< draft-shirey-secgloss-v2-06.txt   draft-shirey-secgloss-v2-07.txt >
INTERNET-DRAFT R. W. Shirey INTERNET-DRAFT R. W. Shirey
Obsoletes: RFC 2828, FYI 36 BBN Technologies Corp. Obsoletes: RFC 2828, FYI 36 BBN Technologies Corp.
Expiration Date: 29 February 2007 29 August 2006 Expiration Date: 8 March 2007 8 September 2006
Internet Security Glossary, Version 2 Internet Security Glossary, Version 2
<draft-shirey-secgloss-v2-06.txt> <draft-shirey-secgloss-v2-07.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may
not be created, except to publish it as an RFC and to translate it not be created, except to publish it as an RFC and to translate it
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entries offer recommendations to improve the clarity of Internet entries offer recommendations to improve the clarity of Internet
Standards documents (ISDs) and to make them more easily understood by Standards documents (ISDs) and to make them more easily understood by
international readers. The recommendations follow the principles that international readers. The recommendations follow the principles that
ISDs should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same ISDs should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same
concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary
sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open
publications; and (d) avoid terms that either favor a particular publications; and (d) avoid terms that either favor a particular
vendor or favor a particular technology or mechanism over other, vendor or favor a particular technology or mechanism over other,
competing techniques that already exist or could be developed. competing techniques that already exist or could be developed.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
Section Page Section Page
------- ---- ------- ----
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Format of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Format of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Order of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 Order of Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Capitalization and Abbreviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Capitalization and Abbreviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Support for Automated Searching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3 Support for Automated Searching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 Definition Type and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4 Definition Type and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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3.3 Type "O": Other Terms and Definitions to be Noted . . . . 7 3.3 Type "O": Other Terms and Definitions to be Noted . . . . 7
3.4 Type "D": Deprecated Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . 8 3.4 Type "D": Deprecated Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . 8
3.5 Definition Substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.5 Definition Substitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 5. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
6. Security Considerations and IANA Considerations . . . . . . . 333 6. Security Considerations and IANA Considerations . . . . . . . 333
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
8. Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 8. Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
9. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 9. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This Glossary is *not* an Internet Standard, and its recommendations This Glossary is *not* an Internet Standard, and its recommendations
represent only the opinions of its author. However, this Glossary represent only the opinions of its author. However, this Glossary
provides reasons for its recommendations -- especially for the SHOULD gives reasons for its recommendations -- especially for the SHOULD
NOTs -- so that readers can judge for themselves what to do. NOTs -- so that readers can judge for themselves what to do.
This Glossary provides an internally consistent and self-contained This Glossary provides an internally consistent and self-contained
set of terms, abbreviations, and definitions -- supported by set of terms, abbreviations, and definitions -- supported by
explanations, recommendations, and references -- for terminology that explanations, recommendations, and references -- for terminology that
concerns information system security. The intent of this Glossary is concerns information system security. The intent of this Glossary is
to improve the comprehensibility of Internet Standards documents to improve the comprehensibility of Internet Standards documents
(ISDs) -- i.e., RFCs, Internet-Drafts, and other material produced as (ISDs) -- i.e., RFCs, Internet-Drafts, and other material produced as
part of the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026) -- and other part of the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026) -- and other
Internet-related discourse. A few non-security, networking terms are Internet-related discourse. A few non-security, networking terms are
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Just as STD protocols require demonstrated experience and Just as STD protocols require demonstrated experience and
stability before adoption, ISDs need to use well-established stability before adoption, ISDs need to use well-established
language; and the robustness principle for protocols -- "be language; and the robustness principle for protocols -- "be
liberal in what you accept, and conservative in what you send" -- liberal in what you accept, and conservative in what you send" --
is also applicable to the language used in ISDs that describe is also applicable to the language used in ISDs that describe
protocols. Using terms in their plainest, dictionary sense (when protocols. Using terms in their plainest, dictionary sense (when
appropriate) helps to ensure international understanding. ISDs appropriate) helps to ensure international understanding. ISDs
need to avoid using private, newly invented terms in place of need to avoid using private, newly invented terms in place of
generally accepted terms from open publications. ISDs need to generally accepted terms from open publications. ISDs need to
avoid substituting new definitions that conflict with established avoid substituting new definitions that conflict with established
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ones. ISDs need to avoid using "cute" synonyms (e.g., "Green ones. ISDs need to avoid using "cute" synonyms (e.g., "Green
Book"), because no matter how popular a nickname may be in one Book"), because no matter how popular a nickname may be in one
community, it is likely to cause confusion in another. community, it is likely to cause confusion in another.
o Openness, Fairness, and Timeliness o Openness, Fairness, and Timeliness
ISDs need to avoid using proprietary and trademarked terms for ISDs need to avoid using proprietary and trademarked terms for
purposes other than referring to those particular systems. ISDs purposes other than referring to those particular systems. ISDs
also need to avoid terms that either favor a particular vendor or also need to avoid terms that either favor a particular vendor or
favor a particular security technology or mechanism over other, favor a particular security technology or mechanism over other,
competing techniques that already exist or might be developed in competing techniques that already exist or might be developed in
the future. The set of terminology used across the set of ISDs the future. The set of terminology used across the set of ISDs
needs to be flexible and adaptable as the state of Internet needs to be flexible and adaptable as the state of Internet
security art evolves. security art evolves.
In support of those goals, this Glossary provides guidance by marking In support of those goals, this Glossary offers guidance by marking
terms and definitions as being either endorsed or deprecated for use terms and definitions as being either endorsed or deprecated for use
in ISDs. The key words "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", in ISDs. The key words "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" are intended to be interpreted the same way as in an and "OPTIONAL" are intended to be interpreted the same way as in an
Internet Standard (i.e., as specified in RFC 2119). Other glossaries Internet Standard (i.e., as specified in RFC 2119). Other glossaries
(e.g., [Raym]) list additional terms that deal with Internet security (e.g., [Raym]) list additional terms that deal with Internet security
but have not been included in this Glossary because they are not but have not been included in this Glossary because they are not
appropriate for ISDs. appropriate for ISDs.
2. Format of Entries 2. Format of Entries
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such as "1a" and "1b". such as "1a" and "1b".
2.2 Capitalization and Abbreviations 2.2 Capitalization and Abbreviations
Entries that are proper nouns are capitalized (e.g., "Data Entries that are proper nouns are capitalized (e.g., "Data
Encryption Algorithm"), as are other words derived from proper Encryption Algorithm"), as are other words derived from proper
nouns (e.g., "Caesar cipher"). All other entries are not nouns (e.g., "Caesar cipher"). All other entries are not
capitalized (e.g., "certification authority"). Each acronym or capitalized (e.g., "certification authority"). Each acronym or
other abbreviation that appears in this Glossary, either as an other abbreviation that appears in this Glossary, either as an
entry or in a definition or explanation, is defined in this entry or in a definition or explanation, is defined in this
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Glossary, except items of common English usage, such as "a.k.a.", Glossary, except items of common English usage, such as "a.k.a.",
"e.g.", "etc.", "i.e.", "vol.", "pp.", and "U.S.". "e.g.", "etc.", "i.e.", "vol.", "pp.", and "U.S.".
2.3 Support for Automated Searching 2.3 Support for Automated Searching
Each entry is preceded by a dollar sign ($) and a space. This Each entry is preceded by a dollar sign ($) and a space. This
makes it possible to find the defining entry for an item "X" by makes it possible to find the defining entry for an item "X" by
searching for the character string "$ X", without stopping at searching for the character string "$ X", without stopping at
entries in which "X" is used in explanations. other entries in which "X" is used in explanations.
2.4 Definition Type and Context 2.4 Definition Type and Context
Each entry is preceded by a character -- I, N, O, or D -- enclosed Each entry is preceded by a character -- I, N, O, or D -- enclosed
in parentheses, to indicate the type of definition (as is in parentheses, to indicate the type of definition (as is
explained further in Section 3): explained further in Section 3):
- "I" for a RECOMMENDED term or definition of Internet origin. - "I" for a RECOMMENDED term or definition of Internet origin.
- "N" if RECOMMENDED but not of Internet origin. - "N" if RECOMMENDED but not of Internet origin.
- "O" for a term or definition that is NOT recommended for use in - "O" for a term or definition that is NOT recommended for use in
ISDs but is something that authors of Internet documents should ISDs but is something that authors of Internet documents should
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If a definition is valid only in a specific context (e.g., If a definition is valid only in a specific context (e.g.,
"baggage"), that context is shown immediately following the "baggage"), that context is shown immediately following the
definition type and is enclosed by a pair of slash symbols (/). If definition type and is enclosed by a pair of slash symbols (/). If
the definition is valid only for specific parts of speech, that is the definition is valid only for specific parts of speech, that is
shown in the same way (e.g., "archive"). shown in the same way (e.g., "archive").
2.5 Explanatory Notes 2.5 Explanatory Notes
Some entries have explanatory text that is introduced by one or Some entries have explanatory text that is introduced by one or
more of the following keywords: more of the following keywords:
- Deprecated Abbreviation (e.g., "EE", "H field", "W3") - Deprecated Abbreviation (e.g., "AA")
- Deprecated Definition (e.g., "digital certification") - Deprecated Definition (e.g., "digital certification")
- Deprecated Usage (e.g., "authenticate") - Deprecated Usage (e.g., "authenticate")
- Deprecated Term (e.g., "certificate authority") - Deprecated Term (e.g., "certificate authority")
- Pronunciation (e.g., "*-property") - Pronunciation (e.g., "*-property")
- Derivation (e.g., "discretionary access control") - Derivation (e.g., "discretionary access control")
- Tutorial (e.g., "accreditation") - Tutorial (e.g., "accreditation")
- Example (e.g., "back door") - Example (e.g., "back door")
- Usage (e.g., "access") - Usage (e.g., "access")
Explanatory text in this Glossary MAY be reused in other ISDs. Explanatory text in this Glossary MAY be reused in other ISDs.
However, such text is not intended to authoritatively supersede However, such text is not intended to authoritatively supersede
text of an ISD in which the Glossary entry is already used. text of an ISD in which the Glossary entry is already used.
2.6 Cross-References 2.6 Cross-References
Some entries contain a parenthetical remark of the form "(See: Some entries contain a parenthetical remark of the form "(See:
X.)", where X is a list of other, related terms. Some entries X.)", where X is a list of other, related terms. Some entries
contain a remark of the form "(Compare: X)", where X is a list of contain a remark of the form "(Compare: X)", where X is a list of
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terms that either are antonyms of the entry or differ in some terms that either are antonyms of the entry or differ in some
other manner worth noting. other manner worth noting.
2.7 Trademarks 2.7 Trademarks
All servicemarks and trademarks that appear in this Glossary are All servicemarks and trademarks that appear in this Glossary are
used in an editorial fashion and to the benefit of the mark owner, used in an editorial fashion and to the benefit of the mark owner,
without any intention of infringement. without any intention of infringement.
2.8 The New Punctuation 2.8 The New Punctuation
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be deleted instead of one. be deleted instead of one.
Similarly, use of standard American punctuation might cause Similarly, use of standard American punctuation might cause
misunderstanding in entries in this Glossary. Thus, the new misunderstanding in entries in this Glossary. Thus, the new
punctuation is used here, and we recommend it for ISDs. punctuation is used here, and we recommend it for ISDs.
3. Types of Entries 3. Types of Entries
Each entry in this Glossary is marked as type I, N, O, or D: Each entry in this Glossary is marked as type I, N, O, or D:
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3.1 Type "I": Recommended Definitions of Internet Origin 3.1 Type "I": Recommended Definitions of Internet Origin
The marking "I" indicates two things: The marking "I" indicates two things:
- Origin: "I" (as opposed to "N") means either that the Internet - Origin: "I" (as opposed to "N") means either that the Internet
Standards Process or Internet community is authoritative for Standards Process or Internet community is authoritative for
the definition *or* that the term is sufficiently generic that the definition *or* that the term is sufficiently generic that
this Glossary can freely state a definition without this Glossary can freely state a definition without
contradicting a non-Internet authority (e.g., "attack"). contradicting a non-Internet authority (e.g., "attack").
- Recommendation: "I" (as opposed to "O") means that the term and - Recommendation: "I" (as opposed to "O") means that the term and
definition are RECOMMENDED for use in ISDs. However, some "I" definition are RECOMMENDED for use in ISDs. However, some "I"
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The marking "O" means that the definition is of non-Internet The marking "O" means that the definition is of non-Internet
origin and SHOULD NOT be used in ISDs *except* in cases where the origin and SHOULD NOT be used in ISDs *except* in cases where the
term is specifically identified as non-Internet. term is specifically identified as non-Internet.
For example, an ISD might mention "BCA" (see: brand certification For example, an ISD might mention "BCA" (see: brand certification
authority) or "baggage" as an example of some concept; in that authority) or "baggage" as an example of some concept; in that
case, the document should specifically say "SET(trademark) BCA" or case, the document should specifically say "SET(trademark) BCA" or
"SET(trademark) baggage" and include the definition of the term. "SET(trademark) baggage" and include the definition of the term.
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3.4 Type "D": Deprecated Terms and Definitions 3.4 Type "D": Deprecated Terms and Definitions
If this Glossary recommends that a term or definition SHOULD NOT If this Glossary recommends that a term or definition SHOULD NOT
be used in ISDs, then the entry is marked as type "D", and an be used in ISDs, then the entry is marked as type "D", and an
explanatory note -- "Deprecated Term", "Deprecated Abbreviation", explanatory note -- "Deprecated Term", "Deprecated Abbreviation",
"Deprecated Definition", or "Deprecated Usage" -- is provided. "Deprecated Definition", or "Deprecated Usage" -- is provided.
3.5 Definition Substitutions 3.5 Definition Substitutions
Some terms have a definition published by a non-Internet authority Some terms have a definition published by a non-Internet authority
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more situations and for more kinds of service. However, the "O" more situations and for more kinds of service. However, the "O"
definition is also listed so that ISD authors will be aware of the definition is also listed so that ISD authors will be aware of the
context in which the term is used more narrowly. context in which the term is used more narrowly.
When making substitutions, this Glossary attempts to avoid When making substitutions, this Glossary attempts to avoid
contradicting any non-Internet authority. Still, terminology contradicting any non-Internet authority. Still, terminology
differs between authorities such as the American Bar Association, differs between authorities such as the American Bar Association,
OSI, SET, the U.S. DoD, and other authorities; and this Glossary OSI, SET, the U.S. DoD, and other authorities; and this Glossary
probably is not exactly aligned with any of them. probably is not exactly aligned with any of them.
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4. Definitions 4. Definitions
$ *-property $ *-property
(N) Synonym for "confinement property" in the context of the Bell- (N) Synonym for "confinement property" in the context of the Bell-
LaPadula model. Pronunciation: star property. LaPadula model. Pronunciation: star property.
$ 3DES $ 3DES
(N) See: Triple Data Encryption Algorithm. (N) See: Triple Data Encryption Algorithm.
$ A1 computer system $ A1 computer system
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encoding rules for those transformations. (See: BER.) encoding rules for those transformations. (See: BER.)
In ASN.1, formal names are written without spaces, and separate In ASN.1, formal names are written without spaces, and separate
words in a name are indicated by capitalizing the first letter of words in a name are indicated by capitalizing the first letter of
each word except the first word. For example, the name of a CRL is each word except the first word. For example, the name of a CRL is
"certificateRevocationList". "certificateRevocationList".
$ ACC $ ACC
(I) See: access control center. (I) See: access control center.
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$ acceptable risk $ acceptable risk
(I) A risk that is understood and tolerated by a system's user, (I) A risk that is understood and tolerated by a system's user,
operator, owner, or accreditor, usually because the cost or operator, owner, or accreditor, usually because the cost or
difficulty of implementing an effective countermeasure for the difficulty of implementing an effective countermeasure for the
associated vulnerability exceeds the expectation of loss. (See: associated vulnerability exceeds the expectation of loss. (See:
adequate security, risk, "second law" under "Courtney's laws".) adequate security, risk, "second law" under "Courtney's laws".)
$ access $ access
1a. (I) The ability and means to communicate with or otherwise 1a. (I) The ability and means to communicate with or otherwise
interact with a system to use system resources either to handle interact with a system to use system resources either to handle
information or to gain knowledge of the information the system information or to gain knowledge of the information the system
contains. (Compare: handle.) contains. (Compare: handle.)
Usage: The definition is intended to include all types of Usage: The definition is intended to include all types of
communication with a system, including one-way communication in communication with a system, including one-way communication in
either direction. In actual practice, however, passive users might either direction. In actual practice, however, passive users might
be treated as not having "access" and, therefore, be exempt from be treated as not having "access" and, therefore, be exempt from
most requirements of the system's security policy. (See: "passive most requirements of the system's security policy. (See: "passive
user" under "user".) user" under "user".)
1a. (O) "Opportunity to make use of an information system (IS) 1b. (O) "Opportunity to make use of an information system (IS)
resource." [C4009] resource." [C4009]
2. (O) /formal model/ "A specific type of interaction between a 2. (O) /formal model/ "A specific type of interaction between a
subject and an object that results in the flow of information from subject and an object that results in the flow of information from
one to the other." [NCS04] one to the other." [NCS04]
$ Access Certificate for Electronic Services (ACES) $ Access Certificate for Electronic Services (ACES)
(O) A PKI operated by the U.S. Government's General Services (O) A PKI operated by the U.S. Government's General Services
Administration in cooperation with industry partners. (See: CAM.) Administration in cooperation with industry partners. (See: CAM.)
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and objects in an information system. and objects in an information system.
4. (O) "The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, 4. (O) "The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource,
including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized
manner." [I7498-2] manner." [I7498-2]
5. (O) /U.S. Government/ A system using physical, electronic, or 5. (O) /U.S. Government/ A system using physical, electronic, or
human controls to identify or admit personnel with properly human controls to identify or admit personnel with properly
authorized access to a SCIF. authorized access to a SCIF.
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$ access control center (ACC) $ access control center (ACC)
(I) A computer that maintains a database (possibly in the form of (I) A computer that maintains a database (possibly in the form of
an access control matrix) defining the security policy for an an access control matrix) defining the security policy for an
access control service, and that acts as a server for clients access control service, and that acts as a server for clients
requesting access control decisions. requesting access control decisions.
Tutorial: An ACC is sometimes used in conjunction with a key Tutorial: An ACC is sometimes used in conjunction with a key
center to implement access control in a key-distribution system center to implement access control in a key-distribution system
for symmetric cryptography. (See: BLACKER, Kerberos.) for symmetric cryptography. (See: BLACKER, Kerberos.)
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security level. [C4009] (See: security level.) security level. [C4009] (See: security level.)
2. (D) Synonym for "clearance level". 2. (D) Synonym for "clearance level".
Deprecated Definitions: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with these Deprecated Definitions: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with these
definitions because they duplicate the meaning of more specific definitions because they duplicate the meaning of more specific
terms. Any ISD that uses this term SHOULD provide a specific terms. Any ISD that uses this term SHOULD provide a specific
definition for it because access control may be based on many definition for it because access control may be based on many
attributes other than classification level and clearance level. attributes other than classification level and clearance level.
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$ access list $ access list
(I) /physical security/ Roster of persons who are authorized to (I) /physical security/ Roster of persons who are authorized to
enter a controlled area. (Compare: access control list.) enter a controlled area. (Compare: access control list.)
$ access mode $ access mode
(I) A distinct type of data processing operation (e.g., read, (I) A distinct type of data processing operation (e.g., read,
write, append, or execute, or a combination of operations) that a write, append, or execute, or a combination of operations) that a
subject can potentially perform on an object in an information subject can potentially perform on an object in an information
system. [Huff] (See: read, write.) system. [Huff] (See: read, write.)
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$ accounting legend code (ALC) $ accounting legend code (ALC)
(O) /U.S. Government/ Numeric system used to indicate the minimum (O) /U.S. Government/ Numeric system used to indicate the minimum
accounting controls required for items of COMSEC material within accounting controls required for items of COMSEC material within
the CMCS. [C4009] (See: COMSEC accounting.) the CMCS. [C4009] (See: COMSEC accounting.)
$ accreditation $ accreditation
(N) An administrative action by which a designated authority (N) An administrative action by which a designated authority
declares that an information system is approved to operate in a declares that an information system is approved to operate in a
particular security configuration with a prescribed set of particular security configuration with a prescribed set of
safeguards. [FP102, SP37] (See: certification.) safeguards. [FP102, SP37] (See: certification.)
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Tutorial: An accreditation is usually based on a technical Tutorial: An accreditation is usually based on a technical
certification of the system's security mechanisms. To accredit a certification of the system's security mechanisms. To accredit a
system, the approving authority must determine that any residual system, the approving authority must determine that any residual
risk is an acceptable risk. Although the terms "certification" and risk is an acceptable risk. Although the terms "certification" and
"accreditation" are used more in the U.S. DoD and other government "accreditation" are used more in the U.S. DoD and other government
agencies than in commercial organizations, the concepts apply any agencies than in commercial organizations, the concepts apply any
place where managers are required to deal with and accept place where managers are required to deal with and accept
responsibility for security risks. For example, the American Bar responsibility for security risks. For example, the American Bar
Association is developing accreditation criteria for CAs. Association is developing accreditation criteria for CAs.
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$ active content $ active content
1a. (I) Executable software that is bound to a document or other 1a. (I) Executable software that is bound to a document or other
data file and that executes automatically when a user accesses the data file and that executes automatically when a user accesses the
file, without explicit initiation by the user. (Compare: mobile file, without explicit initiation by the user. (Compare: mobile
code.) code.)
Tutorial: Active content can be mobile code when its associated Tutorial: Active content can be mobile code when its associated
file is transferred across a network. file is transferred across a network.
1b. (O) "Electronic documents that can carry out or trigger 1b. (O) "Electronic documents that can carry out or trigger
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actions automatically on a computer platform without the actions automatically on a computer platform without the
intervention of a user. [This technology enables] mobile code intervention of a user. [This technology enables] mobile code
associated with a document to execute as the document is associated with a document to execute as the document is
rendered." [SP28] rendered." [SP28]
$ active user $ active user
(I) See: secondary definition under "attack". (I) See: secondary definition under "attack".
$ active wiretapping $ active wiretapping
(I) A wiretapping attack that attempts to alter data being (I) A wiretapping attack that attempts to alter data being
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$ adequate security $ adequate security
(O) /U.S. DoD/ "Security commensurate with the risk and magnitude (O) /U.S. DoD/ "Security commensurate with the risk and magnitude
of harm resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to of harm resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to
or modification of information." (See: acceptable risk, residual or modification of information." (See: acceptable risk, residual
risk.) risk.)
$ administrative security $ administrative security
1. (I) Management procedures and constraints to prevent 1. (I) Management procedures and constraints to prevent
unauthorized access to a system. (See: "third law" under unauthorized access to a system. (See: "third law" under
"Courtney's laws", operational security, procedural security, "Courtney's laws", manager, operational security, procedural
security architecture. Compare: technical security.) security, security architecture. Compare: technical security.)
Examples: Clear delineation and separation of duties; Examples: Clear delineation and separation of duties;
configuration control. configuration control.
Usage: Administrative security is usually understood to consist of Usage: Administrative security is usually understood to consist of
methods and mechanisms that are implemented and executed primarily methods and mechanisms that are implemented and executed primarily
by people, rather than by automated systems. by people, rather than by automated systems.
2. (O) "The management constraints, operational procedures, 2. (O) "The management constraints, operational procedures,
accountability procedures, and supplemental controls established accountability procedures, and supplemental controls established
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$ administrator $ administrator
1. (O) /Common Criteria/ A person that is responsible for 1. (O) /Common Criteria/ A person that is responsible for
configuring, maintaining, and administering the TOE in a correct configuring, maintaining, and administering the TOE in a correct
manner for maximum security. (See: administrative security.) manner for maximum security. (See: administrative security.)
2. (O) /ITSEC/ A person in contact with the TOE, who is 2. (O) /ITSEC/ A person in contact with the TOE, who is
responsible for maintaining its operational capability. responsible for maintaining its operational capability.
$ Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) $ Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
(N) A U.S. Government standard [FP197] (the successor to DES) that (N) A U.S. Government standard [FP197] (the successor to DES) that
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(a) specifies "the AES algorithm", which is a symmetric block (a) specifies "the AES algorithm", which is a symmetric block
cipher that is based on Rijndael and uses key sizes of 128, 192, cipher that is based on Rijndael and uses key sizes of 128, 192,
or 256 bits to operate on a 128-bit block, and (b) states policy or 256 bits to operate on a 128-bit block, and (b) states policy
for using that algorithm to protect unclassified, sensitive data. for using that algorithm to protect unclassified, sensitive data.
Tutorial: Rijndael was designed to handle additional block sizes Tutorial: Rijndael was designed to handle additional block sizes
and key lengths that were not adopted in the AES. Rijndael was and key lengths that were not adopted in the AES. Rijndael was
selected by NIST through a public competition that was held to selected by NIST through a public competition that was held to
find a successor to the DEA; the other finalists were MARS, RC6, find a successor to the DEA; the other finalists were MARS, RC6,
Serpent, and Twofish. Serpent, and Twofish.
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(I) See: Authentication Header (I) See: Authentication Header
$ air gap $ air gap
(I) An interface between two systems at which (a) they are not (I) An interface between two systems at which (a) they are not
connected physically and (b) any logical connection is not connected physically and (b) any logical connection is not
automated (i.e., data is transferred through the interface only automated (i.e., data is transferred through the interface only
manually, under human control). (See: sneaker net. Compare: manually, under human control). (See: sneaker net. Compare:
gateway.) gateway.)
Example: Computer A and computer B are on opposite sides of a Example: Computer A and computer B are on opposite sides of a
room. To move data from A to B, a person carries a floppy disk room. To move data from A to B, a person carries a disk across the
across the room. If A and B operate in different security domains, room. If A and B operate in different security domains, then
than moving data across the air gap may involve an upgrade or moving data across the air gap may involve an upgrade or downgrade
downgrade operation. operation.
$ ALC $ ALC
(O) See: accounting legend code. (O) See: accounting legend code.
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$ algorithm $ algorithm
(I) A finite set of step-by-step instructions for a problem- (I) A finite set of step-by-step instructions for a problem-
solving or computation procedure, especially one that can be solving or computation procedure, especially one that can be
implemented by a computer. (See: cryptographic algorithm.) implemented by a computer. (See: cryptographic algorithm.)
$ alias $ alias
(I) A name that an entity uses in place of its real name, usually (I) A name that an entity uses in place of its real name, usually
for the purpose of either anonymity or masquerade. for the purpose of either anonymity or masquerade.
$ Alice and Bob $ Alice and Bob
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technical reports, industry processes, and verification tests technical reports, industry processes, and verification tests
for interoperability and reliability of telecommunications for interoperability and reliability of telecommunications
networks, equipment, and software. Example: [A1523]. networks, equipment, and software. Example: [A1523].
$ American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) $ American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII)
(N) A scheme that encodes 128 specified characters -- the numbers (N) A scheme that encodes 128 specified characters -- the numbers
0-9, the letters a-z and A-Z, some basic punctuation symbols, some 0-9, the letters a-z and A-Z, some basic punctuation symbols, some
control codes that originated with Teletype machines, and a blank control codes that originated with Teletype machines, and a blank
space -- into the 7-bit binary integers. Forms the basis of the space -- into the 7-bit binary integers. Forms the basis of the
character set representations used in most computers and many character set representations used in most computers and many
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Internet standards. [FP001] (See: code.) Internet standards. [FP001] (See: code.)
$ Anderson report $ Anderson report
(O) A 1972 study of computer security that was written by James P. (O) A 1972 study of computer security that was written by James P.
Anderson for the U.S. Air Force [Ande]. Anderson for the U.S. Air Force [Ande].
Tutorial: Anderson collaborated with a panel of experts to study Tutorial: Anderson collaborated with a panel of experts to study
Air Force requirements for multilevel security. The study Air Force requirements for multilevel security. The study
recommended research and development that was urgently needed to recommended research and development that was urgently needed to
provide secure information processing for command and control provide secure information processing for command and control
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anyone to gather information about which servers the client anyone to gather information about which servers the client
accesses and (b) without allowing the accessed servers to gather accesses and (b) without allowing the accessed servers to gather
information about the client, such as its IP address. information about the client, such as its IP address.
$ anonymous credential $ anonymous credential
(D) /U.S. Government/ A credential that (a) can be used to (D) /U.S. Government/ A credential that (a) can be used to
authenticate a person as having a specific attribute or being a authenticate a person as having a specific attribute or being a
member of a specific group (e.g., military veterans or U.S. member of a specific group (e.g., military veterans or U.S.
citizens) but (b) does not reveal the individual identity of the citizens) but (b) does not reveal the individual identity of the
person that presents the credential. [M0404] (See: anonymity.) person that presents the credential. [M0404] (See: anonymity.)
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Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it mixes concepts Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it mixes concepts
in a potentially misleading way. For example, when the credential in a potentially misleading way. For example, when the credential
is an X.509 certificate, the term could be misunderstood to mean is an X.509 certificate, the term could be misunderstood to mean
that the certificate was signed by a CA that has a persona that the certificate was signed by a CA that has a persona
certificate. Instead, use "attribute certificate", "organizational certificate. Instead, use "attribute certificate", "organizational
certificate", or "persona certificate" depending on what is meant, certificate", or "persona certificate" depending on what is meant,
and provide additional explanations as needed. and provide additional explanations as needed.
$ anonymous login $ anonymous login
(I) An access control feature (actually, an access control (I) An access control feature (actually, an access control
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(I) See: application programming interface. (I) See: application programming interface.
$ APOP $ APOP
(I) See: POP3 APOP. (I) See: POP3 APOP.
$ Application Layer $ Application Layer
See: Internet Protocol Suite, OSIRM. See: Internet Protocol Suite, OSIRM.
$ application program $ application program
(I) A computer program that performs a specific function directly (I) A computer program that performs a specific function directly
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for a user (as opposed to a program that is part of a computer for a user (as opposed to a program that is part of a computer
operating system and exists to perform functions in support of operating system and exists to perform functions in support of
application programs). application programs).
$ architecture $ architecture
(I) See: security architecture, system architecture. (I) See: security architecture, system architecture.
$ archive $ archive
1a. (I) /noun/ A collection of data that is stored for a 1a. (I) /noun/ A collection of data that is stored for a
relatively long period of time for historical and other purposes, relatively long period of time for historical and other purposes,
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$ association $ association
(I) A cooperative relationship between system entities, usually (I) A cooperative relationship between system entities, usually
for the purpose of transferring information between them. (See: for the purpose of transferring information between them. (See:
security association.) security association.)
$ assurance $ assurance
See: security assurance. See: security assurance.
$ assurance level $ assurance level
(N) A rank on a hierarchical scale that judges the confidence (N) A rank on a hierarchical scale that judges the confidence
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someone can have that a TOE adequately fulfills stated security someone can have that a TOE adequately fulfills stated security
requirements. (See: assurance, certificate policy, EAL, TCSEC.) requirements. (See: assurance, certificate policy, EAL, TCSEC.)
Example: U.S. Government guidance [M0404] describes four assurance Example: U.S. Government guidance [M0404] describes four assurance
levels for identity authentication, where each level "describes levels for identity authentication, where each level "describes
the [Government] agency's degree of certainty that the user has the [Government] agency's degree of certainty that the user has
presented [a credential] that refers to [the user's] identity." In presented [a credential] that refers to [the user's] identity." In
that guidance, "assurance is defined as (a) "the degree of that guidance, "assurance is defined as (a) "the degree of
confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity
of the individual to whom the credential was issued" and (b) "the of the individual to whom the credential was issued" and (b) "the
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Asymmetric cryptography can be used to create algorithms for Asymmetric cryptography can be used to create algorithms for
encryption, digital signature, and key agreement: encryption, digital signature, and key agreement:
- In an asymmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., "RSA"), when Alice - In an asymmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., "RSA"), when Alice
wants to ensure confidentiality for data she sends to Bob, she wants to ensure confidentiality for data she sends to Bob, she
encrypts the data with a public key provided by Bob. Only Bob encrypts the data with a public key provided by Bob. Only Bob
has the matching private key that is needed to decrypt the has the matching private key that is needed to decrypt the
data. (Compare: seal.) data. (Compare: seal.)
- In an asymmetric digital signature algorithm (e.g., "DSA"), - In an asymmetric digital signature algorithm (e.g., "DSA"),
when Alice wants to ensure data integrity or provide when Alice wants to ensure data integrity or provide
authentication for data she sends to Bob, she uses her private authentication for data she sends to Bob, she uses her private
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key to sign the data (i.e., create a digital signature based on key to sign the data (i.e., create a digital signature based on
the data). To verify the signature, Bob uses the matching the data). To verify the signature, Bob uses the matching
public key that Alice has provided. public key that Alice has provided.
- In an asymmetric key-agreement algorithm (e.g., "Diffie- - In an asymmetric key-agreement algorithm (e.g., "Diffie-
Hellman-Merkle"), Alice and Bob each send their own public key Hellman-Merkle"), Alice and Bob each send their own public key
to the other party. Then each uses their own private key and to the other party. Then each uses their own private key and
the other's public key to compute the new key value. the other's public key to compute the new key value.
$ asymmetric key $ asymmetric key
(I) A cryptographic key that is used in an asymmetric (I) A cryptographic key that is used in an asymmetric
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the security perimeter (an "insider"), i.e., an entity that is the security perimeter (an "insider"), i.e., an entity that is
authorized to access system resources but uses them in a way authorized to access system resources but uses them in a way
not approved by the party that granted the authorization. not approved by the party that granted the authorization.
- An "outside attack" is initiated from outside the security - An "outside attack" is initiated from outside the security
perimeter, by an unauthorized or illegitimate user of the perimeter, by an unauthorized or illegitimate user of the
system (an "outsider"). In the Internet, potential outside system (an "outsider"). In the Internet, potential outside
attackers range from amateur pranksters to organized criminals, attackers range from amateur pranksters to organized criminals,
international terrorists, and hostile governments. international terrorists, and hostile governments.
Attacks can be characterized according to method of delivery: Attacks can be characterized according to method of delivery:
- In a "direct attack", the attacker addresses attacking packets - In a "direct attack", the attacker addresses attacking packets
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to the intended victim(s). to the intended victim(s).
- In an "indirect attack", the attacker addresses packets to a - In an "indirect attack", the attacker addresses packets to a
third party, and the packets either have the address(es) of the third party, and the packets either have the address(es) of the
intended victim(s) as their source address(es) or indicate the intended victim(s) as their source address(es) or indicate the
intended victim(s) in some other way. The third party responds intended victim(s) in some other way. The third party responds
by sending one or more attacking packets to the intended by sending one or more attacking packets to the intended
victims. The attacker can use third parties as attack victims. The attacker can use third parties as attack
amplifiers by providing a broadcast address as the victim amplifiers by providing a broadcast address as the victim
address (e.g., "smurf attack"). (See: reflector attack. address (e.g., "smurf attack"). (See: reflector attack.
Compare: reflection attack, replay attack.) Compare: reflection attack, replay attack.)
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security incident that is the goal of the attack is represented as security incident that is the goal of the attack is represented as
the root node of the tree, and the ways that an attacker could the root node of the tree, and the ways that an attacker could
reach that goal are iteratively and incrementally represented as reach that goal are iteratively and incrementally represented as
branches and subnodes of the tree. Each subnode defines a subgoal, branches and subnodes of the tree. Each subnode defines a subgoal,
and each subgoal may have its own set of further subgoals, etc. and each subgoal may have its own set of further subgoals, etc.
The final nodes on the paths outward from the root, i.e., the leaf The final nodes on the paths outward from the root, i.e., the leaf
nodes, represent different ways to initiate an attack. Each node nodes, represent different ways to initiate an attack. Each node
other than a leaf is either an AND-node or an OR-node. To achieve other than a leaf is either an AND-node or an OR-node. To achieve
the goal represented by an AND-node, the subgoals represented by the goal represented by an AND-node, the subgoals represented by
all of that node's subnodes must be achieved; and for an OR-node, all of that node's subnodes must be achieved; and for an OR-node,
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at least one of the subgoals must be achieved. Branches can be at least one of the subgoals must be achieved. Branches can be
labeled with values representing difficulty, cost, or other attack labeled with values representing difficulty, cost, or other attack
attributes, so that alternative attacks can be compared. attributes, so that alternative attacks can be compared.
$ attribute $ attribute
1. (N) Information of a particular type concerning an identifiable (N) Information of a particular type concerning an identifiable
system entity or object. An "attribute type" is the component of system entity or object. An "attribute type" is the component of
an attribute that indicates the class of information given by the an attribute that indicates the class of information given by the
attribute; and an "attribute value" is a particular instance of attribute; and an "attribute value" is a particular instance of
the class of information indicated by an attribute type. (See: the class of information indicated by an attribute type. (See:
attribute certificate.) attribute certificate.)
$ attribute authority (AA) $ attribute authority (AA)
1. (N) A CA that issues attribute certificates. 1. (N) A CA that issues attribute certificates.
2. (O) "An authority [that] assigns privileges by issuing 2. (O) "An authority [that] assigns privileges by issuing
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- Different lifetimes: When the lifetime of an attribute binding - Different lifetimes: When the lifetime of an attribute binding
is shorter than that of the related public-key certificate, or is shorter than that of the related public-key certificate, or
when it is desirable not to need to revoke a subject's public when it is desirable not to need to revoke a subject's public
key just to revoke an attribute. key just to revoke an attribute.
- Different authorities: When the authority responsible for the - Different authorities: When the authority responsible for the
attributes is different than the one that issues the public-key attributes is different than the one that issues the public-key
certificate for the subject. (There is no requirement that an certificate for the subject. (There is no requirement that an
attribute certificate be issued by the same CA that issued the attribute certificate be issued by the same CA that issued the
associated public-key certificate.) associated public-key certificate.)
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$ audit $ audit
See: security audit. See: security audit.
$ audit log $ audit log
(I) Synonym for "security audit trail". (I) Synonym for "security audit trail".
$ audit service $ audit service
(I) A security service that records information needed to (I) A security service that records information needed to
establish accountability for system events and for the actions of establish accountability for system events and for the actions of
system entities that cause them. (See: security audit.) system entities that cause them. (See: security audit.)
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credential, data origin authentication, peer entity credential, data origin authentication, peer entity
authentication, "relationship between data integrity service and authentication, "relationship between data integrity service and
authentication services" under "data integrity service", simple authentication services" under "data integrity service", simple
authentication, strong authentication, verification, X.509.) authentication, strong authentication, verification, X.509.)
Tutorial: Security services frequently depend on authentication of Tutorial: Security services frequently depend on authentication of
the identity of users, but authentication may involve any type of the identity of users, but authentication may involve any type of
attribute that is recognized by a system. A claim may be made by a attribute that is recognized by a system. A claim may be made by a
subject about itself (e.g., at login, a user typically asserts its subject about itself (e.g., at login, a user typically asserts its
identity) or a claim may be made on behalf of a subject or object identity) or a claim may be made on behalf of a subject or object
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by some other system entity (e.g., a user may claim that a data by some other system entity (e.g., a user may claim that a data
object originates from a specific source, or that a data object is object originates from a specific source, or that a data object is
classified at a specific security level). classified at a specific security level).
An authentication process consists of two basic steps: An authentication process consists of two basic steps:
- Identification step: Presenting the claimed attribute value - Identification step: Presenting the claimed attribute value
(e.g., a user identifier) to the authentication subsystem. (e.g., a user identifier) to the authentication subsystem.
- Verification step: Presenting or generating authentication - Verification step: Presenting or generating authentication
information (e.g., a value signed with a private key) that acts information (e.g., a value signed with a private key) that acts
as evidence to prove the binding between the attribute and that as evidence to prove the binding between the attribute and that
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Tutorial: Replay protection may be selected by the receiver when a Tutorial: Replay protection may be selected by the receiver when a
security association is established. AH authenticates the upper- security association is established. AH authenticates the upper-
layer PDU that is carried as an IP SDU, and also authenticates as layer PDU that is carried as an IP SDU, and also authenticates as
much of the IP PCI (i.e., the IP header) as possible. However, much of the IP PCI (i.e., the IP header) as possible. However,
some IP header fields may change in transit, and the value of some IP header fields may change in transit, and the value of
these fields, when the packet arrives at the receiver, may not be these fields, when the packet arrives at the receiver, may not be
predictable by the sender. Thus, the values of such fields cannot predictable by the sender. Thus, the values of such fields cannot
be protected end-to-end by AH; protection of the IP header by AH be protected end-to-end by AH; protection of the IP header by AH
is only partial when such fields are present. is only partial when such fields are present.
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AH may be used alone, or in combination with the ESP, or in a AH may be used alone, or in combination with the ESP, or in a
nested fashion with tunneling. Security services can be provided nested fashion with tunneling. Security services can be provided
between a pair of communicating hosts, between a pair of between a pair of communicating hosts, between a pair of
communicating security gateways, or between a host and a gateway. communicating security gateways, or between a host and a gateway.
ESP can provide nearly the same security services as AH, and ESP ESP can provide nearly the same security services as AH, and ESP
can also provide data confidentiality service. The main difference can also provide data confidentiality service. The main difference
between authentication services provided by ESP and AH is the between authentication services provided by ESP and AH is the
extent of the coverage; ESP does not protect IP header fields extent of the coverage; ESP does not protect IP header fields
unless they are encapsulated by AH. unless they are encapsulated by AH.
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Tutorial: In a network, there are two general forms of Tutorial: In a network, there are two general forms of
authentication service: data origin authentication service and authentication service: data origin authentication service and
peer entity authentication service. peer entity authentication service.
$ authenticity $ authenticity
(I) The property of being genuine and able to be verified and be (I) The property of being genuine and able to be verified and be
trusted. (See: authenticate, authentication, validate vs. verify.) trusted. (See: authenticate, authentication, validate vs. verify.)
$ authority $ authority
(D) "An entity, responsible for the issuance of certificates." (D) /PKI/ "An entity [that is] responsible for the issuance of
[X509] certificates." [X509]
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
attribute authority, certification authority, registration attribute authority, certification authority, registration
authority, or similar terms; the shortened form may cause authority, or similar terms; the shortened form may cause
confusion. Instead, use the full term at the first instance of confusion. Instead, use the full term at the first instance of
usage and then, if it is necessary to shorten text, use AA, CA, usage and then, if it is necessary to shorten text, use AA, CA,
RA, and other abbreviations defined in this Glossary. RA, and other abbreviations defined in this Glossary.
$ authority certificate $ authority certificate
(D) "A certificate issued to an authority (e.g. either to a (D) "A certificate issued to an authority (e.g. either to a
certification authority or to an attribute authority)." [X509] certification authority or to an attribute authority)." [X509]
(See: authority.) (See: authority.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is
ambiguous. Instead, use the full term "certification authority ambiguous. Instead, use the full term "certification authority
certificate", "attribute authority certificate", "registration certificate", "attribute authority certificate", "registration
authority certificate", etc. at the first instance of usage and authority certificate", etc. at the first instance of usage and
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then, if it is necessary to shorten text, use AA, CA, RA, and then, if it is necessary to shorten text, use AA, CA, RA, and
other abbreviations defined in this Glossary. other abbreviations defined in this Glossary.
$ Authority Information Access extension $ Authority Information Access extension
(I) The private extension defined by PKIX for X.509 certificates (I) The private extension defined by PKIX for X.509 certificates
to indicate "how to access CA information and services for the to indicate "how to access CA information and services for the
issuer of the certificate in which the extension appears. issuer of the certificate in which the extension appears.
Information and services may include on-line validation services Information and services may include on-line validation services
and CA policy data." [R3280] (See: private extension.) and CA policy data." [R3280] (See: private extension.)
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$ authorization credential $ authorization credential
(I) See: /access control/ under "credential". (I) See: /access control/ under "credential".
$ authorize $ authorize
(I) Grant an authorization to a system entity. (I) Grant an authorization to a system entity.
$ authorized user $ authorized user
(I) /access control/ A system entity that accesses a system (I) /access control/ A system entity that accesses a system
resource for which the entity has received an authorization. resource for which the entity has received an authorization.
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(Compare: insider, outsider, unauthorized user.) (Compare: insider, outsider, unauthorized user.)
Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a
definition for it because the term is used in many ways and could definition for it because the term is used in many ways and could
easily be misunderstood. easily be misunderstood.
$ automated information system $ automated information system
See: information system. See: information system.
$ availability $ availability
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Tutorial: This service addresses the security concerns raised by Tutorial: This service addresses the security concerns raised by
denial-of-service attacks. It depends on proper management and denial-of-service attacks. It depends on proper management and
control of system resources, and thus depends on access control control of system resources, and thus depends on access control
service and other security services. service and other security services.
$ avoidance $ avoidance
(I) See: secondary definition under "security". (I) See: secondary definition under "security".
$ B1, B2, or B3 computer system $ B1, B2, or B3 computer system
(O) /TCSEC/ See: Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System (O) /TCSEC/ See: Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System
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Evaluation Criteria". Evaluation Criteria".
$ back door $ back door
1. (I) /COMPUSEC/ A computer system feature -- which may be (a) an 1. (I) /COMPUSEC/ A computer system feature -- which may be (a) an
unintentional flaw, (b) a mechanism deliberately installed by the unintentional flaw, (b) a mechanism deliberately installed by the
system's creator, or (c) a mechanism surreptitiously installed by system's creator, or (c) a mechanism surreptitiously installed by
an intruder -- that provides access to a system resource by other an intruder -- that provides access to a system resource by other
than the usual procedure and usually is hidden or otherwise not than the usual procedure and usually is hidden or otherwise not
well-known. (See: maintenance hook. Compare: Trojan Horse.) well-known. (See: maintenance hook. Compare: Trojan Horse.)
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typically by failing to program the computer properly." [NCSSG] typically by failing to program the computer properly." [NCSSG]
(See: flaw.) (See: flaw.)
Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different
metaphors for these concepts. Therefore, to avoid international metaphors for these concepts. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated
Usage under "Green Book.") Usage under "Green Book.")
$ baggage $ baggage
(O) /SET/ An "opaque encrypted tuple, which is included in a SET (O) /SET/ An "opaque encrypted tuple, which is included in a SET
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message but appended as external data to the PKCS encapsulated message but appended as external data to the PKCS encapsulated
data. This avoids superencryption of the previously encrypted data. This avoids superencryption of the previously encrypted
tuple, but guarantees linkage with the PKCS portion of the tuple, but guarantees linkage with the PKCS portion of the
message." [SET2] message." [SET2]
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term to describe a data Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term to describe a data
element, except in the form "SET(trademark) baggage" with the element, except in the form "SET(trademark) baggage" with the
meaning given above. meaning given above.
$ baked-in security $ baked-in security
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$ bastion host $ bastion host
(I) A strongly protected computer that is in a network protected (I) A strongly protected computer that is in a network protected
by a firewall (or is part of a firewall) and is the only host (or by a firewall (or is part of a firewall) and is the only host (or
one of only a few) in the network that can be directly accessed one of only a few) in the network that can be directly accessed
from networks on the other side of the firewall. (See: firewall.) from networks on the other side of the firewall. (See: firewall.)
Tutorial: Filtering routers in a firewall typically restrict Tutorial: Filtering routers in a firewall typically restrict
traffic from the outside network to reaching just one host, the traffic from the outside network to reaching just one host, the
bastion host, which usually is part of the firewall. Since only bastion host, which usually is part of the firewall. Since only
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this one host can be directly attacked, only this one host needs this one host can be directly attacked, only this one host needs
to be very strongly protected, so security can be maintained more to be very strongly protected, so security can be maintained more
easily and less expensively. However, to allow legitimate internal easily and less expensively. However, to allow legitimate internal
and external users to access application resources through the and external users to access application resources through the
firewall, higher layer protocols and services need to be relayed firewall, higher layer protocols and services need to be relayed
and forwarded by the bastion host. Some services (e.g., DNS and and forwarded by the bastion host. Some services (e.g., DNS and
SMTP) have forwarding built in; other services (e.g., TELNET and SMTP) have forwarding built in; other services (e.g., TELNET and
FTP) require a proxy server on the bastion host. FTP) require a proxy server on the bastion host.
$ BBN Technologies $ BBN Technologies
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cannot be compromised by human access [to the data]." [C4009] cannot be compromised by human access [to the data]." [C4009]
2. (O) /COMPUSEC/ See: secondary definition under "trust". 2. (O) /COMPUSEC/ See: secondary definition under "trust".
$ benign fill $ benign fill
(N) Process by which keying material is generated, distributed, (N) Process by which keying material is generated, distributed,
and placed into an ECU without exposure to any human or other and placed into an ECU without exposure to any human or other
system entity, except the cryptographic module that consumes and system entity, except the cryptographic module that consumes and
uses the material. (See: benign.) uses the material. (See: benign.)
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$ BER $ BER
(I) See: Basic Encoding Rules. (I) See: Basic Encoding Rules.
$ beyond A1 $ beyond A1
1. (O) /formal/ A level of security assurance that is beyond the 1. (O) /formal/ A level of security assurance that is beyond the
highest level (level A1) of criteria specified by the TCSEC. (See: highest level (level A1) of criteria specified by the TCSEC. (See:
Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria".) Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria".)
2. (O) /informal/ A level of trust so high that it is beyond 2. (O) /informal/ A level of trust so high that it is beyond
state-of-the-art technology; i.e., it cannot be provided or state-of-the-art technology; i.e., it cannot be provided or
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$ BIN $ BIN
(O) See: bank identification number. (O) See: bank identification number.
$ bind $ bind
(I) To inseparably associate by applying some security mechanism. (I) To inseparably associate by applying some security mechanism.
Example: A CA creates a public-key certificate by using a digital Example: A CA creates a public-key certificate by using a digital
signature to bind together (a) a subject name, (b) a public key, signature to bind together (a) a subject name, (b) a public key,
and usually (c) some additional data items (e.g., "X.509 public- and usually (c) some additional data items (e.g., "X.509 public-
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key certificate"). key certificate").
$ biometric authentication $ biometric authentication
(I) A method of generating authentication information for a person (I) A method of generating authentication information for a person
by digitizing measurements of a physical or behavioral by digitizing measurements of a physical or behavioral
characteristic, such as a fingerprint, hand shape, retina pattern, characteristic, such as a fingerprint, hand shape, retina pattern,
voiceprint, handwriting style, or face. voiceprint, handwriting style, or face.
$ birthday attack $ birthday attack
(I) A class of attacks against cryptographic functions, including (I) A class of attacks against cryptographic functions, including
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information storage, which has two possible states or values. The information storage, which has two possible states or values. The
values usually are represented by the symbols "0" (zero) and "1" values usually are represented by the symbols "0" (zero) and "1"
(one). (See: block, byte, nibble, word.) (one). (See: block, byte, nibble, word.)
$ bit string $ bit string
(I) A sequence of bits, each of which is either "0" or "1". (I) A sequence of bits, each of which is either "0" or "1".
$ BLACK $ BLACK
1. (N) Designation for data that consists only of cipher text, and 1. (N) Designation for data that consists only of cipher text, and
for information system equipment items or facilities that handle for information system equipment items or facilities that handle
only cipher text. Example: "BLACK key".(See: color change, only cipher text. Example: "BLACK key".(See: BCR, color change,
RED/BLACK separation. Compare: RED.) RED/BLACK separation. Compare: RED.)
2. (O) /U.S. Government/ "Designation applied to information 2. (O) /U.S. Government/ "Designation applied to information
systems, and to associated areas, circuits, components, and systems, and to associated areas, circuits, components, and
equipment, in which national security information is encrypted or equipment, in which national security information is encrypted or
is not processed." [C4009] is not processed." [C4009]
3. (D) Any data that can be disclosed without harm. 3. (D) Any data that can be disclosed without harm.
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Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term with Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term with
definition 3 because the definition is ambiguous with regard to definition 3 because the definition is ambiguous with regard to
whether the data is protected or not. whether the data is protected or not.
$ BLACK/Crypto/RED (BCR) $ BLACK/Crypto/RED (BCR)
(N) An experimental, end-to-end, network packet encryption system (N) An experimental, end-to-end, network packet encryption system
developed in a working prototype form by BBN and the Collins Radio developed in a working prototype form by BBN and the Collins Radio
division of Rockwell Corporation in the 1975-1980 time frame for division of Rockwell Corporation in the 1975-1980 time frame for
the U.S. DoD. BCR was the first network security system to support the U.S. DoD. BCR was the first network security system to support
TCP/IP traffic, and it incorporated the first DES chips that were TCP/IP traffic, and it incorporated the first DES chips that were
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hosts. (b) The BLACKER components are trusted to separate hosts. (b) The BLACKER components are trusted to separate
datagrams of different security levels, so that each datagram of a datagrams of different security levels, so that each datagram of a
given security level can be received only by a host that is given security level can be received only by a host that is
authorized for that security level; and thus BLACKER can separate authorized for that security level; and thus BLACKER can separate
host communities that operate at different security levels. (c) host communities that operate at different security levels. (c)
The host side of a BFE is itself MLS and can recognize a security The host side of a BFE is itself MLS and can recognize a security
label on each packet, so that an MLS user host can be authorized label on each packet, so that an MLS user host can be authorized
to successively transmit datagrams that are labeled with different to successively transmit datagrams that are labeled with different
security levels. security levels.
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$ blind attack $ blind attack
(I) A type of network-based attack method that does not require (I) A type of network-based attack method that does not require
the attacking entity to receive data traffic from the attacked the attacking entity to receive data traffic from the attacked
entity; i.e., the attacker does not need to "see" data packets entity; i.e., the attacker does not need to "see" data packets
sent by the victim. Example: SYN flood. sent by the victim. Example: SYN flood.
Tutorial: If an attack method is blind, the attacker's packets can Tutorial: If an attack method is blind, the attacker's packets can
carry (a) a false IP source address (making it difficult for the carry (a) a false IP source address (making it difficult for the
victim to find the attacker) and (b) a different address on every victim to find the attacker) and (b) a different address on every
packet (making it difficult for the victim to block the attack). packet (making it difficult for the victim to block the attack).
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$ brain-damaged $ brain-damaged
(D) /slang/ "Obviously wrong: extremely poorly designed. Calling (D) /slang/ "Obviously wrong: extremely poorly designed. Calling
something brain-damaged is very extreme. The word implies that the something brain-damaged is very extreme. The word implies that the
thing is completely unusable, and that its failure to work is due thing is completely unusable, and that its failure to work is due
to poor design, not accident." [NCSSG] (See: flaw.) to poor design, not accident." [NCSSG] (See: flaw.)
Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different
metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated
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Usage under "Green Book.") Usage under "Green Book.")
$ brand $ brand
1. (I) A distinctive mark or name that identifies a product or 1. (I) A distinctive mark or name that identifies a product or
business entity. business entity.
2. (O) /SET/ The name of a payment card. (See: BCA.) 2. (O) /SET/ The name of a payment card. (See: BCA.)
Tutorial: Financial institutions and other companies have founded Tutorial: Financial institutions and other companies have founded
payment card brands, protect and advertise the brands, establish payment card brands, protect and advertise the brands, establish
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firms F(1), F(2), ..., F(N) is categorized into mutually exclusive firms F(1), F(2), ..., F(N) is categorized into mutually exclusive
conflict-of-interest classes I(1), I(2), ..., I(M) that apply conflict-of-interest classes I(1), I(2), ..., I(M) that apply
across all firms. Each firm belongs to exactly one class. The across all firms. Each firm belongs to exactly one class. The
Brewer-Nash model has the following mandatory rules: Brewer-Nash model has the following mandatory rules:
- Brewer-Nash Read Rule: Subject S can read information object O - Brewer-Nash Read Rule: Subject S can read information object O
from firm F(i) only if either (a) O is from the same firm as from firm F(i) only if either (a) O is from the same firm as
some object previously read by S *or* (b) O belongs to a class some object previously read by S *or* (b) O belongs to a class
I(i) from which S has not previously read any object. (See: I(i) from which S has not previously read any object. (See:
object, subject.) object, subject.)
- Brewer-Nash Write Rule: Subject S can write information object - Brewer-Nash Write Rule: Subject S can write information object
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O to firm F(i) only if (a) S can read O by the Brewer-Nash Read O to firm F(i) only if (a) S can read O by the Brewer-Nash Read
Rule *and* (b) no object can be read by S from a different firm Rule *and* (b) no object can be read by S from a different firm
F(j), no matter whether F(j) belongs to the same class as F(i) F(j), no matter whether F(j) belongs to the same class as F(i)
or to a different class. or to a different class.
$ bridge $ bridge
(I) A gateway for traffic flowing at OSIRM Layer 2 between two (I) A gateway for traffic flowing at OSIRM Layer 2 between two
networks (usually two LANs). (Compare: bridge CA, router.) networks (usually two LANs). (Compare: bridge CA, router.)
$ bridge CA $ bridge CA
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(I) A cryptanalysis technique or other kind of attack method (I) A cryptanalysis technique or other kind of attack method
involving an exhaustive procedure that tries a large number of involving an exhaustive procedure that tries a large number of
possible solutions to the problem. (See: impossible, strength, possible solutions to the problem. (See: impossible, strength,
work factor.) work factor.)
Tutorial: In some cases, brute force involves trying all of the Tutorial: In some cases, brute force involves trying all of the
possibilities. For example, for cipher text where the analyst possibilities. For example, for cipher text where the analyst
already knows the decryption algorithm, a brute force technique already knows the decryption algorithm, a brute force technique
for finding matching plain text is to decrypt the message with for finding matching plain text is to decrypt the message with
every possible key. In other cases, brute force involves trying a every possible key. In other cases, brute force involves trying a
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large number of possibilities but substantially fewer than all of large number of possibilities but substantially fewer than all of
them. For example, given a hash function that produces a N-bit them. For example, given a hash function that produces a N-bit
hash result, the probability is greater than 1/2 that the analyst hash result, the probability is greater than 1/2 that the analyst
will find two inputs that have the same hash result after trying will find two inputs that have the same hash result after trying
only 2**(N/2) random chosen inputs. (See: birthday attack.) only 2**(N/2) random chosen inputs. (See: birthday attack.)
$ BS7799 $ BS7799
(N) See: British Standard 7799. (N) See: British Standard 7799.
$ buffer overflow $ buffer overflow
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interpreted to mean that multiple channels are encrypted interpreted to mean that multiple channels are encrypted
separately but at the same time. However, the common meaning of separately but at the same time. However, the common meaning of
the term is that multiple data flows are combined into a single the term is that multiple data flows are combined into a single
stream and then that stream is encrypted as a whole. stream and then that stream is encrypted as a whole.
$ bulk key $ bulk key
(D) In a few published descriptions of hybrid encryption for SSH, (D) In a few published descriptions of hybrid encryption for SSH,
Windows 2000, and other applications, this term refers to a Windows 2000, and other applications, this term refers to a
symmetric key that (a) is used to encrypt a relatively large symmetric key that (a) is used to encrypt a relatively large
amount of data and (b) is itself encrypted with a public key. amount of data and (b) is itself encrypted with a public key.
(Compare: bulk keying material.) (Compare: bulk keying material, session key.)
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Example: To send a large file to Bob, Alice (a) generates a Example: To send a large file to Bob, Alice (a) generates a
symmetric key and uses it to encrypt the file (i.e., encrypt the symmetric key and uses it to encrypt the file (i.e., encrypt the
bulk of the information that is to be sent) and then (b) encrypts bulk of the information that is to be sent) and then (b) encrypts
that symmetric key (the "bulk key") with Bob's public key. that symmetric key (the "bulk key") with Bob's public key.
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term or definition; they Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term or definition; they
are not well-established and could be confused with the are not well-established and could be confused with the
established term "bulk keying material". Instead, use "symmetric established term "bulk keying material". Instead, use "symmetric
key" and carefully explain how the key is applied. key" and carefully explain how the key is applied.
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associated risks. (See: risk analysis.) associated risks. (See: risk analysis.)
$ byte $ byte
(I) A fundamental unit of computer storage; the smallest (I) A fundamental unit of computer storage; the smallest
addressable unit in a computer's architecture. Usually holds one addressable unit in a computer's architecture. Usually holds one
character of information and, today, usually means eight bits. character of information and, today, usually means eight bits.
(Compare: octet.) (Compare: octet.)
Usage: Understood to be larger than a "bit", but smaller than a Usage: Understood to be larger than a "bit", but smaller than a
"word". Although "byte" almost always means "octet" today, some "word". Although "byte" almost always means "octet" today, some
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computer architectures have had bytes in other sizes (e.g., six computer architectures have had bytes in other sizes (e.g., six
bits, nine bits). Therefore, an STD SHOULD state the number of bits, nine bits). Therefore, an STD SHOULD state the number of
bits in a byte where the term is first used in the STD. bits in a byte where the term is first used in the STD.
$ C field $ C field
(D) See: Compartments field. (D) See: Compartments field.
$ C1 or C2 computer system $ C1 or C2 computer system
(O) /TCSEC/ See: Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System (O) /TCSEC/ See: Tutorial under "Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria". Evaluation Criteria".
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That would specifically indicate that "the certified public key That would specifically indicate that "the certified public key
may be used to verify certificate signatures", i.e., that the may be used to verify certificate signatures", i.e., that the
private key may be used by a CA. private key may be used by a CA.
However, there also are other ways to indicate such usage. The However, there also are other ways to indicate such usage. The
certificate may have a "key Usage" extension that indicates the certificate may have a "key Usage" extension that indicates the
purposes for which the public key may be used, and one of the purposes for which the public key may be used, and one of the
values that X.509 defines for that extension is "keyCertSign", to values that X.509 defines for that extension is "keyCertSign", to
indicate that the certificate may be used for verifying a CA's indicate that the certificate may be used for verifying a CA's
signature on certificates. If "keyCertSign" is present in a signature on certificates. If "keyCertSign" is present in a
certificate that also has a "basicConstraints" extension, than certificate that also has a "basicConstraints" extension, then
"cA" is set to "TRUE" in that extension. Alternatively, a CA could "cA" is set to "TRUE" in that extension. Alternatively, a CA could
be issued a certificate in which "keyCertSign" is asserted without be issued a certificate in which "keyCertSign" is asserted without
"basicConstraints" being present; and an entity that acts as a CA "basicConstraints" being present; and an entity that acts as a CA
could be issued a certificate with "keyUsage" set to other values, could be issued a certificate with "keyUsage" set to other values,
either with or without "keyCertSign". either with or without "keyCertSign".
$ CA domain $ CA domain
(N) /PKI/ A security policy domain that "consists of a CA and its (N) /PKI/ A security policy domain that "consists of a CA and its
subjects [i.e., the entities named in the certificates issued by subjects [i.e., the entities named in the certificates issued by
the CA]. Sometimes referred to as a PKI domain." [PAG] (See: the CA]. Sometimes referred to as a PKI domain." [PAG] (See:
domain.) domain.)
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$ Caesar cipher $ Caesar cipher
(I) A cipher that is defined for an alphabet of N characters, (I) A cipher that is defined for an alphabet of N characters,
A(1), A(2), ..., A(N), and creates cipher text by replacing each A(1), A(2), ..., A(N), and creates cipher text by replacing each
plaintext character A(i) by A(i+K, mod N) for some 0<K<N+1. [Schn] plaintext character A(i) by A(i+K, mod N) for some 0<K<N+1. [Schn]
Examples: (a) During the Gallic wars, Julius Caesar used a cipher Examples: (a) During the Gallic wars, Julius Caesar used a cipher
with K=3. In a Caesar cipher with K=3 for the English alphabet, A with K=3. In a Caesar cipher with K=3 for the English alphabet, A
is replaced by D, B by E, C by F, ..., W by Z, X by A, Y by B, Z is replaced by D, B by E, C by F, ..., W by Z, X by A, Y by B, Z
by C. (b) UNIX systems sometimes include "ROT13" software that by C. (b) UNIX systems sometimes include "ROT13" software that
implements a Caesar cipher with K=13 (i.e., ROTate by 13). implements a Caesar cipher with K=13 (i.e., ROTate by 13).
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subnetwork, so that the subnetwork can operate at a different subnetwork, so that the subnetwork can operate at a different
security level than the hosts. (b) Like BLACKER, the CANEWARE security level than the hosts. (b) Like BLACKER, the CANEWARE
components are trusted to separate datagrams of different security components are trusted to separate datagrams of different security
levels, so that each datagram of a given security level can be levels, so that each datagram of a given security level can be
received only by a host that is authorized for that security received only by a host that is authorized for that security
level; and thus CANEWARE can separate host communities that level; and thus CANEWARE can separate host communities that
operate at different security levels. (c) Unlike a BFE, the host operate at different security levels. (c) Unlike a BFE, the host
side of a CFE is not MLS, and treats all packets received from a side of a CFE is not MLS, and treats all packets received from a
user host as being at the same mandatory security level. user host as being at the same mandatory security level.
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$ capability list $ capability list
(I) /information system/ A mechanism that implements access (I) /information system/ A mechanism that implements access
control for a system entity by enumerating the system resources control for a system entity by enumerating the system resources
that the entity is permitted to access and, either implicitly or that the entity is permitted to access and, either implicitly or
explicitly, the access modes granted for each resource. (Compare: explicitly, the access modes granted for each resource. (Compare:
access control list, access control matrix, access profile, access control list, access control matrix, access profile,
capability token.) capability token.)
$ capability token $ capability token
(I) A token, usually an unforgeable data object, that gives the (I) A token (usually an unforgeable data object) that gives the
bearer or holder the right to access a system resource. Possession bearer or holder the right to access a system resource. Possession
of the token is accepted by a system as proof that the holder has of the token is accepted by a system as proof that the holder has
been authorized to access the resource indicated by the token. been authorized to access the resource indicated by the token.
(See: attribute certificate, capability list, credential, digital (See: attribute certificate, capability list, credential, digital
certificate, ticket, token.) certificate, ticket, token.)
$ Capability Maturity Model (CMM) $ Capability Maturity Model (CMM)
(N) Method for judging the maturity of software processes in an (N) Method for judging the maturity of software processes in an
organization and for identifying crucial practices needed to organization and for identifying crucial practices needed to
increase process maturity. [Chris] (Compare: Common Criteria.) increase process maturity. [Chris] (Compare: Common Criteria.)
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innovative ideas and technologies. innovative ideas and technologies.
$ CAPI $ CAPI
(I) See: cryptographic application programming interface. (I) See: cryptographic application programming interface.
$ CAPSTONE $ CAPSTONE
(N) An integrated microcircuit (in MYK-8x series manufactured by (N) An integrated microcircuit (in MYK-8x series manufactured by
Mykotronx, Inc.) that implements SKIPJACK, KEA, DSA, SHA, and Mykotronx, Inc.) that implements SKIPJACK, KEA, DSA, SHA, and
basic mathematical functions needed to support asymmetric basic mathematical functions needed to support asymmetric
cryptography; has non-deterministic random number generator; and cryptography; has non-deterministic random number generator; and
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supports key escrow. (See: FORTEZZA. Compare: CLIPPER.) supports key escrow. (See: FORTEZZA. Compare: CLIPPER.)
