| < draft-ietf-ipsec-doc-roadmap-00.txt | draft-ietf-ipsec-doc-roadmap-01.txt > | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Network Working Group R. Thayer | Network Working Group R. Thayer | |||
| Internet Draft N. Doraswamy | Internet Draft N. Doraswamy | |||
| Category: Informational R. Glenn | Category: Informational R. Glenn | |||
| Expire in six months July 1997 | Expire in six months July 1997 | |||
| IP Security | IP Security | |||
| Document Roadmap | Document Roadmap | |||
| <draft-ietf-ipsec-doc-roadmap-00.txt> | <draft-ietf-ipsec-doc-roadmap-01.txt> | |||
| Status of This Memo | Status of This Memo | |||
| This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working | This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working | |||
| documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, | documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, | |||
| and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute | and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute | |||
| working documents as Internet-Drafts. | working documents as Internet-Drafts. | |||
| Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | |||
| and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | |||
| skipping to change at page 1, line 41 ¶ | skipping to change at page 1, line 41 ¶ | |||
| does not specify an Internet standard. Distribution of this memo is | does not specify an Internet standard. Distribution of this memo is | |||
| unlimited. | unlimited. | |||
| Abstract | Abstract | |||
| The IPsec protocol suite is used to provide privacy and | The IPsec protocol suite is used to provide privacy and | |||
| authentication services at the IP layer. Several documents are used | authentication services at the IP layer. Several documents are used | |||
| to describe this protocol suite. The interrelationship and | to describe this protocol suite. The interrelationship and | |||
| organization of the various documents covering the IPsec protocol are | organization of the various documents covering the IPsec protocol are | |||
| discussed here. An explanation of what to find in which document, | discussed here. An explanation of what to find in which document, | |||
| and what to include in new Cipher and Authenticator documents are | and what to include in new Encryption Algorithm and Authentication | |||
| described. | Algorithm documents are described. | |||
| Contents | Contents | |||
| Status of This Memo .................................................1 | Status of This Memo .................................................1 | |||
| Abstract ............................................................1 | Abstract ............................................................1 | |||
| Contents ............................................................2 | Contents ............................................................2 | |||
| 1. Introduction .....................................................3 | 1. Introduction .....................................................3 | |||
| 2. Interrelationship of IPsec Documents .............................3 | 2. Interrelationship of IPsec Documents .............................3 | |||
| 3. Keying Material ..................................................5 | 3. Keying Material ..................................................5 | |||
| 4. Recommended Content of Cipher and Authenticator Documents ........5 | 4. Recommended Content of Algorithm Documents .......................6 | |||
| 4.1 Cipher and Authenticator ........................................5 | 4.1 Encryption and Authentication Algorithms ........................6 | |||
| 4.2 Cipher ..........................................................6 | 4.2 Encryption Algorithms ...........................................7 | |||
| 4.3 Authenticator ...................................................7 | 4.3 Authentication Algorithms .......................................8 | |||
| 5. Security Considerations ..........................................8 | 5. Security Considerations ..........................................8 | |||
| 6. Acknowledgments ..................................................8 | 6. Acknowledgments ..................................................9 | |||
| 7. References .......................................................9 | 7. References .......................................................9 | |||
| 8. Author's Addresses ...............................................9 | 8. Author's Addresses ..............................................10 | |||
| 1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
