relies on transmission of static (i.e., repetitively used)
passwords in cleartext form is inadequate. (See: one-time passwords in cleartext form is inadequate. (See: one-time
password, strong authentication.) password, strong authentication.)
$ Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) $ Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)
(I) A simple authentication mechanism in PPP. In PAP, a user (I) A simple authentication mechanism in PPP. In PAP, a user
identifier and password are transmitted in cleartext form. [R1334] identifier and password are transmitted in cleartext form. [R1334]
(See: CHAP.) (See: CHAP.)
$ password sniffing $ password sniffing
(I) Passive wiretapping, usually on a LAN, to gain knowledge of (D) /slang/ Passive wiretapping to gain knowledge of passwords.
passwords. (See: Deprecated Usage under "sniffing".) (See: Deprecated Usage under "sniffing".)
$ path discovery $ path discovery
(I) For a digital certificate, the process of finding a set of (I) For a digital certificate, the process of finding a set of
public-key certificates that comprise a certification path from a public-key certificates that comprise a certification path from a
trusted key to that specific certificate. trusted key to that specific certificate.
$ path validation $ path validation
(I) The process of validating (a) all of the digital certificates (I) The process of validating (a) all of the digital certificates
in a certification path and (b) the required relationships between in a certification path and (b) the required relationships between
those certificates, thus validating the contents of the last those certificates, thus validating the contents of the last
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in the PC Card form factor. (See: PC card.) in the PC Card form factor. (See: PC card.)
$ PDS $ PDS
(N) See: protective distribution system. (N) See: protective distribution system.
$ PDU $ PDU
(N) See: protocol data unit. (N) See: protocol data unit.
$ peer entity authentication $ peer entity authentication
(I) "The corroboration that a peer entity in an association is the (I) "The corroboration that a peer entity in an association is the
one claimed." [I7498 Part 2] (See: authentication.) one claimed." [I7498-2] (See: authentication.)
$ peer entity authentication service $ peer entity authentication service
(I) A security service that verifies an identity claimed by or for (I) A security service that verifies an identity claimed by or for
a system entity in an association. (See: authentication, a system entity in an association. (See: authentication,
authentication service.) authentication service.)
Tutorial: This service is used at the establishment of, or at Tutorial: This service is used at the establishment of, or at
times during, an association to confirm the identity of one entity times during, an association to confirm the identity of one entity
to another, thus protecting against a masquerade by the first to another, thus protecting against a masquerade by the first
entity. However, unlike data origin authentication service, this entity. However, unlike data origin authentication service, this
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the system's security policy. the system's security policy.
$ PGP(trademark) $ PGP(trademark)
(O) See: Pretty Good Privacy(trademark). (O) See: Pretty Good Privacy(trademark).
$ phase 1 negotiation $ phase 1 negotiation
$ phase 2 negotiation $ phase 2 negotiation
(I) /ISAKMP/ See: secondary definition under "Internet Security (I) /ISAKMP/ See: secondary definition under "Internet Security
Association and Key Management Protocol". Association and Key Management Protocol".
$ phishing
(D) /slang/ A technique for attempting to acquire sensitive data,
such as bank account numbers, through a fraudulent solicitation in
email or on a Web site, in which the perpetrator masquerades as a
legitimate business or reputable person. (See: social
engineering.)
Derivation: Possibly from "phony fishing"; the solicitation
usually involves some kind of lure or bait to hook unwary
recipients.
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it is not listed
in most dictionaries and could confuse international readers.
$ Photuris $ Photuris
(I) A UDP-based, key establishment protocol for session keys, (I) A UDP-based, key establishment protocol for session keys,
designed for use with the IPsec protocols AH and ESP. Superseded designed for use with the IPsec protocols AH and ESP. Superseded
by IKE. by IKE.
$ phreaking $ phreaking
(D) A contraction of "telephone breaking". An attack on or (D) A contraction of "telephone breaking". An attack on or
penetration of a telephone system or, by extension, any other penetration of a telephone system or, by extension, any other
communication or information system. [Raym] communication or information system. [Raym]
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2. (D) /noun/ A synonym for plain text. 2. (D) /noun/ A synonym for plain text.
Deprecated Usage: ISDs should not use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Usage: ISDs should not use this term as a synonym for
"plain text". ISDs SHOULD distinguish between the adjective "plain text". ISDs SHOULD distinguish between the adjective
"plaintext" and the noun phrase "plain text". "plaintext" and the noun phrase "plain text".
$ PLI $ PLI
(I) See: Private Line Interface. (I) See: Private Line Interface.
$ PMA
(N) See: policy management authority.
$ Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) $ Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)
(I) An Internet Standard protocol (RFC 1661) for encapsulation and (I) An Internet Standard protocol (RFC 1661) for encapsulation and
full-duplex transportation of protocol data packets in OSIRM Layer full-duplex transportation of protocol data packets in OSIRM Layer
3 over an OSIRM Layer 2 link between two peers, and for 3 over an OSIRM Layer 2 link between two peers, and for
multiplexing different Layer 3 protocols over the same link. multiplexing different Layer 3 protocols over the same link.
Includes optional negotiation to select and use a peer entity Includes optional negotiation to select and use a peer entity
authentication protocol to authenticate the peers to each other authentication protocol to authenticate the peers to each other
before they exchange Layer 3 data. (See: CHAP, EAP, PAP.) before they exchange Layer 3 data. (See: CHAP, EAP, PAP.)
$ Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) $ Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)
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- "Procedures" define how a system is operated, and relate - "Procedures" define how a system is operated, and relate
closely to issues of what technology is used, who the operators closely to issues of what technology is used, who the operators
are, and how the system is deployed physically. Procedures are, and how the system is deployed physically. Procedures
define both normal and abnormal operating circumstances. define both normal and abnormal operating circumstances.
- For every control defined by a practice statement, there should - For every control defined by a practice statement, there should
be corresponding procedures to implement the control and be corresponding procedures to implement the control and
provide ongoing measurement of the control parameters. provide ongoing measurement of the control parameters.
Conversely, procedures require management practices to insure Conversely, procedures require management practices to insure
consistent and correct operational behavior. consistent and correct operational behavior.
$ policy approval authority
(D) /PKI/ Synonym for "policy management authority". [PAG]
Deprecated Term: IDSs SHOULD NOT use this term as synonym for
"policy management authority". The term suggests a limited,
passive role that is not typical of PMAs.
$ policy approving authority (PAA) $ policy approving authority (PAA)
(O) /MISSI/ The top-level signing authority of a MISSI (O) /MISSI/ The top-level signing authority of a MISSI
certification hierarchy. The term refers both to that certification hierarchy. The term refers both to that
authoritative office or role and to the person who plays that authoritative office or role and to the person who plays that
role. (See: root registry.) role. (See: policy management authority, root registry.)
Tutorial: A PAA registers MISSI PCAs and signs their X.509 public- Tutorial: A MISSI PAA (a) registers MISSI PCAs and signs their
key certificates. A PAA issues CRLs but does not issue a CKL. A X.509 public-key certificates, (b) issues CRLs but does not issue
PAA may issue cross-certificates to other PAAs. a CKL, and (c) may issue cross-certificates to other PAAs.
$ policy authority
(D) /PKI/ Synonym for "policy management authority". [PAG]
Deprecated Term: IDSs SHOULD NOT use this term as synonym for
"policy management authority". The term is unnecessarily vague and
thus may be confused with other PKI entities, such as CAs and RAs,
that enforce of apply various aspects of PKI policy.
$ policy certification authority (Internet PCA) $ policy certification authority (Internet PCA)
(I) An X.509-compliant CA at the second level of the Internet (I) An X.509-compliant CA at the second level of the Internet
certification hierarchy, under the IPRA. Each PCA operates in certification hierarchy, under the IPRA. Each PCA operates in
accordance with its published security policy (see: certificate accordance with its published security policy (see: certificate
policy, CPS) and within constraints established by the IPRA for policy, CPS) and within constraints established by the IPRA for
all PCAs. [R1422]. (See: policy creation authority.) all PCAs. [R1422]. (See: policy creation authority.)
$ policy creation authority (MISSI PCA) $ policy creation authority (MISSI PCA)
(O) /MISSI/ The second level of a MISSI certification hierarchy; (O) /MISSI/ The second level of a MISSI certification hierarchy;
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authoritative office or role and to the person who fills that authoritative office or role and to the person who fills that
office. (See: policy certification authority.) office. (See: policy certification authority.)
Tutorial: A MISSI PCA's certificate is issued by a PAA. The PCA Tutorial: A MISSI PCA's certificate is issued by a PAA. The PCA
registers the CAs in its domain, defines their configurations, and registers the CAs in its domain, defines their configurations, and
issues their X.509 public-key certificates. (The PCA may also issues their X.509 public-key certificates. (The PCA may also
issue certificates for SCAs, ORAs, and other end entities, but a issue certificates for SCAs, ORAs, and other end entities, but a
PCA does not usually do this.) The PCA periodically issues CRLs PCA does not usually do this.) The PCA periodically issues CRLs
and CKLs for its domain. and CKLs for its domain.
$ Policy Management Authority $ policy management authority (PMA)
(O) Canadian usage: An organization responsible for PKI oversight (I) /PKI/ A person, role, or organization within a PKI that is
and policy management in the Government of Canada. responsible for (a) creating or approving the content of the
certificate policies and CPSs that are used in the PKI; (b)
ensuring the administration of those policies; and (c) approving
any cross-certification or interoperability agreements with CAs
external to the PKI and any related policy mappings. The PMA may
also be the accreditor for the PKI as a whole or for some of its
components or applications. [DoD9, PAG] (See: policy approving
authority.)
Example: In the U.S. Department of Defense, an organization called
the Policy Management Authority is responsible for DoD PKI [DoD9].
$ policy mapping $ policy mapping
(I) "Recognizing that, when a CA in one domain certifies a CA in (I) "Recognizing that, when a CA in one domain certifies a CA in
another domain, a particular certificate policy in the second another domain, a particular certificate policy in the second
domain may be considered by the authority of the first domain to domain may be considered by the authority of the first domain to
be equivalent (but not necessarily identical in all respects) to a be equivalent (but not necessarily identical in all respects) to a
particular certificate policy in the first domain." [X509] particular certificate policy in the first domain." [X509]
$ policy rule $ policy rule
(I) A building block of a security policy; it (a) defines a set of (I) A building block of a security policy; it (a) defines a set of
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AUTH are those used by IMAP4. AUTH are those used by IMAP4.
$ port scan $ port scan
(I) An attack that sends client requests to a range of server port (I) An attack that sends client requests to a range of server port
addresses on a host, with the goal of finding an active port and addresses on a host, with the goal of finding an active port and
exploiting a known vulnerability of that service. (Compare: ping exploiting a known vulnerability of that service. (Compare: ping
sweep.) sweep.)
$ positive authorization $ positive authorization
(I) The principle that a security architecture should be designed (I) The principle that a security architecture should be designed
so that access to system resources is granted only in a positive so that access to system resources is permitted only when
way; i.e., in the absence of an explicit authorization that grants explicitly granted; i.e., in the absence of an explicit
access, the default action shall be to refuse access. authorization that grants access, the default action shall be to
refuse access. (See: authorization, access.)
$ POSIX $ POSIX
(N) Portable Operating System Interface for Computer Environments, (N) Portable Operating System Interface for Computer Environments,
a standard [FP151, IS9945-1] (originally IEEE Standard P1003.1) a standard [FP151, IS9945-1] (originally IEEE Standard P1003.1)
that defines an operating system interface and environment to that defines an operating system interface and environment to
support application portability at the source code level. It is support application portability at the source code level. It is
intended to be used by both application developers and system intended to be used by both application developers and system
implementers. implementers.
Tutorial: P1003.1 supports security functionality like that on Tutorial: P1003.1 supports security functionality like that on
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$ privacy $ privacy
1. (I) The right of an entity (normally a person), acting in its 1. (I) The right of an entity (normally a person), acting in its
own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with
its environment, including the degree to which the entity is its environment, including the degree to which the entity is
willing to share its personal information with others. (See: willing to share its personal information with others. (See:
HIPAA, personal information, Privacy Act of 1974. Compare: HIPAA, personal information, Privacy Act of 1974. Compare:
anonymity, data confidentiality.) anonymity, data confidentiality.)
2. (O) "The right of individuals to control or influence what 2. (O) "The right of individuals to control or influence what
information related to them may be collected and stored and by information related to them may be collected and stored and by
whom and to whom that information may be disclosed." [I7498 Part whom and to whom that information may be disclosed." [I7498-2]
2]
3. (D) Synonym for "data confidentiality". 3. (D) Synonym for "data confidentiality".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "data confidentiality" or "data confidentiality service", for "data confidentiality" or "data confidentiality service",
which are different concepts. Privacy is a reason for security which are different concepts. Privacy is a reason for security
rather than a kind of security. For example, a system that stores rather than a kind of security. For example, a system that stores
personal data needs to protect the data to prevent harm, personal data needs to protect the data to prevent harm,
embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any person about embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any person about
whom data is maintained, and to protect the person's privacy. For whom data is maintained, and to protect the person's privacy. For
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- PL4 is equivalent to either multilevel or compartmented - PL4 is equivalent to either multilevel or compartmented
security mode, depending on the details of users' clearances. security mode, depending on the details of users' clearances.
- PL3 is equivalent to partitioned security mode. - PL3 is equivalent to partitioned security mode.
- PL2 is equivalent to system-high security mode. - PL2 is equivalent to system-high security mode.
- PL1 is equivalent to dedicated security mode. - PL1 is equivalent to dedicated security mode.
$ protection profile $ protection profile
(N) /Common Criteria/ An implementation-independent set of (N) /Common Criteria/ An implementation-independent set of
security requirements for a category of targets of evaluation that security requirements for a category of targets of evaluation that
meet specific consumer needs. [CCIB] Example: [IDSAN]. (See: meet specific consumer needs. [CCIB] Example: [IDSAN]. (See:
target of evaluation. Compare: package.) target of evaluation. Compare: certificate profile, package.)
Tutorial: A protection profile (PP) is the kind of document used Tutorial: A protection profile (PP) is the kind of document used
by consumers to specify functional requirements they want in a by consumers to specify functional requirements they want in a
product, and a target of evaluation (TOE) is the kind of document product, and a target of evaluation (TOE) is the kind of document
used by vendors to make functional claims about a product. used by vendors to make functional claims about a product.
