< draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-05.txt		draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-06.txt >
	RATS H. Tschofenig		RATS H. Tschofenig
	Internet-Draft S. Frost		Internet-Draft S. Frost
	Intended status: Informational M. Brossard		Intended status: Informational M. Brossard
	Expires: 7 September 2020 A. Shaw		Expires: 4 June 2021 A. Shaw
	T. Fossati		T. Fossati
	Arm Limited		Arm Limited
	6 March 2020		1 December 2020
	Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) Attestation Token		Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA) Attestation Token
	draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-05		draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	The Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a family of hardware and		The Platform Security Architecture (PSA) is a family of hardware and
	firmware security specifications, as well as open-source reference		firmware security specifications, as well as open-source reference
	implementations, to help device makers and chip manufacturers build		implementations, to help device makers and chip manufacturers build
	best-practice security into products. Devices that are PSA compliant		best-practice security into products. Devices that are PSA compliant
	are able to produce attestation tokens as described in this memo,		are able to produce attestation tokens as described in this memo,
	which are the basis for a number of different protocols, including		which are the basis for a number of different protocols, including
	secure provisioning and network access control. This document		secure provisioning and network access control. This document
	skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 4 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 September 2020.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 June 2021.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components		and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
	extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text		extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
	as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are		as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
	provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.		provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2.1. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. PSA Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. PSA Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1. Caller Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.1. Caller Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1.1. Auth Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.1.1. Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1.2. Client ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.1.2. Client ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.2. Target Identification Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.2. Target Identification Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.2.1. Instance ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.2.1. Instance ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.2.2. Implementation ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.2.2. Implementation ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.2.3. Hardware Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2.3. Certification Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.3. Target State Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.3. Target State Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.3.1. Security Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.3.1. Security Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.3.2. Boot Seed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.3.2. Boot Seed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.4. Software Inventory Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.4. Software Inventory Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.4.1. Software Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.4.1. Software Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.4.2. No Software Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.4.2. No Software Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.5. Verification Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.5. Verification Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.5.1. Verification Service Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.5.1. Verification Service Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.5.2. Profile Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.5.2. Profile Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4. Token Encoding and Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4. Token Encoding and Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	5. Collated CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		5. Collated CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		6. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		7. Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		8.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		8.1.1. Nonce Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	Appendix A. Reference Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		8.1.2. Client ID Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Appendix B. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		8.1.3. Instance ID Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		8.1.4. Implementation ID Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		8.1.5. Certification Reference Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		8.1.6. Security Lifecycle Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
			8.1.7. Boot Seed Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
			8.1.8. Software Components Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
			8.1.9. No Software Measurements Claim . . . . . . . . . . . 18
			8.1.10. Verification Service Indicator Claim . . . . . . . . 18
			8.1.11. Profile Definition Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
			8.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
			8.3. CoAP Content-Formats Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
			8.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
			9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
			9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
			9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
			Appendix A. Reference Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
			Appendix B. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
			Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
			Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Trusted execution environments are now present in many devices, which		Trusted execution environments are now present in many devices, which
	provide a safe environment to place security sensitive code such as		provide a safe environment to place security sensitive code such as
	cryptography, secure boot, secure storage, and other essential		cryptography, secure boot, secure storage, and other essential
	security functions. These security functions are typically exposed		security functions. These security functions are typically exposed
	through a narrow and well-defined interface, and can be used by		through a narrow and well-defined interface, and can be used by
	operating system libraries and applications. Various APIs have been		operating system libraries and applications. Various APIs have been
	developed by Arm as part of the Platform Security Architecture [PSA]		developed by Arm as part of the Platform Security Architecture [PSA]
	skipping to change at page 4, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 41 ¶
	token.		token.
	CDDL [RFC8610] along with text descriptions is used to define each		CDDL [RFC8610] along with text descriptions is used to define each
	claim independent of encoding. The following CDDL type(s) are reused		claim independent of encoding. The following CDDL type(s) are reused
	by different claims:		by different claims:
	psa-hash-type = bytes .size 32 / bytes .size 48 / bytes .size 64		psa-hash-type = bytes .size 32 / bytes .size 48 / bytes .size 64
	3.1. Caller Claims		3.1. Caller Claims
	3.1.1. Auth Challenge		3.1.1. Nonce
	The Auth Challenge claim is an input object from the caller. For		The Nonce claim is a challenge from the caller. The length must be
	example, this can be a cryptographic nonce, a hash of locally		32, 48, or 64 bytes.
	attested data. The length must be 32, 48, or 64 bytes.
	This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.		This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.
	psa-nonce-claim = (		psa-nonce = (
	arm_psa_nonce => psa-hash-type		psa-nonce-key => psa-hash-type
	)		)
	3.1.2. Client ID		3.1.2. Client ID
	The Client ID claim represents the Partition ID of the caller. It is		The Client ID claim represents the security domain of the caller.
	a signed integer whereby negative values represent callers from the
	NSPE and where positive IDs represent callers from the SPE. The		In PSA, a security domain is represented by a signed integer whereby
	value 0 is not permitted. For a definition of the Partition ID, see		negative values represent callers from the NSPE and where positive
	the PSA Firmware Framework [PSA-FF].		IDs represent callers from the SPE. The value 0 is not permitted.