| This document is intended to provide guidelines for the development | This document is intended to provide guidelines for the development | |||
| of collateral specifications describing the use of new Cipher and | of collateral specifications describing the use of new encryption and | |||
| Authenticator algorithms with the ESP protocol, described in [ESP] | authentication algorithms with the ESP protocol, described in [ESP] | |||
| and new Authenticator algorithms used with the AH protocol, described | and new authentication algorithms used with the AH protocol, | |||
| in [AH]. ESP and AH are part of the IP Security architecture | described in [AH]. ESP and AH are part of the IP Security | |||
| described in [Arch]. There is a requirement for a well-known | architecture described in [Arch]. There is a requirement for a well- | |||
| procedure that can be used to add new cipher algorithms or | known procedure that can be used to add new encryption algorithms or | |||
| authenticator algorithms to ESP and AH, not only while the initial | authentication algorithms to ESP and AH, not only while the initial | |||
| document set is undergoing development but after the base documents | document set is undergoing development but after the base documents | |||
| have achieved RFC status. Following the guidelines discussed below | have achieved RFC status. Following the guidelines discussed below | |||
| simplifies adding new algorithms and reduces that amount of redundant | simplifies adding new algorithms and reduces that amount of redundant | |||
| documentation. | documentation. | |||
| The goal in writing a new ESP or AH algorithm document is to | The goal in writing a new Encryption Algorithm or Authentication | |||
| concentrate on the application of the specific algorithm. General | Algorithm document is to concentrate on the application of the | |||
| ESP and AH concepts, definitions, and issues are covered in the ESP | specific algorithm within ESP and AH. General ESP and AH concepts, | |||
| and AH documents. The algorithms themselves are not described in | definitions, and issues are covered in the ESP and AH documents. The | |||
| these documents. This gives us the capability to add new algorithms | algorithms themselves are not described in these documents. This | |||
| and also specify how any given algorithm might interact with other | gives us the capability to add new algorithms and also specify how | |||
| algorithms. The intent is to achieve the goal of avoiding duplication | any given algorithm might interact with other algorithms. The intent | |||
| of information and excessive numbers of documents, the so-called | is to achieve the goal of avoiding duplication of information and | |||
| "draft explosion" effect. | excessive numbers of documents, the so-called "draft explosion" | |||
| effect. | ||||
| 2. Interrelationship of IPsec Documents | 2. Interrelationship of IPsec Documents | |||
| The documents describing the set of IPsec protocols are divided into | The documents describing the set of IPsec protocols are divided into | |||
| seven groups. This is illustrated in Figure 1. There is a main | seven groups. This is illustrated in Figure 1. There is a main | |||
| Architecture document which broadly covers the general concepts, | Architecture document which broadly covers the general concepts, | |||
| security requirements, definitions, and mechanisms defining IPsec | security requirements, definitions, and mechanisms defining IPsec | |||
| technology. | technology. | |||
| There is an ESP Protocol document and an AH Protocol document which | There is an ESP Protocol document and an AH Protocol document which | |||
| covers the packet format and general issues regarding the respective | covers the packet format and general issues regarding the respective | |||
| protocols. These protocol documents also contain default values if | protocols. These protocol documents also contain default values if | |||
| appropriate, such as the default padding contents, and mandatory to | appropriate, such as the default padding contents, and mandatory to | |||
| implement algorithms. These documents dictate some of the values in | implement algorithms. These documents dictate some of the values in | |||
| the Domain Of Interpretation document [DOI]. Note the DOI document | the Domain Of Interpretation document [DOI]. Note the DOI document | |||
| is itself part of the IANA Assigned Numbers mechanism and so the | is itself part of the IANA Assigned Numbers mechanism and so the | |||
| values described in the DOI are well-known. See [DOI] for more | values described in the DOI are well-known. See [DOI] for more | |||