$ card $ card
See: cryptographic card, FORTEZZA, payment card, PC card, smart See: cryptographic card, FORTEZZA, payment card, PC card, smart
card, token. card, token.
$ card backup $ card backup
See: token backup. See: token backup.
$ card copy $ card copy
See: token copy. See: token copy.
$ card restore $ card restore
See: token restore. See: token restore.
$ cardholder $ cardholder
1. (I) An entity to whom or to which a card has been issued. 1. (I) An entity to whom or to which a card has been issued.
Usage: Usually refers to a living human being, but might refer (a) Usage: Usually refers to a living human being, but might refer (a)
to a position (see: billet, role) in an organization or (b) to an to a position (see: billet, role) in an organization or (b) to an
automated process. (See: user.) automated process. (Compare: user.)
2. (O) /SET/ "The holder of a valid payment card account and user 2. (O) /SET/ "The holder of a valid payment card account and user
of software supporting electronic commerce." [SET2] A cardholder of software supporting electronic commerce." [SET2] A cardholder
is issued a payment card by an issuer. SET ensures that in the is issued a payment card by an issuer. SET ensures that in the
cardholder's interactions with merchants, the payment card account cardholder's interactions with merchants, the payment card account
information remains confidential. [SET1] information remains confidential. [SET1]
$ cardholder certificate $ cardholder certificate
(O) /SET/ A digital certificate that is issued to a cardholder (O) /SET/ A digital certificate that is issued to a cardholder
upon approval of the cardholder's issuing financial institution upon approval of the cardholder's issuing financial institution
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distribute CRLs issued by root CAs, brand CAs, geopolitical CAs, distribute CRLs issued by root CAs, brand CAs, geopolitical CAs,
and payment gateway CAs. [SET2] and payment gateway CAs. [SET2]
$ CAST $ CAST
(N) A design procedure for symmetric encryption algorithms, and a (N) A design procedure for symmetric encryption algorithms, and a
resulting family of algorithms, invented by Carlisle Adams (C.A.) resulting family of algorithms, invented by Carlisle Adams (C.A.)
and Stafford Tavares (S.T.). [R2144, R2612] and Stafford Tavares (S.T.). [R2144, R2612]
$ category $ category
(I) A grouping of sensitive information items to which a non- (I) A grouping of sensitive information items to which a non-
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hierarchical restrictive security label is applied to increase hierarchical restrictive security label is applied to increase
protection of the data. (See: formal access approval. Compare: protection of the data. (See: formal access approval. Compare:
compartment, classification.) compartment, classification.)
$ CAW $ CAW
(N) See: certification authority workstation. (N) See: certification authority workstation.
$ CBC $ CBC
(N) See: cipher block chaining. (N) See: cipher block chaining.
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1. (I) /general English/ A document that attests to the truth of 1. (I) /general English/ A document that attests to the truth of
something or the ownership of something. something or the ownership of something.
2. (I) /general security/ See: capability token, digital 2. (I) /general security/ See: capability token, digital
certificate. certificate.
3. (I) /PKI/ See: attribute certificate, public-key certificate. 3. (I) /PKI/ See: attribute certificate, public-key certificate.
$ Certificate Arbitrator Module (CAM) $ Certificate Arbitrator Module (CAM)
(O) An open-source software module that is designed to be (O) An open-source software module that is designed to be
integrated with an application for the purpose of routing, integrated with an application for routing, replying to, and
replying to, and otherwise managing and meditating certificate otherwise managing and meditating certificate validation requests
validation requests between that application and the CAs in the between that application and the CAs in the ACES PKI.
ACES PKI.
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$ certificate authority $ certificate authority
(D) Synonym for "certification authority". (D) Synonym for "certification authority".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it suggests Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it suggests
careless use of the term "certification authority", which is careless use of the term "certification authority", which is
preferred in PKI standards (e.g., [X509, R3280]). preferred in PKI standards (e.g., [X509, R3280]).
$ certificate chain $ certificate chain
(D) Synonym for "certification path". (See: trust chain.) (D) Synonym for "certification path". (See: trust chain.)
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Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for the subject of a digital certificate; the term is potentially for the subject of a digital certificate; the term is potentially
ambiguous. For example, the term could be misunderstood as ambiguous. For example, the term could be misunderstood as
referring to a system entity or component, such as a repository, referring to a system entity or component, such as a repository,
that simply has possession of a copy of the certificate. that simply has possession of a copy of the certificate.
$ certificate management $ certificate management
(I) The functions that a CA may perform during the life cycle of a (I) The functions that a CA may perform during the life cycle of a
digital certificate, including the following: digital certificate, including the following:
- Acquire and verify data items to bind into the certificate. - Acquire and verify data items to bind into the certificate.
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- Encode and sign the certificate. - Encode and sign the certificate.
- Store the certificate in a directory or repository. - Store the certificate in a directory or repository.
- Renew, rekey, and update the certificate. - Renew, rekey, and update the certificate.
- Revoke the certificate and issue a CRL. - Revoke the certificate and issue a CRL.
(See: archive management, certificate management, key management, (See: archive management, certificate management, key management,
security architecture, token management.) security architecture, token management.)
$ certificate management authority (CMA) $ certificate management authority (CMA)
(D) /U.S. DoD/ Used to mean either a CA or an RA. [DoD7, SP32] (D) /U.S. DoD/ Used to mean either a CA or an RA. [DoD7, SP32]
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is
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decide whether a certificate should be trusted in a particular decide whether a certificate should be trusted in a particular
application. "For example, a particular certificate policy might application. "For example, a particular certificate policy might
indicate applicability of a type of certificate for the indicate applicability of a type of certificate for the
authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the
trading of goods within a given price range." [R3647] trading of goods within a given price range." [R3647]
A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "certificatePolicies" A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "certificatePolicies"
extension that lists certificate policies, recognized by the extension that lists certificate policies, recognized by the
issuing CA, that apply to the certificate and govern its use. Each issuing CA, that apply to the certificate and govern its use. Each
policy is denoted by an object identifier and may optionally have policy is denoted by an object identifier and may optionally have
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certificate policy qualifiers. (See: certificate profile.) certificate policy qualifiers. (See: certificate profile.)
Each SET certificate specifies at least one certificate policy, Each SET certificate specifies at least one certificate policy,
that of the SET root CA. SET uses certificate policy qualifiers to that of the SET root CA. SET uses certificate policy qualifiers to
point to the actual policy statement and to add qualifying point to the actual policy statement and to add qualifying
policies to the root policy. (See: SET qualifier.) policies to the root policy. (See: SET qualifier.)
$ certificate policy qualifier $ certificate policy qualifier
(I) Information that pertains to a certificate policy and is (I) Information that pertains to a certificate policy and is
included in a "certificatePolicies" extension in a v3 X.509 included in a "certificatePolicies" extension in a v3 X.509
public-key certificate. public-key certificate.
$ certificate profile $ certificate profile
(I) A specification (e.g., [DoD7, R3280]) of the format and (I) A specification (e.g., [DoD7, R3280]) of the format and
semantics of public-key certificates or attribute certificates, semantics of public-key certificates or attribute certificates,
constructed for use in a specific application context by selecting constructed for use in a specific application context by selecting
from among options offered by a broader standard. (Compare: from among options offered by a broader standard. (Compare:
protection profile.) protection profile.)
$ certificate reactivation $ certificate reactivation
(I) The act or process by which a digital certificate, which a CA (I) The act or process by which a digital certificate, that a CA
has designated for revocation but not yet listed on a CRL, is has designated for revocation but not yet listed on a CRL, is
returned to the valid state. returned to the valid state.
$ certificate rekey $ certificate rekey
1. (I) The act or process by which an existing public-key 1. (I) The act or process by which an existing public-key
certificate has its key value changed by issuing a new certificate certificate has its key value changed by issuing a new certificate
with a different (usually new) public key. (See: certificate with a different (usually new) public key. (See: certificate
renewal, certificate update, rekey.) renewal, certificate update, rekey.)
Tutorial: For an X.509 public-key certificate, the essence of Tutorial: For an X.509 public-key certificate, the essence of
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different validity period. A new key creation date and maximum key different validity period. A new key creation date and maximum key
lifetime period are assigned to each newly generated key. If a new lifetime period are assigned to each newly generated key. If a new
KEA key is generated, that key is assigned a new KMID. The old KEA key is generated, that key is assigned a new KMID. The old
certificate remains valid until it expires, but may not be further certificate remains valid until it expires, but may not be further
renewed, rekeyed, or updated. renewed, rekeyed, or updated.
$ certificate renewal $ certificate renewal
(I) The act or process by which the validity of the binding (I) The act or process by which the validity of the binding
asserted by an existing public-key certificate is extended in time asserted by an existing public-key certificate is extended in time
by issuing a new certificate. (See: certificate rekey, certificate by issuing a new certificate. (See: certificate rekey, certificate
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update.) update.)
Tutorial: For an X.509 public-key certificate, this term means Tutorial: For an X.509 public-key certificate, this term means
that the validity period is extended (and, of course, a new serial that the validity period is extended (and, of course, a new serial
number is assigned) but the binding of the public key to the number is assigned) but the binding of the public key to the
subject and to other data items stays the same. The other data subject and to other data items stays the same. The other data
items are changed, and the old certificate is revoked, only as items are changed, and the old certificate is revoked, only as
required by the PKI and CPS to support the renewal. If changes go required by the PKI and CPS to support the renewal. If changes go
beyond that, the process is a "certificate rekey" or "certificate beyond that, the process is a "certificate rekey" or "certificate
update". update".
$ certificate request $ certificate request
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have been invalidated by their issuer prior to when they were have been invalidated by their issuer prior to when they were
scheduled to expire. (See: certificate expiration, delta CRL, scheduled to expire. (See: certificate expiration, delta CRL,
X.509 certificate revocation list.) X.509 certificate revocation list.)
2. (O) "A signed list indicating a set of certificates that are no 2. (O) "A signed list indicating a set of certificates that are no
longer considered valid by the certificate issuer. In addition to longer considered valid by the certificate issuer. In addition to
the generic term CRL, some specific CRL types are defined for CRLs the generic term CRL, some specific CRL types are defined for CRLs
that cover particular scopes." [X509] that cover particular scopes." [X509]
$ certificate revocation tree $ certificate revocation tree
(N) A mechanism for distributing notice of certificate (N) A mechanism for distributing notices of certificate
revocations; uses a tree of hash results that is signed by the revocations; uses a tree of hash results that is signed by the
tree's issuer. Offers an alternative to issuing a CRL, but is not tree's issuer. Offers an alternative to issuing a CRL, but is not
supported in X.509. (See: certificate status responder.) supported in X.509. (See: certificate status responder.)
$ certificate serial number $ certificate serial number
1. (I) An integer value that (a) is associated with, and may be 1. (I) An integer value that (a) is associated with, and may be
carried in, a digital certificate; (b) is assigned to the carried in, a digital certificate; (b) is assigned to the
certificate by the certificate's issuer; and (c) is unique among certificate by the certificate's issuer; and (c) is unique among
all the certificates produced by that issuer. all the certificates produced by that issuer.
2. (O) "An integer value, unique within the issuing CA, which is 2. (O) "An integer value, unique within the issuing CA, [that] is
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unambiguously associated with a certificate issued by that CA." unambiguously associated with a certificate issued by that CA."
[X509] [X509]
$ certificate status authority $ certificate status authority
(D) /U.S. DoD/ "A trusted entity that provides on-line (D) /U.S. DoD/ "A trusted entity that provides on-line
verification to a Relying Party of a subject certificate's verification to a Relying Party of a subject certificate's
trustworthiness [should instead say 'validity'], and may also trustworthiness [should instead say 'validity'], and may also
provide additional attribute information for the subject provide additional attribute information for the subject
certificate." [DoD7] certificate." [DoD7]
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not
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bound to the public key, such that it is necessary to revoke the bound to the public key, such that it is necessary to revoke the
old certificate. (Otherwise, the process is only a "certificate old certificate. (Otherwise, the process is only a "certificate
rekey" or "certificate renewal".) rekey" or "certificate renewal".)
$ certificate user $ certificate user
1. (I) A system entity that depends on the validity of information 1. (I) A system entity that depends on the validity of information
(such as another entity's public key value) provided by a digital (such as another entity's public key value) provided by a digital
certificate. (See: relying party. Compare: /digital certificate/ certificate. (See: relying party. Compare: /digital certificate/
subject.) subject.)
Usage: The depending entity may be a human being or an
organization, or a device or process controlled by a human or
organization. (See: user.)
2. (O) "An entity that needs to know, with certainty, the public 2. (O) "An entity that needs to know, with certainty, the public
key of another entity." [X509] key of another entity." [X509]
Usage: The system entity may be a human being or an organization,
or a device or process controlled by a human or organization.
(See: user.)
3. (D) Synonym for "subject" of a digital certificate. 3. (D) Synonym for "subject" of a digital certificate.
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
definition 3; the term could be confused with one of the other two definition 3; the term could be confused with one of the other two
definitions given above. definitions given above.
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$ certificate validation $ certificate validation
1. (I) An act or process by which a certificate user establishes 1. (I) An act or process by which a certificate user establishes
that the assertions made by a digital certificate can be trusted. that the assertions made by a digital certificate can be trusted.
(See: valid certificate, validate vs. verify.) (See: valid certificate, validate vs. verify.)
2. (O) "The process of ensuring that a certificate was valid at a 2. (O) "The process of ensuring that a certificate was valid at a
given time, including possibly the construction and processing of given time, including possibly the construction and processing of
a certification path [R4158], and ensuring that all certificates a certification path [R4158], and ensuring that all certificates
in that path were valid (i.e. were not expired or revoked) at that in that path were valid (i.e. were not expired or revoked) at that
given time." [X509] given time." [X509]
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of specified security requirements. [C4009, FP102, SP37] (See: of specified security requirements. [C4009, FP102, SP37] (See:
accreditation. Compare: evaluation.) accreditation. Compare: evaluation.)
2. (I) /digital certificate/ The act or process of vouching for 2. (I) /digital certificate/ The act or process of vouching for
the truth and accuracy of the binding between data items in a the truth and accuracy of the binding between data items in a
certificate. (See: certify.) certificate. (See: certify.)
3. (I) /PKI/ The act or process of vouching for the ownership of a 3. (I) /PKI/ The act or process of vouching for the ownership of a
public key by issuing a public-key certificate that binds the key public key by issuing a public-key certificate that binds the key
to the name of the entity that possesses the matching private key. to the name of the entity that possesses the matching private key.
In addition to binding a key with a name, a public-key certificate Besides binding a key with a name, a public-key certificate may
may bind those items with other restrictive or explanatory data bind those items with other restrictive or explanatory data items.
items. (See: X.509 public-key certificate.) (See: X.509 public-key certificate.)
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4. (O) /SET/ "The process of ascertaining that a set of 4. (O) /SET/ "The process of ascertaining that a set of
requirements or criteria has been fulfilled and attesting to that requirements or criteria has been fulfilled and attesting to that
fact to others, usually with some written instrument. A system fact to others, usually with some written instrument. A system
that has been inspected and evaluated as fully compliant with the that has been inspected and evaluated as fully compliant with the
SET protocol by duly authorized parties and process would be said SET protocol by duly authorized parties and process would be said
to have been certified compliant." [SET2] to have been certified compliant." [SET2]
$ certification authority (CA) $ certification authority (CA)
1. (I) An entity that issues digital certificates (especially 1. (I) An entity that issues digital certificates (especially
X.509 certificates) and vouches for the binding between the data X.509 certificates) and vouches for the binding between the data
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responsible for the life cycle of key pairs associated with the responsible for the life cycle of key pairs associated with the
certificates (see: key management). certificates (see: key management).
$ certification authority workstation (CAW) $ certification authority workstation (CAW)
(N) A computer system that enables a CA to issue digital (N) A computer system that enables a CA to issue digital
certificates and supports other certificate management functions certificates and supports other certificate management functions
as required. as required.
$ certification hierarchy $ certification hierarchy
1. (I) A tree-structured (loop-free) topology of relationships 1. (I) A tree-structured (loop-free) topology of relationships
among CAs and the entities to whom the CAs issue public-key between CAs and the entities to whom the CAs issue public-key
certificates. (See: hierarchical PKI, hierarchy management.) certificates. (See: hierarchical PKI, hierarchy management.)
Tutorial: In this structure, one CA is the top CA, the highest Tutorial: In this structure, one CA is the top CA, the highest
level of the hierarchy. (See: root, top CA.) The top CA may issue level of the hierarchy. (See: root, top CA.) The top CA may issue
public-key certificates to one or more additional CAs that form public-key certificates to one or more additional CAs that form
the second-highest level. Each of these CAs may issue certificates the second-highest level. Each of these CAs may issue certificates
to more CAs at the third highest level, and so on. The CAs at the to more CAs at the third highest level, and so on. The CAs at the
second-lowest level issue certificates only to non-CA entities second-lowest level issue certificates only to non-CA entities
that form the lowest level (see: end entity). Thus, all that form the lowest level (see: end entity). Thus, all
certification paths begin at the top CA and descend through zero certification paths begin at the top CA and descend through zero
or more levels of other CAs. All certificate users base path or more levels of other CAs. All certificate users base path
validations on the top CA's public key. validations on the top CA's public key.
2. (I) /PEM/ A certification hierarchy for PEM has three levels of 2. (I) /PEM/ A certification hierarchy for PEM has three levels of
CAs [R1422]: CAs [R1422]:
- The highest level is the "Internet Policy Registration - The highest level is the "Internet Policy Registration
Authority". Authority".
- A CA at the second-highest level is a "policy certification - A CA at the second-highest level is a "policy certification
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authority". authority".
- A CA at the third-highest level is a "certification authority". - A CA at the third-highest level is a "certification authority".
3. (O) /MISSI/ A certification hierarchy for MISSI has three or 3. (O) /MISSI/ A certification hierarchy for MISSI has three or
four levels of CAs: four levels of CAs:
- A CA at the highest level, the top CA, is a "policy approving - A CA at the highest level, the top CA, is a "policy approving
authority". authority".
- A CA at the second-highest level is a "policy creation - A CA at the second-highest level is a "policy creation
authority". authority".
- A CA at the third-highest level is a local authority called a - A CA at the third-highest level is a local authority called a
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i.e., the private key used to sign a certificate and the public i.e., the private key used to sign a certificate and the public
key contained in the preceding certificate form a key pair that key contained in the preceding certificate form a key pair that
has previously been bound to the authority that signed. has previously been bound to the authority that signed.
The path is the "list of certificates needed to [enable] a The path is the "list of certificates needed to [enable] a
particular user to obtain the public key [or attributes] of particular user to obtain the public key [or attributes] of
another [user]." [X509] Here, the word "particular" points out another [user]." [X509] Here, the word "particular" points out
that a certification path that can be validated by one certificate that a certification path that can be validated by one certificate
user might not be able to be validated by another. That is because user might not be able to be validated by another. That is because
either the first certificate needs to be a trusted certificate or either the first certificate needs to be a trusted certificate or
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the signature on the first certificate needs to be verifiable by a the signature on the first certificate needs to be verifiable by a
trusted key (e.g., a root key), but such trust is established only trusted key (e.g., a root key), but such trust is established only
relative to a "particular" (i.e., specific) user, not absolutely relative to a "particular" (i.e., specific) user, not absolutely
for all users. for all users.
$ certification policy $ certification policy
(D) Synonym for either "certificate policy" or "certification (D) Synonym for either "certificate policy" or "certification
practice statement". practice statement".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
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certification, and sent to a CA, which transforms the request to certification, and sent to a CA, which transforms the request to
an X.509 public-key certificate or another type of certificate. an X.509 public-key certificate or another type of certificate.
$ certify $ certify
1. (I) Issue a digital certificate and thus vouch for the truth, 1. (I) Issue a digital certificate and thus vouch for the truth,
accuracy, and binding between data items in the certificate (e.g., accuracy, and binding between data items in the certificate (e.g.,
"X.509 public-key certificate"), such as the identity of the "X.509 public-key certificate"), such as the identity of the
certificate's subject and the ownership of a public key. (See: certificate's subject and the ownership of a public key. (See:
certification.) certification.)
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Usage: To "certify a public key" means to issue a public-key Usage: To "certify a public key" means to issue a public-key
certificate that vouches for the binding between the certificate's certificate that vouches for the binding between the certificate's
subject and the key. subject and the key.
2. (I) The act by which a CA uses measures to verify the truth, 2. (I) The act by which a CA uses measures to verify the truth,
accuracy, and binding between data items in a digital certificate. accuracy, and binding between data items in a digital certificate.
Tutorial: A description of the measures used for verification Tutorial: A description of the measures used for verification
should be included in the CA's CPS. should be included in the CA's CPS.
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$ channel $ channel
1. (I) An information transfer path within a system. (See: covert 1. (I) An information transfer path within a system. (See: covert
channel.) channel.)
2. (O) "A subdivision of the physical medium allowing possibly 2. (O) "A subdivision of the physical medium allowing possibly
shared independent uses of the medium." (RFC 3753) shared independent uses of the medium." (RFC 3753)
$ channel capacity $ channel capacity
(I) The total capacity of a link to carry information; usually (I) The total capacity of a link to carry information; usually
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expressed in bits per second. (RFC 3753) (Compare: bandwidth.) expressed in bits per second. (RFC 3753) (Compare: bandwidth.)
Tutorial: Within a given bandwidth, the theoretical maximum Tutorial: Within a given bandwidth, the theoretical maximum
channel capacity is given by Shannon's Law. The actual channel channel capacity is given by Shannon's Law. The actual channel
capacity is determined by the bandwidth, the coding system used, capacity is determined by the bandwidth, the coding system used,
and the signal-to-noise ratio. and the signal-to-noise ratio.
$ CHAP $ CHAP
(I) See: Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol. (I) See: Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol.
$ checksum $ checksum
(I) A value that (a) is computed by a function that is dependent (I) A value that (a) is computed by a function that is dependent
on the contents of a data object and (b) is stored or transmitted on the contents of a data object and (b) is stored or transmitted
together with the object, for the purpose of detecting changes in together with the object, for detecting changes in the data. (See:
the data. (See: cyclic redundancy check, data integrity service, cyclic redundancy check, data integrity service, error detection
error detection code, hash, keyed hash, parity bit, protected code, hash, keyed hash, parity bit, protected checksum.)
checksum.)
Tutorial: To gain confidence that a data object has not been Tutorial: To gain confidence that a data object has not been
changed, an entity that later uses the data can independently changed, an entity that later uses the data can independently
recompute the checksum value and compare the result with the value recompute the checksum value and compare the result with the value
that was stored or transmitted with the object. that was stored or transmitted with the object.
Computer systems and networks use checksums (and other mechanisms) Computer systems and networks use checksums (and other mechanisms)
to detect accidental changes in data. However, active wiretapping to detect accidental changes in data. However, active wiretapping
that changes data could also change an accompanying checksum to that changes data could also change an accompanying checksum to
match the changed data. Thus, some checksum functions by match the changed data. Thus, some checksum functions by
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states that if a consultant has access to class I(i) information states that if a consultant has access to class I(i) information
from a firm in that class, then the consultant may not access from a firm in that class, then the consultant may not access
information from another firm in that same class, but may access information from another firm in that same class, but may access
information from another firm that is in a different class. Thus, information from another firm that is in a different class. Thus,
the policy creates a barrier to communication between firms that the policy creates a barrier to communication between firms that
are in the same conflict-of-interest class. Brewer and Nash are in the same conflict-of-interest class. Brewer and Nash
modeled enforcement of this policy [BN89], including dealing with modeled enforcement of this policy [BN89], including dealing with
policy violations that could occur because two or more consultants policy violations that could occur because two or more consultants
work for the same firm. work for the same firm.
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$ chosen-ciphertext attack $ chosen-ciphertext attack
(I) A cryptanalysis technique in which the analyst tries to (I) A cryptanalysis technique in which the analyst tries to
determine the key from knowledge of plain text that corresponds to determine the key from knowledge of plain text that corresponds to
cipher text selected (i.e., dictated) by the analyst. cipher text selected (i.e., dictated) by the analyst.
$ chosen-plaintext attack $ chosen-plaintext attack
(I) A cryptanalysis technique in which the analyst tries to (I) A cryptanalysis technique in which the analyst tries to
determine the key from knowledge of cipher text that corresponds determine the key from knowledge of cipher text that corresponds
to plain text selected (i.e., dictated) by the analyst. to plain text selected (i.e., dictated) by the analyst.
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$ cipher text $ cipher text
1. (I) /noun/ Data that has been transformed by encryption so that 1. (I) /noun/ Data that has been transformed by encryption so that
its semantic information content (i.e., its meaning) is no longer its semantic information content (i.e., its meaning) is no longer
intelligible or directly available. (See: ciphertext. Compare: intelligible or directly available. (See: ciphertext. Compare:
clear text, plain text.) clear text, plain text.)
2. (O) "Data produced through the use of encipherment. The 2. (O) "Data produced through the use of encipherment. The
semantic content of the resulting data is not available." [I7498- semantic content of the resulting data is not available." [I7498-
2] 2]
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$ ciphertext $ ciphertext
1. (O) /noun/ Synonym for "cipher text" [I7498-2]. 1. (O) /noun/ Synonym for "cipher text" [I7498-2].
2. (I) /adjective/ Referring to cipher text. Usage: Commonly used 2. (I) /adjective/ Referring to cipher text. Usage: Commonly used
instead of "cipher-text". (Compare: cleartext, plaintext.) instead of "cipher-text". (Compare: cleartext, plaintext.)
$ ciphertext auto-key (CTAK) $ ciphertext auto-key (CTAK)
(D) "Cryptographic logic that uses previous cipher text to (D) "Cryptographic logic that uses previous cipher text to
generate a key stream." [C4009, A1523] (See: KAK.) generate a key stream." [C4009, A1523] (See: KAK.)
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environments. environments.
- "Class 3": Intended for applications handling unclassified, - "Class 3": Intended for applications handling unclassified,
medium-value data in moderately protected environments, or medium-value data in moderately protected environments, or
handling unclassified or high-value data in highly protected handling unclassified or high-value data in highly protected
environments, and for discretionary access control of environments, and for discretionary access control of
classified data in highly protected environments. classified data in highly protected environments.
- "Class 4": Intended for applications handling unclassified, - "Class 4": Intended for applications handling unclassified,
high-value data in minimally protected environments. high-value data in minimally protected environments.
- "Class 5": Intended for applications handling classified data - "Class 5": Intended for applications handling classified data
in minimally protected environments, and for authentication of in minimally protected environments, and for authentication of
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material that would affect the security of classified systems. material that would affect the security of classified systems.
The environments are defined as follows: The environments are defined as follows:
- "Highly protected environment": Networks that are protected - "Highly protected environment": Networks that are protected
either with encryption devices approved by NSA for protection either with encryption devices approved by NSA for protection
of classified data or via physical isolation, and that are of classified data or via physical isolation, and that are
certified for processing system-high classified data, where certified for processing system-high classified data, where
exposure of unencrypted data is limited to U.S. citizens exposure of unencrypted data is limited to U.S. citizens
holding appropriate security clearances. holding appropriate security clearances.
- "Moderately protected environment": - "Moderately protected environment":
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Evaluation Criteria". Evaluation Criteria".
$ classification $ classification
1. (I) A grouping of classified information to which a 1. (I) A grouping of classified information to which a
hierarchical, restrictive security label is applied to increase hierarchical, restrictive security label is applied to increase
protection of the data from unauthorized disclosure. (See: protection of the data from unauthorized disclosure. (See:
aggregation, classified, data confidentiality service. Compare: aggregation, classified, data confidentiality service. Compare:
category, compartment.) category, compartment.)
2. (I) An authorized process by which information is determined to 2. (I) An authorized process by which information is determined to
be classified and assigned to a security level. (See: be classified and assigned to a security level. (Compare:
declassification.) declassification.)
Usage: Usually understood to involve data confidentiality, but Usage: Usually understood to involve data confidentiality, but
ISDs SHOULD make this clear when data also is sensitive in other ISDs SHOULD make this clear when data also is sensitive in other
ways and SHOULD use other terms for those other sensitivity ways and SHOULD use other terms for those other sensitivity
concepts. (See: sensitive information, data integrity.) concepts. (See: sensitive information, data integrity.)
$ classification label $ classification label
(I) A security label that tells the degree of harm that will (I) A security label that tells the degree of harm that will
result from unauthorized disclosure of the labeled data, and may result from unauthorized disclosure of the labeled data, and may
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protect the data from unauthorized disclosure. Example: IPSO. protect the data from unauthorized disclosure. Example: IPSO.
(See: classified, data confidentiality service. Compare: integrity (See: classified, data confidentiality service. Compare: integrity
label.) label.)
Usage: Usually understood to involve data confidentiality, but Usage: Usually understood to involve data confidentiality, but
ISDs SHOULD make this clear when data also is sensitive in other ISDs SHOULD make this clear when data also is sensitive in other
ways and SHOULD use other terms for those other sensitivity ways and SHOULD use other terms for those other sensitivity
concepts. (See: sensitive information, data integrity.) concepts. (See: sensitive information, data integrity.)
$ classification level $ classification level
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(I) A hierarchical level of protection (against unauthorized (I) A hierarchical level of protection (against unauthorized
disclosure) that is required to be applied to certain classified disclosure) that is required to be applied to certain classified
data. (See: classified. Compare: security level.) data. (See: classified. Compare: security level.)
Usage: Usually understood to involve data confidentiality, but Usage: Usually understood to involve data confidentiality, but
ISDs SHOULD make this clear when data also is sensitive in other ISDs SHOULD make this clear when data also is sensitive in other
ways and SHOULD use other terms for those other sensitivity ways and SHOULD use other terms for those other sensitivity
concepts. (See: sensitive information, data integrity.) concepts. (See: sensitive information, data integrity.)
$ classified $ classified
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(D) /verb/ Synonym for "erase". [C4009] (D) /verb/ Synonym for "erase". [C4009]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term with this Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term with this
definition; that could be confused with "clear text" in which definition; that could be confused with "clear text" in which
information is directly recoverable. information is directly recoverable.
$ clear text $ clear text
1. (I) /noun/ Data in which the semantic information content 1. (I) /noun/ Data in which the semantic information content
(i.e., the meaning) is intelligible or is directly available, (i.e., the meaning) is intelligible or is directly available,
i.e., not encrypted. (See: cleartext, in the clear. Compare: i.e., not encrypted. (See: cleartext, in the clear. Compare:
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cipher text, plain text.) cipher text, plain text.)
2. (O) /noun/ "Intelligible data, the semantic content of which is 2. (O) /noun/ "Intelligible data, the semantic content of which is
available." [I7498-2] available." [I7498-2]
3. (D) /noun/ Synonym for "plain text". 3. (D) /noun/ Synonym for "plain text".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "plain text", because the plain text that is input to an for "plain text", because the plain text that is input to an
encryption operation may itself be cipher text that was output encryption operation may itself be cipher text that was output
from a previous encryption operation. (See: superencryption.) from a previous encryption operation. (See: superencryption.)
$ clearance $ clearance
See: security clearance. See: security clearance.
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$ client-server system $ client-server system
(I) A distributed system in which one or more entities, called (I) A distributed system in which one or more entities, called
clients, request a specific service from one or more other clients, request a specific service from one or more other
entities, called servers, that provide the service to the clients. entities, called servers, that provide the service to the clients.
Example: The Word Wide Web, in which component servers provide Example: The Word Wide Web, in which component servers provide
information that is requested by component clients called information that is requested by component clients called
"browsers". "browsers".
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$ CLIPPER $ CLIPPER
(N) An integrated microcircuit (in MYK-7x series manufactured by (N) An integrated microcircuit (in MYK-7x series manufactured by
Mykotronx, Inc.) that implements SKIPJACK, has non-deterministic Mykotronx, Inc.) that implements SKIPJACK, has non-deterministic
random number generator, and supports key escrow. (See: Escrowed random number generator, and supports key escrow. (See: Escrowed
Encryption Standard. Compare: CLIPPER.) Encryption Standard. Compare: CLIPPER.)
Tutorial: The chip was mainly intended for protecting Tutorial: The chip was mainly intended for protecting
telecommunications over the public switched network. The key telecommunications over the public switched network. The key
escrow scheme for the chip involves a SKIPJACK key that is common escrow scheme for the chip involves a SKIPJACK key that is common
to all chips and that protects the unique serial number of the to all chips and that protects the unique serial number of the
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malicious logic. (b) Configuration control provides sufficient malicious logic. (b) Configuration control provides sufficient
assurance that system applications and the equipment they run on assurance that system applications and the equipment they run on
are protected against the introduction of malicious logic prior to are protected against the introduction of malicious logic prior to
and during the operation of applications. [NCS04] (See: "first and during the operation of applications. [NCS04] (See: "first
law" under "Courtney's laws". Compare: open security environment.) law" under "Courtney's laws". Compare: open security environment.)
$ CMA $ CMA
(D) See: certificate management authority. (D) See: certificate management authority.
$ CMAC $ CMAC
(N) A message authentication code, specified by NIST [SP38B], that (N) A message authentication code [SP38B] that is based on a
is based on a symmetric block cipher. (See: block cipher.) symmetric block cipher. (See: block cipher.)
Derivation: Cipher-based MAC. (Compare: HMAC.) Derivation: Cipher-based MAC. (Compare: HMAC.)
Tutorial: Because CMAC is based on approved, symmetric-key block Tutorial: Because CMAC is based on approved, symmetric-key block
ciphers, such as AES, CMAC can be considered a mode of operation ciphers, such as AES, CMAC can be considered a mode of operation
for those block ciphers. (See: mode of operation.) for those block ciphers. (See: mode of operation.)
$ CMCS $ CMCS
(O) See: COMSEC Material Control System. (O) See: COMSEC Material Control System.
$ CMM $ CMM
(N) See: Capability Maturity Model. (N) See: Capability Maturity Model.
$ CMS $ CMS
(I) See: Cryptographic Message Syntax. (I) See: Cryptographic Message Syntax.
$ code $ code
1. (I) A system of symbols used to represent information, which 1. (I) A system of symbols used to represent information, which
might originally have some other representation. Examples: ASCII, might originally have some other representation. Examples: ASCII,
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BER, country code, Morse code. (See: encode, object code, source BER, country code, Morse code. (See: encode, object code, source
code.) code.)
Deprecated Abbreviation: To avoid confusion with definition 1, Deprecated Abbreviation: To avoid confusion with definition 1,
ISDs SHOULD NOT use "code" as an abbreviation of "country code", ISDs SHOULD NOT use "code" as an abbreviation of "country code",
"cyclic redundancy code", "Data Authentication Code", "error "cyclic redundancy code", "Data Authentication Code", "error
detection code", or "Message Authentication Code". To avoid detection code", or "Message Authentication Code". To avoid
misunderstanding, use the fully qualified term in these other misunderstanding, use the fully qualified term in these other
cases, at least at the point of first usage. cases, at least at the point of first usage.
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(I) A security mechanism that uses a digital signature to provide (I) A security mechanism that uses a digital signature to provide
data integrity and data origin authentication for software that is data integrity and data origin authentication for software that is
being distributed for use. (See: mobile code, trusted being distributed for use. (See: mobile code, trusted
distribution.) distribution.)
Tutorial: In some cases, the signature on a software module may Tutorial: In some cases, the signature on a software module may
imply some assertion that the signer makes about the software. For imply some assertion that the signer makes about the software. For
example, a signature may imply that the software has been example, a signature may imply that the software has been
designed, developed, or tested according some criterion. designed, developed, or tested according some criterion.
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$ code word $ code word
(O) /U.S. Government/ "A single word assigned a classified meaning (O) /U.S. Government/ "A single word assigned a classified meaning
by appropriate authority to ensure proper security concerning by appropriate authority to ensure proper security concerning
intentions and to safeguard information pertaining to actual, intentions and to safeguard information pertaining to actual,
real-world military plans or operations classified as CONFIDENTIAL real-world military plans or operations classified as CONFIDENTIAL
or higher." or higher."
$ collateral information $ collateral information
(O) /U.S. Government/ "Information identified as National Security (O) /U.S. Government/ "Information identified as National Security
Information under the provisions of [Executive Order] 12958 but Information under the provisions of [Executive Order] 12958 but
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SAP information." SAP information."
$ COI $ COI
(I) See: community of interest. (I) See: community of interest.
$ cold start $ cold start
(N) /cryptographic module/ A procedure for initially keying (N) /cryptographic module/ A procedure for initially keying
cryptographic equipment. [C4009] cryptographic equipment. [C4009]
$ color change $ color change
(I) In a system being operated in periods processing mode, the act (I) In a system being operated in periods-processing mode, the act
of purging all information from one processing period and then of purging all information from one processing period and then
changing over to the next processing period. (See: BLACK, RED.) changing over to the next processing period. (See: BLACK, RED.)
$ Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program (CCEP) $ Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program (CCEP)
(O) "Relationship between NSA and industry in which NSA provides (O) "Relationship between NSA and industry in which NSA provides
the COMSEC expertise (i.e., standards, algorithms, evaluations, the COMSEC expertise (i.e., standards, algorithms, evaluations,
and guidance) and industry provides design, development, and and guidance) and industry provides design, development, and
production capabilities to produce a type 1 or type 2 product." production capabilities to produce a type 1 or type 2 product."
[C4009] [C4009]
$ commercially licensed evaluation facility (CLEF) $ commercially licensed evaluation facility (CLEF)
(N) An organization that has official approval to evaluate the (N) An organization that has official approval to evaluate the
security of products and systems in accordance with the Common security of products and systems under the Common Criteria, ITSEC,
Criteria, ITSEC, or some other standard. (Compare: KLIF.) or some other standard. (Compare: KLIF.)
$ Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) $ Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS)
(O) A U.S. Government, interagency, standing committee of the (O) A U.S. Government, interagency, standing committee of the
President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. The CNSS is President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. The CNSS is
chaired by the Secretary of Defense and provides a forum for the chaired by the Secretary of Defense and provides a forum for the
discussion of policy issues, sets national policy, and promulgates discussion of policy issues, sets national policy, and promulgates
direction, operational procedures, and guidance for the security direction, operational procedures, and guidance for the security
of national security systems. The Secretary of Defense and the of national security systems. The Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence are responsible for developing Director of Central Intelligence are responsible for developing
and overseeing the implementation of Government-wide policies, and overseeing the implementation of Government-wide policies,
principles, standards, and guidelines for the security of systems principles, standards, and guidelines for the security of systems
that handle national security information. that handle national security information.
$ Common Criteria for Information Technology Security $ Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
(N) A standard for evaluating information technology (IT) products (N) A standard for evaluating information technology (IT) products
and systems. It states requirements for security functions and for and systems. It states requirements for security functions and for
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assurance measures. [CCIB] (See: CLEF, EAL, packages, protection assurance measures. [CCIB] (See: CLEF, EAL, packages, protection
profile, security target, TOE. Compare: CMM.) profile, security target, TOE. Compare: CMM.)
Tutorial: Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Tutorial: Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and the United States (NIST and NSA) began developing Kingdom, and the United States (NIST and NSA) began developing
this standard in 1993, based on the European ITSEC, the Canadian this standard in 1993, based on the European ITSEC, the Canadian
Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC), and the Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC), and the
U.S. "Federal Criteria for Information Technology Security" and U.S. "Federal Criteria for Information Technology Security" and
its precursor, the TCSEC. Work was done in cooperation with its precursor, the TCSEC. Work was done in cooperation with
ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 (Information Technology), ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 (Information Technology),
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assurance components for use as a standard way of expressing the assurance components for use as a standard way of expressing the
such requirements for IT products and systems, and defines such requirements for IT products and systems, and defines
evaluation criteria for protection profiles and security targets. evaluation criteria for protection profiles and security targets.
$ Common IP Security Option (CIPSO) $ Common IP Security Option (CIPSO)
(I) See: secondary definition under "IPSO". (I) See: secondary definition under "IPSO".
$ common name $ common name
(N) A character string that (a) may be a part of the X.500 DN of a (N) A character string that (a) may be a part of the X.500 DN of a
Directory object ("commonName" attribute), (b) is a (possibly Directory object ("commonName" attribute), (b) is a (possibly
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ambiguous) name by which the object is commonly known in some ambiguous) name by which the object is commonly known in some
limited scope (such as an organization), and (c) conforms to the limited scope (such as an organization), and (c) conforms to the
naming conventions of the country or culture with which it is naming conventions of the country or culture with which it is
associated. [X520] (See: "subject" and "issuer" under "X.509 associated. [X520] (See: "subject" and "issuer" under "X.509
public-key certificate".) public-key certificate".)
Examples: "Dr. Albert Einstein", "The United Nations", and "12-th Examples: "Dr. Albert Einstein", "The United Nations", and "12-th
Floor Laser Printer". Floor Laser Printer".
$ communications cover $ communications cover
(N) "Concealing or altering of characteristic communications (N) "Concealing or altering of characteristic communications
patterns to hide information that could be of value to an patterns to hide information that could be of value to an
adversary." [C4009] (See: operations security, traffic-flow adversary." [C4009] (See: operations security, traffic-flow
confidentiality, TRANSEC.) confidentiality, TRANSEC.)
$ communication security (COMSEC) $ communication security (COMSEC)
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$ community string $ community string
(I) A community name in the form of an octet string that serves as (I) A community name in the form of an octet string that serves as
a cleartext password in SNMP version 1 (RFC 1157) and version 2 a cleartext password in SNMP version 1 (RFC 1157) and version 2
(RFC 1901). (See: password, Simple Network Management Protocol.) (RFC 1901). (See: password, Simple Network Management Protocol.)
Tutorial: The SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 protocols have been declared Tutorial: The SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 protocols have been declared
"historic" and have been replaced by the more secure SNMPv3 "historic" and have been replaced by the more secure SNMPv3
standard (RFCs 3410-3418), which does not use cleartext passwords. standard (RFCs 3410-3418), which does not use cleartext passwords.
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$ compartment $ compartment
1. (I) A grouping of sensitive information items that require 1. (I) A grouping of sensitive information items that require
special access controls beyond those normally provided for the special access controls beyond those normally provided for the
basic classification level of the information. (See: compartmented basic classification level of the information. (See: compartmented
security mode. Compare: category, classification.) security mode. Compare: category, classification.)
Usage: The term is usually understood to include the special Usage: The term is usually understood to include the special
handling procedures to be used for the information. handling procedures to be used for the information.
2. (I) Synonym for "category". 2. (I) Synonym for "category".
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$ component $ component
See: system component. See: system component.
$ compression $ compression
(I) A process that encodes information in a way that minimizes the (I) A process that encodes information in a way that minimizes the
number of resulting code symbols and thus reduces storage space or number of resulting code symbols and thus reduces storage space or
transmission time. transmission time.
Tutorial: A data compression algorithm may be "lossless", i.e., Tutorial: A data compression algorithm may be "lossless", i.e.,
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retain all information that was encoded in the data, so that retain all information that was encoded in the data, so that
decompression can recover all the information; or an algorithm may decompression can recover all the information; or an algorithm may
be "lossy". Text usually needs to be compressed losslessly, but be "lossy". Text usually needs to be compressed losslessly, but
images are often compressed with lossy schemes. images are often compressed with lossy schemes.
Not all schemes that encode information losslessly for machine Not all schemes that encode information losslessly for machine
processing are efficient in terms of minimizing the number of processing are efficient in terms of minimizing the number of
output bits. For example, ASCII encoding is lossless, but ASCII output bits. For example, ASCII encoding is lossless, but ASCII
data can often be losslessly reencoded in fewer bits with other data can often be losslessly reencoded in fewer bits with other
schemes. These more efficient schemes take advantage of some sort schemes. These more efficient schemes take advantage of some sort
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(N) /MISSI/ A list that identifies keys for which unauthorized (N) /MISSI/ A list that identifies keys for which unauthorized
disclosure or alteration may have occurred. (See: compromise.) disclosure or alteration may have occurred. (See: compromise.)
Tutorial: A CKL is issued by an CA, like a CRL is issued. But a Tutorial: A CKL is issued by an CA, like a CRL is issued. But a
CKL lists only KMIDs, not subjects that hold the keys, and not CKL lists only KMIDs, not subjects that hold the keys, and not
certificates in which the keys are bound. certificates in which the keys are bound.
$ COMPUSEC $ COMPUSEC
(I) See: computer security. (I) See: computer security.
$ computer system
(I) Synonym for "information system", or a component thereof.
(Compare: computer platform.)
$ computer emergency response team (CERT) $ computer emergency response team (CERT)
(I) An organization that studies computer and network INFOSEC in (I) An organization that studies computer and network INFOSEC in
order to provide incident response services to victims of attacks, order to provide incident response services to victims of attacks,
publish alerts concerning vulnerabilities and threats, and offer publish alerts concerning vulnerabilities and threats, and offer
other information to help improve computer and network security. other information to help improve computer and network security.
(See: CSIRT, security incident.) (See: CSIRT, security incident.)
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Examples: CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University Examples: CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University
(sometimes called "the" CERT); CIAC. (sometimes called "the" CERT); CIAC.
$ Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) $ Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC)
(O) The centralized CSIRT of the U.S. Department of Energy; a (O) The centralized CSIRT of the U.S. Department of Energy; a
member of FIRST. member of FIRST.
$ computer network $ computer network
(I) A collection of host computers together with the subnetwork or (I) A collection of host computers together with the subnetwork or
internetwork through which they can exchange data. internetwork through which they can exchange data.
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Tutorial: To be considered a CSIRT, an organization must do as Tutorial: To be considered a CSIRT, an organization must do as
follows: (a) Provide a (secure) channel for receiving reports follows: (a) Provide a (secure) channel for receiving reports
about suspected security incidents. (b) Provide assistance to about suspected security incidents. (b) Provide assistance to
members of its constituency in handling the incidents. (c) members of its constituency in handling the incidents. (c)
Disseminate incident-related information to its constituency and Disseminate incident-related information to its constituency and
other involved parties. other involved parties.
$ computer security object $ computer security object
(I) The definition or representation of a resource, tool, or (I) The definition or representation of a resource, tool, or
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mechanism used to maintain a condition of security in computerized mechanism used to maintain a condition of security in computerized
environments. Includes many items referred to in standards that environments. Includes many items referred to in standards that
are either selected or defined by separate user communities. are either selected or defined by separate user communities.
[CSOR] (See: object identifier, Computer Security Objects [CSOR] (See: object identifier, Computer Security Objects
Register.) Register.)
$ Computer Security Objects Register (CSOR) $ Computer Security Objects Register (CSOR)
(N) A service operated by NIST is establishing a catalog for (N) A service operated by NIST is establishing a catalog for
computer security objects to provide stable object definitions computer security objects to provide stable object definitions
identified by unique names. The use of this register will enable identified by unique names. The use of this register will enable
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Tutorial: The CSOR follows registration guidelines established by Tutorial: The CSOR follows registration guidelines established by
the international standards community and ANSI. Those guidelines the international standards community and ANSI. Those guidelines
establish minimum responsibilities for registration authorities establish minimum responsibilities for registration authorities
and assign the top branches of an international registration and assign the top branches of an international registration
hierarchy. Under that international registration hierarchy the hierarchy. Under that international registration hierarchy the
CSOR is responsible for the allocation of unique identifiers under CSOR is responsible for the allocation of unique identifiers under
the branch: {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) the branch: {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840)
organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)}. organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)}.
$ computer system
(I) Synonym for "information system", or a component thereof.
(Compare: computer platform.)
$ Computers At Risk $ Computers At Risk
(O) The 1991 report [NRC91] of the System Security Study (O) The 1991 report [NRC91] of the System Security Study
Committee, sponsored by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and Committee, sponsored by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and
supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the
U.S. DoD. It made many recommendations for industry and Government U.S. DoD. It made many recommendations for industry and Government
to improve computer security and trustworthiness. Some of the most to improve computer security and trustworthiness. Some of the most
important recommendations (e.g., establishing an Information important recommendations (e.g., establishing an Information
Security Foundation chartered by the U.S. Government) have not Security Foundation chartered by the U.S. Government) have not
been implemented at all, and others (e.g., codifying Generally been implemented at all, and others (e.g., codifying Generally
Accepted System Security Principles similar to accounting Accepted System Security Principles similar to accounting
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control of COMSEC material." [C4009] (See: COMSEC custodian.) control of COMSEC material." [C4009] (See: COMSEC custodian.)
$ COMSEC accounting $ COMSEC accounting
(O) /U.S. Government/ The process of creating, collecting, and (O) /U.S. Government/ The process of creating, collecting, and
maintaining data records that describe the status and custody of maintaining data records that describe the status and custody of
designated items of COMSEC material. (See: accounting legend designated items of COMSEC material. (See: accounting legend
code.) code.)
Tutorial: Almost any secure information system needs to record a Tutorial: Almost any secure information system needs to record a
security audit trail, but a system that manages COMSEC material security audit trail, but a system that manages COMSEC material
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needs to record additional data about the status and custody of needs to record additional data about the status and custody of
COMSEC items. COMSEC items.
- COMSEC tracking: The process of automatically collecting, - COMSEC tracking: The process of automatically collecting,
recording, and managing information that describes the status recording, and managing information that describes the status
of designated items of COMSEC material at all times during each of designated items of COMSEC material at all times during each
product's lifecycle. product's lifecycle.
- COMSEC controlling: The process of supplementing tracking data - COMSEC controlling: The process of supplementing tracking data
with custody data, which consists of explicit acknowledgements with custody data, which consists of explicit acknowledgements
of system entities that they (a) have received specific COMSEC of system entities that they (a) have received specific COMSEC
items and (b) are responsible for preventing exposure of those items and (b) are responsible for preventing exposure of those
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are not limited to) keys; equipment, devices, documents, firmware, are not limited to) keys; equipment, devices, documents, firmware,
and software that embodies or describes cryptographic logic; and and software that embodies or describes cryptographic logic; and
other items that perform COMSEC functions. [C4009] (Compare: other items that perform COMSEC functions. [C4009] (Compare:
keying material.) keying material.)
$ COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS) $ COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS)
(O) /U.S. Government/ "Logistics and accounting system through (O) /U.S. Government/ "Logistics and accounting system through
which COMSEC material marked 'CRYPTO' is distributed, controlled, which COMSEC material marked 'CRYPTO' is distributed, controlled,
and safeguarded." [C4009] (See: COMSEC account, COMSEC custodian.) and safeguarded." [C4009] (See: COMSEC account, COMSEC custodian.)
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$ confidentiality $ confidentiality
See: data confidentiality. See: data confidentiality.
$ concealment system $ concealment system
(O) "A method of achieving confidentiality in which sensitive (O) "A method of achieving confidentiality in which sensitive
information is hidden by embedding it in irrelevant data." [NCS04] information is hidden by embedding it in irrelevant data." [NCS04]
(Compare: steganography.) (Compare: steganography.)
$ configuration control $ configuration control
(I) The process of regulating changes to hardware, firmware, (I) The process of regulating changes to hardware, firmware,
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of an intermediate cache server. The two basic content filtering of an intermediate cache server. The two basic content filtering
techniques are (a) to block a specified list of URLs and (b) to techniques are (a) to block a specified list of URLs and (b) to
block material that contains specified words and phrases. block material that contains specified words and phrases.
$ contingency plan $ contingency plan
(I) A plan for emergency response, backup operations, and post- (I) A plan for emergency response, backup operations, and post-
disaster recovery in a system as part of a security program to disaster recovery in a system as part of a security program to
ensure availability of critical system resources and facilitate ensure availability of critical system resources and facilitate
continuity of operations in a crisis. [NCS04] (See: availability.) continuity of operations in a crisis. [NCS04] (See: availability.)
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$ control zone $ control zone
(O) "The space, expressed in feet of radius, surrounding equipment (O) "The space, expressed in feet of radius, surrounding equipment
processing sensitive information, that is under sufficient processing sensitive information, that is under sufficient
physical and technical control to preclude an unauthorized entry physical and technical control to preclude an unauthorized entry
or compromise." [NCSSG] (Compare: inspectable space, TEMPEST or compromise." [NCSSG] (Compare: inspectable space, TEMPEST
zone.) zone.)
$ controlled access protection $ controlled access protection
(O) /TCSEC/ The level of evaluation criteria for a C2 computer (O) /TCSEC/ The level of evaluation criteria for a C2 computer
system. system.
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mode). (See: /system operation/ under "mode", protection level.) mode). (See: /system operation/ under "mode", protection level.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. It was defined in Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. It was defined in
a Government policy regarding system accreditation and was a Government policy regarding system accreditation and was
subsumed by "partitioned security mode" in a later policy. Both subsumed by "partitioned security mode" in a later policy. Both
terms were dropped in still later policies. terms were dropped in still later policies.
Tutorial: Controlled mode was intended to encourage ingenuity in Tutorial: Controlled mode was intended to encourage ingenuity in
meeting data confidentiality requirements in ways less restrictive meeting data confidentiality requirements in ways less restrictive
than "dedicated security mode" and "system-high security mode", than "dedicated security mode" and "system-high security mode",
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but at a level of risk lower than that generally associated with but at a level of risk lower than that generally associated with
true "multilevel security mode". This was intended to be true "multilevel security mode". This was intended to be
accomplished by implementation of explicit augmenting measures to accomplished by implementation of explicit augmenting measures to
reduce or remove a substantial measure of system software reduce or remove a substantial measure of system software
vulnerability together with specific limitation of the security vulnerability together with specific limitation of the security
clearance levels of users having concurrent access to the system. clearance levels of users having concurrent access to the system.
$ controlling authority $ controlling authority
(O) /U.S. Government/ "Official responsible for directing the (O) /U.S. Government/ "Official responsible for directing the
operation of a cryptonet and for managing the operational use and operation of a cryptonet and for managing the operational use and
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(N) UTC is derived from International Atomic Time (TAI) by adding (N) UTC is derived from International Atomic Time (TAI) by adding
a number of leap seconds. The International Bureau of Weights and a number of leap seconds. The International Bureau of Weights and
Measures computes TAI once each month by averaging data from many Measures computes TAI once each month by averaging data from many
laboratories. (See: GeneralizedTime, UTCTime.) laboratories. (See: GeneralizedTime, UTCTime.)
$ correction $ correction
(I) /security/ A system change made to eliminate or reduce the (I) /security/ A system change made to eliminate or reduce the
risk of reoccurrence of a security violation or threat risk of reoccurrence of a security violation or threat
consequence. (See: secondary definition under "security".) consequence. (See: secondary definition under "security".)
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$ correctness $ correctness
(I) "The property of a system that is guaranteed as the result of (I) "The property of a system that is guaranteed as the result of
formal verification activities." [Huff] (See: correctness proof, formal verification activities." [Huff] (See: correctness proof,
verification.) verification.)
$ correctness integrity $ correctness integrity
(I) The property that the information represented by data is (I) The property that the information represented by data is
accurate and consistent. (Compare: data integrity, source accurate and consistent. (Compare: data integrity, source
integrity.) integrity.)
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in the alteration of system functions or data. in the alteration of system functions or data.
- "Natural disaster": /corruption/ Any "act of God" (e.g., power - "Natural disaster": /corruption/ Any "act of God" (e.g., power
surge caused by lightning) that alters system functions or surge caused by lightning) that alters system functions or
data. [FP031 section 2] data. [FP031 section 2]
$ counter $ counter
1. (N) /noun/ See: counter mode. 1. (N) /noun/ See: counter mode.
2. (I) /verb/ See: countermeasure. 2. (I) /verb/ See: countermeasure.
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$ counter-countermeasure $ counter-countermeasure
(I) An action, device, procedure, or technique used by an attacker (I) An action, device, procedure, or technique used by an attacker
to offset a defensive countermeasure. to offset a defensive countermeasure.
Tutorial: For every countermeasure devised to protect computers Tutorial: For every countermeasure devised to protect computers
and networks, some cracker probably will be able to devise a and networks, some cracker probably will be able to devise a
counter-countermeasure. Thus, systems must use "defense in depth". counter-countermeasure. Thus, systems must use "defense in depth".
$ counter mode (CTR) $ counter mode (CTR)
(N) A block cipher mode that enhances ECB mode by ensuring that (N) A block cipher mode that enhances ECB mode by ensuring that
each encrypted block is different from every other block encrypted each encrypted block is different from every other block encrypted
under the same key. [SP38A] (See: block cipher.) under the same key. [SP38A] (See: block cipher.)
Tutorial: This mode operates by first encrypting a generated Tutorial: This mode operates by first encrypting a generated
sequence of blocks, called "counters", which are separate from the sequence of blocks, called "counters", that are separate from the
input sequence of plaintext blocks which the mode is intended to input sequence of plaintext blocks which the mode is intended to
protect. The resulting sequence of encrypted counters is protect. The resulting sequence of encrypted counters is
exclusive-ORed with the sequence of plaintext blocks to produce exclusive-ORed with the sequence of plaintext blocks to produce
the final ciphertext output blocks. The sequence of counters must the final ciphertext output blocks. The sequence of counters must
have the property that each counter is different from every other have the property that each counter is different from every other
counter for all of the plain text that is encrypted under the same counter for all of the plain text that is encrypted under the same
key. key.
$ Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code $ Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
(CCM) (CCM)
(N) A block cipher mode, specified by NIST [SP38C], that provides (N) A block cipher mode [SP38C] that provides both data
both data confidentiality and data origin authentication, by confidentiality and data origin authentication, by combining the
combining the techniques of CTR and a CBC-based message techniques of CTR and a CBC-based message authentication code.
authentication code. (See: block cipher.) (See: block cipher.)
$ countermeasure $ countermeasure
(I) An action, device, procedure, or technique that meets or (I) An action, device, procedure, or technique that meets or
opposes (i.e., counters) a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack opposes (i.e., counters) a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack
by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can
cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective
action can be taken. action can be taken.
Tutorial: In an Internet protocol, a countermeasure may take the Tutorial: In an Internet protocol, a countermeasure may take the
form of a protocol feature, an component function, or a usage form of a protocol feature, an component function, or a usage
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Tutorial: For each nation, ISO Standard 3166 defines a unique two- Tutorial: For each nation, ISO Standard 3166 defines a unique two-
character alphabetic code, a unique three-character alphabetic character alphabetic code, a unique three-character alphabetic
code, and a three-digit code. Among many uses of these codes, the code, and a three-digit code. Among many uses of these codes, the
two-character codes are used as top-level domain names. two-character codes are used as top-level domain names.
$ Courtney's laws $ Courtney's laws
(N) Principles for managing system security that were stated by (N) Principles for managing system security that were stated by
Robert H. Courtney, Jr. Robert H. Courtney, Jr.
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Tutorial: Bill Murray codified Courtney's laws as follows: [Murr] Tutorial: Bill Murray codified Courtney's laws as follows: [Murr]
- Courtney's first law: You cannot say anything interesting - Courtney's first law: You cannot say anything interesting
(i.e., significant) about the security of a system except in (i.e., significant) about the security of a system except in
the context of a particular application and environment. the context of a particular application and environment.
- Courtney's second law: Never spend more money eliminating a - Courtney's second law: Never spend more money eliminating a
security exposure than tolerating it will cost you. (See: security exposure than tolerating it will cost you. (See:
acceptable risk, risk analysis.) acceptable risk, risk analysis.)
-- First corollary: Perfect security has infinite cost. -- First corollary: Perfect security has infinite cost.
-- Second corollary: There is no such thing as zero risk. -- Second corollary: There is no such thing as zero risk.
- Courtney's third law: There are no technical solutions to - Courtney's third law: There are no technical solutions to
management problems, but there are management solutions to management problems, but there are management solutions to
technical problems. technical problems.
$ covert action $ covert action
(I) An operation that is planned and executed in a way that (I) An operation that is planned and executed in a way that
conceals the identity of the operator. conceals the identity of the operator.
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(I) A system feature that enable one system entity to signal (I) A system feature that enable one system entity to signal
information to another by modulating its own use of a system information to another by modulating its own use of a system
resource in such a way as to affect system response time observed resource in such a way as to affect system response time observed
by the second entity. (See: covert channel.) by the second entity. (See: covert channel.)
$ CPS $ CPS
(I) See: certification practice statement. (I) See: certification practice statement.
$ cracker $ cracker
(I) Someone who tries to break the security of, and gain (I) Someone who tries to break the security of, and gain
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unauthorized access to, someone else's system, often with unauthorized access to, someone else's system, often with
malicious intent. (See: adversary, intruder, packet monkey, script malicious intent. (See: adversary, intruder, packet monkey, script
kiddy. Compare: hacker.) kiddy. Compare: hacker.)
Usage: Was sometimes spelled "kracker". [NCSSG] Usage: Was sometimes spelled "kracker". [NCSSG]
$ CRAM $ CRAM
(I) See: Challenge-Response Authentication Mechanism. (I) See: Challenge-Response Authentication Mechanism.
$ CRC $ CRC
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is "verified", not the credential; the credential is "validated". is "verified", not the credential; the credential is "validated".
(See: validate vs. verify.) (See: validate vs. verify.)
Tutorial: In general English, "credentials" are evidence or Tutorial: In general English, "credentials" are evidence or
testimonials that (a) support a claim of identity or authorization testimonials that (a) support a claim of identity or authorization
and (b) usually are intended to be used more than once (i.e., a and (b) usually are intended to be used more than once (i.e., a
credential's life is long compared to the time needed for one credential's life is long compared to the time needed for one
use). Some examples are a policeman's badge, an automobile use). Some examples are a policeman's badge, an automobile
driver's license, and a national passport. An authentication or driver's license, and a national passport. An authentication or
access control process that uses a badge, license, or passport is access control process that uses a badge, license, or passport is
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outwardly simple: the holder just shows the thing. outwardly simple: the holder just shows the thing.
The problem with adopting this term in Internet security is that The problem with adopting this term in Internet security is that
an automated process for authentication or access control usually an automated process for authentication or access control usually
requires multiple steps using multiple data objects, and it might requires multiple steps using multiple data objects, and it might
not be immediately obvious which of those objects should get the not be immediately obvious which of those objects should get the
name "credential". name "credential".
For example, if the verification step in a user authentication For example, if the verification step in a user authentication
process employs public-key technology, then the process involves process employs public-key technology, then the process involves
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as either "critical" or "non-critical". In a certificate, if a as either "critical" or "non-critical". In a certificate, if a
computer program does not recognize an extension's type (i.e., computer program does not recognize an extension's type (i.e.,
does not implement its semantics), then if the extension is does not implement its semantics), then if the extension is
critical, the program is required to treat the certificate as critical, the program is required to treat the certificate as
invalid; but if the extension is non-critical, the program is invalid; but if the extension is non-critical, the program is
permitted to ignore the extension. permitted to ignore the extension.
In a CRL, if a program does not recognize a critical extension In a CRL, if a program does not recognize a critical extension
that is associated with a specific certificate, the program is that is associated with a specific certificate, the program is
required to assume that the listed certificate has been revoked required to assume that the listed certificate has been revoked
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and is no longer valid, and then take whatever action is required and is no longer valid, and then take whatever action is required
by local policy. by local policy.
When a program does not recognize a critical extension that is When a program does not recognize a critical extension that is
associated with the CRL as a whole, the program is required to associated with the CRL as a whole, the program is required to
assume that all listed certificates have been revoked and are no assume that all listed certificates have been revoked and are no
longer valid. However, since failing to process the extension may longer valid. However, since failing to process the extension may
mean that the list has not been completed, the program cannot mean that the list has not been completed, the program cannot
assume that other certificates are valid, and the program needs to assume that other certificates are valid, and the program needs to
take whatever action is therefore required by local policy. take whatever action is therefore required by local policy.
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when both CAs are in the same PKI, i.e., when either (a) CA1 and when both CAs are in the same PKI, i.e., when either (a) CA1 and
CA2 are under the same root or (b) CA1 is itself a root. The CA2 are under the same root or (b) CA1 is itself a root. The
"cross-certification" concept applies in other cases: "cross-certification" concept applies in other cases:
First, cross-certification applies when two CAs are in different First, cross-certification applies when two CAs are in different
PKIs, i.e., when CA1 and CA2 are under different roots, or perhaps PKIs, i.e., when CA1 and CA2 are under different roots, or perhaps
are both roots themselves. Issuing the cross-certificate enables are both roots themselves. Issuing the cross-certificate enables
end entities certified under CA1 in PK1 to construct the end entities certified under CA1 in PK1 to construct the
certification paths needed to validate the certificates of end certification paths needed to validate the certificates of end
entities certified under CA2 in PKI2. Sometimes, a pair of cross- entities certified under CA2 in PKI2. Sometimes, a pair of cross-
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certificates is issued -- by CA1 to CA2, and by CA2 to CA1 -- so certificates is issued -- by CA1 to CA2, and by CA2 to CA1 -- so
that an end entity in either PKI can validate certificates issued that an end entity in either PKI can validate certificates issued
in the other PKI. in the other PKI.
Second, X.509 says that two CAs in some complex, multi-CA PKI can Second, X.509 says that two CAs in some complex, multi-CA PKI can
cross-certify one another for the purpose of shortening the cross-certify one another to shorten the certification paths
certification paths constructed by end entities. Whether or not a constructed by end entities. Whether or not a CA may perform this
CA may perform this or any other form of cross-certification, and or any other form of cross-certification, and how such
how such certificates may be used by end entities, should be certificates may be used by end entities, should be addressed by
addressed by the local certificate policy and CPS. the local certificate policy and CPS.
$ cross-domain solution $ cross-domain solution
1. (D) Synonym for "guard". 1. (D) Synonym for "guard".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"guard"; this term unnecessarily (and verbosely) duplicates the "guard"; this term unnecessarily (and verbosely) duplicates the
meaning of the long-established "guard". meaning of the long-established "guard".
2. (O) /U.S. Government/ A process or subsystem that provides a 2. (O) /U.S. Government/ A process or subsystem that provides a
capability (which could be either manual or automated) to access capability (which could be either manual or automated) to access
two or more differing security domains in a system, or to transfer two or more differing security domains in a system, or to transfer
information between such domains. (See: domain, guard.) information between such domains. (See: domain, guard.)
$ cryptanalysis $ cryptanalysis
1. (I) The mathematical science that deals with analysis of a 1. (I) The mathematical science that deals with analysis of a
cryptographic system in order to gain knowledge needed to break or cryptographic system to gain knowledge needed to break or
circumvent the protection that the system is designed to provide. circumvent the protection that the system is designed to provide.
(See: cryptology, secondary defintion under "intrusion".) (See: cryptology, secondary definition under "intrusion".)