			For an example definition of client IDs, see the PSA Firmware
			Framework [PSA-FF].
	It is essential that this claim is checked in the verification		It is essential that this claim is checked in the verification
	process to ensure that a security domain, i.e., an attestation		process to ensure that a security domain, i.e., an attestation
	endpoint, cannot spoof a report from another security domain.		endpoint, cannot spoof a report from another security domain.
	This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.		This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.
			Note that the CDDL label used to be called arm_psa_partition_id.
	psa-client-id-nspe-type = -2147483648...0		psa-client-id-nspe-type = -2147483648...0
	psa-client-id-spe-type = 1..2147483647		psa-client-id-spe-type = 1..2147483647
	psa-client-id-type = psa-client-id-nspe-type / psa-client-id-spe-type		psa-client-id-type = psa-client-id-nspe-type / psa-client-id-spe-type
	psa-client-id = (		psa-client-id = (
	arm_psa_partition_id => psa-client-id-type		psa-client-id-key => psa-client-id-type
	)		)
	3.2. Target Identification Claims		3.2. Target Identification Claims
	3.2.1. Instance ID		3.2.1. Instance ID
	The Instance ID claim represents the unique identifier of the device		The Instance ID claim represents the unique identifier of the device
	instance. It is a 32 bytes hash of the public key corresponding to		instance. It is a 32 bytes hash of the public key corresponding to
	the Initial Attestation Key (IAK). If the IAK is a symmetric key		the Initial Attestation Key (IAK). If the IAK is a symmetric key
	then the Instance ID is a hash of the IAK itself. It is encoded as a		then the Instance ID is a hash of the hash of the IAK itself. It is
	Universal Entity ID of type RAND [I-D.ietf-rats-eat], i.e.,		encoded as a Universal Entity ID of type RAND [I-D.ietf-rats-eat],
	prepending a 0x01 type byte to the key hash. The full definition is		i.e., prepending a 0x01 type byte to the key hash. The full
	in [PSA-SM].		definition is in [PSA-SM].
	This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.		This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.
	psa-instance-id-type = bytes .size 33		psa-instance-id-type = bytes .size 33
	psa-instance-id = (		psa-instance-id = (
	arm_psa_UEID => psa-instance-id-type		psa-instance-id-key => psa-instance-id-type
	)		)
	3.2.2. Implementation ID		3.2.2. Implementation ID
	The Implementation ID claim uniquely identifies the underlying		The Implementation ID claim uniquely identifies the underlying
	immutable PSA RoT. A verification service can use this claim to		immutable PSA RoT. A verification service can use this claim to
	locate the details of the verification process. Such details include		locate the details of the verification process. Such details include
	the implementation's origin and associated certification state. The		the implementation's origin and associated certification state. The
	full definition is in [PSA-SM].		full definition is in [PSA-SM].
	This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.		This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.
	psa-implementation-id-type = bytes .size 32		psa-implementation-id-type = bytes .size 32
	psa-implementation-id = (		psa-implementation-id = (
	arm_psa_implementation_id => psa-implementation-id-type		psa-implementation-id-key => psa-implementation-id-type
	)		)
	3.2.3. Hardware Version		3.2.3. Certification Reference
	The Hardware Version claim provides metadata linking the token to the		The Certification Reference claim is used to link the class of chip
	GDSII that went to fabrication for this instance. It can be used to		and PSA RoT of the attesting device to an associated entry in the PSA
	link the class of chip and PSA RoT to the data on a certification		Certification database. It MUST be represented as a thirteen-digit
	website. It MUST be represented as a thirteen-digit [EAN-13].		[EAN-13].
	psa-hardware-version-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}"		Linking to the PSA Certification entry can still be achieved if this
			claim is not present in the token by making an association at a
			Verifier between the reference value and other token claim values -
			for example, the Implementation ID.
	psa-hardware-version = (		psa-certification-reference-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}"
	? arm_psa_hw_version => psa-hardware-version-type
			psa-certification-reference = (
			? psa-certification-reference-key =>
			psa-certification-reference-type
	)		)
	3.3. Target State Claims		3.3. Target State Claims
	3.3.1. Security Lifecycle		3.3.1. Security Lifecycle
	The Security Lifecycle claim represents the current lifecycle state		The Security Lifecycle claim represents the current lifecycle state
	of the PSA RoT. The state is represented by an integer that is		of the PSA RoT. The state is represented by an integer that is
	divided to convey a major state and a minor state. A major state is		divided to convey a major state and a minor state. A major state is
	mandatory and defined by [PSA-SM]. A minor state is optional and		mandatory and defined by [PSA-SM]. A minor state is optional and
	skipping to change at page 7, line 46 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 23 ¶
	psa-lifecycle-type =		psa-lifecycle-type =
	psa-lifecycle-unknown-type /		psa-lifecycle-unknown-type /
	psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type /		psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type /
	psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type /		psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type /
	psa-lifecycle-secured-type /		psa-lifecycle-secured-type /
	psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type /		psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type /
	psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type /		psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type /
	psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type		psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type
	psa-lifecycle = (		psa-lifecycle = (
	arm_psa_security_lifecycle => psa-lifecycle-type		psa-lifecycle-key => psa-lifecycle-type
	)		)
	3.3.2. Boot Seed		3.3.2. Boot Seed
	The Boot Seed claim represents a random value created at system boot		The Boot Seed claim represents a random value created at system boot
	time that will allow differentiation of reports from different boot		time that will allow differentiation of reports from different boot
	sessions.		sessions.
