< draft-shirey-security-glossary-00.txt   draft-shirey-security-glossary-01.txt >
Internet Engineering Task Force R. Shirey Internet Engineering Task Force R. Shirey
INTERNET DRAFT GTE Internetworking INTERNET-DRAFT GTE / BBN Technologies
Expiration Date: 3 February 2000 3 August 1999 Expiration Date: 17 April 2000 17 October 1999
SECURITY GLOSSARY Internet Security Glossary
<draft-shirey-security-glossary-00.txt> <draft-shirey-security-glossary-01.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of section 10 of RFC2026 *except* that the right to all provisions of section 10 of RFC 2026 *except* that the right to
produce derivative works is *not* granted. (See copyright notice produce derivative works is *not* granted. (See GTE copyright notice
below.) below. However, if and when this document is issued as an RFC, we
expect that it will instead carry the standard Internet Society
copyright notice.)
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) GTE Internetworking (1999). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) GTE / BBN Technologies (1999). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, in whole, without restriction of any kind, provided that the others, in whole, without restriction of any kind, provided that the
above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such
copies. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, copies. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way,
such as by removing the copyright notice or removing references to such as by removing the copyright notice or removing references to
GTE Internetworking. GTE or BBN.
(If and when this document is issued as an RFC, we expect this
copyright to be changed to the standard Internet Society copyright.)
Abstract Abstract
This Glossary contains abbreviations, definitions, and explanations This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, explanations, and
for security-related terms. We propose that the Security Area recommendations for use of information system security terminology.
Directorate and the Security Area Advisory Group of the Internet The intent of the Glossary is to improve the comprehensibility of
Engineering Task Force should review, approve, and issue this Internet Standards Process [R2026] documents (ISPDs). To be clear and
Glossary as a consistent, self-supporting set of terminology to understandable, ISPDs should use the same term or definition whenever
improve the comprehensibility of Internet Standards Process and wherever the same concept is mentioned. To improve international
documents. To be clear and understandable, those documents should use understanding, ISPDs should use terms in their plainest, dictionary
the same term or definition whenever and wherever the same concept is sense. ISPDs should use terms established in standards documents and
mentioned. To improve international understanding, the documents other well-founded publications and should avoid substituting private
should use terms in the plainest, dictionary sense. The documents or newly made-up terms. ISPDs should avoid terms that are proprietary
should use terms established in standards documents and other well-
founded publications and should avoid substituting private or newly
made-up terms. The documents should avoid terms that are proprietary
or otherwise favor a particular vendor, or that create a bias toward or otherwise favor a particular vendor, or that create a bias toward
a particular security technology or mechanism over other, competing a particular security technology or mechanism versus other, competing
techniques that already exist or might be developed in the future. techniques that already exist or might be developed in the future.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction Section Page
2. Explanation of Paragraph Markings ------- ----
3. Definitions 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. References 2. Explanation of Paragraph Markings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations 2.1 Recommended Terms with an Internet Basis ("I") . . . . . . 4
6. Acknowledgements 2.2 Recommended Terms with a Non-Internet Basis ("N") . . . . 5
7. Author's Address 2.3 Other Definitions ("O") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Expiration Date 2.4 Deprecated Terms, Definitions, and Uses ("D") . . . . . . 6
2.5 Commentary and Additional Guidance ("C") . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
7. Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8. Expiration Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This Glossary seeks to improve the comprehensibility of Internet This Glossary seeks to improve the comprehensibility of Internet
documents by providing a consistent, self-supporting set of over Standards Process [R2026] documents (ISPDs)--i.e., RFCs and Internet-
1,000 abbreviations, definitions, and explanations for terms related Drafts--by providing a consistent, self-supporting set of
to information system security. A few non-security, networking terms definitions, abbreviations, explanations, and recommendations for use
have been included to make the Glossary self-contained, but more of terminology related to information system security. A few non-
complete glossaries of networking terms are available elsewhere security, networking terms are included to make the Glossary self-
[R1208, R1983]. contained, but more complete glossaries of networking terms are
available elsewhere [R1208, R1983]. There are other glossaries of
computing terminology (including an extensive listing of hacker
jargon [Raym]) that list additional terms that apply to Internet
security. However, many of those terms are not appropriate for
standards documents and, thus, have not been included in this
dictionary.