2. (O) "The analysis of a cryptographic system and/or its inputs 2. (O) "The analysis of a cryptographic system and/or its inputs
and outputs to derive confidential variables and/or sensitive data and outputs to derive confidential variables and/or sensitive data
including cleartext." [I7498-2] including cleartext." [I7498-2]
Tutorial: Definition 2 states the traditional goal of Tutorial: Definition 2 states the traditional goal of
cryptanalysis, i.e. convert cipher text to plain text (which cryptanalysis, i.e. convert cipher text to plain text (which
usually is clear text) without knowing the key; but that usually is clear text) without knowing the key; but that
definition applies only to encryption systems. Today, the term is definition applies only to encryption systems. Today, the term is
used with reference to all kinds of cryptographic algorithms and used with reference to all kinds of cryptographic algorithms and
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ciphertext; and these generalize to the other kinds of ciphertext; and these generalize to the other kinds of
cryptography. cryptography.
$ crypto, CRYPTO $ crypto, CRYPTO
1. (N) A prefix ("crypto-") that means "cryptographic". 1. (N) A prefix ("crypto-") that means "cryptographic".
Usage: ISDs MAY use this prefix when it is part of a term listed Usage: ISDs MAY use this prefix when it is part of a term listed
in this Glossary. Otherwise, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this prefix; in this Glossary. Otherwise, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this prefix;
instead, use the unabbreviated adjective, "cryptographic". instead, use the unabbreviated adjective, "cryptographic".
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2. (D) In lower case, "crypto" is an abbreviation for the 2. (D) In lower case, "crypto" is an abbreviation for the
adjective "cryptographic", or for the nouns "cryptography" or adjective "cryptographic", or for the nouns "cryptography" or
"cryptographic component". "cryptographic component".
Deprecated Abbreviation: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this abbreviation Deprecated Abbreviation: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this abbreviation
because it could easily be misunderstood in some technical sense. because it could easily be misunderstood in some technical sense.
3. (O) /U.S. Government/ In upper case, "CRYPTO" is a marking or 3. (O) /U.S. Government/ In upper case, "CRYPTO" is a marking or
designator that identifies "COMSEC keying material used to secure designator that identifies "COMSEC keying material used to secure
or authenticate telecommunications carrying classified or or authenticate telecommunications carrying classified or
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$ cryptographic hash $ cryptographic hash
(I) See: secondary definition under "hash function". (I) See: secondary definition under "hash function".
$ cryptographic ignition key (CIK) $ cryptographic ignition key (CIK)
1. (N) A physical (usually electronic) token used to store, 1. (N) A physical (usually electronic) token used to store,
transport, and protect cryptographic keys and activation data. transport, and protect cryptographic keys and activation data.
Usage: Sometimes abbreviated as "crypto-ignition key". (Compare: Usage: Sometimes abbreviated as "crypto-ignition key". (Compare:
fill device.) fill device.)
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Tutorial: A key-encrypting key could be divided (see: split key) Tutorial: A key-encrypting key could be divided (see: split key)
between a CIK and a cryptographic module, so that it would be between a CIK and a cryptographic module, so that it would be
necessary to combine the two to regenerate the key, use it to necessary to combine the two to regenerate the key, use it to
decrypt other keys and data contained in the module, and thus decrypt other keys and data contained in the module, and thus
activate the module. activate the module.
2. (O) "Device or electronic key used to unlock the secure mode of 2. (O) "Device or electronic key used to unlock the secure mode of
cryptographic equipment." [C4009] cryptographic equipment." [C4009]
$ cryptographic key $ cryptographic key
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transformation(s) to be used being selected by keys. The transformation(s) to be used being selected by keys. The
transformations are normally defined by a mathematical algorithm." transformations are normally defined by a mathematical algorithm."
[X509] [X509]
$ cryptographic token $ cryptographic token
1. (I) A portable, user-controlled, physical device (e.g., smart 1. (I) A portable, user-controlled, physical device (e.g., smart
card or PCMCIA card) used to store cryptographic information and card or PCMCIA card) used to store cryptographic information and
possibly also perform cryptographic functions. (See: cryptographic possibly also perform cryptographic functions. (See: cryptographic
card, token.) card, token.)
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Tutorial: A smart token might implement some set of cryptographic Tutorial: A smart token might implement some set of cryptographic
algorithms and might incorporate related key management functions, algorithms and might incorporate related key management functions,
such as a random number generator. A smart cryptographic token may such as a random number generator. A smart cryptographic token may
contain a cryptographic module or may not be explicitly designed contain a cryptographic module or may not be explicitly designed
that way. that way.
$ cryptography $ cryptography
1. (I) The mathematical science that deals with transforming data 1. (I) The mathematical science that deals with transforming data
to render its meaning unintelligible (i.e., to hide its semantic to render its meaning unintelligible (i.e., to hide its semantic
content), prevent its undetected alteration, or prevent its content), prevent its undetected alteration, or prevent its
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Businesses and governments use cryptography to make data Businesses and governments use cryptography to make data
incomprehensible to outsiders; to make data incomprehensible to incomprehensible to outsiders; to make data incomprehensible to
both outsiders and insiders, the data is sent to lawyers for a both outsiders and insiders, the data is sent to lawyers for a
rewrite. rewrite.
$ Cryptoki $ Cryptoki
(N) A CAPI defined in PKCS #11. Pronunciation: "CRYPTO-key". (N) A CAPI defined in PKCS #11. Pronunciation: "CRYPTO-key".
Derivation: Abbreviation of "cryptographic token interface". Derivation: Abbreviation of "cryptographic token interface".
$ cryptology $ cryptology
(I) The science of secret communication, that includes both (I) The science of secret communication, which includes both
cryptography and cryptanalysis. cryptography and cryptanalysis.
Tutorial: Sometimes the term is used more broadly to denote Tutorial: Sometimes the term is used more broadly to denote
activity that includes both rendering signals secure (see: signal activity that includes both rendering signals secure (see: signal
security) and extracting information from signals (see: signal security) and extracting information from signals (see: signal
intelligence) [Kahn]. intelligence) [Kahn].
$ cryptonet $ cryptonet
(I) A network (i.e., a communicating set) of system entities that (I) A network (i.e., a communicating set) of system entities that
share a secret cryptographic key for a symmetric algorithm. (See: share a secret cryptographic key for a symmetric algorithm. (See:
controlling authority.) controlling authority.)
(O) "Stations holding a common key." [C4009] (O) "Stations holding a common key." [C4009]
$ cryptoperiod $ cryptoperiod
(I) The time span during which a particular key value is (I) The time span during which a particular key value is
authorized to be used in a cryptographic system. (See: key authorized to be used in a cryptographic system. (See: key
management.) management.)
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Usage: This term is long-established in COMPUSEC usage. In the Usage: This term is long-established in COMPUSEC usage. In the
context of certificates and public keys, "key lifetime" and context of certificates and public keys, "key lifetime" and
"validity period" are often used instead. "validity period" are often used instead.
Tutorial: A cryptoperiod is usually stated in terms of calendar or Tutorial: A cryptoperiod is usually stated in terms of calendar or
clock time, but sometimes is stated in terms of the maximum amount clock time, but sometimes is stated in terms of the maximum amount
of data permitted to be processed by a cryptographic algorithm of data permitted to be processed by a cryptographic algorithm
using the key. Specifying a cryptoperiod involves a tradeoff using the key. Specifying a cryptoperiod involves a tradeoff
between the cost of rekeying and the risk of successful between the cost of rekeying and the risk of successful
cryptoanalysis. cryptoanalysis.
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but is used to implement data integrity service where accidental but is used to implement data integrity service where accidental
changes to data are expected. Sometimes called "cyclic redundancy changes to data are expected. Sometimes called "cyclic redundancy
code". code".
$ DAC $ DAC
(N) See: Data Authentication Code, discretionary access control. (N) See: Data Authentication Code, discretionary access control.
Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a
definition for it because this abbreviation is ambiguous. definition for it because this abbreviation is ambiguous.
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$ daemon $ daemon
(I) A computer program that is not invoked explicitly but waits (I) A computer program that is not invoked explicitly but waits
until a specified condition occurs, and then runs with no until a specified condition occurs, and then runs with no
associated user (principal), usually for an administrative associated user (principal), usually for an administrative
purpose. (See: zombie.) purpose. (See: zombie.)
$ dangling threat $ dangling threat
(O) A threat to a system for which there is no corresponding (O) A threat to a system for which there is no corresponding
vulnerability and, therefore, no implied risk. [C4009] vulnerability and, therefore, no implied risk. [C4009]
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misleading way. The word "authentication" is misleading because misleading way. The word "authentication" is misleading because
the checksum may be used to perform a data integrity function the checksum may be used to perform a data integrity function
rather than a data origin authentication function. rather than a data origin authentication function.
$ Data Authentication Code, data authentication code $ Data Authentication Code, data authentication code
1. (N) /capitalized/ A specific U.S. Government standard [FP113] 1. (N) /capitalized/ A specific U.S. Government standard [FP113]
for a checksum that is computed by the Data Authentication for a checksum that is computed by the Data Authentication
Algorithm. Usage: a.k.a. Message Authentication Code [A9009].) Algorithm. Usage: a.k.a. Message Authentication Code [A9009].)
(See: DAC.) (See: DAC.)
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2. (D) /not capitalized/ Synonym for some kind of "checksum". 2. (D) /not capitalized/ Synonym for some kind of "checksum".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the uncapitalized form "data Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the uncapitalized form "data
authentication code" as a synonym for any kind of checksum, authentication code" as a synonym for any kind of checksum,
regardless of whether or not the checksum is based on the Data regardless of whether or not the checksum is based on the Data
Authentication Algorithm. The uncapitalized term can be confused Authentication Algorithm. The uncapitalized term can be confused
with the Data Authentication Code and also mixes concepts in a with the Data Authentication Code and also mixes concepts in a
potentially misleading way (see: authentication code). potentially misleading way (see: authentication code).
$ data compromise $ data compromise
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2. (O) /U.S. DoD/ A "compromise" is a "communication or physical 2. (O) /U.S. DoD/ A "compromise" is a "communication or physical
transfer of information to an unauthorized recipient." [DoD5] transfer of information to an unauthorized recipient." [DoD5]
3. (O) /U.S. Government/ A "compromise" is an "unauthorized 3. (O) /U.S. Government/ A "compromise" is an "unauthorized
disclosure of classified information." disclosure of classified information."
$ data confidentiality $ data confidentiality
1. (I) The property that data is not disclosed to system entities 1. (I) The property that data is not disclosed to system entities
unless they have been authorized to know the data. (See: Bell- unless they have been authorized to know the data. (See: Bell-
LaPadula model, classification, data confidentiality service. LaPadula model, classification, data confidentiality service,
Compare: privacy.) secret. Compare: privacy.)
2. (D) "The property that information is not made available or 2. (D) "The property that information is not made available or
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes
[i.e., to any unauthorized system entity]." [I7498-2]. [i.e., to any unauthorized system entity]." [I7498-2].
Deprecated Definition: The phrase "made available" might be Deprecated Definition: The phrase "made available" might be
interpreted to mean that the data could be altered, and that would interpreted to mean that the data could be altered, and that would
confuse this term with the concept of "data integrity". confuse this term with the concept of "data integrity".
$ data confidentiality service $ data confidentiality service
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$ Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) $ Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA)
(N) A symmetric block cipher, defined in the U.S. Government's (N) A symmetric block cipher, defined in the U.S. Government's
DES. DEA uses a 64-bit key, of which 56 bits are independently DES. DEA uses a 64-bit key, of which 56 bits are independently
chosen and 8 are parity bits, and maps a 64-bit block into another chosen and 8 are parity bits, and maps a 64-bit block into another
64-bit block. [FP046] (See: AES, symmetric cryptography.) 64-bit block. [FP046] (See: AES, symmetric cryptography.)
Usage: This algorithm is usually referred to as "DES". The Usage: This algorithm is usually referred to as "DES". The
algorithm has also been adopted in standards outside the algorithm has also been adopted in standards outside the
Government (e.g., [A3092]). Government (e.g., [A3092]).
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$ data encryption key (DEK) $ data encryption key (DEK)
(I) A cryptographic key that is used to encipher application data. (I) A cryptographic key that is used to encipher application data.
(Compare: key-encrypting key.) (Compare: key-encrypting key.)
$ Data Encryption Standard (DES) $ Data Encryption Standard (DES)
(N) A U.S. Government standard [FP046] that specifies the DEA and (N) A U.S. Government standard [FP046] that specifies the DEA and
states policy for using the algorithm to protect unclassified, states policy for using the algorithm to protect unclassified,
sensitive data. (See: AES.) sensitive data. (See: AES.)
$ data integrity $ data integrity
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Relationship between data integrity service and authentication Relationship between data integrity service and authentication
services: Although data integrity service is defined separately services: Although data integrity service is defined separately
from data origin authentication service and peer entity from data origin authentication service and peer entity
authentication service, it is closely related to them. authentication service, it is closely related to them.
Authentication services depend, by definition, on companion data Authentication services depend, by definition, on companion data
integrity services. Data origin authentication service provides integrity services. Data origin authentication service provides
verification that the identity of the original source of a verification that the identity of the original source of a
received data unit is as claimed; there can be no such received data unit is as claimed; there can be no such
verification if the data unit has been altered. Peer entity verification if the data unit has been altered. Peer entity
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authentication service provides verification that the identity of authentication service provides verification that the identity of
a peer entity in a current association is as claimed; there can be a peer entity in a current association is as claimed; there can be
no such verification if the claimed identity has been altered. no such verification if the claimed identity has been altered.
$ data origin authentication $ data origin authentication
(I) "The corroboration that the source of data received is as (I) "The corroboration that the source of data received is as
claimed." [I7498-2] (See: authentication.) claimed." [I7498-2] (See: authentication.)
$ data origin authentication service $ data origin authentication service
(I) A security service that verifies the identity of a system (I) A security service that verifies the identity of a system
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cipher text. (See: recovery.) cipher text. (See: recovery.)
2. (I) /system integrity/ The process of restoring information 2. (I) /system integrity/ The process of restoring information
following damage or destruction. following damage or destruction.
$ data security $ data security
(I) The protection of data from disclosure, alteration, (I) The protection of data from disclosure, alteration,
destruction, or loss that either is accidental or is intentional destruction, or loss that either is accidental or is intentional
but unauthorized. but unauthorized.
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Tutorial: Both data confidentiality service and data integrity Tutorial: Both data confidentiality service and data integrity
service are needed to achieve data security. service are needed to achieve data security.
$ datagram $ datagram
(I) "A self-contained, independent entity of data [i.e., a packet] (I) "A self-contained, independent entity of data [i.e., a packet]
carrying sufficient information to be routed from the source carrying sufficient information to be routed from the source
[computer] to the destination computer without reliance on earlier [computer] to the destination computer without reliance on earlier
exchanges between this source and destination computer and the exchanges between this source and destination computer and the
transporting network." [R1983] Example: A PDU of IP. transporting network." [R1983] Example: A PDU of IP.
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important in many Internet security situations, and so there are important in many Internet security situations, and so there are
different kinds of data integrity services suited to different different kinds of data integrity services suited to different
applications. This service is the simplest kind; it is suitable applications. This service is the simplest kind; it is suitable
for connectionless data transfers. for connectionless data transfers.
Datagram integrity service usually is designed only to attempt to Datagram integrity service usually is designed only to attempt to
detect changes to the SDU in each packet, but it might also detect changes to the SDU in each packet, but it might also
attempt to detect changes to some or all of the PCI in each packet attempt to detect changes to some or all of the PCI in each packet
(see: selective field integrity). In contrast to this simple, one- (see: selective field integrity). In contrast to this simple, one-
at-a-time service, some security situations demand a more complex at-a-time service, some security situations demand a more complex
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service that also attempts to detect deleted, inserted, or service that also attempts to detect deleted, inserted, or
reordered datagrams within a stream of datagrams (see: stream reordered datagrams within a stream of datagrams (see: stream
integrity service). integrity service).
$ DEA $ DEA
(N) See: Data Encryption Algorithm. (N) See: Data Encryption Algorithm.
$ deception $ deception
(I) A circumstance or event that may result in an authorized (I) A circumstance or event that may result in an authorized
entity receiving false data and believing it to be true. (See: entity receiving false data and believing it to be true. (See:
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for "decrypt". However, see usage note under "encryption". for "decrypt". However, see usage note under "encryption".
$ decipherment $ decipherment
(D) Synonym for "decryption". (D) Synonym for "decryption".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "decryption". However, see the Usage note under "encryption". for "decryption". However, see the Usage note under "encryption".
$ declassification $ declassification
(I) An authorized process by which information is declassified. (I) An authorized process by which information is declassified.
(See: classification.) (Compare: classification.)
$ declassify $ declassify
(I) To officially remove the security level designation of a (I) To officially remove the security level designation of a
classified information item or information type, such that the classified information item or information type, such that the
information is no longer classified (i.e., becomes unclassified). information is no longer classified (i.e., becomes unclassified).
(See: classified, classify, security level. Compare: downgrade.) (See: classified, classify, security level. Compare: downgrade.)
$ decode $ decode
1. (I) Convert encoded data back to its original form of 1. (I) Convert encoded data back to its original form of
representation. (Compare: decrypt.) representation. (Compare: decrypt.)
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Deprecated Definition: Encoding is not usually meant to conceal Deprecated Definition: Encoding is not usually meant to conceal
meaning. Therefore, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for meaning. Therefore, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"decrypt", because that would mix concepts in a potentially "decrypt", because that would mix concepts in a potentially
misleading way. misleading way.
$ decrypt $ decrypt
(I) Cryptographically restore cipher text to the plaintext form it (I) Cryptographically restore cipher text to the plaintext form it
had before encryption. had before encryption.
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$ decryption $ decryption
(I) See: secondary definition under "encryption". (I) See: secondary definition under "encryption".
$ dedicated security mode $ dedicated security mode
(I) A mode of system operation wherein all users having access to (I) A mode of system operation wherein all users having access to
the system possess, for all data handled by the system, both (a) the system possess, for all data handled by the system, both (a)
all necessary authorizations (i.e., security clearance and formal all necessary authorizations (i.e., security clearance and formal
access approval) and (b) a need-to-know. (See: /system operation/ access approval) and (b) a need-to-know. (See: /system operation/
under "mode", formal access approval, need to know, protection under "mode", formal access approval, need to know, protection
level, security clearance.) level, security clearance.)
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provide protection. provide protection.
This architectural concept is appealing because it aligns with This architectural concept is appealing because it aligns with
traditional warfare doctrine, which applies defense in depth to traditional warfare doctrine, which applies defense in depth to
physical, geospatial structures; but applying the concept to physical, geospatial structures; but applying the concept to
logical, cyberspace structures of computer networks is more logical, cyberspace structures of computer networks is more
difficult. The concept assumes that networks have a spatial or difficult. The concept assumes that networks have a spatial or
topological representation. It also assumes that there can be topological representation. It also assumes that there can be
implemented -- from the "outer perimeter" of a network, through implemented -- from the "outer perimeter" of a network, through
its various "layers" of components, to its "center" (i.e., to the its various "layers" of components, to its "center" (i.e., to the
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subscriber application systems supported by the network) -- a subscriber application systems supported by the network) -- a
varied series of countermeasures that together provide adequate varied series of countermeasures that together provide adequate
protection. However, it is more difficult to map the topology of protection. However, it is more difficult to map the topology of
networks and make certain that no path exists by which an attacker networks and make certain that no path exists by which an attacker
could bypass all defensive layers. could bypass all defensive layers.
$ Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) $ Defense Information Infrastructure (DII)
(O) /U.S. DoD/ The U.S. DoD's shared, interconnected system of (O) /U.S. DoD/ The U.S. DoD's shared, interconnected system of
computers, communications, data, applications, security, people, computers, communications, data, applications, security, people,
training, and support structures, serving information needs training, and support structures, serving information needs
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$ deletion $ deletion
(I) /packet/ See: secondary definition under "stream integrity (I) /packet/ See: secondary definition under "stream integrity
service". service".
$ deliberate exposure $ deliberate exposure
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "exposure". (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "exposure".
$ delta CRL $ delta CRL
(I) A partial CRL that only contains entries for certificates that (I) A partial CRL that only contains entries for certificates that
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have been revoked since the issuance of a prior, base CRL [X509]. have been revoked since the issuance of a prior, base CRL [X509].
This method can be used to partition CRLs that become too large This method can be used to partition CRLs that become too large
and unwieldy. (Compare: CRL distribution point.) and unwieldy. (Compare: CRL distribution point.)
$ demilitarized zone (DMZ) $ demilitarized zone (DMZ)
(D) Synonym for "buffer zone". (D) Synonym for "buffer zone".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it mixes Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it mixes
concepts in a potentially misleading way. (See: Deprecated Usage concepts in a potentially misleading way. (See: Deprecated Usage
under "Green Book".) under "Green Book".)
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$ dictionary attack $ dictionary attack
(I) An attack that uses a brute-force technique of successively (I) An attack that uses a brute-force technique of successively
trying all the words in some large, exhaustive list. trying all the words in some large, exhaustive list.
Examples: Attack an authentication service by trying all possible Examples: Attack an authentication service by trying all possible
passwords. Attack an encryption service by encrypting some known passwords. Attack an encryption service by encrypting some known
plaintext phrase with all possible keys so that the key for any plaintext phrase with all possible keys so that the key for any
given encrypted message containing that phrase may be obtained by given encrypted message containing that phrase may be obtained by
lookup. lookup.
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$ Diffie-Hellman $ Diffie-Hellman
$ Diffie-Hellman-Merkle $ Diffie-Hellman-Merkle
(N) A key-agreement algorithm published in 1976 by Whitfield (N) A key-agreement algorithm published in 1976 by Whitfield
Diffie and Martin Hellman [DH76, R2631]. Diffie and Martin Hellman [DH76, R2631].
Usage: The algoritm is most often called "Diffie-Hellman". Usage: The algorithm is most often called "Diffie-Hellman".
However, in the November 1978 issue of "IEEE Communications However, in the November 1978 issue of "IEEE Communications
Magazine", Hellman wrote that the algorithm "is a public key Magazine", Hellman wrote that the algorithm "is a public key
distribution system, a concept developed by [Ralph C.] Merkle, and distribution system, a concept developed by [Ralph C.] Merkle, and
hence should be called 'Diffie-Hellman-Merkle' . . . to recognize hence should be called 'Diffie-Hellman-Merkle' . . . to recognize
Merkle's equal contribution to the invention of public key Merkle's equal contribution to the invention of public key
cryptography." cryptography."
Tutorial: Diffie-Hellman-Merkle does key establishment, not Tutorial: Diffie-Hellman-Merkle does key establishment, not
encryption. However, the key that it produces may be used for encryption. However, the key that it produces may be used for
encryption, for further key management operations, or for any encryption, for further key management operations, or for any
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Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term to refer to a Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term to refer to a
signed CRL or CKL. Although the recommended definition can be signed CRL or CKL. Although the recommended definition can be
interpreted to include other signed items, the security community interpreted to include other signed items, the security community
does not use the term with those meanings. does not use the term with those meanings.
$ digital certification $ digital certification
(D) Synonym for "certification". (D) Synonym for "certification".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this definition unless Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this definition unless
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the context is not sufficient to distinguish between digital the context is not sufficient to distinguish between digital
certification and another kind of certification, in which case it certification and another kind of certification, in which case it
would be better to use "public-key certification" or another would be better to use "public-key certification" or another
phrase that indicates what is being certified. phrase that indicates what is being certified.
$ digital document $ digital document
(I) An electronic data object that represents information (I) An electronic data object that represents information
originally written in a non-electronic, non-magnetic medium originally written in a non-electronic, non-magnetic medium
(usually ink on paper) or is an analogue of a document of that (usually ink on paper) or is an analogue of a document of that
type. type.
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other process. (See: key.) other process. (See: key.)
Deprecated Usage: The adjective "digital" need not be used with Deprecated Usage: The adjective "digital" need not be used with
"key" or "cryptographic key", unless the context is insufficient "key" or "cryptographic key", unless the context is insufficient
to distinguish the digital key from another kind of key, such as a to distinguish the digital key from another kind of key, such as a
metal key for a door lock. metal key for a door lock.
$ digital notary $ digital notary
(I) An electronic functionary analogous to a notary public. (I) An electronic functionary analogous to a notary public.
Provides a trusted time stamp for a digital document, so that Provides a trusted time stamp for a digital document, so that
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someone can later prove that the document existed at that point in someone can later prove that the document existed at that point in
time; verifies the signature(s) on a signed document before time; verifies the signature(s) on a signed document before
applying the stamp. (See: notarization.) applying the stamp. (See: notarization.)
$ digital signature $ digital signature
1. (I) A value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and 1. (I) A value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and
associated with a data object in such a way that any recipient of associated with a data object in such a way that any recipient of
the data can use the signature to verify the data's origin and the data can use the signature to verify the data's origin and
integrity. (See: data origin authentication service, data integrity. (See: data origin authentication service, data
integrity service, signer. Compare: digitized signature, integrity service, signer. Compare: digitized signature,
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private key to encrypt the hash result. Bob receives both the private key to encrypt the hash result. Bob receives both the
message and the digital signature. Bob can use Alice's public key message and the digital signature. Bob can use Alice's public key
to decrypt the signature, and then compare the plaintext result to to decrypt the signature, and then compare the plaintext result to
the hash result that he computes by hashing the message himself. the hash result that he computes by hashing the message himself.
If the values are equal, Bob accepts the message because he is If the values are equal, Bob accepts the message because he is
certain that it is from Alice and has arrived unchanged. If the certain that it is from Alice and has arrived unchanged. If the
values are not equal, Bob rejects the message because either the values are not equal, Bob rejects the message because either the
message or the signature was altered in transit. message or the signature was altered in transit.
Other digital signature schemes (e.g., "DSS") transform the hash Other digital signature schemes (e.g., "DSS") transform the hash
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result with an algorithm (e.g., "DSA", "El Gamal") that cannot be result with an algorithm (e.g., "DSA", "El Gamal") that cannot be
directly used to encrypt data. Such a scheme creates a signature directly used to encrypt data. Such a scheme creates a signature
value from the hash and provides a way to verify the signature value from the hash and provides a way to verify the signature
value, but does not provide a way to recover the hash result from value, but does not provide a way to recover the hash result from
the signature value. In some countries, such a scheme may improve the signature value. In some countries, such a scheme may improve
exportability and avoid other legal constraints on usage. Alice exportability and avoid other legal constraints on usage. Alice
sends the signature value to Bob along with both the message and sends the signature value to Bob along with both the message and
its hash result. The algorithm enables Bob to use Alice's public its hash result. The algorithm enables Bob to use Alice's public
signature key and the signature value to verify the hash result he signature key and the signature value to verify the hash result he
receives. Then, as before, he compares that hash result she sent receives. Then, as before, he compares that hash result she sent
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Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without including Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without including
this definition. This term suggests careless use of "digital this definition. This term suggests careless use of "digital
signature", which is the term standardized by [I7498-2]. (See: signature", which is the term standardized by [I7498-2]. (See:
electronic signature.) electronic signature.)
$ DII $ DII
(O) See: Defense Information Infrastructure. (O) See: Defense Information Infrastructure.
$ direct attack $ direct attack
(I) See: secondary definition under "attack". Compare: indirect (I) See: secondary definition under "attack". (Compare: indirect
attack. attack.)
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$ directory, Directory $ directory, Directory
1. (I) /not capitalized/ Refers generically to a database server 1. (I) /not capitalized/ Refers generically to a database server
or other system that stores and provides access to values of or other system that stores and provides access to values of
descriptive or operational data items that are associated with the descriptive or operational data items that are associated with the
components of a system. (Compare: repository.) components of a system. (Compare: repository.)
2. (N) /capitalized/ Refers specifically to the X.500 Directory. 2. (N) /capitalized/ Refers specifically to the X.500 Directory.
(See: DN, X.500.) (See: DN, X.500.)
$ Directory Access Protocol (DAP) $ Directory Access Protocol (DAP)
(N) An OSI protocol [X519] for communication between a Directory (N) An OSI protocol [X519] for communication between a Directory
User Agent (a type of X.500 client) and a Directory System Agent User Agent (a type of X.500 client) and a Directory System Agent
(a type of X.500 server). (See: LDAP.) (a type of X.500 server). (See: LDAP.)
$ disaster plan $ disaster plan
(O) Synonym for "contingency plan". (O) Synonym for "contingency plan".
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permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject." [DoD1] permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject." [DoD1]
$ DISN $ DISN
(O) See: Defense Information Systems Network (DISN). (O) See: Defense Information Systems Network (DISN).
$ disruption $ disruption
(I) A circumstance or event that interrupts or prevents the (I) A circumstance or event that interrupts or prevents the
correct operation of system services and functions. (See: correct operation of system services and functions. (See:
availability, critical, system integrity, threat consequence.) availability, critical, system integrity, threat consequence.)
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Tutorial: Disruption is a type of threat consequence; it can be Tutorial: Disruption is a type of threat consequence; it can be
caused by the following types of threat actions: incapacitation, caused by the following types of threat actions: incapacitation,
corruption, and obstruction. corruption, and obstruction.
$ Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) $ Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
(N) A subset of the Basic Encoding Rules that always provides only (N) A subset of the Basic Encoding Rules that always provides only
one way to encode any data structure defined by ASN.1. [X690]. one way to encode any data structure defined by ASN.1. [X690].
Tutorial: For a data structure defined abstractly in ASN.1, BER Tutorial: For a data structure defined abstractly in ASN.1, BER
often provides for encoding the structure into an octet string in often provides for encoding the structure into an octet string in
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tasks among a group of geographically separate yet cooperating tasks among a group of geographically separate yet cooperating
computers. (See: distributed attack.) computers. (See: distributed attack.)
$ distribution point $ distribution point
(I) An X.500 Directory entry or other information source that is (I) An X.500 Directory entry or other information source that is
named in a v3 X.509 public-key certificate extension as a location named in a v3 X.509 public-key certificate extension as a location
from which to obtain a CRL that may list the certificate. from which to obtain a CRL that may list the certificate.
Tutorial: A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a Tutorial: A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a
"cRLDistributionPoints" extension that names places to get CRLs on "cRLDistributionPoints" extension that names places to get CRLs on
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which the certificate might be listed. (See: certificate profile.) which the certificate might be listed. (See: certificate profile.)
A CRL obtained from a distribution point may (a) cover either all A CRL obtained from a distribution point may (a) cover either all
reasons for which a certificate might be revoked or only some of reasons for which a certificate might be revoked or only some of
the reasons, (b) be issued by either the authority that signed the the reasons, (b) be issued by either the authority that signed the
certificate or some other authority, and (c) contain revocation certificate or some other authority, and (c) contain revocation
entries for only a subset of the full set of certificates issued entries for only a subset of the full set of certificates issued
by one CA or (d) contain revocation entries for multiple CAs. by one CA or (d) contain revocation entries for multiple CAs.
$ DKIM $ DKIM
(I) See: Domain Keys Identified Mail. (I) See: Domain Keys Identified Mail.
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different security policies. different security policies.
1b. (O) /security policy/ A set of users, their information 1b. (O) /security policy/ A set of users, their information
objects, and a common security policy. [DGSA, SP33] objects, and a common security policy. [DGSA, SP33]
1c. (O) /security policy/ A system or collection of systems that 1c. (O) /security policy/ A system or collection of systems that
(a) belongs to a community of interest that implements a (a) belongs to a community of interest that implements a
consistent security policy and (b) is administered by a single consistent security policy and (b) is administered by a single
authority. authority.
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2. (O) /COMPUSEC/ A operating state or mode of a set of computer 2. (O) /COMPUSEC/ A operating state or mode of a set of computer
hardware. hardware.
Tutorial: Most computers have at least two hardware operating Tutorial: Most computers have at least two hardware operating
modes [Gass]: modes [Gass]:
- "Privileged" mode: a.k.a. "executive", "master", "system", - "Privileged" mode: a.k.a. "executive", "master", "system",
kernel", or "supervisor" mode. In this mode, software can kernel", or "supervisor" mode. In this mode, software can
execute all machine instructions and access all storage execute all machine instructions and access all storage
locations. locations.
- "Unprivileged" mode: a.k.a. "user", "application", or "problem" - "Unprivileged" mode: a.k.a. "user", "application", or "problem"
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$ domain name $ domain name
(I) The style of identifier that is defined for subtrees in the (I) The style of identifier that is defined for subtrees in the
Internet DNS -- i.e., a sequence of case-insensitive ASCII labels Internet DNS -- i.e., a sequence of case-insensitive ASCII labels
separated by dots (e.g., "bbn.com") -- and also is used in other separated by dots (e.g., "bbn.com") -- and also is used in other
types of Internet identifiers, such as host names (e.g., types of Internet identifiers, such as host names (e.g.,
"rosslyn.bbn.com"), mailbox names (e.g., "rshirey@bbn.com.") and "rosslyn.bbn.com"), mailbox names (e.g., "rshirey@bbn.com.") and
URLs (e.g., "http://www.rosslyn.bbn.com./foo"). (See: domain. URLs (e.g., "http://www.rosslyn.bbn.com./foo"). (See: domain.
Compare: DN.) Compare: DN.)
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Tutorial: The name space of the DNS is a tree structure in which Tutorial: The name space of the DNS is a tree structure in which
each node and leaf holds records describing a resource. Each node each node and leaf holds records describing a resource. Each node
has a label. The domain name of a node is the list of labels on has a label. The domain name of a node is the list of labels on
the path from the node to the root of the tree. The labels in a the path from the node to the root of the tree. The labels in a
domain name are printed or read left to right, from the most domain name are printed or read left to right, from the most
specific (lowest, farthest from the root) to the least specific specific (lowest, farthest from the root) to the least specific
(highest, closest to the root), but the root's label is the null (highest, closest to the root), but the root's label is the null
string. (See: country code.) string. (See: country code.)
$ Domain Name System (DNS) $ Domain Name System (DNS)
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Derivation: The DOI concept is based on work by the TSIG's CIPSO Derivation: The DOI concept is based on work by the TSIG's CIPSO
Working Group. Working Group.
$ dominate $ dominate
(I) Security level A is said to "dominate" security level B if the (I) Security level A is said to "dominate" security level B if the
(hierarchical) classification level of A is greater (higher) than (hierarchical) classification level of A is greater (higher) than
or equal to that of B, and A's (nonhierarchical) categories or equal to that of B, and A's (nonhierarchical) categories
include (as a subset) all of B's categories. (See: lattice, include (as a subset) all of B's categories. (See: lattice,
lattice model.) lattice model.)
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$ dongle $ dongle
(I) A portable, physical, usually electronic device that is (I) A portable, physical, usually electronic device that is
required to be attached to a computer to enable a particular required to be attached to a computer to enable a particular
software program to run. (See: token.) software program to run. (See: token.)
Tutorial: A dongle is essentially a physical key used for copy Tutorial: A dongle is essentially a physical key used for copy
protection of software; that is, the program will not run unless protection of software; that is, the program will not run unless
the matching dongle is attached. When the software runs, it the matching dongle is attached. When the software runs, it
periodically queries the dongle and quits if the dongle does not periodically queries the dongle and quits if the dongle does not
reply with the proper authentication information. Dongles were reply with the proper authentication information. Dongles were
originally constructed as an EPROM (erasable programmable read- originally constructed as an EPROM (erasable programmable read-
only memory) to be connected to a serial input-output port of a only memory) to be connected to a serial input-output port of a
personal computer. personal computer.
$ downgrade $ downgrade
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of the data. (Compare: downgrade.) of the data. (Compare: downgrade.)
$ downgrade attack $ downgrade attack
(I) A type of man-in-the-middle attack in which the attacker can (I) A type of man-in-the-middle attack in which the attacker can
cause two parties, that are negotiating a security association, to cause two parties, that are negotiating a security association, to
agree on a lower level of protection than the highest level that agree on a lower level of protection than the highest level that
could have been supported by both of them. (Compare: downgrade.) could have been supported by both of them. (Compare: downgrade.)
$ draft RFC $ draft RFC
(D) A preliminary, temporary version of a document that is (D) A preliminary, temporary version of a document that is
intended to become an RFC. intended to become an RFC. (Compare: Internet-Draft.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. The RFC series is Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. The RFC series is
archival in nature and consists only of documents in permanent archival in nature and consists only of documents in permanent
form. A document that is intended to become an RFC usually needs form. A document that is intended to become an RFC usually needs
to be published first as an "Internet-Draft" (RFC 2026). (See: to be published first as an Internet-Draft (RFC 2026). (See:
"Draft Standard" under "Internet Standard".) "Draft Standard" under "Internet Standard".)
$ Draft Standard $ Draft Standard
(I) See: secondary definition under "Internet Standard". (I) See: secondary definition under "Internet Standard".
$ DSA $ DSA
(N) See: Digital Signature Algorithm. (N) See: Digital Signature Algorithm.
$ DSS $ DSS
(N) See: Digital Signature Standard. (N) See: Digital Signature Standard.
$ dual control $ dual control
(I) A procedure that uses two or more entities (usually persons) (I) A procedure that uses two or more entities (usually persons)
operating in concert to protect a system resource, such that no operating in concert to protect a system resource, such that no
single entity acting alone can access that resource. (See: no-lone single entity acting alone can access that resource. (See: no-lone
zone, separation of duties, split knowledge.) zone, separation of duties, split knowledge.)
$ dual signature $ dual signature
(O) /SET/ A single digital signature that protects two separate (O) /SET/ A single digital signature that protects two separate
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messages by including the hash results for both sets in a single messages by including the hash results for both sets in a single
encrypted value. [SET2] encrypted value. [SET2]
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term except when Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term except when
qualified as "SET(trademark) dual signature" with this definition. qualified as "SET(trademark) dual signature" with this definition.
Tutorial: Generated by hashing each message separately, Tutorial: Generated by hashing each message separately,
concatenating the two hash results, and then hashing that value concatenating the two hash results, and then hashing that value
and encrypting the result with the signer's private key. Done to and encrypting the result with the signer's private key. Done to
reduce the number of encryption operations and to enable reduce the number of encryption operations and to enable
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(O) See: evaluation assurance level. (O) See: evaluation assurance level.
$ Easter egg $ Easter egg
(O) "Hidden functionality within an application program, which (O) "Hidden functionality within an application program, which
becomes activated when an undocumented, and often convoluted, set becomes activated when an undocumented, and often convoluted, set
of commands and keystrokes is entered. Easter eggs are typically of commands and keystrokes is entered. Easter eggs are typically
used to display the credits for the development team and [are] used to display the credits for the development team and [are]
intended to be non-threatening" [SP28], but Easter eggs have the intended to be non-threatening" [SP28], but Easter eggs have the
potential to contain malicious code. potential to contain malicious code.
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Deprecated Usage: It is likely that other cultures use different Deprecated Usage: It is likely that other cultures use different
metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated
Usage under "Green Book".) Usage under "Green Book".)
$ eavesdropping $ eavesdropping
(I) Passive wiretapping done secretly, i.e., without the knowledge (I) Passive wiretapping done secretly, i.e., without the knowledge
of the originator or the intended recipients of the communication. of the originator or the intended recipients of the communication.
$ ECB $ ECB
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$ EES $ EES
(O) See: Escrowed Encryption Standard. (O) See: Escrowed Encryption Standard.
$ effective key length $ effective key length
(O) "A measure of strength of a cryptographic algorithm, (O) "A measure of strength of a cryptographic algorithm,
regardless of actual key length." [IATF] (See: work factor.) regardless of actual key length." [IATF] (See: work factor.)
$ effectiveness $ effectiveness
(O) /ITSEC/ A property of a TOE representing how well it provides (O) /ITSEC/ A property of a TOE representing how well it provides
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security in the context of its actual or proposed operational use. security in the context of its actual or proposed operational use.
$ El Gamal algorithm $ El Gamal algorithm
(N) An algorithm for asymmetric cryptography, invented in 1985 by (N) An algorithm for asymmetric cryptography, invented in 1985 by
Taher El Gamal, that is based on the difficulty of calculating Taher El Gamal, that is based on the difficulty of calculating
discrete logarithms and can be used for both encryption and discrete logarithms and can be used for both encryption and
digital signatures. digital signatures.
$ electronic codebook (ECB) $ electronic codebook (ECB)
(N) An block cipher mode in which a plaintext block is used (N) An block cipher mode in which a plaintext block is used
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(D) Synonym for "digital signature" or "digitized signature". (D) Synonym for "digital signature" or "digitized signature".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; there is no Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; there is no
current consensus on its definition. Instead, use "digital current consensus on its definition. Instead, use "digital
signature", if that is what was intended signature", if that is what was intended
$ electronic wallet $ electronic wallet
(D) A secure container to hold, in digitized form, some sensitive (D) A secure container to hold, in digitized form, some sensitive
data objects that belong to the owner, such as electronic money, data objects that belong to the owner, such as electronic money,
authentication material, and various types of personal authentication material, and various types of personal
information. (See: IOTP.)
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information.
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. There is no Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. There is no
current consensus on its definition; and some uses and definitions current consensus on its definition; and some uses and definitions
may be proprietary. Meanings range from virtual wallets may be proprietary. Meanings range from virtual wallets
implemented by data structures to physical wallets implemented by implemented by data structures to physical wallets implemented by
cryptographic tokens. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book".) cryptographic tokens. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book".)
$ elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) $ elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
(I) A type of asymmetric cryptography based on mathematics of (I) A type of asymmetric cryptography based on mathematics of
groups that are defined by the points on a curve, where the curve groups that are defined by the points on a curve, where the curve
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$ emanations analysis $ emanations analysis
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under
"interception". "interception".
$ emanations security (EMSEC) $ emanations security (EMSEC)
(I) Physical security measures to protect against data compromise (I) Physical security measures to protect against data compromise
that could occur because of emanations that might be received and that could occur because of emanations that might be received and
read by an unauthorized party. (See: emanation, TEMPEST.) read by an unauthorized party. (See: emanation, TEMPEST.)
Usage: Refers both to preventing or limiting emanations from a Usage: Refers either to preventing or limiting emanations from a
system and to preventing or limiting the ability of unauthorized system and to preventing or limiting the ability of unauthorized
parties to receive the emissions. parties to receive the emissions.
$ embedded cryptography $ embedded cryptography
(N) "Cryptography engineered into an equipment or system whose (N) "Cryptography engineered into an equipment or system whose
basic function is not cryptographic." [C4009] basic function is not cryptographic." [C4009]
$ emergency plan $ emergency plan
(D) Synonym for "contingency plan". (D) Synonym for "contingency plan".
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Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. Instead, for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. Instead, for
neutrality and consistency of language, use "contingency plan". neutrality and consistency of language, use "contingency plan".
$ emergency response $ emergency response
(O) An urgent response to a fire, flood, civil commotion, natural (O) An urgent response to a fire, flood, civil commotion, natural
disaster, bomb threat, or other serious situation, with the intent disaster, bomb threat, or other serious situation, with the intent
of protecting lives, limiting damage to property, and minimizing of protecting lives, limiting damage to property, and minimizing
disruption of system operations. [FP087] (See: availability, CERT, disruption of system operations. [FP087] (See: availability, CERT,
emergency plan.) emergency plan.)
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$ encipherment $ encipherment
(D) Synonym for "encryption". (D) Synonym for "encryption".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "encryption". However, see Usage note under "encryption". for "encryption". However, see Usage note under "encryption".
$ enclave $ enclave
1. (I) A set of system resources that operate in the same security 1. (I) A set of system resources that operate in the same security
domain and that share the protection of a single, common, domain and that share the protection of a single, common,
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continuous security perimeter. (Compare: domain.) continuous security perimeter. (Compare: domain.)
2. (D) /U.S. Government/ "Collection of computing environments 2. (D) /U.S. Government/ "Collection of computing environments
connected by one or more internal networks under the control of a connected by one or more internal networks under the control of a
single authority and security policy, including personnel and single authority and security policy, including personnel and
physical security." [C4009] physical security." [C4009]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
definition 2 because the definition applies to what is usually definition 2 because the definition applies to what is usually
called a "security domain". That is, a security domain is a set of called a "security domain". That is, a security domain is a set of
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international documents (particularly ISO and CCITT standards) international documents (particularly ISO and CCITT standards)
avoid "to encrypt" and instead use the verb "to encipher" (and avoid "to encrypt" and instead use the verb "to encipher" (and
related variations: encipherment, decipher, decipherment). related variations: encipherment, decipher, decipherment).
Tutorial: Usually, the plaintext input to an encryption operation Tutorial: Usually, the plaintext input to an encryption operation
is clear text. But in some cases, the plain text may be cipher is clear text. But in some cases, the plain text may be cipher
text that was output from another encryption operation. (See: text that was output from another encryption operation. (See:
superencryption.) superencryption.)
Encryption and decryption involve a mathematical algorithm for Encryption and decryption involve a mathematical algorithm for
transforming data. In addition to the data to be transformed, the transforming data. Besides the data to be transformed, the
algorithm has one or more inputs that are control parameters: (a) algorithm has one or more inputs that are control parameters: (a)
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a key that varies the transformation and, in some cases, (b) an IV a key that varies the transformation and, in some cases, (b) an IV
that establishes the starting state of the algorithm. that establishes the starting state of the algorithm.
$ encryption certificate $ encryption certificate
(I) A public-key certificate that contains a public key that is (I) A public-key certificate that contains a public key that is
intended to be used for encrypting data, rather than for verifying intended to be used for encrypting data, rather than for verifying
digital signatures or performing other cryptographic functions. digital signatures or performing other cryptographic functions.
Tutorial: A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "keyUsage" Tutorial: A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "keyUsage"
extension that indicates the purpose for which the certified extension that indicates the purpose for which the certified
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security infrastructure such as a key management system, is the security infrastructure such as a key management system, is the
lowest level of identifiable component with which a management lowest level of identifiable component with which a management
transaction can be conducted transaction can be conducted
$ end entity $ end entity
1. (I) A system entity that is the subject of a public-key 1. (I) A system entity that is the subject of a public-key
certificate and that is using, or is permitted and able to use, certificate and that is using, or is permitted and able to use,
the matching private key only for purposes other than signing a the matching private key only for purposes other than signing a
digital certificate; i.e., an entity that is not a CA. digital certificate; i.e., an entity that is not a CA.
2. (O) "A certificate subject which uses its public [sic] key for 2. (O) "A certificate subject [that] uses its public [sic] key for
purposes other than signing certificates." [X509] purposes other than signing certificates." [X509]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2, which is Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2, which is
misleading and incomplete. First, that definition should have said misleading and incomplete. First, that definition should have said
"private key" rather than "public key" because certificates are "private key" rather than "public key" because certificates are
not usefully signed with a public key. Second, the X.509 not usefully signed with a public key. Second, the X.509
definition is ambiguous regarding whether an end entity may or may definition is ambiguous regarding whether an end entity may or may
not use the private key to sign a certificate, i.e., whether the not use the private key to sign a certificate, i.e., whether the
subject may be a CA. The intent of X.509's authors was that an end subject may be a CA. The intent of X.509's authors was that an end
entity certificate is not valid for use in verifying a signature entity certificate is not valid for use in verifying a signature
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other than signing certificates". other than signing certificates".
Usage: Despite the problems in the X.509 definition, the term Usage: Despite the problems in the X.509 definition, the term
itself is useful in describing applications of asymmetric itself is useful in describing applications of asymmetric
cryptography. The way the term is used in X.509 implies that it cryptography. The way the term is used in X.509 implies that it
was meant to be defined, as we have done here, relative to roles was meant to be defined, as we have done here, relative to roles
that an entity (which is associated with an OSI end system) is that an entity (which is associated with an OSI end system) is
playing or is permitted to play in applications of asymmetric playing or is permitted to play in applications of asymmetric
cryptography other than the PKI that supports applications. cryptography other than the PKI that supports applications.
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Tutorial: Whether a subject can play both CA and non-CA roles, Tutorial: Whether a subject can play both CA and non-CA roles,
with either the same or different certificates, is a matter of with either the same or different certificates, is a matter of
policy. (See: CPS.) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a policy. (See: CPS.) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a
"basicConstraints" extension containing a "cA" value that "basicConstraints" extension containing a "cA" value that
specifically "indicates whether or not the public key may be used specifically "indicates whether or not the public key may be used
to verify certificate signatures". (See: certificate profile.) to verify certificate signatures". (See: certificate profile.)
$ end system $ end system
(N) /OSIRM/ A computer that implements all seven layers of the (N) /OSIRM/ A computer that implements all seven layers of the
OSIRM and may attach to a subnetwork. Usage: In the IPS context, OSIRM and may attach to a subnetwork. Usage: In the IPS context,
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embodies a U.S. Government classified cryptographic logic and is embodies a U.S. Government classified cryptographic logic and is
endorsed by NSA for the protection of national security endorsed by NSA for the protection of national security
information." [C4009] (Compare: CCI, type 2 product.) information." [C4009] (Compare: CCI, type 2 product.)
$ entity $ entity
See: system entity. See: system entity.
$ entrapment $ entrapment
(I) "The deliberate planting of apparent flaws in a system for the (I) "The deliberate planting of apparent flaws in a system for the
purpose of detecting attempted penetrations or confusing an purpose of detecting attempted penetrations or confusing an
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intruder about which flaws to exploit." [FP039] (See: honey pot.) intruder about which flaws to exploit." [FP039] (See: honey pot.)
$ entropy $ entropy
1. (I) An information-theoretic measure (usually stated as a 1. (I) An information-theoretic measure (usually stated as a
number of bits) of the amount of uncertainty that an attacker number of bits) of the amount of uncertainty that an attacker
faces to determine the value of a secret. [SP63] (See: strength.) faces to determine the value of a secret. [SP63] (See: strength.)
Example: If a password is said to contain at least 20 bits of Example: If a password is said to contain at least 20 bits of
entropy, that means that it must be as hard to find the password entropy, that means that it must be as hard to find the password
as to guess a 20-bit random number. as to guess a 20-bit random number.
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equipment used to encrypt and decrypt sensitive, unclassified, equipment used to encrypt and decrypt sensitive, unclassified,
telecommunications data. telecommunications data.
$ ESP $ ESP
(I) See: Encapsulating Security Payload. (I) See: Encapsulating Security Payload.
$ Estelle $ Estelle
(N) A language (ISO 9074-1989) for formal specification of (N) A language (ISO 9074-1989) for formal specification of
computer network protocols. computer network protocols.
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$ ETSI $ ETSI
(N) See: European Telecommunication Standards Institute. (N) See: European Telecommunication Standards Institute.
$ EUCI $ EUCI
(O) See: endorsed-for-unclassified cryptographic item. (O) See: endorsed-for-unclassified cryptographic item.
$ European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) $ European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI)
(N) An independent, non-profit organization, based in France, that (N) An independent, non-profit organization, based in France, that
is officially recognized by the European Commission and is officially recognized by the European Commission and
responsible for standardization of information and communication responsible for standardization of information and communication
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Tutorial: The Common Criteria defines a scale of seven, Tutorial: The Common Criteria defines a scale of seven,
hierarchically ordered EALs for rating a TOE. From highest to hierarchically ordered EALs for rating a TOE. From highest to
lowest, they are as follows: lowest, they are as follows:
- EAL7. Formally verified design and tested. - EAL7. Formally verified design and tested.
- EAL6. Semiformally verified design and tested. - EAL6. Semiformally verified design and tested.
- EAL5. Semiformally designed and tested. - EAL5. Semiformally designed and tested.
- EAL4. Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed. - EAL4. Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed.
- EAL3. Methodically tested and checked. - EAL3. Methodically tested and checked.
- EAL2. Structurally tested. - EAL2. Structurally tested.
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- EAL1. Functionally tested. - EAL1. Functionally tested.
An EAL is a consistent, baseline set of requirements. The increase An EAL is a consistent, baseline set of requirements. The increase
in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substituting in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substituting
higher assurance components (i.e. criteria of increasing rigor, higher assurance components (i.e. criteria of increasing rigor,
scope, or depth) from seven assurance classes: (a) configuration scope, or depth) from seven assurance classes: (a) configuration
management, (b) delivery and operation, (c) development, (d) management, (b) delivery and operation, (c) development, (d)
guidance documents, (e) life cycle support, (f) tests, and (g) guidance documents, (e) life cycle support, (f) tests, and (g)
vulnerability assessment. vulnerability assessment.
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$ Extended Security Option $ Extended Security Option
(I) See: secondary definition under "IPSO". (I) See: secondary definition under "IPSO".
$ Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) $ Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
(I) A extension framework for PPP that supports multiple, optional (I) A extension framework for PPP that supports multiple, optional
authentication mechanisms, including cleartext passwords, authentication mechanisms, including cleartext passwords,
challenge-response, and arbitrary dialog sequences. [R3748] challenge-response, and arbitrary dialog sequences. [R3748]
(Compare: GSS-API, SASL.) (Compare: GSS-API, SASL.)
Tutorial: EAP typically runs directly over IPS data link protocols Tutorial: EAP typically runs directly over IPS data link protocols
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or OSIRM Layer 2 protocols, i.e., without requiring IP. or OSIRM Layer 2 protocols, i.e., without requiring IP.
Originally, EAP was developed for use in PPP, by a host or router Originally, EAP was developed for use in PPP, by a host or router
that connects to a network server via switched circuits or dial-up that connects to a network server via switched circuits or dial-up
lines. Today, EAP's domain of applicability includes other areas lines. Today, EAP's domain of applicability includes other areas
of network access control; it is used in wired and wireless LANs of network access control; it is used in wired and wireless LANs
with IEEE 802.1X, and in IPsec with IKEv2. EAP is conceptually with IEEE 802.1X, and in IPsec with IKEv2. EAP is conceptually
related to other authentication mechanism frameworks, such as SASL related to other authentication mechanism frameworks, such as SASL
and GSS-API. and GSS-API.
$ Extensible Markup Language (XML) $ Extensible Markup Language (XML)
(N) A version of Standard Generalized Markup Language (ISO 8879), (N) A version of Standard Generalized Markup Language (ISO 8879)
which separately represents both a document's content and its that separately represents a document's content and its structure.
structure. XML was designed by W3C for use on the World Wide Web. XML was designed by W3C for use on the World Wide Web.
$ extension $ extension
(I) /protocol/ A data item or a mechanism that is defined in a (I) /protocol/ A data item or a mechanism that is defined in a
protocol to extend the protocol's basic or original functionality. protocol to extend the protocol's basic or original functionality.
Tutorial: Many protocols have extension mechanisms, and the use of Tutorial: Many protocols have extension mechanisms, and the use of
these extension is usually optional. IP and X.509 are two examples these extension is usually optional. IP and X.509 are two examples
of protocols that have optional extensions. In IP version 4, of protocols that have optional extensions. In IP version 4,
extensions are called "options", and some of the options have extensions are called "options", and some of the options have
security purposes (see: IPSO). security purposes (see: IPSO).
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$ extranet $ extranet
(I) A computer network that an organization uses for application (I) A computer network that an organization uses for application
data traffic between the organization and its business partners. data traffic between the organization and its business partners.
(Compare: intranet.) (Compare: intranet.)
Tutorial: An extranet can be implemented securely, either on the Tutorial: An extranet can be implemented securely, either on the
Internet or using Internet technology, by constructing the Internet or using Internet technology, by constructing the
extranet as a VPN. extranet as a VPN.
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$ extraction resistance $ extraction resistance
(O) Ability of cryptographic equipment to resist efforts to (O) Ability of cryptographic equipment to resist efforts to
extract keying material directly from the equipment (as opposed to extract keying material directly from the equipment (as opposed to
gaining knowledge of keying material by cryptanalysis). [C4009] gaining knowledge of keying material by cryptanalysis). [C4009]
$ extrusion detection $ extrusion detection
(I) Monitoring for unauthorized transfers of sensitive information (I) Monitoring for unauthorized transfers of sensitive information
and other communications that originate inside a system's security and other communications that originate inside a system's security
perimeter and are directed toward the outside; i.e., roughly the perimeter and are directed toward the outside; i.e., roughly the
opposite of "intrusion detection". opposite of "intrusion detection".
$ fail-safe $ fail-safe
1. (I) Synonym for "fail-secure". 1. (I) Synonym for "fail-secure".
2. (I) A mode of termination of system functions that prevents 2. (I) A mode of termination of system functions that prevents
damage to specified system resources and system entities (i.e., damage to specified system resources and system entities (i.e.,
specified data, property, and life) when a failure occurs or is specified data, property, and life) when a failure occurs or is
detected in the system (but the failure still might cause a detected in the system (but the failure still might cause a
security compromise). (See: failure control.) security compromise). (See: failure control.)
Tutorial: Definitions 1 and 2 are opposite design alternatives. Tutorial: Definitions 1 and 2 are opposing design alternatives.
Therefore, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without providing a Therefore, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without providing a
definition for it. If definition 1 is intended, ISDs can avoid definition for it. If definition 1 is intended, ISDs can avoid
ambiguity by using "fail-secure" instead. ambiguity by using "fail-secure" instead.
$ fail-secure $ fail-secure
(I) A mode of termination of system functions that prevents loss (I) A mode of termination of system functions that prevents loss
of secure state when a failure occurs or is detected in the system of secure state when a failure occurs or is detected in the system
(but the failure still might cause damage to some system resource (but the failure still might cause damage to some system resource
or system entity). (See: failure control. Compare: fail-safe.) or system entity). (See: failure control. Compare: fail-safe.)
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the resource is made equitably or impartially available to all the resource is made equitably or impartially available to all
eligible users. (RFC 3753) eligible users. (RFC 3753)
Tutorial: Fairness can be used to defend against some types of Tutorial: Fairness can be used to defend against some types of
denial-of-service attacks on a system connected to a network. denial-of-service attacks on a system connected to a network.
However, this technique assumes that the system can properly However, this technique assumes that the system can properly
receive and process inputs from the network. Therefore, the receive and process inputs from the network. Therefore, the
technique can mitigate flooding but is ineffective against technique can mitigate flooding but is ineffective against
jamming. jamming.
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$ falsification $ falsification
(I) A type of threat action whereby false data deceives an (I) A type of threat action whereby false data deceives an
authorized entity. (See: active wiretapping, deception.) authorized entity. (See: active wiretapping, deception.)
Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes: Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes:
- "Substitution": Altering or replacing valid data with false - "Substitution": Altering or replacing valid data with false
data that serves to deceive an authorized entity. data that serves to deceive an authorized entity.
- "Insertion": Introducing false data that serves to deceive an - "Insertion": Introducing false data that serves to deceive an
authorized entity. authorized entity.
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of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 as of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 as
amended by the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235) amended by the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235)
as technical guidelines for U.S. Government procurements of as technical guidelines for U.S. Government procurements of
information processing system equipment and services. (See: information processing system equipment and services. (See:
"[FPxxx]" items in Section 5, Informative References.) "[FPxxx]" items in Section 5, Informative References.)
$ Federal Public-key Infrastructure (FPKI) $ Federal Public-key Infrastructure (FPKI)
(O) A PKI being planned to establish facilities, specifications, (O) A PKI being planned to establish facilities, specifications,
and policies needed by the U.S. Government to use public-key and policies needed by the U.S. Government to use public-key
certificates in systems involving unclassified but sensitive certificates in systems involving unclassified but sensitive
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applications and interactions between Federal agencies as well as applications and interactions between Federal agencies as well as
with entities of other branches of the Federal Government, state, with entities of other branches of the Federal Government, state,
and local governments, business, and the public. [FPKI] and local governments, business, and the public. [FPKI]
$ Federal Standard 1027 $ Federal Standard 1027
(N) An U.S. Government document defining emanation, anti-tamper, (N) An U.S. Government document defining emanation, anti-tamper,
security fault analysis, and manual key management criteria for security fault analysis, and manual key management criteria for
DES encryption devices, primary for OSIRM Layer 2. Was renamed DES encryption devices, primary for OSIRM Layer 2. Was renamed
"FIPS PUB 140" when responsibility for protecting unclassified, "FIPS PUB 140" when responsibility for protecting unclassified,
sensitive information was transferred from NSA to NIST, and has sensitive information was transferred from NSA to NIST, and has
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$ fill device $ fill device
(N) /COMSEC/ A device used to transfer or store keying material in (N) /COMSEC/ A device used to transfer or store keying material in
electronic form or to insert keying material into cryptographic electronic form or to insert keying material into cryptographic
equipment. equipment.
$ filter $ filter
1. (I) /noun/ Synonym for "guard". (Compare: content filter, 1. (I) /noun/ Synonym for "guard". (Compare: content filter,
filtering router.) filtering router.)
2. (I) /verb/ To process a flow of data and selectively block 2. (I) /verb/ To process a flow of data and selectively block
passage or permit passage of individual data items in accordance passage or permit passage of individual data items according to a
with a security policy. security policy.
$ filtering router $ filtering router
(I) An internetwork router that selectively prevents the passage (I) An internetwork router that selectively prevents the passage
of data packets according to a security policy. (See: guard.) of data packets according to a security policy. (See: guard.)
Tutorial: A router usually has two or more physical connections to Tutorial: A router usually has two or more physical connections to
networks or other systems; and when the router receives a packet networks or other systems; and when the router receives a packet
on one of those connections, it forwards the packet on a second on one of those connections, it forwards the packet on a second
connection. A filtering router does the same; but it first connection. A filtering router does the same; but it first
decides, according to some security policy, whether the packet decides, according to some security policy, whether the packet
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destination addresses and TCP port numbers) [R2179]. A filtering destination addresses and TCP port numbers) [R2179]. A filtering
router may be used alone as a simple firewall or be used as a router may be used alone as a simple firewall or be used as a
component of a more complex firewall. component of a more complex firewall.
$ financial institution $ financial institution
(N) "An establishment responsible for facilitating customer- (N) "An establishment responsible for facilitating customer-
initiated transactions or transmission of funds for the extension initiated transactions or transmission of funds for the extension
of credit or the custody, loan, exchange, or issuance of money." of credit or the custody, loan, exchange, or issuance of money."
[SET2] [SET2]
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$ fingerprint $ fingerprint
1. (I) A pattern of curves formed by the ridges on a fingertip. 1. (I) A pattern of curves formed by the ridges on a fingertip.
(See: biometric authentication. Compare: thumbprint.) (See: biometric authentication. Compare: thumbprint.)
2. (D) /PGP/ A hash result ("key fingerprint") used to 2. (D) /PGP/ A hash result ("key fingerprint") used to
authenticate a public key or other data. [PGP] authenticate a public key or other data. [PGP]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
definition 2, and SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "hash definition 2, and SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "hash
result" of *any* kind. Either use would mix concepts in a result" of *any* kind. Either use would mix concepts in a
potentially misleading way. potentially misleading way.
$ FIPS $ FIPS
(N) See: Federal Information Processing Standards. (N) See: Federal Information Processing Standards.
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2. (O) A device or system that controls the flow of traffic 2. (O) A device or system that controls the flow of traffic
between networks using differing security postures. [SP41] between networks using differing security postures. [SP41]
Tutorial: A firewall typically protects a smaller, secure network Tutorial: A firewall typically protects a smaller, secure network
(such as a corporate LAN, or even just one host) from a larger (such as a corporate LAN, or even just one host) from a larger
network (such as the Internet). The firewall is installed at the network (such as the Internet). The firewall is installed at the
point where the networks connect, and the firewall applies policy point where the networks connect, and the firewall applies policy
rules to control traffic that flows in and out of the protected rules to control traffic that flows in and out of the protected
network. network.
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A firewall is not always a single computer. For example, a A firewall is not always a single computer. For example, a
firewall may consist of a pair of filtering routers and one or firewall may consist of a pair of filtering routers and one or
more proxy servers running on one or more bastion hosts, all more proxy servers running on one or more bastion hosts, all
connected to a small, dedicated LAN (see: buffer zone) between the connected to a small, dedicated LAN (see: buffer zone) between the
two routers. The external router blocks attacks that use IP to two routers. The external router blocks attacks that use IP to
break security (IP address spoofing, source routing, packet break security (IP address spoofing, source routing, packet
fragments), while proxy servers block attacks that would exploit a fragments), while proxy servers block attacks that would exploit a
vulnerability in a higher layer protocol or service. The internal vulnerability in a higher layer protocol or service. The internal
router blocks traffic from leaving the protected network except router blocks traffic from leaving the protected network except
through the proxy servers. The difficult part is defining criteria through the proxy servers. The difficult part is defining criteria
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assuming it does, on the ease of exploiting it and the extent of assuming it does, on the ease of exploiting it and the extent of
control or compromise it would provide. The prioritized list is control or compromise it would provide. The prioritized list is
used to direct a penetration test or attack against the system. used to direct a penetration test or attack against the system.
[NCS04] (See: fault tree, flaw.) [NCS04] (See: fault tree, flaw.)
$ flooding $ flooding
1. (I) An attack that attempts to cause a failure in a system by 1. (I) An attack that attempts to cause a failure in a system by
providing more input than the system can process properly. (See: providing more input than the system can process properly. (See:
denial of service, fairness. Compare: jamming.) denial of service, fairness. Compare: jamming.)
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Tutorial: Flooding uses "overload" as a type of "obstruction" Tutorial: Flooding uses "overload" as a type of "obstruction"
intended to cause "disruption". intended to cause "disruption".
2. (I) The process of delivering data or control messages to every 2. (I) The process of delivering data or control messages to every
node of a network. (RFC 3753) node of a network. (RFC 3753)
$ flow analysis $ flow analysis
(I) An analysis performed on a nonprocedural, formal, system (I) An analysis performed on a nonprocedural, formal, system
specification that locates potential flows of information between specification that locates potential flows of information between
system variables. By assigning security levels to the variables, system variables. By assigning security levels to the variables,
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access to a particular category of information in a system. (See: access to a particular category of information in a system. (See:
category.) category.)
$ Formal Development Methodology $ Formal Development Methodology
(O) See: Ina Jo. (O) See: Ina Jo.
$ formal model $ formal model
(I) A security model that is formal. Example: Bell-LaPadula model. (I) A security model that is formal. Example: Bell-LaPadula model.
[Land] (See: formal, security model.) [Land] (See: formal, security model.)
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$ formal proof $ formal proof
(I) "A complete and convincing mathematical argument, presenting (I) "A complete and convincing mathematical argument, presenting
the full logical justification for each step in the proof, for the the full logical justification for each step in the proof, for the
truth of a theorem or set of theorems." [NCSSG] truth of a theorem or set of theorems." [NCSSG]
$ formal specification $ formal specification
(I) A precise description of the (intended) behavior of a system, (I) A precise description of the (intended) behavior of a system,
usually written in a mathematical language, sometimes for the usually written in a mathematical language, sometimes for the
purpose of supporting formal verification through a correctness purpose of supporting formal verification through a correctness
proof. [Huff] (See: Affirm, Gypsy, HDM, Ina Jo.) (See: formal.) proof. [Huff] (See: Affirm, Gypsy, HDM, Ina Jo.) (See: formal.)
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$ formulary $ formulary
(I) A technique for enabling a decision to grant or deny access to (I) A technique for enabling a decision to grant or deny access to
be made dynamically at the time the access is attempted, rather be made dynamically at the time the access is attempted, rather
than earlier when an access control list or ticket is created. than earlier when an access control list or ticket is created.