	This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.		This claim MUST be present in a PSA attestation token.
	psa-boot-seed-type = bytes .size 32		psa-boot-seed-type = bytes .size 32
	psa-boot-seed = (		psa-boot-seed = (
	arm_psa_boot_seed => psa-boot-seed-type		psa-boot-seed-key => psa-boot-seed-type
	)		)
	3.4. Software Inventory Claims		3.4. Software Inventory Claims
	3.4.1. Software Components		3.4.1. Software Components
	The Software Components claim is a list of software components that		The Software Components claim is a list of software components that
	includes all the software loaded by the PSA RoT. This claim SHALL be		includes all the software loaded by the PSA RoT. This claim SHALL be
	included in attestation tokens produced by an implementation		included in attestation tokens produced by an implementation
	conformant with [PSA-SM]. If the Software Components claim is		conformant with [PSA-SM]. If the Software Components claim is
	skipping to change at page 9, line 6 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 21 ¶
	party will typically see the result of the verification process from		party will typically see the result of the verification process from
	the Verifier in form of an attestation result, rather than the		the Verifier in form of an attestation result, rather than the
	"naked" PSA token from the attesting endpoint. Therefore, a relying		"naked" PSA token from the attesting endpoint. Therefore, a relying
	party is not expected to understand the Software Components claim.		party is not expected to understand the Software Components claim.
	Instead, it is for the Verifier to check this claim against the		Instead, it is for the Verifier to check this claim against the
	available endorsements and provide an answer in form of an "high		available endorsements and provide an answer in form of an "high
	level" attestation result, which may or may not include the original		level" attestation result, which may or may not include the original
	Software Components claim.		Software Components claim.
	psa-software-component = {		psa-software-component = {
	? 1 => text, ; measurement type		? 1 => text, ; measurement type
	2 => psa-hash-type, ; measurement value		2 => psa-hash-type, ; measurement value
	? 4 => text, ; version		? 4 => text, ; version
	5 => psa-hash-type, ; signer id		5 => psa-hash-type, ; signer id
	? 6 => text, ; measurement description		? 6 => text, ; measurement description
	}		}
	psa-software-components = (		psa-software-components = (
	arm_psa_sw_components => [ + psa-software-component ]		psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ]
	)		)
	3.4.1.1. Measurement Type		3.4.1.1. Measurement Type
	The Measurement Type attribute (key=1) is short string representing		The Measurement Type attribute (key=1) is short string representing
	the role of this software component.		the role of this software component.
	The following measurement types MAY be used:		The following measurement types MAY be used:
	* "BL": a Boot Loader		* "BL": a Boot Loader
	skipping to change at page 10, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 8 ¶
	In the event that the implementation does not contain any software		In the event that the implementation does not contain any software
	measurements then the Software Components claim Section 3.4.1 can be		measurements then the Software Components claim Section 3.4.1 can be
	omitted but instead the token MUST include this claim to indicate		omitted but instead the token MUST include this claim to indicate
	this is a deliberate state. The value SHOULD be 1. This claim is		this is a deliberate state. The value SHOULD be 1. This claim is
	intended for devices that are not compliant with [PSA-SM].		intended for devices that are not compliant with [PSA-SM].
	psa-no-sw-measurements-type = 1		psa-no-sw-measurements-type = 1
	psa-no-sw-measurement = (		psa-no-sw-measurement = (
	arm_psa_no_sw_measurements => psa-no-sw-measurements-type		psa-no-sw-measurement-key => psa-no-sw-measurements-type
	)		)
	3.5. Verification Claims		3.5. Verification Claims
	3.5.1. Verification Service Indicator		3.5.1. Verification Service Indicator
	The Verification Service Indicator claim is a hint used by a relying		The Verification Service Indicator claim is a hint used by a relying
	party to locate a validation service for the token. The value is a		party to locate a validation service for the token. The value is a
	text string that can be used to locate the service or a URL		text string that can be used to locate the service or a URL
	specifying the address of the service. A verifier may choose to		specifying the address of the service. A verifier may choose to
	ignore this claim in favor of other information.		ignore this claim in favor of other information.
	psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text		psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text
	psa-verification-service-indicator = (		psa-verification-service-indicator = (
	? arm_psa_origination => psa-verification-service-indicator-type		? psa-verification-service-indicator-key =>
			psa-verification-service-indicator-type
	)		)
	3.5.2. Profile Definition		3.5.2. Profile Definition
	The Profile Definition claim contains the name of a document that		The Profile Definition claim contains the name of a document that
	describes the "profile" of the report. The document name may include		describes the "profile" of the report. The document name may include
	versioning. The value for this specification MUST be		versioning. The value for this specification MUST be
	PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1.		PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1.
