< draft-walker-ieee802-req-00.txt		draft-walker-ieee802-req-01.txt >
	Network Working Group Dorothy Stanley		Network Working Group Dorothy Stanley
	INTERNET-DRAFT Agere		INTERNET-DRAFT Agere
	Category: Informational Jesse Walker		Category: Best Current Practice Jesse Walker
	<draft-walker-ieee802-req-00.txt> Intel Corporation		<draft-walker-ieee802-req-01.txt> Intel Corporation
	3 February 2004 Bernard Aboba		11 May 2004 Bernard Aboba
	Microsoft Corporation		Microsoft Corporation
	EAP Method Requirements for Wireless LANs		EAP Method Requirements for Wireless LANs
	This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all		This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
	provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.		all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
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	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.		Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
	Abstract		Abstract
	The Draft IEEE 802.11i MAC Security Enhancements Amendment makes use of		The IEEE 802.11i MAC Security Enhancements Amendment makes use of
	IEEE 802.1X which in turn relies on the Extensible Authentication		IEEE 802.1X which in turn relies on the Extensible Authentication
	Protocol (EAP). This document defines requirements for EAP methods used		Protocol (EAP). This document defines requirements for EAP methods
	in IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN deployments. The material in this document		used in IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN deployments. The material in this
	has been approved by IEEE 802.11 and it is being presented as an IETF		document has been approved by IEEE 802.11 and it is being presented
	RFC for informational purposes.		as an IETF RFC for informational purposes.
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Draft IEEE 802.11i MAC Security Enhancements Amendment [IEEE802.11i]		The IEEE 802.11i MAC Security Enhancements Amendment [IEEE802.11i]
	makes use of IEEE 802.1X [IEEE8021X-REV] which in turn relies on the		makes use of IEEE 802.1X [IEEE8021X-REV] which in turn relies on the
	Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC2284bis].		Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748].
	Deployments of IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs today are based on EAP, and use
	several EAP methods, including EAP-TLS [RFC2716], EAP-TTLS [TTLS], PEAP
	[PEAP] and EAP-SIM [SIM]. These methods support authentication
	credentials that include digital certificates, user-names and passwords,
	secure tokens, and SIM secrets.
	This document defines requirements for EAP methods used in IEEE 802.11		Deployments of IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs today are based on EAP, and
	wireless LAN deployments.		use several EAP methods, including EAP-TLS [RFC2716], EAP-TTLS
			[TTLS], PEAP [PEAP] and EAP-SIM [SIM]. These methods support
			authentication credentials that include digital certificates, user-
			names and passwords, secure tokens, and SIM secrets.
			This document defines requirements for EAP methods used in IEEE
			802.11 wireless LAN deployments. EAP methods claiming conformance to
			the IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN requirements for EAP methods must
			complete IETF last call review.
	1.1. Requirements specification		1.1. Requirements specification
	In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements of		In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
	the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key words		of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
	"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD		"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
	NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be		and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
	interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		[RFC2119].
	An EAP authentication method is not compliant with this specification if		An EAP authentication method is not compliant with this specification
	it fails to satisfy one or more of the MUST or MUST NOT requirements.		if it fails to satisfy one or more of the MUST or MUST NOT
	An EAP authentication method that satisfies all the MUST, MUST NOT,		requirements. An EAP authentication method that satisfies all the
	SHOULD and SHOULD NOT requirements is said to be "unconditionally		MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD and SHOULD NOT requirements is said to be
	compliant"; one that satisfies all the MUST and MUST NOT requirements		"unconditionally compliant"; one that satisfies all the MUST and MUST
	but not all the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT requirements is said to be		NOT requirements but not all the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT requirements is
	"conditionally compliant".		said to be "conditionally compliant".
			1.2. Terminology
			authenticator
			The end of the link initiating EAP authentication. The term
			Authenticator is used in [IEEE-802.1X], and authenticator has the
			same meaning in this document.
			peer The end of the link that responds to the authenticator. In
			[IEEE-802.1X], this end is known as the Supplicant.
			Supplicant
			The end of the link that responds to the authenticator in
			[IEEE-802.1X].
			backend authentication server
			A backend authentication server is an entity that provides an
			authentication service to an authenticator. When used, this server
			typically executes EAP methods for the authenticator. This
			terminology is also used in [IEEE-802.1X].