$ FORTEZZA(trademark) $ FORTEZZA(trademark)
(O) A registered trademark of NSA, used for a family of (O) A registered trademark of NSA, used for a family of
interoperable security products that implement a NIST/NSA-approved interoperable security products that implement a NIST/NSA-approved
suite of cryptographic algorithms for digital signature, hash, suite of cryptographic algorithms for digital signature, hash,
encryption, and key exchange. The products include a PC card (that encryption, and key exchange. The products include a PC card
contains a CAPSTONE chip), and compatible serial port modems, (which contains a CAPSTONE chip), and compatible serial port
server boards, and software implementations. modems, server boards, and software implementations.
$ Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) $ Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)
(N) An international consortium of CSIRTs (e.g., CIAC) that work (N) An international consortium of CSIRTs (e.g., CIAC) that work
together to handle computer security incidents and promote together to handle computer security incidents and promote
preventive activities. (See: CSIRT, security incident.) preventive activities. (See: CSIRT, security incident.)
Tutorial: FIRST was founded in 1990 and, as of July 2004, had more Tutorial: FIRST was founded in 1990 and, as of July 2004, had more
than 100 members spanning the globe. Its mission includes: than 100 members spanning the globe. Its mission includes:
- Provide members with technical information, tools, methods, - Provide members with technical information, tools, methods,
assistance, and guidance. assistance, and guidance.
- Coordinate proactive liaison activities and analytical support. - Coordinate proactive liaison activities and analytical support.
- Encourage development of quality products and services. - Encourage development of quality products and services.
- Improve national and international information security for - Improve national and international information security for
government, private industry, academia, and the individual. government, private industry, academia, and the individual.
- Enhance the image and status of the CSIRT community. - Enhance the image and status of the CSIRT community.
$ forward secrecy $ forward secrecy
(I) See: perfect forward secrecy. (I) See: perfect forward secrecy.
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$ FOUO $ FOUO
(O) See: For Official Use Only. (O) See: For Official Use Only.
$ FPKI $ FPKI
(O) See: Federal Public-Key Infrastructure. (O) See: Federal Public-Key Infrastructure.
$ fraggle attack $ fraggle attack
(D) /slang/ A synonym for "smurf attack". (D) /slang/ A synonym for "smurf attack".
Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different
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guard, internetwork, proxy server, router, and subnetwork.) guard, internetwork, proxy server, router, and subnetwork.)
Tutorial: The networks may differ in any of several aspects, Tutorial: The networks may differ in any of several aspects,
including protocols and security mechanisms. When two computer including protocols and security mechanisms. When two computer
networks differ in the protocol by which they offer service to networks differ in the protocol by which they offer service to
hosts, a gateway may translate one protocol into the other or hosts, a gateway may translate one protocol into the other or
otherwise facilitate interoperation of hosts (see: Internet otherwise facilitate interoperation of hosts (see: Internet
Protocol). In theory, gateways between computer networks are Protocol). In theory, gateways between computer networks are
conceivable at any OSIRM layer. In practice, they usually operate conceivable at any OSIRM layer. In practice, they usually operate
at OSIRM Layer 2 (see: bridge), 3 (see: router), or 7 (see: proxy at OSIRM Layer 2 (see: bridge), 3 (see: router), or 7 (see: proxy
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server). server).
$ GCA $ GCA
(O) See: geopolitical certificate authority. (O) See: geopolitical certificate authority.
$ GDOI $ GDOI
(O) See: Group Domain of Interpretation. (O) See: Group Domain of Interpretation.
$ GeldKarte $ GeldKarte
(O) A smartcard-based, electronic money system that is maintained (O) A smartcard-based, electronic money system that is maintained
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to distribute responsibility for managing certificates to to distribute responsibility for managing certificates to
geographic or political regions, so that brand policies can vary geographic or political regions, so that brand policies can vary
between regions as needed. between regions as needed.
$ GIG $ GIG
(O) See: Global Information Grid. (O) See: Global Information Grid.
$ Global Information Grid (GIG) $ Global Information Grid (GIG)
(O) /U.S. DoD/ The GIG is "a globally interconnected, end-to-end (O) /U.S. DoD/ The GIG is "a globally interconnected, end-to-end
set of information capabilities, associated processes and set of information capabilities, associated processes and
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personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and
managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and managing information on demand to war fighters, policy makers, and
support personnel." [IATF] Usage: Formerly referred to as the DII. support personnel." [IATF] Usage: Formerly referred to as the DII.
$ good engineering practice(s) $ good engineering practice(s)
(N) A term used to specify or characterize design, implementation, (N) A term used to specify or characterize design, implementation,
installation, or operating practices for an information system, installation, or operating practices for an information system,
when a more explicit specification is not possible. Generally when a more explicit specification is not possible. Generally
understood to refer to the state of the engineering art for understood to refer to the state of the engineering art for
commercial systems that have problems and solutions equivalent to commercial systems that have problems and solutions equivalent to
the system in question. the system in question.
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Krasner, Addison-Wesley, 1983. Krasner, Addison-Wesley, 1983.
- "X/Open Compatibility Guide". - "X/Open Compatibility Guide".
- A particular CD-ROM format developed by Phillips. - A particular CD-ROM format developed by Phillips.
$ Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) $ Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI)
(I) An ISAKMP/IKE domain of interpretation for group key (I) An ISAKMP/IKE domain of interpretation for group key
management; i.e., a phase 2 protocol in ISAKMP. [R3547] (See: management; i.e., a phase 2 protocol in ISAKMP. [R3547] (See:
secure multicast.) secure multicast.)
Tutorial: In this group key management model that extends the Tutorial: In this group key management model that extends the
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ISAKMP standard, the protocol is run between a group member and a ISAKMP standard, the protocol is run between a group member and a
"group controller/key server", which establishes security "group controller/key server", which establishes security
associations [R2401] among authorized group members. The GDOI associations [R2401] among authorized group members. The GDOI
protocol is itself protected by an ISAKMP phase 1 association. protocol is itself protected by an ISAKMP phase 1 association.
For example, multicast applications may use ESP to protect their For example, multicast applications may use ESP to protect their
data traffic. GDOI carries the needed security association data traffic. GDOI carries the needed security association
parameters for ESP. In this way, GDOI supports multicast ESP with parameters for ESP. In this way, GDOI supports multicast ESP with
group authentication of ESP packets using a shared, group key. group authentication of ESP packets using a shared, group key.
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the two. (See: controlled interface, cross-domain solution, the two. (See: controlled interface, cross-domain solution,
domain, filter. Compare: firewall.) domain, filter. Compare: firewall.)
Usage: Frequently understood to mean that one system is operating Usage: Frequently understood to mean that one system is operating
at a higher security level than the other, and that the gateway's at a higher security level than the other, and that the gateway's
purpose is to prevent unauthorized disclosure of data from the purpose is to prevent unauthorized disclosure of data from the
higher system to the lower. However, the purpose might also be to higher system to the lower. However, the purpose might also be to
protect the data integrity, availability, or general system protect the data integrity, availability, or general system
integrity of one system from threats posed by connecting to the integrity of one system from threats posed by connecting to the
other system. The mediation may be entirely automated or may other system. The mediation may be entirely automated or may
involve reliable human review. involve "reliable human review".
$ guest login $ guest login
(I) See: anonymous login. (I) See: anonymous login.
$ GULS $ GULS
(I) Generic Upper Layer Security service element (ISO 11586), a (I) Generic Upper Layer Security service element (ISO 11586), a
five-part standard for the exchange of security information and five-part standard for the exchange of security information and
security-transformation functions that protect confidentiality and security-transformation functions that protect confidentiality and
integrity of application data. integrity of application data.
$ Gypsy verification environment $ Gypsy verification environment
(O) A methodology, language, and integrated set of software tools (O) A methodology, language, and integrated set of software tools
developed at the University of Texas for specifying, coding, and developed at the University of Texas for specifying, coding, and
verifying software to produce correct and reliable programs. verifying software to produce correct and reliable programs.
[Cheh] [Cheh]
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$ H field $ H field
(D) See: "Deprecated Usage" under "Handling Restrictions field". (D) See: "Deprecated Usage" under "Handling Restrictions field".
$ hack $ hack
1a. (I) /verb/ To work on something, especially to program a 1a. (I) /verb/ To work on something, especially to program a
computer. (See: hacker.) computer. (See: hacker.)
1b. (I) /verb/ To do some kind of mischief, especially to play a 1b. (I) /verb/ To do some kind of mischief, especially to play a
prank on, or penetrate, a system. (See: hacker, cracker.) prank on, or penetrate, a system. (See: hacker, cracker.)
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(especially by journalists) with definition 3. (especially by journalists) with definition 3.
$ handle $ handle
1. (I) /verb/ Perform processing operations on data, such as 1. (I) /verb/ Perform processing operations on data, such as
receive and transmit, collect and disseminate, create and delete, receive and transmit, collect and disseminate, create and delete,
store and retrieve, read and write, and compare. (See: access.) store and retrieve, read and write, and compare. (See: access.)
2. (I) /noun/ An on-line pseudonym, particularly one used by a 2. (I) /noun/ An on-line pseudonym, particularly one used by a
cracker; derived from citizens band radio culture. cracker; derived from citizens band radio culture.
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$ handling restriction $ handling restriction
(I) A type of access control other than (a) the rule-based (I) A type of access control other than (a) the rule-based
protections of mandatory access control and (b) the identity-based protections of mandatory access control and (b) the identity-based
protections of discretionary access control; usually involves protections of discretionary access control; usually involves
administrative security. administrative security.
$ Handling Restrictions field $ Handling Restrictions field
(I) A 16-bit field that specifies a control and release marking in (I) A 16-bit field that specifies a control and release marking in
the security option (option type 130) of IP's datagram header the security option (option type 130) of IP's datagram header
format. The valid field values are alphanumeric digraphs assigned format. The valid field values are alphanumeric digraphs assigned
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See: token. See: token.
$ hash code $ hash code
(D) Synonym for "hash result" or "hash function". (D) Synonym for "hash result" or "hash function".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it mixes concepts Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it mixes concepts
in a potentially misleading way. A hash result is not a "code", in a potentially misleading way. A hash result is not a "code",
and a hash function does not "encode" in any sense defined by this and a hash function does not "encode" in any sense defined by this
glossary. (See: hash value, message digest.) glossary. (See: hash value, message digest.)
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$ hash function $ hash function
1. (I) A function H that maps an arbitrary, variable-length bit 1. (I) A function H that maps an arbitrary, variable-length bit
string, s, into a fixed-length string, h = H(s) (called the "hash string, s, into a fixed-length string, h = H(s) (called the "hash
result"). For most computing applications, it is desirable that result"). For most computing applications, it is desirable that
given a string s with H(s) = h, any change to s that creates a given a string s with H(s) = h, any change to s that creates a
different string s' will result in an unpredictable hash result different string s' will result in an unpredictable hash result
H(s') that is, with high probability, not equal to H(s). H(s') that is, with high probability, not equal to H(s).
2. (O) "A (mathematical) function which maps values from a large 2. (O) "A (mathematical) function which maps values from a large
(possibly very large) domain into a smaller range. A 'good' hash (possibly very large) domain into a smaller range. A 'good' hash
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amount of computation required is only O(2**(n/2)); i.e., after amount of computation required is only O(2**(n/2)); i.e., after
computing H(s) for 2 to the power n/2 randomly chosen values of s, computing H(s) for 2 to the power n/2 randomly chosen values of s,
the probability is greater than 1/2 that two of those values have the probability is greater than 1/2 that two of those values have
the same hash result. (See: birthday attack.) the same hash result. (See: birthday attack.)
$ hash result $ hash result
1. (I) The output of a hash function. (See: hash code, hash value. 1. (I) The output of a hash function. (See: hash code, hash value.
Compare: hash value.) Compare: hash value.)
2. (O) "The output produced by a hash function upon processing a 2. (O) "The output produced by a hash function upon processing a
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message" (where "message" is broadly defined as "a digital message" (where "message" is broadly defined as "a digital
representation of data"). [DSG] representation of data"). [DSG]
Usage: ISDs SHOULD avoid the unusual usage of "message" that is Usage: ISDs SHOULD avoid the unusual usage of "message" that is
seen in the "O" definition. seen in the "O" definition.
$ hash value $ hash value
(D) Synonym for "hash result". (D) Synonym for "hash result".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term for the output of a Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term for the output of a
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Communications and Electronics Association conference. Communications and Electronics Association conference.
Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it
because the term mixes concepts and could easily be misunderstood. because the term mixes concepts and could easily be misunderstood.
$ hijack attack $ hijack attack
(I) A form of active wiretapping in which the attacker seizes (I) A form of active wiretapping in which the attacker seizes
control of a previously established communication association. control of a previously established communication association.
(See: man-in-the-middle attack, pagejacking, piggyback attack.) (See: man-in-the-middle attack, pagejacking, piggyback attack.)
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$ HIPAA $ HIPAA
(N) Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, (N) Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
a U.S. law (Public Law 104-191) that is intended to protect the a U.S. law (Public Law 104-191) that is intended to protect the
privacy of patients' medical records and other health information privacy of patients' medical records and other health information
in all forms, and mandates security for that information, in all forms, and mandates security for that information,
including for its electronic storage and transmission. including for its electronic storage and transmission.
$ HMAC $ HMAC
(I) A keyed hash [R2104] that can be based on any iterated (I) A keyed hash [R2104] that can be based on any iterated
cryptographic hash (e.g., MD5 or SHA-1), so that the cryptographic cryptographic hash (e.g., MD5 or SHA-1), so that the cryptographic
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Usage: It is likely that other cultures use different metaphors Usage: It is likely that other cultures use different metaphors
for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, an ISD SHOULD NOT use this term without misunderstanding, an ISD SHOULD NOT use this term without
providing a definition for it. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green providing a definition for it. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green
Book.") Book.")
$ host $ host
1. (I) /general/ A computer that is attached to a communication 1. (I) /general/ A computer that is attached to a communication
subnetwork or internetwork and can use services provided by the subnetwork or internetwork and can use services provided by the
network to exchange data with other attached systems. (See: end network to exchange data with other attached systems. (See: end
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system. Compare: server.) system. Compare: server.)
2. (I) /IPS/ A networked computer that does not forward IP packets 2. (I) /IPS/ A networked computer that does not forward IP packets
that are not addressed to the computer itself. (Compare: router.) that are not addressed to the computer itself. (Compare: router.)
Derivation: As viewed by its users, a host "entertains" them, Derivation: As viewed by its users, a host "entertains" them,
providing Application-Layer services or access to other computers providing Application-Layer services or access to other computers
attached to the network. However, even though some traditional attached to the network. However, even though some traditional
peripheral service devices, such as printers, can now be peripheral service devices, such as printers, can now be
independently connected to networks, they are not usually called independently connected to networks, they are not usually called
hosts. hosts.
$ HTML $ HTML
(I) See: Hypertext Markup Language. (I) See: Hypertext Markup Language.
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(I) In hypertext or hypermedia, an information object (such as a (I) In hypertext or hypermedia, an information object (such as a
word, a phrase, or an image, which usually is highlighted by color word, a phrase, or an image, which usually is highlighted by color
or underscoring) that points (i.e., indicates how to connect) to or underscoring) that points (i.e., indicates how to connect) to
related information that is located elsewhere and can be retrieved related information that is located elsewhere and can be retrieved
by activating the link (e.g., by selecting the object with a mouse by activating the link (e.g., by selecting the object with a mouse
pointer and then clicking). pointer and then clicking).
$ hypermedia $ hypermedia
(I) A generalization of hypertext; any media that contain (I) A generalization of hypertext; any media that contain
hyperlinks that point to material in the same or another data hyperlinks that point to material in the same or another data
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object. object.
$ hypertext $ hypertext
(I) A computer document, or part of a document, that contains (I) A computer document, or part of a document, that contains
hyperlinks to other documents; i.e., text that contains active hyperlinks to other documents; i.e., text that contains active
pointers to other text. Usually written in HTML and accessed using pointers to other text. Usually written in HTML and accessed using
a web browser. (See: hypermedia.) a web browser. (See: hypermedia.)
$ Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) $ Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)
(I) A platform-independent system of syntax and semantics (RFC (I) A platform-independent system of syntax and semantics (RFC
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(N) See: indirect certificate revocation list. (N) See: indirect certificate revocation list.
$ IDEA $ IDEA
(N) See: International Data Encryption Algorithm. (N) See: International Data Encryption Algorithm.
$ identification $ identification
(I) An act or process that presents an identifier to a system so (I) An act or process that presents an identifier to a system so
that the system can recognize a system entity and distinguish it that the system can recognize a system entity and distinguish it
from other entities. (See: authentication.) from other entities. (See: authentication.)
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$ identification information $ identification information
(D) Synonym for either "identifier" or "authentication (D) Synonym for either "identifier" or "authentication
information". (See: authentication.) information". (See: authentication.)
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for either of those terms; that would be duplicative and would mix for either of those terms; that would be duplicative and would mix
concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, use concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, use
"identifier" or "authentication information ", depending on what "identifier" or "authentication information ", depending on what
is meant. is meant.
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set of characteristics) by which a system user or other system set of characteristics) by which a system user or other system
entity is recognizable or known. (See: authenticate, registration. entity is recognizable or known. (See: authenticate, registration.
Compare: identifier.) Compare: identifier.)
Usage: An ISD MAY apply this term to either a single entity or a Usage: An ISD MAY apply this term to either a single entity or a
set of entities. If an ISD involves both meanings, the ISD SHOULD set of entities. If an ISD involves both meanings, the ISD SHOULD
use the following terms and definitions to avoid ambiguity: use the following terms and definitions to avoid ambiguity:
- "Singular identity": An identity that is registered for an - "Singular identity": An identity that is registered for an
entity that is one person or one process. entity that is one person or one process.
- "Shared identity": An identity that is registered for an entity - "Shared identity": An identity that is registered for an entity
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that is a set of singular entities (1) in which each member is that is a set of singular entities (1) in which each member is
authorized to assume the identity individually and (2) for authorized to assume the identity individually and (2) for
which the registering system maintains a record of the singular which the registering system maintains a record of the singular
entities that comprise the set. In this case, we would expect entities that comprise the set. In this case, we would expect
each member entity to be registered with a singular identity each member entity to be registered with a singular identity
before becoming associated with the shared identity. before becoming associated with the shared identity.
- "Group identity": An identity that is registered for an entity - "Group identity": An identity that is registered for an entity
(1) that is a set of entities (2) for which the registering (1) that is a set of entities (2) for which the registering
system does not maintain a record of singular entities that system does not maintain a record of singular entities that
comprise the set. comprise the set.
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identity's authenticity (i.e., that the user has the right to identity's authenticity (i.e., that the user has the right to
claim or use the identity) and its eligibility (i.e., that the claim or use the identity) and its eligibility (i.e., that the
identity is qualified to be registered and needs to be identity is qualified to be registered and needs to be
registered). registered).
The following diagram illustrates how this term relates to some The following diagram illustrates how this term relates to some
other terms in a PKI system: authentication information, other terms in a PKI system: authentication information,
identifier, identifier credential, registration, registered user, identifier, identifier credential, registration, registered user,
subscriber, and user. subscriber, and user.
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Relationships: === one-to-one, ==> one-to-many, <=> many-to-many. Relationships: === one-to-one, ==> one-to-many, <=> many-to-many.
+- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + +- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
| PKI System | | PKI System |
+ - - - - + | +------------------+ +-------------------------+ | + - - - - + | +------------------+ +-------------------------+ |
| User, | | |Subscriber, i.e., | | Identity of Subscriber | | | User, | | |Subscriber, i.e., | | Identity of Subscriber | |
|i.e., one| | | Registered User, | | is system-unique | | |i.e., one| | | Registered User, | | is system-unique | |
| of the | | | is system-unique | | +---------------------+ | | | of the | | | is system-unique | | +---------------------+ | |
|following| | | +--------------+ | | | Subscriber | | | |following| | | +--------------+ | | | Subscriber | | |
| | | | | User's core | | | | Identity's | | | | | | | | User's core | | | | Identity's | | |
| +-----+ |===| | Registration | |==>| | Registration data | | | | +-----+ |===| | Registration | |==>| | Registration data | | |
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(N) See: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (N) See: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
$ IEEE 802.10 $ IEEE 802.10
(N) An IEEE committee developing security standards for local area (N) An IEEE committee developing security standards for local area
networks. (See: SILS.) networks. (See: SILS.)
$ IEEE P1363 $ IEEE P1363
(N) An IEEE working group, Standard for Public-Key Cryptography, (N) An IEEE working group, Standard for Public-Key Cryptography,
engaged in developing a comprehensive reference standard for engaged in developing a comprehensive reference standard for
asymmetric cryptography. Covers discrete logarithm (e.g., DSA), asymmetric cryptography. Covers discrete logarithm (e.g., DSA),
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elliptic curve, and integer factorization (e.g., RSA); and covers elliptic curve, and integer factorization (e.g., RSA); and covers
key agreement, digital signature, and encryption. key agreement, digital signature, and encryption.
$ IESG $ IESG
(I) See: Internet Engineering Steering Group. (I) See: Internet Engineering Steering Group.
$ IETF $ IETF
(I) See: Internet Engineering Task Force. (I) See: Internet Engineering Task Force.
$ IKE $ IKE
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(I) A type of threat action that prevents or interrupts system (I) A type of threat action that prevents or interrupts system
operation by disabling a system component. (See: disruption.) operation by disabling a system component. (See: disruption.)
Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes: Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes:
- "Malicious logic": In context of incapacitation, any hardware, - "Malicious logic": In context of incapacitation, any hardware,
firmware, or software (e.g., logic bomb) intentionally firmware, or software (e.g., logic bomb) intentionally
introduced into a system to destroy system functions or introduced into a system to destroy system functions or
resources. (See: corruption, main entry for "malicious logic", resources. (See: corruption, main entry for "malicious logic",
masquerade, misuse.) masquerade, misuse.)
- "Physical destruction": Deliberate destruction of a system - "Physical destruction": Deliberate destruction of a system
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component to interrupt or prevent system operation. component to interrupt or prevent system operation.
- "Human error": /incapacitation/ Action or inaction that - "Human error": /incapacitation/ Action or inaction that
unintentionally disables a system component. (See: corruption, unintentionally disables a system component. (See: corruption,
exposure.) exposure.)
- "Hardware or software error": /incapacitation/ Error that - "Hardware or software error": /incapacitation/ Error that
unintentionally causes failure of a system component and leads unintentionally causes failure of a system component and leads
to disruption of system operation. (See: corruption, exposure.) to disruption of system operation. (See: corruption, exposure.)
- "Natural disaster": /incapacitation/ Any "act of God" (e.g., - "Natural disaster": /incapacitation/ Any "act of God" (e.g.,
fire, flood, earthquake, lightning, or wind) that disables a fire, flood, earthquake, lightning, or wind) that disables a
system component. [FP031 section 2] system component. [FP031 section 2]
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$ incident $ incident
See: security incident. See: security incident.
$ INCITS $ INCITS
(N) See: "International Committee for Information Technology (N) See: "International Committee for Information Technology
Standardization" under "ANSI". Standardization" under "ANSI".
$ indicator $ indicator
(N) An action -- either specific, generalized, or theoretical -- (N) An action -- either specific, generalized, or theoretical --
that an adversary might be expected to take in preparation for an that an adversary might be expected to take in preparation for an
attack. [C4009] (See: attack sensing, warning, and response.) attack. [C4009] (See: "attack sensing, warning, and response".
Compare: message indicator.)
$ indirect attack $ indirect attack
(I) See: secondary definition under "attack". Compare: direct (I) See: secondary definition under "attack". Compare: direct
attack. attack.
$ indirect certificate revocation list (ICRL) $ indirect certificate revocation list (ICRL)
(N) In X.509, a CRL that may contain certificate revocation (N) In X.509, a CRL that may contain certificate revocation
notifications for certificates issued by CAs other than the issuer notifications for certificates issued by CAs other than the issuer
(i.e., signer) of the ICRL. (i.e., signer) of the ICRL.
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sensitive data, but not necessarily the data contained in the sensitive data, but not necessarily the data contained in the
communication. (See: traffic analysis, signal analysis.) communication. (See: traffic analysis, signal analysis.)
2. (I) A type of threat action that indirectly gains unauthorized 2. (I) A type of threat action that indirectly gains unauthorized
access to sensitive information in a database management system by access to sensitive information in a database management system by
correlating query responses with information that is already correlating query responses with information that is already
known. known.
$ inference control $ inference control
(I) Protection of data confidentiality against inference attack. (I) Protection of data confidentiality against inference attack.
(See: traffic-flow confidentiality.) (See: traffic-flow confidentiality.)
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Tutorial: A database management system containing N records about Tutorial: A database management system containing N records about
individuals may be required to provide statistical summaries about individuals may be required to provide statistical summaries about
subsets of the population, while not revealing sensitive subsets of the population, while not revealing sensitive
information about a single individual. An attacker may try to information about a single individual. An attacker may try to
obtain sensitive information about an individual by isolating a obtain sensitive information about an individual by isolating a
desired record at the intersection of a set of overlapping desired record at the intersection of a set of overlapping
queries. A system can attempt to prevent this by restricting the queries. A system can attempt to prevent this by restricting the
size and overlap of query sets, distorting responses by rounding size and overlap of query sets, distorting responses by rounding
or otherwise perturbing database values, and limiting queries to or otherwise perturbing database values, and limiting queries to
random samples. However, these techniques may be impractical to random samples. However, these techniques may be impractical to
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These measures include providing for restoration of information These measures include providing for restoration of information
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction
capabilities." [C4009] capabilities." [C4009]
$ Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF) $ Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF)
(O) A publicly available document [IATF], developed through a (O) A publicly available document [IATF], developed through a
collaborative effort by organizations in the U.S. Government and collaborative effort by organizations in the U.S. Government and
industry, and issued by NSA. Intended for security managers and industry, and issued by NSA. Intended for security managers and
system security engineers as a tutorial and reference document system security engineers as a tutorial and reference document
about security problems in information systems and networks, to about security problems in information systems and networks, to
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improve awareness of tradeoffs among available technology improve awareness of tradeoffs among available technology
solutions and of desired characteristics of security approaches solutions and of desired characteristics of security approaches
for particular problems. (See: ISO 17799, [SP14].) for particular problems. (See: ISO 17799, [SP14].)
$ information domain $ information domain
(O) See: secondary definition under "domain". (O) See: secondary definition under "domain".
$ information domain security policy $ information domain security policy
(O) See: secondary definition under "domain". (O) See: secondary definition under "domain".
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information systems, including in computer systems (see: COMPUSEC) information systems, including in computer systems (see: COMPUSEC)
and in communication systems (see: COMSEC). and in communication systems (see: COMSEC).
$ information system $ information system
(I) An organized assembly of computing and communication resources (I) An organized assembly of computing and communication resources
and procedures -- i.e., equipment and services, together with and procedures -- i.e., equipment and services, together with
their supporting infrastructure, facilities, and personnel -- that their supporting infrastructure, facilities, and personnel -- that
create, collect, record, process, store, transport, retrieve, create, collect, record, process, store, transport, retrieve,
display, disseminate, control, or dispose of information to display, disseminate, control, or dispose of information to
accomplish a specified set of functions. (See: system entity, accomplish a specified set of functions. (See: system entity,
system resource.) system resource. Compare: computer platform.)
$ Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) $ Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC)
(N) A Standard [ITSEC] jointly developed by France, Germany, the (N) A Standard [ITSEC] jointly developed by France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom for use in the European Union; Netherlands, and the United Kingdom for use in the European Union;
accommodates a wider range of security assurance and functionality accommodates a wider range of security assurance and functionality
combinations than the TCSEC. Superseded by the Common Criteria. combinations than the TCSEC. Superseded by the Common Criteria.
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$ INFOSEC $ INFOSEC
(I) See: information security. (I) See: information security.
$ ingress filtering $ ingress filtering
(I) A method [R2827] for countering attacks that use packets with (I) A method [R2827] for countering attacks that use packets with
false IP source addresses, by blocking such packets at the false IP source addresses, by blocking such packets at the
boundary between connected networks. boundary between connected networks.
Tutorial: Suppose network A of an internet service provider (ISP) Tutorial: Suppose network A of an internet service provider (ISP)
includes a filtering router that is connected to customer network includes a filtering router that is connected to customer network
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$ initialization value (IV) $ initialization value (IV)
(I) /cryptography/ An input parameter that sets the starting state (I) /cryptography/ An input parameter that sets the starting state
of a cryptographic algorithm or mode. (Compare: activation data.) of a cryptographic algorithm or mode. (Compare: activation data.)
Usage: Sometimes called "initialization vector" or "message Usage: Sometimes called "initialization vector" or "message
indicator", but ISDs SHOULD NOT use these synonyms because they indicator", but ISDs SHOULD NOT use these synonyms because they
mix concepts in potentially confusing ways. mix concepts in potentially confusing ways.
Tutorial: An IV can be used to synchronize one cryptographic Tutorial: An IV can be used to synchronize one cryptographic
process with another; e.g., CBC, CFB, and OFB use IVs. An IV also process with another; e.g., CBC, CFB, and OFB use IVs. An IV also
can be used to introduce cryptographic variance (see: salt) in can be used to introduce cryptographic variance (see: salt)
addition to that provided by a key. besides that provided by a key.
$ initialization vector $ initialization vector
(D) /cryptographic function/ Synonym for "initialization value". (D) /cryptographic function/ Synonym for "initialization value".
Deprecated Term: To avoid international misunderstanding, ISDs Deprecated Term: To avoid international misunderstanding, ISDs
SHOULD NOT use this term in the context of cryptographic functions SHOULD NOT use this term in the context of cryptographic functions
because the term's dictionary definition includes the concept of because the term's dictionary definition includes the concept of
direction, which is not intended in cryptographic use. direction, which is not intended in cryptographic use.
$ insertion $ insertion
1. (I) /packet/ See: secondary definition under "stream integrity 1. (I) /packet/ See: secondary definition under "stream integrity
service". service".
2. (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under 2. (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under
"falsification". "falsification".
$ inside attack $ inside attack
(I) See: secondary definition under "attack". Compare: insider. (I) See: secondary definition under "attack". Compare: insider.
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$ insider $ insider
1. (I) A user (usually a person) that accesses a system from a 1. (I) A user (usually a person) that accesses a system from a
position that is inside the system's security perimeter. (Compare: position that is inside the system's security perimeter. (Compare:
authorized user, outsider, unauthorized user.) authorized user, outsider, unauthorized user.)
Tutorial: An insider has been assigned a role that has more Tutorial: An insider has been assigned a role that has more
privileges to access system resources than do some other types of privileges to access system resources than do some other types of
users, or can access those resources without being constrained by users, or can access those resources without being constrained by
some access controls that are applied to outside users. For some access controls that are applied to outside users. For
example, a salesclerk is an insider who has access to the cash example, a salesclerk is an insider who has access to the cash
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$ integrity $ integrity
See: data integrity, datagram integrity service, correctness See: data integrity, datagram integrity service, correctness
integrity, source integrity, stream integrity service, system integrity, source integrity, stream integrity service, system
integrity. integrity.
$ integrity check $ integrity check
(D) A computation that is part of a mechanism to provide data (D) A computation that is part of a mechanism to provide data
integrity service or data origin authentication service. (Compare: integrity service or data origin authentication service. (Compare:
checksum.) checksum.)
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Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"cryptographic hash" or "protected checksum. This term "cryptographic hash" or "protected checksum". This term
unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of other, well-established unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of other, well-established
terms; this term only mentions integrity, even though the intended terms; this term only mentions integrity, even though the intended
service may be data origin authentication; and not every checksum service may be data origin authentication; and not every checksum
is cryptographically protected. is cryptographically protected.
$ integrity label $ integrity label
(I) A security label that tells the degree of confidence that may (I) A security label that tells the degree of confidence that may
be placed in the data, and may also tell what countermeasures are be placed in the data, and may also tell what countermeasures are
required to be applied to protect the data against from alteration required to be applied to protect the data against from alteration
and destruction. (See: integrity. Compare: classification label.) and destruction. (See: integrity. Compare: classification label.)
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(See: cross-certification.) (See: cross-certification.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not
widely known and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. widely known and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way.
For example, suppose that end entity 1 ("EE1) is in one PKI For example, suppose that end entity 1 ("EE1) is in one PKI
("PKI1"), end entity 2 ("EE2) is in another PKI ("PKI2"), and the ("PKI1"), end entity 2 ("EE2) is in another PKI ("PKI2"), and the
root in PKI1 ("CA1") cross-certifies the root CA in PKI2 ("CA2"). root in PKI1 ("CA1") cross-certifies the root CA in PKI2 ("CA2").
Then if EE1 constructs the certification path CA1-to-CA2-to-EE2 to Then if EE1 constructs the certification path CA1-to-CA2-to-EE2 to
validate a certificate of EE2, conventional English usage would validate a certificate of EE2, conventional English usage would
describe CA2 as being in the "intermediate" position in that path, describe CA2 as being in the "intermediate" position in that path,
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not CA1. not CA1.
$ internal controls $ internal controls
(I) /COMPUSEC/ Functions, features, and technical characteristics (I) /COMPUSEC/ Functions, features, and technical characteristics
of computer hardware and software, especially of operating of computer hardware and software, especially of operating
systems. Includes mechanisms to regulate the operation of a systems. Includes mechanisms to regulate the operation of a
computer system with regard to access control, flow control, and computer system with regard to access control, flow control, and
inference control. (Compare: external controls.) inference control. (Compare: external controls.)
$ International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) $ International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)
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which decisions of the IESG may be appealed. Responsible for which decisions of the IESG may be appealed. Responsible for
approving appointments to the IESG from among nominees submitted approving appointments to the IESG from among nominees submitted
by the IETF nominating committee. (RFC 2026) by the IETF nominating committee. (RFC 2026)
$ Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) $ Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
(I) From the early days of the Internet, the IANA was chartered by (I) From the early days of the Internet, the IANA was chartered by
the ISOC and the U.S. Government's Federal Network Council to be the ISOC and the U.S. Government's Federal Network Council to be
the central coordination, allocation, and registration body for the central coordination, allocation, and registration body for
parameters for Internet protocols. Superseded by ICANN. parameters for Internet protocols. Superseded by ICANN.
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$ Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) $ Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
(I) An Internet Standard protocol (RFC 792) that is used to report (I) An Internet Standard protocol (RFC 792) that is used to report
error conditions during IP datagram processing and to exchange error conditions during IP datagram processing and to exchange
other information concerning the state of the IP network. other information concerning the state of the IP network.
$ Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) $ Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
(I) The non-profit, private corporation that has assumed (I) The non-profit, private corporation that has assumed
responsibility for the IP address space allocation, protocol responsibility for the IP address space allocation, protocol
parameter assignment, DNS management, and root server system parameter assignment, DNS management, and root server system
management functions formerly performed under U.S. Government management functions formerly performed under U.S. Government
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ICANN was formed in October 1998, by a coalition of the Internet's ICANN was formed in October 1998, by a coalition of the Internet's
business, technical, and academic communities. The U.S. Government business, technical, and academic communities. The U.S. Government
designated ICANN to serve as the global consensus entity with designated ICANN to serve as the global consensus entity with
responsibility for coordinating four key functions for the responsibility for coordinating four key functions for the
Internet: allocation of IP address space, assignment of protocol Internet: allocation of IP address space, assignment of protocol
parameters, management of the DNS, and management of the DNS root parameters, management of the DNS, and management of the DNS root
server system. server system.
$ Internet-Draft $ Internet-Draft
(I) A working document of the IETF, its areas, and its working (I) A working document of the IETF, its areas, and its working
groups. (RFC 2026) groups. (RFC 2026) (Compare: RFC.)
Usage: The term is customarily hyphenated when used either as a Usage: The term is customarily hyphenated when used either as a
adjective or a noun, even though the latter is not standard adjective or a noun, even though the latter is not standard
English punctuation. English punctuation.
Tutorial: An Internet-Draft is not an archival document like an Tutorial: An Internet-Draft is not an archival document like an
RFC is. Instead, an Internet-Draft is a preliminary or working RFC is. Instead, an Internet-Draft is a preliminary or working
document that is valid for a maximum of six months and may be document that is valid for a maximum of six months and may be
updated, replaced, or made obsolete by other documents at any updated, replaced, or made obsolete by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use an Internet Draft as reference time. It is inappropriate to use an Internet Draft as reference
material or to cite it other than as "work in progress". Although material or to cite it other than as "work in progress". Although
most of the Internet-Drafts are produced by the IETF, any most of the Internet-Drafts are produced by the IETF, any
interested organization may request to have its working documents interested organization may request to have its working documents
published as Internet-Drafts. published as Internet-Drafts.
$ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) $ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG)
(I) The part of the ISOC responsible for technical management of (I) The part of the ISOC responsible for technical management of
IETF activities and administration of the Internet Standards IETF activities and administration of the Internet Standards
Process according to procedures approved by the ISOC Trustees. Process according to procedures approved by the ISOC Trustees.
Directly responsible for actions along the "standards track", Directly responsible for actions along the "standards track",
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including final approval of specifications as Internet Standards. including final approval of specifications as Internet Standards.
Composed of IETF Area Directors and the IETF chairperson, who also Composed of IETF Area Directors and the IETF chairperson, who also
chairs the IESG. (RFC 2026) chairs the IESG. (RFC 2026)
$ Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) $ Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
(I) A self-organized group of people who make contributions to the (I) A self-organized group of people who make contributions to the
development of Internet technology. The principal body engaged in development of Internet technology. The principal body engaged in
developing Internet Standards, although not itself a part of the developing Internet Standards, although not itself a part of the
ISOC. Composed of Working Groups, which are arranged into Areas ISOC. Composed of Working Groups, which are arranged into Areas
(such as the Security Area), each coordinated by one or more Area (such as the Security Area), each coordinated by one or more Area
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protocols (e.g., TLS). protocols (e.g., TLS).
$ Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA) $ Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA)
(I) An X.509-compliant CA that is the top CA of the Internet (I) An X.509-compliant CA that is the top CA of the Internet
certification hierarchy operated under the auspices of the ISOC certification hierarchy operated under the auspices of the ISOC
[R1422]. (See: /PEM/ under "certification hierarchy".) [R1422]. (See: /PEM/ under "certification hierarchy".)
$ Internet Private Line Interface (IPLI) $ Internet Private Line Interface (IPLI)
(O) A successor to the PLI, updated to use TCP/IP and newer (O) A successor to the PLI, updated to use TCP/IP and newer
military-grade COMSEC equipment (TSEC/KG-84). The IPLI was a military-grade COMSEC equipment (TSEC/KG-84). The IPLI was a
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portable, modular system that was developed for use in tactical, portable, modular system that was developed for use in tactical,
packet-radio networks. packet-radio networks. (See: end-to-end encryption.)
$ Internet Protocol (IP) $ Internet Protocol (IP)
(I) A Internet Standard, Internet-Layer protocol that moves (I) A Internet Standard, Internet-Layer protocol that moves
datagrams (discrete sets of bits) from one computer to another datagrams (discrete sets of bits) from one computer to another
across an internetwork but does not provide reliable delivery, across an internetwork but does not provide reliable delivery,
flow control, sequencing, or other end-to-end services that TCP flow control, sequencing, or other end-to-end services that TCP
provides. IP version 4 (IPv4) is specified in RFC 791, and IP provides. IP version 4 (IPv4) is specified in RFC 791, and IP
version 6 (IPv6) is specified in RFC 2460. (See: IP address, version 6 (IPv6) is specified in RFC 2460. (See: IP address,
TCP/IP.) TCP/IP.)
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is always placed at the top of that layer, on top of any other is always placed at the top of that layer, on top of any other
protocols that are used in that layer. In some sense, IP is the protocols that are used in that layer. In some sense, IP is the
only protocol specified for the IPS Internet Layer; other only protocol specified for the IPS Internet Layer; other
protocols used there, such as AH and ESP, are just IP variations. protocols used there, such as AH and ESP, are just IP variations.
$ Internet Protocol security $ Internet Protocol security
See: IP Security Protocol. See: IP Security Protocol.
$ Internet Protocol Security Option (IPSO) $ Internet Protocol Security Option (IPSO)
(I) Refers to one of three types of IP security options, which are (I) Refers to one of three types of IP security options, which are
fields that may be added to an IP datagram for the purpose of fields that may be added to an IP datagram for carrying security
carrying security information about the datagram. (Compare: information about the datagram. (Compare: IPsec.)
IPsec.)
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without a modifier Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term without a modifier
to indicate which of the following three types is meant: to indicate which of the following three types is meant:
- "DoD Basic Security Option" (IP option type 130): Defined for - "DoD Basic Security Option" (IP option type 130): Defined for
use on U.S. DoD common-use data networks. Identifies the DoD use on U.S. DoD common-use data networks. Identifies the DoD
classification level at which the datagram is to be protected classification level at which the datagram is to be protected
and the protection authorities whose rules apply to the and the protection authorities whose rules apply to the
datagram. (A "protection authority" is a National Access datagram. (A "protection authority" is a National Access
Program (e.g., GENSER, SIOP-ESI, SCI, NSA, Department of Program (e.g., GENSER, SIOP-ESI, SCI, NSA, Department of
Energy) or Special Access Program that specifies protection Energy) or Special Access Program that specifies protection
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- "DoD Extended Security Option" (IP option type 133): Permits - "DoD Extended Security Option" (IP option type 133): Permits
additional security labeling information, beyond that present additional security labeling information, beyond that present
in the Basic Security Option, to be supplied in the datagram to in the Basic Security Option, to be supplied in the datagram to
meet the needs of registered authorities. [R1108] meet the needs of registered authorities. [R1108]
- "Common IP Security Option" (CIPSO) (IP option type 134): - "Common IP Security Option" (CIPSO) (IP option type 134):
Designed by TSIG to carry hierarchic and non-hierarchic Designed by TSIG to carry hierarchic and non-hierarchic
security labels. (Formerly called "Commercial IP Security security labels. (Formerly called "Commercial IP Security
Option"; a version 2.3 draft was published 9 March 1993 as an Option"; a version 2.3 draft was published 9 March 1993 as an
Internet-Draft but did not advance to RFC form.) [CIPSO] Internet-Draft but did not advance to RFC form.) [CIPSO]
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$ Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) $ Internet Protocol Suite (IPS)
(I) The set of network communication protocols that are specified (I) The set of network communication protocols that are specified
by the IETF, and approved as Internet Standards by the IESG, by the IETF, and approved as Internet Standards by the IESG,
within the oversight of the IAB. (See: OSIRM Security within the oversight of the IAB. (See: OSIRM Security
Architecture. Compare: OSIRM.) Architecture. Compare: OSIRM.)
Usage: This set of protocols is popularly known as "TCP/IP" Usage: This set of protocols is popularly known as "TCP/IP"
because TCP and IP are its most basic and important components. because TCP and IP are its most basic and important components.
For clarity, this Glossary refers to IPS protocol layers by name For clarity, this Glossary refers to IPS protocol layers by name
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| | MAC [I8802-3] - Hardware - not include | | MAC [I8802-3] - Hardware - not include
+----------------+ - (or Network - standards for +----------------+ - (or Network - standards for
|1.Physical | Baseband - Substrate) - this layer. |1.Physical | Baseband - Substrate) - this layer.
+----------------+ Signaling [Stal] + - - - - - - + +----------------+ Signaling [Stal] + - - - - - - +
The diagram approximates how the five IPS layers align with the The diagram approximates how the five IPS layers align with the
seven OSIRM layers, and it offers examples of protocol stacks that seven OSIRM layers, and it offers examples of protocol stacks that
provide roughly equivalent electronic mail service over a private provide roughly equivalent electronic mail service over a private
local area network that uses baseband signaling. local area network that uses baseband signaling.
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- IPS Application Layer: The user runs an application program. - IPS Application Layer: The user runs an application program.
The program selects the data transport service it needs -- The program selects the data transport service it needs --
either a sequence of data messages or a continuous stream of either a sequence of data messages or a continuous stream of
data -- and hands application data to the Transport Layer for data -- and hands application data to the Transport Layer for
delivery. delivery.
- IPS Transport Layer: This layer divides application data into - IPS Transport Layer: This layer divides application data into
packets, adds a destination address to each, and communicates packets, adds a destination address to each, and communicates
them end-to-end -- from one application program to another -- them end-to-end -- from one application program to another --
optionally regulating the flow and ensuring reliable (error- optionally regulating the flow and ensuring reliable (error-
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- Some OSIRM Layer 5 services -- for example, connection - Some OSIRM Layer 5 services -- for example, connection
termination -- are built into TCP, and the remaining Layer 5 termination -- are built into TCP, and the remaining Layer 5
and 6 functions are built into IPS Application-Layer protocols and 6 functions are built into IPS Application-Layer protocols
where needed. where needed.
- The OSIRM does not place any security services in Layer 5 (see: - The OSIRM does not place any security services in Layer 5 (see:
OSIRM Security Architecture). OSIRM Security Architecture).
- The lack of an explicit Presentation Layer in the IPS sometimes - The lack of an explicit Presentation Layer in the IPS sometimes
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makes it simpler to implement security in IPS applications. For makes it simpler to implement security in IPS applications. For
example, a primary function of Layer 6 is to convert data example, a primary function of Layer 6 is to convert data
between internal and external forms, using a transfer syntax to between internal and external forms, using a transfer syntax to
unambiguously encode data for transmission. If an OSIRM unambiguously encode data for transmission. If an OSIRM
application encrypts data to protect against disclosure during application encrypts data to protect against disclosure during
transmission, the transfer encoding must be done before the transmission, the transfer encoding must be done before the
encryption. If an application does encryption, as is done in encryption. If an application does encryption, as is done in
OSI message handling and directory service protocols, then OSI message handling and directory service protocols, then
Layer 6 functions must be replicated in Layer 7. [X400, X500]. Layer 6 functions must be replicated in Layer 7. [X400, X500].
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such as ESP. such as ESP.
$ Internet Society (ISOC) $ Internet Society (ISOC)
(I) A professional society concerned with Internet development (I) A professional society concerned with Internet development
(including technical Internet Standards); with how the Internet is (including technical Internet Standards); with how the Internet is
and can be used; and with social, political, and technical issues and can be used; and with social, political, and technical issues
that result. The ISOC Board of Trustees approves appointments to that result. The ISOC Board of Trustees approves appointments to
the IAB from among nominees submitted by the IETF nominating the IAB from among nominees submitted by the IETF nominating
committee. (RFC 2026) committee. (RFC 2026)
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$ Internet Standard $ Internet Standard
(I) A specification, approved by the IESG and published as an RFC, (I) A specification, approved by the IESG and published as an RFC,
that is stable and well-understood, is technically competent, has that is stable and well-understood, is technically competent, has
multiple, independent, and interoperable implementations with multiple, independent, and interoperable implementations with
substantial operational experience, enjoys significant public substantial operational experience, enjoys significant public
support, and is recognizably useful in some or all parts of the support, and is recognizably useful in some or all parts of the
Internet. (RFC 2026) (Compare: RFC.) Internet. (RFC 2026) (Compare: RFC.)
Tutorial: The "Internet Standards Process" is an activity of the Tutorial: The "Internet Standards Process" is an activity of the
ISOC and is organized and managed by the IAB and the IESG. The ISOC and is organized and managed by the IAB and the IESG. The
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3 protocol service they offer, an internet can be built by 3 protocol service they offer, an internet can be built by
implementing a uniform internetwork protocol (e.g., IP) that implementing a uniform internetwork protocol (e.g., IP) that
operates at the top of Layer 3 and hides the underlying operates at the top of Layer 3 and hides the underlying
subnetworks' heterogeneity from hosts that use communication subnetworks' heterogeneity from hosts that use communication
services provided by the internet. (See: router.) services provided by the internet. (See: router.)
$ intranet $ intranet
(I) A computer network, especially one based on Internet (I) A computer network, especially one based on Internet
technology, that an organization uses for its own internal (and technology, that an organization uses for its own internal (and
usually private) purposes and that is closed to outsiders. (See: usually private) purposes and that is closed to outsiders. (See:
extranet, virtual private network.) extranet, VPN.)
$ intruder $ intruder
(I) An entity that gains or attempts to gain access to a system or (I) An entity that gains or attempts to gain access to a system or
system resource without having authorization to do so. (See: system resource without having authorization to do so. (See:
intrusion. Compare: adversary, cracker, hacker.) intrusion. Compare: adversary, cracker, hacker.)
$ intrusion $ intrusion
1. (I) A security event, or a combination of multiple security 1. (I) A security event, or a combination of multiple security
events, that constitutes a security incident in which an intruder events, that constitutes a security incident in which an intruder
gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system or system resource gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system or system resource
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without having authorization to do so. (See: IDS.) without having authorization to do so. (See: IDS.)
2. (I) A type of threat action whereby an unauthorized entity 2. (I) A type of threat action whereby an unauthorized entity
gains access to sensitive data by circumventing a system's gains access to sensitive data by circumventing a system's
security protections. (See: unauthorized disclosure.) security protections. (See: unauthorized disclosure.)
Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes: Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes:
- "Trespass": Gaining physical access to sensitive data by - "Trespass": Gaining physical access to sensitive data by
circumventing a system's protections. circumventing a system's protections.
- "Penetration": Gaining logical access to sensitive data by - "Penetration": Gaining logical access to sensitive data by
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based or network-based: based or network-based:
- "Host-based": Intrusion detection components -- traffic sensors - "Host-based": Intrusion detection components -- traffic sensors
and analyzers -- run directly on the hosts that they are and analyzers -- run directly on the hosts that they are
intended to protect. intended to protect.
- "Network-based": Sensors are placed on subnetwork components, - "Network-based": Sensors are placed on subnetwork components,
and analysis components run either on subnetwork components or and analysis components run either on subnetwork components or
hosts. hosts.
$ invalidity date $ invalidity date
(N) An X.509 CRL entry extension that "indicates the date at which (N) An X.509 CRL entry extension that "indicates the date at which
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it is known or suspected that the [revoked certificate's private it is known or suspected that the [revoked certificate's private
key] was compromised or that the certificate should otherwise be key] was compromised or that the certificate should otherwise be
considered invalid." [X509]. considered invalid." [X509].
Tutorial: This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the Tutorial: This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the
CRL entry, and may even be earlier than the date of issue of CRL entry, and may even be earlier than the date of issue of
earlier CRLs. However, the invalidity date is not, by itself, earlier CRLs. However, the invalidity date is not, by itself,
sufficient for purposes of non-repudiation service. For example, sufficient for purposes of non-repudiation service. For example,
to fraudulently repudiate a validly generated signature, a private to fraudulently repudiate a validly generated signature, a private
key holder may falsely claim that the key was compromised at some key holder may falsely claim that the key was compromised at some
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and associated set of protocols (primarily AH, ESP, and IKE). and associated set of protocols (primarily AH, ESP, and IKE).
Usage: In ISDs that use the abbreviation "IPsec", the letters "IP" Usage: In ISDs that use the abbreviation "IPsec", the letters "IP"
SHOULD be in upper case, and the letters "sec" SHOULD NOT. SHOULD be in upper case, and the letters "sec" SHOULD NOT.
Tutorial: The security services provided by IPsec include access Tutorial: The security services provided by IPsec include access
control service, connectionless data integrity service, data control service, connectionless data integrity service, data
origin authentication service, protection against replays origin authentication service, protection against replays
(detection of the arrival of duplicate datagrams, within a (detection of the arrival of duplicate datagrams, within a
constrained window), data confidentiality service, and limited constrained window), data confidentiality service, and limited
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traffic-flow confidentiality. IPsec specifies (a) security traffic-flow confidentiality. IPsec specifies (a) security
protocols (AH and ESP), (b) security associations (what they are, protocols (AH and ESP), (b) security associations (what they are,
how they work, how they are managed, and associated processing), how they work, how they are managed, and associated processing),
(c) key management (IKE), and (d) algorithms for authentication (c) key management (IKE), and (d) algorithms for authentication
and encryption. Implementation of IPsec is optional for IP version and encryption. Implementation of IPsec is optional for IP version
4, but mandatory for IP version 6. 4, but mandatory for IP version 6. (See: transport mode, tunnel
mode.)
$ IPLI $ IPLI
(I) See: Internet Private Line Interface. (I) See: Internet Private Line Interface.
$ IPRA $ IPRA
(I) See: Internet Policy Registration Authority. (I) See: Internet Policy Registration Authority.
$ IPS $ IPS
(I) See: Internet Protocol Suite. (I) See: Internet Protocol Suite.
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activity. Other international governmental and non-governmental activity. Other international governmental and non-governmental
organizations, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part. (ANSI organizations, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part. (ANSI
is the U.S. voting member of ISO. ISO is a class D member of is the U.S. voting member of ISO. ISO is a class D member of
ITU-T.) ITU-T.)
The ISO standards development process has four levels of The ISO standards development process has four levels of
increasing maturity: Working Draft (WD), Committee Draft (CD), increasing maturity: Working Draft (WD), Committee Draft (CD),
Draft International Standard (DIS), and International Standard Draft International Standard (DIS), and International Standard
(IS). (Compare: "Internet Standards Track" under "Internet (IS). (Compare: "Internet Standards Track" under "Internet
Standard".) In information technology, ISO and IEC have a joint Standard".) In information technology, ISO and IEC have a joint
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technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1. DISs adopted by JTC 1 are technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1. DISs adopted by JTC 1 are
circulated to national bodies for voting, and publication as an IS circulated to national bodies for voting, and publication as an IS
requires approval by at least 75% of the national bodies casting a requires approval by at least 75% of the national bodies casting a
vote. vote.
$ ISO 17799 $ ISO 17799
(N) An International Standard that is a code of practice, derived (N) An International Standard that is a code of practice, derived
from Part 1 of British Standard 7799, for managing the security of from Part 1 of British Standard 7799, for managing the security of
information systems in an organization. This standard does not information systems in an organization. This standard does not
provide definitive or specific material on any security topic. It provide definitive or specific material on any security topic. It
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brand regulations and local legislation. [SET1] brand regulations and local legislation. [SET1]
$ ITAR $ ITAR
(O) See: International Traffic in Arms Regulations. (O) See: International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
$ ITSEC $ ITSEC
(N) See: Information Technology System Evaluation Criteria. (N) See: Information Technology System Evaluation Criteria.
$ ITU-T $ ITU-T
(N) International Telecommunications Union, Telecommunication (N) International Telecommunications Union, Telecommunication
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Standardization Sector (formerly "CCITT"), a United Nations treaty Standardization Sector (formerly "CCITT"), a United Nations treaty
organization that is composed mainly of postal, telephone, and organization that is composed mainly of postal, telephone, and
telegraph authorities of the member countries and that publishes telegraph authorities of the member countries and that publishes
standards called "Recommendations". (See: X.400, X.500.) standards called "Recommendations". (See: X.400, X.500.)
Tutorial: The Department of State represents the United States. Tutorial: The Department of State represents the United States.
ITU-T works on many kinds of communication systems. ITU-T ITU-T works on many kinds of communication systems. ITU-T
cooperates with ISO on communication protocol standards, and many cooperates with ISO on communication protocol standards, and many
Recommendations in that area are also published as an ISO standard Recommendations in that area are also published as an ISO standard
with an ISO name and number. with an ISO name and number.
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(DES) to implement ticket-based, peer entity authentication (DES) to implement ticket-based, peer entity authentication
service and access control service distributed in a client-server service and access control service distributed in a client-server
network environment. [R4120, Stei] (See: realm.) network environment. [R4120, Stei] (See: realm.)
Tutorial: Kerberos was originally developed by Project Athena and Tutorial: Kerberos was originally developed by Project Athena and
is named for the mythical three-headed dog that guards Hades. The is named for the mythical three-headed dog that guards Hades. The
system architecture includes authentication servers and ticket- system architecture includes authentication servers and ticket-
granting servers that function as an ACC and a KDC. granting servers that function as an ACC and a KDC.
RFC 4556 describes extensions to the Kerberos specification that RFC 4556 describes extensions to the Kerberos specification that
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modify the initial authentication exchange between a client and modify the initial authentication exchange between a client and
the KDC. The extensions employ public-key cryptography to enable the KDC. The extensions employ public-key cryptography to enable
the client and KDC to mutually authenticate and establish shared, the client and KDC to mutually authenticate and establish shared,
symmetric keys that are used to complete the exchange. (See: symmetric keys that are used to complete the exchange. (See:
PKINT.) PKINT.)
$ kernel $ kernel
(I) A small, trusted part of a system that provides services on (I) A small, trusted part of a system that provides services on
which the other parts of the system depend. (See: security which the other parts of the system depend. (See: security
kernel.) kernel.)
$ Kernelized Secure Operating System (KSOS) $ Kernelized Secure Operating System (KSOS)
(O) An MLS computer operating system, designed to be a provably (O) An MLS computer operating system, designed to be a provably
secure replacement for UNIX Version 6, and consisting of a secure replacement for UNIX Version 6, and consisting of a
security kernel, non-kernel security-related utility programs, and security kernel, non-kernel security-related utility programs, and
optional UNIX application development and support environments. optional UNIX application development and support environments.
[Perr] [Perr]
Tutorial: KSOS-6 was the implementation on a SCOMP. KSOS-11 was Tutorial: KSOS-6 was the implementation on a SCOMP. KSOS-11 was
the implementation by Ford Aerospace and Communications the implementation by Ford Aerospace and Communications
Corporation on the DEC PDP-11/45 and PDP-111/70 computers. Corporation on the DEC PDP-11/45 and PDP-11/70 computers.
$ key $ key
1a. (I) /cryptography/ An input parameter used to vary a 1a. (I) /cryptography/ An input parameter used to vary a
transformation function performed by a cryptographic algorithm. transformation function performed by a cryptographic algorithm.
(See: private key, public key, storage key, symmetric key, traffic (See: private key, public key, storage key, symmetric key, traffic
key. Compare: initialization value.) key. Compare: initialization value.)
1b. (O) /cryptography/ Used in singular form as a collective noun 1b. (O) /cryptography/ Used in singular form as a collective noun
referring to keys or keying material. Example: A fill device can referring to keys or keying material. Example: A fill device can
be used transfer key between two cryptographic devices. be used transfer key between two cryptographic devices.
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1. (I) A key establishment method (especially one involving 1. (I) A key establishment method (especially one involving
asymmetric cryptography) by which two or more entities, without asymmetric cryptography) by which two or more entities, without
prior arrangement except a public exchange of data (such as public prior arrangement except a public exchange of data (such as public
keys), each can generate the same key value. That is, the method keys), each can generate the same key value. That is, the method
does not send a secret from one entity to the other; instead, both does not send a secret from one entity to the other; instead, both
entities, without prior arrangement except a public exchange of entities, without prior arrangement except a public exchange of
data, can compute the same secret value, but that value cannot be data, can compute the same secret value, but that value cannot be
computed by other, unauthorized entities. (See: Diffie-Hellman- computed by other, unauthorized entities. (See: Diffie-Hellman-
Merkle, key establishment, KEA, MQV. Compare: key transport.) Merkle, key establishment, KEA, MQV. Compare: key transport.)
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2. (O) "A method for negotiating a key value on line without 2. (O) "A method for negotiating a key value on line without
transferring the key, even in an encrypted form, e.g., the Diffie- transferring the key, even in an encrypted form, e.g., the Diffie-
Hellman technique." [X509] (See: Diffie-Hellman-Merkle.) Hellman technique." [X509] (See: Diffie-Hellman-Merkle.)
3. (O) "The procedure whereby two different parties generate 3. (O) "The procedure whereby two different parties generate
shared symmetric keys such that any of the shared symmetric keys shared symmetric keys such that any of the shared symmetric keys
is a function of the information contributed by all legitimate is a function of the information contributed by all legitimate
participants, so that no party [alone] can predetermine the value participants, so that no party [alone] can predetermine the value
of the key." [A9042] of the key." [A9042]
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(N) "The assurance [provided to] the legitimate participants in a (N) "The assurance [provided to] the legitimate participants in a
key establishment protocol that the [parties that are intended to key establishment protocol that the [parties that are intended to
share] the symmetric key actually possess the shared symmetric share] the symmetric key actually possess the shared symmetric
key." [A9042] key." [A9042]
$ key distribution $ key distribution
(I) A process that delivers a cryptographic key from the location (I) A process that delivers a cryptographic key from the location
where it is generated to the locations where it is used in a where it is generated to the locations where it is used in a
cryptographic algorithm. (See: key establishment, key management.) cryptographic algorithm. (See: key establishment, key management.)
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$ key distribution center (KDC) $ key distribution center (KDC)
1. (I) A type of key center (used in symmetric cryptography) that 1. (I) A type of key center (used in symmetric cryptography) that
implements a key-distribution protocol to provide keys (usually, implements a key-distribution protocol to provide keys (usually,
session keys) to two (or more) entities that wish to communicate session keys) to two (or more) entities that wish to communicate
securely. (Compare: key translation center.) securely. (Compare: key translation center.)
2. (N) "COMSEC facility generating and distributing key in 2. (N) "COMSEC facility generating and distributing key in
electrical form." [C4009] electrical form." [C4009]
Tutorial: A KDC distributes keys to Alice and Bob, who (a) wish to Tutorial: A KDC distributes keys to Alice and Bob, who (a) wish to
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Tutorial: Key escrow is typically implemented with split knowledge Tutorial: Key escrow is typically implemented with split knowledge
techniques. For example, the Escrowed Encryption Standard [FP185] techniques. For example, the Escrowed Encryption Standard [FP185]
entrusts two components of a device-unique split key to separate entrusts two components of a device-unique split key to separate
escrow agents. The agents provide the components only to someone escrow agents. The agents provide the components only to someone
legally authorized to conduct electronic surveillance of legally authorized to conduct electronic surveillance of
telecommunications encrypted by that specific device. The telecommunications encrypted by that specific device. The
components are used to reconstruct the device-unique key, and it components are used to reconstruct the device-unique key, and it
is used to obtain the session key needed to decrypt is used to obtain the session key needed to decrypt
communications. communications.
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$ key establishment (algorithm or protocol) $ key establishment (algorithm or protocol)
1. (I) A procedure that combines the key generation and key- 1. (I) A procedure that combines the key generation and key-
distribution steps needed to set up or install a secure distribution steps needed to set up or install a secure
communication association. communication association.
2. (I) A procedure that results in keying material being shared 2. (I) A procedure that results in keying material being shared
among two or more system entities. [A9042, SP56] among two or more system entities. [A9042, SP56]
Tutorial: The two basic techniques for key establishment are "key Tutorial: The two basic techniques for key establishment are "key
agreement" and "key transport". agreement" and "key transport".
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definition 1 because a key's cryptoperiod may be only a part of definition 1 because a key's cryptoperiod may be only a part of
the key's lifetime. A key could be generated at some time prior to the key's lifetime. A key could be generated at some time prior to
when its cryptoperiod begins and might not be destroyed (i.e., when its cryptoperiod begins and might not be destroyed (i.e.,
zeroized) until some time after its cryptoperiod ends. zeroized) until some time after its cryptoperiod ends.
2. (O) /MISSI/ An attribute of a MISSI key pair that specifies a 2. (O) /MISSI/ An attribute of a MISSI key pair that specifies a
time span that bounds the validity period of any MISSI X.509 time span that bounds the validity period of any MISSI X.509
public-key certificate that contains the public component of the public-key certificate that contains the public component of the
pair. (See: cryptoperiod.) pair. (See: cryptoperiod.)
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$ key loader $ key loader
(N) Synonym for "fill device". (N) Synonym for "fill device".
$ key loading and initialization facility (KLIF) $ key loading and initialization facility (KLIF)
(N) A place where ECU hardware is activated after being (N) A place where ECU hardware is activated after being
fabricated. (Compare: CLEF.) fabricated. (Compare: CLEF.)
Tutorial: Before going to its KLIF, an ECU is not ready to be Tutorial: Before going to its KLIF, an ECU is not ready to be
fielded, usually because it is not yet able to receive DEKs. The fielded, usually because it is not yet able to receive DEKs. The
KLIF employs trusted processes to complete the ECU by installing KLIF employs trusted processes to complete the ECU by installing
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Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"keying material". "keying material".
$ key pair $ key pair
(I) A set of mathematically related keys -- a public key and a (I) A set of mathematically related keys -- a public key and a
private key -- that are used for asymmetric cryptography and are private key -- that are used for asymmetric cryptography and are
generated in a way that makes it computationally infeasible to generated in a way that makes it computationally infeasible to
derive the private key from knowledge of the public key. (See: derive the private key from knowledge of the public key. (See:
Diffie-Hellman-Merkle, RSA.) Diffie-Hellman-Merkle, RSA.)
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Tutorial: A key pair's owner discloses the public key to other Tutorial: A key pair's owner discloses the public key to other
system entities so they can use the key to (a) encrypt data, (b) system entities so they can use the key to (a) encrypt data, (b)
verify a digital signature, or (c) generate a key with a key- verify a digital signature, or (c) generate a key with a key-
agreement algorithm. The matching private key is kept secret by agreement algorithm. The matching private key is kept secret by
the owner, who uses it to (a') decrypt data, (b') generate a the owner, who uses it to (a') decrypt data, (b') generate a
digital signature, or (c') generate a key with a key-agreement digital signature, or (c') generate a key with a key-agreement
algorithm. algorithm.
$ key recovery $ key recovery
1. (I) /cryptanalysis/ A process for learning the value of a 1. (I) /cryptanalysis/ A process for learning the value of a
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center. The center decrypts the set, reencrypts the set in the KEK center. The center decrypts the set, reencrypts the set in the KEK
it shares with Bob, and either (a) sends that reencrypted set to it shares with Bob, and either (a) sends that reencrypted set to
Alice for her to forward to Bob or (b) sends it directly to Bob Alice for her to forward to Bob or (b) sends it directly to Bob
(although direct distribution is not supported in the ANSI (although direct distribution is not supported in the ANSI
standard [A9017]). standard [A9017]).
$ key transport (algorithm or protocol) $ key transport (algorithm or protocol)
1. (I) A key establishment method by which a secret key is 1. (I) A key establishment method by which a secret key is
generated by a system entity in a communication association and generated by a system entity in a communication association and
securely sent to another entity in the association. (Compare: key securely sent to another entity in the association. (Compare: key
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agreement.) agreement.)
Tutorial: Either (a) one entity generates a secret key and Tutorial: Either (a) one entity generates a secret key and
securely sends it to the other entity, or (b) each entity securely sends it to the other entity, or (b) each entity
generates a secret value and securely sends it to the other generates a secret value and securely sends it to the other
entity, where the two values are combined to form a secret key. entity, where the two values are combined to form a secret key.
For example, a message originator can generate a random session For example, a message originator can generate a random session
key and then use the RSA algorithm to encrypt that key with the key and then use the RSA algorithm to encrypt that key with the
public key of the intended recipient. public key of the intended recipient.