| information on the mechanism. | information on the mechanism. | |||
| The "Cipher" document set, shown on the left, is the set of documents | The "Encryption Algorithm" document set, shown on the left, is the | |||
| describing how various ciphers are used for ESP. These documents are | set of documents describing how various encryption algorithms are | |||
| intended to fit in this roadmap, and should avoid overlap with the | used for ESP. These documents are intended to fit in this roadmap, | |||
| ESP protocol document and with the Authenticator documents. Examples | and should avoid overlap with the ESP protocol document and with the | |||
| of this document are the [DES-1829], [DES-Detroit], [3DES], or [CAST] | Authentication Algorithm documents. Examples of this document are | |||
| documents. When these or other Ciphers are used for ESP, the DOI | the [DES-1829], [DES-Detroit], [3DES], or [CAST] documents. When | |||
| document has to indicate certain values, such as Cipher type, so | these or other encryption algorithms are used for ESP, the DOI | |||
| these documents provide input to the DOI. | document has to indicate certain values, such as an encryption | |||
| algorithm identifier, so these documents provide input to the DOI. | ||||
| The "Authenticator" document set, shown on the right, is the set of | The "Authentication Algorithm" document set, shown on the right, is | |||
| documents describing how various authenticator algorithms are used | the set of documents describing how various authentication algorithms | |||
| for both ESP and AH. These documents are intended to fit in this | are used for both ESP and AH. These documents are intended to fit in | |||
| roadmap, and should avoid overlap with the AH protocol document and | this roadmap, and should avoid overlap with the AH protocol document | |||
| with the Cipher documents. Examples of this document are the [HMAC- | and with the Encryption Algorithm documents. Examples of this | |||
| MD5], and [HMAC-SHA-1] documents. When these or other algorithms are | document are the [HMAC-MD5], and [HMAC-SHA-1] documents. When these | |||
| used for either ESP or AH, the DOI document has to indicate certain | or other algorithms are used for either ESP or AH, the DOI document | |||
| values, such as algorithm type, so these documents provide input to | has to indicate certain values, such as algorithm type, so these | |||
| the DOI. | documents provide input to the DOI. | |||
| The "Key Management Documents", shown at the bottom, are the | The "Key Management Documents", shown at the bottom, are the | |||
| documents describing the IETF standards-track key management schemes. | documents describing the IETF standards-track key management schemes. | |||
| These documents provide certain values for the DOI also. Note that | These documents provide certain values for the DOI also. Note that | |||
| issues of key management should be indicated here and not in, for | issues of key management should be indicated here and not in, for | |||
| example, the ESP and AH protocol documents. Currently this box | example, the ESP and AH protocol documents. Currently this box | |||
| represents [ISAKMP], [Oakley], and [Resolution]. | represents [ISAKMP], [Oakley], and [Resolution]. | |||
| The DOI document, shown in the middle, contains values needed for the | The DOI document, shown in the middle, contains values needed for the | |||
| other documents to relate to each other. This includes for example | other documents to relate to each other. This includes for example | |||
| Cipher algorithms, Authenticator algorithms, and operational | encryption algorithms, authentication algorithms, and operational | |||
| parameters such as key lifetimes. | parameters such as key lifetimes. | |||
| +--------------+ | +--------------+ | |||
| | Architecture | | | Architecture | | |||
| +--------------+ | +--------------+ | |||
| v v | v v | |||
| +<-<-<-<-+ +->->->->+ | +<-<-<-<-+ +->->->->+ | |||
| v v | v v | |||
| +----------+ +----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | |||
| | ESP | | AH | | | ESP | | AH | | |||
| | PROTOCOL | | PROTOCOL | | | Protocol | | Protocol | | |||
| +----------+ +----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | |||
| v v v v | v v v v | |||
| v +->->->->->->->->+ v v | v +->->->->->->->->+ v v | |||
| v v v v v | v v v v v | |||
| v v v v v | v v v v v | |||
| v +--------+ +---------------+ v | v +------------+ +----------------+ v | |||
| v | +--------+ | +---------------+ v | v | +------------+ | +----------------+ v | |||
| v | | | | | | v | v | | Encryption | | | Authentication | v | |||