A PP is intended to be a reusable statement of product security A PP is intended to be a reusable statement of product security
needs, which are known to be useful and effective, for a set of needs, which are known to be useful and effective, for a set of
information technology security products that could be built. A PP information technology security products that could be built. A PP
contains a set of security requirements, preferably taken from the contains a set of security requirements, preferably taken from the
skipping to change at page 210, line 35 skipping to change at page 213, line 55
$ RA domains $ RA domains
(I) A feature of a CAW that allows a CA to divide the (I) A feature of a CAW that allows a CA to divide the
responsibility for certificate requests among multiple RAs. responsibility for certificate requests among multiple RAs.
Tutorial: This ability might be used to restrict access to private Tutorial: This ability might be used to restrict access to private
authorization data that is provided with a certificate request, authorization data that is provided with a certificate request,
and to distribute the responsibility to review and approve and to distribute the responsibility to review and approve
certificate requests in high volume environments. RA domains might certificate requests in high volume environments. RA domains might
segregate certificate requests according to an attribute of the segregate certificate requests according to an attribute of the
certificate subject, such as an organizational unit. certificate's subject, such as an organizational unit.
$ RADIUS $ RADIUS
(I) See: Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service. (I) See: Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service.
$ Rainbow Series $ Rainbow Series
(O) /COMPUSEC/ A set of more than 30 technical and policy (O) /COMPUSEC/ A set of more than 30 technical and policy
documents with colored covers, issued by the NCSC, that discuss in documents with colored covers, issued by the NCSC, that discuss in
detail the TCSEC and provide guidance for meeting and applying the detail the TCSEC and provide guidance for meeting and applying the
criteria. (See: Green Book, Orange Book, Red Book, Yellow Book.) criteria. (See: Green Book, Orange Book, Red Book, Yellow Book.)
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cryptographic data or plain text through cryptanalysis. (See: key cryptographic data or plain text through cryptanalysis. (See: key
recovery, data recovery.) recovery, data recovery.)
2a. (I) /system integrity/ The process of restoring a secure state 2a. (I) /system integrity/ The process of restoring a secure state
in a system after there has been an accidental failure or a in a system after there has been an accidental failure or a
successful attack. (See: secondary definition under "security", successful attack. (See: secondary definition under "security",
system integrity.) system integrity.)
2b. (I) /system integrity/ The process of restoring an information 2b. (I) /system integrity/ The process of restoring an information
system's assets and operation following damage or destruction. system's assets and operation following damage or destruction.
(See: contingency plan.) (See: contingency plan.)
$ RED $ RED
1. (I) Designation for data that consists only of clear text, and 1. (I) Designation for data that consists only of clear text, and
for information system equipment items and facilities that handle for information system equipment items and facilities that handle
only clear text. Example: "RED key". (See: color change, RED/BLACK clear text. Example: "RED key". (See: color change, RED/BLACK
separation. Compare: BLACK.) separation. Compare: BLACK.)
Derivation: From the practice of marking equipment with colors to Derivation: From the practice of marking equipment with colors to
prevent operational errors. prevent operational errors.
2. (O) /U.S. Government/ Designation applied to information 2. (O) /U.S. Government/ Designation applied to information
systems, and to associated areas, circuits, components, and systems, and to associated areas, circuits, components, and
equipment, "in which unencrypted national security information is equipment, "in which unencrypted national security information is
being processed." [C4009] being processed." [C4009]
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and configuration information needed by the client to deliver and configuration information needed by the client to deliver
service to the user. service to the user.
$ renew $ renew
See: certificate renewal. See: certificate renewal.
$ replay attack $ replay attack
(I) An attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or (I) An attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or
fraudulently repeated, either by the originator or by an adversary fraudulently repeated, either by the originator or by an adversary
who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as part of a who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as part of a
masquerade attack. (See: active wiretapping, liveness. Compare: masquerade attack. (See: active wiretapping, fresh, liveness,
reflection attack.) nonce. Compare: reflection attack.)
$ reordering $ reordering
(I) /packet/ See: secondary definition under "stream integrity (I) /packet/ See: secondary definition under "stream integrity
service". service".
$ repository $ repository
1. (I) A system for storing and distributing digital certificates 1. (I) A system for storing and distributing digital certificates
and related information (including CRLs, CPSs, and certificate and related information (including CRLs, CPSs, and certificate
policies) to certificate users. (Compare: archive, directory.) policies) to certificate users. (Compare: archive, directory.)
2. (O) "A trustworthy system for storing and retrieving 2. (O) "A trustworthy system for storing and retrieving
certificates or other information relevant to certificates." [ABA] certificates or other information relevant to certificates." [DSG]
Tutorial: A certificate is published to those who might need it by Tutorial: A certificate is published to those who might need it by
putting it in a repository. The repository usually is a publicly putting it in a repository. The repository usually is a publicly
accessible, on-line server. In the FPKI, for example, the expected accessible, on-line server. In the FPKI, for example, the expected
repository is a directory that uses LDAP, but also may be an X.500 repository is a directory that uses LDAP, but also may be an X.500
Directory that uses DAP, or an HTTP server, or an FTP server that Directory that uses DAP, or an HTTP server, or an FTP server that
permits anonymous login. permits anonymous login.
$ repudiation $ repudiation
1. (I) Denial by a system entity that was involved in an 1. (I) Denial by a system entity that was involved in an
association (especially an association that transfers information) association (especially a communication association that transfers
of having participated in the relationship. (See: accountability, data) of having participated in the relationship. (See:
non-repudiation service.) accountability, non-repudiation service.)
2. (I) A type of threat action whereby an entity deceives another 2. (I) A type of threat action whereby an entity deceives another
by falsely denying responsibility for an act. (See: deception.) by falsely denying responsibility for an act. (See: deception.)
Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes: Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes:
- False denial of origin: Action whereby an originator denies - False denial of origin: Action whereby an originator denies
responsibility for sending data. responsibility for sending data.
- False denial of receipt: Action whereby a recipient denies - False denial of receipt: Action whereby a recipient denies
receiving and possessing data. receiving and possessing data.
3. (O) /OSIRM/ "Denial by one of the entities involved in a 3. (O) /OSIRM/ "Denial by one of the entities involved in a
communication of having participated in all or part of the communication of having participated in all or part of the
communication." [I7498 Part 2] communication." [I7498-2]
$ Request for Comment (RFC) $ Request for Comment (RFC)
1. (I) One of the documents in the archival series that is the 1. (I) One of the documents in the archival series that is the
official channel for ISDs and other publications of the Internet official channel for ISDs and other publications of the Internet
Engineering Steering Group, the Internet Architecture Board, and Engineering Steering Group, the Internet Architecture Board, and
the Internet community in general. (RFC 2026, 2223) (See: Internet the Internet community in general. (RFC 2026, 2223) (See: Internet
Standard.) Standard.)
2. (D) A popularly misused synonym for a document on the Internet 2. (D) A popularly misused synonym for a document on the Internet
Standards Track, i.e., an Internet Standard, Draft Standard, or Standards Track, i.e., an Internet Standard, Draft Standard, or
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(I) See: Request for Comment. (I) See: Request for Comment.
$ Rijndael $ Rijndael
(N) A symmetric, block cipher that was designed by Joan Daemen and (N) A symmetric, block cipher that was designed by Joan Daemen and
Vincent Rijmen as a candidate for the AES, and that won that Vincent Rijmen as a candidate for the AES, and that won that
competition. [Daem] (See: Advanced Encryption Standard.) competition. [Daem] (See: Advanced Encryption Standard.)
$ risk $ risk
1. (I) An expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a 1. (I) An expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a
particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability with a particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability with a
particular harmful result. particular harmful result. (See: residual risk.)
2. (O) /SET/ "The possibility of loss because of one or more 2. (O) /SET/ "The possibility of loss because of one or more
threats to information (not to be confused with financial or threats to information (not to be confused with financial or
business risk)." [SET2] business risk)." [SET2]
Tutorial: There are four basic ways to deal with a risk [SP30]: Tutorial: There are four basic ways to deal with a risk [SP30]:
- "Risk avoidance": Eliminate the risk by either countering the - "Risk avoidance": Eliminate the risk by either countering the
threat or removing the vulnerability. (Compare: "avoidance" threat or removing the vulnerability. (Compare: "avoidance"
under "security".) under "security".)
- "Risk transference": Shift the risk to another system or - "Risk transference": Shift the risk to another system or
entity; e.g., buy insurance to compensate for potential loss. entity; e.g., buy insurance to compensate for potential loss.
- "Risk limitation": Limit the risk by implementing controls that - "Risk limitation": Limit the risk by implementing controls that
minimize resulting loss. minimize resulting loss.
- "Risk assumption": Accept the potential for loss and continue - "Risk assumption": Accept the potential for loss and continue
operating the system. operating the system.
$ risk analysis $ risk analysis
(I) An assessment process that systematically (a) identifies (I) An assessment process that systematically (a) identifies
valuable system resources and threats to those resources, (b) valuable system resources and threats to those resources, (b)
quantifies loss exposures (i.e., loss potential) based on quantifies loss exposures (i.e., loss potential) based on
estimated frequencies and costs of occurrence, and (c) estimated frequencies and costs of occurrence, and (c)
(optionally) recommends how to allocate available resources to (optionally) recommends how to allocate available resources to
countermeasures so as to minimize total exposure. (See: risk countermeasures so as to minimize total exposure. (See: risk
management, business case analysis. Compare: threat analysis.) management, business-case analysis. Compare: threat analysis.)
Tutorial: Usually, it is financially and technically infeasible to Tutorial: Usually, it is financially and technically infeasible to
avoid or transfer all risks (see: "first corollary" of "second avoid or transfer all risks (see: "first corollary" of "second
law" under "Courtney's laws"), and some residual risks will law" under "Courtney's laws"), and some residual risks will
remain, even after all available countermeasures have been remain, even after all available countermeasures have been
deployed (see: "second corollary" of "second law" under deployed (see: "second corollary" of "second law" under
"Courtney's laws"). Thus, a risk analysis typically lists risks in "Courtney's laws"). Thus, a risk analysis typically lists risks in
order of cost and criticality, thereby determining where order of cost and criticality, thereby determining where
countermeasures should be applied first. [FP031, R2196] countermeasures should be applied first. [FP031, R2196]
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Tutorial: Administrators assign permissions to roles as needed to Tutorial: Administrators assign permissions to roles as needed to
perform functions in the system. Administrators separately assign perform functions in the system. Administrators separately assign
user identities to roles. When a user accesses the system in an user identities to roles. When a user accesses the system in an
identity (for which the user has been registered) and initiates a identity (for which the user has been registered) and initiates a
session using a role (to which the user has been assigned), then session using a role (to which the user has been assigned), then
the permissions that have been assigned to the role are available the permissions that have been assigned to the role are available
to be exercised by the user. to be exercised by the user.
The following diagram shows that role-based access control The following diagram shows that role-based access control
involves five different relationships: (1) administrators assign involves five different relationships: (a) administrators assign
identities to roles, (2) administrators assign permissions to identities to roles, (b) administrators assign permissions to
roles, (3) administrators assign roles to roles, (4) users select roles, (c) administrators assign roles to roles, (d) users select
identities in sessions, and (5) users select roles in sessions. identities in sessions, and (e) users select roles in sessions.
Security policies may define constraints on these assignments and Security policies may define constraints on these assignments and
selections. selections.
(3) Permission Inheritance Assignments (i.e., Role Hierarchy) (c) Permission Inheritance Assignments (i.e., Role Hierarchy)
[Constraints] [Constraints]
+=====+ +=====+
| | | |
(1) Identity v v (2) Permission (a) Identity v v (b) Permission
+----------+ Assignments +-------+ Assignments +----------+ +----------+ Assignments +-------+ Assignments +----------+
|Identities|<=============>| Roles |<=============>|Permissions| |Identities|<=============>| Roles |<=============>|Permissions|
+----------+ [Constraints] +-------+ [Constraints] +----------+ +----------+ [Constraints] +-------+ [Constraints] +----------+
| | ^ ^ | | ^ ^
| | +-----------+ | | +---------------------+ | | +-----------+ | | +---------------------+
| | | +-------+ | | | | Legend | | | | +-------+ | | | | Legend |
| +====>|Session|=====+ | | | | +====>|Session|=====+ | | |
| | +-------+ | | | One-to-One | | | +-------+ | | | One-to-One |
| | ... | | | =================== | | | ... | | | =================== |
| | +-------+ | | | | | | +-------+ | | | |
+========>|Session|=========+ | One-to-Many | +========>|Session|=========+ | One-to-Many |
(4) Identity | +-------+ | (5) Role | ==================> | (d) Identity | +-------+ | (e) Role | ==================> |
Selections | | Selections | | Selections | | Selections | |
[Constraints]| Access |[Constraints] | Many-to-Many | [Constraints]| Access |[Constraints] | Many-to-Many |
| Sessions | | <=================> | | Sessions | | <=================> |
+-----------+ +---------------------+ +-----------+ +---------------------+
$ role certificate $ role certificate
(I) An organizational certificate that is issued to a system (I) An organizational certificate that is issued to a system
entity that is a member of the set of users that have identities entity that is a member of the set of users that have identities
that are assigned to the same role. (See: role-based access that are assigned to the same role. (See: role-based access
control.) control.)
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(N) See: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman. (N) See: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman.
$ rule $ rule
See: policy rule. See: policy rule.
$ rule-based security policy $ rule-based security policy
(I) "A security policy based on global rules [i.e., policy rules] (I) "A security policy based on global rules [i.e., policy rules]
imposed for all users. These rules usually rely on comparison of imposed for all users. These rules usually rely on comparison of
the sensitivity of the resource being accessed and the possession the sensitivity of the resource being accessed and the possession
of corresponding attributes of users, a group of users, or of corresponding attributes of users, a group of users, or
entities acting on behalf of users." [I7498 Part 2] (Compare: entities acting on behalf of users." [I7498-2] (Compare: identity-
identity-based security policy, policy rule, RBAC.) based security policy, policy rule, RBAC.)