			EAP server
			The entity that terminates the EAP authentication method with the
			peer. In the case where no backend authentication server is used,
			the EAP server is part of the authenticator. In the case where the
			authenticator operates in pass-through mode, the EAP server is
			located on the backend authentication server.
			Master Session Key (MSK)
			Keying material that is derived between the EAP peer and server and
			exported by the EAP method. The MSK is at least 64 octets in
			length. In existing implementations a AAA server acting as an EAP
			server transports the MSK to the authenticator.
			Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)
			Additional keying material derived between the EAP client and
			server that is exported by the EAP method. The EMSK is at least 64
			octets in length. The EMSK is not shared with the authenticator or
			any other third party. The EMSK is reserved for future uses that
			are not defined yet.
			4-Way Handshake
			A pairwise Authentication and Key Management Protocol (AKMP)
			defined in [IEEE802.11i], which confirms mutual possession of a
			Pairwise Master Key by two parties and distributes a Group Key.
	2. Method requirements		2. Method requirements
	2.1. Credential types		2.1. Credential types
	The Draft IEEE 802.11i MAC Security Enhancements Amendment requires that		The IEEE 802.11i MAC Security Enhancements Amendment requires that
	EAP authentication methods are available. Wireless LAN deployments are		EAP authentication methods are available. Wireless LAN deployments
	expected to use different credentials types, including digital		are expected to use different credentials types, including digital
	certificates, user-names and passwords, existing secure tokens, and		certificates, user-names and passwords, existing secure tokens, and
	mobile network credentials (GSM and UMTS secrets). Other credential		mobile network credentials (GSM and UMTS secrets). Other credential
	types that may be used include public/private key (without necessarily		types that may be used include public/private key (without
	requiring certificates), and asymmetric credential support (password on		necessarily requiring certificates), and asymmetric credential
	one side, public/private key on the other).		support (such as password on one side, public/private key on the
			other).
	2.2. Mandatory requirements		2.2. Mandatory requirements
	EAP authentication methods suitable for use in wireless LAN		EAP authentication methods suitable for use in wireless LAN
	authentication MUST satisfy the following criteria:		authentication MUST satisfy the following criteria:
	[1] Generation of keying material. This corresponds to the "Key
	derivation" security claim defined in [RFC2284bis], Section 7.2.1.
	[2] Mutual authentication support. This corresponds to the "Mutual		[1] Generation of symmetric keying material. This corresponds to the
	authentication" security claim defined in [RFC2284bis], Section		"Key derivation" security claim defined in [RFC3748], Section
	7.2.1.		7.2.1.
	[3] Synchronization of state. This corresponds to the "Protected		[2] Key strength. An EAP method suitable for use with IEEE 802.11 MUST
	result indication" security claim defined in [RFC2284bis], Section		be capable of generating keying material with 128-bits of effective
	7.2.1.		key strength, as defined in [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1. As noted in
			[RFC3748] Section 7.10, an EAP method supporting key derivation
			MUST export a Master Session Key (MSK) of at least 64 octets, and
			an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) of at least 64 octets.
	[4] Resistance to dictionary attacks. This corresponds to the		[3] Mutual authentication support. This corresponds to the "Mutual
	"Dictionary attack resistance" security claim defined in		authentication" security claim defined in [RFC3748], Section 7.2.1.
	[RFC2284bis], Section 7.2.1.
	[5] Protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. This corresponds to		[4] Synchronization of state. This requirement applies when the EAP
	the "Cryptographic binding", "Integrity Protection", "Replay		method completes successfully. The exact state attributes that are
	protection", and "Session Independence" security claims defined in		shared may vary from method to method but typically include the
	[RFC2284bis], Section 7.2.1.		protocol both executed, what credentials were presented and
			accepted by both parties, what cryptographic keys are shared and
			what EAP method specific attributes were negotiated, such as cipher
			suites and limitations of usage on all protocol state. Both
			parties must be able to distinguish this instance of the protocol
			from all other instances of the protocol and they must share the
			same view of which state attributes are public and which are
			private to the two parties alone.