2. (O) "The procedure to send a symmetric key from one party to 2. (O) "The procedure to send a symmetric key from one party to
other parties. As a result, all legitimate participants share a other parties. As a result, all legitimate participants share a
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corresponding hash result cannot be correctly computed without corresponding hash result cannot be correctly computed without
knowledge of the secret key. Thus, the secret key protects the knowledge of the secret key. Thus, the secret key protects the
hash result so it can be used as a checksum even when there is a hash result so it can be used as a checksum even when there is a
threat of an active attack on the data. There are two basic types threat of an active attack on the data. There are two basic types
of keyed hash: of keyed hash:
- A function based on a keyed encryption algorithm. Example: Data - A function based on a keyed encryption algorithm. Example: Data
Authentication Code. Authentication Code.
- A function based on a keyless hash that is enhanced by - A function based on a keyless hash that is enhanced by
combining (e.g., by concatenating) the input data object combining (e.g., by concatenating) the input data object
parameter with a key parameter before mapping to the hash parameter with a key parameter before mapping to the hash
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result. Example: HMAC. result. Example: HMAC.
$ keying material $ keying material
1. (I) Data that is needed to establish and maintain a 1. (I) Data that is needed to establish and maintain a
cryptographic security association, such as keys, key pairs, and cryptographic security association, such as keys, key pairs, and
IVs. IVs.
2. (O) "Key, code, or authentication information in physical or 2. (O) "Key, code, or authentication information in physical or
magnetic form." [C4009] (Compare: COMSEC material.) magnetic form." [C4009] (Compare: COMSEC material.)
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determine the key from knowledge of some plaintext-ciphertext determine the key from knowledge of some plaintext-ciphertext
pairs (although the analyst may also have other clues, such as pairs (although the analyst may also have other clues, such as
knowing the cryptographic algorithm). knowing the cryptographic algorithm).
$ kracker $ kracker
(O) Old spelling for "cracker". (O) Old spelling for "cracker".
$ KSOS, KSOS-6, KSOS-11 $ KSOS, KSOS-6, KSOS-11
(O) See: Kernelized Secure Operating System. (O) See: Kernelized Secure Operating System.
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$ L2F $ L2F
(N) See: Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol. (N) See: Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol.
$ L2TP $ L2TP
(N) See: Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol. (N) See: Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol.
$ label $ label
See: time stamp, security label. See: time stamp, security label.
$ laboratory attack $ laboratory attack
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non-hierarchical categories C(1), ..., C(M) -- together with the non-hierarchical categories C(1), ..., C(M) -- together with the
"dominate" relation. Security level (x,c) is said to "dominate" "dominate" relation. Security level (x,c) is said to "dominate"
(x',c') if and only if (a) x is greater (higher) than or equal to (x',c') if and only if (a) x is greater (higher) than or equal to
x' and (b) c includes at least all of the elements of c'. (See: x' and (b) c includes at least all of the elements of c'. (See:
dominate, lattice model.) dominate, lattice model.)
$ lattice model $ lattice model
1. (I) A description of the semantic structure formed by a finite 1. (I) A description of the semantic structure formed by a finite
set of security levels, such as those used in military set of security levels, such as those used in military
organizations. (See: dominate, lattice, security model.) organizations. (See: dominate, lattice, security model.)
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2. (I) /formal model/ A model for flow control in a system, based 2. (I) /formal model/ A model for flow control in a system, based
on the lattice that is formed by the finite security levels in a on the lattice that is formed by the finite security levels in a
system and their partial ordering. [Denn] system and their partial ordering. [Denn]
$ Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF) $ Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF)
(N) A data item that is automatically embedded in data encrypted (N) A data item that is automatically embedded in data encrypted
by devices (e.g., CLIPPER chip) that implement the Escrowed by devices (e.g., CLIPPER chip) that implement the Escrowed
Encryption Standard. Encryption Standard.
$ Layer 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 $ Layer 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
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$ Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol (L2F) $ Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol (L2F)
(N) An Internet protocol (originally developed by Cisco (N) An Internet protocol (originally developed by Cisco
Corporation) that uses tunneling of PPP over IP to create a Corporation) that uses tunneling of PPP over IP to create a
virtual extension of a dial-up link across a network, initiated by virtual extension of a dial-up link across a network, initiated by
the dial-up server and transparent to the dial-up user. (See: the dial-up server and transparent to the dial-up user. (See:
L2TP.) L2TP.)
$ Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) $ Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)
(N) An Internet client-server protocol that combines aspects of (N) An Internet client-server protocol that combines aspects of
PPTP and L2F and supports tunneling of PPP over an IP network or PPTP and L2F and supports tunneling of PPP over an IP network or
over frame relay or other switched network. (See: virtual private over frame relay or other switched network. (See: VPN.)
network.)
Tutorial: PPP can in turn encapsulate any OSIRM Layer 3 protocol. Tutorial: PPP can in turn encapsulate any OSIRM Layer 3 protocol.
Thus, L2TP does not specify security services; it depends on Thus, L2TP does not specify security services; it depends on
protocols layered above and below it to provide any needed protocols layered above and below it to provide any needed
security. security.
$ LDAP $ LDAP
(I) See: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol. (I) See: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.
$ least common mechanism $ least common mechanism
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$ least privilege $ least privilege
(I) The principle that a security architecture should be designed (I) The principle that a security architecture should be designed
so that each system entity is granted the minimum system resources so that each system entity is granted the minimum system resources
and authorizations that the entity needs to do its work. (Compare: and authorizations that the entity needs to do its work. (Compare:
economy of mechanism, least trust.) economy of mechanism, least trust.)
Tutorial: This principle tends to limit damage that can be caused Tutorial: This principle tends to limit damage that can be caused
by an accident, error, or unauthorized act. This principle also by an accident, error, or unauthorized act. This principle also
tends to reduce complexity and promote modularity, which can make tends to reduce complexity and promote modularity, which can make
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certification easier and more effective. This principle is similar certification easier and more effective. This principle is similar
to the principle of protocol layering, wherein each layer provides to the principle of protocol layering, wherein each layer provides
specific, limited communication services, and the functions in one specific, limited communication services, and the functions in one
layer are independent of those in other layers. layer are independent of those in other layers.
$ least trust $ least trust
(I) The principle that a security architecture should be designed (I) The principle that a security architecture should be designed
in a way that minimizes (a) the number of components that require in a way that minimizes (a) the number of components that require
trust and (b) the extent to which each component is trusted. trust and (b) the extent to which each component is trusted.
(Compare: least privilege, trust level.) (Compare: least privilege, trust level.)
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step, the protocol might also be designed so that if a man-in-the- step, the protocol might also be designed so that if a man-in-the-
middle attack succeeds during the vulnerable first part, then the middle attack succeeds during the vulnerable first part, then the
attacker must remain in the middle for all subsequent exchanges or attacker must remain in the middle for all subsequent exchanges or
else one of the legitimate parties will be able to detect the else one of the legitimate parties will be able to detect the
attack. attack.
$ level of concern $ level of concern
(N) /U.S. DoD/ A rating assigned to an information system that (N) /U.S. DoD/ A rating assigned to an information system that
indicates the extent to which protective measures, techniques, and indicates the extent to which protective measures, techniques, and
procedures must be applied. (See: critical, sensitive, level of procedures must be applied. (See: critical, sensitive, level of
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robustness.) robustness.)
$ level of robustness $ level of robustness
(N) /U.S. DoD/ A characterization of (a) the strength of a (N) /U.S. DoD/ A characterization of (a) the strength of a
security function, mechanism, service, or solution and (b) the security function, mechanism, service, or solution and (b) the
assurance (or confidence) that it is implemented and functioning. assurance (or confidence) that it is implemented and functioning.
[Cons, IATF] (See: level of concern.) [Cons, IATF] (See: level of concern.)
$ Liberty Alliance $ Liberty Alliance
(O) An international consortium of more than 150 commercial, (O) An international consortium of more than 150 commercial,
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2. (I) /World Wide Web/ See: hyperlink. 2. (I) /World Wide Web/ See: hyperlink.
$ link encryption $ link encryption
(I) Stepwise (link-by-link) protection of data that flows between (I) Stepwise (link-by-link) protection of data that flows between
two points in a network, provided by encrypting data separately on two points in a network, provided by encrypting data separately on
each network link, i.e., by encrypting data when it leaves a host each network link, i.e., by encrypting data when it leaves a host
or subnetwork relay and decrypting when it arrives at the next or subnetwork relay and decrypting when it arrives at the next
host or relay. Each link may use a different key or even a host or relay. Each link may use a different key or even a
different algorithm. [R1455] (Compare: end-to-end encryption.) different algorithm. [R1455] (Compare: end-to-end encryption.)
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$ liveness $ liveness
(I) A property of a communication association or a feature of a (I) A property of a communication association or a feature of a
communication protocol that provides assurance to the recipient of communication protocol that provides assurance to the recipient of
data that the data is being freshly transmitted by its originator, data that the data is being freshly transmitted by its originator,
i.e., that the data is not being replayed, by either the i.e., that the data is not being replayed, by either the
originator or a third party, from a previous transmission. (See: originator or a third party, from a previous transmission. (See:
fresh, nonce, replay attack.) fresh, nonce, replay attack.)
$ logic bomb $ logic bomb
(I) Malicious logic that activates when specified conditions are (I) Malicious logic that activates when specified conditions are
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$ LOTOS $ LOTOS
(N) See: Language of Temporal Ordering Specification. (N) See: Language of Temporal Ordering Specification.
$ MAC $ MAC
(N) See: mandatory access control, Message Authentication Code. (N) See: mandatory access control, Message Authentication Code.
Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a
definition for it because this abbreviation is ambiguous. definition for it because this abbreviation is ambiguous.
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$ magnetic remanence $ magnetic remanence
(N) Magnetic representation of residual information remaining on a (N) Magnetic representation of residual information remaining on a
magnetic medium after the medium has been cleared. [NCS25] (See: magnetic medium after the medium has been cleared. [NCS25] (See:
clear, degauss, purge.) clear, degauss, purge.)
$ main mode $ main mode
(I) See: /IKE/ under "mode". (I) See: /IKE/ under "mode".
$ maintenance hook $ maintenance hook
(N) "Special instructions (trapdoors) in software allowing easy (N) "Special instructions (trapdoors) in software allowing easy
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(D) A contraction of "malicious software". (See: malicious logic.) (D) A contraction of "malicious software". (See: malicious logic.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it is not listed Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it is not listed
in most dictionaries and could confuse international readers. in most dictionaries and could confuse international readers.
$ MAN $ MAN
(I) metropolitan area network. (I) metropolitan area network.
$ man-in-the-middle attack $ man-in-the-middle attack
(I) A form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker (I) A form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker
intercepts and selectively modifies communicated data in order to intercepts and selectively modifies communicated data to
masquerade as one or more of the entities involved in a masquerade as one or more of the entities involved in a
communication association. (See: hijack attack, piggyback attack.) communication association. (See: hijack attack, piggyback attack.)
Tutorial: For example, suppose Alice and Bob try to establish a Tutorial: For example, suppose Alice and Bob try to establish a
session key by using the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm without session key by using the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm without
data origin authentication service. A "man in the middle" could data origin authentication service. A "man in the middle" could
(a) block direct communication between Alice and Bob and then (b) (a) block direct communication between Alice and Bob and then (b)
masquerade as Alice sending data to Bob, (c) masquerade as Bob masquerade as Alice sending data to Bob, (c) masquerade as Bob
sending data to Alice, (d) establish separate session keys with sending data to Alice, (d) establish separate session keys with
each of them, and (e) function as a clandestine proxy server each of them, and (e) function as a clandestine proxy server
between them in order to capture or modify sensitive information between them to capture or modify sensitive information that Alice
that Alice and Bob think they are sending only to each other. and Bob think they are sending only to each other.
$ manager $ manager
(I) A person who controls the service configuration of a system or (I) A person who controls the service configuration of a system or
the functional privileges of operators and other users. the functional privileges of operators and other users. (See:
administrative security. Compare: operator, SSO, user.)
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$ mandatory access control $ mandatory access control
1. (I) An access control service that enforces a security policy 1. (I) An access control service that enforces a security policy
based on comparing (a) security labels, which indicate how based on comparing (a) security labels, which indicate how
sensitive or critical system resources are, with (b) security sensitive or critical system resources are, with (b) security
clearances, which indicate that system entities are eligible to clearances, which indicate that system entities are eligible to
access certain resources. (See: discretionary access control, MAC, access certain resources. (See: discretionary access control, MAC,
rule-based security policy.) rule-based security policy.)
Derivation: This kind of access control is called "mandatory" Derivation: This kind of access control is called "mandatory"
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Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different
metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated
Usage under "Green Book".) Usage under "Green Book".)
$ masquerade $ masquerade
(I) A type of threat action whereby an unauthorized entity gains (I) A type of threat action whereby an unauthorized entity gains
access to a system or performs a malicious act by illegitimately access to a system or performs a malicious act by illegitimately
posing as an authorized entity. (See: deception.) posing as an authorized entity. (See: deception.)
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Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes: Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes:
- "Spoof": Attempt by an unauthorized entity to gain access to a - "Spoof": Attempt by an unauthorized entity to gain access to a
system by posing as an authorized user. system by posing as an authorized user.
- "Malicious logic": In context of masquerade, any hardware, - "Malicious logic": In context of masquerade, any hardware,
firmware, or software (e.g., Trojan horse) that appears to firmware, or software (e.g., Trojan horse) that appears to
perform a useful or desirable function, but actually gains perform a useful or desirable function, but actually gains
unauthorized access to system resources or tricks a user into unauthorized access to system resources or tricks a user into
executing other malicious logic. (See: corruption, executing other malicious logic. (See: corruption,
incapacitation, main entry for "malicious logic", misuse.) incapacitation, main entry for "malicious logic", misuse.)
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used to refer to a pair of such certificates where one is for used to refer to a pair of such certificates where one is for
digital signature use and the other is for encryption. digital signature use and the other is for encryption.
$ merchant certification authority (MCA) $ merchant certification authority (MCA)
(O) /SET/ A CA that issues digital certificates to merchants and (O) /SET/ A CA that issues digital certificates to merchants and
is operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an acquirer, or is operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an acquirer, or
another party according to brand rules. Acquirers verify and another party according to brand rules. Acquirers verify and
approve requests for merchant certificates prior to issuance by approve requests for merchant certificates prior to issuance by
the MCA. An MCA does not issue a CRL, but does distribute CRLs the MCA. An MCA does not issue a CRL, but does distribute CRLs
issued by root CAs, brand CAs, geopolitical CAs, and payment issued by root CAs, brand CAs, geopolitical CAs, and payment
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gateway CAs. [SET2] gateway CAs. [SET2]
$ mesh PKI $ mesh PKI
(I) A non-hierarchical PKI architecture in which there are several (I) A non-hierarchical PKI architecture in which there are several
trusted CAs rather than a single root. Each certificate user bases trusted CAs rather than a single root. Each certificate user bases
path validations on the public key of one of the trusted CAs, path validations on the public key of one of the trusted CAs,
usually the one that issued that user's own public-key usually the one that issued that user's own public-key
certificate. Rather than having superior-to-subordinate certificate. Rather than having superior-to-subordinate
relationships between CAs, the relationships are peer-to-peer, and relationships between CAs, the relationships are peer-to-peer, and
CAs issue cross-certificates to each other. (Compare: hierarchical CAs issue cross-certificates to each other. (Compare: hierarchical
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implies that the mechanism is particularly suitable for or limited implies that the mechanism is particularly suitable for or limited
to electronic mail (see: Message Handling Systems). to electronic mail (see: Message Handling Systems).
$ message handling system $ message handling system
(D) Synonym for the Internet electronic mail system. (D) Synonym for the Internet electronic mail system.
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term, because it could Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term, because it could
be confused with Message Handling System. Instead, use "Internet be confused with Message Handling System. Instead, use "Internet
electronic mail" or some other, more specific term. electronic mail" or some other, more specific term.
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$ Message Handling System $ Message Handling System
(O) A ITU-T system concept that encompasses the notion of (O) A ITU-T system concept that encompasses the notion of
electronic mail but defines more comprehensive OSI systems and electronic mail but defines more comprehensive OSI systems and
services that enable users to exchange messages on a store-and- services that enable users to exchange messages on a store-and-
forward basis. (The ISO equivalent is "Message Oriented Text forward basis. (The ISO equivalent is "Message Oriented Text
Interchange System".) (See: X.400.) Interchange System".) (See: X.400.)
$ message indicator $ message indicator
1. (D) /cryptographic function/ Synonym for "initialization 1. (D) /cryptographic function/ Synonym for "initialization
value". value". (Compare: indicator.)
2. (D) "Sequence of bits transmitted over a communications system 2. (D) "Sequence of bits transmitted over a communications system
for synchronizing cryptographic equipment." [C4009] for synchronizing cryptographic equipment." [C4009]
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"initialization value"; the term mixes concepts in a potentially "initialization value"; the term mixes concepts in a potentially
misleading way. The word "message" is misleading because it misleading way. The word "message" is misleading because it
suggests that the mechanism is limited to electronic mail. (See: suggests that the mechanism is limited to electronic mail. (See:
Message Handling System.) Message Handling System.)
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$ meta-data $ meta-data
(I) Descriptive information about a data object; i.e., data about (I) Descriptive information about a data object; i.e., data about
data, or data labels that describe other data. (See: security data, or data labels that describe other data. (See: security
label. Compare: metadata) label. Compare: metadata)
Tutorial: Meta-data can serve various management purposes: Tutorial: Meta-data can serve various management purposes:
- System management: File name, type, size, creation date. - System management: File name, type, size, creation date.
- Application management: Document title, version, author. - Application management: Document title, version, author.
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- Usage management: Data categories, keywords, classifications. - Usage management: Data categories, keywords, classifications.
Meta-data can be associated with a data object in two basic ways: Meta-data can be associated with a data object in two basic ways:
- Explicitly: Be part of the data object (e.g., a header field of - Explicitly: Be part of the data object (e.g., a header field of
a data file or packet) or be linked to the object. a data file or packet) or be linked to the object.
- Implicitly: Be associated with the data object because of some - Implicitly: Be associated with the data object because of some
other, explicit attribute of the object. other, explicit attribute of the object.
$ metadata, Metadata(trademark), METADATA(trademark) $ metadata, Metadata(trademark), METADATA(trademark)
(D) Proprietary variants of "meta-data". (See: SPAM(trademark).) (D) Proprietary variants of "meta-data". (See: SPAM(trademark).)
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logical or physical control of a system resource. (See: logical or physical control of a system resource. (See:
usurpation.) usurpation.)
Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes: Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes:
- Theft of data: Unauthorized acquisition and use of data - Theft of data: Unauthorized acquisition and use of data
contained in a system. contained in a system.
- Theft of service: Unauthorized use of a system service. - Theft of service: Unauthorized use of a system service.
- Theft of functionality: Unauthorized acquisition of actual - Theft of functionality: Unauthorized acquisition of actual
hardware, firmware, or software of a system component. hardware, firmware, or software of a system component.
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$ MISPC $ MISPC
(N) See: Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI (N) See: Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI
Components. Components.
$ MISSI $ MISSI
(O) Multilevel Information System Security Initiative, an NSA (O) Multilevel Information System Security Initiative, an NSA
program to encourage development of interoperable, modular program to encourage development of interoperable, modular
products for constructing secure network information systems in products for constructing secure network information systems in
support of a wide variety of Government missions. (See: MSP, SP3, support of a wide variety of Government missions. (See: MSP, SP3,
SP4.) SP4.)
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$ mission essential $ mission essential
(O) /U.S. DoD/ Refers to materiel that is authorized and available (O) /U.S. DoD/ Refers to materiel that is authorized and available
to combat, combat support, combat service support, and combat to combat, combat support, combat service support, and combat
readiness training forces to accomplish their assigned missions. readiness training forces to accomplish their assigned missions.
[JCSP1] (Compare: mission critical.) [JCSP1] (Compare: mission critical.)
$ misuse $ misuse
1. (I) The intentional use (by authorized users) of system 1. (I) The intentional use (by authorized users) of system
resources for other than authorized purposes. Example: An resources for other than authorized purposes. Example: An
authorized system administrator creates an unauthorized account authorized system administrator creates an unauthorized account
for a friend. for a friend. (See: misuse detection.)
2. (I) A type of threat action that causes a system component to 2. (I) A type of threat action that causes a system component to
perform a function or service that is detrimental to system perform a function or service that is detrimental to system
security. (See: usurpation.) security. (See: usurpation.)
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Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes: Usage: This type of threat action includes the following subtypes:
- "Tampering": /misuse/ Deliberately altering a system's logic, - "Tampering": /misuse/ Deliberately altering a system's logic,
data, or control information to cause the system to perform data, or control information to cause the system to perform
unauthorized functions or services. (See: corruption, main unauthorized functions or services. (See: corruption, main
entry for "tampering".) entry for "tampering".)
- "Malicious logic": /misuse/ Any hardware, firmware, or software - "Malicious logic": /misuse/ Any hardware, firmware, or software
intentionally introduced into a system to perform or control intentionally introduced into a system to perform or control
execution of an unauthorized function or service. (See: execution of an unauthorized function or service. (See:
corruption, incapacitation, main entry for "malicious logic", corruption, incapacitation, main entry for "malicious logic",
masquerade.) masquerade.)
- "Violation of authorizations": Action by an entity that exceeds - "Violation of authorizations": Action by an entity that exceeds
the entity's system privileges by executing an unauthorized the entity's system privileges by executing an unauthorized
function. (See: authorization.) function. (See: authorization.)
$ misuse detection $ misuse detection
(I) An intrusion detection method that is based on rules that (I) An intrusion detection method that is based on rules that
specify system events, sequences of events, or observable specify system events, sequences of events, or observable
properties of a system that are believed to be symptomatic of properties of a system that are believed to be symptomatic of
security incidents. (See: IDS. Compare: anomaly detection.) security incidents. (See: IDS, misuse. Compare: anomaly
detection.)
$ MLS $ MLS
(I) See: multilevel secure (I) See: multilevel secure
$ mobile code $ mobile code
1a. (I) Software that originates from a remote server, is 1a. (I) Software that originates from a remote server, is
transmitted across a network, and is loaded onto and executed on a transmitted across a network, and is loaded onto and executed on a
local client system without explicit initiation by the client's local client system without explicit initiation by the client's
user and, in some cases, without that user's knowledge. (Compare: user and, in some cases, without that user's knowledge. (Compare:
active content.) active content.)
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2b. (O) "Programs (e.g., script, macro, or other portable 2b. (O) "Programs (e.g., script, macro, or other portable
instruction) that can be shipped unchanged to a heterogeneous instruction) that can be shipped unchanged to a heterogeneous
collection of platforms and executed with identical semantics" collection of platforms and executed with identical semantics"
[SP-28]. (See: active content.) [SP-28]. (See: active content.)
Tutorial: Mobile code might be malicious. Using techniques such as Tutorial: Mobile code might be malicious. Using techniques such as
"code signing" and a "sandbox" can reduce the risks of receiving "code signing" and a "sandbox" can reduce the risks of receiving
and executing mobile code. and executing mobile code.
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$ mode $ mode
$ mode of operation $ mode of operation
1. (I) /cryptographic operation/ A technique for enhancing the 1. (I) /cryptographic operation/ A technique for enhancing the
effect of a cryptographic algorithm or adapting the algorithm for effect of a cryptographic algorithm or adapting the algorithm for
an application, such as applying a block cipher to a sequence of an application, such as applying a block cipher to a sequence of
data blocks or a data stream. (See: CBC, CCM, CMAC, CFB, CTR, ECB, data blocks or a data stream. (See: CBC, CCM, CMAC, CFB, CTR, ECB,
OFB.) OFB.)
2. (I) /system operation/ A type of security policy that states 2. (I) /system operation/ A type of security policy that states
the range of classification levels of information that a system is the range of classification levels of information that a system is
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of users who are permitted to access the system. (See: of users who are permitted to access the system. (See:
compartmented security mode, controlled security mode, dedicated compartmented security mode, controlled security mode, dedicated
security mode, multilevel security mode, partitioned security security mode, multilevel security mode, partitioned security
mode, system-high security mode. Compare: protection level.) mode, system-high security mode. Compare: protection level.)
3. (I) /IKE/ IKE refers to its various types of ISAKMP-scripted 3. (I) /IKE/ IKE refers to its various types of ISAKMP-scripted
exchanges of messages as "modes". Among these are the following: exchanges of messages as "modes". Among these are the following:
- "Main mode": One of IKE's two phase 1 modes. (See: ISAKMP.) - "Main mode": One of IKE's two phase 1 modes. (See: ISAKMP.)
- "Quick mode": IKE's only phase 2 mode. (See: ISAKMP.) - "Quick mode": IKE's only phase 2 mode. (See: ISAKMP.)
$ model
See: formal model, security model.
$ modulus $ modulus
(I) The defining constant in modular arithmetic, and usually a (I) The defining constant in modular arithmetic, and usually a
part of the public key in asymmetric cryptography that is based on part of the public key in asymmetric cryptography that is based on
modular arithmetic. (See: Diffie-Hellman-Merkle, RSA.) modular arithmetic. (See: Diffie-Hellman-Merkle, RSA.)
$ Mondex $ Mondex
(O) A smartcard-based electronic money system that incorporates (O) A smartcard-based electronic money system that incorporates
cryptography and can be used to make payments via the Internet. cryptography and can be used to make payments via the Internet.
(See: IOTP.) (See: IOTP.)
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(N) A key-agreement protocol [Mene] that was proposed by A.J. (N) A key-agreement protocol [Mene] that was proposed by A.J.
Menezes, M. Qu, and S.A. Vanstone in 1995 and is based on the Menezes, M. Qu, and S.A. Vanstone in 1995 and is based on the
Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm. Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm.
$ MSP $ MSP
(N) See: Message Security Protocol. (N) See: Message Security Protocol.
$ multicast security $ multicast security
See: secure multicast See: secure multicast
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$ Multics $ Multics
(N) MULTiplexed Information and Computing Service, an MLS computer (N) MULTiplexed Information and Computing Service, an MLS computer
timesharing system designed and implemented during 1965-69 by a timesharing system designed and implemented during 1965-69 by a
consortium including Massachusetts Institute of Technology, consortium including Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
General Electric, and Bell Laboratories, and later offered General Electric, and Bell Laboratories, and later offered
commercially by Honeywell. commercially by Honeywell.
Tutorial: Multics was one of the first large, general-purpose, Tutorial: Multics was one of the first large, general-purpose,
operating systems to include security as a primary goal from the operating systems to include security as a primary goal from the
inception of the design and development and was rated in TCSEC inception of the design and development and was rated in TCSEC
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system. (b) All authorized users have the proper security system. (b) All authorized users have the proper security
clearance and appropriate specific access approval for the clearance and appropriate specific access approval for the
information to which they have access. (c) All authorized users information to which they have access. (c) All authorized users
have a need-to-know only for information to which they have have a need-to-know only for information to which they have
access. [C4009] (See: formal access approval, protection level.) access. [C4009] (See: formal access approval, protection level.)
$ Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) $ Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)
(I) An Internet protocol (RFC 2045) that enhances the basic format (I) An Internet protocol (RFC 2045) that enhances the basic format
of Internet electronic mail messages (RFC 822) (a) to enable of Internet electronic mail messages (RFC 822) (a) to enable
character sets other than U.S. ASCII to be used for textual character sets other than U.S. ASCII to be used for textual
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headers and content and (b) to carry non-textual and multi-part headers and content and (b) to carry non-textual and multi-part
content. (See: S/MIME.) content. (See: S/MIME.)
$ mutual suspicion $ mutual suspicion
(I) The state that exists between two interacting system entities (I) The state that exists between two interacting system entities
in which neither entity can trust the other to function correctly in which neither entity can trust the other to function correctly
with regard to some security requirement. with regard to some security requirement.
$ name $ name
(I) Synonym for "identifier". (I) Synonym for "identifier".
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sector laboratories for the testing of information security sector laboratories for the testing of information security
products using the Common Criteria. products using the Common Criteria.
- Working to establish a formal, international mutual recognition - Working to establish a formal, international mutual recognition
scheme for a Common Criteria-based evaluation. scheme for a Common Criteria-based evaluation.
$ National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) $ National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
(N) A U.S. Department of Commerce organization that promotes U.S. (N) A U.S. Department of Commerce organization that promotes U.S.
economic growth by working with industry to develop and apply economic growth by working with industry to develop and apply
technology, measurements, and standards. Has primary Government technology, measurements, and standards. Has primary Government
responsibility for INFOSEC standards for sensitive unclassified responsibility for INFOSEC standards for sensitive unclassified
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information. (See: ANSI, DES, DSA, DSS, FIPS, NIAP, NSA.) information. (See: ANSI, DES, DSA, DSS, FIPS, NIAP, NSA.)
$ National Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) $ National Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC)
(N) An advisory committee chartered by the U.S. Federal (N) An advisory committee chartered by the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), with participation by network Communications Commission (FCC), with participation by network
service providers and vendors, to provide recommendations to the service providers and vendors, to provide recommendations to the
FCC for assuring reliability, interoperability, robustness, and FCC for assuring reliability, interoperability, robustness, and
security of wireless, wireline, satellite, cable, and public data security of wireless, wireline, satellite, cable, and public data
communication networks. communication networks.
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military forces; (d) involves equipment that is an integral part military forces; (d) involves equipment that is an integral part
of a weapon or weapon system; or (e) is critical to the direct of a weapon or weapon system; or (e) is critical to the direct
fulfillment of military or intelligence missions and does not fulfillment of military or intelligence missions and does not
include a system that is to be used for routine administrative and include a system that is to be used for routine administrative and
business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and
personnel management applications). [Title 40 U.S.C. Section 1552, personnel management applications). [Title 40 U.S.C. Section 1552,
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996.] (See: type Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996.] (See: type
2 product.) 2 product.)
$ natural disaster $ natural disaster
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "corruption" (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definitions under "corruption"
and "incapacitation". and "incapacitation".
$ NCSC $ NCSC
(O) See: National Computer Security Center. (O) See: National Computer Security Center.
$ need to know, need-to-know $ need to know, need-to-know
(I) The necessity for access to, knowledge of, or possession of (I) The necessity for access to, knowledge of, or possession of
specific information required to carry out official duties. specific information required to carry out official duties.
Usage: The compound "need-to-know" is used as both an adjective Usage: The compound "need-to-know" is used as both an adjective
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and a noun. and a noun.
Tutorial: The need-to-know criterion is used in security Tutorial: The need-to-know criterion is used in security
procedures that require a custodian of sensitive information, procedures that require a custodian of sensitive information,
prior to disclosing the information to someone else, to establish prior to disclosing the information to someone else, to establish
that the intended recipient has proper authorization to access the that the intended recipient has proper authorization to access the
information. information.
$ network $ network
(I) An information system comprised of a collection of (I) An information system comprised of a collection of
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(O) The U.S. DoD's common-use Non-Classified Internet Protocol (O) The U.S. DoD's common-use Non-Classified Internet Protocol
Router Network; the part of the Internet that is wholly controlled Router Network; the part of the Internet that is wholly controlled
by the U.S. DoD and is used for official DoD business. by the U.S. DoD and is used for official DoD business.
$ NIST $ NIST
(N) See: National Institute of Standards and Technology. (N) See: National Institute of Standards and Technology.
$ NLSP $ NLSP
(N) See: Network Layer Security Protocol (N) See: Network Layer Security Protocol
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$ no-lone zone $ no-lone zone
(I) A room or other space or area to which no person may have (I) A room or other space or area to which no person may have
unaccompanied access and that, when occupied, is required to be unaccompanied access and that, when occupied, is required to be
occupied by two or more appropriately authorized persons. [C4009] occupied by two or more appropriately authorized persons. [C4009]
(See: dual control.) (See: dual control.)
$ no-PIN ORA (NORA) $ no-PIN ORA (NORA)
(O) /MISSI/ An organizational RA that operates in a mode in which (O) /MISSI/ An organizational RA that operates in a mode in which
the ORA performs no card management functions and, therefore, does the ORA performs no card management functions and, therefore, does
not require knowledge of either the SSO PIN or user PIN for an end not require knowledge of either the SSO PIN or user PIN for an end
user's FORTEZZA PC card. user's FORTEZZA PC card.
$ node $ node
(I) A collection of related subsystems located on one or more (I) A collection of related subsystems located on one or more
computer platforms at a single system site. computer platforms at a single site. (See: site.)
$ nonce $ nonce
(I) A random or non-repeating value that is included in data (I) A random or non-repeating value that is included in data
exchanged by a protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing exchanged by a protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing
liveness and thus detecting and protecting against replay attacks. liveness and thus detecting and protecting against replay attacks.
(See: fresh.) (See: fresh.)
$ non-critical $ non-critical
See: critical. See: critical.
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Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2 because it Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2 because it
bundles two security services -- non-repudiation with proof of bundles two security services -- non-repudiation with proof of
origin, and non-repudiation with proof of receipt -- that can be origin, and non-repudiation with proof of receipt -- that can be
provided independently of each other. provided independently of each other.
Usage: ISDs SHOULD distinguish between the technical aspects and Usage: ISDs SHOULD distinguish between the technical aspects and
the legal aspects of a non-repudiation service: the legal aspects of a non-repudiation service:
- "Technical non-repudiation": Refers to the assurance a relying - "Technical non-repudiation": Refers to the assurance a relying
party has that if a public key is used to validate a digital party has that if a public key is used to validate a digital
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signature, then that signature had to have been made by the signature, then that signature had to have been made by the
corresponding private signature key. [SP32] corresponding private signature key. [SP32]
- "Legal non-repudiation": Refers to how well possession or - "Legal non-repudiation": Refers to how well possession or
control of the private signature key can be established. [SP32] control of the private signature key can be established. [SP32]
Tutorial: Non-repudiation service does not prevent an entity from Tutorial: Non-repudiation service does not prevent an entity from
repudiating a communication. Instead, the service provides repudiating a communication. Instead, the service provides
evidence that can be stored and later presented to a third party evidence that can be stored and later presented to a third party
to resolve disputes that arise if and when a communication is to resolve disputes that arise if and when a communication is
repudiated by one of the entities involved. repudiated by one of the entities involved.
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5. Retain evidence: The evidence is retained for possible future 5. Retain evidence: The evidence is retained for possible future
retrieval and use. retrieval and use.
6. Resolve dispute: In this phase, which occurs only if the 6. Resolve dispute: In this phase, which occurs only if the
critical action is repudiated, the evidence is retrieved from critical action is repudiated, the evidence is retrieved from
storage, presented, and verified to resolve the dispute. storage, presented, and verified to resolve the dispute.
$ non-repudiation with proof of origin $ non-repudiation with proof of origin
(I) A security service that provides the recipient of data with (I) A security service that provides the recipient of data with
evidence that proves the origin of the data, and thus protects the evidence that proves the origin of the data, and thus protects the
recipient against an attempt by the originator to falsely deny recipient against an attempt by the originator to falsely deny
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sending the data. (See: non-repudiation service.) sending the data. (See: non-repudiation service.)
Tutorial: This service is a strong version of data origin Tutorial: This service is a strong version of data origin
authentication service. This service can not only verify the authentication service. This service can not only verify the
identity of a system entity that is the original source of identity of a system entity that is the original source of
received data; it can also provide proof of that identity to a received data; it can also provide proof of that identity to a
third party. third party.
$ non-repudiation with proof of receipt $ non-repudiation with proof of receipt
(I) A security service that provides the originator of data with (I) A security service that provides the originator of data with
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(I) An algorithm [R2410] that is specified as doing nothing to (I) An algorithm [R2410] that is specified as doing nothing to
transform plaintext data; i.e., a no-op. It originated because ESP transform plaintext data; i.e., a no-op. It originated because ESP
always specifies the use of an encryption algorithm for always specifies the use of an encryption algorithm for
confidentiality. The NULL encryption algorithm is a convenient way confidentiality. The NULL encryption algorithm is a convenient way
to represent the option of not applying encryption in ESP (or in to represent the option of not applying encryption in ESP (or in
any other context where a no-op is needed). (Compare: null.) any other context where a no-op is needed). (Compare: null.)
$ OAKLEY $ OAKLEY
(I) A key establishment protocol (proposed for IPsec but (I) A key establishment protocol (proposed for IPsec but
superseded by IKE) based on the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm superseded by IKE) based on the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm
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and designed to be a compatible component of ISAKMP. [R2412] and designed to be a compatible component of ISAKMP. [R2412]
Tutorial: OAKLEY establishes a shared key with an assigned Tutorial: OAKLEY establishes a shared key with an assigned
identifier and associated authenticated identities for parties; identifier and associated authenticated identities for parties;
i.e., OAKLEY provides authentication service to ensure the i.e., OAKLEY provides authentication service to ensure the
entities of each other's identity, even if the Diffie-Hellman- entities of each other's identity, even if the Diffie-Hellman-
Merkle exchange is threatened by active wiretapping. Also, it Merkle exchange is threatened by active wiretapping. Also, it
provides public-key forward secrecy for the shared key and provides public-key forward secrecy for the shared key and
supports key updates, incorporation of keys distributed by out-of- supports key updates, incorporation of keys distributed by out-of-
band mechanisms, and user-defined abstract group structures for band mechanisms, and user-defined abstract group structures for
use with Diffie-Hellman-Merkle. use with Diffie-Hellman-Merkle.
$ object $ object
(I) /formal model/ Trusted-system modeling usage: A system (I) /formal model/ Trusted-system modeling usage: A system
component that contains or receives information. (See: Bell- component that contains or receives information. (See: Bell-
LaPadula model, trusted system.) LaPadula model, object reuse, trusted system.)
$ object identifier (OID) $ object identifier (OID)
1. (N) An official, globally unique name for a thing, written as a 1. (N) An official, globally unique name for a thing, written as a
sequence of integers (which are formed and assigned as defined in sequence of integers (which are formed and assigned as defined in
the ASN.1 standard) and used to reference the thing in abstract the ASN.1 standard) and used to reference the thing in abstract
specifications and during negotiation of security services in a specifications and during negotiation of security services in a
protocol. protocol.
2. (O) "A value (distinguishable from all other such values) which 2. (O) "A value (distinguishable from all other such values)
is associated with an object." [X680] [that] is associated with an object." [X680]
Tutorial: Objects named by OIDs are leaves of the object Tutorial: Objects named by OIDs are leaves of the object
identifier tree (which is similar to but different from the X.500 identifier tree (which is similar to but different from the X.500
Directory Information Tree). Each arc (i.e., each branch of the Directory Information Tree). Each arc (i.e., each branch of the
tree) is labeled with a non-negative integer. An OID is the tree) is labeled with a non-negative integer. An OID is the
sequence of integers on the path leading from the root of the tree sequence of integers on the path leading from the root of the tree
to a named object. to a named object.
The OID tree has three arcs immediately below the root: {0} for The OID tree has three arcs immediately below the root: {0} for
use by ITU-T, {1} for use by ISO, and {2} for use by both jointly. use by ITU-T, {1} for use by ISO, and {2} for use by both jointly.
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recommendations. Below {0 0} are 26 arcs, one for each series of recommendations. Below {0 0} are 26 arcs, one for each series of
recommendations starting with the letters A to Z, and below these recommendations starting with the letters A to Z, and below these
are arcs for each recommendation. Thus, the OID for ITU-T are arcs for each recommendation. Thus, the OID for ITU-T
Recommendation X.509 is {0 0 24 509}. Below ISO are four arcs, Recommendation X.509 is {0 0 24 509}. Below ISO are four arcs,
where {1 0 }is for ISO standards, and below these are arcs for where {1 0 }is for ISO standards, and below these are arcs for
each ISO standard. Thus, the OID for ISO/IEC 9594-8 (the ISO each ISO standard. Thus, the OID for ISO/IEC 9594-8 (the ISO
number for X.509) is {1 0 9594 8}. number for X.509) is {1 0 9594 8}.
ANSI registers organization names below the branch {joint-iso- ANSI registers organization names below the branch {joint-iso-
ccitt(2) country(16) US(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)}. ccitt(2) country(16) US(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)}.
The NIST CSOR records PKI objects below the branch {joint-iso-itu- The NIST CSOR records PKI objects below the branch {joint-iso-itu-
t(2) country(16) us(840) organization (1) gov(101) csor(3)}. The t(2) country(16) us(840) organization (1) gov(101) csor(3)}. The
U.S. DoD registers INFOSEC objects below the branch {joint-iso- U.S. DoD registers INFOSEC objects below the branch {joint-iso-
itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2)
infosec(1)}. infosec(1)}.
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The IETF's Public-Key Infrastructure (pkix) Working Group The IETF's Public-Key Infrastructure (pkix) Working Group
registers PKI objects below the branch {iso(1) identified- registers PKI objects below the branch {iso(1) identified-
organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5)
pkix(7)}. [R3280] pkix(7)}. [R3280]
$ object reuse $ object reuse
(N) /COMPUSEC/ Reassignment and reuse of an area of a storage (N) /COMPUSEC/ Reassignment and reuse of an area of a storage
medium (e.g., random-access memory, floppy disk, magnetic tape) medium (e.g., random-access memory, floppy disk, magnetic tape)
that once contained sensitive data objects. Before being that once contained sensitive data objects. Before being
reassigned for use by a new subject, the area needs to be erased reassigned for use by a new subject, the area needs to be erased
or, in some cases, purged. [NCS04] or, in some cases, purged. [NCS04] (See: object.)
$ obstruction $ obstruction
(I) A type of threat action that interrupts delivery of system (I) A type of threat action that interrupts delivery of system
services by hindering system operations. (See: disruption.) services by hindering system operations. (See: disruption.)
Tutorial: This type of threat action includes the following Tutorial: This type of threat action includes the following
subtypes: subtypes:
- "Interference": Disruption of system operations by blocking - "Interference": Disruption of system operations by blocking
communication of user data or control information. (See: communication of user data or control information. (See:
jamming.) jamming.)
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$ ohnosecond $ ohnosecond
(D) That minuscule fraction of time in which you realize that your (D) That minuscule fraction of time in which you realize that your
private key has been compromised. private key has been compromised.
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it is a joke for Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it is a joke for
English speakers. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book".) English speakers. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book".)
$ OID $ OID
(N) See: object identifier. (N) See: object identifier.
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$ On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) $ On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
(I) An Internet protocol [R2560] used by a client to obtain from a (I) An Internet protocol [R2560] used by a client to obtain from a
server the validity status and other information about a digital server the validity status and other information about a digital
certificate. (Mentioned in [X509] but not specified there.) certificate. (Mentioned in [X509] but not specified there.)
Tutorial: In some applications, such as those involving high-value Tutorial: In some applications, such as those involving high-value
commercial transactions, it may be necessary either (a) to obtain commercial transactions, it may be necessary either (a) to obtain
certificate revocation status that is more timely than is possible certificate revocation status that is timelier than is possible
with CRLs or (b) to obtain other kinds of status information. OCSP with CRLs or (b) to obtain other kinds of status information. OCSP
may be used to determine the current revocation status of a may be used to determine the current revocation status of a
digital certificate, in lieu of or as a supplement to checking digital certificate, in lieu of or as a supplement to checking
against a periodic CRL. An OCSP client issues a status request to against a periodic CRL. An OCSP client issues a status request to
an OCSP server and suspends acceptance of the certificate in an OCSP server and suspends acceptance of the certificate in
question until the server provides a response. question until the server provides a response.
$ one-time pad $ one-time pad
1. (N) A manual encryption system in the form of a paper pad for 1. (N) A manual encryption system in the form of a paper pad for
one-time use. one-time use.
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function to generate one-time passwords for use as authentication function to generate one-time passwords for use as authentication
information in system login and in other processes that need information in system login and in other processes that need
protection against replay attacks. protection against replay attacks.
$ one-way encryption $ one-way encryption
(I) Irreversible transformation of plain text to cipher text, such (I) Irreversible transformation of plain text to cipher text, such
that the plain text cannot be recovered from the cipher text by that the plain text cannot be recovered from the cipher text by
other than exhaustive procedures even if the cryptographic key is other than exhaustive procedures even if the cryptographic key is
known. (See: brute force, encryption.) known. (See: brute force, encryption.)
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$ one-way function $ one-way function
(I) "A (mathematical) function, f, which is easy to compute, but (I) "A (mathematical) function, f, [that] is easy to compute, but
which for a general value y in the range, it is computationally which for a general value y in the range, it is computationally
difficult to find a value x in the domain such that f(x) = y. difficult to find a value x in the domain such that f(x) = y.
There may be a few values of y for which finding x is not There may be a few values of y for which finding x is not
computationally difficult." [X509] computationally difficult." [X509]
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"cryptographic hash". "cryptographic hash".
$ onion routing $ onion routing
(I) A system that can be used to provide both (a) data (I) A system that can be used to provide both (a) data
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accredited facility, but not in General Services Administration accredited facility, but not in General Services Administration
approved secure containers, while the facility is unoccupied by approved secure containers, while the facility is unoccupied by
authorized personnel." [C4009] authorized personnel." [C4009]
$ Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model (OSIRM) $ Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model (OSIRM)
(N) A joint ISO/ITU-T standard [I7498-1] for a seven-layer, (N) A joint ISO/ITU-T standard [I7498-1] for a seven-layer,
architectural communication framework for interconnection of architectural communication framework for interconnection of
computers in networks. (See: OSIRM Security Architecture. Compare: computers in networks. (See: OSIRM Security Architecture. Compare:
Internet Protocol Suite.) Internet Protocol Suite.)
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Tutorial: OSIRM-based standards include communication protocols Tutorial: OSIRM-based standards include communication protocols
that are mostly incompatible with the IPS, but also include that are mostly incompatible with the IPS, but also include
security models, such as X.509, that are used in the Internet. security models, such as X.509, that are used in the Internet.
The OSIRM layers, from highest to lowest, are (7) Application, (6) The OSIRM layers, from highest to lowest, are (7) Application, (6)
Presentation, (5) Session, (4) Transport, (3) Network, (2) Data Presentation, (5) Session, (4) Transport, (3) Network, (2) Data
Link, and (1) Physical. Link, and (1) Physical.
Usage: This Glossary refers to OSIRM layers by number to avoid Usage: This Glossary refers to OSIRM layers by number to avoid
confusing them with IPS layers, which are referred to by name. confusing them with IPS layers, which are referred to by name.
Some unknown person described how the OSIRM layers correspond to Some unknown person described how the OSIRM layers correspond to
the seven deadly sins: the seven deadly sins:
7. Wrath: Application is always angry at the mess it sees below 7. Wrath: Application is always angry with the mess it sees below
itself. (Hey! Who is it to be pointing fingers?) itself. (Hey! Who is it to be pointing fingers?)
6. Sloth: Presentation is too lazy to do anything productive by 6. Sloth: Presentation is too lazy to do anything productive by
itself. itself.
5. Lust: Session is always craving and demanding what truly 5. Lust: Session is always craving and demanding what truly
belongs to Application's functionality. belongs to Application's functionality.
4. Avarice: Transport wants all of the end-to-end functionality. 4. Avarice: Transport wants all of the end-to-end functionality.
(Of course, it deserves it, but life isn't fair.) (Of course, it deserves it, but life isn't fair.)
3. Gluttony: (Connection-Oriented) Network is overweight and 3. Gluttony: (Connection-Oriented) Network is overweight and
overbearing after trying too often to eat Transport's lunch. overbearing after trying too often to eat Transport's lunch.
2. Envy: Poor Data Link is always starved for attention. (With 2. Envy: Poor Data Link is always starved for attention. (With
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2. Sneezy: Data Link makes loud noises in the hope of attracting 2. Sneezy: Data Link makes loud noises in the hope of attracting
attention. attention.
1. Bashful: Physical quietly does its work, unnoticed by the 1. Bashful: Physical quietly does its work, unnoticed by the
others. others.
$ operational integrity $ operational integrity
(I) Synonym for "system integrity"; this synonym emphasizes the (I) Synonym for "system integrity"; this synonym emphasizes the
actual performance of system functions rather than just the actual performance of system functions rather than just the
ability to perform them. ability to perform them.
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$ operational security $ operational security
1. (I) System capabilities, or performance of system functions, 1. (I) System capabilities, or performance of system functions,
that are needed either (a) to securely manage a system or (b) to that are needed either (a) to securely manage a system or (b) to
manage security features of a system. (Compare: operations manage security features of a system. (Compare: operations
security (OPSEC).) security (OPSEC).)
Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition because Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition because
(a) the definition provided here is general and vague and (b) the (a) the definition provided here is general and vague and (b) the
term could easily be confused with "operations security", which is term could easily be confused with "operations security", which is
a different concept. a different concept.
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$ operations security (OPSEC) $ operations security (OPSEC)
(I) A process to identify, control, and protect evidence of the (I) A process to identify, control, and protect evidence of the
planning and execution of sensitive activities and operations, and planning and execution of sensitive activities and operations, and
thereby prevent potential adversaries from gaining knowledge of thereby prevent potential adversaries from gaining knowledge of
capabilities and intentions. (See: communications cover. Compare: capabilities and intentions. (See: communications cover. Compare:
operational security.) operational security.)
$ operator $ operator
(I) A person who has been authorized to direct selected functions (I) A person who has been authorized to direct selected functions
of a system. (Compare: manager.) of a system. (Compare: manager, user.)
Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it
because a system operator may or may not be treated as a "user". because a system operator may or may not be treated as a "user".
$ OPSEC $ OPSEC
1. (I) Abbreviation for "operations security". 1. (I) Abbreviation for "operations security".
2. (D) Abbreviation for "operational security". 2. (D) Abbreviation for "operational security".
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this abbreviation for Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this abbreviation for
"operational security" (as defined in this Glossary), because its "operational security" (as defined in this Glossary), because its
use for "operations security" has been well established for many use for "operations security" has been well established for many
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years, particular in the military community. years, particular in the military community.
$ ORA $ ORA
See: organizational registration authority. See: organizational registration authority.
$ Orange Book $ Orange Book
(D) /slang/ Synonym for "Trusted Computer System Evaluation (D) /slang/ Synonym for "Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria" [CSC001, DoD1]. Criteria" [CSC001, DoD1].
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
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register other end entities, by gathering, verifying, and entering register other end entities, by gathering, verifying, and entering
data and forwarding it to the signing authority and (b) may also data and forwarding it to the signing authority and (b) may also
assist with card management functions. An ORA is a local assist with card management functions. An ORA is a local
administrative authority, and the term refers both to the role and administrative authority, and the term refers both to the role and
to the person who plays that role. An ORA does not sign to the person who plays that role. An ORA does not sign
certificates, CRLs, or CKLs. (See: no-PIN ORA, SSO-PIN ORA, user- certificates, CRLs, or CKLs. (See: no-PIN ORA, SSO-PIN ORA, user-
PIN ORA.) PIN ORA.)
$ origin authentication $ origin authentication
(D) Synonym for "data origin authentication". (See: (D) Synonym for "data origin authentication". (See:
authentication, data origin authentication.) authentication, data origin authentication.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it suggests Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it suggests
careless use of the internationally standardized term "data origin careless use of the internationally standardized term "data origin
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authentication" and also could be confused with "peer entity authentication" and also could be confused with "peer entity
authentication." authentication."
$ origin authenticity $ origin authenticity
(D) Synonym for "data origin authentication". (See: authenticity, (D) Synonym for "data origin authentication". (See: authenticity,
data origin authentication.) data origin authentication.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it suggests Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it suggests
careless use of the internationally standardized term "data origin careless use of the internationally standardized term "data origin
authentication" and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading authentication" and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading
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process that operates above the Application Layer may itself process that operates above the Application Layer may itself
provide security services.) Similarly, the table suggests which provide security services.) Similarly, the table suggests which
services are suitable for each IPS layer. However, explaining and services are suitable for each IPS layer. However, explaining and
justifying these allocations is beyond the scope of this Glossary. justifying these allocations is beyond the scope of this Glossary.
Legend for Table Entries: Legend for Table Entries:
O = Yes, [IS7498-2] permits the service in this OSIRM layer. O = Yes, [IS7498-2] permits the service in this OSIRM layer.
I = Yes, the service can be incorporated in this IPS layer. I = Yes, the service can be incorporated in this IPS layer.
* = This layer subsumed by Application Layer in IPS. * = This layer subsumed by Application Layer in IPS.
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IPS Protocol Layers +-----------------------------------------+ IPS Protocol Layers +-----------------------------------------+
|Network| Net |In-| Trans | Application | |Network| Net |In-| Trans | Application |
| H/W |Inter|ter| -port | | | H/W |Inter|ter| -port | |
| |-face|net| | | | |-face|net| | |
OSIRM Protocol Layers +-----------------------------------------+ OSIRM Protocol Layers +-----------------------------------------+
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
Confidentiality +-----------------------------------------+ Confidentiality +-----------------------------------------+
- Datagram | O I | O I | O I | O I | | O * | O I | - Datagram | O I | O I | O I | O I | | O * | O I |
- Selective Field | | | I | | | O * | O I | - Selective Field | | | I | | | O * | O I |
- Traffic Flow | O | | O | | | | O | - Traffic Flow | O | | O | | | | O |
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printed or magnetic media containing symmetric cryptographic keys printed or magnetic media containing symmetric cryptographic keys
for use in Internet encryption devices. (See: key distribution.) for use in Internet encryption devices. (See: key distribution.)
$ output feedback (OFB) $ output feedback (OFB)
(N) A block cipher mode that modifies ECB mode to operate on (N) A block cipher mode that modifies ECB mode to operate on
plaintext segments of variable length less than or equal to the plaintext segments of variable length less than or equal to the
block length. [FP081] (See: block cipher, [SP38A].) block length. [FP081] (See: block cipher, [SP38A].)
Tutorial: This mode operates by directly using the algorithm's Tutorial: This mode operates by directly using the algorithm's
previously generated output block as the algorithm's next input previously generated output block as the algorithm's next input
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block (i.e., by "feeding back" the output block) and combining block (i.e., by "feeding back" the output block) and combining
(exclusive OR-ing) the output block with the next plaintext (exclusive OR-ing) the output block with the next plaintext
segment (of block length or less) to form the next ciphertext segment (of block length or less) to form the next ciphertext
segment. segment.
$ outside attack $ outside attack
(I) See: secondary definition under "attack". Compare: outsider.) (I) See: secondary definition under "attack". Compare: outsider.)
$ outsider $ outsider
(I) A user (usually a person) that accesses a system from a (I) A user (usually a person) that accesses a system from a
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either more complex packages or protection profiles and security either more complex packages or protection profiles and security
targets. A package expresses a set of either functional or targets. A package expresses a set of either functional or
assurance requirements that meet some particular need, expressed assurance requirements that meet some particular need, expressed
as a set of security objectives. as a set of security objectives.
$ packet $ packet
(I) A block of data that is carried from a source to a destination (I) A block of data that is carried from a source to a destination
through a communication channel or, more generally, across a through a communication channel or, more generally, across a
network. (Compare: datagram, PDU.) network. (Compare: datagram, PDU.)
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$ packet filter $ packet filter
(I) See: secondary definition under "filtering router". (I) See: secondary definition under "filtering router".
$ packet monkey $ packet monkey
(D) /slang/ Someone who floods a system with packets, creating a (D) /slang/ Someone who floods a system with packets, creating a
denial-of-service condition for the system's users. (See: denial-of-service condition for the system's users. (See:
cracker.) cracker.)
Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different
metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international
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Usage: Usually abbreviated as "partitioned mode". This term was Usage: Usually abbreviated as "partitioned mode". This term was
defined in U.S. Government policy on system accreditation. defined in U.S. Government policy on system accreditation.
$ PASS $ PASS
(N) See: personnel authentication system string. (N) See: personnel authentication system string.
$ passive attack $ passive attack
(I) See: secondary definition under "attack". (I) See: secondary definition under "attack".
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$ passive user $ passive user
(I) See: secondary definition under "user". (I) See: secondary definition under "user".
$ passive wiretapping $ passive wiretapping
(I) A wiretapping attack that attempts only to observe a (I) A wiretapping attack that attempts only to observe a
communication flow and gain knowledge of the data it contains, but communication flow and gain knowledge of the data it contains, but
does not alter or otherwise affect that flow. (See: wiretapping. does not alter or otherwise affect that flow. (See: wiretapping.
Compare: passive attack, active wiretapping.) Compare: passive attack, active wiretapping.)
$ password $ password
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(I) A simple authentication mechanism in PPP. In PAP, a user (I) A simple authentication mechanism in PPP. In PAP, a user
identifier and password are transmitted in cleartext form. [R1334] identifier and password are transmitted in cleartext form. [R1334]
(See: CHAP.) (See: CHAP.)
$ password sniffing $ password sniffing
(D) /slang/ Passive wiretapping to gain knowledge of passwords. (D) /slang/ Passive wiretapping to gain knowledge of passwords.
(See: Deprecated Usage under "sniffing".) (See: Deprecated Usage under "sniffing".)
$ path discovery $ path discovery
(I) For a digital certificate, the process of finding a set of (I) For a digital certificate, the process of finding a set of
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public-key certificates that comprise a certification path from a public-key certificates that comprise a certification path from a
trusted key to that specific certificate. trusted key to that specific certificate.
$ path validation $ path validation
(I) The process of validating (a) all of the digital certificates (I) The process of validating (a) all of the digital certificates
in a certification path and (b) the required relationships between in a certification path and (b) the required relationships between
those certificates, thus validating the contents of the last those certificates, thus validating the contents of the last
certificate on the path. (See: certificate validation.) certificate on the path. (See: certificate validation.)
Tutorial: To promote interoperable PKI applications in the Tutorial: To promote interoperable PKI applications in the
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of a certification path. of a certification path.
$ payment card $ payment card
(N) /SET/ Collectively refers "to credit cards, debit cards, (N) /SET/ Collectively refers "to credit cards, debit cards,
charge cards, and bank cards issued by a financial institution and charge cards, and bank cards issued by a financial institution and
which reflects a relationship between the cardholder and the which reflects a relationship between the cardholder and the
financial institution." [SET2] financial institution." [SET2]
$ payment gateway $ payment gateway
(O) /SET/ A system operated by an acquirer, or a third party (O) /SET/ A system operated by an acquirer, or a third party
designated by an acquirer, for the purpose of providing electronic designated by an acquirer, to provide electronic commerce services
commerce services to the merchants in support of the acquirer, and to the merchants in support of the acquirer, and which interfaces
which interfaces to the acquirer to support the authorization, to the acquirer to support the authorization, capture, and
capture, and processing of merchant payment messages, including processing of merchant payment messages, including payment
payment instructions from cardholders. [SET1, SET2] instructions from cardholders. [SET1, SET2]
$ payment gateway certification authority (SET PCA) $ payment gateway certification authority (SET PCA)
(O) /SET/ A CA that issues digital certificates to payment (O) /SET/ A CA that issues digital certificates to payment
gateways and is operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an gateways and is operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an
acquirer, or another party according to brand rules. A SET PCA acquirer, or another party according to brand rules. A SET PCA
issues a CRL for compromised payment gateway certificates. [SET2] issues a CRL for compromised payment gateway certificates. [SET2]
(See: PCA.) (See: PCA.)
$ PC card $ PC card
(N) A type of credit card-sized, plug-in peripheral device that (N) A type of credit card-sized, plug-in peripheral device that
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each of which have a 68-pin interface between the card and the each of which have a 68-pin interface between the card and the
socket into which it plugs. All three types have the same length socket into which it plugs. All three types have the same length
and width, roughly the size of a credit card, but differ in their and width, roughly the size of a credit card, but differ in their
thickness from 3.3 to 10.5 mm. Examples include storage modules, thickness from 3.3 to 10.5 mm. Examples include storage modules,
modems, device interface adapters, and cryptographic modules. modems, device interface adapters, and cryptographic modules.
$ PCA $ PCA
(D) Abbreviation of various kinds of "certification authority". (D) Abbreviation of various kinds of "certification authority".
(See: Internet policy certification authority, (MISSI) policy (See: Internet policy certification authority, (MISSI) policy
creation authority, (SET) payment gateway certification creation authority, (SET) payment gateway certification
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authority.) authority.)
Deprecated Usage: An ISD that uses this abbreviation SHOULD define Deprecated Usage: An ISD that uses this abbreviation SHOULD define
it at the point of first use. it at the point of first use.
$ PCI $ PCI
(N) See: "protocol control information" under "protocol data (N) See: "protocol control information" under "protocol data
unit". unit".
$ PCMCIA $ PCMCIA
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$ PEM $ PEM
(I) See: Privacy Enhanced Mail. (I) See: Privacy Enhanced Mail.
$ penetrate $ penetrate
1a. (I) Circumvent a system's security protections. (See: attack, 1a. (I) Circumvent a system's security protections. (See: attack,
break, violation.) break, violation.)
1b. (I) Successfully and repeatedly gain unauthorized access to a 1b. (I) Successfully and repeatedly gain unauthorized access to a
protected system resource. [Huff] protected system resource. [Huff]
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$ penetration $ penetration
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "intrusion". (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "intrusion".
$ penetration test $ penetration test
(I) A system test, often part of system certification, in which (I) A system test, often part of system certification, in which
evaluators attempt to circumvent the security features of a evaluators attempt to circumvent the security features of a
system. [NCS04, SP42] (See: tiger team.) system. [NCS04, SP42] (See: tiger team.)
Tutorial: Penetration testing evaluates the relative vulnerability Tutorial: Penetration testing evaluates the relative vulnerability
of a system to attacks and identifies methods of gaining access to of a system to attacks and identifies methods of gaining access to
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- One concept of "forward secrecy" is that, given observations of - One concept of "forward secrecy" is that, given observations of
the operation of a key establishment protocol up to time t, and the operation of a key establishment protocol up to time t, and
given some of the session keys derived from those protocol given some of the session keys derived from those protocol
runs, you cannot derive unknown past session keys or future runs, you cannot derive unknown past session keys or future
session keys. session keys.
- A related property is that, given observations of the protocol - A related property is that, given observations of the protocol
and knowledge of the derived session keys, you cannot derive and knowledge of the derived session keys, you cannot derive
one or more of the long-term private keys. one or more of the long-term private keys.
- The "I" definition presented above involves a third concept of - The "I" definition presented above involves a third concept of
"forward secrecy" that refers to the effect of the compromise "forward secrecy" that refers to the effect of the compromise
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of long-term keys. of long-term keys.
- All three concepts involve the idea that a compromise of "this" - All three concepts involve the idea that a compromise of "this"
encryption key is not supposed to compromise the "next" one. encryption key is not supposed to compromise the "next" one.
There also is the idea that compromise of a single key will There also is the idea that compromise of a single key will
compromise only the data protected by the single key. In compromise only the data protected by the single key. In
Internet literature, the focus has been on protection against Internet literature, the focus has been on protection against
decryption of back traffic in the event of a compromise of decryption of back traffic in the event of a compromise of
secret key material held by one or both parties to a secret key material held by one or both parties to a
communication. communication.
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See: security perimeter. See: security perimeter.
$ periods processing $ periods processing
(I) A mode of system operation in which information of different (I) A mode of system operation in which information of different
sensitivities is processed at distinctly different times by the sensitivities is processed at distinctly different times by the
same system, with the system being properly purged or sanitized same system, with the system being properly purged or sanitized
between periods. (See: color change.) between periods. (See: color change.)
Tutorial: The security mode of operation and maximum Tutorial: The security mode of operation and maximum
classification of data handled by the system is established for an classification of data handled by the system is established for an
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interval of time and then is changed for the following interval of interval of time and then is changed for the following interval of
time. A period extends from the secure initialization of the time. A period extends from the secure initialization of the
system to the completion of any purging of sensitive data handled system to the completion of any purging of sensitive data handled
by the system during the period. by the system during the period.
$ permanent storage $ permanent storage
(I) Non-volatile media that, once written into, can never be (I) Non-volatile media that, once written into, can never be
completely erased. completely erased.
$ permission $ permission
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DN to multiple users. The latter condition implies that a persona DN to multiple users. The latter condition implies that a persona
certificate is not an organizational certificate unless the certificate is not an organizational certificate unless the
organization has just one member or representative. organization has just one member or representative.
$ personal identification number (PIN) $ personal identification number (PIN)
1a. (I) A character string used as a password to gain access to a 1a. (I) A character string used as a password to gain access to a
system resource. (See: authentication information.) system resource. (See: authentication information.)
Example: A cryptographic token typically requires its user to Example: A cryptographic token typically requires its user to
enter a PIN in order to access information stored in the token and enter a PIN in order to access information stored in the token and
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invoke the token's cryptographic functions. invoke the token's cryptographic functions.
1b. (O) An alphanumeric code or password used to authenticate an 1b. (O) An alphanumeric code or password used to authenticate an
identity. identity.
Tutorial: Despite the words "identification" and "number", a PIN Tutorial: Despite the words "identification" and "number", a PIN
seldom serves as a user identifier, and a PIN's characters are not seldom serves as a user identifier, and a PIN's characters are not
necessarily all numeric. Retail banking applications use 4-digit necessarily all numeric. Retail banking applications use 4-digit
numeric user PINs, but the FORTEZZA PC card uses 12-character numeric user PINs, but the FORTEZZA PC card uses 12-character
alphanumeric SSO PINs. (See: SSO PIN, user PIN.) alphanumeric SSO PINs. (See: SSO PIN, user PIN.)
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certificates of different types (such as DSA versus RSA), for certificates of different types (such as DSA versus RSA), for
different purposes (such as digital signature versus encryption), different purposes (such as digital signature versus encryption),
or with different authorizations. or with different authorizations.
$ personnel authentication system string (PASS) $ personnel authentication system string (PASS)
(N) See: Tutorial under "personal identification number". (N) See: Tutorial under "personal identification number".
$ personnel security $ personnel security
(I) Procedures to ensure that persons who access a system have (I) Procedures to ensure that persons who access a system have
proper clearance, authorization, and need-to-know as required by proper clearance, authorization, and need-to-know as required by
the system's security policy. (See: security architecture.)
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the system's security policy.
$ PGP(trademark) $ PGP(trademark)
(O) See: Pretty Good Privacy(trademark). (O) See: Pretty Good Privacy(trademark).
$ phase 1 negotiation $ phase 1 negotiation
$ phase 2 negotiation $ phase 2 negotiation
(I) /ISAKMP/ See: secondary definition under "Internet Security (I) /ISAKMP/ See: secondary definition under "Internet Security
Association and Key Management Protocol". Association and Key Management Protocol".
$ phishing $ phishing
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readers. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book.") readers. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book.")
$ physical destruction $ physical destruction
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under
"incapacitation". "incapacitation".
$ physical security $ physical security
(I) Tangible means of preventing unauthorized physical access to a (I) Tangible means of preventing unauthorized physical access to a
system. Examples: Fences, walls, and other barriers; locks, safes, system. Examples: Fences, walls, and other barriers; locks, safes,
and vaults; dogs and armed guards; sensors and alarm bells. and vaults; dogs and armed guards; sensors and alarm bells.
[FP031, R1455] [FP031, R1455] (See: security architecture.)