$ rules of behavior $ rules of behavior
(I) A body of security policy that has been established and (I) A body of security policy that has been established and
implemented concerning the responsibilities and expected behavior implemented concerning the responsibilities and expected behavior
of entities that have access to a system. (Compare: [R1281].) of entities that have access to a system. (Compare: [R1281].)
Tutorial: For persons employed by a corporation or government, the Tutorial: For persons employed by a corporation or government, the
rules might cover such matters as working at home, remote access, rules might cover such matters as working at home, remote access,
use of the Internet, use of copyrighted works, use of system use of the Internet, use of copyrighted works, use of system
resources for unofficial purpose, assignment and limitation of resources for unofficial purpose, assignment and limitation of
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$ SDNS $ SDNS
(O) See: Secure Data Network System. (O) See: Secure Data Network System.
$ SDU $ SDU
(N) See: "service data unit" under "protocol data unit". (N) See: "service data unit" under "protocol data unit".
$ seal $ seal
1. (I) To use asymmetric cryptography to encrypt plain text with a 1. (I) To use asymmetric cryptography to encrypt plain text with a
public key in such a way that only the holder of the matching public key in such a way that only the holder of the matching
private key can learn what was the plain text. [Chau] private key can learn what was the plain text. [Chau] (Compare:
shroud, wrap.)
Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as defined here;
because this definition is not widely known. the definition duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms.
Instead, use "encrypt" or another term that is specific with
regard to the mechanism being used.
Tutorial: The definition does *not* say "only the holder of the Tutorial: The definition does *not* say "only the holder of the
matching private key can decrypt the ciphertext to learn what was matching private key can decrypt the ciphertext to learn what was
the plaintext"; sealing is stronger than that. If Alice simply the plaintext"; sealing is stronger than that. If Alice simply
encrypts a plaintext P with a public key K to produce ciphertext C encrypts a plaintext P with a public key K to produce ciphertext C
= K(P), then if Bob guesses that P = X, Bob could verify the guess = K(P), then if Bob guesses that P = X, Bob could verify the guess
by checking whether K(P) = K(X). To "seal" P and block Bob's by checking whether K(P) = K(X). To "seal" P and block Bob's
guessing attack, Alice could attach a long string R of random bits guessing attack, Alice could attach a long string R of random bits
to P before encrypting to produce C = K(P,R); if Bob guesses that to P before encrypting to produce C = K(P,R); if Bob guesses that
P = X, Bob can only test the guess by also guessing R. P = X, Bob can only test the guess by also guessing R.
2. (D) To use cryptography to provide data integrity service for a 2. (D) To use cryptography to provide data integrity service for a
data object. (See: sign.) data object. (See: sign.)
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with this Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
definition. Instead, use a term that is more specific with regard definition 2. Instead, use a term that is more specific with
to the mechanism used to provide the data integrity service; e.g., regard to the mechanism used to provide the data integrity
use "sign" when the mechanism is digital signature. service; e.g., use "sign" when the mechanism is digital signature.
$ secret $ secret
1a. (I) /adjective/ The condition of information being protected 1a. (I) /adjective/ The condition of information being protected
from being known by any system entities except those that are from being known by any system entities except those that are
intended to know it. intended to know it.
1b. (I) /noun/ An item of information that is protected thusly. 1b. (I) /noun/ An item of information that is protected thusly.
Usage: This term applies to symmetric keys, private keys, and Usage: This term applies to symmetric keys, private keys, and
passwords. passwords.
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demonstrate an architecture to secure the Border Gateway Protocol demonstrate an architecture to secure the Border Gateway Protocol
(RFC 1771) and to promote deployment of that architecture in the (RFC 1771) and to promote deployment of that architecture in the
Internet. Internet.
Tutorial: S-BGP incorporates three security mechanisms: Tutorial: S-BGP incorporates three security mechanisms:
- A PKI supports authentication of ownership of IP address - A PKI supports authentication of ownership of IP address
blocks, autonomous system (AS) numbers, an AS's identity, and a blocks, autonomous system (AS) numbers, an AS's identity, and a
BGP router's identity and its authorization to represent an AS. BGP router's identity and its authorization to represent an AS.
This PKI parallels and takes advantage of the Internet's This PKI parallels and takes advantage of the Internet's
existing IP address and AS number assignment system. existing IP address and AS number assignment system.
- A new, optional, BGP transitive path attribute carries digital - A new, optional, BGP transitive path attribute carries digital
signatures (in "attestations") covering the routing information signatures (in "attestations") covering the routing information
in a BGP UPDATE. These signatures along with certificates from in a BGP UPDATE. These signatures along with certificates from
the S-BGP PKI enable the receiver of a BGP routing UPDATE to the S-BGP PKI enable the receiver of a BGP routing UPDATE to
validate the attribute and gain trust in the address prefixes validate the attribute and gain trust in the address prefixes
and path information that it contains. and path information that it contains.
- IPsec provides data and partial sequence integrity, and enables - IPsec provides data and partial sequence integrity, and enables
BGP routers to authenticate each other for exchanges of BGP BGP routers to authenticate each other for exchanges of BGP
control traffic. control traffic.
$ Secure Data Exchange (SDE) $ Secure Data Exchange (SDE)
(N) A LAN security protocol defined by the IEEE 802.10 standard. (N) A LAN security protocol defined by the IEEE 802.10 standard.
$ Secure Data Network System (SDNS) $ Secure Data Network System (SDNS)
(O) An NSA program that developed security protocols for (O) An NSA program that developed security protocols for
electronic mail (see: MSP), OSIRM Layer 3 (see: SP3), OSIRM Layer electronic mail (see: MSP), OSIRM Layer 3 (see: SP3), OSIRM Layer
4 (see: SP4), and key establishment (see: KMP). 4 (see: SP4), and key establishment (see: KMP).
$ secure distribution
(I) See: trusted distribution.
$ Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) $ Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
(N) A cryptographic hash function (specified in SHS) that produces (N) A cryptographic hash function (specified in SHS) that produces
a 160-bit output (hash result) for input data of any length < a 160-bit output (hash result) for input data of any length <
2**64 bits. 2**64 bits.
$ Secure Hash Standard (SHS) $ Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
(N) The U.S. Government standard [FP180] that specifies SHA. (N) The U.S. Government standard [FP180] that specifies SHA.
$ Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP) $ Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP)
(I) A Internet protocol [R2660] for providing client-server (I) A Internet protocol [R2660] for providing client-server
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"assurance level" (rather than "security assurance") of an "assurance level" (rather than "security assurance") of an
identity authentication process. Also, the processes of identity authentication process. Also, the processes of
registration and authentication should be defined and designed registration and authentication should be defined and designed
separately to ensure clarity in certification. separately to ensure clarity in certification.
$ security audit $ security audit
(I) An independent review and examination of a system's records (I) An independent review and examination of a system's records
and activities to determine the adequacy of system controls, and activities to determine the adequacy of system controls,
ensure compliance with established security policy and procedures, ensure compliance with established security policy and procedures,
detect breaches in security services, and recommend any changes detect breaches in security services, and recommend any changes
that are indicated for countermeasures. [I7498 Part 2, NCS01] that are indicated for countermeasures. [I7498-2, NCS01] (Compare:
(Compare: accounting, intrusion detection.) accounting, intrusion detection.)
Tutorial: The basic audit objective is to establish accountability Tutorial: The basic audit objective is to establish accountability
for system entities that initiate or participate in security- for system entities that initiate or participate in security-
relevant events and actions. Thus, means are needed to generate relevant events and actions. Thus, means are needed to generate
and record a security audit trail and to review and analyze the and record a security audit trail and to review and analyze the
audit trail to discover and investigate security violations. audit trail to discover and investigate security violations.
$ security audit trail $ security audit trail
(I) A chronological record of system activities that is sufficient (I) A chronological record of system activities that is sufficient
to enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence of to enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence of
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$ security by obscurity $ security by obscurity
(O) Attempting to maintain or increase security of a system by (O) Attempting to maintain or increase security of a system by
keeping secret the design or construction of a security mechanism. keeping secret the design or construction of a security mechanism.
Tutorial: This approach has long been discredited in cryptography, Tutorial: This approach has long been discredited in cryptography,
where the phrase refers to trying to keep an algorithm secret, where the phrase refers to trying to keep an algorithm secret,
rather than just concealing the keys [Schn]. One must assume that rather than just concealing the keys [Schn]. One must assume that
mass-produced or widely fielded cryptographic devices eventually mass-produced or widely fielded cryptographic devices eventually
will be lost or stolen and, therefore, that the algorithms will be will be lost or stolen and, therefore, that the algorithms will be
reverse engineered and become known to the adversary. Thus, one reverse engineered and become known to the adversary. Thus, one
should rely only on algorithms and protocols that are strong should rely on only those algorithms and protocols that are strong
enough to have been published widely, and have been peer reviewed enough to have been published widely, and have been peer reviewed
for long enough that their flaws have been found and removed. For for long enough that their flaws have been found and removed. For
example, NIST used a long, public process to select AES to replace example, NIST used a long, public process to select AES to replace
DES. DES.
In computer and network security, the principle of "no security by In computer and network security, the principle of "no security by
obscurity" also applies to security mechanisms other than obscurity" also applies to security mechanisms other than
cryptography. For example, if the design and implementation of a cryptography. For example, if the design and implementation of a
protocol for access control are strong, than reading the protocol for access control are strong, than reading the
protocol's source code should not enable you to find a way to protocol's source code should not enable you to find a way to
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protocols." [R2401] protocols." [R2401]
Tutorial: IPsec's AH or ESP can be implemented on a gateway Tutorial: IPsec's AH or ESP can be implemented on a gateway
between a protected network and an unprotected network, in order between a protected network and an unprotected network, in order
to provide security services to the protected network's hosts when to provide security services to the protected network's hosts when
they communicate across the unprotected network to other hosts and they communicate across the unprotected network to other hosts and
gateways. gateways.
$ security incident $ security incident
1. (I) A security event that involves a security violation. (See: 1. (I) A security event that involves a security violation. (See:
CERT, GRIP, security event, security intrusion, security CERT, security event, security intrusion, security violation.)
violation.)
Tutorial: In other words, a security-relevant system event in Tutorial: In other words, a security-relevant system event in
which the system's security policy is disobeyed or otherwise which the system's security policy is disobeyed or otherwise
breached. breached.
2. (D) "Any adverse event [that] compromises some aspect of 2. (D) "Any adverse event [that] compromises some aspect of
computer or network security." [R2350] computer or network security." [R2350]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this definition, Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2 because
because (a) a security incident may occur without actually being (a) a security incident may occur without actually being harmful
harmful (i.e., adverse) and (b) this Glossary defines "compromise" (i.e., adverse) and (b) this Glossary defines "compromise" more
more narrowly in relation to unauthorized access. narrowly in relation to unauthorized access.
3. (D) "A violation or imminent threat of violation of computer 3. (D) "A violation or imminent threat of violation of computer
security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard computer
security practices." [SP61] security practices." [SP61]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this definition because Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this definition because
mixes concepts in way that does not agree with common usage; a mixes concepts in way that does not agree with common usage; a
security incident is commonly thought of as involving a security incident is commonly thought of as involving a
realization of a threat (see: threat action), not just a threat. realization of a threat (see: threat action), not just a threat.
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messages that the nodes exchange. messages that the nodes exchange.
$ security perimeter $ security perimeter
(I) A physical or logical boundary that is defined for a domain or (I) A physical or logical boundary that is defined for a domain or
enclave and within which a particular security policy or security enclave and within which a particular security policy or security
architecture applies. (See: insider, outsider.) architecture applies. (See: insider, outsider.)
$ security policy $ security policy
1. (I) A definite goal, course, or method of action to guide and 1. (I) A definite goal, course, or method of action to guide and
determine present and future decisions concerning security in a determine present and future decisions concerning security in a
system. [R3198] system. [R3198] (Compare: certificate policy.)
2a. (I) A set of policy rules (or principles) that direct how a 2a. (I) A set of policy rules (or principles) that direct how a
system (or an organization) provides security services to protect system (or an organization) provides security services to protect
sensitive and critical system resources. (See: identity-based sensitive and critical system resources. (See: identity-based
security policy, policy rule, rule-based security policy, rules of security policy, policy rule, rule-based security policy, rules of
behavior. Compare: security architecture, security doctrine, behavior. Compare: security architecture, security doctrine,
security mechanism, security model, [R1281].) security mechanism, security model, [R1281].)
2b. (O) A set of rules to administer, manage, and control access 2b. (O) A set of rules to administer, manage, and control access
to network resources. [R3060, R3198] to network resources. [R3060, R3198]
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(See: access control service, audit service, availability service, (See: access control service, audit service, availability service,
data confidentiality service, data integrity service, data origin data confidentiality service, data integrity service, data origin
authentication service, non-repudiation service, peer entity authentication service, non-repudiation service, peer entity
authentication service, system integrity service.) authentication service, system integrity service.)
Tutorial: Security services implement security policies, and are Tutorial: Security services implement security policies, and are
implemented by security mechanisms. implemented by security mechanisms.
2. (O) "A service, provided by a layer of communicating open 2. (O) "A service, provided by a layer of communicating open
systems, which ensures adequate security of the systems or the systems, which ensures adequate security of the systems or the
data transfers." [I7498 Part 2] data transfers." [I7498-2]
$ security situation $ security situation
(I) /ISAKMP/ The set of all security-relevant information -- e.g., (I) /ISAKMP/ The set of all security-relevant information -- e.g.,
network addresses, security classifications, manner of operation network addresses, security classifications, manner of operation
(normal or emergency) -- that is needed to decide the security (normal or emergency) -- that is needed to decide the security
services that are required to protect the association that is services that are required to protect the association that is
being negotiated. being negotiated.
$ security target $ security target
(N) /Common Criteria/ A set of security requirements and (N) /Common Criteria/ A set of security requirements and
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$ shielded enclosure $ shielded enclosure
(O) "Room or container designed to attenuate electromagnetic (O) "Room or container designed to attenuate electromagnetic
radiation." [C4009] (See: emanation. Compare: SCIF.) radiation." [C4009] (See: emanation. Compare: SCIF.)