We propose that the Security Area Directorate and the Security Area To provide guidance for ISPDs, this Glossary marks term and
Advisory Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force should definitions as either endorsed or deprecated for use. The key words
undertake to review, approve, and issue this Glossary as an "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
Informational RFC (or perhaps eventually as a Best Practice RFC) for "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
use in writing Internet Standards Process documents (i.e., RFCs and 2119. (The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHALL", and "SHALL NOT" are
Internet-Drafts [R2026]). Toward that end, this Glossary marks each not used in this Glossary.)
term as either endorsed or deprecated for use. The key words "MUST",
"MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
This Glossary supports the goals of the Internet Standards Process: This Glossary supports the goals of the Internet Standards Process:
o Clear, Concise, and Easily Understood Documentation o Clear, Concise, and Easily Understood Documentation
This Glossary seeks to improve comprehensibility of security- This Glossary seeks to improve comprehensibility of security-
related content of Internet Standards Process documents. That related content of ISPDs. That requires the wording to be clear
requires the wording to be clear and understandable, and requires and understandable, and requires the set of security-related terms
the set of security-related terms and definitions to be consistent and definitions to be consistent and self-supporting. Also, the
and self-supporting. Also, the terminology needs to be uniform and terminology needs to be uniform and across all ISPDs; the same
across all of the documents; the same term or definition needs to term or definition needs to be used whenever and wherever the same
be used whenever and wherever the same concept is mentioned. concept is mentioned. Harmonization of existing ISPDs need not be
Harmonization of existing documents need not be done immediately, done immediately, but is desirable to do when new versions are
but is desirable to do when new versions of documents are issued issued in the normal course of standards development and
in the normal course of standards development and evolution. evolution.
o Technical Excellence o Technical Excellence
Just as Internet Standard protocols should operate effectively, Just as Internet Standard protocols should operate effectively,
Internet Standards should use terminology accurately, precisely, ISPDs should use terminology accurately, precisely, and
and unambiguously to enable them to be implemented correctly. unambiguously to enable them to be implemented correctly.
o Prior Implementation and Testing o Prior Implementation and Testing
Just as Internet Standard protocols require experience and Just as Internet Standard protocols require experience and
stability before adoption, Internet Standards Process documents stability before adoption, ISPDs need to use well-established
need to use well-established language. Using terms in their language. Using terms in their plainest, dictionary sense (when
plainest, dictionary sense (when appropriate) help to ensure appropriate) help to ensure international understanding. ISPDs
international understanding. The documents need to avoid using need to avoid using private, made-up terms in place of generally-
private, made-up terms in place of generally-accepted terms from accepted terms from standards and other publications. ISPDs need
standards and other publications. The documents need to avoid to avoid substituting new definitions that conflict with
substituting new definitions that conflict with established ones. established ones. ISPDs need to avoid using "cute" synonyms (e.g.,
The documents need to avoid using "cute" synonyms (e.g., see: see: Green Book); no matter how popular a nickname may be in one
Green Book); no matter how popular a nickname may be in one
community, it is likely to cause confusion in another. community, it is likely to cause confusion in another.
o Openness, Fairness, and Timeliness o Openness, Fairness, and Timeliness
Internet Standards Process documents need to avoid terms that are ISPDs need to avoid terms that are proprietary or otherwise favor
proprietary or otherwise favor a particular vendor, or that create a particular vendor, or that create a bias toward a particular
a bias toward a particular security technology or mechanism over security technology or mechanism over other, competing techniques
other, competing techniques that already exist or might be that already exist or might be developed in the future. The set of
developed in the future. The set of terminology used across the terminology used across the set of ISPDs needs to be flexible and
set of documents needs to be flexible and adaptable as the state adaptable as the state of Internet security art evolves.
of Internet security art evolves.
