< draft-turner-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01.txt   draft-turner-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02.txt >
Network Working Group M. Reynolds Network Working Group M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft BBN Internet-Draft BBN
Updates: [ID.sidr-res-certs] S. Turner Updates: [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] S. Turner
Intended Status: Standards Track IECA Intended Status: Standards Track IECA
Expires: January 28, 2012 July 27, 2011 Expires: February 3, 2012 August 2, 2011
A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-turner-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 draft-turner-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper
operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under
development as a component to address the requirement to provide development as a component to address the requirement to provide
security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a
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cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
number extension, to routers within the Autonomous System (AS). The number extension, to routers within the Autonomous System (AS). The
certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the private key are certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the private key are
authorized to send out secure route advertisements on behalf of the authorized to send out secure route advertisements on behalf of the
specified AS. This document also profiles the Certificate Revocation specified AS. This document also profiles the Certificate Revocation
List (CRL), profiles the format of certification requests, and List (CRL), profiles the format of certification requests, and
specifies Relying Party certificate path validation procedures. The specifies Relying Party certificate path validation procedures. The
document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the RPKI document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the RPKI
Resource Certificates Profile (draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs). Resource Certificates Profile (draft-ietf-sidr-res-cert-profile).
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 3, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of
appropriate uses defined within [ID.sidr-cp]. The issuance of BGPSEC appropriate uses defined within [ID.sidr-cp]. The issuance of BGPSEC
Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI
CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
specified in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]). Further, the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]). Further, the algorithms
used to generate RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPSEC Router used to generate RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPSEC Router
Certificates and the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the Certificates and the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the
BGPSEC Router Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as BGPSEC Router Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
specified in [ID.sidr-rpki-algs]). The only impact is that the RPKI specified in [ID.sidr-rpki-algs]). The only impact is that the RPKI
CAs will need to be able to process a profiled certificate request CAs will need to be able to process a profiled certificate request
(see Section 5) signed with algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec- (see Section 5) signed with algorithms found in [ID.turner-sidr-
algs]. The use of BGPSEC Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI bgpsec-algs]. The use of BGPSEC Router Certificates in no way
RPs that process Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests and ROAs because the public
the BGPSEC Router Certificate is only ever used to verify the key found in the BGPSEC Router Certificate is only ever used to
signature on the BGPSEC certificate request (only CAs process these), verify the signature on the BGPSEC certificate request (only CAs
another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only BGPSEC routers process process these), another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only BGPSEC
these), and the signature on a BGPSEC Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec- routers process these), and the signature on a BGPSEC Update Message
protocol] (only BGPSEC routers process these). [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPSEC routers process these).
Only the differences between this profile and the profile in Only the differences between this profile and the profile in
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router
Certificates are EE certificates. Certificates are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on
process described in [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility].
3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields 3. Updates to [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]
3.1 BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields
A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280] and [ID.sidr-res-cert- consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280] and [ID.sidr-res-cert-
profile], containing the fields listed in this section. Only the profile], containing the fields listed in this section. Only the
differences between this profile and the profile in [ID.sidr-res- differences between this profile and the profile in [ID.sidr-res-
cert-profile] are listed. cert-profile] are listed.
3.1. Subject 3.1.1.1 Subject
This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been
issued. Consistent with [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile], only two issued. Consistent with [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile], only two
attributes are allowed in the Subject field: common name and serial attributes are allowed in the Subject field: common name and serial
number. Moreover, the only common name encoding options that are number. Moreover, the only common name encoding options that are
supported are printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router supported are printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router
Certificates, it is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute Certificates, it is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute
contain the literal string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number contain the literal string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number
[RFC3779] encoded as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial [RFC3779] encoded as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial
number attribute contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., number attribute contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e.,
the router ID) encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If the same the router ID) encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If the same
certificate is issued to more than one router (hence the private key certificate is issued to more than one router (hence the private key
is shared among these routers), the choice of the router ID used in is shared among these routers), the choice of the router ID used in
this name is at the discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs this name is at the discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs
are not guaranteed to be unique across the Internet, and thus the are not guaranteed to be unique across the Internet, and thus the
Subject name in a BGPSEC Router Certificate issued using this Subject name in a BGPSEC Router Certificate issued using this
convention also is not guaranteed to be unique across different convention also is not guaranteed to be unique across different
issuers. However, each certificate issued by an individual CA MUST issuers. However, each certificate issued by an individual CA MUST
contain a Subject name that is unique within that context. contain a Subject name that is unique within that context.
3.2. Subject Public Key Info 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info
Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.turner-sidr-bgpsec-algs].
3.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.1.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent, The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent,
if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where
explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a
conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate. conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate.
3.3.1. Extended Key Usage 3.1.3.1. Extended Key Usage
BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU) BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU)
extension. As specified, in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] this extension. As specified, in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] this
extension MUST be marked as non-critical. This document defines one extension MUST be marked as non-critical. This document defines one
EKU for BGPSEC Router Certificates: EKU for BGPSEC Router Certificates:
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) TBD } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) TBD }
id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD } id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
Relying Parties MUST require the extended key usage extension to be Relying Parties MUST require the extended key usage extension to be
present in a BGPSEC Router Certificate. If multiple KeyPurposeId present in a BGPSEC Router Certificate. If multiple KeyPurposeId
values are included, the relying parties need not recognize all of values are included, the relying parties need not recognize all of
them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is present. BGPSEC them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is present. BGPSEC
RPs MUST reject certificates that do not contain the BGPSEC Router RPs MUST reject certificates that do not contain the BGPSEC Router
EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in
[RFC5280]. [RFC5280].