	[6] Protected ciphersuite negotiation. If the method negotiates the		[5] Resistance to dictionary attacks. This corresponds to the
			"Dictionary attack resistance" security claim defined in [RFC3748],
			Section 7.2.1.
			[6] Protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. This corresponds to
			the "Cryptographic binding", "Integrity protection", "Replay
			protection", and "Session independence" security claims defined in
			[RFC3748], Section 7.2.1.
			[7] Protected ciphersuite negotiation. If the method negotiates the
	ciphersuite used to protect the EAP conversation, then it MUST		ciphersuite used to protect the EAP conversation, then it MUST
	support the "Protected ciphersuite negotiation" security claim		support the "Protected ciphersuite negotiation" security claim
	defined in [RFC2284bis], Section 7.2.1.		defined in [RFC3748], Section 7.2.1.
	[7] Key strength. An EAP method suitable for use with IEEE 802.11 MUST
	be capable of generating keying material with 128-bits of effective
	key strength, as defined in [RFC2284bis] Section 7.2.1. As noted
	in [RFC2284bis] Section 7.10, an EAP method supporting key
	derivation MUST export a Master Session Key (MSK) of at least 64
	octets, and an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) of at least 64
	octets.
	2.3. Recommended requirements		2.3. Recommended requirements
	EAP authentication methods used for wireless LAN authentication SHOULD		EAP authentication methods used for wireless LAN authentication
	support the following features:		SHOULD support the following features:
	[8] Fragmentation. [RFC2284bis] Section 3.1 states: "EAP methods can		[8] Fragmentation. [RFC3748] Section 3.1 states: "EAP methods can
	assume a minimum EAP MTU of 1020 octets, in the absence of other		assume a minimum EAP MTU of 1020 octets, in the absence of other
	information. EAP methods SHOULD include support for fragmentation		information. EAP methods SHOULD include support for fragmentation
	and reassembly if their payloads can be larger than this minimum		and reassembly if their payloads can be larger than this minimum
	EAP MTU." This implies support for the "Fragmentation" claim		EAP MTU." This implies support for the "Fragmentation" claim
	defined in [RFC2284bis], Section 7.2.1.		defined in [RFC3748], Section 7.2.1.
	2.4. Optional features		[9] End-user identity hiding. This corresponds to the
			"Confidentiality" security claim defined in [RFC3748], Section
			7.2.1.
	EAP authentication methods used for wireless LAN authentication MAY		2.4. Optional features
	support the following features:
	[9] Channel binding. This corresponds to the "Channel binding"		EAP authentication methods used for wireless LAN authentication MAY
	security claim defined in [RFC2284bis], Section 7.2.1.		support the following features:
	[10] End-user identity hiding. This corresponds to the		[10] Channel binding. This corresponds to the "Channel binding"
	"Confidentiality" security claim defined in [RFC2284bis], Section		security claim defined in [RFC3748], Section 7.2.1.
	7.2.1.
	[11] Fast reconnect. This corresponds to the "Fast reconnect" security		[11] Fast reconnect. This corresponds to the "Fast reconnect" security
	claim defined in [RFC2284bis], Section 7.2.1.		claim defined in [RFC3748], Section 7.2.1.
	2.5. Non-compliant EAP authentication methods		2.5. Non-compliant EAP authentication methods
	EAP-MD5-Challenge (the current mandatory-to-implement EAP authentication		EAP-MD5-Challenge (the current mandatory-to-implement EAP
	method), is defined in [RFC2284bis] Section 5.4. EAP-MD5-Challenge and		authentication method), is defined in [RFC3748] Section 5.4. EAP-
	two EAP authentication methods defined in [RFC2284bis], One-Time		MD5-Challenge, One-Time Password (Section 5.5) and Generic Token Card
	Password (Section 5.5) and Generic Token Card (Section 5.6), are non-		(Section 5.6), as defined in [RFC3748] are non-compliant with the
	compliant with the requirements defined in this document.		requirements specified in this document. As noted in [RFC3748],
			these methods do not support any of the mandatory requirements
			defined in Section 2.2 including key derivation, or mutual
			authentication. In addition, these methods do not support any of the
			recommended features defined in Section 2.3 or any of the optional
			features defined in Section 2.4.