| v +-| Cipher | +-| Authenticator | v | v +-| Algorithm | +-| Algorithm | v | |||
| v +--------+ +---------------+ v | v +------------+ +----------------+ v | |||
| v v v v | v v v v | |||
| v v +-----+ v v | v v +-----+ v v | |||
| +>->->->-+->->->->| DOI |<-<-<-<-+-<-<-<-<-+ | +>->->->-+->->->->| DOI |<-<-<-<-+-<-<-<-<-+ | |||
| +-----+ | +-----+ | |||
| ^ | ^ | |||
| ^ | ^ | |||
| +------------+ | +------------+ | |||
| | KEY | | | KEY | | |||
| | MANAGEMENT | | | MANAGEMENT | | |||
| +------------+ | +------------+ | |||
| Figure 1. IPsec Document Roadmap. | Figure 1. IPsec Document Roadmap. | |||
| 3. Keying Material | 3. Keying Material | |||
| Describing the cipher and authenticator algorithms in different docu- | Describing the encryption and authentication algorithms in different | |||
| ments raises the issue of how the key management protocols knows the | documents raises the issue of how the key management protocols knows | |||
| required keying material length for the desired algorithms when used | the required keying material length for the desired algorithms when | |||
| together with ESP. It also raises the issue of how to divide the | used together with ESP. It also raises the issue of how to divide | |||
| keying material. This is known as the "slicing and dicing" informa- | the keying material. This is known as the "slicing and dicing" | |||
| tion. | information. | |||
| Each cipher and authenticator document should specify their respec- | Each Encryption Algorithm and Authentication Algorithm document | |||
| tive key lengths. The key management protocols should use the length | should specify their respective key lengths. The key management pro- | |||
| of the keys specified in the cipher and authenticator documents to | tocols should use the length of the keys specified in the respective | |||
| generate the keying material of required length. | Algorithm documents to generate the keying material of required | |||
| length. | ||||
| The ESP protocol document is responsible for specifying how the keys | The key management protocol generates keying material with enough | |||
| are extracted from the keying material (sliced and diced). For exam- | strength and size to generate keys for individual algorithms. The ESP | |||
| ple, it should specify if the cipher or the authenticator algorithm | protocol document is responsible for specifying how the keys are | |||
| uses the first n-bits in the provided keying material. The AH proto- | extracted from the keying material (sliced and diced). The Encryption | |||
| col document has no such requirement. [Editor's Note: This paragraph | Algorithm and Authentication Algorithm documents are responsible for | |||
| is still under contention and will be modified once the location of | specifying the key sizes and strengths for each algorithm. However, | |||
| the key derivation mechanism is known]. | whether the entire keying material is passed down to the kernel to | |||
| perform slicing and dicing or if the keys are sliced and diced by key | ||||
| management protocol is an implementation issue. The AH protocol docu- | ||||
| ment has no such requirement. | ||||
| 4. Recommended Content of Cipher and Authenticator Documents | 4. Recommended Content of Algorithm Documents | |||
| The document describing how a specific cipher or authenticator is | The document describing how a specific encryption or authentication | |||
| used should contain information appropriate to that cipher or authen- | algorithm is used should contain information appropriate to that | |||
| ticator. This section enumerates what information should be pro- | encryption or authentication algorithm. This section enumerates what | |||
| vided. It is the intention of the document roadmap that: | information should be provided. It is the intention of the document | |||
| roadmap that: | ||||
| . General protocol information goes in the respective ESP or AH protocol | . General protocol information goes in the respective ESP or AH protocol | |||
| documents. | documents. | |||
| . Key management information goes in the key management documents. | . Key management information goes in the key management documents. | |||
| . Assigned values and constants go in the DOI document. | . Assigned values and constants go in the DOI document. | |||
| Cipher and Authenticator algorithms require some set of optional | Encryption and authentication algorithms require some set of optional | |||
| parameters or have optional modes of operation (e.g. IVs, authentica- | parameters or have optional modes of operation (e.g. IVs, authentica- | |||