$ short title $ short title
(O) "Identifying combination of letters and numbers assigned to (O) "Identifying combination of letters and numbers assigned to
certain items of COMSEC material to facilitate handling, certain items of COMSEC material to facilitate handling,
accounting, and controlling." [C4009] (Compare: KMID, long title.) accounting, and controlling." [C4009] (Compare: KMID, long title.)
$ shroud
(D) /verb/ To encrypt a private key, possibly in concert with a
policy that prevents the key from ever being available in
cleartext form beyond a certain, well-defined security perimeter.
[PKCS12] (See: encrypt. Compare: seal, wrap.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as defined here;
the definition duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms.
Instead, use "encrypt" or another term that is specific with
regard to the mechanism being used.
$ SHS $ SHS
(N) See: Secure Hash Standard. (N) See: Secure Hash Standard.
$ sign $ sign
(I) Create a digital signature for a data object. (See: signer.) (I) Create a digital signature for a data object. (See: signer.)
$ signal analysis $ signal analysis
(I) Gaining indirect knowledge (inference) of communicated data by (I) Gaining indirect knowledge (inference) of communicated data by
monitoring and analyzing a signal that is emitted by a system and monitoring and analyzing a signal that is emitted by a system and
that contains the data but is not intended to communicate the that contains the data but is not intended to communicate the
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able to verify the signature of the original message. able to verify the signature of the original message.
Tutorial: The receipt is bound to the original message by a Tutorial: The receipt is bound to the original message by a
signature; consequently, the service may be requested only for a signature; consequently, the service may be requested only for a
message that is signed. The receipt sender may optionally also message that is signed. The receipt sender may optionally also
encrypt the receipt to provide confidentiality between the receipt encrypt the receipt to provide confidentiality between the receipt
sender and the receipt recipient. sender and the receipt recipient.
$ signer $ signer
(N) A human being or organization entity that uses a private key (N) A human being or organization entity that uses a private key
to sign (i.e., create a digital signature on) a data object. [ABA] to sign (i.e., create a digital signature on) a data object. [DSG]
$ SILS $ SILS
(N) See: Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security. (N) See: Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security.
$ simple authentication $ simple authentication
1. (I) An authentication process that uses a password as the 1. (I) An authentication process that uses a password as the
information needed to verify an identity claimed for an entity. information needed to verify an identity claimed for an entity.
(Compare: strong authentication.) (Compare: strong authentication.)
2. (O) "Authentication by means of simple password arrangements." 2. (O) "Authentication by means of simple password arrangements."
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in most English dictionaries, and other cultures are likely to use in most English dictionaries, and other cultures are likely to use
different metaphors for this concept. different metaphors for this concept.
$ Snefru $ Snefru
(N) A public-domain, cryptographic hash function (also called "The (N) A public-domain, cryptographic hash function (also called "The
Xerox Secure Hash Function") designed by Ralph C. Merkle at Xerox Xerox Secure Hash Function") designed by Ralph C. Merkle at Xerox
Corporation. Snefru can produce either a 128-bit or 256-bit output Corporation. Snefru can produce either a 128-bit or 256-bit output
(i.e., hash result). [Schn] (See: Khafre, Khufu.) (i.e., hash result). [Schn] (See: Khafre, Khufu.)
$ sniffing $ sniffing
(D) /slang/ Synonym for "passive wiretapping". (See: password (D) /slang/ Synonym for "passive wiretapping"; most often refers
sniffing.) to capturing and examining the data packets carried on a LAN.
(See: password sniffing.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it unnecessarily Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it unnecessarily
duplicates the meaning of a term that is better established. (See: duplicates the meaning of a term that is better established. (See:
Deprecated Usage under "Green Book". Deprecated Usage under "Green Book".
$ SNMP $ SNMP
(I) See: Simple Network Management Protocol. (I) See: Simple Network Management Protocol.
$ social engineering $ social engineering
(D) A euphemism for non-technical or low-technology methods, often (D) A euphemism for non-technical or low-technology methods, often
involving trickery or fraud, that are used to attack information involving trickery or fraud, that are used to attack information
systems. systems. Example: phishing.
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it is too vague. Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it is too vague.
Instead, use a term that is specific with regard to the means of Instead, use a term that is specific with regard to the means of
attack, e.g., blackmail, bribery, coercion, impersonation, attack, e.g., blackmail, bribery, coercion, impersonation,
intimidation, lying, or theft. intimidation, lying, or theft.
$ SOCKS $ SOCKS
(I) An Internet protocol [R1928] that provides a generalized proxy (I) An Internet protocol [R1928] that provides a generalized proxy
server that enables client-server applications (e.g., TELNET, FTP, server that enables client-server applications (e.g., TELNET, FTP,
or HTTP; running over either TCP or UDP) to use the services of a or HTTP; running over either TCP or UDP) to use the services of a
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used, authenticates with the chosen method, and then sends a relay used, authenticates with the chosen method, and then sends a relay
request. The SOCKS server evaluates the request, typically based request. The SOCKS server evaluates the request, typically based
on source and destination addresses, and either establishes the on source and destination addresses, and either establishes the
appropriate connection or denies it. appropriate connection or denies it.
$ soft TEMPEST $ soft TEMPEST
(O) The use of software techniques to reduce the radio frequency (O) The use of software techniques to reduce the radio frequency
information leakage from computer displays and keyboards. [Kuhn] information leakage from computer displays and keyboards. [Kuhn]
(See: TEMPEST.) (See: TEMPEST.)
$ soft token
(D) A data object that is used to control access or authenticate
authorization. (See: token.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as defined here;
the definition duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms.
Instead, use "attribute certifate" or another term that is
specific with regard to the mechanism being used.
$ software $ software
(I) Computer programs (which are stored in and executed by (I) Computer programs (which are stored in and executed by
computer hardware) and associated data (which also is stored in computer hardware) and associated data (which also is stored in
the hardware) that may be dynamically written or modified during the hardware) that may be dynamically written or modified during
execution. (Compare: firmware.) execution. (Compare: firmware.)
$ SORA $ SORA
(O) See: SSO-PIN ORA. (O) See: SSO-PIN ORA.
$ source authentication $ source authentication
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- "Reordering": The destination receives packets in a different - "Reordering": The destination receives packets in a different
order than that in which they were sent by the source. order than that in which they were sent by the source.
- "Deletion": A packet sent by the source is not ever delivered - "Deletion": A packet sent by the source is not ever delivered
to the intended destination. to the intended destination.
- "Delay": A packet is detained for some period of time at a - "Delay": A packet is detained for some period of time at a
relay, thus hampering and postponing the packet's normal timely relay, thus hampering and postponing the packet's normal timely
delivery from source to destination. delivery from source to destination.
$ strength $ strength
1. (I) /cryptography/ A cryptographic mechanism's level of 1. (I) /cryptography/ A cryptographic mechanism's level of
resistance to attacks [R3776]. resistance to attacks [R3776]. (See: strong.)
2. (N) /Common Criteria/ "Strength of function" is a 2. (N) /Common Criteria/ "Strength of function" is a
"qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum "qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behavior efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behavior
by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms": (See: by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms": (See:
strong.) strong.)
- Basic: "A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis - Basic: "A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis
shows that the function provides adequate protection against shows that the function provides adequate protection against
casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low
attack potential." attack potential."
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2. (N) /Common Criteria/ "Strength of function" is a 2. (N) /Common Criteria/ "Strength of function" is a
"qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum "qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behavior efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behavior
by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms": (See: by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms": (See:
strong.) strong.)
- Basic: "A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis - Basic: "A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis
shows that the function provides adequate protection against shows that the function provides adequate protection against
casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low
attack potential." attack potential."
- Medium: "... against straightforward or intentional breach ... - Medium: "... against straightforward or intentional breach ...
by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential. by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
- High: "... against deliberately planned or organized breach ... - High: "... against deliberately planned or organized breach ...
by attackers possessing a high attack potential." by attackers possessing a high attack potential."
$ strong $ strong
1. (I) /cryptography/ Used to describe a cryptographic algorithm 1. (I) /cryptography/ Used to describe a cryptographic algorithm
that would require a large amount of computational power to defeat that would require a large amount of computational power to defeat
it. (See: work factor, strength.) it. (See: strength, work factor.)
2. (I) /COMPUSEC/ Used to describe a security mechanism that would 2. (I) /COMPUSEC/ Used to describe a security mechanism that would
be difficult to defeat. (See: strength.) be difficult to defeat. (See: strength, work factor.)
$ strong authentication $ strong authentication
1. (I) An authentication process that uses a cryptographic 1. (I) An authentication process that uses a cryptographic
security mechanism -- particularly public-key certificates -- to security mechanism -- particularly public-key certificates -- to
verify the identity claimed for an entity. (Compare: simple verify the identity claimed for an entity. (Compare: simple
authentication.) authentication.)
2. (O) "Authentication by means of cryptographically derived 2. (O) "Authentication by means of cryptographically derived
credentials." [X509] credentials." [X509]
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and risk when the key is distributed to both Alice and Bob. (See: and risk when the key is distributed to both Alice and Bob. (See:
key distribution, key management.) key distribution, key management.)
$ symmetric key $ symmetric key
(I) A cryptographic key that is used in a symmetric cryptographic (I) A cryptographic key that is used in a symmetric cryptographic
algorithm. (See: symmetric cryptography.) algorithm. (See: symmetric cryptography.)
$ SYN flood $ SYN flood
(I) A denial-of-service attack that sends a large number of TCP (I) A denial-of-service attack that sends a large number of TCP
SYN (synchronize) packets to a host with the intent of disrupting SYN (synchronize) packets to a host with the intent of disrupting
the operation of that host. (See: flooding.) the operation of that host. (See: blind attack, flooding.)
Tutorial: This attack seeks to exploit a vulnerability in the TCP Tutorial: This attack seeks to exploit a vulnerability in the TCP
specification or in a TCP implementation. Normally, two hosts use specification or in a TCP implementation. Normally, two hosts use
a three-way exchange of packets to establish a TCP connection: (a) a three-way exchange of packets to establish a TCP connection: (a)
host 1 requests a connection by sending a SYN packet to host 2; host 1 requests a connection by sending a SYN packet to host 2;
(b) host 2 replies by sending a SYN-ACK (acknowledgement) packet (b) host 2 replies by sending a SYN-ACK (acknowledgement) packet
to host 1; and (c) host 1 completes the connection by sending an to host 1; and (c) host 1 completes the connection by sending an
ACK packet to host 2. To attack host 2, host 1 can send a series ACK packet to host 2. To attack host 2, host 1 can send a series
of TCP SYNs, each with a different phony source address. ([R2827] of TCP SYNs, each with a different phony source address. ([R2827]
discusses how to use packet filtering to prevent such attacks from discusses how to use packet filtering to prevent such attacks from
being launched from behind an Internet service provider's being launched from behind an Internet service provider's
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even, if there are flaws in host 2's TCP implementation, crash even, if there are flaws in host 2's TCP implementation, crash
when the available space is exhausted. when the available space is exhausted.
$ synchronization $ synchronization
(I) Any technique by which a receiving (decrypting) cryptographic (I) Any technique by which a receiving (decrypting) cryptographic
process attains an internal state that matches the transmitting process attains an internal state that matches the transmitting
(encrypting) process, i.e., has the appropriate keying material to (encrypting) process, i.e., has the appropriate keying material to
process the cipher text and is correctly initialized to do so. process the cipher text and is correctly initialized to do so.
$ system $ system
Usage: In this Glossary, the term is mainly used as an (I) Synonym for "information system".
abbreviation of "information system". (See: subsystem.)
Usage: This is a generic definition, and is the one with which the
term is used in this Glossary. However, ISDs that use the term in
protocol specifications SHOULD provide a much more specific
definition for it. Also, ISDs that specify security features,
services, and assurances need to define which system components
and system resources are inside the applicable security perimeter
and which are outside. (See: security architecture.)
$ system architecture $ system architecture
(N) The structure of system components, their relationships, and (N) The structure of system components, their relationships, and
the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution
over time. [DoDAF1] (Compare: security architecture.) over time. [DoDAF1] (Compare: security architecture.)
$ system component $ system component
1. (I) A collection of system resources that (a) forms a physical 1. (I) A collection of system resources that (a) forms a physical
or logical part of the system, (b) has specified functions and or logical part of the system, (b) has specified functions and
interfaces, and (c) is treated (e.g., by policies or interfaces, and (c) is treated (e.g., by policies or
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(RFC 854) for remote login from one host to another. (RFC 854) for remote login from one host to another.
$ TEMPEST $ TEMPEST
(N) Short name for technology and methods for protecting against (N) Short name for technology and methods for protecting against
data compromise due to electromagnetic emanations from electrical data compromise due to electromagnetic emanations from electrical
and electronic equipment. [Russ] (See: inspectable space, soft and electronic equipment. [Russ] (See: inspectable space, soft
TEMPEST, TEMPEST zone. Compare: QUADRANT) TEMPEST, TEMPEST zone. Compare: QUADRANT)
(O) /U.S. Government/ "Short name referring to investigation, (O) /U.S. Government/ "Short name referring to investigation,
study, and control of compromising emanations from IS equipment." study, and control of compromising emanations from IS equipment."
[N4009] [C4009]
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"electromagnetic emanations security"; instead, use EMSEC. Also, "electromagnetic emanations security"; instead, use EMSEC. Also,
the term is NOT an acronym for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse the term is NOT an acronym for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse
Surveillance Technology. Surveillance Technology.
Tutorial: The U.S. Federal Government issues security policies Tutorial: The U.S. Federal Government issues security policies
that (a) state specifications and standards for techniques to that (a) state specifications and standards for techniques to
reduce the strength of emanations from systems and reduce the reduce the strength of emanations from systems and reduce the
ability of unauthorized parties to receive and make use of ability of unauthorized parties to receive and make use of
emanations and (b) state rules for applying those techniques. emanations and (b) state rules for applying those techniques.
Other nations presumably do the same. Other nations presumably do the same.
$ TEMPEST zone $ TEMPEST zone
(O) "Designated area [i.e., a physical volume] within a facility (O) "Designated area [i.e., a physical volume] within a facility
where equipment that has appropriate TEMPEST characteristics ... where equipment that has appropriate TEMPEST characteristics ...
may be operated." [C4009] (See: emanation security, TEMPEST.
may be operated." [C4009] (See: emanation security, TEMPEST.