3.3.2. Subject Information Access 3.1.3.2. Subject Information Access
This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUST be This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUST be
omitted. omitted.
3.3.3. IP Resources 3.1.3.3. IP Resources
This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUSt be This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUSt be
omitted. omitted.
3.3.4. AS Resources 3.1.3.4. AS Resources
Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource
extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of [ID.sidr-res-cert- extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of [ID.sidr-res-cert-
profile]. The AS Resource extension MUST include exactly one AS profile]. The AS Resource extension MUST include exactly one AS
number, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be specified. number, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be specified.
4. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile 3.2. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile
Refer to section 6 of [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]. The only Refer to section 6 of [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]. The only
differences between this profile and the profile in [ID.sidr-res- differences between this profile and the profile in [ID.sidr-res-
cert-profile] are: cert-profile] are:
o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA
MUST honor the request; MUST honor the request;
o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and, [ID.turner-sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and,
o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr- o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.turner-
bgpsec-algs]. sidr-bgpsec-algs].
5. BGPSEC Router Certificate Validation 3.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Validation
The validation procedure used for BGPSEC Router Certificates is The validation procedure used for BGPSEC Router Certificates is
identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] except that where "this specification" [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] except that where "this specification"
refers to [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] in that profile in this profile refers to [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] in that profile in this profile
"this specification" is this document. "this specification" is this document.
The differences are as follows: The differences are as follows:
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the BGPSEC EKU defined in o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the BGPSEC EKU defined in
Section 3.9.5. Section 3.9.5.
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension. o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension.
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource
extension. extension.
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource extension. o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource extension.
6. Design Notes 4. Design Notes
The BGPSEC Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource The BGPSEC Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource
Certificate profile as specified in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]. Certificate profile as specified in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile].
As a result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of As a result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of
the design choices that were taken in that prior work. The reader the design choices that were taken in that prior work. The reader
is referred to [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] for a fuller discussion is referred to [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] for a fuller discussion
of those choices. of those choices.
7. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] apply. The Security Considerations of [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] apply.
A bgpsec certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile], because the algorithm suite is
different. Consequently, a RP needs to identify the EKU before
applying the correspondent validation.
A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [ID.sidr- A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [ID.sidr-
arch] to encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger arch] to encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger
BGPSEC security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC BGPSEC security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC
Signature-Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr- Signature-Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-
bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the
secure binding of an AS number to a public key, consistent with secure binding of an AS number to a public key, consistent with
the RPKI allocation/assignment hierarchy. the RPKI allocation/assignment hierarchy.
8. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
None. None.
9. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
The efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were instrumental in We would like to thanks Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and
preparing this work. Additionally, we'd like to thank Roque Robert Loomans for their work on [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile], which
Gagliano for his helpful suggestion about including an EKU. We'd this work is based on. In addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and
like to thank Sandra Murphy and Geoff Huston for their reviews. Matt Lepinski were instrumental in preparing this work.
Additionally, we'd like to thank Roque Gagliano for his helpful
suggestion about including an EKU and the validation security
consideration section. We'd like to thank Sandra Murphy and Geoff
Huston for their reviews.
10. Normative References 8. Normative References
10.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border
Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
skipping to change at page 8, line 5 skipping to change at page 8, line 18
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R.
Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs, work-in-progress. draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs, work-in-progress.
[ID.sidr-rpki-algs] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key [ID.sidr-rpki-algs] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key
Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs, work-in-progress. draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs, work-in-progress.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, [ID.turner-sidr-bgpsec-algs] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "BGP
Key Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-turner-sidr- Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-
bgpsec-algs, work-in-progress. turner-sidr-bgpsec-algs, work-in-progress.
10.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
RFC 4272, January 2006. RFC 4272, January 2006.
[RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the
Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008. Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008.
[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009. with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009.
skipping to change at page 8, line 37 skipping to change at page 8, line 50
[ID.sidr-rpki-roa-format] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A [ID.sidr-rpki-roa-format] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A
Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", draft- Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", draft-
ietf-sidr-roa-format, work-in-progress ietf-sidr-roa-format, work-in-progress
[ID.sidr-rpki-manifests] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. [ID.sidr-rpki-manifests] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M.
Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests, work-in- Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests, work-in-
progress. progress.
[ID.sidr-algorithm-agility] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner,
"Algorithm Agility Procedure for RPKI", draft-ietf-sidr-
algorithm-agility, work-in-progress.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPSEC Protocol [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPSEC Protocol
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in-
progress. progress.
Appendix A. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Appendix A. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation Lis Appendix B. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Request
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mark Reynolds Mark Reynolds
Raytheon BBN Technologies Corp. Raytheon BBN Technologies Corp.
10 Moulton St. 10 Moulton St.
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138
Email: mreynold@bbn.com Email: mreynold@bbn.com
Sean Turner Sean Turner
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