2. Explanation of Paragraph Markings 2. Explanation of Paragraph Markings
Section 3 marks terms and definitions as follows: Section 3 marks terms and definitions as follows:
o Capitalization: Only terms that are proper nouns are capitalized. o Capitalization: Only terms that are proper nouns are capitalized.
o Paragraph Marking: Definitions and explanations are stated in o Paragraph Marking: Definitions and explanations are stated in
paragraphs that are marked as follows: paragraphs that are marked as follows:
- "I" identifies a recommended Internet definition. - "I" identifies a RECOMMENDED Internet definition.
- "N" identifies a recommended non-Internet definition. - "N" identifies a RECOMMENDED non-Internet definition.
- "O" identifies a definition that is not recommended for use but - "O" identifies a definition that is not recommended as the
is something that authors of Internet documents need to know. first choice for Internet documents but is something that
authors of Internet documents need to know.
- "D" identifies a term or definition that SHOULD NOT be used in
Internet documents.
- "C" identifies commentary or additional usage guidance, - "C" identifies commentary or additional usage guidance,
including identifying deprecated terms. including identifying deprecated terms.
The rest of Section 2 further explains those four markings. The rest of Section 2 further explains those four markings.
2.1 Recommended Terms with an Internet Basis ("I") 2.1 Recommended Terms with an Internet Basis ("I")
The paragraph marking "I" (as opposed to "O") identifies a definition The paragraph marking "I" (as opposed to "O") indicates a definition
that the Directorate recommends SHOULD be the first choice for use in that SHOULD be the first choice for use in ISPDs. Most terms and
Internet documents. Terms and definitions of this type MAY be used in definitions of this type MAY be used in ISPDs; however, some "I"
Internet documents. However, some such definitions are preceded by an definitions are accompanied by a "D" paragraph that recommends
indication of a contextual usage limitation (e.g., see: against use of the term. Also, some "I" definitions are preceded by
certification), and the Directorate's endorsement of the term and an indication of a contextual usage limitation (e.g., see:
definition does not apply outside that context. certification), and ISPDs should not the term and definition outside
that context
An "I" (as opposed to an "N") also indicates that the definition has An "I" (as opposed to an "N") also indicates that the definition has
an Internet basis. That is, either the Internet Standards Process an Internet basis. That is, either the Internet Standards Process is
[R2026] is authoritative for the term, or the term is sufficiently authoritative for the term, or the term is sufficiently generic that
generic that the Directorate can freely state a definition without the Directorate can freely state a definition without contradicting a
contradicting a non-Internet authority (e.g., see: attack). non-Internet authority (e.g., see: attack).
For a proper noun, a "I" definition is only intended to provide Many terms with "I" definitions are proper nouns (e.g., see: Internet
information in the style of a desktop encyclopedia; the authoritative Protocol). For these terms, the "I" definition is intended only to
definition is found elsewhere (e.g., see: Internet Protocol). provide basic information; the authoritative definition is found
elsewhere.
For a proper noun identified as an "Internet protocol", please refer
to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards"
(STD 1) for the standardization state and status of the protocol.
2.2 Recommended Terms with a Non-Internet Basis ("N") 2.2 Recommended Terms with a Non-Internet Basis ("N")
The paragraph marking "N" (as opposed to "O") identifies a definition The paragraph marking "N" (as opposed to "O") indicates a definition
that the Directorate recommends SHOULD be the first choice for the that the Directorate recommends SHOULD be the first choice for the
term, if it is used at all in Internet documents. Terms and term, if the term is used at all in Internet documents. Terms and
definitions of this type MAY be used in Internet documents (e.g., definitions of this type MAY be used in Internet documents (e.g.,
see: X.509 public-key certificate). see: X.509 public-key certificate).