Compare: inspectable space.) Compare: inspectable space.)
Tutorial: The strength of an electromagnetic signal decreases in Tutorial: The strength of an electromagnetic signal decreases in
proportion to the square of the distance between the source and proportion to the square of the distance between the source and
the receiver. Therefore, EMSEC for electromagnetic signals can be the receiver. Therefore, EMSEC for electromagnetic signals can be
achieved by a combination of (a) reducing the strength of achieved by a combination of (a) reducing the strength of
emanations to a defined level and (b) establishing around that emanations to a defined level and (b) establishing around that
equipment an appropriately sized physical buffer zone from which equipment an appropriately sized physical buffer zone from which
unauthorized entities are excluded. By making the zone large unauthorized entities are excluded. By making the zone large
enough, it is possible to limit the signal strength available to enough, it is possible to limit the signal strength available to
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2. (O) The technical and operational ability of a hostile entity 2. (O) The technical and operational ability of a hostile entity
to detect, exploit, or subvert a friendly system and the to detect, exploit, or subvert a friendly system and the
demonstrated, presumed, or inferred intent of that entity to demonstrated, presumed, or inferred intent of that entity to
conduct such activity. conduct such activity.
Tutorial: To be likely to launch an attack, an adversary must have Tutorial: To be likely to launch an attack, an adversary must have
(a) a motive to attack, (b) a method or technical ability to make (a) a motive to attack, (b) a method or technical ability to make
the attack, and (c) an opportunity to appropriately access the the attack, and (c) an opportunity to appropriately access the
targeted system. targeted system.
3. (O) "An indication of an impending undesirable event." [Park] 3. (D) "An indication of an impending undesirable event." [Park]
Tutorial: Definition 3 was intended to include these meanings: Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term with
definition 3 because the definition is ambiguous. This definition
was intended to include the following three meanings:
- "Potential threat": A possible security violation; i.e., the - "Potential threat": A possible security violation; i.e., the
same as definition 1. same as definition 1.
- "Active threat": An expression of intent to violate security. - "Active threat": An expression of intent to violate security.
(Context usually distinguishes this meaning from the previous (Context usually distinguishes this meaning from the previous
one.) one.)
- "Accomplished threat" or "actualized threat": That is, a threat - "Accomplished threat" or "actualized threat": That is, a threat
action. Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term "threat" action. Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term "threat"
with this meaning; instead, use "threat action". with this meaning; instead, use "threat action".
$ threat action $ threat action
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(See: various kinds of threat actions defined under the four kinds (See: various kinds of threat actions defined under the four kinds
of "threat consequence".) of "threat consequence".)
$ threat agent $ threat agent
(I) A system entity that performs a threat action, or an event (I) A system entity that performs a threat action, or an event
that results in a threat action. that results in a threat action.
$ threat analysis $ threat analysis
(I) An analysis of the threat actions that might affect a system, (I) An analysis of the threat actions that might affect a system,
primarily emphasizing their probability of occurrence but also primarily emphasizing their probability of occurrence but also
considering their resulting threat consequences. (Compare: risk considering their resulting threat consequences. Example: RFC
analysis.) 3833. (Compare: risk analysis.)
$ threat consequence $ threat consequence
(I) A security violation that results from a threat action. (I) A security violation that results from a threat action.
Tutorial: The four basic types of threat consequence are Tutorial: The four basic types of threat consequence are
"unauthorized disclosure", "deception", "disruption", and "unauthorized disclosure", "deception", "disruption", and
"usurpation". (See main Glossary entries of each of these four "usurpation". (See main Glossary entries of each of these four
terms for lists of the types of threat actions that can result in terms for lists of the types of threat actions that can result in
these consequences.) these consequences.)
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UTC time value and other parameters (policy OID, serial number, UTC time value and other parameters (policy OID, serial number,
indication of time accuracy, nonce, DN of the authority, and indication of time accuracy, nonce, DN of the authority, and
various extensions), and then signing that dataset with the various extensions), and then signing that dataset with the
authority's private key as specified in CMS. Such an authority authority's private key as specified in CMS. Such an authority
typically would operate as a trusted third-party service, but typically would operate as a trusted third-party service, but
other operational models might be used. other operational models might be used.
$ timing channel $ timing channel
(I) See: covert timing channel. (I) See: covert timing channel.
$ TKEY
(I) A mnemonic referring to an Internet protocol (RFC 2930) for
establishing a shared secret key between a DNS resolver and a DNS
name server. (See: TSIG.)
$ TLS $ TLS
(I) See: Transport Layer Security. (I) See: Transport Layer Security.
$ TLSP $ TLSP
(N) See: Transport Layer Security Protocol. (N) See: Transport Layer Security Protocol.
$ TOE $ TOE
(N) See: target of evaluation (N) See: target of evaluation
$ token $ token
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is not directly available (e.g., when the data is encrypted). is not directly available (e.g., when the data is encrypted).
These characteristics include the identities and locations of the These characteristics include the identities and locations of the
source(s) and destination(s) of the flow, and the flow's presence, source(s) and destination(s) of the flow, and the flow's presence,
amount, frequency, and duration of occurrence. The object of the amount, frequency, and duration of occurrence. The object of the
analysis might be information in SDUs, information in the PCI, or analysis might be information in SDUs, information in the PCI, or
both. (See: inference, traffic-flow confidentiality, wiretapping. both. (See: inference, traffic-flow confidentiality, wiretapping.
Compare: signal analysis.) Compare: signal analysis.)
2. (O) "The inference of information from observation of traffic 2. (O) "The inference of information from observation of traffic
flows (presence, absence, amount, direction, and frequency)." flows (presence, absence, amount, direction, and frequency)."
[I7498 Part 2] [I7498-2]
$ traffic-flow analysis $ traffic-flow analysis
(I) Synonym for "traffic analysis". (I) Synonym for "traffic analysis".
$ traffic-flow confidentiality (TFC) $ traffic-flow confidentiality (TFC)
1. (I) A data confidentiality service to protect against traffic 1. (I) A data confidentiality service to protect against traffic
analysis. (See: communications cover.) analysis. (See: communications cover.)
2. (O) "A confidentiality service to protect against traffic 2. (O) "A confidentiality service to protect against traffic
analysis." [I7498 Part 2] analysis." [I7498-2]
Tutorial: Confidentiality concerns involve both direct and Tutorial: Confidentiality concerns involve both direct and
indirect disclosure of data, and the latter includes traffic indirect disclosure of data, and the latter includes traffic
analysis. However, operational considerations can make TFC analysis. However, operational considerations can make TFC
difficult to achieve. For example, if Alice sends a product idea difficult to achieve. For example, if Alice sends a product idea
to Bob in an email message, she wants data confidentiality for the to Bob in an email message, she wants data confidentiality for the
message's content, and she might also want to conceal the message's content, and she might also want to conceal the
destination of the message in order to hide Bob's identity from destination of the message in order to hide Bob's identity from
her competitors. However, the identity of the intended recipient, her competitors. However, the identity of the intended recipient,
or at least a network address for that recipient, needs to be made or at least a network address for that recipient, needs to be made
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$ traffic key $ traffic key
(I) A cryptographic key used by a device for protecting (I) A cryptographic key used by a device for protecting
information that is being transmitted between devices, as opposed information that is being transmitted between devices, as opposed
to protecting information that being is maintained in the device. to protecting information that being is maintained in the device.
(Compare: storage key.) (Compare: storage key.)
$ traffic padding $ traffic padding
(I) "The generation of spurious instances of communication, (I) "The generation of spurious instances of communication,
spurious data units, and/or spurious data within data units." spurious data units, and/or spurious data within data units."
[I7498 Part 2] [I7498-2]
$ tranquillity property $ tranquillity property
(N) /formal model/ Property of a system whereby the security level (N) /formal model/ Property of a system whereby the security level
of an object cannot change while the object is being processed by of an object cannot change while the object is being processed by
the system. (See: Bell-LaPadula model.) the system. (See: Bell-LaPadula model.)
$ transaction $ transaction
1. (I) A unit of interaction between an external entity and a 1. (I) A unit of interaction between an external entity and a
system, or between components within a system, that involves a system, or between components within a system, that involves a
series of system actions or events. series of system actions or events.
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(I) An Internet Standard, Transport-Layer protocol (RFC 793) that (I) An Internet Standard, Transport-Layer protocol (RFC 793) that
reliably delivers a sequence of datagrams from one computer to reliably delivers a sequence of datagrams from one computer to
another in a computer network. (See: TCP/IP.) another in a computer network. (See: TCP/IP.)
Tutorial: TCP is designed to fit into a layered suite of protocols Tutorial: TCP is designed to fit into a layered suite of protocols
that support internetwork applications. TCP assumes it can obtain that support internetwork applications. TCP assumes it can obtain
a simple but potentially unreliable end-to-end datagram service a simple but potentially unreliable end-to-end datagram service
(such as IP) from the lower layer protocols. (such as IP) from the lower layer protocols.
$ transmission security (TRANSEC) $ transmission security (TRANSEC)
(I) Measures that protect communications from interception and (I) COMSEC measures that protect communications from interception
exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. Usually understood and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. Example:
to be a part of COMSEC. (Compare: traffic flow confidentiality.) frequency hopping. (Compare: anti-jam, traffic flow
confidentiality.)
$ Transport Layer $ Transport Layer
See: Internet Protocol Suite, OSIRM. See: Internet Protocol Suite, OSIRM.
$ Transport Layer Security (TLS) $ Transport Layer Security (TLS)
(I) TLS Version 1.0 is an Internet protocol [R2246] that is based (I) TLS Version 1.0 is an Internet protocol [R2246] that is based
on, and very similar to, SSL Version 3.0. (Compare: TLSP.) on, and very similar to, SSL Version 3.0. (Compare: TLSP.)
Deprecated Usage: The TLS protocol is misnamed. The name Deprecated Usage: The TLS protocol is misnamed. The name
misleadingly suggests that TLS is situated in the IPS Transport misleadingly suggests that TLS is situated in the IPS Transport
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$ triple-wrapped $ triple-wrapped
(I) /S-MIME/ Data that has been signed with a digital signature, (I) /S-MIME/ Data that has been signed with a digital signature,
then encrypted, and then signed again. [R2634] then encrypted, and then signed again. [R2634]
$ Trojan horse $ Trojan horse
(I) A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but (I) A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but
also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades
security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate
authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program. (See: authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program. (See:
malware, spyware. Compare: logic bomb, virus, worm.) malware, spyware. Compare: logic bomb, virus, worm.)
$ trust $ trust
1. (I) /information system/ A feeling of certainty (sometimes 1. (I) /information system/ A feeling of certainty (sometimes
based on inconclusive evidence) either (a) that the system will based on inconclusive evidence) either (a) that the system will
not fail or (b) that the system meets its specifications (i.e., not fail or (b) that the system meets its specifications (i.e.,
the system does what it claims to do and does not perform unwanted the system does what it claims to do and does not perform unwanted
functions). (See: trust level, trusted system, trustworthy system. functions). (See: trust level, trusted system, trustworthy system.
Compare: assurance.) Compare: assurance.)
Tutorial: Components of a system can be grouped into three classes
of trust [Gass]:
- "Trusted": The component is responsible for enforcing security
policy on other components; the system's security depends on
flawless operation of the component. (See: trusted process.)
- "Benign": The component is not responsible for enforcing
security policy, but it has sensitive authorizations. It must
be trusted not to intentionally violate security policy, but
security violations are assumed to be accidental and not likely
to affect overall system security.
- "Untrusted": The component is of unknown or suspicious
provenance and must be treated as deliberately malicious. (See:
malicious logic.)
2. (I) /PKI/ A relationship between a certificate user and a CA in 2. (I) /PKI/ A relationship between a certificate user and a CA in
which the user acts according to the assumption that the CA which the user acts according to the assumption that the CA
creates only valid digital certificates. creates only valid digital certificates.
Tutorial: "Generally, an entity is said to 'trust' a second entity Tutorial: "Generally, an entity is said to 'trust' a second entity
when the first entity makes the assumption that the second entity when the first entity makes the assumption that the second entity
will behave exactly as the first entity expects. This trust may will behave exactly as the first entity expects. This trust may
apply only for some specific function. The key role of trust in apply only for some specific function. The key role of trust in
[X.509] is to describe the relationship between an entity [i.e., a [X.509] is to describe the relationship between an entity [i.e., a
certificate user] and a [CA]; an entity shall be certain that it certificate user] and a [CA]; an entity shall be certain that it
can trust the CA to create only valid and reliable certificates." can trust the CA to create only valid and reliable certificates."
[X509] [X509]
Components of a system can be grouped into three classes of trust
[Gass]:
- "Trusted": The component is responsible for enforcing security
policy on other components; the system's security depends on
flawless operation of the component. (See: trusted process.)
- "Benign": The component is not responsible for enforcing
security policy, but it has sensitive authorizations. It must
be trusted not to intentionally violate security policy, but
security violations are assumed to be accidental and not likely
to affect overall system security.
- "Untrusted": The component is of unknown or suspicious
provenance and must be treated as deliberately malicious. (See:
malicious logic.)
$ trust anchor $ trust anchor
(I) /PKI/ An established point of trust (usually based on the (I) /PKI/ An established point of trust (usually based on the
authority of some person, office, or organization) from which a authority of some person, office, or organization) from which a
certificate user begins the validation of a certification path. certificate user begins the validation of a certification path.
(See: path validation, trust anchor CA, trust anchor certificate, (See: path validation, trust anchor CA, trust anchor certificate,
trust anchor key.) trust anchor key.)
Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it
because it is used in various ways in existing ISDs and other PKI because it is used in various ways in existing ISDs and other PKI
literature. The literature almost always uses this term in a sense literature. The literature almost always uses this term in a sense
that is equivalent to this definition, but usage often differs that is equivalent to this definition, but usage often differs
with regard to what constitutes the point of trust. with regard to what constitutes the point of trust.