	psa-profile-type = "PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1"		psa-profile-type = "PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1"
	psa-profile = (		psa-profile = (
	? arm_psa_profile_id => psa-profile-type		? psa-profile-key => psa-profile-type
	)		)
	4. Token Encoding and Signing		4. Token Encoding and Signing
	The report is encoded as a COSE Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392], similar to		The report is encoded as a COSE Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392], similar to
	the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]. The token		the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]. The token
	consists of a series of claims declaring evidence as to the nature of		consists of a series of claims declaring evidence as to the nature of
	the instance of hardware and software. The claims are encoded in		the instance of hardware and software. The claims are encoded in
	CBOR [RFC7049] format. For asymmetric key algorithms, the signature		CBOR [RFC7049] format. For asymmetric key algorithms, the signature
	structure MUST be COSE-Sign1. For symmetric key algorithms, the		structure MUST be COSE_Sign1. For symmetric key algorithms, the
	structure MUST be COSE-Mac0.		structure MUST be COSE_Mac0.
	5. Collated CDDL		5. Collated CDDL
	psa-token = {		psa-token = {
	psa-nonce-claim,		psa-nonce,
	psa-instance-id,		psa-instance-id,
	psa-verification-service-indicator,		psa-verification-service-indicator,
	psa-profile,		psa-profile,
	psa-implementation-id,		psa-implementation-id,
	psa-client-id,		psa-client-id,
	psa-lifecycle,		psa-lifecycle,
	psa-hardware-version,		psa-certification-reference,
	psa-boot-seed,		psa-boot-seed,
	( psa-software-components // psa-no-sw-measurement ),		( psa-software-components // psa-no-sw-measurement ),
	}		}
	arm_psa_profile_id = -75000		psa-profile-key = -75000
	arm_psa_partition_id = -75001		psa-client-id-key = -75001
	arm_psa_security_lifecycle = -75002		psa-lifecycle-key = -75002
	arm_psa_implementation_id = -75003		psa-implementation-id-key = -75003
	arm_psa_boot_seed = -75004		psa-boot-seed-key = -75004
	arm_psa_hw_version = -75005		psa-certification-reference-key = -75005
	arm_psa_sw_components = -75006		psa-software-components-key = -75006
	arm_psa_no_sw_measurements = -75007		psa-no-sw-measurement-key = -75007
	arm_psa_nonce = -75008		psa-nonce-key = -75008
	arm_psa_UEID = -75009		psa-instance-id-key = -75009
	arm_psa_origination = -75010		psa-verification-service-indicator-key = -75010
	psa-hash-type = bytes .size 32 / bytes .size 48 / bytes .size 64		psa-hash-type = bytes .size 32 / bytes .size 48 / bytes .size 64
	psa-boot-seed-type = bytes .size 32		psa-boot-seed-type = bytes .size 32
	psa-boot-seed = (		psa-boot-seed = (
	arm_psa_boot_seed => psa-boot-seed-type		psa-boot-seed-key => psa-boot-seed-type
	)		)
	psa-client-id-nspe-type = -2147483648...0		psa-client-id-nspe-type = -2147483648...0
	psa-client-id-spe-type = 1..2147483647		psa-client-id-spe-type = 1..2147483647
	psa-client-id-type = psa-client-id-nspe-type / psa-client-id-spe-type		psa-client-id-type = psa-client-id-nspe-type / psa-client-id-spe-type
	psa-client-id = (		psa-client-id = (
	arm_psa_partition_id => psa-client-id-type		psa-client-id-key => psa-client-id-type
	)		)
	psa-hardware-version-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}"		psa-certification-reference-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}"
	psa-hardware-version = (		psa-certification-reference = (
	? arm_psa_hw_version => psa-hardware-version-type		? psa-certification-reference-key =>
			psa-certification-reference-type
	)		)
	psa-implementation-id-type = bytes .size 32		psa-implementation-id-type = bytes .size 32
	psa-implementation-id = (		psa-implementation-id = (
	arm_psa_implementation_id => psa-implementation-id-type		psa-implementation-id-key => psa-implementation-id-type
	)		)
	psa-instance-id-type = bytes .size 33		psa-instance-id-type = bytes .size 33
	psa-instance-id = (		psa-instance-id = (
	arm_psa_UEID => psa-instance-id-type		psa-instance-id-key => psa-instance-id-type
	)		)
	psa-no-sw-measurements-type = 1		psa-no-sw-measurements-type = 1
	psa-no-sw-measurement = (		psa-no-sw-measurement = (
	arm_psa_no_sw_measurements => psa-no-sw-measurements-type		psa-no-sw-measurement-key => psa-no-sw-measurements-type
	)		)
	psa-nonce-claim = (
	arm_psa_nonce => psa-hash-type		psa-nonce = (
			psa-nonce-key => psa-hash-type
	)		)
	psa-profile-type = "PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1"		psa-profile-type = "PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1"
	psa-profile = (		psa-profile = (
	? arm_psa_profile_id => psa-profile-type		? psa-profile-key => psa-profile-type
	)		)
	psa-lifecycle-unknown-type = 0x0000..0x00ff		psa-lifecycle-unknown-type = 0x0000..0x00ff
	psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type = 0x1000..0x10ff		psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type = 0x1000..0x10ff
	psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type = 0x2000..0x20ff		psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type = 0x2000..0x20ff
	psa-lifecycle-secured-type = 0x3000..0x30ff		psa-lifecycle-secured-type = 0x3000..0x30ff
	psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x4000..0x40ff		psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x4000..0x40ff
	psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x5000..0x50ff		psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x5000..0x50ff
	psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type = 0x6000..0x60ff		psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type = 0x6000..0x60ff
	psa-lifecycle-type =		psa-lifecycle-type =
	psa-lifecycle-unknown-type /		psa-lifecycle-unknown-type /
	psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type /		psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type /
	psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type /		psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type /
	psa-lifecycle-secured-type /		psa-lifecycle-secured-type /
	psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type /		psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type /
	psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type /		psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type /
	psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type		psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type
	psa-lifecycle = (		psa-lifecycle = (
	arm_psa_security_lifecycle => psa-lifecycle-type		psa-lifecycle-key => psa-lifecycle-type
	)		)
	psa-software-component = {		psa-software-component = {
	? 1 => text, ; measurement type		? 1 => text, ; measurement type
	2 => psa-hash-type, ; measurement value		2 => psa-hash-type, ; measurement value
	? 4 => text, ; version		? 4 => text, ; version
	5 => psa-hash-type, ; signer id		5 => psa-hash-type, ; signer id
	? 6 => text, ; measurement description		? 6 => text, ; measurement description
	}		}
	psa-software-components = (		psa-software-components = (
	arm_psa_sw_components => [ + psa-software-component ]		psa-software-components-key => [ + psa-software-component ]
	)		)
	psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text		psa-verification-service-indicator-type = text
	psa-verification-service-indicator = (		psa-verification-service-indicator = (
	? arm_psa_origination => psa-verification-service-indicator-type		? psa-verification-service-indicator-key =>
			psa-verification-service-indicator-type
	)		)
	6. Security and Privacy Considerations		6. Security and Privacy Considerations
	This specification re-uses the CWT and the EAT specification. Hence,		This specification re-uses the CWT and the EAT specification. Hence,
	the security and privacy considerations of those specifications apply		the security and privacy considerations of those specifications apply
	here as well.		here as well.
	Since CWTs offer different ways to protect the token, this		Since CWTs offer different ways to protect the token, this
	specification profiles those options and allows signatures based on		specification profiles those options and allows signatures based on
	use of public key cryptography as well as MAC authentication. The		use of public key cryptography as well as MAC authentication. The
	token MUST be signed following the structure of the COSE		token MUST be signed following the structure of the COSE
	specification [RFC8152]. The COSE type MUST be COSE-Sign1 for public		specification [RFC8152]. The COSE type MUST be COSE_Sign1 for public
	key signatures or COSE-Mac0 for MAC authentication. Note however		key signatures or COSE_Mac0 for MAC authentication. Note however
	that use of MAC authentication is NOT RECOMMENDED due to the		that use of MAC authentication is NOT RECOMMENDED due to the
	associated infrastructure costs for key management and protocol		associated infrastructure costs for key management and protocol
	complexities. It may also restrict the ability to interoperate with		complexities. It may also restrict the ability to interoperate with
	third parties.		third parties.
	Attestation tokens contain information that may be unique to a device		Attestation tokens contain information that may be unique to a device
	and therefore they may allow to single out an individual device for		and therefore they may allow to single out an individual device for
	tracking purposes. Implementations that have privacy requirements		tracking purposes. Implementations that have privacy requirements
	must take appropriate measures to ensure that the token is only used		must take appropriate measures to ensure that the token is only used
	to provision anonymous/pseudonym keys.		to provision anonymous/pseudonym keys.
	7. IANA Considerations		7. Verification
	IANA is requested to allocate the claims defined in Section 3 to the		To verify the token, the primary need is to check correct formation
	CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims registry [IANA-CWT]. The change		and signing as for any CWT token. In addition though, the verifier
	controller are the authors and the reference is this document.		can operate a policy where values of some of the claims in this
			profile can be compared to reference values, registered with the
			verifier for a given deployment, in order to confirm that the device
			is endorsed by the manufacturer supply chain. The policy may require
			that the relevant claims must have a match to a registered reference
			value. All claims may be worthy of additional appraisal. It is
			likely that most deployments would include a policy with appraisal
			for the following claims:
	8. References		* Instance ID - the value of the Instance ID can be used (together
			with the kid in the token COSE header, if present) to assist in
			locating the public key used to verify the token signature.
	8.1. Normative References		* Implementation ID - the value of the Implementation ID can be used
			to identify the verification requirements of the deployment.