However, an "N" (as opposed to an "I") indicates that the definition However, an "N" (as opposed to an "I") also indicates a definition
has a non-Internet basis or origin; that is, the Internet Standards that has a non-Internet basis or origin; that is, the Internet
Process is not authoritative for the definition. Many such Standards Process is not authoritative for the definition. Many such
definitions are preceded by an indication of a contextual usage definitions are preceded by an indication of a contextual usage
limitation, and the Directorate's endorsement does not apply outside limitation, and the Directorate's endorsement does not apply outside
that context. Also, some contexts are rarely if ever expected to that context. Also, some contexts are rarely if ever expected to
occur in a Internet document (e.g., see: baggage). In those cases, occur in a Internet document (e.g., see: baggage). In those cases,
the listing exists to make Internet authors aware of the non-Internet the listing exists to make Internet authors aware of the non-Internet
usage so that they can avoid conflicts with non-Internet documents. usage so that they can avoid conflicts with non-Internet documents.
Many terms with "N" definitions are proper nouns (e.g., see: Computer Many terms with "N" definitions are proper nouns (e.g., see: Computer
Security Objects Register). For these terms, the "N" definitions are Security Objects Register). For these terms, the "N" definition is
intended only to provide a basic information; the authoritative intended only to provide basic information; the authoritative
definition is found elsewhere. definition is found elsewhere.
2.3 Other Definitions 2.3 Other Definitions ("O")
For some terms, the "I" or "N" paragraph is followed by one or more The paragraph marking "O" (as opposed to "D") indicates a definition
"O" paragraphs. The "O" indicates that the definition has a non- that has a non-Internet basis or origin and also indicates that the
Internet basis or origin and also indicates that the Directorate Directorate recommends that the definition SHOULD NOT be used in
recommends that the term SHOULD NOT be used in Internet documents, Internet documents *except* in cases where the term is specifically
except possibly in cases where the term is specifically identified by identified as non-Internet.
as non-Internet. For example, some Internet Standards Process
document might was to mention BCA (see: brand certification
authority) as an example to illustrate some concept; in that case,
the document should specifically refer to it as "SET(trademark) BCA"
and give the SET definition.
For many terms that have a definition published by a non-Internet For example, an ISPD might mention "BCA" (see: brand certification
authority) or "baggage" as an example to illustrate some concept; in
that case, the document should specifically say "SET(trademark) BCA"
or "SET(trademark) baggage" and state the definition of the term.
For some terms that have a definition published by a non-Internet
authority--government (see: object reuse), industry (see: Secure Data authority--government (see: object reuse), industry (see: Secure Data
Exchange), national (see: key authentication), or international (see: Exchange), national (see: key authentication), or international (see:
data confidentiality)--this Glossary provides an "N" definition, data confidentiality)--this Glossary marks the definition "N",
recommended for use in Internet documents. But in other cases, the recommending its use in Internet documents. In other cases, an
available non-Internet definition is inadequate or other available non-Internet definitions is inadequate or inappropriate for
inappropriate for Internet Standards use. It may be narrow or ISPDs. For example, it may be narrow or outdated, or it may need
outdated, or it need clarification by substituting more careful clarification by substituting more careful wording or more
wording or more explanatory wording, based on other terms that explanatory wording, based on other terms that are defined here. In
defined here. In those cases, this Glossary provides an "I" those cases, this Glossary provides an "I" definition (or sometimes a
definition that supersedes the non-Internet definition. different "N" definition), which precedes and supersedes the
definition marked "O".
In cases where this Glossary provides a "I" definition to supersede a In cases where this Glossary provides a definition to supersede one
non-Internet definition that is some kind of standard, the substitute that is some kind of standard, the substitute is intended to subsume
is intended to subsume the meaning of the non-Internet definition and the meaning of the "O" definition and not conflict with it. For
not conflict with it. For example, the "O" definition of "security "security service", for example, the "O" definition deals narrowly
service" deals narrowly with only communication services provided by with only communication services provided by layers in the OSI model
layers in the OSI model and is inadequate for the full range of and is inadequate for the full range of ISPD usage; the "I"
Internet Standards Process usage; the "I" definition can be used in definition can be used in more situations and for more kinds of
more situations and for more kinds of service. However, the "O" service. However, the "O" definition is provided to make authors of
definition is listed to make authors of Internet documents aware of ISPDs aware of situations in which the term is used narrowly.
situations in which the term is used narrowly.