Tutorial: A trust anchor may be defined as being based on a public Tutorial: A trust anchor may be defined as being based on a public
key, a CA, a public-key certificate, or some combination or key, a CA, a public-key certificate, or some combination or
variation of those: variation of those:
- A public key as a point of trust: Although a certification path - 1. A public key as a point of trust: Although a certification
is defined as beginning with a "sequence of public-key path is defined as beginning with a "sequence of public-key
certificates", an implementation of a path validation process certificates", an implementation of a path validation process
might not explicitly handle a root certificate as part of the might not explicitly handle a root certificate as part of the
path, but instead begin the process by using a trusted root key path, but instead begin the process by using a trusted root key
to verify the signature on a certificate that was issued by the to verify the signature on a certificate that was issued by the
root. root.
Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as just a public Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as just a public
key. (See: root key, trust anchor key, trusted key.) key. (See: root key, trust anchor key, trusted key.)
- A CA as a point of trust: A trusted public key is just one of - 2. A CA as a point of trust: A trusted public key is just one
the data elements needed for path validation; the IPS path of the data elements needed for path validation; the IPS path
validation algorithm [R3280] also needs the name of the CA to validation algorithm [R3280] also needs the name of the CA to
which that key belongs, i.e., the DN of the issuer of the first which that key belongs, i.e., the DN of the issuer of the first
X.509 certificate to be validated on the path. (See: issue.) X.509 certificate to be validated on the path. (See: issue.)
Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as either just a Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as either just a
CA (where some public key is implied) or as a CA together with CA (where some public key is implied) or as a CA together with
a specified public key belonging to that CA. (See: root, trust a specified public key belonging to that CA. (See: root, trust
anchor CA, trusted CA.) anchor CA, trusted CA.)
Example: "A public key and the name of a [CA] that is used to Example: "A public key and the name of a [CA] that is used to
validate the first certificate in a sequence of certificates. validate the first certificate in a sequence of certificates.
The trust anchor public key is used to verify the signature on The trust anchor public key is used to verify the signature on
a certificate issued by a trust anchor [CA]." [SP57] a certificate issued by a trust anchor [CA]." [SP57]
- A public-key certificate as a point of trust: In addition to - 3. A public-key certificate as a point of trust: In addition to
the trusted CA's public key and name, the path validation the trusted CA's public key and name, the path validation
algorithm needs to know the digital signature algorithm and any algorithm needs to know the digital signature algorithm and any
associated parameters with which the public key is used, and associated parameters with which the public key is used, and
also any constraints that have been placed on the set of paths also any constraints that have been placed on the set of paths
that may be validated using the key. All of this information is that may be validated using the key. All of this information is
available from a CA's public-key certificate. available from a CA's public-key certificate.
Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as a public-key Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as a public-key
certificate of a CA. (See: root certificate, trust anchor certificate of a CA. (See: root certificate, trust anchor
certificate, trusted certificate.) certificate, trusted certificate.)
- Combinations: Combinations and variations of the first three - 4. Combinations: Combinations and variations of the first three
definitions are also used in the PKI literature. definitions are also used in the PKI literature.
Example: "trust anchor information". The IPS standard for path Example: "trust anchor information". The IPS standard for path
validation [R3280] specifies the information that describes "a validation [R3280] specifies the information that describes "a
CA that serves as a trust anchor for the certification path. CA that serves as a trust anchor for the certification path.
The trust anchor information includes: (1) the trusted issuer The trust anchor information includes: (a) the trusted issuer
name, (2) the trusted public key algorithm, (3) the trusted name, (b) the trusted public key algorithm, (c) the trusted
public key, and (4) optionally, the trusted public key public key, and (d) optionally, the trusted public key
parameters associated with the public key. The trust anchor parameters associated with the public key. The trust anchor
information may be provided to the path processing procedure in information may be provided to the path processing procedure in
the form of a self-signed certificate. The trusted anchor the form of a self-signed certificate. The trusted anchor
information is trusted because it was delivered to the path information is trusted because it was delivered to the path
processing procedure by some trustworthy out-of-band procedure. processing procedure by some trustworthy out-of-band procedure.
If the trusted public key algorithm requires parameters, then If the trusted public key algorithm requires parameters, then
the parameters are provided along with the trusted public key." the parameters are provided along with the trusted public key."
$ trust anchor CA $ trust anchor CA
(I) A CA that is the subject of a trust anchor certificate or (I) A CA that is the subject of a trust anchor certificate or
skipping to change at page 276, line 22 skipping to change at page 280, line 29
$ trust level $ trust level
(N) A characterization of a standard of security protection to be (N) A characterization of a standard of security protection to be
met by an information system. (See: Common Criteria, TCSEC.) met by an information system. (See: Common Criteria, TCSEC.)
Tutorial: A trust level is based not only on (a) the presence of Tutorial: A trust level is based not only on (a) the presence of
security mechanisms, but also on the use of (b) systems security mechanisms, but also on the use of (b) systems
engineering discipline to properly structure the system and (c) engineering discipline to properly structure the system and (c)
implementation analysis to ensure that the system provides an implementation analysis to ensure that the system provides an
appropriate degree of trust. appropriate degree of trust.
$ trusted
(I) See: secondary definition under "trust".
$ trusted CA $ trusted CA
(I) A CA upon which a certificate user relies as issuing valid (I) A CA upon which a certificate user relies as issuing valid
certificates; especially a CA that is used as a trust anchor CA. certificates; especially a CA that is used as a trust anchor CA.
(See: certification path, root, trust anchor CA, validation.) (See: certification path, root, trust anchor CA, validation.)
Tutorial. This trust is transitive to the extent that the X.509 Tutorial. This trust is transitive to the extent that the X.509
certificate extensions permit; that is, if a trusted CA issues a certificate extensions permit; that is, if a trusted CA issues a
certificate to another CA, a user that trusts the first CA also certificate to another CA, a user that trusts the first CA also
trusts the second CA if the user succeeds in validating the trusts the second CA if the user succeeds in validating the
certificate path (see: path validation). certificate path (see: path validation).
skipping to change at page 277, line 29 skipping to change at page 281, line 40
- Division D: Minimal protection, i.e., has been evaluated but - Division D: Minimal protection, i.e., has been evaluated but
does not meet the requirements for a higher evaluation class. does not meet the requirements for a higher evaluation class.
$ trusted computing base (TCB) $ trusted computing base (TCB)
(N) "The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer (N) "The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer
system, including hardware, firmware, and software, the system, including hardware, firmware, and software, the
combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security
policy." [NCS04] (See: "trusted" under "trust".) policy." [NCS04] (See: "trusted" under "trust".)
$ trusted distribution $ trusted distribution
(I) /computer security/ "A trusted method for distributing the TCB (I) /COMPUSEC/ "A trusted method for distributing the TCB
hardware, software, and firmware components, both originals and hardware, software, and firmware components, both originals and
updates, that provides methods for protecting the TCB from updates, that provides methods for protecting the TCB from
modification during distribution and for detection of any changes modification during distribution and for detection of any changes
to the TCB that may occur." [NCS04] (See: code signing, to the TCB that may occur." [NCS04] (See: code signing,
configuration control.) configuration control.)
$ trusted key $ trusted key
(D) Abbreviation for "trusted public key" and also for other types (D) Abbreviation for "trusted public key" and also for other types
of keys. (See: root key, trust anchor key.) of keys. (See: root key, trust anchor key.)
skipping to change at page 279, line 7 skipping to change at page 283, line 19
$ trustworthy system $ trustworthy system
1. (I) A system that not only is trusted, but also for which the 1. (I) A system that not only is trusted, but also for which the
trust can be guaranteed in some convincing way, such as through trust can be guaranteed in some convincing way, such as through
formal analysis or code review. (See: trust. Compare: trusted.) formal analysis or code review. (See: trust. Compare: trusted.)
2. (O) /Digital Signature Guidelines/ "Computer hardware, 2. (O) /Digital Signature Guidelines/ "Computer hardware,
software, and procedures that: (a) are reasonably secure from software, and procedures that: (a) are reasonably secure from
intrusion and misuse; (b) provide a reasonably reliable level of intrusion and misuse; (b) provide a reasonably reliable level of
availability, reliability, and correct operation; (c) are availability, reliability, and correct operation; (c) are
reasonably suited to performing their intended functions; and (d) reasonably suited to performing their intended functions; and (d)
adhere to generally accepted security principles." [ABA] adhere to generally accepted security principles." [DSG]
$ TSEC $ TSEC
(O) See: Telecommunications Security Nomenclature System. (O) See: Telecommunications Security Nomenclature System.
(Compare: TCSEC.) (Compare: TCSEC.)
$ TSIG $ TSIG
(N) See: Trusted System Interoperability Group. 1. (N) See: Trusted System Interoperability Group.
2. (I) A mnemonic (presumed to be derived from "Transaction
SIGnature") referring to an Internet protocol (RFC 2845) for data
origin authentication and data integrity for certain DNS
operations. (See: TKEY.)
$ tunnel $ tunnel
1. (I) A communication channel created in a computer network by 1. (I) A communication channel created in a computer network by
encapsulating (i.e., layering) a communication protocol's data encapsulating (i.e., layering) a communication protocol's data
packets in (i.e., above) a second protocol that normally would be packets in (i.e., above) a second protocol that normally would be
carried above, or at the same layer as, the first one. (See: L2TP, carried above, or at the same layer as, the first one. (See: L2TP,
VPN.) (Compare: covert channel.) VPN.) (Compare: covert channel.)
Tutorial: Tunneling can involve almost any two IPS protocol Tutorial: Tunneling can involve almost any two IPS protocol
layers. For example, a TCP connection between two hosts could layers. For example, a TCP connection between two hosts could
skipping to change at page 282, line 48 skipping to change at page 287, line 11
host name of a server (written as a domain name). In an FTP or host name of a server (written as a domain name). In an FTP or
HTTP URL, the host name is followed by the path name of a file on HTTP URL, the host name is followed by the path name of a file on
the server. The last (optional) part of a URL may be either a the server. The last (optional) part of a URL may be either a
fragment identifier that indicates a position in the file, or a fragment identifier that indicates a position in the file, or a
query string. query string.
$ uniform resource name (URN) $ uniform resource name (URN)
(I) A URI that has an institutional commitment to persistence and (I) A URI that has an institutional commitment to persistence and
availability. availability.
$ untrusted
(I) See: secondary definition under "trust".
$ untrusted process $ untrusted process
1. (I) A system component that is not able to affect the state of 1. (I) A system component that is not able to affect the state of
system security through incorrect or malicious operation. Example: system security through incorrect or malicious operation. Example:
A component that has its operations confined by a security kernel. A component that has its operations confined by a security kernel.
(See: trusted process.) (See: trusted process.)
2. (I) A system component that (a) has not been evaluated or 2. (I) A system component that (a) has not been evaluated or
examined for adherence to a specified security policy and, examined for adherence to a specified security policy and,
therefore, (b) must be assumed to contain logic that might attempt therefore, (b) must be assumed to contain logic that might attempt
to circumvent system security. to circumvent system security.
skipping to change at page 287, line 28 skipping to change at page 291, line 45
EDI format translation, to EDI-to-FAX conversion, to integrated EDI format translation, to EDI-to-FAX conversion, to integrated
business systems. business systems.
$ VAN $ VAN
(I) See: value-added network. (I) See: value-added network.
$ verification $ verification
1. (I) /authentication/ Presenting information to establish the 1. (I) /authentication/ Presenting information to establish the
truth of a claimed identity. (See: validate vs. verify.) truth of a claimed identity. (See: validate vs. verify.)
2. (N) /computer security/ The process of comparing two levels of 2. (N) /COMPUSEC/ The process of comparing two levels of system
system specification for proper correspondence, such as comparing specification for proper correspondence, such as comparing a
a security model with a top-level specification, a top-level security model with a top-level specification, a top-level
specification with source code, or source code with object code. specification with source code, or source code with object code.
[NCS04] [NCS04]
$ verified design $ verified design
(O) See: TCSEC Class A1. (O) See: TCSEC Class A1.
$ verify $ verify
(I) To test or prove the truth or accuracy of a fact or value. For (I) To test or prove the truth or accuracy of a fact or value. For
example, see "authenticate". (See: validate vs. verify.) example, see "authenticate". (See: validate vs. verify.)
skipping to change at page 291, line 30 skipping to change at page 295, line 48
sort of medium used for a link or even from a node, such as a sort of medium used for a link or even from a node, such as a
gateway or subnetwork switch. gateway or subnetwork switch.
Tutorial: Wiretapping can be characterized according to intent: Tutorial: Wiretapping can be characterized according to intent:
- "Active wiretapping" attempts to alter the data or otherwise - "Active wiretapping" attempts to alter the data or otherwise
affect the flow. affect the flow.
- "Passive wiretapping" only attempts to observe the data flow - "Passive wiretapping" only attempts to observe the data flow
and gain knowledge of information contained in it. and gain knowledge of information contained in it.
$ work factor $ work factor
1. (I) /COMPUSEC/ The estimated amount of effort or time that can 1a. (I) /COMPUSEC/ The estimated amount of effort or time that can
be expected to be expended by a potential intruder to penetrate a be expected to be expended by a potential intruder to penetrate a
system, or defeat a particular countermeasure, when using system, or defeat a particular countermeasure, when using
specified amounts of expertise and resources. (See: strength.) specified amounts of expertise and resources. (See: brute force,
impossible, strength.)
2. (I) /cryptography/ The estimated amount of computing power and 1b. (I) /cryptography/ The estimated amount of computing power and
time needed to break a cryptographic system. time needed to break a cryptographic system. (See: brute force,
impossible, strength.)
$ World Wide Web ("the Web", WWW) $ World Wide Web ("the Web", WWW)
(N) The global, hypermedia-based collection of information and (N) The global, hypermedia-based collection of information and
services that is available on Internet servers and is accessed by services that is available on Internet servers and is accessed by
browsers using Hypertext Transfer Protocol and other information browsers using Hypertext Transfer Protocol and other information
retrieval mechanisms. (See: web vs. Web, [R2084].) retrieval mechanisms. (See: web vs. Web, [R2084].)
$ World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) $ World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
(N) Created in October 1994 to develop and standardize protocols (N) Created in October 1994 to develop and standardize protocols
to promote the evolution and interoperability of the Web, and now to promote the evolution and interoperability of the Web, and now
skipping to change at page 292, line 13 skipping to change at page 296, line 33
W3C Recommendations are similar to the standards published by W3C Recommendations are similar to the standards published by
others organizations. (Compare: Internet Standard, ISO.) others organizations. (Compare: Internet Standard, ISO.)