| tor lengths, and key lengths). To help eliminate some complexity | tion data lengths, and key lengths). To help eliminate some complex- | |||
| involved with key management having to negotiate large numbers of | ity involved with key management having to negotiate large numbers of | |||
| algorithm-specific parameters, Cipher and Authenticator documents will | algorithm-specific parameters, encryption and authentication algorithm | |||
| select fixed values for these parameters when it is deemed technically | documents will select fixed values for these parameters when it is | |||
| reasonable and feasible. | deemed technically reasonable and feasible. | |||
| Note, the following information is intended as a general guideline | Note, the following information is intended as a general guideline | |||
| only. | only. | |||
| 4.1 Cipher and Authenticator | 4.1 Encryption and Authentication Algorithms | |||
| This section describes the information that should be included in | This section describes the information that should be included in | |||
| both Cipher and Authenticator documents. | both Encryption Algorithm and Authentication Algorithm documents. | |||
| Keying Material | Keying Material | |||
| . Size of keys, including minimum, maximum, recommended and/or | . Size of keys, including minimum, maximum, recommended and/or | |||
| required sizes. Note: the security considerations section should | required sizes. Note: the security considerations section should | |||
| address any weakness in specific sizes. | address any weakness in specific sizes. | |||
| . Recommended or required pseudo-random number generator techniques | ||||
| and attributes to provide sufficiently strong keys. [RANDOM] | ||||
| provides recommendations on generating strong randomness for use | ||||
| with security. | ||||
| . Format of keying material. | . Format of keying material. | |||
| . Known weak keys or references to documentation on known weak keys. | . Known weak keys or references to documentation on known weak keys. | |||
| . Recommended or required processing of input keying material such as | . Recommended or required processing of input keying material such as | |||
| parity generation or checking. | parity generation or checking. | |||
| . Requirements and/or recommendations on how often the keying | . Requirements and/or recommendations on how often the keying | |||
| material should be refreshed. | material should be refreshed. | |||
| Performance Considerations | Performance Considerations | |||
| . Any available estimates on performance of this algorithm. | . Any available estimates on performance of this algorithm. | |||
| . Any available comparison data (e.g., compared against DES or | . Any available comparison data (e.g., compared against DES or | |||
| MD5). | MD5). | |||
| . Input size or other considerations that could improve or degrade | . Input size or other considerations that could improve or degrade | |||
| performance. | performance. | |||
| ESP Environmental Considerations | ESP Environmental Considerations | |||
| . Any known issues regarding interactions between this algorithm and | . Any known issues regarding interactions between this algorithm and | |||
| other aspects of ESP, such as use of certain authentication | other aspects of ESP, such as use of certain authentication | |||
| schemes. Note: As new authentication and cipher algorithms are | schemes. Note: As new encryption and authentication algorithms are | |||
| applied to ESP, the later documents will be required to address | applied to ESP, the later documents will be required to address | |||
| interactions with previously specified algorithms. | interactions with previously specified algorithms. | |||
| Payload Content and Format Description | Payload Content and Format Description | |||
| . Specification of size, placement, and content of algorithm-specific | . Specification of size, placement, and content of algorithm-specific | |||
| fields not defined in the ESP or AH protocol documents (e.g., IV). | fields not defined in the ESP or AH protocol documents (e.g., IV). | |||
| Security Considerations | Security Considerations | |||
| . Discuss any known attacks. | . Discuss any known attacks. | |||
| . Discuss any known common implementation pitfalls, such as use of | . Discuss any known common implementation pitfalls, such as use of | |||
| weak random number generators. | weak random number generators. | |||
| . Discuss any relevant validation procedures, such as test vectors. | . Discuss any relevant validation procedures, such as test vectors. | |||
| 4.2 Cipher | 4.2 Encryption Algorithms | |||