$ piggyback attack $ piggyback attack
(I) A form of active wiretapping in which the attacker gains (I) A form of active wiretapping in which the attacker gains
access to a system via intervals of inactivity in another user's access to a system via intervals of inactivity in another user's
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legitimate communication connection. Sometimes called a "between- legitimate communication connection. Sometimes called a "between-
the-lines" attack. (See: hijack attack, man-in-the-middle attack.) the-lines" attack. (See: hijack attack, man-in-the-middle attack.)
Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a
definition for it because the term could confuse international definition for it because the term could confuse international
readers. readers.
$ PIN $ PIN
(I) See: personal identification number. (I) See: personal identification number.
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from one computer system to another, as described in PKCS #8. from one computer system to another, as described in PKCS #8.
$ PKCS #7 $ PKCS #7
(N) A standard [PKC07] (see: RFC 2315) from the PKCS series; (N) A standard [PKC07] (see: RFC 2315) from the PKCS series;
defines a syntax for data that may have cryptography applied to defines a syntax for data that may have cryptography applied to
it, such as for digital signatures and digital envelopes. (See: it, such as for digital signatures and digital envelopes. (See:
CMS.) CMS.)
$ PKCS #10 $ PKCS #10
(N) A standard [PKC10] (see: RFC 2986) from the PKCS series; (N) A standard [PKC10] (see: RFC 2986) from the PKCS series;
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defines a syntax for certification requests. (See: certification defines a syntax for certification requests. (See: certification
request.) request.)
Tutorial: A PKCS #10 request contains a DN and a public key, and Tutorial: A PKCS #10 request contains a DN and a public key, and
may contain other attributes, and is signed by the entity making may contain other attributes, and is signed by the entity making
the request. The request is sent to a CA, who converts it to an the request. The request is sent to a CA, who converts it to an
X.509 public-key certificate (or some other form), and returns it, X.509 public-key certificate (or some other form), and returns it,
possibly in PKCS #7 format. possibly in PKCS #7 format.
$ PKCS #11 $ PKCS #11
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the PKI, and (d) information about certificate policies and CPSs, the PKI, and (d) information about certificate policies and CPSs,
covering the areas of PKI security not directly addressed in the covering the areas of PKI security not directly addressed in the
rest of PKIX. rest of PKIX.
$ plain text $ plain text
1. (I) /noun/ Data that is input to an encryption process. (See: 1. (I) /noun/ Data that is input to an encryption process. (See:
plaintext. Compare: cipher text, clear text.) plaintext. Compare: cipher text, clear text.)
2. (D) /noun/ Synonym for "clear text". 2. (D) /noun/ Synonym for "clear text".
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Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "clear text". Sometimes plain text that is input to an for "clear text". Sometimes plain text that is input to an
encryption operation is clear text, but other times plain text is encryption operation is clear text, but other times plain text is
cipher text that was output from a previous encryption operation. cipher text that was output from a previous encryption operation.
(See: superencryption.) (See: superencryption.)
$ plaintext $ plaintext
1. (O) /noun/ Synonym for "plain text". 1. (O) /noun/ Synonym for "plain text".
2. (I) /adjective/ Referring to plain text. Usage: Commonly used 2. (I) /adjective/ Referring to plain text. Usage: Commonly used
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protocol or OSIRM Layer 3 protocol. Therefore, PPTP does not protocol or OSIRM Layer 3 protocol. Therefore, PPTP does not
specify security services; it depends on protocols above and below specify security services; it depends on protocols above and below
it to provide any needed security. PPTP makes it possible to it to provide any needed security. PPTP makes it possible to
divorce the location of the initial dial-up server (i.e., the PPTP divorce the location of the initial dial-up server (i.e., the PPTP
Access Concentrator, the client, which runs on a special-purpose Access Concentrator, the client, which runs on a special-purpose
host) from the location at which the dial-up protocol (PPP) host) from the location at which the dial-up protocol (PPP)
connection is terminated and access to the network is provided connection is terminated and access to the network is provided
(i.e., at the PPTP Network Server, which runs on a general-purpose (i.e., at the PPTP Network Server, which runs on a general-purpose
host). host).
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$ policy $ policy
1a. (I) A plan or course of action that is stated for a system or 1a. (I) A plan or course of action that is stated for a system or
organization and is intended to affect and direct the decisions organization and is intended to affect and direct the decisions
and deeds of that entity's components or members. (See: security and deeds of that entity's components or members. (See: security
policy.) policy.)
1b. (O) A definite goal, course, or method of action to guide and 1b. (O) A definite goal, course, or method of action to guide and
determine present and future decisions, that is implemented or determine present and future decisions, that is implemented or
executed within a particular context, such as within a business executed within a particular context, such as within a business
unit. [R3198] unit. [R3198]
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examples of control measurements that are recorded as part of examples of control measurements that are recorded as part of
system operations. system operations.
- "Procedures" define how a system is operated, and relate - "Procedures" define how a system is operated, and relate
closely to issues of what technology is used, who the operators closely to issues of what technology is used, who the operators
are, and how the system is deployed physically. Procedures are, and how the system is deployed physically. Procedures
define both normal and abnormal operating circumstances. define both normal and abnormal operating circumstances.
- For every control defined by a practice statement, there should - For every control defined by a practice statement, there should
be corresponding procedures to implement the control and be corresponding procedures to implement the control and
provide ongoing measurement of the control parameters. provide ongoing measurement of the control parameters.
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Conversely, procedures require management practices to insure Conversely, procedures require management practices to insure
consistent and correct operational behavior. consistent and correct operational behavior.
$ policy approval authority $ policy approval authority
(D) /PKI/ Synonym for "policy management authority". [PAG] (D) /PKI/ Synonym for "policy management authority". [PAG]
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as synonym for
"policy management authority". The term suggests a limited, "policy management authority". The term suggests a limited,
passive role that is not typical of PMAs. passive role that is not typical of PMAs.
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$ policy authority $ policy authority
(D) /PKI/ Synonym for "policy management authority". [PAG] (D) /PKI/ Synonym for "policy management authority". [PAG]
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as synonym for
"policy management authority". The term is unnecessarily vague and "policy management authority". The term is unnecessarily vague and
thus may be confused with other PKI entities, such as CAs and RAs, thus may be confused with other PKI entities, such as CAs and RAs,
that enforce of apply various aspects of PKI policy. that enforce of apply various aspects of PKI policy.
$ policy certification authority (Internet PCA) $ policy certification authority (Internet PCA)
(I) An X.509-compliant CA at the second level of the Internet (I) An X.509-compliant CA at the second level of the Internet
certification hierarchy, under the IPRA. Each PCA operates in certification hierarchy, under the IPRA. Each PCA operates under
accordance with its published security policy (see: certificate its published security policy (see: certificate policy, CPS) and
policy, CPS) and within constraints established by the IPRA for within constraints established by the IPRA for all PCAs. [R1422].
all PCAs. [R1422]. (See: policy creation authority.) (See: policy creation authority.)
$ policy creation authority (MISSI PCA) $ policy creation authority (MISSI PCA)
(O) /MISSI/ The second level of a MISSI certification hierarchy; (O) /MISSI/ The second level of a MISSI certification hierarchy;
the administrative root of a security policy domain of MISSI users the administrative root of a security policy domain of MISSI users
and other, subsidiary authorities. The term refers both to that and other, subsidiary authorities. The term refers both to that
authoritative office or role and to the person who fills that authoritative office or role and to the person who fills that
office. (See: policy certification authority.) office. (See: policy certification authority.)
Tutorial: A MISSI PCA's certificate is issued by a PAA. The PCA Tutorial: A MISSI PCA's certificate is issued by a PAA. The PCA
registers the CAs in its domain, defines their configurations, and registers the CAs in its domain, defines their configurations, and
issues their X.509 public-key certificates. (The PCA may also issues their X.509 public-key certificates. (The PCA may also
issue certificates for SCAs, ORAs, and other end entities, but a issue certificates for SCAs, ORAs, and other end entities, but a
PCA does not usually do this.) The PCA periodically issues CRLs PCA does not usually do this.) The PCA periodically issues CRLs
and CKLs for its domain. and CKLs for its domain.
$ policy management authority (PMA) $ policy management authority (PMA)
(I) /PKI/ A person, role, or organization within a PKI that is (I) /PKI/ A person, role, or organization within a PKI that is
responsible for (a) creating or approving the content of the responsible for (a) creating or approving the content of the
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certificate policies and CPSs that are used in the PKI; (b) certificate policies and CPSs that are used in the PKI; (b)
ensuring the administration of those policies; and (c) approving ensuring the administration of those policies; and (c) approving
any cross-certification or interoperability agreements with CAs any cross-certification or interoperability agreements with CAs
external to the PKI and any related policy mappings. The PMA may external to the PKI and any related policy mappings. The PMA may
also be the accreditor for the PKI as a whole or for some of its also be the accreditor for the PKI as a whole or for some of its
components or applications. [DoD9, PAG] (See: policy approving components or applications. [DoD9, PAG] (See: policy approving
authority.) authority.)
Example: In the U.S. Department of Defense, an organization called Example: In the U.S. Department of Defense, an organization called
the Policy Management Authority is responsible for DoD PKI [DoD9]. the Policy Management Authority is responsible for DoD PKI [DoD9].
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$ POP3 AUTH $ POP3 AUTH
(I) A POP3 command [R1734] (better described as a transaction (I) A POP3 command [R1734] (better described as a transaction
type, or subprotocol) by which a POP3 client optionally proposes a type, or subprotocol) by which a POP3 client optionally proposes a
mechanism to a POP3 server to authenticate the client to the mechanism to a POP3 server to authenticate the client to the
server and provide other security services. (See: POP3 APOP, IMAP4 server and provide other security services. (See: POP3 APOP, IMAP4
AUTHENTICATE.) AUTHENTICATE.)
Tutorial: If the server accepts the proposal, the command is Tutorial: If the server accepts the proposal, the command is
followed by performing a challenge-response authentication followed by performing a challenge-response authentication
protocol and, optionally, negotiating a protection mechanism for protocol and, optionally, negotiating a protection mechanism for
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subsequent POP3 interactions. The security mechanisms used by POP3 subsequent POP3 interactions. The security mechanisms used by POP3
AUTH are those used by IMAP4. AUTH are those used by IMAP4.
$ port scan $ port scan
(I) A technique that sends client requests to a range of service (I) A technique that sends client requests to a range of service
port addresses on a host. (See: probe. Compare: ping sweep.) port addresses on a host. (See: probe. Compare: ping sweep.)
Tutorial: A port scan can be used for pre-attack surveillance, Tutorial: A port scan can be used for pre-attack surveillance,
with the goal of finding an active port and subsequently with the goal of finding an active port and subsequently
exploiting a known vulnerability of that port's service. A port exploiting a known vulnerability of that port's service. A port
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Tutorial: POP3 has mechanisms for optionally authenticating a Tutorial: POP3 has mechanisms for optionally authenticating a
client to a server and providing other security services. (See: client to a server and providing other security services. (See:
POP3 APOP, POP3 AUTH.) POP3 APOP, POP3 AUTH.)
$ PPP $ PPP
(I) See: Point-to-Point Protocol. (I) See: Point-to-Point Protocol.
$ PPTP $ PPTP
(I) See: Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol. (I) See: Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol.
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$ preauthorization $ preauthorization
(N) /PKI/ A CAW feature that enables certification requests to be (N) /PKI/ A CAW feature that enables certification requests to be
automatically validated against data provided in advance to the CA automatically validated against data provided in advance to the CA
by an authorizing entity. by an authorizing entity.
$ precedence $ precedence
1. (I) /information system/ A ranking assigned to events or data 1. (I) /information system/ A ranking assigned to events or data
objects that determines the relative order in which they are objects that determines the relative order in which they are
processed. processed.
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hash and an asymmetric encryption algorithm (originally, MD5 and hash and an asymmetric encryption algorithm (originally, MD5 and
RSA). To establish ownership of public keys, PGP depends on the RSA). To establish ownership of public keys, PGP depends on the
"web of trust". "web of trust".
$ prevention $ prevention
(I) See: secondary definition under "security". (I) See: secondary definition under "security".
$ primary account number (PAN) $ primary account number (PAN)
(O) /SET/ "The assigned number that identifies the card issuer and (O) /SET/ "The assigned number that identifies the card issuer and
cardholder. This account number is composed of an issuer cardholder. This account number is composed of an issuer
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identification number, an individual account number identification number, an individual account number
identification, and an accompanying check digit as defined by ISO identification, and an accompanying check digit as defined by ISO
7812-1985." [SET2, IS7812] (See: bank identification number.) 7812-1985." [SET2, IS7812] (See: bank identification number.)
Tutorial: The PAN is embossed, encoded, or both on a magnetic- Tutorial: The PAN is embossed, encoded, or both on a magnetic-
strip-based credit card. The PAN identifies the issuer to which a strip-based credit card. The PAN identifies the issuer to which a
transaction is to be routed and the account to which it is to be transaction is to be routed and the account to which it is to be
applied unless specific instructions indicate otherwise. The applied unless specific instructions indicate otherwise. The
authority that assigns the BIN part of the PAN is the American authority that assigns the BIN part of the PAN is the American
Bankers Association. Bankers Association.
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3. (D) Synonym for "data confidentiality". 3. (D) Synonym for "data confidentiality".
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "data confidentiality" or "data confidentiality service", for "data confidentiality" or "data confidentiality service",
which are different concepts. Privacy is a reason for security which are different concepts. Privacy is a reason for security
rather than a kind of security. For example, a system that stores rather than a kind of security. For example, a system that stores
personal data needs to protect the data to prevent harm, personal data needs to protect the data to prevent harm,
embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any person about embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any person about
whom data is maintained, and to protect the person's privacy. For whom data is maintained, and to protect the person's privacy. For
that reason, the system may need to provide data confidentiality that reason, the system may need to provide data confidentiality
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service. service.
Tutorial: The term "privacy" is used for various separate but Tutorial: The term "privacy" is used for various separate but
related concepts, including bodily privacy, territorial privacy, related concepts, including bodily privacy, territorial privacy,
personal information privacy, and communication privacy. ISDs are personal information privacy, and communication privacy. ISDs are
expected to address only communication privacy, which in this expected to address only communication privacy, which in this
Glossary is defined primarily by "data confidentiality" and Glossary is defined primarily by "data confidentiality" and
secondarily by "data integrity". secondarily by "data integrity".
ISDs are not expected to address information privacy, but this ISDs are not expected to address information privacy, but this
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[R1421, R1422]. (Compare: DKIM, MOSS, MSP, PGP, S/MIME.) [R1421, R1422]. (Compare: DKIM, MOSS, MSP, PGP, S/MIME.)
Tutorial: PEM encrypts messages with a symmetric algorithm Tutorial: PEM encrypts messages with a symmetric algorithm
(originally, DES in CBC mode), provides distribution for the (originally, DES in CBC mode), provides distribution for the
symmetric keys by encrypting them with an asymmetric algorithm symmetric keys by encrypting them with an asymmetric algorithm
(originally, RSA), and signs messages with an asymmetric (originally, RSA), and signs messages with an asymmetric
encryption algorithm over a cryptographic hash (originally, RSA encryption algorithm over a cryptographic hash (originally, RSA
over either MD2 or MD5). To establish ownership of public keys, over either MD2 or MD5). To establish ownership of public keys,
PEM uses a certification hierarchy, with X.509 public-key PEM uses a certification hierarchy, with X.509 public-key
certificates and X.509 CRLs that are signed with an asymmetric certificates and X.509 CRLs that are signed with an asymmetric
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encryption algorithm over a cryptographic hash (originally, RSA encryption algorithm over a cryptographic hash (originally, RSA
over MD2). over MD2).
PEM is designed to be compatible with a wide range of key PEM is designed to be compatible with a wide range of key
management methods, but is limited to specifying security services management methods, but is limited to specifying security services
only for text messages and, like MOSS, has not been widely only for text messages and, like MOSS, has not been widely
implemented in the Internet. implemented in the Internet.
$ private component $ private component
(I) Synonym for "private key". (I) Synonym for "private key".
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$ privilege management infrastructure $ privilege management infrastructure
(O) "The infrastructure able to support the management of (O) "The infrastructure able to support the management of
privileges in support of a comprehensive authorization service and privileges in support of a comprehensive authorization service and
in relationship with a" PKI; i.e., processes concerned with in relationship with a" PKI; i.e., processes concerned with
attribute certificates. [X509] attribute certificates. [X509]
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with this Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with this
definition. This definition is vague, and there is no consensus on definition. This definition is vague, and there is no consensus on
a more specific one. a more specific one.
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$ privileged process $ privileged process
(I) An computer process that is authorized (and, therefore, (I) An computer process that is authorized (and, therefore,
trusted) to perform some security-relevant functions that ordinary trusted) to perform some security-relevant functions that ordinary
processes are not. (See: privilege, trusted process.) processes are not. (See: privilege, trusted process.)
$ privileged user $ privileged user
(I) An user that has access to system control, monitoring, or (I) An user that has access to system control, monitoring, or
administration functions. (See: privilege, /UNIX/ under "root", administration functions. (See: privilege, /UNIX/ under "root",
superuser, user.) superuser, user.)
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routers, multiplexers, and other important equipment. routers, multiplexers, and other important equipment.
- Users that are authorized to monitor or perform troubleshooting - Users that are authorized to monitor or perform troubleshooting
for a system's security functions, typically using special for a system's security functions, typically using special
tools and features that are not available to ordinary users. tools and features that are not available to ordinary users.
$ probe $ probe
(I) /verb/ A technique that attempts to access a system to learn (I) /verb/ A technique that attempts to access a system to learn
something about the system. (See: port scan.) something about the system. (See: port scan.)
Tutorial: The purpose of a probe may be offensive, e.g., an Tutorial: The purpose of a probe may be offensive, e.g., an
attempt to gather information for the purpose of circumventing the attempt to gather information for circumventing the system's
system's protections; or the purpose may be defensive, e.g., to protections; or the purpose may be defensive, e.g., to verify that
verify that the system is working properly. the system is working properly.
$ procedural security $ procedural security
(D) Synonym for "administrative security". (D) Synonym for "administrative security".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"administrative security". The term may be misleading because any "administrative security". The term may be misleading because any
type of security may involve procedures, and procedures may be type of security may involve procedures, and procedures may be
either external to the system or internal. Instead, use either external to the system or internal. Instead, use
"administrative security", "communication security", "computer "administrative security", "communication security", "computer
security", "emanations security", "personnel security", "physical security", "emanations security", "personnel security", "physical
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architecture.) architecture.)
$ profile $ profile
See: certificate profile, protection profile. See: certificate profile, protection profile.
$ proof-of-possession protocol $ proof-of-possession protocol
(I) A protocol whereby a system entity proves to another that it (I) A protocol whereby a system entity proves to another that it
possesses and controls a cryptographic key or other secret possesses and controls a cryptographic key or other secret
information. (See: zero-knowledge proof.) information. (See: zero-knowledge proof.)
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$ proprietary $ proprietary
(I) Refers to information (or other property) that is owned by an (I) Refers to information (or other property) that is owned by an
individual or organization and for which the use is restricted by individual or organization and for which the use is restricted by
that entity. that entity.
$ protected checksum $ protected checksum
(I) A checksum that is computed for a data object by means that (I) A checksum that is computed for a data object by means that
protect against active attacks that would attempt to change the protect against active attacks that would attempt to change the
checksum to make it match changes made to the data object. (See: checksum to make it match changes made to the data object. (See:
digital signature, keyed hash, Tutorial under "checksum".) digital signature, keyed hash, Tutorial under "checksum".)
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could specify security features and assurances that must be could specify security features and assurances that must be
included in any system that was intended to operate at that level. included in any system that was intended to operate at that level.
Example: Given some set of data objects that are classified at one Example: Given some set of data objects that are classified at one
or more hierarchical levels and in one or more non-hierarchical or more hierarchical levels and in one or more non-hierarchical
categories, the following table defines five protection levels for categories, the following table defines five protection levels for
systems that would handle that data. Beginning with PL1 and systems that would handle that data. Beginning with PL1 and
evolving to PL5, each successive level would require stronger evolving to PL5, each successive level would require stronger
features and assurances to handle the dataset. (See: clearance, features and assurances to handle the dataset. (See: clearance,
formal access approval, and need-to-know.) formal access approval, and need-to-know.)
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Lowest Clearance Formal Access Need-To-Know Lowest Clearance Formal Access Need-To-Know
Among All Users Approval of Users of Users Among All Users Approval of Users of Users
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+ +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
PL5 | Some user has no | [Does not matter.]| [Does not matter.]| PL5 | Some user has no | [Does not matter.]| [Does not matter.]|
High | clearance at all. | | | High | clearance at all. | | |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+ +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
PL4 | All are cleared | [Does not matter.]| [Does not matter.]| PL4 | All are cleared | [Does not matter.]| [Does not matter.]|
| for some data. | | | | for some data. | | |
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+ +-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
PL3 | All are cleared | Some not approved | [Does not matter.]| PL3 | All are cleared | Some not approved | [Does not matter.]|
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catalogs in Parts 2 and 3 of the Common Criteria, and should catalogs in Parts 2 and 3 of the Common Criteria, and should
include an EAL. A PP could be developed by user communities, include an EAL. A PP could be developed by user communities,
product developers, or any other parties interested in defining a product developers, or any other parties interested in defining a
common set of requirements. common set of requirements.
$ protection ring $ protection ring
(I) One of a hierarchy of privileged operation modes of a system (I) One of a hierarchy of privileged operation modes of a system
that gives certain access rights to processes authorized to that gives certain access rights to processes authorized to
operate in that mode. (See: Multics.) operate in that mode. (See: Multics.)
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$ protective distribution system (PDS) $ protective distribution system (PDS)
(N) A wireline or fiber-optic communication system used to (N) A wireline or fiber-optic communication system used to
transmit cleartext classified information through an area of transmit cleartext classified information through an area of
lesser classification or control. [N7003] lesser classification or control. [N7003]
$ protocol $ protocol
1a. (I) A set of rules (i.e., formats and procedures) to implement 1a. (I) A set of rules (i.e., formats and procedures) to implement
and control some type of association (e.g., communication) between and control some type of association (e.g., communication) between
systems. Example: Internet Protocol. systems. Example: Internet Protocol.
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2. (I) A computer process -- often used as, or as part of, a 2. (I) A computer process -- often used as, or as part of, a
firewall -- that relays application transactions or a protocol firewall -- that relays application transactions or a protocol
between client and server computer systems, by appearing to the between client and server computer systems, by appearing to the
client to be the server and appearing to the server to be the client to be the server and appearing to the server to be the
client. (See: SOCKS.) client. (See: SOCKS.)
Tutorial: In a firewall, a proxy server usually runs on a bastion Tutorial: In a firewall, a proxy server usually runs on a bastion
host, which may support proxies for several applications and host, which may support proxies for several applications and
protocols (e.g., FTP, HTTP, and TELNET). Instead of a client in protocols (e.g., FTP, HTTP, and TELNET). Instead of a client in
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the protected enclave connecting directly to an external server, the protected enclave connecting directly to an external server,
the internal client connects to the proxy server which in turn the internal client connects to the proxy server which in turn
connects to the external server. The proxy server waits for a connects to the external server. The proxy server waits for a
request from inside the firewall, forwards the request to the request from inside the firewall, forwards the request to the
server outside the firewall, gets the response, then sends the server outside the firewall, gets the response, then sends the
response back to the client. The proxy may be transparent to the response back to the client. The proxy may be transparent to the
clients, or they may need to connect first to the proxy server, clients, or they may need to connect first to the proxy server,
and then use that association to also initiate a connection to the and then use that association to also initiate a connection to the
real server. real server.
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(I) A sequence of values that appears to be random (i.e., (I) A sequence of values that appears to be random (i.e.,
unpredictable) but is actually generated by a deterministic unpredictable) but is actually generated by a deterministic
algorithm. (See: compression, random, random number generator.) algorithm. (See: compression, random, random number generator.)
$ pseudorandom number generator $ pseudorandom number generator
(I) See: secondary definition under "random number generator". (I) See: secondary definition under "random number generator".
$ public component $ public component
(I) Synonym for "public key". (I) Synonym for "public key".
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Deprecated Usage: In most cases, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; to Deprecated Usage: In most cases, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; to
avoid confusing readers, use "private key" instead. However, the avoid confusing readers, use "private key" instead. However, the
term MAY be used when discussing a key pair; e.g., "A key pair has term MAY be used when discussing a key pair; e.g., "A key pair has
a public component and a private component." a public component and a private component."
$ public key $ public key
1. (I) The publicly disclosable component of a pair of 1. (I) The publicly disclosable component of a pair of
cryptographic keys used for asymmetric cryptography. (See: key cryptographic keys used for asymmetric cryptography. (See: key
pair. Compare: private key.) pair. Compare: private key.)
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official standards organization, such as ANSI, ITU-T, or IETF. RSA official standards organization, such as ANSI, ITU-T, or IETF. RSA
Laboratories retains sole decision-making authority over the PKCS. Laboratories retains sole decision-making authority over the PKCS.
$ public-key forward secrecy (PFS) $ public-key forward secrecy (PFS)
(I) For a key-agreement protocol based on asymmetric cryptography, (I) For a key-agreement protocol based on asymmetric cryptography,
the property that ensures that a session key derived from a set of the property that ensures that a session key derived from a set of
long-term public and private keys will not be compromised if one long-term public and private keys will not be compromised if one
of the private keys is compromised in the future. (See: Usage note of the private keys is compromised in the future. (See: Usage note
and other discussion under "perfect forward secrecy".) and other discussion under "perfect forward secrecy".)
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$ public-key Kerberos $ public-key Kerberos
(I) See: Tutorial under "Kerberos", PKINIT. (I) See: Tutorial under "Kerberos", PKINIT.
$ public-key infrastructure (PKI) $ public-key infrastructure (PKI)
1. (I) A system of CAs (and, optionally, RAs and other supporting 1. (I) A system of CAs (and, optionally, RAs and other supporting
servers and agents) that perform some set of certificate servers and agents) that perform some set of certificate
management, archive management, key management, and token management, archive management, key management, and token
management functions for a community of users in an application of management functions for a community of users in an application of
asymmetric cryptography. (See: hierarchical PKI, mesh PKI, asymmetric cryptography. (See: hierarchical PKI, mesh PKI,
security management infrastructure, trust-file PKI.) security management infrastructure, trust-file PKI.)
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erase.) erase.)
$ QUADRANT $ QUADRANT
(O) /U.S. Government/ Short name for technology and methods that (O) /U.S. Government/ Short name for technology and methods that
protect cryptographic equipment by making the equipment tamper- protect cryptographic equipment by making the equipment tamper-
resistant. [C4009] (Compare: protective packaging, TEMPEST.) resistant. [C4009] (Compare: protective packaging, TEMPEST.)
Tutorial: Equipment cannot be made completely tamper-proof, but it Tutorial: Equipment cannot be made completely tamper-proof, but it
can be made tamper-resistant or tamper-evident. can be made tamper-resistant or tamper-evident.
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$ qualified certificate $ qualified certificate
(I) A public-key certificate that has the primary purpose of (I) A public-key certificate that has the primary purpose of
identifying a person with a high level of assurance, where the identifying a person with a high level of assurance, where the
certificate meets some qualification requirements defined by an certificate meets some qualification requirements defined by an
applicable legal framework, such as the European Directive on applicable legal framework, such as the European Directive on
Electronic Signature [EU-ESDIR]. [R3739]. Electronic Signature [EU-ESDIR]. [R3739].
$ quick mode $ quick mode
(I) See: /IKE/ under "mode". (I) See: /IKE/ under "mode".
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of any other bit in the sequence. of any other bit in the sequence.
- "Random value": A individual value that is unpredictable; i.e., - "Random value": A individual value that is unpredictable; i.e.,
each value in the total population of possibilities has equal each value in the total population of possibilities has equal
probability of being selected. probability of being selected.
$ random number generator $ random number generator
(I) A process that is invoked to generate a random sequence of (I) A process that is invoked to generate a random sequence of
values (usually a sequence of bits) or an individual random value. values (usually a sequence of bits) or an individual random value.
Tutorial: There are two basic types of generators. [SP22] Tutorial: There are two basic types of generators. [SP22]
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- "(True) random number generator": It uses one or more non- - "(True) random number generator": It uses one or more non-
deterministic bit sources (e.g., electrical circuit noise, deterministic bit sources (e.g., electrical circuit noise,
timing of human processes such as key strokes or mouse timing of human processes such as key strokes or mouse
movements, semiconductor quantum effects, and other physical movements, semiconductor quantum effects, and other physical
phenomena) and a processing function that formats the bits, and phenomena) and a processing function that formats the bits, and
it outputs a sequence of values that is unpredictable and it outputs a sequence of values that is unpredictable and
uniformly distributed. uniformly distributed.
- "Pseudorandom number generator": It uses a deterministic - "Pseudorandom number generator": It uses a deterministic
computational process (usually implemented by software) that computational process (usually implemented by software) that
has one or more inputs called "seeds", and it outputs a has one or more inputs called "seeds", and it outputs a
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successful attack. (See: secondary definition under "security", successful attack. (See: secondary definition under "security",
system integrity.) system integrity.)
2b. (I) /system integrity/ The process of restoring an information 2b. (I) /system integrity/ The process of restoring an information
system's assets and operation following damage or destruction. system's assets and operation following damage or destruction.
(See: contingency plan.) (See: contingency plan.)
$ RED $ RED
1. (N) Designation for data that consists only of clear text, and 1. (N) Designation for data that consists only of clear text, and
for information system equipment items and facilities that handle for information system equipment items and facilities that handle
clear text. Example: "RED key". (See: color change, RED/BLACK clear text. Example: "RED key". (See: BCR, color change, RED/BLACK
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separation. Compare: BLACK.) separation. Compare: BLACK.)
Derivation: From the practice of marking equipment with colors to Derivation: From the practice of marking equipment with colors to
prevent operational errors. prevent operational errors.
2. (O) /U.S. Government/ Designation applied to information 2. (O) /U.S. Government/ Designation applied to information
systems, and to associated areas, circuits, components, and systems, and to associated areas, circuits, components, and
equipment, "in which unencrypted national security information is equipment, "in which unencrypted national security information is
being processed." [C4009] being processed." [C4009]
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(I) An attack in which a valid data transmission is replayed to (I) An attack in which a valid data transmission is replayed to
the originator by an attacker who intercepts the original the originator by an attacker who intercepts the original
transmission. (Compare: indirect attack, replay attack.) transmission. (Compare: indirect attack, replay attack.)
$ reflector attack $ reflector attack
(D) Synonym for "indirect attack". (D) Synonym for "indirect attack".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it could be Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it could be
confused with "reflection attack", which is a different concept. confused with "reflection attack", which is a different concept.
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$ registered user $ registered user
(I) A system entity that is authorized to receive a system's (I) A system entity that is authorized to receive a system's
products and services or otherwise access system resources. (See: products and services or otherwise access system resources. (See:
registration, user.) registration, user.)
$ registration $ registration
1. (I) /information system/ A system process that (a) initializes 1. (I) /information system/ A system process that (a) initializes
an identity (of a system entity) in the system, (b) establishes an an identity (of a system entity) in the system, (b) establishes an
identifier for that identity, (c) may associate authentication identifier for that identity, (c) may associate authentication
information with that identifier, and (d) may issue an identifier information with that identifier, and (d) may issue an identifier
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- Whether a person is required to appear before the CA or RA, or - Whether a person is required to appear before the CA or RA, or
can instead be represented by an agent. can instead be represented by an agent.
- Whether and how an entity proves possession of the private key - Whether and how an entity proves possession of the private key
matching a public key. matching a public key.
$ registration authority (RA) $ registration authority (RA)
1. (I) An optional PKI entity (separate from the CAs) that does 1. (I) An optional PKI entity (separate from the CAs) that does
not sign either digital certificates or CRLs but has not sign either digital certificates or CRLs but has
responsibility for recording or verifying some or all of the responsibility for recording or verifying some or all of the
information (particularly the identities of subjects) needed by a information (particularly the identities of subjects) needed by a
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CA to issue certificates and CRLs and to perform other certificate CA to issue certificates and CRLs and to perform other certificate
management functions. (See: ORA, registration.) management functions. (See: ORA, registration.)
2. (I) /PKIX/ An optional PKI component, separate from the CA(s). 2. (I) /PKIX/ An optional PKI component, separate from the CA(s).
The functions that the RA performs will vary from case to case but The functions that the RA performs will vary from case to case but
may include identity authentication and name assignment, key may include identity authentication and name assignment, key
generation and archiving of key pairs, token distribution, and generation and archiving of key pairs, token distribution, and
revocation reporting. [R4210] revocation reporting. [R4210]
Tutorial: Sometimes, a CA may perform all certificate management Tutorial: Sometimes, a CA may perform all certificate management
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manner. (See: downgrade, upgrade.) manner. (See: downgrade, upgrade.)
$ rekey $ rekey
(I) Change the value of a cryptographic key that is being used in (I) Change the value of a cryptographic key that is being used in
an application of a cryptographic system. (See: certificate an application of a cryptographic system. (See: certificate
rekey.) rekey.)
Tutorial: Rekey is required at the end of a cryptoperiod or key Tutorial: Rekey is required at the end of a cryptoperiod or key
lifetime. lifetime.
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$ reliability $ reliability
(I) The ability of a system to perform a required function under (I) The ability of a system to perform a required function under
stated conditions for a specified period of time. (Compare: stated conditions for a specified period of time. (Compare:
availability, survivability.) availability, survivability.)
$ reliable human review $ reliable human review
(I) Any manual, automated, or hybrid process or procedure for (I) Any manual, automated, or hybrid process or procedure which
opening and reviewing a digital object, such as text or an image, ensures that a human examines a digital object, such as text or an
to determine whether the object may be permitted, according to image, to determine whether the object may be permitted, according
some security policy, to be transferred across a controlled to some security policy, to be transferred across a controlled
interface. (See: guard.) interface. (See: guard.)
$ relying party $ relying party
(I) Synonym for "certificate user". (I) Synonym for "certificate user".
Usage: Used in a legal context to mean a recipient of a Usage: Used in a legal context to mean a recipient of a
certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate. (See: ABA certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate. (See: ABA
Guidelines.) Guidelines.)
$ remanence $ remanence
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$ renew $ renew
See: certificate renewal. See: certificate renewal.
$ replay attack $ replay attack
(I) An attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or (I) An attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or
fraudulently repeated, either by the originator or by a third fraudulently repeated, either by the originator or by a third
party who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as part party who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as part
of a masquerade attack. (See: active wiretapping, fresh, liveness, of a masquerade attack. (See: active wiretapping, fresh, liveness,
nonce. Compare: indirect attack, reflection attack.) nonce. Compare: indirect attack, reflection attack.)
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$ reordering $ reordering
(I) /packet/ See: secondary definition under "stream integrity (I) /packet/ See: secondary definition under "stream integrity
service". service".
$ repository $ repository
1. (I) A system for storing and distributing digital certificates 1. (I) A system for storing and distributing digital certificates
and related information (including CRLs, CPSs, and certificate and related information (including CRLs, CPSs, and certificate
policies) to certificate users. (Compare: archive, directory.) policies) to certificate users. (Compare: archive, directory.)
2. (O) "A trustworthy system for storing and retrieving 2. (O) "A trustworthy system for storing and retrieving
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Standard.) Standard.)
2. (D) A popularly misused synonym for a document on the Internet 2. (D) A popularly misused synonym for a document on the Internet
Standards Track, i.e., an Internet Standard, Draft Standard, or Standards Track, i.e., an Internet Standard, Draft Standard, or
Proposed Standard. (See: Internet Standard.) Proposed Standard. (See: Internet Standard.)
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
definition 2 because many other types of documents also are definition 2 because many other types of documents also are
published as RFCs. published as RFCs.
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$ residual risk $ residual risk
(I) The portion of an original risk or set of risks that remains (I) The portion of an original risk or set of risks that remains
after countermeasures have been applied. (Compare: acceptable after countermeasures have been applied. (Compare: acceptable
risk, risk analysis.) risk, risk analysis.)
$ restore $ restore
See: card restore. See: card restore.
$ reverse engineering $ reverse engineering
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "intrusion". (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "intrusion".
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competition. [Daem] (See: Advanced Encryption Standard.) competition. [Daem] (See: Advanced Encryption Standard.)
$ risk $ risk
1. (I) An expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a 1. (I) An expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a
particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability with a particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability with a
particular harmful result. (See: residual risk.) particular harmful result. (See: residual risk.)
2. (O) /SET/ "The possibility of loss because of one or more 2. (O) /SET/ "The possibility of loss because of one or more
threats to information (not to be confused with financial or threats to information (not to be confused with financial or
business risk)." [SET2] business risk)." [SET2]
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Tutorial: There are four basic ways to deal with a risk [SP30]: Tutorial: There are four basic ways to deal with a risk [SP30]:
- "Risk avoidance": Eliminate the risk by either countering the - "Risk avoidance": Eliminate the risk by either countering the
threat or removing the vulnerability. (Compare: "avoidance" threat or removing the vulnerability. (Compare: "avoidance"
under "security".) under "security".)
- "Risk transference": Shift the risk to another system or - "Risk transference": Shift the risk to another system or
entity; e.g., buy insurance to compensate for potential loss. entity; e.g., buy insurance to compensate for potential loss.
- "Risk limitation": Limit the risk by implementing controls that - "Risk limitation": Limit the risk by implementing controls that
minimize resulting loss. minimize resulting loss.
- "Risk assumption": Accept the potential for loss and continue - "Risk assumption": Accept the potential for loss and continue
operating the system. operating the system.
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$ risk assumption $ risk assumption
(I) See: secondary definition under "risk". (I) See: secondary definition under "risk".
$ risk avoidance $ risk avoidance
(I) See: secondary definition under "risk". (I) See: secondary definition under "risk".
$ risk limitation $ risk limitation
(I) See: secondary definition under "risk". (I) See: secondary definition under "risk".
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$ risk management $ risk management
1. (I) The process of identifying, measuring, and controlling 1. (I) The process of identifying, measuring, and controlling
(i.e., mitigating) risks in information systems so as to reduce (i.e., mitigating) risks in information systems so as to reduce
the risks to a level commensurate with the value of the assets the risks to a level commensurate with the value of the assets
protected. (See: risk analysis.) protected. (See: risk analysis.)
2. (I) The process of controlling uncertain events that may affect 2. (I) The process of controlling uncertain events that may affect
information system resources. information system resources.
3. (O) "The total process of identifying, controlling, and 3. (O) "The total process of identifying, controlling, and
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To create an RSA key pair, randomly choose two large prime To create an RSA key pair, randomly choose two large prime
numbers, p and q, and compute the modulus, n = pq. Randomly choose numbers, p and q, and compute the modulus, n = pq. Randomly choose
a number e, the public exponent, that is less than n and a number e, the public exponent, that is less than n and
relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1). Choose another number d, the relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1). Choose another number d, the
private exponent, such that ed-1 evenly divides (p-1)(q-1). The private exponent, such that ed-1 evenly divides (p-1)(q-1). The
public key is the set of numbers (n,e), and the private key is the public key is the set of numbers (n,e), and the private key is the
set (n,d). set (n,d).
It is assumed to be difficult to compute the private key (n,d) It is assumed to be difficult to compute the private key (n,d)
from the public key (n,e). However, if n can be factored into p from the public key (n,e). However, if n can be factored into p
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and q, then the private key d can be computed easily. Thus, RSA and q, then the private key d can be computed easily. Thus, RSA
security depends on the assumption that it is computationally security depends on the assumption that it is computationally
difficult to factor a number that is the product of two large difficult to factor a number that is the product of two large
prime numbers. (Of course, p and q are treated as part of the prime numbers. (Of course, p and q are treated as part of the
private key, or else are destroyed after computing n.) private key, or else are destroyed after computing n.)
For encryption of a message, m, to be sent to Bob, Alice uses For encryption of a message, m, to be sent to Bob, Alice uses
Bob's public key (n,e) to compute m**e (mod n) = c. She sends c to Bob's public key (n,e) to compute m**e (mod n) = c. She sends c to
Bob. Bob computes c**d (mod n) = m. Only Bob knows d, so only Bob Bob. Bob computes c**d (mod n) = m. Only Bob knows d, so only Bob
can compute c**d (mod n) to recover m. can compute c**d (mod n) to recover m.
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authorization, constraint, identity, principal, role.) authorization, constraint, identity, principal, role.)
Tutorial: Administrators assign permissions to roles as needed to Tutorial: Administrators assign permissions to roles as needed to
perform functions in the system. Administrators separately assign perform functions in the system. Administrators separately assign
user identities to roles. When a user accesses the system in an user identities to roles. When a user accesses the system in an
identity (for which the user has been registered) and initiates a identity (for which the user has been registered) and initiates a
session using a role (to which the user has been assigned), then session using a role (to which the user has been assigned), then
the permissions that have been assigned to the role are available the permissions that have been assigned to the role are available
to be exercised by the user. to be exercised by the user.
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The following diagram shows that role-based access control The following diagram shows that role-based access control
involves five different relationships: (a) administrators assign involves five different relationships: (a) administrators assign
identities to roles, (b) administrators assign permissions to identities to roles, (b) administrators assign permissions to
roles, (c) administrators assign roles to roles, (d) users select roles, (c) administrators assign roles to roles, (d) users select
identities in sessions, and (e) users select roles in sessions. identities in sessions, and (e) users select roles in sessions.
Security policies may define constraints on these assignments and Security policies may define constraints on these assignments and
selections. selections.
(c) Permission Inheritance Assignments (i.e., Role Hierarchy) (c) Permission Inheritance Assignments (i.e., Role Hierarchy)
[Constraints] [Constraints]
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whose public key all certificate users base their validation of whose public key all certificate users base their validation of
certificates, CRLs, certification paths, and other constructs. certificates, CRLs, certification paths, and other constructs.
(See: top CA.) (See: top CA.)
Tutorial: The root CA in a certification hierarchy issues public- Tutorial: The root CA in a certification hierarchy issues public-
key certificates to one or more additional CAs that form the key certificates to one or more additional CAs that form the
second highest level. Each of these CAs may issue certificates to second highest level. Each of these CAs may issue certificates to
more CAs at the third highest level, and so on. To initialize more CAs at the third highest level, and so on. To initialize
operation of a hierarchical PKI, the root's initial public key is operation of a hierarchical PKI, the root's initial public key is
securely distributed to all certificate users in a way that does securely distributed to all certificate users in a way that does
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not depend on the PKI's certification relationships, i.e., by an not depend on the PKI's certification relationships, i.e., by an
out-of-band procedure. The root's public key may be distributed out-of-band procedure. The root's public key may be distributed
simply as a numerical value, but typically is distributed in a simply as a numerical value, but typically is distributed in a
self-signed certificate in which the root is the subject. The self-signed certificate in which the root is the subject. The
root's certificate is signed by the root itself because there is root's certificate is signed by the root itself because there is
no higher authority in a certification hierarchy. The root's no higher authority in a certification hierarchy. The root's
certificate is then the first certificate in every certification certificate is then the first certificate in every certification
path. path.
3. (I) /DNS/ The base of the tree structure that defines the name 3. (I) /DNS/ The base of the tree structure that defines the name
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1b. (I) /IPS/ A gateway that operates in the IPS Internet Layer to 1b. (I) /IPS/ A gateway that operates in the IPS Internet Layer to
connect two or more subnetworks. connect two or more subnetworks.
1c. (N) /OSIRM/ A computer that is a gateway between two networks 1c. (N) /OSIRM/ A computer that is a gateway between two networks
at OSIRM Layer 3 and that relays and directs data packets through at OSIRM Layer 3 and that relays and directs data packets through
that internetwork. (Compare: bridge, proxy.) that internetwork. (Compare: bridge, proxy.)
$ RSA $ RSA
(N) See: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman. (N) See: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman.
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$ rule $ rule
See: policy rule. See: policy rule.
$ rule-based security policy $ rule-based security policy
(I) "A security policy based on global rules [i.e., policy rules] (I) "A security policy based on global rules [i.e., policy rules]
imposed for all users. These rules usually rely on comparison of imposed for all users. These rules usually rely on comparison of
the sensitivity of the resource being accessed and the possession the sensitivity of the resource being accessed and the possession
of corresponding attributes of users, a group of users, or of corresponding attributes of users, a group of users, or
entities acting on behalf of users." [I7498-2] (Compare: identity- entities acting on behalf of users." [I7498-2] (Compare: identity-
based security policy, policy rule, RBAC.) based security policy, policy rule, RBAC.)
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the currently presented password (or initialization value) one the currently presented password (or initialization value) one
time and comparing the hash result with the previously presented time and comparing the hash result with the previously presented
password. password.
$ S/MIME $ S/MIME
(I) See: Secure/MIME. (I) See: Secure/MIME.
$ SAD $ SAD
(I) See: Security Association Database. (I) See: Security Association Database.
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$ safety $ safety
(I) The property of a system being free from risk of causing harm (I) The property of a system being free from risk of causing harm
(especially physical harm) to its system entities. (Compare: (especially physical harm) to its system entities. (Compare:
security.) security.)
$ SAID $ SAID
(I) See: security association identifier. (I) See: security association identifier.
$ salami swindle $ salami swindle
(D) /slang/ "Slicing off a small amount from each transaction. (D) /slang/ "Slicing off a small amount from each transaction.
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accessing any system resources except those for which the software accessing any system resources except those for which the software
is authorized. is authorized.
$ sanitize $ sanitize
1. (I) Delete sensitive data from a file, device, or system. (See: 1. (I) Delete sensitive data from a file, device, or system. (See:
erase, zeroize.) erase, zeroize.)
2. (I) Modify data so as to be able either (a) to completely 2. (I) Modify data so as to be able either (a) to completely
declassify it or (b) to downgrade it to a lower security level. declassify it or (b) to downgrade it to a lower security level.
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$ SAP $ SAP
(O) See: special access program. (O) See: special access program.
$ SASL $ SASL
(I) See: Simple Authentication and Security Layer. (I) See: Simple Authentication and Security Layer.
$ SCA $ SCA
(I) See: subordinate certification authority. (I) See: subordinate certification authority.
$ scavenging $ scavenging
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metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated
Usage under "Green Book".) Usage under "Green Book".)
$ SDE $ SDE
(N) See: Secure Data Exchange. (N) See: Secure Data Exchange.
$ SDNS $ SDNS
(O) See: Secure Data Network System. (O) See: Secure Data Network System.
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$ SDU $ SDU
(N) See: "service data unit" under "protocol data unit". (N) See: "service data unit" under "protocol data unit".
$ seal $ seal
1. (I) To use asymmetric cryptography to encrypt plain text with a 1. (I) To use asymmetric cryptography to encrypt plain text with a
public key in such a way that only the holder of the matching public key in such a way that only the holder of the matching
private key can learn what was the plain text. [Chau] (Compare: private key can learn what was the plain text. [Chau] (Compare:
shroud, wrap.) shroud, wrap.)
Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with definition 1 Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with definition 1
unless the ISD includes the definition, because the definition is unless the ISD includes the definition, because the definition is
not wide known and the concept can be expressed by using other, not widely known and the concept can be expressed by using other,
standard terms. Instead, use "salt and encrypt" or other standard terms. Instead, use "salt and encrypt" or other
terminology that is specific with regard to the mechanism being terminology that is specific with regard to the mechanism being
used. used.
Tutorial: The definition does *not* say "only the holder of the Tutorial: The definition does *not* say "only the holder of the
matching private key can decrypt the ciphertext to learn what was matching private key can decrypt the ciphertext to learn what was
the plaintext"; sealing is stronger than that. If Alice simply the plaintext"; sealing is stronger than that. If Alice simply
encrypts a plaintext P with a public key K to produce ciphertext C encrypts a plaintext P with a public key K to produce ciphertext C
= K(P), then if Bob guesses that P = X, Bob could verify the guess = K(P), then if Bob guesses that P = X, Bob could verify the guess
by checking whether K(P) = K(X). To "seal" P and block Bob's by checking whether K(P) = K(X). To "seal" P and block Bob's
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data object. (See: sign.) data object. (See: sign.)
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term with
definition 2. Instead, use a term that is more specific with definition 2. Instead, use a term that is more specific with
regard to the mechanism used to provide the data integrity regard to the mechanism used to provide the data integrity
service; e.g., use "sign" when the mechanism is digital signature. service; e.g., use "sign" when the mechanism is digital signature.
$ secret $ secret
1a. (I) /adjective/ The condition of information being protected 1a. (I) /adjective/ The condition of information being protected
from being known by any system entities except those that are from being known by any system entities except those that are
intended to know it. intended to know it. (See: data confidentiality.)
1b. (I) /noun/ An item of information that is protected thusly. 1b. (I) /noun/ An item of information that is protected thusly.
Usage: This term applies to symmetric keys, private keys, and Usage: This term applies to symmetric keys, private keys, and
passwords. passwords.
$ secret key $ secret key
(D) A key that is kept secret or needs to be kept secret. (D) A key that is kept secret or needs to be kept secret.
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it mixes concepts Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it mixes concepts
in a potentially misleading way. In the context of asymmetric in a potentially misleading way. In the context of asymmetric
cryptography, ISDs SHOULD use "private key". In the context of cryptography, ISDs SHOULD use "private key". In the context of
symmetric cryptography, the adjective "secret" is unnecessary symmetric cryptography, the adjective "secret" is unnecessary
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because all keys must be kept secret. because all keys must be kept secret.
$ secret-key cryptography $ secret-key cryptography
(D) Synonym for "symmetric cryptography". (D) Synonym for "symmetric cryptography".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it could be Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it could be
confused with "asymmetric cryptography", in which the private key confused with "asymmetric cryptography", in which the private key
is kept secret. is kept secret.
Derivation: Symmetric cryptography is sometimes called "secret-key Derivation: Symmetric cryptography is sometimes called "secret-key
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4 (see: SP4), and key establishment (see: KMP). 4 (see: SP4), and key establishment (see: KMP).
$ secure distribution $ secure distribution
(I) See: trusted distribution. (I) See: trusted distribution.
$ Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) $ Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
(N) A cryptographic hash function (specified in SHS) that produces (N) A cryptographic hash function (specified in SHS) that produces
a 160-bit output (hash result) for input data of any length < a 160-bit output (hash result) for input data of any length <
2**64 bits. 2**64 bits.
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$ Secure Hash Standard (SHS) $ Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
(N) The U.S. Government standard [FP180] that specifies SHA. (N) The U.S. Government standard [FP180] that specifies SHA.
$ Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP) $ Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP)
(I) A Internet protocol [R2660] for providing client-server (I) A Internet protocol [R2660] for providing client-server
security services for HTTP communications. (Compare: https.) security services for HTTP communications. (Compare: https.)
Tutorial: S-HTTP was originally specified by CommerceNet, a Tutorial: S-HTTP was originally specified by CommerceNet, a
coalition of businesses interested in developing the Internet for coalition of businesses interested in developing the Internet for
commercial uses. Several message formats may be incorporated into commercial uses. Several message formats may be incorporated into
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$ Secure Shell(trademark) (SSH(trademark)) $ Secure Shell(trademark) (SSH(trademark))
(N) Refers to a protocol for secure remote login and other secure (N) Refers to a protocol for secure remote login and other secure
network services. network services.
Usage: On the Web site of SSH Communication Security Corporation, Usage: On the Web site of SSH Communication Security Corporation,
at http://www.ssh.com/legal_notice.html, it says, "SSH [and] the at http://www.ssh.com/legal_notice.html, it says, "SSH [and] the
SSH logo . . . are either trademarks or registered trademarks of SSH logo . . . are either trademarks or registered trademarks of
SSH." This Glossary seeks to make readers aware of this trademark SSH." This Glossary seeks to make readers aware of this trademark
claim but takes no position on its validity. claim but takes no position on its validity.
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Tutorial: SSH has three main parts: Tutorial: SSH has three main parts:
- Transport layer protocol: Provides server authentication, - Transport layer protocol: Provides server authentication,
confidentiality, and integrity; and can optionally provide confidentiality, and integrity; and can optionally provide
compression. This layer typically runs over a TCP connection, compression. This layer typically runs over a TCP connection,
but might also run on top of any other reliable data stream. but might also run on top of any other reliable data stream.
- User authentication protocol: Authenticates the client-side - User authentication protocol: Authenticates the client-side
user to the server. It runs over the transport layer protocol. user to the server. It runs over the transport layer protocol.
- Connection protocol: Multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into - Connection protocol: Multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into
several logical channels. It runs over the user authentication several logical channels. It runs over the user authentication
protocol. protocol.
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transaction.) transaction.)
1b. (I) /formal model/ A system condition in which no subject can 1b. (I) /formal model/ A system condition in which no subject can
access any object in an unauthorized manner. (See: secondary access any object in an unauthorized manner. (See: secondary
definition under "Bell-LaPadula model".) definition under "Bell-LaPadula model".)
$ security $ security
1a. (I) A system condition that results from the establishment and 1a. (I) A system condition that results from the establishment and
maintenance of measures to protect the system. maintenance of measures to protect the system.
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1b. (I) A system condition in which system resources are free from 1b. (I) A system condition in which system resources are free from
unauthorized access and from unauthorized or accidental change, unauthorized access and from unauthorized or accidental change,
destruction, or loss. (Compare: safety.) destruction, or loss. (Compare: safety.)
2. (I) Measures taken to protect a system. 2. (I) Measures taken to protect a system.
Tutorial: Parker [Park] suggests that providing a condition of Tutorial: Parker [Park] suggests that providing a condition of
system security may involve the following six basic functions, system security may involve the following six basic functions,
which overlap to some extent: which overlap to some extent:
- "Deterrence": Reducing an intelligent threat by discouraging - "Deterrence": Reducing an intelligent threat by discouraging
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- "Correction": Changing a security architecture to eliminate or - "Correction": Changing a security architecture to eliminate or
reduce the risk of reoccurrence of a security violation or reduce the risk of reoccurrence of a security violation or
threat consequence, such as by eliminating a vulnerability. threat consequence, such as by eliminating a vulnerability.
$ security architecture $ security architecture
(I) A plan and set of principles that describe (a) the security (I) A plan and set of principles that describe (a) the security
services that a system is required to provide to meet the needs of services that a system is required to provide to meet the needs of
its users, (b) the system components required to implement the its users, (b) the system components required to implement the
services, and (c) the performance levels required in the services, and (c) the performance levels required in the
components to deal with the threat environment (e.g., [R2179]). components to deal with the threat environment (e.g., [R2179]).
(See: defense in depth, IATF, security controls, Tutorial under (See: defense in depth, IATF, OSIRM Security Architecture,
"security policy". Compare: OSIRM System Architecture.) security controls, Tutorial under "security policy".)
Tutorial: A security architecture is the result of applying the Tutorial: A security architecture is the result of applying the
system engineering process. A complete system security system engineering process. A complete system security
architecture includes administrative security, communication architecture includes administrative security, communication
security, computer security, emanations security, personnel security, computer security, emanations security, personnel
security, and physical security. A complete security architecture security, and physical security. A complete security architecture
needs to deal with both intentional, intelligent threats and needs to deal with both intentional, intelligent threats and
accidental threats. accidental threats.
$ Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) $ Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
(N) A protocol consisting of XML-based request and response (N) A protocol consisting of XML-based request and response
message formats for exchanging security information, expressed in message formats for exchanging security information, expressed in
the form of assertions about subjects, between online business the form of assertions about subjects, between online business
partners. [SAML] partners. [SAML]
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$ security association $ security association
1. (I) A relationship established between two or more entities to 1. (I) A relationship established between two or more entities to
enable them to protect data they exchange. (See: association, enable them to protect data they exchange. (See: association,
ISAKMP, SAD. Compare: session.) ISAKMP, SAD. Compare: session.)
Tutorial: The relationship is represented by a set of data that is Tutorial: The relationship is represented by a set of data that is
shared between the entities and is agreed upon and considered a shared between the entities and is agreed upon and considered a
contract between them. The data describes how the associated contract between them. The data describes how the associated
entities jointly use security services. The relationship is used entities jointly use security services. The relationship is used
to negotiate characteristics of security mechanisms, but the to negotiate characteristics of security mechanisms, but the
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$ security association identifier (SAID) $ security association identifier (SAID)
(I) A data field in a security protocol (such as NLSP or SDE), (I) A data field in a security protocol (such as NLSP or SDE),
used to identify the security association to which a PDU is bound. used to identify the security association to which a PDU is bound.
The SAID value is usually used to select a key for decryption or The SAID value is usually used to select a key for decryption or
authentication at the destination. (See: Security Parameter authentication at the destination. (See: Security Parameter
Index.) Index.)
$ security assurance $ security assurance
1. (I) An attribute of an information system that provides grounds 1. (I) An attribute of an information system that provides grounds
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for having confidence that the system operates such that the for having confidence that the system operates such that the
system's security policy is enforced. (Compare: trust.) system's security policy is enforced. (Compare: trust.)
2. (I) A procedure that ensures a system is developed and operated 2. (I) A procedure that ensures a system is developed and operated
as intended by the system's security policy. as intended by the system's security policy.
3. (D) "The degree of confidence one has that the security 3. (D) "The degree of confidence one has that the security
controls operate correctly and protect the system as intended." controls operate correctly and protect the system as intended."
[SP12] [SP12]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 3; it is a Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 3; it is a
definition for "assurance level" rather than for "assurance". definition for "assurance level" rather than for "assurance".
4. (D) /U.S. Government, identity authentication/ The (a) "degree 4. (D) /U.S. Government, identity authentication/ The (a) "degree
of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the
identity of the individual to whom the [identity] credential was identity of the individual to whom the [identity] credential was
issued" and (b) "the degree of confidence that the individual who issued" and the (b) "degree of confidence that the individual who
uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was
issued". [M0404] issued". [M0404]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 4; it mixes Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 4; it mixes
concepts in a potentially misleading way. Part "a" is a definition concepts in a potentially misleading way. Part "a" is a definition
for "assurance level" (rather than "security assurance") of an for "assurance level" (rather than "security assurance") of an
identity registration process; and part "b" is a definition for identity registration process; and part "b" is a definition for
"assurance level" (rather than "security assurance") of an "assurance level" (rather than "security assurance") of an
identity authentication process. Also, the processes of identity authentication process. Also, the processes of
registration and authentication should be defined and designed registration and authentication should be defined and designed
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$ security audit trail $ security audit trail
(I) A chronological record of system activities that is sufficient (I) A chronological record of system activities that is sufficient
to enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence of to enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence of
environments and activities surrounding or leading to an environments and activities surrounding or leading to an
operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction
from inception to final results. [NCS04] (See: security audit.) from inception to final results. [NCS04] (See: security audit.)
$ security by obscurity $ security by obscurity
(O) Attempting to maintain or increase security of a system by (O) Attempting to maintain or increase security of a system by
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keeping secret the design or construction of a security mechanism. keeping secret the design or construction of a security mechanism.
Tutorial: This approach has long been discredited in cryptography, Tutorial: This approach has long been discredited in cryptography,
where the phrase refers to trying to keep an algorithm secret, where the phrase refers to trying to keep an algorithm secret,
rather than just concealing the keys [Schn]. One must assume that rather than just concealing the keys [Schn]. One must assume that
mass-produced or widely fielded cryptographic devices eventually mass-produced or widely fielded cryptographic devices eventually
will be lost or stolen and, therefore, that the algorithms will be will be lost or stolen and, therefore, that the algorithms will be
reverse engineered and become known to the adversary. Thus, one reverse engineered and become known to the adversary. Thus, one
should rely on only those algorithms and protocols that are strong should rely on only those algorithms and protocols that are strong
enough to have been published widely, and have been peer reviewed enough to have been published widely, and have been peer reviewed
for long enough that their flaws have been found and removed. For for long enough that their flaws have been found and removed. For
example, NIST used a long, public process to select AES to replace example, NIST used a long, public process to select AES to replace
DES. DES.
In computer and network security, the principle of "no security by In computer and network security, the principle of "no security by
obscurity" also applies to security mechanisms other than obscurity" also applies to security mechanisms other than
cryptography. For example, if the design and implementation of a cryptography. For example, if the design and implementation of a
protocol for access control are strong, than reading the protocol for access control are strong, then reading the
protocol's source code should not enable you to find a way to protocol's source code should not enable you to find a way to
evade the protection and penetrate the system. evade the protection and penetrate the system.
$ security class $ security class
(D) Synonym for "security level". (D) Synonym for "security level".
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. Instead, use Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. Instead, use
"security level", which is more widely established and understood. "security level", which is more widely established and understood.
$ security clearance $ security clearance
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requirements and adequately protect the confidentiality, requirements and adequately protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the system and its information. integrity, and availability of the system and its information.
[FP199] (See: security architecture.) [FP199] (See: security architecture.)
$ security doctrine $ security doctrine
(I) A specified set of procedures or practices that direct or (I) A specified set of procedures or practices that direct or
provide guidance for how to comply with security policy. (Compare: provide guidance for how to comply with security policy. (Compare:
security mechanism, security policy.) security mechanism, security policy.)
Tutorial: Security policy and security doctrine are closely Tutorial: Security policy and security doctrine are closely
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related. However, policy deals mainly with strategy, and doctrine related. However, policy deals mainly with strategy, and doctrine
deals with tactics. deals with tactics.
Security doctrine is often understood to refer mainly to Security doctrine is often understood to refer mainly to
administrative security, personnel security, and physical administrative security, personnel security, and physical
security. For example, security mechanisms and devices that security. For example, security mechanisms and devices that
implement them are normally designed to operate in a limited range implement them are normally designed to operate in a limited range
of environmental and administrative conditions, and these of environmental and administrative conditions, and these
conditions must be met to complement and ensure the technical conditions must be met to complement and ensure the technical
protection afforded by the hardware, firmware, and software in the protection afforded by the hardware, firmware, and software in the
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- Failing a built-in hardware self-test or a software system - Failing a built-in hardware self-test or a software system
integrity check. integrity check.
$ security fault analysis $ security fault analysis
(I) A security analysis, usually performed on hardware at the (I) A security analysis, usually performed on hardware at the
level of gate logic, gate-by-gate, to determine the security level of gate logic, gate-by-gate, to determine the security
properties of a device when a hardware fault is encountered. properties of a device when a hardware fault is encountered.
$ security function $ security function
(I) A function in a system that is relevant to the security of the (I) A function in a system that is relevant to the security of the
system; i.e., a system function that must operate correctly in system; i.e., a system function that must operate correctly to
order to ensure adherence to the system's security policy. ensure adherence to the system's security policy.
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$ security gateway $ security gateway
1. (I) An internetwork gateway that separates trusted (or 1. (I) An internetwork gateway that separates trusted (or
relatively more trusted) hosts on one side from untrusted (or less relatively more trusted) hosts on one side from untrusted (or less
trusted) hosts on the other side. (See: firewall and guard.) trusted) hosts on the other side. (See: firewall and guard.)
2. (O) /IPsec/ "An intermediate system that implements IPsec 2. (O) /IPsec/ "An intermediate system that implements IPsec
protocols." [R2401] protocols." [R2401]
Tutorial: IPsec's AH or ESP can be implemented on a gateway Tutorial: IPsec's AH or ESP can be implemented on a gateway
between a protected network and an unprotected network, in order between a protected network and an unprotected network, to provide
to provide security services to the protected network's hosts when security services to the protected network's hosts when they
they communicate across the unprotected network to other hosts and communicate across the unprotected network to other hosts and
gateways. gateways.
$ security incident $ security incident
1. (I) A security event that involves a security violation. (See: 1. (I) A security event that involves a security violation. (See:
CERT, security event, security intrusion, security violation.) CERT, security event, security intrusion, security violation.)
Tutorial: In other words, a security event in which the system's Tutorial: In other words, a security event in which the system's
security policy is disobeyed or otherwise breached. security policy is disobeyed or otherwise breached.
2. (D) "Any adverse event [that] compromises some aspect of 2. (D) "Any adverse event [that] compromises some aspect of
computer or network security." [R2350] computer or network security." [R2350]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2 because Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2 because
(a) a security incident may occur without actually being harmful (a) a security incident may occur without actually being harmful
(i.e., adverse) and (b) this Glossary defines "compromise" more (i.e., adverse) and because (b) this Glossary defines "compromise"
narrowly in relation to unauthorized access. more narrowly in relation to unauthorized access.
3. (D) "A violation or imminent threat of violation of computer 3. (D) "A violation or imminent threat of violation of computer
security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard computer
security practices." [SP61] security practices." [SP61]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 3 because it Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 3 because it
mixes concepts in way that does not agree with common usage; a mixes concepts in way that does not agree with common usage; a
security incident is commonly thought of as involving a security incident is commonly thought of as involving a
realization of a threat (see: threat action), not just a threat. realization of a threat (see: threat action), not just a threat.
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gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system or system resource gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system or system resource
without having authorization to do so. without having authorization to do so.
$ security kernel $ security kernel
(I) "The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a trusted (I) "The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a trusted
computing base that implement the reference monitor concept. It computing base that implement the reference monitor concept. It
must mediate all accesses, be protected from modification, and be must mediate all accesses, be protected from modification, and be
verifiable as correct." [NCS04] (See: kernel, TCB.) verifiable as correct." [NCS04] (See: kernel, TCB.)
Tutorial: A security kernel is an implementation of a reference Tutorial: A security kernel is an implementation of a reference
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monitor for a given hardware base. [Huff] monitor for a given hardware base. [Huff]
$ security label $ security label
(I) An item of meta-data that designates the value of one or more (I) An item of meta-data that designates the value of one or more
security-relevant attributes (e.g., security level) of a system security-relevant attributes (e.g., security level) of a system
resource. (See: [R1457]. Compare: security marking.) resource. (See: [R1457]. Compare: security marking.)
Deprecated usage: To avoid confusion, ISDs SHOULD NOT use Deprecated usage: To avoid confusion, ISDs SHOULD NOT use
"security label" for "security marking", or vice versa, even "security label" for "security marking", or vice versa, even
though that is commonly done (including in some national and though that is commonly done (including in some national and
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easily be misunderstood. easily be misunderstood.
$ Security Level field $ Security Level field
(I) A 16-bit field that specifies a security level value in the (I) A 16-bit field that specifies a security level value in the
security option (option type 130) of version 4 IP's datagram security option (option type 130) of version 4 IP's datagram
header format. header format.
Deprecated Abbreviation: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the abbreviation "S Deprecated Abbreviation: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the abbreviation "S
field", which is potentially ambiguous. field", which is potentially ambiguous.
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$ security management infrastructure (SMI) $ security management infrastructure (SMI)
(I) System components and activities that support security policy (I) System components and activities that support security policy
by monitoring and controlling security services and mechanisms, by monitoring and controlling security services and mechanisms,
distributing security information, and reporting security events. distributing security information, and reporting security events.