$ worm $ worm
(I) A computer program that can run independently, can propagate a (I) A computer program that can run independently, can propagate a
complete working version of itself onto other hosts on a network, complete working version of itself onto other hosts on a network,
and may consume system resources destructively. (See: mobile code, and may consume system resources destructively. (See: mobile code,
Morris Worm, virus.) Morris Worm, virus.)
$ wrap $ wrap
(D) To use cryptography to provide data confidentiality service (D) /verb/ To use cryptography to provide data confidentiality
for keying material. (See: encrypt. Compare: seal.) service for keying material. (See: encrypt. Compare: seal,
shroud.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as defined here; Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as defined here;
the definition duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms. the definition duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms.
Instead, use "encrypt" or another term that is specific with Instead, use "encrypt" or another term that is specific with
regard to the mechanism being used. regard to the mechanism being used.
$ write $ write
(I) /COMPUSEC/ A fundamental operation in an information system (I) /COMPUSEC/ A fundamental operation in an information system
that results in a flow of information only from a subject to an that results in a flow of information only from a subject to an
object. (See: access mode.) object. (See: access mode.)
skipping to change at page 297, line 8 skipping to change at page 301, line 8
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated
Usage under "Green Book".) Usage under "Green Book".)
$ zone of control $ zone of control
(O) /EMSEC/ Synonym for "inspectable space". [C4009] (See: (O) /EMSEC/ Synonym for "inspectable space". [C4009] (See:
TEMPEST.) TEMPEST.)
5. Informative References 5. Informative References
This Glossary focuses on the Internet Standards Process. Therefore, This Glossary focuses on the Internet Standards Process. Therefore,
this set of references emphasizes international, governmental, and this set of informative references emphasizes international,
industry standards documents. RFCs referenced in Glossary entries are governmental, and industry standards documents. Some RFCs that are
listed here if they are specifically security-relevant; other especially relevant to Internet security are mentioned in Glossary
referenced RFCs are only mentioned by number (e.g., see "RFC 959" in entries in square brackets (e.g., see "[R1457]" in the entry for
the entry for "File Transport Protocol"). "security label") and are listed here; some other RFCs are mentioned
in parentheses (e.g., see "(RFC 959)" in the entry for "File
Transport Protocol") but are not listed here.
This Glossary does not require any normative references.
[A1523] American National Standards Institute, "American National [A1523] American National Standards Institute, "American National
Standard Telecomm Glossary", ANSI T1.523-2001. Standard Telecomm Glossary", ANSI T1.523-2001.
[A3092] ---, "American National Standard Data Encryption Algorithm", [A3092] ---, "American National Standard Data Encryption Algorithm",
ANSI X3.92-1981, 30 December 1980. ANSI X3.92-1981, 30 December 1980.
[A9009] ---, "Financial Institution Message Authentication [A9009] ---, "Financial Institution Message Authentication
(Wholesale)", ANSI X9.9-1986, 15 August 1986. (Wholesale)", ANSI X9.9-1986, 15 August 1986.
skipping to change at page 297, line 43 skipping to change at page 301, line 47
[A9052] ---, "Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation", [A9052] ---, "Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation",
X9.52-1998, ANSI approval 9 November 1998. X9.52-1998, ANSI approval 9 November 1998.
[A9062] ---, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services [A9062] ---, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)", X9.62-1998, ANSI approval 7 January 1999. (ECDSA)", X9.62-1998, ANSI approval 7 January 1999.
[A9063] ---, "---: Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic [A9063] ---, "---: Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic
Curve Cryptography", X9.63-2001. Curve Cryptography", X9.63-2001.
[ABA] American Bar Association, "Digital Signature Guidelines:
Legal Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and
Secure Electronic Commerce", Chicago, IL, 1 August 1996.
[ACM] Association for Computing Machinery, "Communications of the [ACM] Association for Computing Machinery, "Communications of the
ACM", July 1998 issue with: M. Yeung, "Digital ACM", July 1998 issue with: M. Yeung, "Digital
Watermarking"; N. Memom and P. Wong, "Protecting Digital Watermarking"; N. Memom and P. Wong, "Protecting Digital
Media Content"; and S. Craver, B.-L. Yeo, and M. Yeung, Media Content"; and S. Craver, B.-L. Yeo, and M. Yeung,
"Technical Trials and Legal Tribulations". "Technical Trials and Legal Tribulations".
[Ande] Anderson, J., "Computer Security Technology Planning Study", [Ande] Anderson, J., "Computer Security Technology Planning Study",
ESD-TR-73-51, Vols. I and II, USAF Electronics Systems Div., ESD-TR-73-51, Vols. I and II, USAF Electronics Systems Div.,
Bedford, MA, October 1972. (Available as AD-758206 and - Bedford, MA, October 1972. (Available as AD-758206 and -
772806, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, 772806, National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
skipping to change at page 300, line 13 skipping to change at page 304, line 11
249. 249.
[DH76] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography", [DH76] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography",
in "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory", vol. IT-22, in "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory", vol. IT-22,
no. 6, November 1976, pp. 644-654. no. 6, November 1976, pp. 644-654.
[DoD1] U.S. DoD, "Department of Defense Trusted Computer System [DoD1] U.S. DoD, "Department of Defense Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria", DoD 5200.28-STD, 26 December 1985. Evaluation Criteria", DoD 5200.28-STD, 26 December 1985.
(Supersedes [CSC1].) (Superseded by DoD Directive 8500.1.) (Supersedes [CSC1].) (Superseded by DoD Directive 8500.1.)
[DoD3] ---, "X.509 Certificate Policy for the United States
Department of Defense", version 7, 18 December 2002.
[DoD4] ---, "NSA Key Recovery Assessment Criteria", 8 June 1998. [DoD4] ---, "NSA Key Recovery Assessment Criteria", 8 June 1998.
[DoD5] ---, Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program", [DoD5] ---, Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program",
13 December 1996. 13 December 1996.
[DoD6] ---, "DoD Architecture Framework", Version 1, 30 August [DoD6] ---, "DoD Architecture Framework", Version 1, 30 August
2003. 2003.
[DoD7] ---, "X.509 Certificate Policy for the United States
Department of Defense", version 7, 18 December 2002.
(Superseded by [DoD9].)
[DoD9] ---, "X.509 Certificate Policy for the United States
Department of Defense", version 9, 9 February 2005.
[DSG] American Bar Association, "Digital Signature Guidelines:
Legal Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and
Secure Electronic Commerce", Chicago, IL, 1 August 1996.
(See: [PAG].)
[ElGa] El Gamal, T., "A Public-Key Cryptosystem and a Signature [ElGa] El Gamal, T., "A Public-Key Cryptosystem and a Signature
Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms", in "IEEE Transactions Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms", in "IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory", vol. IT-31, no. 4, 1985, pp. 469- on Information Theory", vol. IT-31, no. 4, 1985, pp. 469-
472. 472.
[EMV1] Europay International S.A., MasterCard International [EMV1] Europay International S.A., MasterCard International
Incorporated, and Visa International Service Association, Incorporated, and Visa International Service Association,
"EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment "EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment
Systems", version 3.1.1, 31 May 1998. Systems", version 3.1.1, 31 May 1998.
skipping to change at page 302, line 11 skipping to change at page 306, line 18
[FP197] ---, "Advanced Encryption Standard", FIPS PUB 197, 26 [FP197] ---, "Advanced Encryption Standard", FIPS PUB 197, 26
November 2001. November 2001.
[FP199] ---, "Standards for Security Categorization of Federal [FP199] ---, "Standards for Security Categorization of Federal
Information and Information Systems ", FIPS PUB 199, Information and Information Systems ", FIPS PUB 199,
December 2003. December 2003.
[FPKI] ---, "Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Technical [FPKI] ---, "Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Technical
Specifications: Part A -- Technical Concept of Operations", Specifications: Part A -- Technical Concept of Operations",
National Institute of Standards, 4 September 1998. NIST, 4 September 1998.
[Gass] Gasser, M., "Building a Secure Computer System", Van [Gass] Gasser, M., "Building a Secure Computer System", Van
Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York, 1988, ISBN 0-442-23022- Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York, 1988, ISBN 0-442-23022-
2. 2.
[Gray] Gray, J. and A. Reuter, "Transaction Processing: Concepts [Gray] Gray, J. and A. Reuter, "Transaction Processing: Concepts
and Techniques", Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., 1993. and Techniques", Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., 1993.
[Hafn] Hafner, K. and M. Lyon, "Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The [Hafn] Hafner, K. and M. Lyon, "Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The
Origins of the Internet", Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996. Origins of the Internet", Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996.
skipping to change at page 302, line 36 skipping to change at page 306, line 43
[I3166] International Standards Organization, "Codes for the [I3166] International Standards Organization, "Codes for the
Representation of Names of Countries and Their Subdivisions, Representation of Names of Countries and Their Subdivisions,
Part 1: Country Codes", ISO 3166-1:1997. Part 1: Country Codes", ISO 3166-1:1997.
---, ---, "Part 2: Country Subdivision Codes", ISO/DIS 3166- ---, ---, "Part 2: Country Subdivision Codes", ISO/DIS 3166-
2. 2.
---, ---, "Part 3: Codes for Formerly Used Names of ---, ---, "Part 3: Codes for Formerly Used Names of
Countries", ISO/DIS 3166-3. Countries", ISO/DIS 3166-3.
[I7498] ---, "Information Processing Systems -- Open Systems [I7498-1] ---, "Information Processing Systems -- Open Systems
Interconnection Reference Model, [Part 1:] Basic Reference Interconnection Reference Model, [Part 1:] Basic Reference
Model", ISO/IEC 7498-1. (Equivalent to ITU-T Recommendation Model", ISO/IEC 7498-1. (Equivalent to ITU-T Recommendation
X.200.) X.200.)
---, ---, "Part 2: Security Architecture", ISO/IEC 7499-2. [I7498-2] ---, ---, "Part 2: Security Architecture", ISO/IEC 7499-2.
---, ---, "Part 4: Management Framework", ISO/IEC 7498-4. [I7498-4] ---, ---, "Part 4: Management Framework", ISO/IEC 7498-4.
[I7812] ---, "Identification cards -- Identification of Issuers, [I7812] ---, "Identification cards -- Identification of Issuers,
Part 1: Numbering System", ISO/IEC 7812-1:1993 Part 1: Numbering System", ISO/IEC 7812-1:1993
---, ---, "Part 2: Application and Registration Procedures", ---, ---, "Part 2: Application and Registration Procedures",
ISO/IEC 7812-2:1993. ISO/IEC 7812-2:1993.
[I8073] ---, "Information Processing Systems -- Open Systems [I8073] ---, "Information Processing Systems -- Open Systems
Interconnection, Transport Protocol Specification", ISO IS Interconnection, Transport Protocol Specification", ISO IS
8073. 8073.
skipping to change at page 305, line 30 skipping to change at page 309, line 35
[NRC91] National Research Council, "Computers At Risk: Safe [NRC91] National Research Council, "Computers At Risk: Safe
Computing in the Information Age", National Academy Press, Computing in the Information Age", National Academy Press,
1991. 1991.
[NRC98] Schneider, F., ed., "Trust in Cyberspace", National Research [NRC98] Schneider, F., ed., "Trust in Cyberspace", National Research
Council, National Academy of Sciences, 1998. Council, National Academy of Sciences, 1998.
[Padl] Padlipsky, M., "The Elements of Networking Style", 1985, [Padl] Padlipsky, M., "The Elements of Networking Style", 1985,
ISBN 0-13-268111-0. ISBN 0-13-268111-0.
[PAG] American Bar Association, "PKI Assessment Guidelines",
version 1.0, 10 May 2002. (See: [DSG].)
[Park] Parker, D., "Computer Security Management", ISBN 0-8359- [Park] Parker, D., "Computer Security Management", ISBN 0-8359-
0905-0, 1981 0905-0, 1981
[Perr] Perrine, T. et al, "An Overview of the Kernelized Secure [Perr] Perrine, T. et al, "An Overview of the Kernelized Secure
Operating System (KSOS)", in "Proceedings of the 7th DoD/NBS Operating System (KSOS)", in "Proceedings of the 7th DoD/NBS
Computer Security Conference", 24-26 September 1984. Computer Security Conference", 24-26 September 1984.
[PGP] Garfinkel, S.. "PGP: Pretty Good Privacy", O'Reilly & [PGP] Garfinkel, S.. "PGP: Pretty Good Privacy", O'Reilly &
Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, CA, 1995. Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, CA, 1995.
[PKCS] Kaliski Jr., B., "An Overview of the PKCS Standards", RSA [PKCS] Kaliski Jr., B., "An Overview of the PKCS Standards", RSA
Data Security, Inc., 3 June 1991. Data Security, Inc., 3 June 1991.
[PKC05] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption [PKC05] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption
Standard ", version 1.5, RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 1 Standard ", version 1.5, 1 November 1993. (See: [R2898].)
November 1993. (See: [R2898].)
[PKC07] ---, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard", [PKC07] ---, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard",
version 1.5, RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 1 November version 1.5, 1 November 1993.
1993.
[PKC10] ---, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard", [PKC10] ---, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard",
version 1.0, RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 1 November version 1.0, 1 November 1993.
1993.
[PKC11] ---, "PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard", [PKC11] ---, "PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard",
version 1.0, 28 April 1995. version 1.0, 28 April 1995.
[PKC12] ---, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax",
version 1.0, 24 June 1995.
[R1108] Kent, S., "U.S. Department of Defense Security Options for [R1108] Kent, S., "U.S. Department of Defense Security Options for
the Internet Protocol", RFC 1108, November 1991. the Internet Protocol", RFC 1108, November 1991.
[R1135] Reynolds, J., "The Helminthiasis of the Internet", RFC 1135, [R1135] Reynolds, J., "The Helminthiasis of the Internet", RFC 1135,
December 1989 December 1989
[R1208] Jacobsen, O. and D. Lynch, "A Glossary of Networking Terms", [R1208] Jacobsen, O. and D. Lynch, "A Glossary of Networking Terms",
RFC 1208, March 1991. RFC 1208, March 1991.