	3. References		3. Security Considerations
	3.1. Normative References		Within [IEEE802.11i], EAP is used for both authentication and key
			exchange between the EAP peer and server. Given that wireless local
			area networks provide ready access to an attacker within range, EAP
			usage within [IEEE802.11i] is subject to the threats outlined in
			[RFC3748] Section 7.1. Security considerations relating to EAP are
			discussed in [RFC3748] Sections 7; where an authentication server is
			utilized, the security considerations described in [RFC3579], Section
			4 will apply.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		The system security properties required to address the threats
	Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March, 1997.		described in [RFC3748] Section 7.1 are noted in [Housley56]:
	[RFC2284bis] Blunk, L. , et al., "Extensible Authentication Protocol		Algorithm independence
	(EAP)", draft-ietf-eap-rfc2284bis-08.txt, Internet-Draft		Wherever cryptographic algorithms are chosen, the algorithms must
	(work in progress), February 2004.		be negotiable, in order to provide resilience against compromise of
			a particular cryptographic algorithm. This is addressed by
			mandatory requirement [7] in Section 2.2. Algorithm independence
			is one of the EAP invariants described in [KEYFRAME].
	3.2. Informative References		Strong, fresh session keys
			Session keys must be demonstrated to be strong and fresh in all
			circumstances, while at the same time retaining algorithm
			independence. Key strength is addressed by mandatory requirement
			[2] in Section 2.2. Recommendations for ensuring the Freshness of
			keys derived by EAP methods are discussed in [RFC3748], Section
			7.10.
	[RFC2716] Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication		Replay protection
	Protocol", RFC 2716, October 1999.		All protocol exchanges must be replay protected. This is addressed
			by mandatory requirement [6] in Section 2.2.
	[PEAP] Palekar, A., et al., "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)",		Authentication
	draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-07.txt, Internet draft		All parties need to be authenticated. Mutual authentication is
	(work in progress), November 2003.		required as part of mandatory requirement [3] in Section 2.2. The
			confidentiality of the authenticator must be maintained. Identity
			protection is a recommended capability, described in requirement
			[9] in Section 2.3. No plaintext passwords are allowed. EAP does
			not support plaintext passwords, as noted in [RFC3748] Section
			7.14.
	[TTLS] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "EAP Tunneled TLS		Authorization
	Authentication Protocol (EAP-TTLS)", draft-ietf-pppext-		EAP peer and authenticator authorization must be performed. Issues
	eap-ttls-03.txt, August 2003.		relating to authorization are discussed in [RFC3748] Section 7.15,
			and [RFC3579] Section 4.3.7.
	[EAPSIM] Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "EAP SIM Authentication",		Session keys
	draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-12.txt, Internet draft		Confidentiality of session keys must be maintained. Issues
	(work in progress), October 2003.		relating to Key Derivation are described in [RFC3748] Section 7.10,
			as well as in [KEYFRAME].
	[IEEE802] IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:		Ciphersuite negotiation
	Overview and Architecture, ANSI/IEEE Std 802, 1990.		The selection of the "best" ciphersuite must be securely confirmed.
			This is addressed in mandatory requirement [7] in Section 2.2.
	[802.11] Information technology - Telecommunications and		Unique naming
	information exchange between systems - Local and		Session keys must be uniquely named. Key naming issues are
	metropolitan area networks - Specific Requirements Part		addressed in [KEYFRAME].
	11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and
	Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, IEEE Std.		Domino effect
	802.11-1999, 1999.		Compromise of a single authenticator cannot compromise any other
			part of the system, including session keys and long-term secrets.
			This issue is addressed by mandatory requirement [6] in Section
			2.2.
			Key binding
			The key must be bound to the appropriate context. This issue is
			addressed in optional requirement [10] in Section 2.4. Channel
			binding is also discussed in Section 7.15 of [RFC3748].
			4. References
			4.1. Normative References
			[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
			Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March, 1997.
			[RFC3748] Blunk, L. , et al., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
			(EAP)", RFC 3748, May 2004.
			[802.11] Information technology - Telecommunications and information
			exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area
			networks - Specific Requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium
			Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications,
			IEEE Std. 802.11-1999, 1999.