Tutorial: The associated functions are as follows [I7498-4]: Tutorial: The associated functions are as follows [I7498-4]:
- Controlling (granting or restricting) access to system - Controlling (granting or restricting) access to system
resources: This includes verifying authorizations and resources: This includes verifying authorizations and
identities, controlling access to sensitive security data, and identities, controlling access to sensitive security data, and
modifying access priorities and procedures in the event of modifying access priorities and procedures in the event of
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Examples: Authentication exchange, checksum, digital signature, Examples: Authentication exchange, checksum, digital signature,
encryption, and traffic padding. encryption, and traffic padding.
$ security model $ security model
(I) A schematic description of a set of entities and relationships (I) A schematic description of a set of entities and relationships
by which a specified set of security services are provided by or by which a specified set of security services are provided by or
within a system. Example: Bell-LaPadula model, OSIRM . (See: within a system. Example: Bell-LaPadula model, OSIRM . (See:
Tutorial under "security policy".) Tutorial under "security policy".)
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$ security parameters index (SPI) $ security parameters index (SPI)
1. (I) /IPsec/ A 32-bit identifier used to distinguish among 1. (I) /IPsec/ A 32-bit identifier used to distinguish among
security associations that terminate at the same destination (IP security associations that terminate at the same destination (IP
address) and use the same security protocol (AH or ESP). Carried address) and use the same security protocol (AH or ESP). Carried
in AH and ESP to enable the receiving system to determine under in AH and ESP to enable the receiving system to determine under
which security association to process a received packet. which security association to process a received packet.
2. (I) /mobile IP/ A 32-bit index identifying a security 2. (I) /mobile IP/ A 32-bit index identifying a security
association from among the collection of associations that are association from among the collection of associations that are
available between a pair of nodes, for application to mobile IP available between a pair of nodes, for application to mobile IP
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2d. (O) /Common Criteria/ A set of rules that regulate how assets 2d. (O) /Common Criteria/ A set of rules that regulate how assets
are managed, protected, and distributed within a TOE. are managed, protected, and distributed within a TOE.
Tutorial: Ravi Sandhu suggests that security policy is one of four Tutorial: Ravi Sandhu suggests that security policy is one of four
layers of the security engineering process (as shown in the layers of the security engineering process (as shown in the
following diagram). Each layer provides a different view of following diagram). Each layer provides a different view of
security, ranging from what services are needed to how services security, ranging from what services are needed to how services
are implemented. are implemented.
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What Security Services What Security Services
Should Be Provided? +- - - - - - - - - - - - -+ Should Be Provided? +- - - - - - - - - - - - -+
^ +- - - - - - - - - - - -| Mission Functions View | ^ +- - - - - - - - - - - -| Mission Functions View |
| | Security Policy |- - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | Security Policy |- - - - - - - - - - - - -+
| +- - - - - - - - - - - -| Domain Practices View | | +- - - - - - - - - - - -| Domain Practices View |
| | Security Model |- - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | Security Model |- - - - - - - - - - - - -+
| +- - - - - - - - - - - -| Enclave Services View | | +- - - - - - - - - - - -| Enclave Services View |
| | Security Architecture |- - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | Security Architecture |- - - - - - - - - - - - -+
| +- - - - - - - - - - - -| Agent Mechanisms View | | +- - - - - - - - - - - -| Agent Mechanisms View |
| | Security Mechanism |- - - - - - - - - - - - -+ | | Security Mechanism |- - - - - - - - - - - - -+
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for operating the system. for operating the system.
$ Security Policy Database (SPD) $ Security Policy Database (SPD)
(I) /IPsec/ In an IPsec implementation operating in a network (I) /IPsec/ In an IPsec implementation operating in a network
node, a database that contains parameters that specify policies node, a database that contains parameters that specify policies
set by a user or administrator to determine what IPsec services, set by a user or administrator to determine what IPsec services,
if any, are to be provided to IP datagrams sent or received by the if any, are to be provided to IP datagrams sent or received by the
node, and in what fashion they are provided. For each datagram, node, and in what fashion they are provided. For each datagram,
the SPD specifies one of three choices: discard the datagram, the SPD specifies one of three choices: discard the datagram,
apply IPsec services (e.g., AH or ESP), or bypass IPsec. Separate apply IPsec services (e.g., AH or ESP), or bypass IPsec. Separate
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inbound and outbound SPDs are needed because of the directionality inbound and outbound SPDs are needed because of the directionality
of IPsec security associations. [R2401] (Compare: SAD.) of IPsec security associations. [R2401] (Compare: SAD.)
$ Security Protocol 3 (SP3) $ Security Protocol 3 (SP3)
(O) A protocol [SDNS3] developed by SDNS to provide connectionless (O) A protocol [SDNS3] developed by SDNS to provide connectionless
data security at the top of OSIRM Layer 3. (Compare: IPsec, NLSP.) data security at the top of OSIRM Layer 3. (Compare: IPsec, NLSP.)
$ Security Protocol 4 (SP4) $ Security Protocol 4 (SP4)
(O) A protocol [SDNS4] developed by SDNS to provide either (O) A protocol [SDNS4] developed by SDNS to provide either
connectionless or end-to-end connection-oriented data security at connectionless or end-to-end connection-oriented data security at
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system to give a specific kind of protection to system resources. system to give a specific kind of protection to system resources.
(See: access control service, audit service, availability service, (See: access control service, audit service, availability service,
data confidentiality service, data integrity service, data origin data confidentiality service, data integrity service, data origin
authentication service, non-repudiation service, peer entity authentication service, non-repudiation service, peer entity
authentication service, system integrity service.) authentication service, system integrity service.)
Tutorial: Security services implement security policies, and are Tutorial: Security services implement security policies, and are
implemented by security mechanisms. implemented by security mechanisms.
2. (O) "A service, provided by a layer of communicating open 2. (O) "A service, provided by a layer of communicating open
systems, which ensures adequate security of the systems or the systems, [that] ensures adequate security of the systems or the
data transfers." [I7498-2] data transfers." [I7498-2]
$ security situation $ security situation
(I) /ISAKMP/ The set of all security-relevant information (e.g., (I) /ISAKMP/ The set of all security-relevant information (e.g.,
network addresses, security classifications, manner of operation network addresses, security classifications, manner of operation
such as normal or emergency) that is needed to decide the security such as normal or emergency) that is needed to decide the security
services that are required to protect the association that is services that are required to protect the association that is
being negotiated. being negotiated.
$ security target $ security target
(N) /Common Criteria/ A set of security requirements and (N) /Common Criteria/ A set of security requirements and
specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an
identified TOE. identified TOE.
Tutorial: An security target (ST) is a statement of security Tutorial: An security target (ST) is a statement of security
claims for a particular information technology security product or claims for a particular information technology security product or
system, and is the basis for agreement among all parties as to system, and is the basis for agreement among all parties as to
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what security the product or system offers. An ST parallels the what security the product or system offers. An ST parallels the
structure of an protection profile, but has additional elements structure of an protection profile, but has additional elements
that include product-specific detailed information. An ST contains that include product-specific detailed information. An ST contains
a summary specification, which defines the specific measures taken a summary specification, which defines the specific measures taken
in the product or system to meet the security requirements. in the product or system to meet the security requirements.
$ security token $ security token
(I) See: token. (I) See: token.
$ security violation $ security violation
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confidentiality.) confidentiality.)
Tutorial: Data integrity service may be implemented in a protocol Tutorial: Data integrity service may be implemented in a protocol
to protect the SDU part of packets, the PCI part, or both. to protect the SDU part of packets, the PCI part, or both.
- SDU protection: When service is provided for SDUs, it usually - SDU protection: When service is provided for SDUs, it usually
is applied to entire SDUs, but it might be applied only to is applied to entire SDUs, but it might be applied only to
parts of SDUs in some situations. For example, an IPS parts of SDUs in some situations. For example, an IPS
Application-Layer protocol might need protection of only part Application-Layer protocol might need protection of only part
of each packet, and this might enable faster processing. of each packet, and this might enable faster processing.
- PCI protection: To prevent active wiretapping, it might be - PCI protection: To prevent active wiretapping, it might be
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desirable to apply data integrity service to the entire PCI, desirable to apply data integrity service to the entire PCI,
but some PCI fields in some protocols need to be mutable in but some PCI fields in some protocols need to be mutable in
transit. For example, the "Time to Live" field in IPv4 is transit. For example, the "Time to Live" field in IPv4 is
changed each time a packet passes through a router in the changed each time a packet passes through a router in the
Internet Layer. Thus, the value that the field will have when Internet Layer. Thus, the value that the field will have when
the packet arrives at its destination is not predictable by the the packet arrives at its destination is not predictable by the
sender and cannot be included in a checksum computed by the sender and cannot be included in a checksum computed by the
sender. (See: Authentication Header.) sender. (See: Authentication Header.)
$ self-signed certificate $ self-signed certificate
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$ sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) $ sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF)
(O) /U.S. Government/ An accredited area, room, group of rooms, (O) /U.S. Government/ An accredited area, room, group of rooms,
building, or installation where SCI may be stored, used, building, or installation where SCI may be stored, used,
discussed, or electronically processed. [DC6/9] (See: SCI. discussed, or electronically processed. [DC6/9] (See: SCI.
Compare: shielded enclosure.) Compare: shielded enclosure.)
$ sensitive information $ sensitive information
1. (I) Information for which (a) disclosure, (b) alteration, or 1. (I) Information for which (a) disclosure, (b) alteration, or
(c) destruction or loss could adversely affect the interests or (c) destruction or loss could adversely affect the interests or
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business of its owner or user. (See: data confidentiality, data business of its owner or user. (See: data confidentiality, data
integrity, sensitive. Compare: classified, critical.) integrity, sensitive. Compare: classified, critical.)
2. (O) /U.S. Government/ Information for which (a) loss, (b) 2. (O) /U.S. Government/ Information for which (a) loss, (b)
misuse, (c) unauthorized access, or (d) unauthorized modification misuse, (c) unauthorized access, or (d) unauthorized modification
could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of
federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled
under the Privacy Act of 1974, but that has not been specifically under the Privacy Act of 1974, but that has not been specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order or an authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order or an
Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national
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(O) A symmetric, 128-bit block cipher designed by Ross Anderson, (O) A symmetric, 128-bit block cipher designed by Ross Anderson,
Eli Biham, and Lars Knudsen as a candidate for the AES. Eli Biham, and Lars Knudsen as a candidate for the AES.
$ server $ server
(I) A system entity that provides a service in response to (I) A system entity that provides a service in response to
requests from other system entities called clients. requests from other system entities called clients.
$ service data unit (SDU) $ service data unit (SDU)
(N) See: secondary definition under "protocol data unit". (N) See: secondary definition under "protocol data unit".
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$ session $ session
1a. (I) /computer usage/ A continuous period of time, usually 1a. (I) /computer usage/ A continuous period of time, usually
initiated by a login, during which a user accesses a computer initiated by a login, during which a user accesses a computer
system. system.
1b. (I) /computer activity/ The set of transactions or other 1b. (I) /computer activity/ The set of transactions or other
computer activities that are performed by or for a user during a computer activities that are performed by or for a user during a
period of computer usage. period of computer usage.
2. (I) /access control/ A temporary mapping of a principal to one 2. (I) /access control/ A temporary mapping of a principal to one
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(O) One of the private extensions defined by SET for X.509 (O) One of the private extensions defined by SET for X.509
certificates. Carries information about hashed root key, certificates. Carries information about hashed root key,
certificate type, merchant data, cardholder certificate certificate type, merchant data, cardholder certificate
requirements, encryption support for tunneling, or message support requirements, encryption support for tunneling, or message support
for payment instructions. for payment instructions.
$ SET qualifier $ SET qualifier
(O) A certificate policy qualifier that provides information about (O) A certificate policy qualifier that provides information about
the location and content of a SET certificate policy. the location and content of a SET certificate policy.
QQQQ Tutorial: Besides the policies and qualifiers inherited from its
Tutorial: In addition to the policies and qualifiers inherited own certificate, each CA in the SET certification hierarchy may
from its own certificate, each CA in the SET certification add one qualifying statement to the root policy when the CA issues
hierarchy may add one qualifying statement to the root policy when a certificate. The additional qualifier is a certificate policy
the CA issues a certificate. The additional qualifier is a for that CA. Each policy in a SET certificate may have these
certificate policy for that CA. Each policy in a SET certificate qualifiers: (a) a URL where a copy of the policy statement may be
may have these qualifiers: (a) a URL where a copy of the policy found; (b) an electronic mail address where a copy of the policy
statement may be found; (b) an electronic mail address where a statement may be found; (c) a hash result of the policy statement,
copy of the policy statement may be found; (c) a hash result of computed using the indicated algorithm; and (d) a statement
the policy statement, computed using the indicated algorithm; and declaring any disclaimers associated with the issuing of the
(d) a statement declaring any disclaimers associated with the certificate.
issuing of the certificate.
$ SET Secure Electronic Transaction(trademark) or SET(trademark) $ SET Secure Electronic Transaction(trademark) or SET(trademark)
(N) A protocol developed jointly by MasterCard International and (N) A protocol developed jointly by MasterCard International and
Visa International and published as an open standard to provide Visa International and published as an open standard to provide
confidentiality of transaction information, payment integrity, and confidentiality of transaction information, payment integrity, and
authentication of transaction participants for payment card authentication of transaction participants for payment card
transactions over unsecured networks, such as the Internet. [SET1] transactions over unsecured networks, such as the Internet. [SET1]
(See: acquirer, brand, cardholder, dual signature, electronic (See: acquirer, brand, cardholder, dual signature, electronic
commerce, IOTP, issuer, merchant, payment gateway, third party.) commerce, IOTP, issuer, merchant, payment gateway, third party.)
Tutorial: This term and acronym are trademarks of SETCo. Tutorial: This term and acronym are trademarks of SETCo.
MasterCard and Visa announced the SET standard on 1 February 1996. MasterCard and Visa announced the SET standard on 1 February 1996.
$ SETCo $ SETCo
(O) Abbreviation of "SET Secure Electronic Transaction LLC", (O) Abbreviation of "SET Secure Electronic Transaction LLC",
formed on 19 December 1997 by MasterCard and Visa for the purpose formed on 19 December 1997 by MasterCard and Visa for implementing
of implementing the SET Secure Electronic Transaction(trademark) the SET Secure Electronic Transaction(trademark) standard. A later
standard. A later memorandum of understanding added American memorandum of understanding added American Express and JCB Credit
Express and JCB Credit Card Company as co-owners of SETCo. Card Company as co-owners of SETCo.
$ SHA, SHA-1, SHA-2 $ SHA, SHA-1, SHA-2
(N) See: Secure Hash Algorithm. (N) See: Secure Hash Algorithm.
$ shared identity $ shared identity
(I) See: secondary definition under "identity". (I) See: secondary definition under "identity".
$ shared secret $ shared secret
(D) Synonym for "cryptographic key" or "password". (D) Synonym for "cryptographic key" or "password".
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$ shielded enclosure $ shielded enclosure
(O) "Room or container designed to attenuate electromagnetic (O) "Room or container designed to attenuate electromagnetic
radiation." [C4009] (See: emanation. Compare: SCIF.) radiation." [C4009] (See: emanation. Compare: SCIF.)
$ short title $ short title
(O) "Identifying combination of letters and numbers assigned to (O) "Identifying combination of letters and numbers assigned to
certain items of COMSEC material to facilitate handling, certain items of COMSEC material to facilitate handling,
accounting, and controlling." [C4009] (Compare: KMID, long title.) accounting, and controlling." [C4009] (Compare: KMID, long title.)
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$ shroud $ shroud
(D) /verb/ To encrypt a private key, possibly in concert with a (D) /verb/ To encrypt a private key, possibly in concert with a
policy that prevents the key from ever being available in policy that prevents the key from ever being available in
cleartext form beyond a certain, well-defined security perimeter. cleartext form beyond a certain, well-defined security perimeter.
[PKCS12] (See: encrypt. Compare: seal, wrap.) [PKCS12] (See: encrypt. Compare: seal, wrap.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as defined here; Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as defined here;
the definition duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms. the definition duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms.
Instead, use "encrypt" or other terminology that is specific with Instead, use "encrypt" or other terminology that is specific with
regard to the mechanism being used. regard to the mechanism being used.
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2. Electronic Security 2. Electronic Intelligence 2. Electronic Security 2. Electronic Intelligence
2a. Emission Security 2a. Electronic Reconnaissance 2a. Emission Security 2a. Electronic Reconnaissance
2b. Counter-Countermeasures 2b. Countermeasures 2b. Counter-Countermeasures 2b. Countermeasures
------------------------------ --------------------------------- ------------------------------ ---------------------------------
$ signature $ signature
(O) A symbol or process adopted or executed by a system entity (O) A symbol or process adopted or executed by a system entity
with present intention to declare that a data object is genuine. with present intention to declare that a data object is genuine.
(See: digital signature, electronic signature.) (See: digital signature, electronic signature.)
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$ signature certificate $ signature certificate
(I) A public-key certificate that contains a public key that is (I) A public-key certificate that contains a public key that is
intended to be used for verifying digital signatures, rather than intended to be used for verifying digital signatures, rather than
for encrypting data or performing other cryptographic functions. for encrypting data or performing other cryptographic functions.
Tutorial: A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "keyUsage" Tutorial: A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "keyUsage"
extension that indicates the purpose for which the certified extension that indicates the purpose for which the certified
public key is intended. (See: certificate profile.) public key is intended. (See: certificate profile.)
$ signed receipt $ signed receipt
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authenticating a user to a server and for optionally negotiating authenticating a user to a server and for optionally negotiating
protection of subsequent protocol interactions. The command names protection of subsequent protocol interactions. The command names
a registered security mechanism. SASL mechanisms include Kerberos, a registered security mechanism. SASL mechanisms include Kerberos,
GSS-API, S/KEY, and others. Some protocols that use SASL are IMAP4 GSS-API, S/KEY, and others. Some protocols that use SASL are IMAP4
and POP3. and POP3.
$ Simple Key Management for Internet Protocols (SKIP) $ Simple Key Management for Internet Protocols (SKIP)
(I) A key-distribution protocol that uses hybrid encryption to (I) A key-distribution protocol that uses hybrid encryption to
convey session keys that are used to encrypt data in IP packets. convey session keys that are used to encrypt data in IP packets.
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Tutorial: SKIP was designed by Ashar Aziz and Whitfield Diffie at Tutorial: SKIP was designed by Ashar Aziz and Whitfield Diffie at
Sun Microsystems and proposed as the standard key management Sun Microsystems and proposed as the standard key management
protocol for IPsec, but IKE was chosen instead. Although IKE is protocol for IPsec, but IKE was chosen instead. Although IKE is
mandatory for an IPsec implementation, the use of SKIP is not mandatory for an IPsec implementation, the use of SKIP is not
excluded. excluded.
SKIP uses the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm (or could use SKIP uses the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm (or could use
another key-agreement algorithm) to generate a key-encrypting key another key-agreement algorithm) to generate a key-encrypting key
for use between two entities. A session key is used with a for use between two entities. A session key is used with a
symmetric algorithm to encrypt data in one or more IP packets that symmetric algorithm to encrypt data in one or more IP packets that
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identity to be authenticated at an identity provider -- i.e., at a identity to be authenticated at an identity provider -- i.e., at a
service that authenticates and asserts the user's identity -- and service that authenticates and asserts the user's identity -- and
then have that authentication be honored by other service then have that authentication be honored by other service
providers. providers.
Tutorial: A single sign-on subsystem typically requires a user to Tutorial: A single sign-on subsystem typically requires a user to
log in once at the beginning of a session, and then during the log in once at the beginning of a session, and then during the
session transparently grants access by the user to multiple, session transparently grants access by the user to multiple,
separately protected hosts, applications, or other system separately protected hosts, applications, or other system
resources, without further login action by the user (unless, of resources, without further login action by the user (unless, of
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course, the user logs out). Such a subsystem has the advantages of course, the user logs out). Such a subsystem has the advantages of
being user friendly and enabling authentication to be managed being user friendly and enabling authentication to be managed
consistently across an entire enterprise. Such a subsystem also consistently across an entire enterprise. Such a subsystem also
has the disadvantage of requiring all the accessed components to has the disadvantage of requiring all the accessed components to
depend on the security of the same authentication information. depend on the security of the same authentication information.
$ singular identity $ singular identity
(I) See: secondary definition under "identity". (I) See: secondary definition under "identity".
$ site $ site
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the U.S. DoD "Secret" level. On 23 June 1998, NSA announced that the U.S. DoD "Secret" level. On 23 June 1998, NSA announced that
SKIPJACK had been declassified. SKIPJACK had been declassified.
$ slot $ slot
(O) /MISSI/ One of the FORTEZZA PC card storage areas that are (O) /MISSI/ One of the FORTEZZA PC card storage areas that are
each able to hold an X.509 certificate plus other data, including each able to hold an X.509 certificate plus other data, including
the private key that is associated with a public-key certificate. the private key that is associated with a public-key certificate.
$ smart card $ smart card
(I) A credit-card sized device containing one or more integrated (I) A credit-card sized device containing one or more integrated
circuit chips, which perform the functions of a computer's central circuit chips that perform the functions of a computer's central
processor, memory, and input/output interface. (See: PC card, processor, memory, and input/output interface. (See: PC card,
smart token.) smart token.)
Usage: Sometimes this term is used rather strictly to mean a card Usage: Sometimes this term is used rather strictly to mean a card
that closely conforms to the dimensions and appearance of the kind that closely conforms to the dimensions and appearance of the kind
of plastic credit card issued by banks and merchants. At other of plastic credit card issued by banks and merchants. At other
times, the term is used loosely to include cards that are larger times, the term is used loosely to include cards that are larger
than credit cards, especially cards that are thicker, such as PC than credit cards, especially cards that are thicker, such as PC
cards. cards.
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$ smart token $ smart token
(I) A device that conforms to the definition of "smart card" (I) A device that conforms to the definition of "smart card"
except that rather than having the standard dimensions of a credit except that rather than having the standard dimensions of a credit
card, the token is packaged in some other form, such as a military card, the token is packaged in some other form, such as a military
dog tag or a door key. (See: smart card, cryptographic token.) dog tag or a door key. (See: smart card, cryptographic token.)
$ SMI $ SMI
(I) See: security management infrastructure. (I) See: security management infrastructure.
$ SMTP $ SMTP
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Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different Deprecated Term: It is likely that other cultures use different
metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term.
$ Snefru $ Snefru
(N) A public-domain, cryptographic hash function (a.k.a. "The (N) A public-domain, cryptographic hash function (a.k.a. "The
Xerox Secure Hash Function") designed by Ralph C. Merkle at Xerox Xerox Secure Hash Function") designed by Ralph C. Merkle at Xerox
Corporation. Snefru can produce either a 128-bit or 256-bit output Corporation. Snefru can produce either a 128-bit or 256-bit output
(i.e., hash result). [Schn] (See: Khafre, Khufu.) (i.e., hash result). [Schn] (See: Khafre, Khufu.)
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$ sniffing $ sniffing
(D) /slang/ Synonym for "passive wiretapping"; most often refers (D) /slang/ Synonym for "passive wiretapping"; most often refers
to capturing and examining the data packets carried on a LAN. to capturing and examining the data packets carried on a LAN.
(See: password sniffing.) (See: password sniffing.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it unnecessarily Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term; it unnecessarily
duplicates the meaning of a term that is better established. (See: duplicates the meaning of a term that is better established. (See:
Deprecated Usage under "Green Book". Deprecated Usage under "Green Book".
$ SNMP $ SNMP
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$ soft token $ soft token
(D) A data object that is used to control access or authenticate (D) A data object that is used to control access or authenticate
authorization. (See: token.) authorization. (See: token.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as defined here; Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as defined here;
the definition duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms. the definition duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms.
Instead, use "attribute certificate" or another term that is Instead, use "attribute certificate" or another term that is
specific with regard to the mechanism being used. specific with regard to the mechanism being used.
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$ software $ software
(I) Computer programs (which are stored in and executed by (I) Computer programs (which are stored in and executed by
computer hardware) and associated data (which also is stored in computer hardware) and associated data (which also is stored in
the hardware) that may be dynamically written or modified during the hardware) that may be dynamically written or modified during
execution. (Compare: firmware.) execution. (Compare: firmware.)
$ software error $ software error
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definitions under "corruption", (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definitions under "corruption",
"exposure", and "incapacitation". "exposure", and "incapacitation".
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$ SP4 $ SP4
(O) See: Security Protocol 4. (O) See: Security Protocol 4.
$ spam $ spam
1a. (I) /slang verb/ To indiscriminately send unsolicited, 1a. (I) /slang verb/ To indiscriminately send unsolicited,
unwanted, irrelevant, or inappropriate messages, especially unwanted, irrelevant, or inappropriate messages, especially
commercial advertising in mass quantities. commercial advertising in mass quantities.
1b. (I) /slang noun/ Electronic "junk mail". [R2635] 1b. (I) /slang noun/ Electronic "junk mail". [R2635]
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Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term in upper-case Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term in upper-case
letters, because SPAM(trademark) is a trademark of Hormel Foods letters, because SPAM(trademark) is a trademark of Hormel Foods
Corporation. Hormel says, "We do not object to use of this slang Corporation. Hormel says, "We do not object to use of this slang
term [spam] to describe [unsolicited advertising email], although term [spam] to describe [unsolicited advertising email], although
we do object to the use of our product image in association with we do object to the use of our product image in association with
that term. Also, if the term is to be used, it SHOULD be used in that term. Also, if the term is to be used, it SHOULD be used in
all lower-case letters to distinguish it from our trademark SPAM, all lower-case letters to distinguish it from our trademark SPAM,
which SHOULD be used with all uppercase letters." (See: metadata.) which SHOULD be used with all uppercase letters." (See: metadata.)
Tutorial: In sufficient volume, spam can cause denial of service. Tutorial: In sufficient volume, spam can cause denial of service.
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(I) A cryptographic key that is generated and distributed as two (I) A cryptographic key that is generated and distributed as two
or more separate data items that individually convey no knowledge or more separate data items that individually convey no knowledge
of the whole key that results from combining the items. (See: dual of the whole key that results from combining the items. (See: dual
control, split knowledge.) control, split knowledge.)
$ split knowledge $ split knowledge
1. (I) A security technique in which two or more entities 1. (I) A security technique in which two or more entities
separately hold data items that individually do not convey separately hold data items that individually do not convey
knowledge of the information that results from combining the knowledge of the information that results from combining the
items. (See: dual control, split key.) items. (See: dual control, split key.)
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2. (O) "A condition under which two or more entities separately 2. (O) "A condition under which two or more entities separately
have key components which individually convey no knowledge of the have key components [that] individually convey no knowledge of the
plaintext key which will be produced when the key components are plaintext key [that] will be produced when the key components are
combined in the cryptographic module." [FP140] combined in the cryptographic module." [FP140]
$ spoof $ spoof
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "masquerade". (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "masquerade".
$ spoofing attack $ spoofing attack
(I) Synonym for "masquerade attack". (I) Synonym for "masquerade attack".
$ spread spectrum $ spread spectrum
(N) A TRANSEC technique that transmits a signal in a bandwidth (N) A TRANSEC technique that transmits a signal in a bandwidth
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$ SSH(trademark) $ SSH(trademark)
(N) See: Secure Shell(trademark). (N) See: Secure Shell(trademark).
$ SSL $ SSL
(I) See: Secure Sockets Layer. (I) See: Secure Sockets Layer.
$ SSO $ SSO
(I) See: system security officer. (I) See: system security officer.
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$ SSO PIN $ SSO PIN
(O) /MISSI/ One of two PINs that control access to the functions (O) /MISSI/ One of two PINs that control access to the functions
and stored data of a FORTEZZA PC card. Knowledge of the SSO PIN and stored data of a FORTEZZA PC card. Knowledge of the SSO PIN
enables a card user to perform the FORTEZZA functions intended for enables a card user to perform the FORTEZZA functions intended for
use by an end user and also the functions intended for use by a use by an end user and also the functions intended for use by a
MISSI CA. (See: user PIN.) MISSI CA. (See: user PIN.)
$ SSO-PIN ORA (SORA) $ SSO-PIN ORA (SORA)
(O) /MISSI/ A MISSI organizational RA that operates in a mode in (O) /MISSI/ A MISSI organizational RA that operates in a mode in
which the ORA performs all card management functions and, which the ORA performs all card management functions and,
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system, digital watermarking.) system, digital watermarking.)
$ storage channel $ storage channel
(I) See: covert storage channel. (I) See: covert storage channel.
$ storage key $ storage key
(I) A cryptographic key used by a device for protecting (I) A cryptographic key used by a device for protecting
information that is being maintained in the device, as opposed to information that is being maintained in the device, as opposed to
protecting information that is being transmitted between devices. protecting information that is being transmitted between devices.
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(See: cryptographic token, token copy. Compare: traffic key.) (See: cryptographic token, token copy. Compare: traffic key.)
$ stream cipher $ stream cipher
(I) An encryption algorithm that breaks plain text into a stream (I) An encryption algorithm that breaks plain text into a stream
of successive elements (usually, bits) and encrypts the n-th of successive elements (usually, bits) and encrypts the n-th
plaintext element with the n-th element of a parallel key stream, plaintext element with the n-th element of a parallel key stream,
thus converting the plaintext stream into a ciphertext stream. thus converting the plaintext stream into a ciphertext stream.
[Schn] (See: block cipher.) [Schn] (See: block cipher.)
$ stream integrity service $ stream integrity service
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attack potential." attack potential."
- Medium: "... against straightforward or intentional breach ... - Medium: "... against straightforward or intentional breach ...
by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential. by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
- High: "... against deliberately planned or organized breach ... - High: "... against deliberately planned or organized breach ...
by attackers possessing a high attack potential." by attackers possessing a high attack potential."
$ strong $ strong
1. (I) /cryptography/ Used to describe a cryptographic algorithm 1. (I) /cryptography/ Used to describe a cryptographic algorithm
that would require a large amount of computational power to defeat that would require a large amount of computational power to defeat
it. (See: strength, work factor, weak key.) it. (See: strength, work factor, weak key.)
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2. (I) /COMPUSEC/ Used to describe a security mechanism that would 2. (I) /COMPUSEC/ Used to describe a security mechanism that would
be difficult to defeat. (See: strength, work factor.) be difficult to defeat. (See: strength, work factor.)
$ strong authentication $ strong authentication
1. (I) An authentication process that uses a cryptographic 1. (I) An authentication process that uses a cryptographic
security mechanism -- particularly public-key certificates -- to security mechanism -- particularly public-key certificates -- to
verify the identity claimed for an entity. (Compare: simple verify the identity claimed for an entity. (Compare: simple
authentication.) authentication.)
2. (O) "Authentication by means of cryptographically derived 2. (O) "Authentication by means of cryptographically derived
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router.) router.)
$ subordinate CA (SCA) $ subordinate CA (SCA)
1. (I) A CA whose public-key certificate is issued by another 1. (I) A CA whose public-key certificate is issued by another
(superior) CA. (See: certification hierarchy. Compare: cross- (superior) CA. (See: certification hierarchy. Compare: cross-
certification.) certification.)
2. (O) /MISSI/ The fourth-highest (i.e., bottom) level of a MISSI 2. (O) /MISSI/ The fourth-highest (i.e., bottom) level of a MISSI
certification hierarchy; a MISSI CA whose public-key certificate certification hierarchy; a MISSI CA whose public-key certificate
is signed by a MISSI CA rather than by a MISSI PCA. A MISSI SCA is is signed by a MISSI CA rather than by a MISSI PCA. A MISSI SCA is
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the administrative authority for a subunit of an organization, the administrative authority for a subunit of an organization,
established when it is desirable to organizationally distribute or established when it is desirable to organizationally distribute or
decentralize the CA service. The term refers both to that decentralize the CA service. The term refers both to that
authoritative office or role, and to the person who fills that authoritative office or role, and to the person who fills that
office. A MISSI SCA registers end users and issues their office. A MISSI SCA registers end users and issues their
certificates and may also register ORAs, but may not register certificates and may also register ORAs, but may not register
other CAs. An SCA periodically issues a CRL. other CAs. An SCA periodically issues a CRL.
$ subordinate DN $ subordinate DN
(I) An X.500 DN is subordinate to another X.500 DN if it begins (I) An X.500 DN is subordinate to another X.500 DN if it begins
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perform a system function or deliver a system service. perform a system function or deliver a system service.
$ superuser $ superuser
(I) /UNIX/ Synonym for "root". (I) /UNIX/ Synonym for "root".
$ superencryption $ superencryption
(I) An encryption operation for which the plaintext input to be (I) An encryption operation for which the plaintext input to be
transformed is the ciphertext output of a previous encryption transformed is the ciphertext output of a previous encryption
operation. (Compare: hybrid encryption.) operation. (Compare: hybrid encryption.)
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$ survivability $ survivability
(I) The ability of a system to remain in operation or existence (I) The ability of a system to remain in operation or existence
despite adverse conditions, including natural occurrences, despite adverse conditions, including natural occurrences,
accidental actions, and attacks. (Compare: availability, accidental actions, and attacks. (Compare: availability,
reliability.) reliability.)
$ swIPe $ swIPe
(I) An encryption protocol for IP that provides confidentiality, (I) An encryption protocol for IP that provides confidentiality,
integrity, and authentication and can be used for both end-to-end integrity, and authentication and can be used for both end-to-end
and intermediate-hop security. [Ioan] (Compare: IPsec.) and intermediate-hop security. [Ioan] (Compare: IPsec.)
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$ SYN flood $ SYN flood
(I) A denial-of-service attack that sends a large number of TCP (I) A denial-of-service attack that sends a large number of TCP
SYN (synchronize) packets to a host with the intent of disrupting SYN (synchronize) packets to a host with the intent of disrupting
the operation of that host. (See: blind attack, flooding.) the operation of that host. (See: blind attack, flooding.)
Tutorial: This attack seeks to exploit a vulnerability in the TCP Tutorial: This attack seeks to exploit a vulnerability in the TCP
specification or in a TCP implementation. Normally, two hosts use specification or in a TCP implementation. Normally, two hosts use
a three-way exchange of packets to establish a TCP connection: (a) a three-way exchange of packets to establish a TCP connection: (a)
host 1 requests a connection by sending a SYN packet to host 2; host 1 requests a connection by sending a SYN packet to host 2;
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(b) host 2 replies by sending a SYN-ACK (acknowledgement) packet (b) host 2 replies by sending a SYN-ACK (acknowledgement) packet
to host 1; and (c) host 1 completes the connection by sending an to host 1; and (c) host 1 completes the connection by sending an
ACK packet to host 2. To attack host 2, host 1 can send a series ACK packet to host 2. To attack host 2, host 1 can send a series
of TCP SYNs, each with a different phony source address. ([R2827] of TCP SYNs, each with a different phony source address. ([R2827]
discusses how to use packet filtering to prevent such attacks from discusses how to use packet filtering to prevent such attacks from
being launched from behind an Internet service provider's being launched from behind an Internet service provider's
aggregation point.) Host 2 treats each SYN as a request from a aggregation point.) Host 2 treats each SYN as a request from a
separate host, replies to each with a SYN-ACK, and waits to separate host, replies to each with a SYN-ACK, and waits to
receive the matching ACKs. (The attacker can use random or receive the matching ACKs. (The attacker can use random or
unreachable sources addresses in the SYN packets, or can use unreachable sources addresses in the SYN packets, or can use
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$ system architecture $ system architecture
(N) The structure of system components, their relationships, and (N) The structure of system components, their relationships, and
the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution
over time. [DoDAF1] (Compare: security architecture.) over time. [DoDAF1] (Compare: security architecture.)
$ system component $ system component
1. (I) A collection of system resources that (a) forms a physical 1. (I) A collection of system resources that (a) forms a physical
or logical part of the system, (b) has specified functions and or logical part of the system, (b) has specified functions and
interfaces, and (c) is treated (e.g., by policies or interfaces, and (c) is treated (e.g., by policies or
specifications) as existing independently of other parts of the specifications) as existing independently of other parts of the
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system. (See: subsystem.) system. (See: subsystem.)
2. (O) /ITSEC/ An identifiable and self-contained part of a TOE. 2. (O) /ITSEC/ An identifiable and self-contained part of a TOE.
Usage: Component is a relative term because components may be Usage: Component is a relative term because components may be
nested; i.e., one component of system may be a part of another nested; i.e., one component of system may be a part of another
component of that system. component of that system.
Tutorial: Components can be characterized as follows: Tutorial: Components can be characterized as follows:
- A "physical component" has mass and takes up space. - A "physical component" has mass and takes up space.
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system integrity service.) system integrity service.)
2. (D) "Quality of an [information system] reflecting the logical 2. (D) "Quality of an [information system] reflecting the logical
correctness and reliability of the operating system; the logical correctness and reliability of the operating system; the logical
completeness of the hardware and software implementing the completeness of the hardware and software implementing the
protection mechanisms; and the consistency of the data structures protection mechanisms; and the consistency of the data structures
and occurrence of the stored data." [C4009] and occurrence of the stored data." [C4009]
Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2 because it Deprecated Definition: ISDs SHOULD NOT use definition 2 because it
mixes several concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, mixes several concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead,
ISDs should use the term with the narrower, recommended definition ISDs should use the term with definition 1 and, depending on what
is meant, couple the term with additional, more specifically
QQQQ descriptive and informative terms, such as "correctness",
and, depending on what is meant, couple the term with additional, "reliability", and "data integrity".
more specifically descriptive and informative terms, such as
"correctness", "reliability", and "data integrity".
$ system integrity service $ system integrity service
(I) A security service that protects system resources in a (I) A security service that protects system resources in a
verifiable manner against unauthorized or accidental change, loss, verifiable manner against unauthorized or accidental change, loss,
or destruction. (See: system integrity.) or destruction. (See: system integrity.)
$ system low $ system low
(I) The lowest security level supported by a system at a (I) The lowest security level supported by a system at a
particular time or in a particular environment. (Compare: system particular time or in a particular environment. (Compare: system
high.) high.)
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$ system resource $ system resource
(I) Data contained in an information system; or a service provided (I) Data contained in an information system; or a service provided
by a system; or a system capacity, such as processing power or by a system; or a system capacity, such as processing power or
communication bandwidth; or an item of system equipment (i.e., communication bandwidth; or an item of system equipment (i.e.,
hardware, firmware, software, or documentation); or a facility hardware, firmware, software, or documentation); or a facility
that houses system operations and equipment. (See: system that houses system operations and equipment. (See: system
component.) component.)
$ system security officer (SSO) $ system security officer (SSO)
(I) A person responsible for enforcement or administration of the (I) A person responsible for enforcement or administration of the
security policy that applies to a system. security policy that applies to a system. (Compare: manager,
operator.)
$ system user $ system user
(I) A system entity that consumes a product or service provided by (I) A system entity that consumes a product or service provided by
the system, or that accesses and employs system resources to the system, or that accesses and employs system resources to
produce a product or service of the system. (See: access, [R2504]. produce a product or service of the system. (See: access, [R2504].
Compare: authorized user, manager, operator, principal, privileged Compare: authorized user, manager, operator, principal, privileged
user, subject, subscriber, system entity, unauthorized user.) user, subject, subscriber, system entity, unauthorized user.)
Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it
because the term is used in many ways and could easily be because the term is used in many ways and could easily be
misunderstood: misunderstood:
- This term usually refers to an entity that has been authorized - This term usually refers to an entity that has been authorized
to access the system, but the term sometimes is used without to access the system, but the term sometimes is used without
regard for whether access is authorized. regard for whether access is authorized.
- This term usually refers to a living human being acting either - This term usually refers to a living human being acting either
personally or in an organizational role, but the term also may personally or in an organizational role. However, the term also
refer to an automated process in the form of hardware, may refer to an automated process in the form of hardware,
software, or firmware; to a set of persons; or to a set of software, or firmware; to a set of persons; or to a set of
processes. processes.
- ISDs SHOULD exclude the case of a mixed set containing both - ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term to refer a mixed set containing
persons and processes. The exclusion is intended to prevent both persons and processes. This exclusion is intended to
situations that might require a security policy to be prevent situations that might cause a security policy to be
interpreted in two different and conflicting ways. interpreted in two different and conflicting ways.
A user can be characterized as direct or indirect: A user can be characterized as direct or indirect:
- "Passive user": A system entity that is (a) outside the - "Passive user": A system entity that is (a) outside the
system's security perimeter *and* (b) can receive output from system's security perimeter *and* (b) can receive output from
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the system but cannot provide input or otherwise interact with the system but cannot provide input or otherwise interact with
the system. the system.
- "Active user": A system entity that is (a) inside the system's - "Active user": A system entity that is (a) inside the system's
security perimeter *or* (b) can provide input or otherwise security perimeter *or* (b) can provide input or otherwise
interact with the system. interact with the system.
$ TACACS $ TACACS
(I) See: Terminal Access Controller (TAC) Access Control System. (I) See: Terminal Access Controller (TAC) Access Control System.
$ TACACS+ $ TACACS+
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(Compare: protection profile.) (Compare: protection profile.)
Tutorial: The security characteristics of the target of evaluation Tutorial: The security characteristics of the target of evaluation
(TOE) are described in specific terms by a corresponding security (TOE) are described in specific terms by a corresponding security
target, or in more general terms by a protection profile. In target, or in more general terms by a protection profile. In
Common Criteria philosophy, it is important that a TOE be Common Criteria philosophy, it is important that a TOE be
evaluated against the specific set of criteria expressed in the evaluated against the specific set of criteria expressed in the
target. This evaluation consists of rigorous analysis and testing target. This evaluation consists of rigorous analysis and testing
performed by an accredited, independent laboratory. The scope of a performed by an accredited, independent laboratory. The scope of a
TOE evaluation is set by the EAL and other requirements specified TOE evaluation is set by the EAL and other requirements specified
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in the target. Part of this process is an evaluation of the target in the target. Part of this process is an evaluation of the target
itself, to ensure that it is correct, complete, and internally itself, to ensure that it is correct, complete, and internally
consistent and can be used as the baseline for the TOE evaluation. consistent and can be used as the baseline for the TOE evaluation.
$ TCB $ TCB
(N) See: trusted computing base. (N) See: trusted computing base.
$ TCC field $ TCC field
(I) See: Transmission Control Code field. (I) See: Transmission Control Code field.
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automated protection for a system. (See: security architecture. automated protection for a system. (See: security architecture.
Compare: administrative security.) Compare: administrative security.)
$ Telecommunications Security Word System (TSEC) $ Telecommunications Security Word System (TSEC)
(O) /U.S. Government/ A terminology for designating (O) /U.S. Government/ A terminology for designating
telecommunication security equipment. (Compare: TCSEC.) telecommunication security equipment. (Compare: TCSEC.)
Tutorial: A TSEC designator has the following parts: Tutorial: A TSEC designator has the following parts:
- Prefix "TSEC/" for items and systems, or suffix "/TSEC" for - Prefix "TSEC/" for items and systems, or suffix "/TSEC" for
assemblies. (Often omitted when the context is clear.) assemblies. (Often omitted when the context is clear.)
- First letter, for function: "C" COMSEC equipment system, "G"
QQQQ - First letter, for function: "C" COMSEC equipment system, "G"
general purpose, "K" cryptographic, "H" crypto-ancillary, "M" general purpose, "K" cryptographic, "H" crypto-ancillary, "M"
manufacturing, "N" noncryptographic, "S" special purpose. manufacturing, "N" noncryptographic, "S" special purpose.
- Second letter, for type or purpose: "G" key generation, "I" - Second letter, for type or purpose: "G" key generation, "I"
data transmission, "L" literal conversion, "N" signal data transmission, "L" literal conversion, "N" signal
conversion, "O" multipurpose, "P" materials production, "S" conversion, "O" multipurpose, "P" materials production, "S"
special purpose, "T" testing or checking, "U" television, "W" special purpose, "T" testing or checking, "U" television, "W"
teletypewriter, "X" facsimile, "Y" speech. teletypewriter, "X" facsimile, "Y" speech.
- Optional third letter, used only in designations of assemblies, - Optional third letter, used only in designations of assemblies,
for type or purpose: "A" advancing, "B" base or cabinet, "C" for type or purpose: "A" advancing, "B" base or cabinet, "C"
combining, "D" drawer or panel, "E" strip or chassis, "F" frame combining, "D" drawer or panel, "E" strip or chassis, "F" frame
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Tutorial: The U.S. Federal Government issues security policies Tutorial: The U.S. Federal Government issues security policies
that (a) state specifications and standards for techniques to that (a) state specifications and standards for techniques to
reduce the strength of emanations from systems and reduce the reduce the strength of emanations from systems and reduce the
ability of unauthorized parties to receive and make use of ability of unauthorized parties to receive and make use of
emanations and (b) state rules for applying those techniques. emanations and (b) state rules for applying those techniques.
Other nations presumably do the same. Other nations presumably do the same.
$ TEMPEST zone $ TEMPEST zone
(O) "Designated area [i.e., a physical volume] within a facility (O) "Designated area [i.e., a physical volume] within a facility
where equipment that has appropriate TEMPEST characteristics ... where equipment that has appropriate TEMPEST characteristics ...
may be operated." [C4009] (See: emanation security, TEMPEST.
QQQQ may be operated." [C4009] (See: emanation security, TEMPEST.
Compare: control zone, inspectable space.) Compare: control zone, inspectable space.)
Tutorial: The strength of an electromagnetic signal decreases in Tutorial: The strength of an electromagnetic signal decreases in
proportion to the square of the distance between the source and proportion to the square of the distance between the source and
the receiver. Therefore, EMSEC for electromagnetic signals can be the receiver. Therefore, EMSEC for electromagnetic signals can be
achieved by a combination of (a) reducing the strength of achieved by a combination of (a) reducing the strength of
emanations to a defined level and (b) establishing around that emanations to a defined level and (b) establishing around that
equipment an appropriately sized physical buffer zone from which equipment an appropriately sized physical buffer zone from which
unauthorized entities are excluded. By making the zone large unauthorized entities are excluded. By making the zone large
enough, it is possible to limit the signal strength available to enough, it is possible to limit the signal strength available to
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$ theft $ theft
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definitions under (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definitions under
"interception" and "misappropriation". "interception" and "misappropriation".
$ threat $ threat
1a. (I) A potential for violation of security, which exists when 1a. (I) A potential for violation of security, which exists when
there is an entity, circumstance, capability, action, or event there is an entity, circumstance, capability, action, or event
that could cause harm. (See: dangling threat, INFOCON level, that could cause harm. (See: dangling threat, INFOCON level,
threat action, threat agent, threat consequence. Compare: attack, threat action, threat agent, threat consequence. Compare: attack,
vulnerability.) vulnerability.)
1b. (N) Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely 1b. (N) Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely
QQQQ
affect a system through unauthorized access, destruction, affect a system through unauthorized access, destruction,
disclosure, or modification of data, or denial of service. [C4009] disclosure, or modification of data, or denial of service. [C4009]
(See: sensitive information.) (See: sensitive information.)
Usage: (a) Frequently misused with the meaning of either "threat Usage: (a) Frequently misused with the meaning of either "threat
action" or "vulnerability". (b) In some contexts, "threat" is used action" or "vulnerability". (b) In some contexts, "threat" is used
more narrowly to refer only to intelligent threats; for example, more narrowly to refer only to intelligent threats; for example,
see definition 2 below. (c) In some contexts, "threat" is used see definition 2 below. (c) In some contexts, "threat" is used
more broadly to cover both definition 1 and other concepts, such more broadly to cover both definition 1 and other concepts, such
as in definition 3 below. as in definition 3 below.
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was intended to include the following three meanings: was intended to include the following three meanings:
- "Potential threat": A possible security violation; i.e., the - "Potential threat": A possible security violation; i.e., the
same as definition 1. same as definition 1.
- "Active threat": An expression of intent to violate security. - "Active threat": An expression of intent to violate security.
(Context usually distinguishes this meaning from the previous (Context usually distinguishes this meaning from the previous
one.) one.)
- "Accomplished threat" or "actualized threat": That is, a threat - "Accomplished threat" or "actualized threat": That is, a threat
action. Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term "threat" action. Deprecated Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT use the term "threat"
with this meaning; instead, use "threat action". with this meaning; instead, use "threat action".
QQQQ
$ threat action $ threat action
(I) A realization of a threat, i.e., an occurrence in which system (I) A realization of a threat, i.e., an occurrence in which system
security is assaulted as the result of either an accidental event security is assaulted as the result of either an accidental event
or an intentional act. (See: attack, threat, threat consequence.) or an intentional act. (See: attack, threat, threat consequence.)
Tutorial: A complete security architecture deals with both Tutorial: A complete security architecture deals with both
intentional acts (i.e. attacks) and accidental events [FIPS31]. intentional acts (i.e. attacks) and accidental events [FIPS31].
(See: various kinds of threat actions defined under the four kinds (See: various kinds of threat actions defined under the four kinds
of "threat consequence".) of "threat consequence".)
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Tutorial: A ticket is usually granted by a centralized access Tutorial: A ticket is usually granted by a centralized access
control server (ticket-granting agent) to authorize access to a control server (ticket-granting agent) to authorize access to a
system resource for a limited time. Tickets can be implemented system resource for a limited time. Tickets can be implemented
with either symmetric cryptography (see: Kerberos) or asymmetric with either symmetric cryptography (see: Kerberos) or asymmetric
cryptography (see: attribute certificate). cryptography (see: attribute certificate).
$ tiger team $ tiger team
(O) A group of evaluators employed by a system's managers to (O) A group of evaluators employed by a system's managers to
perform penetration tests on the system. perform penetration tests on the system.
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Deprecated Usage: It is likely that other cultures use different Deprecated Usage: It is likely that other cultures use different
metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international metaphors for this concept. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. (See: Deprecated
Usage under "Green Book".) Usage under "Green Book".)
$ time stamp $ time stamp
1. (I) /noun/ With respect to a data object, a label or marking in 1. (I) /noun/ With respect to a data object, a label or marking in
which is recorded the time (time of day or other instant of which is recorded the time (time of day or other instant of
elapsed time) at which the label or marking was affixed to the elapsed time) at which the label or marking was affixed to the
data object. (See: Time-Stamp Protocol.) data object. (See: Time-Stamp Protocol.)
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other operational models might be used. other operational models might be used.
$ timing channel $ timing channel
(I) See: covert timing channel. (I) See: covert timing channel.
$ TKEY $ TKEY
(I) A mnemonic referring to an Internet protocol (RFC 2930) for (I) A mnemonic referring to an Internet protocol (RFC 2930) for
establishing a shared secret key between a DNS resolver and a DNS establishing a shared secret key between a DNS resolver and a DNS
name server. (See: TSIG.) name server. (See: TSIG.)
QQQQ
$ TLS $ TLS
(I) See: Transport Layer Security. (I) See: Transport Layer Security.
$ TLSP $ TLSP
(N) See: Transport Layer Security Protocol. (N) See: Transport Layer Security Protocol.
$ TOE $ TOE
(N) See: target of evaluation (N) See: target of evaluation
$ token $ token
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cryptographic key. (This is a type of "cryptographic token", cryptographic key. (This is a type of "cryptographic token",
and the key is a type of "authentication information".) and the key is a type of "authentication information".)
- NIST "one-time password device token": A personal hardware - NIST "one-time password device token": A personal hardware
device that generates one-time passwords. (One-time passwords device that generates one-time passwords. (One-time passwords
are typically generated cryptographically. Therefore, this is a are typically generated cryptographically. Therefore, this is a
type of "cryptographic token", and the key is a type of type of "cryptographic token", and the key is a type of
"authentication information".) "authentication information".)
- NIST "soft token": A cryptographic key that typically is stored - NIST "soft token": A cryptographic key that typically is stored
on disk or some other magnetic media. (The key is a type of on disk or some other magnetic media. (The key is a type of
"authentication information"; "authentication key" would be a "authentication information"; "authentication key" would be a
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better description.) better description.)
- NIST "password token": A secret data value that the claimant - NIST "password token": A secret data value that the claimant
memorizes. (This is a "password" that is being used as memorizes. (This is a "password" that is being used as
"authentication information".) "authentication information".)
$ token backup $ token backup
(I) A token management operation that stores sufficient (I) A token management operation that stores sufficient
information in a database (e.g., in a CAW) to recreate or restore information in a database (e.g., in a CAW) to recreate or restore
a security token (e.g., a smart card) if it is lost or damaged. a security token (e.g., a smart card) if it is lost or damaged.
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$ top-level specification $ top-level specification
(I) "A non-procedural description of system behavior at the most (I) "A non-procedural description of system behavior at the most
abstract level; typically a functional specification that omits abstract level; typically a functional specification that omits
all implementation details." [NCS04] (See: formal top-level all implementation details." [NCS04] (See: formal top-level
specification, Tutorial under "security policy".) specification, Tutorial under "security policy".)
Tutorial: A top-level specification is at a level of abstraction Tutorial: A top-level specification is at a level of abstraction
below "security model" and above "security architecture" (see: below "security model" and above "security architecture" (see:
Tutorial under "security policy"). Tutorial under "security policy").
A top-level specification may be descriptive or formal: A top-level specification may be descriptive or formal:
- "Descriptive top-level specification": One that is written in a - "Descriptive top-level specification": One that is written in a
natural language like English or an informal design notation. natural language like English or an informal design notation.
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- "Formal top-level specification": One that is written in a - "Formal top-level specification": One that is written in a
formal mathematical language to enable theorems to be proven formal mathematical language to enable theorems to be proven
that show that the specification correctly implements a set of that show that the specification correctly implements a set of
formal requirements or a formal security model. (See: formal requirements or a formal security model. (See:
correctness proof.) correctness proof.)
$ TPM $ TPM
(N) See: Trusted Platform Module. (N) See: Trusted Platform Module.
$ traceback $ traceback
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2. (O) "A confidentiality service to protect against traffic 2. (O) "A confidentiality service to protect against traffic
analysis." [I7498-2] analysis." [I7498-2]
Tutorial: Confidentiality concerns involve both direct and Tutorial: Confidentiality concerns involve both direct and
indirect disclosure of data, and the latter includes traffic indirect disclosure of data, and the latter includes traffic
analysis. However, operational considerations can make TFC analysis. However, operational considerations can make TFC
difficult to achieve. For example, if Alice sends a product idea difficult to achieve. For example, if Alice sends a product idea
to Bob in an email message, she wants data confidentiality for the to Bob in an email message, she wants data confidentiality for the
message's content, and she might also want to conceal the message's content, and she might also want to conceal the
destination of the message in order to hide Bob's identity from destination of the message to hide Bob's identity from her
her competitors. However, the identity of the intended recipient, competitors. However, the identity of the intended recipient, or
or at least a network address for that recipient, needs to be made at least a network address for that recipient, needs to be made
QQQQ
available to the mail system. Thus, complex forwarding schemes may available to the mail system. Thus, complex forwarding schemes may
be needed to conceal the ultimate destination as the message be needed to conceal the ultimate destination as the message
travels through the open Internet (see: onion routing). travels through the open Internet (see: onion routing).
Later, if Alice uses an ATM during a clandestine visit to Later, if Alice uses an ATM during a clandestine visit to
negotiate with Bob, she might prefer that her bank conceal the negotiate with Bob, she might prefer that her bank conceal the
origin of her transaction, because knowledge of the ATM's location origin of her transaction, because knowledge of the ATM's location
might allow a competitor to infer Bob's identity. The bank, on the might allow a competitor to infer Bob's identity. The bank, on the
other hand, might prefer to protect only Alice's PIN (see: other hand, might prefer to protect only Alice's PIN (see:
selective-field confidentiality). selective-field confidentiality).
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$ traffic padding $ traffic padding
(I) "The generation of spurious instances of communication, (I) "The generation of spurious instances of communication,
spurious data units, and/or spurious data within data units." spurious data units, and/or spurious data within data units."
[I7498-2] [I7498-2]
$ tranquility property $ tranquility property
(N) /formal model/ Property of a system whereby the security level (N) /formal model/ Property of a system whereby the security level
of an object cannot change while the object is being processed by of an object cannot change while the object is being processed by
the system. (See: Bell-LaPadula model.) the system. (See: Bell-LaPadula model.)
QQQQ
$ transaction $ transaction
1. (I) A unit of interaction between an external entity and a 1. (I) A unit of interaction between an external entity and a
system, or between components within a system, that involves a system, or between components within a system, that involves a
series of system actions or events. series of system actions or events.
2. (O) "A discrete event between user and systems that supports a 2. (O) "A discrete event between user and systems that supports a
business or programmatic purpose." [M0404] business or programmatic purpose." [M0404]
Tutorial: To maintain secure state, transactions need to be Tutorial: To maintain secure state, transactions need to be
processed coherently and reliably. Usually, they need to be processed coherently and reliably. Usually, they need to be
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$ transmission security (TRANSEC) $ transmission security (TRANSEC)
(I) COMSEC measures that protect communications from interception (I) COMSEC measures that protect communications from interception
and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. Example: and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. Example:
frequency hopping. (Compare: anti-jam, traffic flow frequency hopping. (Compare: anti-jam, traffic flow
confidentiality.) confidentiality.)
$ Transport Layer $ Transport Layer
See: Internet Protocol Suite, OSIRM. See: Internet Protocol Suite, OSIRM.
QQQQ
$ Transport Layer Security (TLS) $ Transport Layer Security (TLS)
(I) TLS is an Internet protocol [R4346] that is based on, and very (I) TLS is an Internet protocol [R4346] that is based on, and very
similar to, SSL Version 3.0. (Compare: TLSP.) similar to, SSL Version 3.0. (Compare: TLSP.)
Tutorial: The TLS protocol is misnamed. The name misleadingly Tutorial: The TLS protocol is misnamed. The name misleadingly
suggests that TLS is situated in the IPS Transport Layer, but TLS suggests that TLS is situated in the IPS Transport Layer, but TLS
is always layered above a reliable Transport-Layer protocol is always layered above a reliable Transport-Layer protocol
(usually TCP) and either layered immediately below or integrated (usually TCP) and either layered immediately below or integrated
with an Application-Layer protocol (often HTTP). with an Application-Layer protocol (often HTTP).
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(N) An end-to-end encryption protocol (ISO 10736) that provides (N) An end-to-end encryption protocol (ISO 10736) that provides
security services at the bottom of OSIRM Layer 4, i.e., directly security services at the bottom of OSIRM Layer 4, i.e., directly
above Layer 3. (Compare: TLS.) above Layer 3. (Compare: TLS.)
Tutorial: TLSP evolved directly from SP4. Tutorial: TLSP evolved directly from SP4.
$ transport mode $ transport mode
(I) One of two ways to apply AH or ESP to protect data packets; in (I) One of two ways to apply AH or ESP to protect data packets; in
this mode, the IPsec protocol encapsulates (i.e., the protection this mode, the IPsec protocol encapsulates (i.e., the protection
applies to) the packets of an IPS Transport-Layer protocol (e.g., applies to) the packets of an IPS Transport-Layer protocol (e.g.,
TCP, UDP), which is normally carried directly above IP in an IPS TCP, UDP), which normally is carried directly above IP in an IPS
protocol stack. (Compare: tunnel mode.) protocol stack. (Compare: tunnel mode.)
Tutorial: An IPsec transport-mode security association is always Tutorial: An IPsec transport-mode security association is always
between two hosts; neither end has the role of a security gateway. between two hosts; neither end has the role of a security gateway.
Whenever either end of an IPsec security association is a security Whenever either end of an IPsec security association is a security
gateway, the association is required to be in tunnel mode. gateway, the association is required to be in tunnel mode.
$ transposition $ transposition
(I) /cryptography/ A method of encryption in which elements of the (I) /cryptography/ A method of encryption in which elements of the
plain text retain their original form but undergo some change in plain text retain their original form but undergo some change in
their sequential position. (Compare: substitution.) their sequential position. (Compare: substitution.)
$ trap door $ trap door
(I) Synonym for "back door". (I) Synonym for "back door".
$ trespass $ trespass
(I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "intrusion". (I) /threat action/ See: secondary definition under "intrusion".
$ Triple Data Encryption Algorithm $ Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
(I) An block cipher that transforms each 64-bit plaintext block by (I) A block cipher that transforms each 64-bit plaintext block by
applying the DEA three successive times, using either two or three applying the DEA three successive times, using either two or three
different keys for an effective key length of 112 or 168 bits. different keys for an effective key length of 112 or 168 bits.
[A9052, SP67] [A9052, SP67]
Example: A variation proposed for IPsec's ESP uses a 168-bit key, Example: A variation proposed for IPsec's ESP uses a 168-bit key,
consisting of three independent 56-bit values used by the DEA, and consisting of three independent 56-bit values used by the DEA, and
a 64-bit initialization vector. Each datagram contains an IV to a 64-bit initialization vector. Each datagram contains an IV to
ensure that each received datagram can be decrypted even when ensure that each received datagram can be decrypted even when
other datagrams are dropped or a sequence of datagrams is other datagrams are dropped or a sequence of datagrams is
reordered in transit. [R1851] reordered in transit. [R1851]
QQQQ
$ triple-wrapped $ triple-wrapped
(I) /S-MIME/ Data that has been signed with a digital signature, (I) /S-MIME/ Data that has been signed with a digital signature,
then encrypted, and then signed again. [R2634] then encrypted, and then signed again. [R2634]
$ Trojan horse $ Trojan horse
(I) A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but (I) A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but
also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades
security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate
authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program. (See: authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program. (See:
malware, spyware. Compare: logic bomb, virus, worm.) malware, spyware. Compare: logic bomb, virus, worm.)
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[X.509] is to describe the relationship between an entity [i.e., a [X.509] is to describe the relationship between an entity [i.e., a
certificate user] and a [CA]; an entity shall be certain that it certificate user] and a [CA]; an entity shall be certain that it
can trust the CA to create only valid and reliable certificates." can trust the CA to create only valid and reliable certificates."
[X509] [X509]
$ trust anchor $ trust anchor
(I) /PKI/ An established point of trust (usually based on the (I) /PKI/ An established point of trust (usually based on the
authority of some person, office, or organization) from which a authority of some person, office, or organization) from which a
certificate user begins the validation of a certification path. certificate user begins the validation of a certification path.
(See: apex trust anchor, path validation, trust anchor CA, trust (See: apex trust anchor, path validation, trust anchor CA, trust
QQQQ
anchor certificate, trust anchor key.) anchor certificate, trust anchor key.)
Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it
because it is used in various ways in existing ISDs and other PKI because it is used in various ways in existing ISDs and other PKI
literature. The literature almost always uses this term in a sense literature. The literature almost always uses this term in a sense
that is equivalent to this definition, but usage often differs that is equivalent to this definition, but usage often differs
with regard to what constitutes the point of trust. with regard to what constitutes the point of trust.
Tutorial: A trust anchor may be defined as being based on a public Tutorial: A trust anchor may be defined as being based on a public
key, a CA, a public-key certificate, or some combination or key, a CA, a public-key certificate, or some combination or
skipping to change at page 290, line 45 skipping to change at page 290, line 43
Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as either just a Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as either just a
CA (where some public key is implied) or as a CA together with CA (where some public key is implied) or as a CA together with
a specified public key belonging to that CA. (See: root, trust a specified public key belonging to that CA. (See: root, trust
anchor CA, trusted CA.) anchor CA, trusted CA.)
Example: "A public key and the name of a [CA] that is used to Example: "A public key and the name of a [CA] that is used to
validate the first certificate in a sequence of certificates. validate the first certificate in a sequence of certificates.
The trust anchor public key is used to verify the signature on The trust anchor public key is used to verify the signature on
a certificate issued by a trust anchor [CA]." [SP57] a certificate issued by a trust anchor [CA]." [SP57]
- 3. A public-key certificate as a point of trust: In addition to - 3. A public-key certificate as a point of trust: Besides the
the trusted CA's public key and name, the path validation trusted CA's public key and name, the path validation algorithm
algorithm needs to know the digital signature algorithm and any needs to know the digital signature algorithm and any
associated parameters with which the public key is used, and associated parameters with which the public key is used, and
also any constraints that have been placed on the set of paths also any constraints that have been placed on the set of paths
that may be validated using the key. All of this information is that may be validated using the key. All of this information is
available from a CA's public-key certificate. available from a CA's public-key certificate.
Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as a public-key Therefore, "trust anchor" is sometimes defined as a public-key
certificate of a CA. (See: root certificate, trust anchor certificate of a CA. (See: root certificate, trust anchor
certificate, trusted certificate.) certificate, trusted certificate.)
- 4. Combinations: Combinations and variations of the first three - 4. Combinations: Combinations and variations of the first three
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definitions are also used in the PKI literature. definitions are also used in the PKI literature.
Example: "trust anchor information". The IPS standard for path Example: "trust anchor information". The IPS standard for path
validation [R3280] specifies the information that describes "a validation [R3280] specifies the information that describes "a
CA that serves as a trust anchor for the certification path. CA that serves as a trust anchor for the certification path.
The trust anchor information includes: (a) the trusted issuer The trust anchor information includes: (a) the trusted issuer
name, (b) the trusted public key algorithm, (c) the trusted name, (b) the trusted public key algorithm, (c) the trusted
public key, and (d) optionally, the trusted public key public key, and (d) optionally, the trusted public key
parameters associated with the public key. The trust anchor parameters associated with the public key. The trust anchor
information may be provided to the path processing procedure in information may be provided to the path processing procedure in
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(D) Synonym for "certification path". (See: trust anchor, trusted (D) Synonym for "certification path". (See: trust anchor, trusted
certificate.) certificate.)
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term, because it Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term, because it
unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of the internationally unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of the internationally
standardized term. standardized term.
Also, the term mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. Also, the term mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way.
Having "trust" involves factors unrelated to simply verifying Having "trust" involves factors unrelated to simply verifying
signatures and performing other tests as specified by a standard signatures and performing other tests as specified by a standard
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algorithm for path validation (e.g., RFC 3280). Thus, even if a algorithm for path validation (e.g., RFC 3280). Thus, even if a
user is able to validate a certification path algorithmically, the user is able to validate a certification path algorithmically, the
user still might distrust one of the CAs that issued certificates user still might distrust one of the CAs that issued certificates
in that path or distrust some other aspects of the PKI. in that path or distrust some other aspects of the PKI.
$ trust-file PKI $ trust-file PKI
(I) A non-hierarchical PKI in which each certificate user has its (I) A non-hierarchical PKI in which each certificate user has its
own local file (which is used by application software) of trust own local file (which is used by application software) of trust
anchors, i.e., either public keys or public-key certificates that anchors, i.e., either public keys or public-key certificates that
the user trusts as starting points for certification paths. (See: the user trusts as starting points for certification paths. (See:
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(See: certification path, root, trust anchor CA, validation.) (See: certification path, root, trust anchor CA, validation.)