			* Software Component, Measurement Value - this value can uniquely
			identify a firmware release from the supply chain. In some cases,
			a verifier may maintain a record for a series of firmware
			releases, being patches to an original baseline release. A
			verification policy may then allow this value to match any point
			on that release sequence or expect some minimum level of maturity
			related to the sequence.
			* Software Component, Signer ID - where present in a deployment,
			this could allow a verifier to operate a more general policy than
			that for Measurement Value as above, by allowing a token to
			contain any firmware entries signed by a known Signer ID, without
			checking for a uniquely registered version.
			8. IANA Considerations
			8.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration
			This specification registers the following claims in the IANA "CBOR
			Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry [IANA-CWT], established by
			[RFC8392].
			8.1.1. Nonce Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-nonce"
			* Claim Description: Nonce
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-nonce"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75008]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): bytes (32, 48, or 64 bytes in length)
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.1 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.2. Client ID Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-client-id"
			* Claim Description: Client ID
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-client-id"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75001]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): signed integer
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.2 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.3. Instance ID Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-instance-id"
			* Claim Description: Instance ID
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-instance-id"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75009]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): bytes (33 bytes in length)
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.2.1 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.4. Implementation ID Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-implementation-id"
			* Claim Description: Implementation ID
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-implementation-id"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75003]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): bytes (32 bytes in length)
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.2.2 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.5. Certification Reference Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-certification-reference"
			* Claim Description: Certification Reference
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-certification-reference"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75005]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): text
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.2.3 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.6. Security Lifecycle Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-lifecycle"
			* Claim Description: Security Lifecycle
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-lifecycle"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75002]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): unsigned integer
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.3.1 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.7. Boot Seed Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-boot-seed"
			* Claim Description: Boot Seed
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-boot-seed"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75004]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): bytes (32 bytes in length)
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.3.2 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.8. Software Components Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-software-components"
			* Claim Description: Software Components
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-software-components"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75006]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): array
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.4.1 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.9. No Software Measurements Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-no-sw-measurement"
			* Claim Description: No Software Measurements
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-no-sw-measurement"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75007]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): unsigned integer
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.4.2 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.10. Verification Service Indicator Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-verification-service-indicator"
			* Claim Description: Verification Service Indicator
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-verification-service-indicator"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75010]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): text
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.5.1 of [[this RFC]]
			8.1.11. Profile Definition Claim
			* Claim Name: "psa-profile"
			* Claim Description: Profile Definition
			* JWT Claim Name: "psa-profile"
			* Claim Key: [[Proposed: -75000]]
			* Claim Value Type(s): text
			* Change Controller: [[Authors of this RFC]]
			* Specification Document(s): Section 3.5.2 of [[this RFC]]
			8.2. Media Type Registration
			IANA is requested to register the "application/psa-attestation-token"
			media type [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA-MediaTypes]
			in the manner described in RFC 6838 [RFC6838], which can be used to
			indicate that the content is a PSA Attestation Token.
			* Type name: application
			* Subtype name: psa-attestation-token
			* Required parameters: n/a
			* Optional parameters: n/a
			* Encoding considerations: binary
			* Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
			of [[this RFC]]
			* Interoperability considerations: n/a
			* Published specification: [[this RFC]]
			* Applications that use this media type: Attesters and Relying
			Parties sending PSA attestation tokens over HTTP(S), CoAP(S), and
			other transports.
			* Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
			* Additional information:
			- Magic number(s): n/a
			- File extension(s): n/a
			- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
			* Person & email address to contact for further information: Hannes
			Tschofenig, Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com
			* Intended usage: COMMON
			* Restrictions on usage: none
			* Author: Hannes Tschofenig, Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com
			* Change controller: IESG
			* Provisional registration? No
			8.3. CoAP Content-Formats Registration
			IANA is requested to register the CoAP Content-Format ID for the
			"application/psa-attestation-token" media type in the "CoAP Content-
			Formats" registry [IANA-CoAP-Content-Formats].
			8.3.1. Registry Contents
			* Media Type: application/psa-attestation-token
			* Encoding: -
			* Id: [[To-be-assigned by IANA]]
			* Reference: [[this RFC]]
			9. References
			9.1. Normative References
	[EAN-13] GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes",		[EAN-13] GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes",
	2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.		2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.
	[PSA-FF] Arm, "Platform Security Architecture Firmware Framework		[PSA-FF] Arm, "Platform Security Architecture Firmware Framework
	1.0 (PSA-FF)", February 2019,		1.0 (PSA-FF)", February 2019,
	<https://pages.arm.com/psa-resources-ff.html>.		<https://pages.arm.com/psa-resources-ff.html>.
	[PSA-SM] Arm, "Platform Security Architecture Security Model 1.0		[PSA-SM] Arm, "Platform Security Architecture Security Model 1.0
	(PSA-SM)", February 2019,		(PSA-SM)", February 2019,
	<https://pages.arm.com/psa-resources-sm.html>.		<https://pages.arm.com/psa-resources-sm.html>.