| This section describes the information that should be included in | This section describes the information that should be included in the | |||
| Cipher documents. | Encryption Algorithm documents. | |||
| Cipher Description | Encryption Algorithm Description | |||
| . General information how this cipher algorithm is to be used in | . General information how this encryption algorithm is to be used in | |||
| ESP. | ESP. | |||
| . Description of background material and formal algorithm | . Description of background material and formal algorithm | |||
| description. | description. | |||
| . Features of this cipher to be used by ESP, including encryption | . Features of this encryption algorithm to be used by ESP, including encryption | |||
| and/or authentication. | and/or authentication. | |||
| . Mention of any availability issues such as Intellectual Property | . Mention of any availability issues such as Intellectual Property | |||
| considerations. | considerations. | |||
| . References, in IETF style, to background material such as FIPS | . References, in IETF style, to background material such as FIPS | |||
| documents. | documents. | |||
| Algorithm Modes of Operation | Algorithm Modes of Operation | |||
| . Description of how the algorithm is operated, whether it is block | . Description of how the algorithm is operated, whether it is block | |||
| mode or streaming mode or other. | mode or streaming mode or other. | |||
| . Requirements for input or output block format. | . Requirements for input or output block format. | |||
| skipping to change at page 7, line 16 ¶ | skipping to change at page 8, line 5 ¶ | |||
| rounds. | rounds. | |||
| . Identify optional parameters and optional methods of operation and | . Identify optional parameters and optional methods of operation and | |||
| pick reasonable fixed values and methods with explicit technical | pick reasonable fixed values and methods with explicit technical | |||
| explanations. | explanations. | |||
| . Identify those optional parameters in which values and methods | . Identify those optional parameters in which values and methods | |||
| should remain optional with explicit technical explanations on why | should remain optional with explicit technical explanations on why | |||
| fixed values and methods should not be used. | fixed values and methods should not be used. | |||
| . Defaults and mandatory ranges on algorithm-specific optional | . Defaults and mandatory ranges on algorithm-specific optional | |||
| parameters that could not be fixed. | parameters that could not be fixed. | |||
| 4.3 Authenticator | 4.3 Authentication Algorithms | |||
| This section describes the information that should be included in | This section describes the information that should be included in the | |||
| Authenticator documents. In most cases, an authenticator algorithm | Authentication Algorithm documents. In most cases, an authentication | |||
| will operate the same whether it is used for ESP or AH. This should | algorithm will operate the same whether it is used for ESP or AH. | |||
| be represented in a single authenticator algorithm document. | This should be represented in a single Authentication Algorithm docu- | |||
| ment. | ||||
| Authenticator Description | Authentication Algorithm Description | |||
| . General information on how this authenticator algorithm is to be | . General information on how this authentication algorithm is to be | |||
| used with ESP and AH. | used with ESP and AH. | |||
| . Description of background material and formal algorithm | . Description of background material and formal algorithm | |||
| description. | description. | |||
| . Features of this authenticator. | . Features of this authentication algorithm. | |||
| . Mention of any availability issues such as Intellectual Property | . Mention of any availability issues such as Intellectual Property | |||
| considerations. | considerations. | |||
| . References, in IETF style, to background material such as | . References, in IETF style, to background material such as | |||
| FIPS documents and definitive descriptions of underlying | FIPS documents and definitive descriptions of underlying | |||
| algorithms. | algorithms. | |||
| Algorithm Modes of Operation | Algorithm Modes of Operation | |||
| . Description of how the algorithm is operated. | . Description of how the algorithm is operated. | |||
| . Algorithm-specific operating parameters, such as number of | . Algorithm-specific operating parameters, such as number of | |||
| rounds, and input or output block format. | rounds, and input or output block format. | |||