Tutorial. This trust is transitive to the extent that the X.509 Tutorial. This trust is transitive to the extent that the X.509
certificate extensions permit; that is, if a trusted CA issues a certificate extensions permit; that is, if a trusted CA issues a
certificate to another CA, a user that trusts the first CA also certificate to another CA, a user that trusts the first CA also
trusts the second CA if the user succeeds in validating the trusts the second CA if the user succeeds in validating the
certificate path (see: path validation). certificate path (see: path validation).
$ trusted certificate $ trusted certificate
(I) A digital certificate that a certificate user accepts as being (I) A digital certificate that a certificate user accepts as being
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valid "a priori", i.e., without testing the certificate to valid "a priori", i.e., without testing the certificate to
validate it as the final certificate on a certification path; validate it as the final certificate on a certification path;
especially a certificate that is used as a trust anchor especially a certificate that is used as a trust anchor
certificate. (See: certification path, root certificate, trust certificate. (See: certification path, root certificate, trust
anchor certificate, trust-file PKI, validation.) anchor certificate, trust-file PKI, validation.)
Tutorial: The acceptance of a certificate as trusted is a matter Tutorial: The acceptance of a certificate as trusted is a matter
of policy and choice. Usually, a certificate is accepted as of policy and choice. Usually, a certificate is accepted as
trusted because the user obtained it by reliable, out-of-band trusted because the user obtained it by reliable, out-of-band
means that cause the user to believe the certificate accurately means that cause the user to believe the certificate accurately
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combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security
policy." [NCS04] (See: "trusted" under "trust". Compare: TPM.) policy." [NCS04] (See: "trusted" under "trust". Compare: TPM.)
$ Trusted Computing Group (TCG) $ Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
(N) A not-for-profit, industry standards organization formed to (N) A not-for-profit, industry standards organization formed to
develop, define, and promote open standards for hardware-enabled develop, define, and promote open standards for hardware-enabled
trusted computing and security technologies, including hardware trusted computing and security technologies, including hardware
building blocks and software interfaces, across multiple building blocks and software interfaces, across multiple
platforms, peripherals, and devices. (See: TPM, trusted system. platforms, peripherals, and devices. (See: TPM, trusted system.
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Compare: TSIG.) Compare: TSIG.)
$ trusted distribution $ trusted distribution
(I) /COMPUSEC/ "A trusted method for distributing the TCB (I) /COMPUSEC/ "A trusted method for distributing the TCB
hardware, software, and firmware components, both originals and hardware, software, and firmware components, both originals and
updates, that provides methods for protecting the TCB from updates, that provides methods for protecting the TCB from
modification during distribution and for detection of any changes modification during distribution and for detection of any changes
to the TCB that may occur." [NCS04] (See: code signing, to the TCB that may occur." [NCS04] (See: code signing,
configuration control.) configuration control.)
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$ trusted public key $ trusted public key
(I) A public key upon which a user relies; especially a public key (I) A public key upon which a user relies; especially a public key
that is used as a trust anchor key. (See: certification path, root that is used as a trust anchor key. (See: certification path, root
key, trust anchor key, validation.) key, trust anchor key, validation.)
Tutorial: A trusted public key could be (a) the root key in a Tutorial: A trusted public key could be (a) the root key in a
hierarchical PKI, (b) the key of the CA that issued the user's own hierarchical PKI, (b) the key of the CA that issued the user's own
certificate in a mesh PKI, or (c) any key accepted by the user in certificate in a mesh PKI, or (c) any key accepted by the user in
a trust-file PKI. a trust-file PKI.
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$ trusted recovery $ trusted recovery
(I) A process that, after a system has experienced a failure or an (I) A process that, after a system has experienced a failure or an
attack, restores the system to normal operation (or to a secure attack, restores the system to normal operation (or to a secure
state) without causing a security compromise. (See: recovery.) state) without causing a security compromise. (See: recovery.)
$ trusted subnetwork $ trusted subnetwork
(I) A subnetwork containing hosts and routers that trust each (I) A subnetwork containing hosts and routers that trust each
other not to engage in active or passive attacks. (There also is other not to engage in active or passive attacks. (There also is
an assumption that the underlying communication channels, such as an assumption that the underlying communication channels, such as
telephone lines or a LAN, are protected from attack.) telephone lines or a LAN, are protected from attack.)
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$ TSEC $ TSEC
(O) See: Telecommunications Security Nomenclature System. (O) See: Telecommunications Security Nomenclature System.
(Compare: TCSEC.) (Compare: TCSEC.)
$ TSIG $ TSIG
1. (N) See: Trusted System Interoperability Group. 1. (N) See: Trusted System Interoperability Group.
2. (I) A mnemonic (presumed to be derived from "Transaction 2. (I) A mnemonic (presumed to be derived from "Transaction
SIGnature") referring to an Internet protocol (RFC 2845) for data SIGnature") referring to an Internet protocol (RFC 2845) for data
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origin authentication and data integrity for certain DNS origin authentication and data integrity for certain DNS
operations. (See: TKEY.) operations. (See: TKEY.)
$ tunnel $ tunnel
1. (I) A communication channel created in a computer network by 1. (I) A communication channel created in a computer network by
encapsulating (i.e., layering) a communication protocol's data encapsulating (i.e., layering) a communication protocol's data
packets in (i.e., above) a second protocol that normally would be packets in (i.e., above) a second protocol that normally would be
carried above, or at the same layer as, the first one. (See: L2TP, carried above, or at the same layer as, the first one. (See: L2TP,
VPN.) (Compare: covert channel.) tunnel mode, VPN. Compare: covert channel.)
Tutorial: Tunneling can involve almost any two IPS protocol Tutorial: Tunneling can involve almost any two IPS protocol
layers. For example, a TCP connection between two hosts could layers. For example, a TCP connection between two hosts could
conceivably be carried above SMTP (i.e., in SMTP messages) as a conceivably be carried above SMTP (i.e., in SMTP messages) as a
covert channel to evade access controls that a security gateway covert channel to evade access controls that a security gateway
applies to the normal TCP layer that is below SMTP. applies to the normal TCP layer that is below SMTP.
Usually, however, a tunnel is a logical point-to-point link -- Usually, however, a tunnel is a logical point-to-point link --
i.e., an OSIRM Layer 2 connection -- created by encapsulating the i.e., an OSIRM Layer 2 connection -- created by encapsulating the
Layer 2 protocol in one of the following three types of IPS Layer 2 protocol in one of the following three types of IPS
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an IPS Network-Layer or Internet-Layer protocol (such as IP), or an IPS Network-Layer or Internet-Layer protocol (such as IP), or
(c) another Layer 2 protocol. In many cases, the encapsulation is (c) another Layer 2 protocol. In many cases, the encapsulation is
accomplished with an extra, intermediate protocol (i.e., a accomplished with an extra, intermediate protocol (i.e., a
"tunneling protocol"; e.g., L2TP) that is layered below the "tunneling protocol"; e.g., L2TP) that is layered below the
tunneled Layer 2 protocol and above the encapsulating protocol. tunneled Layer 2 protocol and above the encapsulating protocol.
Tunneling can be used to move data between computers that use a Tunneling can be used to move data between computers that use a
protocol not supported by the network connecting them. Tunneling protocol not supported by the network connecting them. Tunneling
also can enable a computer network to use the services of a second also can enable a computer network to use the services of a second
network as though the second network were a set of point-to-point network as though the second network were a set of point-to-point
links between the first network's nodes. (See: virtual private links between the first network's nodes. (See: VPN.)
network.)
2. (O) /SET/ The name of a SET private extension that indicates 2. (O) /SET/ The name of a SET private extension that indicates
whether the CA or the payment gateway supports passing encrypted whether the CA or the payment gateway supports passing encrypted
messages to the cardholder through the merchant. If so, the messages to the cardholder through the merchant. If so, the
extension lists OIDs of symmetric encryption algorithms that are extension lists OIDs of symmetric encryption algorithms that are
supported. supported.
$ tunnel mode $ tunnel mode
(I) One of two ways to apply the IPsec protocols (AH and ESP) to (I) One of two ways to apply the IPsec protocols (AH and ESP) to
protect data packets; in this mode, the IPsec protocol protect data packets; in this mode, the IPsec protocol
encapsulates (i.e., the protection applies to) IP packets, rather encapsulates (i.e., the protection applies to) IP packets, rather
than the packets of higher layer protocols. (Compare: transport than the packets of higher layer protocols. (See: tunnel. Compare:
mode.) transport mode.)
Tutorial: Each end of a tunnel-mode security association may be Tutorial: Each end of a tunnel-mode security association may be
either a host or a security gateway. Whenever either end of an either a host or a security gateway. Whenever either end of an
IPsec security association is a security gateway, the association IPsec security association is a security gateway, the association
is required to be in tunnel mode. is required to be in tunnel mode.
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$ two-person control $ two-person control
(I) The close surveillance and control of a system, a process, or (I) The close surveillance and control of a system, a process, or
materials (especially with regard to cryptography) at all times by materials (especially with regard to cryptography) at all times by
a minimum of two appropriately authorized persons, each capable of a minimum of two appropriately authorized persons, each capable of
detecting incorrect and unauthorized procedures with respect to detecting incorrect and unauthorized procedures with respect to
the tasks to be performed and each familiar with established the tasks to be performed and each familiar with established
security requirements. (See: dual control, no-lone zone.) security requirements. (See: dual control, no-lone zone.)
$ Twofish $ Twofish
(O) A symmetric, 128-bit block cipher with variable key length (O) A symmetric, 128-bit block cipher with variable key length
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(O) /cryptography, U.S. Government/ "Unclassified cryptographic (O) /cryptography, U.S. Government/ "Unclassified cryptographic
algorithm that has been registered by [NIST] but not published as algorithm that has been registered by [NIST] but not published as
a [FIPS]." [C4009] a [FIPS]." [C4009]
$ UDP $ UDP
(I) See: User Datagram Protocol. (I) See: User Datagram Protocol.
$ UDP flood $ UDP flood
(I) A denial-of-service attack that takes advantage of (a) one (I) A denial-of-service attack that takes advantage of (a) one
system's UDP test function that generates a series of characters system's UDP test function that generates a series of characters
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for each packet it receives and (b) another system's UPD test for each packet it receives and (b) another system's UPD test
function that echoes any character it receives; the attack function that echoes any character it receives; the attack
connects (a) to (b) to cause a nonstop flood of data between the connects (a) to (b) to cause a nonstop flow of data between the
two systems. two systems. (See: flooding.)
$ unauthorized disclosure $ unauthorized disclosure
(I) A circumstance or event whereby an entity gains access to (I) A circumstance or event whereby an entity gains access to
information for which the entity is not authorized. information for which the entity is not authorized.
Tutorial: This type of threat consequence can be caused by the Tutorial: This type of threat consequence can be caused by the
following types of threat actions: exposure, interception, following types of threat actions: exposure, interception,
inference, intrusion. Some methods of protecting against this inference, and intrusion. Some methods of protecting against this
consequence include access control, flow control, and inference consequence include access control, flow control, and inference
control. (See: data confidentiality.) control. (See: data confidentiality.)
$ unauthorized user $ unauthorized user
(I) /access control/ A system entity that accesses a system (I) /access control/ A system entity that accesses a system
resource for which the entity has not received an authorization. resource for which the entity has not received an authorization.
(See: user. Compare: authorized user, insider, outsider.) (See: user. Compare: authorized user, insider, outsider.)
Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a definition for it
because the term is used in many ways and could easily be because the term is used in many ways and could easily be
misunderstood. misunderstood.
$ uncertainty $ uncertainty
(N) An information-theoretic measure (usually stated as a number (N) An information-theoretic measure (usually stated as a number
of bits) of the minimum amount of plaintext information that needs of bits) of the minimum amount of plaintext information that needs
to be recovered from cipher text in order to learn the entire to be recovered from cipher text to learn the entire plain text
plain text that was encrypted. [SP63] (See: entropy.) that was encrypted. [SP63] (See: entropy.)
$ unclassified $ unclassified
(I) Not classified. (I) Not classified. (Compare: FOUO.)
$ unencrypted $ unencrypted
(I) Not encrypted. (I) Not encrypted.
$ unforgeable $ unforgeable
(I) /cryptography/ The property of a cryptographic data structure (I) /cryptography/ The property of a cryptographic data structure
(i.e., a data structure that is defined using one or more (i.e., a data structure that is defined using one or more
cryptographic functions, e.g., "digital certificate") that makes cryptographic functions, e.g., "digital certificate") that makes
it computationally infeasible to construct (i.e., compute) an it computationally infeasible to construct (i.e., compute) an
unauthorized but correct value of the structure without having unauthorized but correct value of the structure without having
knowledge of one of more keys. knowledge of one of more keys.
Tutorial: This definition is narrower than general English usage, Tutorial: This definition is narrower than general English usage,
where "unforgeable" means unable to be fraudulently created or where "unforgeable" means unable to be fraudulently created or
duplicated. In that broader sense, anyone can forge a digital duplicated. In that broader sense, anyone can forge a digital
certificate containing any set of data items whatsoever by certificate containing any set of data items whatsoever by
generating the to-be-signed certificate and signing it with any generating the to-be-signed certificate and signing it with any
private key whatsoever. But for PKI purposes, the forged data private key whatsoever. But for PKI purposes, the forged data
structure is invalid if it is not signed with the true private key structure is invalid if it is not signed with the true private key
of the claimed issuer; thus, the forgery will be detected when a of the claimed issuer; thus, the forgery will be detected when a
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certificate user uses the true public key of the claimed issuer to certificate user uses the true public key of the claimed issuer to
verify the signature. verify the signature.
$ uniform resource identifier (URI) $ uniform resource identifier (URI)
(I) A type of formatted identifier (RFC 3986) that encapsulates (I) A type of formatted identifier (RFC 3986) that encapsulates
the name of an Internet object, and labels it with an the name of an Internet object, and labels it with an
identification of the name space, thus producing a member of the identification of the name space, thus producing a member of the
universal set of names in registered name spaces and of addresses universal set of names in registered name spaces and of addresses
referring to registered protocols or name spaces. referring to registered protocols or name spaces.
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depending on the persistence and care in the assignment of depending on the persistence and care in the assignment of
identifiers by the naming authority, rather than on any quality of identifiers by the naming authority, rather than on any quality of
the scheme." ISDs SHOULD "use the general term 'URI' rather than the scheme." ISDs SHOULD "use the general term 'URI' rather than
the more restrictive terms 'URL' and 'URN'." (RFC 3986) the more restrictive terms 'URL' and 'URN'." (RFC 3986)
$ uniform resource locator (URL) $ uniform resource locator (URL)
(I) A URI that describes the access method and location of an (I) A URI that describes the access method and location of an
information resource object on the Internet. (See: Usage under information resource object on the Internet. (See: Usage under
"URI". Compare: URN.) "URI". Compare: URN.)
Tutorial: The term URL "refers to the subset of URIs that, in Tutorial: The term URL "refers to the subset of URIs that, besides
addition to identifying a resource, provide a means of locating identifying a resource, provide a means of locating the resource
the resource by describing its primary access mechanism (e.g., its by describing its primary access mechanism (e.g., its network
network 'location')." (RFC 3986)
A URL provides explicit instructions on how to access the named A URL provides explicit instructions on how to access the named
object. For example, object. For example,
"ftp://bbnarchive.bbn.com/foo/bar/picture/cambridge.zip" is a URL. "ftp://bbnarchive.bbn.com/foo/bar/picture/cambridge.zip" is a URL.
The part before the colon specifies the access scheme or protocol, The part before the colon specifies the access scheme or protocol,
and the part after the colon is interpreted according to that and the part after the colon is interpreted according to that
access method. Usually, two slashes after the colon indicate the access method. Usually, two slashes after the colon indicate the
host name of a server (written as a domain name). In an FTP or host name of a server (written as a domain name). In an FTP or
HTTP URL, the host name is followed by the path name of a file on HTTP URL, the host name is followed by the path name of a file on
the server. The last (optional) part of a URL may be either a the server. The last (optional) part of a URL may be either a
fragment identifier that indicates a position in the file, or a fragment identifier that indicates a position in the file, or a
query string. query string.
$ uniform resource name (URN) $ uniform resource name (URN)
(I) A URI with the properties of a name. (See: Usage under "URI". (I) A URI with the properties of a name. (See: Usage under "URI".
Compare: URL.) Compare: URL.)
Tutorial: The term URN "has been used historically to refer to Tutorial: The term URN "has been used historically to refer to
both URIs under the "urn" scheme (RFC 2141), which are required both URIs under the "urn" scheme (RFC 2141), which are required to
to remain globally unique and persistent even when the resource remain globally unique and persistent even when the resource
ceases to exist or becomes unavailable, and to any other URI with ceases to exist or becomes unavailable, and to any other URI with
the properties of a name." (RFC 3986) the properties of a name." (RFC 3986)
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$ untrusted $ untrusted
(I) See: secondary definition under "trust". (I) See: secondary definition under "trust".
$ untrusted process $ untrusted process
1. (I) A system component that is not able to affect the state of 1. (I) A system component that is not able to affect the state of
system security through incorrect or malicious operation. Example: system security through incorrect or malicious operation. Example:
A component that has its operations confined by a security kernel. A component that has its operations confined by a security kernel.
(See: trusted process.) (See: trusted process.)
2. (I) A system component that (a) has not been evaluated or 2. (I) A system component that (a) has not been evaluated or
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(I) A security service that verifies the identity claimed by an (I) A security service that verifies the identity claimed by an
entity that attempts to access the system. (See: authentication, entity that attempts to access the system. (See: authentication,
user.) user.)
$ User Datagram Protocol (UDP) $ User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
(I) An Internet Standard, Transport-Layer protocol (RFC 768) that (I) An Internet Standard, Transport-Layer protocol (RFC 768) that
delivers a sequence of datagrams from one computer to another in a delivers a sequence of datagrams from one computer to another in a
computer network. (See: UPD flood.) computer network. (See: UPD flood.)
Tutorial: UDP assumes that IP is the underlying protocol. UDP Tutorial: UDP assumes that IP is the underlying protocol. UDP
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enables application programs to send transaction-oriented data to enables application programs to send transaction-oriented data to
other programs with minimal protocol mechanism. UDP does not other programs with minimal protocol mechanism. UDP does not
provide reliable delivery, flow control, sequencing, or other end- provide reliable delivery, flow control, sequencing, or other end-
to-end service guarantees that TCP does. to-end service guarantees that TCP does.
$ user identity $ user identity
(I) See: identity. (I) See: identity.
$ user identifier $ user identifier
(I) See: identifier. (I) See: identifier.
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public-key certificate in version 1 format" or an "X.509 attribute public-key certificate in version 1 format" or an "X.509 attribute
certificate in version 1 format". certificate in version 1 format".
Deprecated Usage: ISDs MAY use this term as an abbreviation of Deprecated Usage: ISDs MAY use this term as an abbreviation of
"version 1 X.509 public-key certificate", but only after using the "version 1 X.509 public-key certificate", but only after using the
full term at the first instance. Otherwise, the term is ambiguous, full term at the first instance. Otherwise, the term is ambiguous,
because X.509 specifies both v1 public-key certificates and v1 because X.509 specifies both v1 public-key certificates and v1
attribute certificates. (See: X.509 attribute certificate, X.509 attribute certificates. (See: X.509 attribute certificate, X.509
public-key certificate.) public-key certificate.)
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$ v1 CRL $ v1 CRL
(N) Abbreviation of "X.509 CRL in version 1 format". (N) Abbreviation of "X.509 CRL in version 1 format".
Usage: ISDs MAY use this abbreviation, but SHOULD use the full Usage: ISDs MAY use this abbreviation, but SHOULD use the full
term at its first occurrence and define the abbreviation there. term at its first occurrence and define the abbreviation there.
$ v2 certificate $ v2 certificate
(N) Abbreviation of "X.509 public-key certificate in version 2 (N) Abbreviation of "X.509 public-key certificate in version 2
format". format".
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1. (I) Establish the soundness or correctness of a construct. 1. (I) Establish the soundness or correctness of a construct.
Example: certificate validation. (See: validate vs. verify.) Example: certificate validation. (See: validate vs. verify.)
2. (I) To officially approve something, sometimes in relation to a 2. (I) To officially approve something, sometimes in relation to a
standard. Example: NIST validates cryptographic modules for standard. Example: NIST validates cryptographic modules for
conformance with FIPS PUB 140 [FP140]. conformance with FIPS PUB 140 [FP140].
$ validate vs. verify $ validate vs. verify
Usage: To ensure consistency and align with ordinary English Usage: To ensure consistency and align with ordinary English
usage, ISDs SHOULD comply with the following two rules: usage, ISDs SHOULD comply with the following two rules:
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- Rule 1: Use "validate" when referring to a process intended to - Rule 1: Use "validate" when referring to a process intended to
establish the soundness or correctness of a construct (e.g., establish the soundness or correctness of a construct (e.g.,
"certificate validation"). (See: validate.) "certificate validation"). (See: validate.)
- Rule 2: Use "verify" when referring to a process intended to - Rule 2: Use "verify" when referring to a process intended to
test or prove the truth or accuracy of a fact or value (e.g., test or prove the truth or accuracy of a fact or value (e.g.,
"authenticate). (See: verify.) "authenticate). (See: verify.)
Tutorial: The Internet security community sometimes uses these two Tutorial: The Internet security community sometimes uses these two
terms inconsistently, especially in a PKI context. Most often, terms inconsistently, especially in a PKI context. Most often,
however, we say "verify the signature" but say "validate the however, we say "verify the signature" but say "validate the
certificate". That is, we "verify" atomic truths but "validate" certificate". That is, we "verify" atomic truths but "validate"
data structures, relationships, and systems that are composed of data structures, relationships, and systems that are composed of
or depend on verified items. This usage has a basis in Latin: or depend on verified items. This usage has a basis in Latin:
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between the subject name and the public key value in a public-key between the subject name and the public key value in a public-key
certificate) is valid, except if the certificate appears on a CRL certificate) is valid, except if the certificate appears on a CRL
or the key appears on a CKL. (See: cryptoperiod, key lifetime.) or the key appears on a CKL. (See: cryptoperiod, key lifetime.)
$ value-added network (VAN) $ value-added network (VAN)
(I) A computer network or subnetwork (usually a commercial (I) A computer network or subnetwork (usually a commercial
enterprise) that transmits, receives, and stores EDI transactions enterprise) that transmits, receives, and stores EDI transactions
on behalf of its users. on behalf of its users.
Tutorial: A VAN may also provide additional services, ranging from Tutorial: A VAN may also provide additional services, ranging from
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EDI format translation, to EDI-to-FAX conversion, to integrated EDI format translation, to EDI-to-FAX conversion, to integrated
business systems. business systems.
$ VAN $ VAN
(I) See: value-added network. (I) See: value-added network.
$ verification $ verification
1. (I) /authentication/ The process of examining information to 1. (I) /authentication/ The process of examining information to
establish the truth of a claimed fact or value. (See: validate vs. establish the truth of a claimed fact or value. (See: validate vs.
verify, verify. Compare: authentication.) verify, verify. Compare: authentication.)
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$ violation $ violation
See: security violation. See: security violation.
$ virtual private network (VPN) $ virtual private network (VPN)
(I) A restricted-use, logical (i.e., artificial or simulated) (I) A restricted-use, logical (i.e., artificial or simulated)
computer network that is constructed from the system resources of computer network that is constructed from the system resources of
a relatively public, physical (i.e., real) network (e.g., the a relatively public, physical (i.e., real) network (e.g., the
Internet), often by using encryption (located at hosts or Internet), often by using encryption (located at hosts or
gateways), and often by tunneling links of the virtual network gateways), and often by tunneling links of the virtual network
across the real network. across the real network. (See: tunnel.)
Tutorial: A VPN is generally less expensive to build and operate Tutorial: A VPN is generally less expensive to build and operate
than a dedicated real network, because the virtual network shares than a dedicated real network, because the virtual network shares
the cost of system resources with other users of the underlying the cost of system resources with other users of the underlying
real network. For example, if a corporation has LANs at several real network. For example, if a corporation has LANs at several
different sites, each connected to the Internet by a firewall, the different sites, each connected to the Internet by a firewall, the
corporation could create a VPN by using encrypted tunnels to corporation could create a VPN by using encrypted tunnels to
connect from firewall to firewall across the Internet. connect from firewall to firewall across the Internet.
$ virus $ virus
(I) A self-replicating (and usually hidden) section of computer (I) A self-replicating (and usually hidden) section of computer
software (usually malicious logic) that propagates by infecting -- software (usually malicious logic) that propagates by infecting --
i.e., inserting a copy of itself into and becoming part of -- i.e., inserting a copy of itself into and becoming part of --
another program. A virus cannot run by itself; it requires that another program. A virus cannot run by itself; it requires that
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its host program be run to make the virus active. its host program be run to make the virus active.
$ Visa Cash $ Visa Cash
(O) A smartcard-based electronic money system that incorporates (O) A smartcard-based electronic money system that incorporates
cryptography and can be used to make payments via the Internet. cryptography and can be used to make payments via the Internet.
(See: IOTP.) (See: IOTP.)
$ volatile media $ volatile media
(I) Storage media that require an external power supply to (I) Storage media that require an external power supply to
maintain stored information. (Compare: non-volatile media, maintain stored information. (Compare: non-volatile media,
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$ W3C $ W3C
(N) See: World Wide Web Consortium. (N) See: World Wide Web Consortium.
$ war dialer $ war dialer
(I) /slang/ A computer program that automatically dials a series (I) /slang/ A computer program that automatically dials a series
of telephone numbers to find lines connected to computer systems, of telephone numbers to find lines connected to computer systems,
and catalogs those numbers so that a cracker can try to break the and catalogs those numbers so that a cracker can try to break the
systems. systems.
Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a Deprecated Usage: ISDs that use this term SHOULD state a
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definition for it because the term could confuse international definition for it because the term could confuse international
readers. readers.
$ Wassenaar Arrangement $ Wassenaar Arrangement
(N) The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional (N) The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a global, multilateral Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a global, multilateral
agreement approved by 33 countries in July 1996 to contribute to agreement approved by 33 countries in July 1996 to contribute to
regional and international security and stability, by promoting regional and international security and stability, by promoting
information exchange concerning, and greater responsibility in, information exchange concerning, and greater responsibility in,
transfers of arms and dual-use items, thus preventing transfers of arms and dual-use items, thus preventing
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$ watermarking $ watermarking
See: digital watermarking. See: digital watermarking.
$ weak key $ weak key
(I) In the context of a particular cryptographic algorithm, a key (I) In the context of a particular cryptographic algorithm, a key
value that provides poor security. (See: strong.) value that provides poor security. (See: strong.)
Example: The DEA has four "weak keys" [Schn] for which encryption Example: The DEA has four "weak keys" [Schn] for which encryption
produces the same result as decryption. It also has ten pairs of produces the same result as decryption. It also has ten pairs of
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"semi-weak keys" [Schn] (a.k.a. "dual keys" [FP074]) for which "semi-weak keys" [Schn] (a.k.a. "dual keys" [FP074]) for which
encryption with one key in the pair produces the same result as encryption with one key in the pair produces the same result as
decryption with the other key. decryption with the other key.
$ web, Web $ web, Web
1. (I) /not capitalized/ ISDs SHOULD NOT capitalize "web" when 1. (I) /not capitalized/ ISDs SHOULD NOT capitalize "web" when
using the term (usually as an adjective) to refer generically to using the term (usually as an adjective) to refer generically to
technology -- such as web browsers, web servers, HTTP, and HTML -- technology -- such as web browsers, web servers, HTTP, and HTML --
that is used in the Web or similar networks. that is used in the Web or similar networks.
skipping to change at page 308, line 4 skipping to change at page 307, line 54
$ WEP $ WEP
(N) See: Wired Equivalency Protocol. (N) See: Wired Equivalency Protocol.
$ Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) $ Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
(N) A cryptographic protocol that is defined in the IEEE 802.11 (N) A cryptographic protocol that is defined in the IEEE 802.11
standard and encapsulates the packets on wireless LANs. Usage: standard and encapsulates the packets on wireless LANs. Usage:
a.k.a. "Wired Equivalency Protocol". a.k.a. "Wired Equivalency Protocol".
Tutorial: The WEP design, which uses RC4 to encrypt both the plain Tutorial: The WEP design, which uses RC4 to encrypt both the plain
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text and a CRC, has been shown to be flawed in multiple ways; and text and a CRC, has been shown to be flawed in multiple ways; and
it also has often suffered from flawed implementation and it also has often suffered from flawed implementation and
management. management.
$ wiretapping $ wiretapping
(I) An attack that intercepts and accesses information contained (I) An attack that intercepts and accesses information contained
in a data flow in a communication system. (See: active in a data flow in a communication system. (See: active
wiretapping, end-to-end encryption, passive wiretapping, secondary wiretapping, end-to-end encryption, passive wiretapping, secondary
definition under "interception".) definition under "interception".)
skipping to change at page 309, line 5 skipping to change at page 309, line 5
government agencies, schools, and others). government agencies, schools, and others).
Tutorial: W3C Recommendations are developed through a process Tutorial: W3C Recommendations are developed through a process
similar to that of the standards published by other organizations, similar to that of the standards published by other organizations,
such as the IETF. The W3 Recommendation Track (i.e., standards such as the IETF. The W3 Recommendation Track (i.e., standards
track) has four levels of increasing maturity: Working, Candidate track) has four levels of increasing maturity: Working, Candidate
Recommendation, Proposed Recommendation, and W3C Recommendation Recommendation, Proposed Recommendation, and W3C Recommendation
W3C Recommendations are similar to the standards published by W3C Recommendations are similar to the standards published by
others organizations. (Compare: Internet Standard, ISO.) others organizations. (Compare: Internet Standard, ISO.)
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$ worm $ worm
(I) A computer program that can run independently, can propagate a (I) A computer program that can run independently, can propagate a
complete working version of itself onto other hosts on a network, complete working version of itself onto other hosts on a network,
and may consume system resources destructively. (See: mobile code, and may consume system resources destructively. (See: mobile code,
Morris Worm, virus.) Morris Worm, virus.)
$ wrap $ wrap
1. (N) To use cryptography to provide data confidentiality service 1. (N) To use cryptography to provide data confidentiality service
for keying material. (See: encrypt, wrapping algorithm, wrapping for keying material. (See: encrypt, wrapping algorithm, wrapping
key. Compare: seal, shroud.) key. Compare: seal, shroud.)
skipping to change at page 310, line 4 skipping to change at page 309, line 56
ITU-T/ISO multi-part standard (X.500-X.525) that defines the X.500 ITU-T/ISO multi-part standard (X.500-X.525) that defines the X.500
Directory, a conceptual collection of systems that provide Directory, a conceptual collection of systems that provide
distributed directory capabilities for OSI entities, processes, distributed directory capabilities for OSI entities, processes,
applications, and services. (The ISO equivalent is IS 9594-1 and applications, and services. (The ISO equivalent is IS 9594-1 and
related standards, IS 9594-x.) (See: directory vs. Directory, related standards, IS 9594-x.) (See: directory vs. Directory,
X.509.) X.509.)
Tutorial: The X.500 Directory is structured as a tree (the Tutorial: The X.500 Directory is structured as a tree (the
Directory Information Tree), and information is stored in Directory Information Tree), and information is stored in
directory entries. Each entry is a collection of information about directory entries. Each entry is a collection of information about
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one object, and each object has a DN. A directory entry is one object, and each object has a DN. A directory entry is
composed of attributes, each with a type and one or more values. composed of attributes, each with a type and one or more values.
For example, if a PKI uses the Directory to distribute For example, if a PKI uses the Directory to distribute
certificates, then the X.509 public-key certificate of an end user certificates, then the X.509 public-key certificate of an end user
is normally stored as a value of an attribute of type is normally stored as a value of an attribute of type
"userCertificate" in the Directory entry that has the DN that is "userCertificate" in the Directory entry that has the DN that is
the subject of the certificate. the subject of the certificate.
$ X.509 $ X.509
(N) An ITU-T Recommendation [X509] that defines a framework to (N) An ITU-T Recommendation [X509] that defines a framework to
skipping to change at page 310, line 43 skipping to change at page 310, line 40
Tutorial: An X.509 attribute certificate has a "subject" field, Tutorial: An X.509 attribute certificate has a "subject" field,
but the attribute certificate is a separate data structure from but the attribute certificate is a separate data structure from
that subject's public-key certificate. A subject may have multiple that subject's public-key certificate. A subject may have multiple
attribute certificates associated with each of its public-key attribute certificates associated with each of its public-key
certificates, and an attribute certificate may be issued by a certificates, and an attribute certificate may be issued by a
different CA than the one that issued the associated public-key different CA than the one that issued the associated public-key
certificate. certificate.
An X.509 attribute certificate contains a sequence of data items An X.509 attribute certificate contains a sequence of data items
and has a digital signature that is computed from that sequence. and has a digital signature that is computed from that sequence.
In addition to the signature, an attribute certificate contains Besides the signature, an attribute certificate contains items 1
items 1 through 9 listed below: through 9 listed below:
1. version Identifies v1. 1. version Identifies v1.
2. subject Is one of the following: 2. subject Is one of the following:
2a. baseCertificateID Issuer and serial number of an 2a. baseCertificateID Issuer and serial number of an
X.509 public-key certificate. X.509 public-key certificate.
2b. subjectName DN of the subject. 2b. subjectName DN of the subject.
3. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed). 3. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed).
4. signature OID of algorithm that signed the cert. 4. signature OID of algorithm that signed the cert.
5. serialNumber Certificate serial number; 5. serialNumber Certificate serial number;
an integer assigned by the issuer. an integer assigned by the issuer.
6. attCertValidityPeriod Validity period; a pair of UTCTime 6. attCertValidityPeriod Validity period; a pair of UTCTime
values: "not before" and "not after". values: "not before" and "not after".
7. attributes Sequence of attributes describing the 7. attributes Sequence of attributes describing the
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subject. subject.
8. issuerUniqueId Optional, when a DN is not sufficient. 8. issuerUniqueId Optional, when a DN is not sufficient.
9. extensions Optional. 9. extensions Optional.
$ X.509 certificate $ X.509 certificate
(N) Synonym for "X.509 public-key certificate". (N) Synonym for "X.509 public-key certificate".
Usage: ISDs MAY use this term as an abbreviation of "X.509 public- Usage: ISDs MAY use this term as an abbreviation of "X.509 public-
key certificate", but only after using the full term at the first key certificate", but only after using the full term at the first
instance. Otherwise, the term is ambiguous, because X.509 instance. Otherwise, the term is ambiguous, because X.509
specifies both public-key certificates and attribute certificates. specifies both public-key certificates and attribute certificates.
skipping to change at page 311, line 40 skipping to change at page 311, line 38
Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT refer to an X.509 CRL as a digital Usage: ISDs SHOULD NOT refer to an X.509 CRL as a digital
certificate; however, note that an X.509 CRL does meet this certificate; however, note that an X.509 CRL does meet this
Glossary's definition of "digital certificate". That is, like a Glossary's definition of "digital certificate". That is, like a
digital certificate, an X.509 CRL makes an assertion and is signed digital certificate, an X.509 CRL makes an assertion and is signed
by a CA. But instead of binding a key or other attributes to a by a CA. But instead of binding a key or other attributes to a
subject, an X.509 CRL asserts that certain previously issued, subject, an X.509 CRL asserts that certain previously issued,
X.509 certificates have been revoked. X.509 certificates have been revoked.
Tutorial: An X.509 CRL contains a sequence of data items and has a Tutorial: An X.509 CRL contains a sequence of data items and has a
digital signature computed on that sequence. In addition to the digital signature computed on that sequence. Besides the
signature, both v1 and v2 contain items 2 through 6b listed below. signature, both v1 and v2 contain items 2 through 6b listed below.
Version 2 contains item 1 and may optionally contain 6c and 7. Version 2 contains item 1 and may optionally contain 6c and 7.
1. version Optional. If present, identifies v2. 1. version Optional. If present, identifies v2.
2. signature OID of the algorithm that signed CRL. 2. signature OID of the algorithm that signed CRL.
3. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed). 3. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed).
4. thisUpdate A UTCTime value. 4. thisUpdate A UTCTime value.
5. nextUpdate A UTCTime value. 5. nextUpdate A UTCTime value.
6. revokedCertificates 3-tuples of 6a, 6b, and (optional) 6c: 6. revokedCertificates 3-tuples of 6a, 6b, and (optional) 6c:
6a. userCertificate A certificate's serial number. 6a. userCertificate A certificate's serial number.
6b. revocationDate UTCTime value for the revocation date. 6b. revocationDate UTCTime value for the revocation date.
6c. crlEntryExtensions Optional. 6c. crlEntryExtensions Optional.
7. crlExtensions Optional. 7. crlExtensions Optional.
$ X.509 public-key certificate $ X.509 public-key certificate
(N) A public-key certificate in one of the formats defined by (N) A public-key certificate in one of the formats defined by
X.509 -- version 1 (v1), version 2 (v2), or version 3 (v3). (The X.509 -- version 1 (v1), version 2 (v2), or version 3 (v3). (The
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v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 public-key certificate are v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 public-key certificate are
disjoint from the v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 CRL, and disjoint from the v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 CRL, and
from the v1 designation for an X.509 attribute certificate.) from the v1 designation for an X.509 attribute certificate.)
Tutorial: An X.509 public-key certificate contains a sequence of Tutorial: An X.509 public-key certificate contains a sequence of
data items and has a digital signature computed on that sequence. data items and has a digital signature computed on that sequence.
In addition to the signature, all three versions contain items 1 Besides the signature, all three versions contain items 1 through
through 7 listed below. Only v2 and v3 certificates may also 7 listed below. Only v2 and v3 certificates may also contain items
contain items 8 and 9, and only v3 may contain item 10. 8 and 9, and only v3 may contain item 10.
1. version Identifies v1, v2, or v3. 1. version Identifies v1, v2, or v3.
2. serialNumber Certificate serial number; 2. serialNumber Certificate serial number;
an integer assigned by the issuer. an integer assigned by the issuer.
3. signature OID of algorithm that was used to 3. signature OID of algorithm that was used to
sign the certificate. sign the certificate.
4. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed). 4. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed).
5. validity Validity period; a pair of UTCTime 5. validity Validity period; a pair of UTCTime
values: "not before" and "not after". values: "not before" and "not after".
6. subject DN of entity who owns the public key. 6. subject DN of entity who owns the public key.
skipping to change at page 313, line 4 skipping to change at page 312, line 55
Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for Deprecated Term: ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
that or any other document. Instead, use the full proper name of that or any other document. Instead, use the full proper name of
the document or, in subsequent references, a conventional the document or, in subsequent references, a conventional
abbreviation. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book", Rainbow abbreviation. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book", Rainbow
Series.) Series.)
$ zero-knowledge proof $ zero-knowledge proof
(I) /cryptography/ A proof-of-possession protocol whereby a system (I) /cryptography/ A proof-of-possession protocol whereby a system
entity can prove possession of some information to another entity, entity can prove possession of some information to another entity,
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without revealing any of that information. (See: proof-of- without revealing any of that information. (See: proof-of-
possession protocol.) possession protocol.)
$ zeroize $ zeroize
1. (I) Synonym for "erase". (See: sanitize.) Usage: Particularly 1. (I) Synonym for "erase". (See: sanitize.) Usage: Particularly
with regard to erasing keys that are stored in a cryptographic with regard to erasing keys that are stored in a cryptographic
module. module.
2. (O) Erase electronically stored data by altering the contents 2. (O) Erase electronically stored data by altering the contents
of the data storage so as to prevent the recovery of the data. of the data storage so as to prevent the recovery of the data.
skipping to change at page 314, line 5 skipping to change at page 314, line 5
terms (such as "robot") for this concept, and some use this term terms (such as "robot") for this concept, and some use this term
for different concepts. Therefore, to avoid international for different concepts. Therefore, to avoid international
misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. Instead, use misunderstanding, ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term. Instead, use
"compromised, coopted computer" or other explicitly descriptive "compromised, coopted computer" or other explicitly descriptive
terminology. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book".) terminology. (See: Deprecated Usage under "Green Book".)
$ zone of control $ zone of control
(O) /EMSEC/ Synonym for "inspectable space". [C4009] (See: (O) /EMSEC/ Synonym for "inspectable space". [C4009] (See:
TEMPEST.) TEMPEST.)
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5. Informative References 5. Informative References
This Glossary focuses on the Internet Standards Process. Therefore, This Glossary focuses on the Internet Standards Process. Therefore,
this set of informative references emphasizes international, this set of informative references emphasizes international,
governmental, and industry standards documents. Some RFCs that are governmental, and industry standards documents. Some RFCs that are
especially relevant to Internet security are mentioned in Glossary especially relevant to Internet security are mentioned in Glossary
entries in square brackets (e.g., "[R1457]" in the entry for entries in square brackets (e.g., "[R1457]" in the entry for
"security label") and are listed here; some other RFCs are mentioned "security label") and are listed here; some other RFCs are mentioned
in parentheses (e.g., "(RFC 959)" in the entry for "File Transport in parentheses (e.g., "(RFC 959)" in the entry for "File Transport
Protocol") but are not listed here. Protocol") but are not listed here.
skipping to change at page 315, line 4 skipping to change at page 315, line 4
[ACM] Association for Computing Machinery, "Communications of the [ACM] Association for Computing Machinery, "Communications of the
ACM", July 1998 issue with: M. Yeung, "Digital ACM", July 1998 issue with: M. Yeung, "Digital
Watermarking"; N. Memom and P. Wong, "Protecting Digital Watermarking"; N. Memom and P. Wong, "Protecting Digital
Media Content"; and S. Craver, B.-L. Yeo, and M. Yeung, Media Content"; and S. Craver, B.-L. Yeo, and M. Yeung,
"Technical Trials and Legal Tribulations". "Technical Trials and Legal Tribulations".
[Ande] Anderson, J., "Computer Security Technology Planning Study", [Ande] Anderson, J., "Computer Security Technology Planning Study",
ESD-TR-73-51, Vols. I and II, USAF Electronics Systems Div., ESD-TR-73-51, Vols. I and II, USAF Electronics Systems Div.,
Bedford, MA, October 1972. (Available as AD-758206/772806, Bedford, MA, October 1972. (Available as AD-758206/772806,
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National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA.) National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA.)
[ANSI] American National Standards Institute, "Role Based Access [ANSI] American National Standards Institute, "Role Based Access
Control", Secretariat, Information Technology Industry Control", Secretariat, Information Technology Industry
Council, BSR INCITS 359, DRAFT, 10 November 2003. Council, BSR INCITS 359, DRAFT, 10 November 2003.
[Army] U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) [Army] U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
and Tempest Protection for Facilities", EP 1110-3-2, 31 and Tempest Protection for Facilities", EP 1110-3-2, 31
December 1990. December 1990.
skipping to change at page 316, line 4 skipping to change at page 316, line 4
[CCIB] Common Criteria Implementation Board, "Common Criteria for [CCIB] Common Criteria Implementation Board, "Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model", version 2.0, CCIB-98-026, Introduction and General Model", version 2.0, CCIB-98-026,
May 1998. May 1998.
[Chau] D. Chaum, "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, [Chau] D. Chaum, "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses,
and Digital Pseudonyms", in "Communications of the ACM", and Digital Pseudonyms", in "Communications of the ACM",
vol. 24, no. 2, February 1981, pp. 84-88. vol. 24, no. 2, February 1981, pp. 84-88.
[Cheh] Cheheyl, M., Gasser, M., Huff, G., and J. Millen, "Verifying [Cheh] Cheheyl, M., Gasser, M., Huff, G., and J. Millen, "Verifying
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Security", in "ACM Computing Surveys", vol. 13, no. 3, Security", in "ACM Computing Surveys", vol. 13, no. 3,
September 1981, pp. 279-339. September 1981, pp. 279-339.
[Chris] Chrissis, M. et al, 1993. "SW-CMM [Capability Maturity Model [Chris] Chrissis, M. et al, 1993. "SW-CMM [Capability Maturity Model
for Software Version", Release 3.0, Software Engineering for Software Version", Release 3.0, Software Engineering
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, August 1996. Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, August 1996.
[CIPSO] Trusted Systems Interoperability Working Group, "Common IP [CIPSO] Trusted Systems Interoperability Working Group, "Common IP
Security Option", version 2.3, 9 March 1993. Security Option", version 2.3, 9 March 1993.
skipping to change at page 317, line 4 skipping to change at page 317, line 4
[Denn] Denning, D., "A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow", [Denn] Denning, D., "A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow",
in "Communications of the ACM", vol. 19, no. 5, May 1976, in "Communications of the ACM", vol. 19, no. 5, May 1976,
pp. 236-243. pp. 236-243.
[Denns] Denning, D. and P. Denning, "Data Security", in "ACM [Denns] Denning, D. and P. Denning, "Data Security", in "ACM
Computing Surveys", vol. 11, no. 3, September 1979, pp. 227- Computing Surveys", vol. 11, no. 3, September 1979, pp. 227-
249. 249.
[DH76] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography", [DH76] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography",
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in "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory", vol. IT-22, in "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory", vol. IT-22,
no. 6, November 1976, pp. 644-654. (See: Diffie-Hellman- no. 6, November 1976, pp. 644-654. (See: Diffie-Hellman-
Merkle.) Merkle.)
[DoD1] U.S. DoD, "Department of Defense Trusted Computer System [DoD1] U.S. DoD, "Department of Defense Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria", DoD 5200.28-STD, 26 December 1985. Evaluation Criteria", DoD 5200.28-STD, 26 December 1985.
(Supersedes [CSC1].) (Superseded by DoD Directive 8500.1.) (Supersedes [CSC1].) (Superseded by DoD Directive 8500.1.)
[DoD4] ---, "NSA Key Recovery Assessment Criteria", 8 June 1998. [DoD4] ---, "NSA Key Recovery Assessment Criteria", 8 June 1998.
skipping to change at page 318, line 4 skipping to change at page 318, line 4
Systems", version 3.1.1, 31 May 1998. Systems", version 3.1.1, 31 May 1998.
[EMV2] ---, "EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Terminal Specification [EMV2] ---, "EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Terminal Specification
for Payment Systems", version 3.1.1, 31 May 1998. for Payment Systems", version 3.1.1, 31 May 1998.
[EMV3] ---, "EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Application [EMV3] ---, "EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Application
Specification for Payment Systems", version 3.1.1, 31 May Specification for Payment Systems", version 3.1.1, 31 May
1998. 1998.
[F1037] U.S. General Services Administration, "Glossary of [F1037] U.S. General Services Administration, "Glossary of
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Telecommunications Terms", FED STD 1037C, 7 August 1996. Telecommunications Terms", FED STD 1037C, 7 August 1996.
[For94] Ford, W., "Computer Communications Security: Principles, [For94] Ford, W., "Computer Communications Security: Principles,
Standard Protocols and Techniques", ISBN 0-13-799453-2, Standard Protocols and Techniques", ISBN 0-13-799453-2,
1994. 1994.
[For97] --- and M. Baum, "Secure Electronic Commerce: Building the [For97] --- and M. Baum, "Secure Electronic Commerce: Building the
Infrastructure for Digital Signatures and Encryption", ISBN Infrastructure for Digital Signatures and Encryption", ISBN
0-13-476342-4, 1994. 0-13-476342-4, 1994.
skipping to change at page 319, line 4 skipping to change at page 319, line 4
2002. 2002.
[FP151] ---, "Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) -- System [FP151] ---, "Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) -- System
Application Program Interface [C Language]", FIPS PUB 151-2, Application Program Interface [C Language]", FIPS PUB 151-2,
12 May 1993 12 May 1993
[FP180] ---, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2000; [FP180] ---, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2000;
with change notice 1, 25 February 2004. with change notice 1, 25 February 2004.
[FP185] ---, "Escrowed Encryption Standard", FIPS PUB 185, 9 [FP185] ---, "Escrowed Encryption Standard", FIPS PUB 185, 9
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February 1994. February 1994.
[FP186] ---, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-2, 27 [FP186] ---, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-2, 27
June 2000; with change notice 1, 5 October 2001. June 2000; with change notice 1, 5 October 2001.
[FP188] ---, "Standard Security Label for Information Transfer", [FP188] ---, "Standard Security Label for Information Transfer",
FIPS PUB 188, 6 September 1994. FIPS PUB 188, 6 September 1994.
[FP191] ---, "Guideline for the Analysis of Local Area Network [FP191] ---, "Guideline for the Analysis of Local Area Network
Security", FIPS PUB 191, 9 November 1994. Security", FIPS PUB 191, 9 November 1994.
skipping to change at page 320, line 5 skipping to change at page 320, line 5
---, ---, "Part 3: Codes for Formerly Used Names of ---, ---, "Part 3: Codes for Formerly Used Names of
Countries", ISO/DIS 3166-3. Countries", ISO/DIS 3166-3.
[I7498-1] ---, "Information Processing Systems -- Open Systems [I7498-1] ---, "Information Processing Systems -- Open Systems
Interconnection Reference Model, [Part 1:] Basic Reference Interconnection Reference Model, [Part 1:] Basic Reference
Model", ISO/IEC 7498-1. (Equivalent to ITU-T Recommendation Model", ISO/IEC 7498-1. (Equivalent to ITU-T Recommendation
X.200.) X.200.)
[I7498-2] ---, ---, "Part 2: Security Architecture", ISO/IEC 7499-2. [I7498-2] ---, ---, "Part 2: Security Architecture", ISO/IEC 7499-2.
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[I7498-4] ---, ---, "Part 4: Management Framework", ISO/IEC 7498-4. [I7498-4] ---, ---, "Part 4: Management Framework", ISO/IEC 7498-4.
[I7812] ---, "Identification cards -- Identification of Issuers, [I7812] ---, "Identification cards -- Identification of Issuers,
Part 1: Numbering System", ISO/IEC 7812-1:1993 Part 1: Numbering System", ISO/IEC 7812-1:1993
---, ---, "Part 2: Application and Registration Procedures", ---, ---, "Part 2: Application and Registration Procedures",
ISO/IEC 7812-2:1993. ISO/IEC 7812-2:1993.
[I8073] ---, "Information Processing Systems -- Open Systems [I8073] ---, "Information Processing Systems -- Open Systems
Interconnection, Transport Protocol Specification", ISO IS Interconnection, Transport Protocol Specification", ISO IS
skipping to change at page 321, line 5 skipping to change at page 321, line 5
[IDSSE] ---, "Intrusion Detection System Sensor Protection Profile", [IDSSE] ---, "Intrusion Detection System Sensor Protection Profile",
version 1.1, NSA, 10 December 2001. version 1.1, NSA, 10 December 2001.
[IDSSY] ---, "Intrusion Detection System", version 1.4, NSA, 4 [IDSSY] ---, "Intrusion Detection System", version 1.4, NSA, 4
February 2002. February 2002.
[Ioan] Ioannidis, J. and M. Blaze, "The Architecture and [Ioan] Ioannidis, J. and M. Blaze, "The Architecture and
Implementation of Network Layer Security in UNIX", in "UNIX Implementation of Network Layer Security in UNIX", in "UNIX
Security IV Symposium", October 1993, pp. 29-39. Security IV Symposium", October 1993, pp. 29-39.
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[ITSEC] "Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria [ITSEC] "Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
(ITSEC): Harmonised Criteria of France, Germany, the (ITSEC): Harmonised Criteria of France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom", version 1.2, U.K. Netherlands, and the United Kingdom", version 1.2, U.K.
Department of Trade and Industry, June 1991. Department of Trade and Industry, June 1991.
[JCSP1] U.S. DoD, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms", [JCSP1] U.S. DoD, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms",
Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. 1, 31 Aug 2005. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. 1, 31 Aug 2005.
[John] Johnson, N. and S. Jajodia, "Exploring Steganography; Seeing [John] Johnson, N. and S. Jajodia, "Exploring Steganography; Seeing
the Unseen", in "IEEE Computer", February 1998, pp. 26-34. the Unseen", in "IEEE Computer", February 1998, pp. 26-34.
skipping to change at page 322, line 5 skipping to change at page 322, line 5
[Murr] Murray, W., "Courtney's Laws of Security", in "Infosecurity [Murr] Murray, W., "Courtney's Laws of Security", in "Infosecurity
News", March/April 1993, p. 65. News", March/April 1993, p. 65.
[N4001] National Security Telecommunications and Information System [N4001] National Security Telecommunications and Information System
Security Committee, "Controlled Cryptographic Items", Security Committee, "Controlled Cryptographic Items",
NSTISSI No. 4001, 25 March 1985. NSTISSI No. 4001, 25 March 1985.
[N4006] ---, "Controlled Cryptographic Items", NSTISSI No. 4006, 2 [N4006] ---, "Controlled Cryptographic Items", NSTISSI No. 4006, 2
December 1991. December 1991.
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[N7003] ---, "Protective Distribution Systems", NSTISSI No. 7003, 13 [N7003] ---, "Protective Distribution Systems", NSTISSI No. 7003, 13
December 1996. December 1996.
[NCS01] National Computer Security Center, "A Guide to Understanding [NCS01] National Computer Security Center, "A Guide to Understanding
Audit in Trusted Systems", NCSC-TG-001, 1 June 1988. (See: Audit in Trusted Systems", NCSC-TG-001, 1 June 1988. (See:
Rainbow Series.) Rainbow Series.)
[NCS03] ---, "Information System Security Policy Guideline", I942- [NCS03] ---, "Information System Security Policy Guideline", I942-
TR-003, version 1, July 1994. (See: Rainbow Series.) TR-003, version 1, July 1994. (See: Rainbow Series.)
skipping to change at page 323, line 5 skipping to change at page 323, line 5
[Perr] Perrine, T. et al, "An Overview of the Kernelized Secure [Perr] Perrine, T. et al, "An Overview of the Kernelized Secure
Operating System (KSOS)", in "Proceedings of the 7th DoD/NBS Operating System (KSOS)", in "Proceedings of the 7th DoD/NBS
Computer Security Conference", 24-26 September 1984. Computer Security Conference", 24-26 September 1984.
[PGP] Garfinkel, S.. "PGP: Pretty Good Privacy", O'Reilly & [PGP] Garfinkel, S.. "PGP: Pretty Good Privacy", O'Reilly &
Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, CA, 1995. Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, CA, 1995.
[PKCS] Kaliski Jr., B., "An Overview of the PKCS Standards", RSA [PKCS] Kaliski Jr., B., "An Overview of the PKCS Standards", RSA
Data Security, Inc., 3 June 1991. Data Security, Inc., 3 June 1991.
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[PKC05] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption [PKC05] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption
Standard ", version 1.5, 1 November 1993. (See: RFC 2898.) Standard ", version 1.5, 1 November 1993. (See: RFC 2898.)
[PKC07] ---, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard", [PKC07] ---, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard",
version 1.5, 1 November 1993. (See: RFC 2315.) version 1.5, 1 November 1993. (See: RFC 2315.)
[PKC10] ---, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard", [PKC10] ---, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard",
version 1.0, 1 November 1993. version 1.0, 1 November 1993.
[PKC11] ---, "PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard", [PKC11] ---, "PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard",
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Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures", Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures",
RFC 1421, February 1993. RFC 1421, February 1993.
[R1422] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail, [R1422] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail,
Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management", RFC 1422, Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management", RFC 1422,
February 1993. February 1993.
[R1455] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Physical Link Security Type of Service", [R1455] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Physical Link Security Type of Service",
RFC 1455, May 1993. RFC 1455, May 1993.
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[R1457] Housley, R., "Security Label Framework for the Internet", [R1457] Housley, R., "Security Label Framework for the Internet",
RFC 1457, May 1993. RFC 1457, May 1993.
[R1492] Finseth, C., "An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes Called [R1492] Finseth, C., "An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes Called
TACACS", RFC 1492, July 1993. TACACS", RFC 1492, July 1993.
[R1507] Kaufman, C., "DASS: Distributed Authentication Security [R1507] Kaufman, C., "DASS: Distributed Authentication Security
Service", RFC 1507, September 1993. Service", RFC 1507, September 1993.
[R1731] Myers, J., "IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms", RFC 1731, [R1731] Myers, J., "IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms", RFC 1731,
skipping to change at page 325, line 4 skipping to change at page 325, line 4
RFC 1958, June 1996. RFC 1958, June 1996.
[R1983] Malkin, G., "Internet Users' Glossary", FYI 18, RFC 1983, [R1983] Malkin, G., "Internet Users' Glossary", FYI 18, RFC 1983,
August 1996. August 1996.
[R1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication [R1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication
Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996. Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[R2078] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program [R2078] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface, Version 2", RFC 2078, January 1997. (Superseded Interface, Version 2", RFC 2078, January 1997. (Superseded
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by RFC 2743.) by RFC 2743.)
[R2084] Bossert, G., Cooper, S., and W. Drummond, "Considerations [R2084] Bossert, G., Cooper, S., and W. Drummond, "Considerations
for Web Transaction Security", RFC 2084, January 1997. for Web Transaction Security", RFC 2084, January 1997.
[R2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [R2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
1997. 1997.
[R2144] Adams, C., "The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm", RFC 2144, [R2144] Adams, C., "The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm", RFC 2144,
skipping to change at page 326, line 5 skipping to change at page 326, line 5
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[R2402] ---, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402, November 1998. [R2402] ---, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402, November 1998.
[R2403] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP [R2403] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP
and AH", RFC 2403, November 1998. and AH", RFC 2403, November 1998.
[R2404] ---, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH", RFC 2404, [R2404] ---, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH", RFC 2404,
November 1998. November 1998.
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[R2405] Madson, C. and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher [R2405] Madson, C. and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher
Algorithm With Explicit IV", RFC 2405, November 1998. Algorithm With Explicit IV", RFC 2405, November 1998.
[R2406] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload [R2406] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998. (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[R2407] Piper, D. "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation [R2407] Piper, D. "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998. for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.
[R2408] Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and J. Turner, [R2408] Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and J. Turner,
skipping to change at page 327, line 5 skipping to change at page 327, line 5
[R2635] Hambridge, S. and A. Lunde, "DON'T SPEW: A Set of Guidelines [R2635] Hambridge, S. and A. Lunde, "DON'T SPEW: A Set of Guidelines
for Mass Unsolicited Mailings and Postings", RFC 2635, June for Mass Unsolicited Mailings and Postings", RFC 2635, June
1999. 1999.
[R2660] Rescorla, E. and A. Schiffman, "The Secure HyperText [R2660] Rescorla, E. and A. Schiffman, "The Secure HyperText
Transfer Protocol", RFC 2660, August 1999. Transfer Protocol", RFC 2660, August 1999.
[R2773] Housley, R., Yee, P., and W. Nace, "Encryption using KEA and [R2773] Housley, R., Yee, P., and W. Nace, "Encryption using KEA and
SKIPJACK", RFC 2773, February 2000. SKIPJACK", RFC 2773, February 2000.
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[R2801] Burdett, D., "Internet Open Trading Protocol - IOTP, Version [R2801] Burdett, D., "Internet Open Trading Protocol - IOTP, Version
1.0", RFC 2801, April 2000. 1.0", RFC 2801, April 2000.
[R2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: [R2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000. Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[R2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote [R2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
June 2000. June 2000.
skipping to change at page 328, line 4 skipping to change at page 328, line 4
[R3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. [R3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3748, June 2004. 3748, June 2004.
[R3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For Public [R3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For Public
Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86, RFC 3766, Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86, RFC 3766,
April 2004. April 2004.
[R3820] Tuecke, S., Welch, V., Engert, D., Pearlman, L., and M. [R3820] Tuecke, S., Welch, V., Engert, D., Pearlman, L., and M.
Thompson, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Thompson, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
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Proxy Certificate Profile", RFC 3820, June 2004. Proxy Certificate Profile", RFC 3820, June 2004.
[R3851] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions [R3851] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851, July (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851, July
2004. 2004.
[R3871] Jones, G., "Operational Security Requirements for Large [R3871] Jones, G., "Operational Security Requirements for Large
Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network Infrastructure", Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network Infrastructure",
RFC 3871, September 2004. RFC 3871, September 2004.
skipping to change at page 329, line 4 skipping to change at page 329, line 4
4.0.0, 24 July 1996. (See: http://www.catb.org/~esr/jargon 4.0.0, 24 July 1996. (See: http://www.catb.org/~esr/jargon
for the latest version. Also, "The New Hacker's Dictionary", for the latest version. Also, "The New Hacker's Dictionary",
3rd edition, MIT Press, September 1996, ISBN 0-262-68092-0.) 3rd edition, MIT Press, September 1996, ISBN 0-262-68092-0.)
[Roge] Rogers, H., "An Overview of the CANEWARE Program", in [Roge] Rogers, H., "An Overview of the CANEWARE Program", in
"Proceedings of the 10th National Computer Security "Proceedings of the 10th National Computer Security
Conference", NIST and NCSC, September 1987. Conference", NIST and NCSC, September 1987.
[RSCG] NSA, "Router Security Configuration Guide: Principles and [RSCG] NSA, "Router Security Configuration Guide: Principles and
Guidance for Secure Configuration of IP Routers, with Guidance for Secure Configuration of IP Routers, with
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Detailed Instructions for Cisco Systems Routers", version Detailed Instructions for Cisco Systems Routers", version
1.0g, C4-054R-00, 20 April 2001, available at 1.0g, C4-054R-00, 20 April 2001, available at
http://www.nsa.gov. http://www.nsa.gov.
[Russ] Russell, D. et al, Chapter 10 ("TEMPEST") of "Computer [Russ] Russell, D. et al, Chapter 10 ("TEMPEST") of "Computer
Security Basics", ISBN 0-937175-71-4, 1991. Security Basics", ISBN 0-937175-71-4, 1991.
[SAML] Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information [SAML] Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information
Standards (OASIS), "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Standards (OASIS), "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)", version 1.1, 2 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)", version 1.1, 2
skipping to change at page 330, line 5 skipping to change at page 330, line 5
Specification", 9 May 2002 (available from NIST Computer Specification", 9 May 2002 (available from NIST Computer
Security Resource Center). Security Resource Center).
[SP12] NIST, "An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST [SP12] NIST, "An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST
Handbook", Special Publication 800-12. Handbook", Special Publication 800-12.
[SP14] Swanson, M. et al (NIST), "Generally Accepted Principles and [SP14] Swanson, M. et al (NIST), "Generally Accepted Principles and
Practices for Security Information Technology Systems", --- Practices for Security Information Technology Systems", ---
800-14, September 1996. 800-14, September 1996.
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[SP15] Burr, W. et al (NIST), "Minimum Interoperability [SP15] Burr, W. et al (NIST), "Minimum Interoperability
Specification for PKI Components (MISPC), Version 1", --- Specification for PKI Components (MISPC), Version 1", ---
800-15, September 1997. 800-15, September 1997.
[SP22] Rukhin, A. et al (NIST), "A Statistical Test Suite for [SP22] Rukhin, A. et al (NIST), "A Statistical Test Suite for
Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic
Applications", --- 800-15, 15 May 2001. Applications", --- 800-15, 15 May 2001.
[SP27] Stoneburner, G. et al (NIST), "Engineering Principles for [SP27] Stoneburner, G. et al (NIST), "Engineering Principles for
Information Technology Security (A Baseline for Achieving Information Technology Security (A Baseline for Achieving
skipping to change at page 331, line 5 skipping to change at page 331, line 5
[SP41] Wack, J. et al (NIST), "Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall [SP41] Wack, J. et al (NIST), "Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall
Policy", --- 800-41, January 2002. Policy", --- 800-41, January 2002.
[SP42] ---, "Guideline on Network Security Testing", --- 800-42, [SP42] ---, "Guideline on Network Security Testing", --- 800-42,
October 2003. October 2003.
[SP56] NIST, "Recommendations on Key Establishment Schemes", Draft [SP56] NIST, "Recommendations on Key Establishment Schemes", Draft
2.0, --- 800-63, January 2003. 2.0, --- 800-63, January 2003.
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[SP57] ---, "Recommendation for Key Management", Part 1 "General [SP57] ---, "Recommendation for Key Management", Part 1 "General
Guideline" and Part 2 "Best Practices for Key Management Guideline" and Part 2 "Best Practices for Key Management
Organization", --- 800-57, DRAFT, January 2003. Organization", --- 800-57, DRAFT, January 2003.
[SP61] Grance, T. et al (NIST), "Computer Security Incident [SP61] Grance, T. et al (NIST), "Computer Security Incident
Handling Guide", --- 800-57, January 2003. Handling Guide", --- 800-57, January 2003.
[SP63] Burr, W. et al (NIST), "Electronic Authentication [SP63] Burr, W. et al (NIST), "Electronic Authentication
Guideline", --- 800-63, June 2004 Guideline", --- 800-63, June 2004
skipping to change at page 332, line 4 skipping to change at page 332, line 4
[X509] ---, Recommendation X.509, ---: "Authentication Framework", [X509] ---, Recommendation X.509, ---: "Authentication Framework",
COM 7-250-E Revision 1, 23 February 2001. (Equivalent to ISO COM 7-250-E Revision 1, 23 February 2001. (Equivalent to ISO
9594-8.) 9594-8.)
[X519] ---, Recommendation X.519, ---: "Protocol Specifications". [X519] ---, Recommendation X.519, ---: "Protocol Specifications".
[X520] ---, Recommendation X.520, ---: "Selected Attribute Types". [X520] ---, Recommendation X.520, ---: "Selected Attribute Types".
[X680] ---, Recommendation X.680, "Information Technology -- [X680] ---, Recommendation X.680, "Information Technology --
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Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) -- Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) -- Specification of
Basic Notation", 15 November 1994. (Equivalent to ISO/IEC Basic Notation", 15 November 1994. (Equivalent to ISO/IEC
8824-1.) 8824-1.)
[X690] ---, Recommendation X.690, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 [X690] ---, Recommendation X.690, "Information Technology -- ASN.1
Encoding Rules -- Specification of Basic Encoding Rules Encoding Rules -- Specification of Basic Encoding Rules
(BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)", 15 November 1994. (Equivalent to Encoding Rules (DER)", 15 November 1994. (Equivalent to
ISO/IEC 8825-1.) ISO/IEC 8825-1.)
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6. Security Considerations and IANA Considerations 6. Security Considerations and IANA Considerations
This document mainly defines security terms and recommends how to use This document mainly defines security terms and recommends how to use
them. It also provides limited tutorial information about security them. It also provides limited tutorial information about security
aspects of Internet protocols, but it does not describe in detail the aspects of Internet protocols, but it does not describe in detail the
vulnerabilities of, or threats to, specific protocols and does not vulnerabilities of, or threats to, specific protocols and does not
definitively describe mechanisms that protect specific protocols. definitively describe mechanisms that protect specific protocols.
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
skipping to change at page 333, line 47 skipping to change at page 333, line 45
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE IS SPONSORED "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE IS SPONSORED
BY, THE INTERNET SOCIETY, AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE BY, THE INTERNET SOCIETY, AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE
DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL
NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Expiration Date: 29 February 2007. Expiration Date: 8 March 2007.
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