[R1281] Pethia, R., Crocker, S., and B. Fraser, "Guidelines for [R1281] Pethia, R., Crocker, S., and B. Fraser, "Guidelines for
skipping to change at page 307, line 6 skipping to change at page 311, line 9
[R1457] Housley, R., "Security Label Framework for the Internet", [R1457] Housley, R., "Security Label Framework for the Internet",
RFC 1457, May 1993. RFC 1457, May 1993.
[R1492] Finseth, C., "An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes Called [R1492] Finseth, C., "An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes Called
TACACS", RFC 1492, July 1993. TACACS", RFC 1492, July 1993.
[R1507] Kaufman, C., "DASS: Distributed Authentication Security [R1507] Kaufman, C., "DASS: Distributed Authentication Security
Service", RFC 1507, September 1993. Service", RFC 1507, September 1993.
[R1510] Kohl, J. and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication [R1510] Kohl, J. and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication
Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993 Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. (Superseded by RFC
4120.)
[R1731] Myers, J., "IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms", RFC 1731, [R1731] Myers, J., "IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms", RFC 1731,
December 1994. December 1994.
[R1734] ---, "POP3 AUTHentication Command", RFC 1734, Dec, 1994. [R1734] ---, "POP3 AUTHentication Command", RFC 1734, Dec, 1994.
[R1750] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, "Randomness [R1750] Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994. Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.
(Superseded by RFC 4086.)
[R1760] Haller, N., "The S/KEY One-Time Password System", RFC 1760, [R1760] Haller, N., "The S/KEY One-Time Password System", RFC 1760,
February 1995. February 1995.
[R1824] Danisch, H., "The Exponential Security System TESS: An [R1824] Danisch, H., "The Exponential Security System TESS: An
Identity-Based Cryptographic Protocol for Authenticated Key- Identity-Based Cryptographic Protocol for Authenticated Key-
Exchange (E.I.S.S.-Report 1995/4)", RFC 1824, August 1995. Exchange (E.I.S.S.-Report 1995/4)", RFC 1824, August 1995.
[R1828] Metzger, P. and W. Simpson, "IP Authentication using Keyed [R1828] Metzger, P. and W. Simpson, "IP Authentication using Keyed
MD5", RFC 1828, August 1995. MD5", RFC 1828, August 1995.
skipping to change at page 307, line 39 skipping to change at page 311, line 44
[R1848] Crocker, S., Freed, N., Galvin, J., and S. Murphy, "MIME [R1848] Crocker, S., Freed, N., Galvin, J., and S. Murphy, "MIME
Object Security Services", RFC 1848, October 1995. Object Security Services", RFC 1848, October 1995.
[R1851] Karn, P., Metzger, P., and W. Simpson, "The ESP Triple DES [R1851] Karn, P., Metzger, P., and W. Simpson, "The ESP Triple DES
Transform", RFC 1851, September 1995. Transform", RFC 1851, September 1995.
[R1928] Leech, M., Ganis, M., Lee, Y., Kuris, R., Koblas, D., and L. [R1928] Leech, M., Ganis, M., Lee, Y., Kuris, R., Koblas, D., and L.
Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC 1928, March 1996. Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC 1928, March 1996.
[R1938] Haller, N. and C. Metz, "A One-Time Password System", RFC [R1938] Haller, N. and C. Metz, "A One-Time Password System", RFC
1938, May 1996. 1938, May 1996. (Superseded by RFC 2289.)
[R1958] Carpenter, B., ed., "Architectural Principles of the [R1958] Carpenter, B., "Architectural Principles of the Internet",
Internet", RFC 1958, June 1996. RFC 1958, June 1996.
[R1983] Malkin, G., ed., "Internet Users' Glossary", FYI 18, RFC [R1983] Malkin, G., "Internet Users' Glossary", FYI 18, RFC 1983,
1983, August 1996. August 1996.
[R1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication [R1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication
Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996. Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[R2078] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program [R2078] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface, Version 2", RFC 2078, January 1997. Interface, Version 2", RFC 2078, January 1997. (Superseded
by RFC 2743.)
[R2084] Bossert, G., Cooper, S., and W. Drummond, "Considerations [R2084] Bossert, G., Cooper, S., and W. Drummond, "Considerations
for Web Transaction Security", RFC 2084, January 1997. for Web Transaction Security", RFC 2084, January 1997.
[R2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [R2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
1997. 1997.
[R2144] Adams, C., "The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm", RFC 2144, [R2144] Adams, C., "The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm", RFC 2144,
May 1997. May 1997.
skipping to change at page 308, line 40 skipping to change at page 312, line 45
[R2315] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax, Version [R2315] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax, Version
1.5", RFC 2315, March 1998. 1.5", RFC 2315, March 1998.
[R2323] Ramos, A., "IETF Identification and Security Guidelines", [R2323] Ramos, A., "IETF Identification and Security Guidelines",
RFC 2323, 1 April 1998. (Intended for humorous entertainment RFC 2323, 1 April 1998. (Intended for humorous entertainment
-- "please laugh loud and hard" -- and does not contain -- "please laugh loud and hard" -- and does not contain
serious security information.) serious security information.)
[R2350] Brownlee, N. and E. Guttman, "Expectations for Computer [R2350] Brownlee, N. and E. Guttman, "Expectations for Computer
Security Incident Response", RFC 2350, June 1998. Security Incident Response", BCP 21, RFC 2350, June 1998.
[R2356] Montenegro, G. and V. Gupta, "Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal [R2356] Montenegro, G. and V. Gupta, "Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal
for Mobile IP", RFC 2356, June 1998. for Mobile IP", RFC 2356, June 1998.
[R2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the [R2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[R2402] ---, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402, November 1998. [R2402] ---, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402, November 1998.
[R2403] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP [R2403] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP
skipping to change at page 309, line 37 skipping to change at page 313, line 41
[R2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher [R2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998. Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998.
[R2504] Guttman, E., Leong, L., and G. Malkin, "Users' Security [R2504] Guttman, E., Leong, L., and G. Malkin, "Users' Security
Handbook", RFC 2504, February 1999. Handbook", RFC 2504, February 1999.
[R2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key [R2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", RFC 2510, Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", RFC 2510,
March 1999. March 1999.
[R2535] Eastlake 3rd, D., Domain Name System Security Extensions,
RFC 2535, March 1999.
[R2536] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.
[R2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. [R2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol", RFC 2560, June 1999. Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
[R2612] Adams, C. and J. Gilchrist, "The CAST-256 Encryption [R2612] Adams, C. and J. Gilchrist, "The CAST-256 Encryption
Algorithm", RFC 2612, June 1999. Algorithm", RFC 2612, June 1999.
[R2628] Smyslov, V., "Simple Cryptographic Program Interface", RFC [R2628] Smyslov, V., "Simple Cryptographic Program Interface (Crypto
2628, June 1999. API)", RFC 2628, June 1999.
[R2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", RFC [R2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", RFC
2631, June 1999. 2631, June 1999.
[R2634] Hoffman, P., ed., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME", [R2634] Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME", RFC
RFC 2634, June 1999. 2634, June 1999.
[R2635] Hambridge, S. and A. Lunde, "Don't Spew: A Set of Guidelines [R2635] Hambridge, S. and A. Lunde, "DON'T SPEW: A Set of Guidelines
for Mass Unsolicited Mailings and Postings", RFC 2635, June for Mass Unsolicited Mailings and Postings", RFC 2635, June
1999. 1999.
[R2660] Rescorla, E. and A. Schiffman, "The Secure HyperText [R2660] Rescorla, E. and A. Schiffman, "The Secure HyperText
Transfer Protocol", RFC 2660, August 1999. Transfer Protocol", RFC 2660, August 1999.
[R2773] Housley, R., Yee, P., and W. Nace, "Encryption using KEA and [R2773] Housley, R., Yee, P., and W. Nace, "Encryption using KEA and
SKIPJACK", RFC 2773, February 2000. SKIPJACK", RFC 2773, February 2000.
[R2801] Burdett, D., "Internet Open Trading Protocol - IOTP, Version [R2801] Burdett, D., "Internet Open Trading Protocol - IOTP, Version
skipping to change at page 310, line 33 skipping to change at page 314, line 30
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000. Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[R2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote [R2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
June 2000. June 2000.
[R2898] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography [R2898] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
Specification, Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000. (See: Specification, Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000. (See:
[PKC05].) [PKC05].)
[R3007] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.
[R3060] Moore, B., Ellesson, E., Strassner, J., and A. Westerinen, [R3060] Moore, B., Ellesson, E., Strassner, J., and A. Westerinen,
"Policy Core Information Model -- Version 1 Specification", "Policy Core Information Model -- Version 1 Specification",
RFC 3060, February 2001. RFC 3060, February 2001.
[R3198] Westerinen, A., Schnizlein, J., Strassner, J., Scherling, [R3198] Westerinen, A., Schnizlein, J., Strassner, J., Scherling,
M., Quinn, B., Herzog, S., Huynh, A., Carlson, M., Perry, M., Quinn, B., Herzog, S., Huynh, A., Carlson, M., Perry,
J., and S. Waldbusser, "Terminology for Policy-Based J., and S. Waldbusser, "Terminology for Policy-Based
Management", RFC 3198, November 2001. Management", RFC 3198, November 2001.
[R3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet [R3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
skipping to change at page 311, line 8 skipping to change at page 314, line 54
"Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet- "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002. Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002.
[R3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model [R3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002. Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002.
[R3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "Group [R3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "Group
Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003. Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.
[R3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text
on Security Considerations", RFC 3552, July 2003.
[R3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S. Wu, [R3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S. Wu,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy
and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647, November and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647, November
2003. 2003.
[R3739] Santesson, S., Nystrom, M., and T. Polk, "Internet X.509 [R3739] Santesson, S., Nystrom, M., and T. Polk, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile", Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile",
RFC 3739, March 2004. RFC 3739, March 2004.
[R3740] Hardjono, T. and B. Weis, "The Multicast Group Security [R3740] Hardjono, T. and B. Weis, "The Multicast Group Security
skipping to change at page 311, line 32 skipping to change at page 315, line 29
3748, June 2004. 3748, June 2004.
[R3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For Public [R3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For Public
Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86, RFC 3766, Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86, RFC 3766,
April 2004. April 2004.
[R3820] Tuecke, S., Welch, V., Engert, D., Pearlman, L., and M. [R3820] Tuecke, S., Welch, V., Engert, D., Pearlman, L., and M.
Thompson, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Thompson, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Proxy Certificate Profile", RFC 3820, June 2004. Proxy Certificate Profile", RFC 3820, June 2004.
[R3851] Ramsdell, B., ed., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail [R3851] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851, July
3851, July 2004. 2004.
[R3871] Jones, G., ed., "Operational Security Requirements for Large [R3871] Jones, G., "Operational Security Requirements for Large
Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network Infrastructure", Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network Infrastructure",
RFC 3871, September 2004. RFC 3871, September 2004.
[R4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
4033, March 2005.
[R4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[R4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[R4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005.
[Raym] Raymond, E., ed., "The On-Line Hacker Jargon File", version [Raym] Raymond, E., ed., "The On-Line Hacker Jargon File", version
4.0.0, 24 July 1996. (See: http://www.tuxedo.org/jargon/ for 4.0.0, 24 July 1996. (See: http://www.tuxedo.org/jargon/ for
the latest version. Also, "The New Hacker's Dictionary", 2nd the latest version. Also, "The New Hacker's Dictionary", 2nd
edition, MIT Press, September 1993, ISBN 0-262-18154-1.) edition, MIT Press, September 1993, ISBN 0-262-18154-1.)
[Roge] Rogers, H., "An Overview of the Caneware Program", in [Roge] Rogers, H., "An Overview of the Caneware Program", in
"Proceedings of the 10th National Computer Security "Proceedings of the 10th National Computer Security
Conference", NIST and NCSC, September 1987. Conference", NIST and NCSC, September 1987.
[RSCG] NSA, "Router Security Configuration Guide: Principles and [RSCG] NSA, "Router Security Configuration Guide: Principles and
skipping to change at page 315, line 5 skipping to change at page 320, line 5
Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) -- Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) -- Specification of
Basic Notation", 15 November 1994. (Equivalent to ISO/IEC Basic Notation", 15 November 1994. (Equivalent to ISO/IEC
8824-1.) 8824-1.)
[X690] ---, Recommendation X.690, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 [X690] ---, Recommendation X.690, "Information Technology -- ASN.1
Encoding Rules -- Specification of Basic Encoding Rules Encoding Rules -- Specification of Basic Encoding Rules
(BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)", 15 November 1994. (Equivalent to Encoding Rules (DER)", 15 November 1994. (Equivalent to
ISO/IEC 8825-1.) ISO/IEC 8825-1.)
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations and IANA Considerations
This document mainly defines security terms and recommends how to use This document mainly defines security terms and recommends how to use
them. It also provides limited tutorial information about security them. It also provides limited tutorial information about security
aspects of Internet protocols, but it does not describe in detail the aspects of Internet protocols, but it does not describe in detail the
vulnerabilities of, or threats to, specific protocols and does not vulnerabilities of, or threats to, specific protocols and does not
definitively describe mechanisms that protect specific protocols. definitively describe mechanisms that protect specific protocols.
This document has no actions for IANA.
7. Acknowledgments 7. Acknowledgments
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society. Internet Society.
George Huff had a good idea! [Huff] George Huff had a good idea! [Huff]
8. Author's Address 8. Author's Address
Please address all comments to: Please address all comments to:
Robert W. Shirey BBN Technologies Robert W. Shirey BBN Technologies
E-mail: rshirey@bbn.com Suite 400, Mail Stop 30/6B1 Email addresses: Suite 400, Mail Stop 30/6C1
1300 Seventeenth Street North Current - rshirey@bbn.com 1300 Seventeenth Street North
Arlington, VA 22209-3801 USA Long-term - rwshirey@uwalumni.com Arlington, VA 22209-3801 USA
9. Full Copyright Statement 9. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE IS SPONSORED "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE IS SPONSORED
BY, THE INTERNET SOCIETY, AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE BY, THE INTERNET SOCIETY, AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE
DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL
NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Expiration Date: 9 September 2005. Expiration Date: 10 May 2006.
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