			[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
			Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
			[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
			Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
			RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
	[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object		[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,		Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
	October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.		October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
	[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",		[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
	RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,		RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	skipping to change at page 15, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 22, line 5 ¶
	[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,		[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
	"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,		"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
	May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.		May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
	[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data		[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
	Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to		Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
	Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and		Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
	JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,		JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
	June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.		June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
	8.2. Informative References		9.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]		[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
	Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., and N. Smith,		Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
	"Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work in		W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
	Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-01,		in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
	4 February 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/		07, 16 October 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
	draft-ietf-rats-architecture-01.txt>.		draft-ietf-rats-architecture-07.txt>.
	[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]		[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
	Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.		Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.
	O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in		O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in
	Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-03, 20		Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-04, 31
	February 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-		August 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
	ietf-rats-eat-03.txt>.		ietf-rats-eat-04.txt>.
			[IANA-CoAP-Content-Formats]
			IANA, "CoAP Content-Formats", 2020,
			<https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters>.
	[IANA-CWT] IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", 2020,		[IANA-CWT] IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", 2020,
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/cwt.xhtml>.		<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/cwt.xhtml>.
			[IANA-MediaTypes]
			IANA, "Media Types", 2020,
			<http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
	[PSA] Arm, "Platform Security Architecture Resources", 2019,		[PSA] Arm, "Platform Security Architecture Resources", 2019,
	<https://www.arm.com/why-arm/architecture/platform-		<https://www.arm.com/why-arm/architecture/platform-
	security-architecture/psa-resources>.		security-architecture/psa-resources>.
	[TF-M] Linaro, "Trusted Firmware", 2020,		[TF-M] Linaro, "Trusted Firmware", 2020,
	<https://www.trustedfirmware.org>.		<https://www.trustedfirmware.org>.
	Appendix A. Reference Implementation		Appendix A. Reference Implementation
	A reference implementation is provided by the Trusted Firmware		A reference implementation is provided by the Trusted Firmware
	project [TF-M].		project [TF-M].
	Appendix B. Example		Appendix B. Example
	The following example shows an attestation token that was produced		The following example shows a PSA attestation token for an
	for a device that has a single-stage bootloader, and an RTOS with a		hypothetical system comprising two measured software components (a
	device management client. From a code point of view, the RTOS and		boot loader and a trusted RTOS). The attesting device is in a
	the device management client form a single binary.		lifecycle state Section 3.3.1 of SECURED. The attestation has been
			requested from a client residing in the SPE:
	EC key using curve P-256 with:
	* x:
	0xdcf0d0f4bcd5e26a54ee36cad660d283d12abc5f7307de58689e77cd60452e75
	* y:
	0x8cbadb5fe9f89a7107e5a2e8ea44ec1b09b7da2a1a82a0252a4c1c26ee1ed7cf
	* d:
	0xc74670bcb7e85b3803efb428940492e73e3fe9d4f7b5a8ad5e480cbdbcb554c2
	Key using COSE format (base64-encoded):
	pSJYIIy621/p+JpxB+Wi6OpE7BsJt9oqGoKgJSpMHCbuHtfPI1ggx0ZwvLfoWzgD77Q		{
	olASS5z4/6dT3taitXkgMvby1VMIBAiFYINzw0PS81eJqVO42ytZg0oPRKrxfcwfeWG		/ psa-profile / -75000: "PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1",
	ied81gRS51IAE=		/ psa-client-id / -75001: 1,
			/ psa-lifecycle / -75002: 12288,
			/ psa-implementation-id / -75003: h'50515253545556575051
			52535455565750515253545556575051525354555657',
			/ psa-boot-seed / -75004: h'DEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEAD
			BEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEF',
			/ psa-certification-reference / -75005: "1234567890123",
			/ psa-software-components / -75006: [
			{
			/ measurement type / 1: "BL",
			/ measurement value / 2: h'0001020400010204000102040001020
			400010204000102040001020400010204',
			/ signer ID / 5: h'519200FF519200FF519200FF519200F
			F519200FF519200FF519200FF519200FF'
			},
			{
			/ measurement type / 1: "PRoT",
			/ measurement value / 2: h'0506070805060708050607080506070
			805060708050607080506070805060708',
			/ signer ID / 5: h'519200FF519200FF519200FF519200F
			F519200FF519200FF519200FF519200FF'
			}
			],
			/ psa-nonce / -75008: h'00010203000102030001020300010203
			00010203000102030001020300010203',
			/ psa-instance-id / -75009: h'01A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2
			A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3',
			/ psa-verification-service-indicator / -75010: "https://psa-ve