| . Implicit and explicit padding requirements of this algorithm. Note: | . Implicit and explicit padding requirements of this algorithm. Note: | |||
| There is a default method for padding of the authenticator field | There is a default method for padding of the authentication data field | |||
| specified in the AH protocol document. This is only needed if the | specified in the AH protocol document. This is only needed if the | |||
| default cannot be used. | default cannot be used. | |||
| . Identify optional parameters and optional methods of operation and | . Identify optional parameters and optional methods of operation and | |||
| pick reasonable fixed values and methods with explicit technical | pick reasonable fixed values and methods with explicit technical | |||
| explanations. | explanations. | |||
| . Identify those optional parameters in which values and methods | . Identify those optional parameters in which values and methods | |||
| should remain optional with explicit technical explanations on why | should remain optional with explicit technical explanations on why | |||
| fixed values and methods should not be used. | fixed values and methods should not be used. | |||
| . Defaults and mandatory ranges on algorithm-specific optional | . Defaults and mandatory ranges on algorithm-specific optional | |||
| parameters that could not be fixed. | parameters that could not be fixed. | |||
| . Authenticator comparison criteria for this algorithm. Note: There | . Authentication data comparison criteria for this algorithm. Note: | |||
| is a default method for verifying the authenticator specified | There is a default method for verifying the authentication data | |||
| in the AH protocol document. This is only needed if the default | specified in the AH protocol document. This is only needed if the | |||
| cannot be used (e.g. when using a signed hash). | default cannot be used (e.g. when using a signed hash). | |||
| 5. Security Considerations | 5. Security Considerations | |||
| This document provides a roadmap and guidelines for writing cipher | This document provides a roadmap and guidelines for writing Encryp- | |||
| and authenticator documents. The reader SHOULD follow all the secu- | tion and Authentication Algorithm documents. The reader SHOULD follow | |||
| rity procedures and guidelines described in the IPsec Architecture, | all the security procedures and guidelines described in the IPsec | |||
| ESP, AH, cipher and authenticator documents. Note that many cipher | Architecture, ESP Protocol, AH Protocol, Encryption Algorithm, and | |||
| algorithms are not considered secure if they are not used with some | Authentication Algorithm documents. Note that many encryption algo- | |||
| sort of authentication mechanism. | rithms are not considered secure if they are not used with some sort | |||
| of authentication mechanism. | ||||
| 6. Acknowledgments | 6. Acknowledgments | |||
| Several Internet drafts were referenced in writing this document. | Several Internet drafts were referenced in writing this document. | |||
| Depending on where the documents are on (or off) the IETF standards | Depending on where the documents are on (or off) the IETF standards | |||
| track these may not be available through the IETF RFC repositories. | track these may not be available through the IETF RFC repositories. | |||
| In certain cases the reader may want to know what version of these | In certain cases the reader may want to know what version of these | |||
| documents were referenced. These documents are: | documents were referenced. These documents are: | |||
| . ARCH: draft-ietf-ipsec-arch-sec-01.txt. | . ARCH: draft-ietf-ipsec-arch-sec-01.txt. | |||
| . DES-Detroit: this is the ANX Workshop style of ESP, based on the | . DES-Detroit: this is the ANX Workshop style of ESP, based on the | |||
| Hughes draft as modified by Cheryl Madson and published on the ANX | Hughes draft as modified by Cheryl Madson and published on the ANX | |||
| mailing list. | mailing list. | |||
| . DES-1829: this is Bill Simpson's DES-CBC for ESP document, to be | . DOI: draft-ietf-ipsec-ipsec-doi-02.txt. | |||
| published as draft-simpson-esp-des1-v2-01.txt. | ||||
| . 3DES: this is <the Triple-DES shim document>. | . 3DES: this is <the Triple-DES shim document>. | |||
| . CAST: this is draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-cast-128-cbc-00.txt, as revised | . CAST: this is draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-cast-128-cbc-00.txt, as revised | |||
| to relate to this document. | to relate to this document. | |||
| . DOI: draft-ietf-ietf-doi-02.txt. | ||||