	[IEEE8021X-REV]		[IEEE8021X-REV]
	IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:		IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port
	Port based Network Access Control, IEEE Std 802.1X-REV,		based Network Access Control, IEEE Std 802.1X-REV, Draft 9,
	Draft 8, December 2003.		March 2004.
	[IEEE802.11i] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,		[IEEE802.11i]
	"Unapproved Draft Supplement to Standard for		Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Unapproved
	Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between		Draft Supplement to Standard for Telecommunications and
	Systems - LAN/MAN Specific Requirements - Part 11:		Information Exchange Between Systems - LAN/MAN Specific
	Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical		Requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
	Layer (PHY) Specifications: Specification for Enhanced		(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications: Specification
	Security", IEEE Draft 802.11i (work in progress), 2003.		for Enhanced Security", IEEE Draft 802.11i (work in progress),
			2003.
			4.2. Informative References
			[Housley56]
			Housley, R., "Key Management in AAA", Presentation to the AAA
			WG at IETF 56,
			http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/03mar/slides/aaa-5/index.html,
			March 2003.
			[RFC2716] Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol",
			RFC 2716, October 1999.
			[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial
			In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication
			Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
			[PEAP] Palekar, A., et al., "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)", draft-
			josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-08.txt, Internet draft (work in
			progress), May 2004.
			[TTLS] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "EAP Tunneled TLS Authentication
			Protocol (EAP-TTLS)", draft-ietf-pppext-eap-ttls-03.txt,
			August 2003.
			[EAPSIM] Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "EAP SIM Authentication", draft-
			haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-12.txt, Internet draft (work in
			progress), October 2003.
			[IEEE802] IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
			Overview and Architecture, ANSI/IEEE Std 802, 1990.
			[KEYFRAME]
			Aboba, B., "EAP Key Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-
			keying-02 (work in progress), May 2004.
	Acknowledgments		Acknowledgments
	The authors would like to acknowledge members of the IEEE 802.11i task		The authors would like to acknowledge contributions to this document
	group, including David Nelson of Enterasys Networks and Clint Chaplin of		from members of the IEEE 802.11i Task Group, including Russ Housley
	Symbol Technologies for contributions to this document.		of Vigil Security, David Nelson of Enterasys Networks and Clint
			Chaplin of Symbol Technologies, as well as members of the EAP WG
			including Joe Salowey of Cisco Systems, Pasi Eronen of Nokia, Jari
			Arkko of Ericsson, and Florent Bersani of France Telecom.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Dorothy Stanley		Dorothy Stanley
	Agere Systems		Agere Systems
	2000 North Naperville Rd.		2000 North Naperville Rd.
	Naperville, IL 60566
	EMail: dstanley@agere.com		Naperville, IL 60566
	Phone: +1 630 979 1572
	Jesse R. Walker		EMail: dstanley@agere.com
	Intel Corporation		Phone: +1 630 979 1572
	2111 N.E. 25th Avenue
	Hillsboro, OR 97214
	EMail: jesse.walker@intel.com
	Bernard Aboba		Jesse R. Walker
	Microsoft Corporation		Intel Corporation
	One Microsoft Way		2111 N.E. 25th Avenue
	Redmond, WA 98052		Hillsboro, OR 97214
	EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com		EMail: jesse.walker@intel.com
	Phone: +1 425 706 6605
	Fax: +1 425 936 7329		Bernard Aboba
			Microsoft Corporation
			One Microsoft Way
			Redmond, WA 98052
			EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
			Phone: +1 425 706 6605
			Fax: +1 425 936 7329
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	languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are		copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
	perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its		followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
	successors or assigns. This document and the information contained		English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and
	herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE		will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or
	INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR		assigns. This document and the information contained herein is
	IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE		provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
	INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED		INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
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			THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
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			Open issues
			Open issues relating to this specification are tracked on the
			following web site:
			http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/eapissues.html
	Expiration Date		Expiration Date
	This memo is filed as <draft-walker-ieee802-req-00.txt>, and expires		This memo is filed as <draft-walker-ieee802-req-01.txt>, and
	August 22, 2004.		expires November 22, 2004.
End of changes. 52 change blocks.
	194 lines changed or deleted		354 lines changed or added
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