			rifier.org"
			}
	Example of EAT token (base64-encoded):		The JWK representation of the IAK used for creating the COSE Sign1
			signature over the PSA token is:
	0oRDoQEmoFkCIqk6AAEk+1ggAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8		{
	6AAEk+lggAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh86AAEk/YSkAlggAA		"kty": "EC",
	ECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8EZTMuMS40BVggAAECAwQFBgcIC		"crv": "P-256",
	QoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8BYkJMpAJYIAABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8QERIT		"x": "MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4",
	FBUWFxgZGhscHR4fBGMxLjEFWCAAAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4PEBESExQVFhcYGRobHB0		"y": "4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM",
	eHwFkUFJvVKQCWCAAAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4PEBESExQVFhcYGRobHB0eHwRjMS4wBV		"d": "870MB6gfuTJ4HtUnUvYMyJpr5eUZNP4Bk43bVdj3eAE",
	ggAAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8BZEFSb1SkAlggAAECAwQFB		"use": "enc",
	gcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8EYzIuMgVYIAABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8Q		"kid": "1"
	ERITFBUWFxgZGhscHR4fAWNBcHA6AAEk+RkwADoAAST/WCAAAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4		}
	PEBESExQVFhcYGRobHB0eHzoAASUBbHBzYV92ZXJpZmllcjoAAST4IDoAASUAWCEBAA
	ECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh86AAEk93FQU0FfSW9UX1BST0ZJT
	EVfMVhAWIYFCO5+jMSOuoctu11pSlQrEyKtDVECPBlw30KfBlAcaDqVEIoMztCm6A4J
	ZvIr1j0cAFaXShG6My14d4f7Tw==
	Same token using extended CBOR diagnostic format:		The resulting COSE object is:
	18(		18(
	[		[
	/ protected / h'a10126' / {		/ protected / h'A10126',
	\ alg \ 1: -7 \ ECDSA 256 \		/ unprotected / {},
	} / ,		/ payload / h'AA3A000124F7715053415F494F545F50524F46494C
	/ unprotected / {},		455F313A000124F8013A000124F91930003A000124FA58205051525354555657
	/ payload / h'a93a000124fb5820000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111		5051525354555657505152535455565750515253545556573A000124FB5820DE
	2131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f3a000124fa5820000102030405060708090a0b0c		ADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEF3A
	0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f3a000124fd84a4025820000102030		000124FC6D313233343536373839303132333A000124FD82A30162424C025820
	405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f0465332e312e		0001020400010204000102040001020400010204000102040001020400010204
	34055820000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1		055820519200FF519200FF519200FF519200FF519200FF519200FF519200FF51
	d1e1f0162424ca4025820000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516		9200FFA3016450526F5402582005060708050607080506070805060708050607
	1718191a1b1c1d1e1f0463312e31055820000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1		08050607080506070805060708055820519200FF519200FF519200FF519200FF
	01112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f016450526f54a40258200001020304050607		519200FF519200FF519200FF519200FF3A000124FF5820000102030001020300
	08090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f0463312e30055820000		01020300010203000102030001020300010203000102033A00012500582101A0
	102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f016441		A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A3A0A1A2A33A
	526f54a4025820000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191		00012501781868747470733A2F2F7073612D76657269666965722E6F7267',
	a1b1c1d1e1f0463322e32055820000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213		/ signature / h'7C0FA38F80E5EA2A5C710A4BB37ABE63B26B25F17D
	1415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f01634170703a000124f91930003a000124ff5820000		B6BE9489587F9B3F8FEB80E0E410D8CDAAFAE5588024CB3E18D60C1F96CED9E0
	102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f3a0001		6743824614019E99BF13FE'
	25016c7073615f76657269666965723a000124f8203a00012500582101000102030
	405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f3a000124f771
	5053415f496f545f50524f46494c455f
	31' / {
	/ arm_psa_boot_seed / -75004: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
	101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ arm_psa_implementation_id / -75003: h'000102030405060708090a0b
	0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ arm_psa_sw_components / -75006: [
	{
	/ measurement / 2: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011
	12131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ version / 4: "3.1.4",
	/ signerID / 5: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121
	31415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ type / 1: "BL"
	},
	{
	/ measurement / 2: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011
	12131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ version / 4: "1.1",
	/ signerID / 5: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121
	31415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ type / 1: "PRoT"
	},
	{
	/ measurement / 2: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011
	12131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ version / 4: "1.0",
	/ signerID / 5: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121
	31415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ type / 1: "ARoT"
	},
	{
	/ measurement / 2: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011
	12131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ version / 4: "2.2",
	/ signerID / 5: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121
	31415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ type / 1: "App"
	}
	],
	/ arm_psa_security_lifecycle / -75002: 12288 / SECURED /,
	/ arm_psa_nonce / -75008: h'000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101
	112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ arm_psa_origination / -75010: "psa_verifier",
	/ arm_psa_partition_id / -75001: -1,
	/ arm_psa_UEID / -75009: h'01000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10
	1112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f',
	/ arm_psa_profile_id / -75000: "PSA_IoT_PROFILE_1"
	}),
	} / ,
	/ signature / h'58860508ee7e8cc48eba872dbb5d694a542b1322ad0d51023c1
	970df429f06501c683a95108a0cced0a6e80e0966f22bd63d1c0056974a11ba332d
	787787fb4f'
	]		]
	)		)
	Contributors		Contributors
	We would like to thank the following colleagues for their		We would like to thank the following colleagues for their
	contributions:		contributions:
	* Laurence Lundblade		* Laurence Lundblade
	Security Theory LLC		Security Theory LLC
End of changes. 70 change blocks.
	215 lines changed or deleted		493 lines changed or added
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