| . ESP: draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-04.txt, mailed to the IETF mailing list | . ESP: draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-04.txt, mailed to the IETF mailing list | |||
| in May/June 1997. | in May/June 1997. | |||
| . AH: draft-ietf-ipsec-auth-05.txt, mailed to the IETF mailing list | . AH: draft-ietf-ipsec-auth-05.txt, mailed to the IETF mailing list | |||
| in May/June 1997. | in May/June 1997. | |||
| . HUGHES: this is draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-des-md5-03.txt | . HUGHES: this is draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-des-md5-03.txt | |||
| . ISAKMP: There are three documents describing ISAKMP. These are | . ISAKMP: There are three documents describing ISAKMP. These are | |||
| draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-07.txt, draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley- | draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-07.txt, draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley- | |||
| 03.txt, and draft-ietf-ipsec-ipsec-doi-02.txt. | 03.txt, and draft-ietf-ipsec-ipsec-doi-02.txt. | |||
| 7. References | 7. References | |||
| [3DES] Triple-DES for ESP, RFC-xxxx. | [3DES] Doraswamy, N., Metzger, P., Simpson, W.A., "The ESP | |||
| Triple DES Transform", | ||||
| draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-des3-00.txt, July 1997. | ||||
| [ARCH] Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet | [Arch] Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet | |||
| Protocol", RFC-1825, Naval Research Laboratory, | Protocol", RFC-1825, Naval Research Laboratory, | |||
| July 1995. | July 1995. | |||
| [CAST] CAST for ESP, RFC-xxxx. | [CAST] Pereira, R., Carter, G., "The ESP CAST128-CBC | |||
| Algorithm", draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-cast128-cbc-00.txt, | ||||
| July 1997. | ||||
| [DES-Detroit] DES for ESP, Detroit dialect, RFC-xxxx. | [DES-Detroit] Madson, C., "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With | |||
| Explicit IV", draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-des-expiv-00.txt, | ||||
| July 1997. | ||||
| [DES-1829] DES for ESP, 1829-Compatible mode, RFC-xxxx. | [DES-1829] Metzger, P., Simpson, W.A., "The ESP DES-CBC | |||
| Transform", draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-des-derived-00.txt, | ||||
| July 1997. | ||||
| [DOI] IP Security Domain of Interpretation, RFC-xxxx. | [DOI] IP Security Domain of Interpretation, RFC-xxxx. | |||
| [ESP] Karn, P., Metzger, P., and W. Simpson, "The ESP DES-CBC | [AH] Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", | |||
| Transform", RFC 1829, Qualcomm, Inc., Piermont, | draft-ietf-ipsec-auth-header-01.txt, July 1997. | |||
| Daydreamer, August 1995. | ||||
| [ESP] Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security | ||||
| Payload (ESP)", draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v2-00.txt, | ||||
| July 1997. | ||||
| [HMAC] Krawczyk, K., Bellare, M., and Canetti R., "HMAC: | [HMAC] Krawczyk, K., Bellare, M., and Canetti R., "HMAC: | |||
| Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC-2104, | Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC-2104, | |||
| February 1997. | February 1997. | |||
| [HMAC-MD5] Madson, C., Glenn, R., "The Use of HMAC-MD5 within ESP | [HMAC-MD5] Madson, C., Glenn, R., "The Use of HMAC-MD5 within ESP | |||
| and AH", draft-ietf-ipsec-ff-auth-hmac-sha-1-00.txt, | and AH", draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-96-00.txt, | |||
| June 1997. | July 1997. | |||
| [HMAC-SHA-1] Madson, C., Glenn, R., "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1 within | [HMAC-SHA-1] Madson, C., Glenn, R., "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1 within | |||
| ESP and AH", draft-ietf-ipsec-ff-auth-hmac-sha-1-00.txt, | ESP and AH", draft-ietf-ipsec-auth-hmac-sha196-00.txt, | |||
| June 1997. | July 1997. | |||
| [RANDOM] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S., Schiller, J., "Randomness | ||||
| Recommendations for Security", RFC-1750, | ||||
| December 1994. | ||||
| 8. Author's Addresses | 8. Author's Addresses | |||
| Rodney Thayer | Rodney Thayer | |||
| Sable Technology Corporation | Sable Technology Corporation | |||
| 246 Walnut Street | 246 Walnut Street | |||
| Newton, Massachusetts 02160 | Newton, Massachusetts 02160 | |||
| <mailto:rodney@sabletech.com> | <mailto:rodney@sabletech.com> | |||
| Naganand Doraswamy | Naganand Doraswamy | |||
| End of changes. 45 change blocks. | ||||
| 121 lines changed or deleted | 146 lines changed or added | |||
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