This Glossary attempts to substitute understandable English that does This Glossary attempts to substitute understandable English that does
not contradict any non-Internet authority. Still, terminology differs not contradict any non-Internet authority. Still, terminology differs
between the standards of the American Bar Association, OSI, SET, the between the standards of the American Bar Association, OSI, SET, the
U.S. Department of Defense, and other authorities, and this Glossary U.S. Department of Defense, and other authorities, and this Glossary
probably is not exactly aligned with all of them. probably is not exactly aligned with all of them.
2.4 Commentary and Additional Guidance 2.4 Deprecated Terms, Definitions, and Uses ("D")
The paragraph marking "(C)" identifies text that is advisory or If the Directorate recommends that a term or definition SHOULD NOT be
used, or SHOULD NOT be used in a certain way, in ISPDs, then either
the definition has the paragraph marking "D", or an additional "D"
paragraph states that restriction. Usually, a rationale is given for
the negative recommendation (e.g., see: Green Book).
2.5 Commentary and Additional Guidance ("C")
The paragraph marking "C" identifies text that is advisory or
tutorial. This text MAY be reused in other Internet documents. This tutorial. This text MAY be reused in other Internet documents. This
text is not intended to be authoritative, but is provided to clarify text is not intended to be authoritative, but is provided to clarify
the definitions and to enhance this Glossary so that Internet the definitions and to enhance this Glossary so that Internet
security novices can use it as a tutorial. security novices can use it as a tutorial.
2.5 Deprecated Terms 3. Definitions
If the Directorate recommends that a term SHOULD NOT be used at all, ---------------------------------------------------------------------
then that term has only a "C" paragraph that states that "Internet Note: Any acronym or other abbreviation (excluding items of common
Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use" the term. A rationale is English usage, such as e.g., i.e., vol., pp., etc.) that is used in
given for each such negative recommendation (e.g., see: Green Book). this Glossary, either in a definition or as a subpart of a defined
term, is also defined in this Glossary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Definitions $ 3DES
See: triple DES.
ABA Guidelines $ *-property
(I) (Pronounced "star property".) See: "confinement property"
under Bell-LaPadula Model.
$ ABA Guidelines
(N) "American Bar Association (ABA) Digital Signature Guidelines" (N) "American Bar Association (ABA) Digital Signature Guidelines"
[ABA], a framework of legal principles for using digital [ABA], a framework of legal principles for using digital
signatures and digital certificates in electronic commerce. signatures and digital certificates in electronic commerce.
Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) $ Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)
(N) A standard for describing data objects [X680]. (N) A standard for describing data objects [X680].
(C) OSI standards use ASN.1 to specify data formats for protocols. (C) OSI standards use ASN.1 to specify data formats for protocols.
OSI defines functionality in layers, and information objects at OSI defines functionality in layers, and information objects at
higher layers are abstractly defined to be implemented with higher layers are abstractly defined to be implemented with
objects at lower layers. A higher layer may define transfers of objects at lower layers. A higher layer may define transfers of
abstract objects between computers, and a lower layer may define abstract objects between computers, and a lower layer may define
transfers concretely as strings of bits. Syntax is needed to transfers concretely as strings of bits. Syntax is needed to
define abstract objects, and encoding rules (see: Basic Encoding define abstract objects, and encoding rules (see: Basic Encoding
Rules) are needed to transform between abstract objects and bit Rules) are needed to transform between abstract objects and bit
strings. strings.
(C) In ASN.1, formal names are written without spaces, and (C) In ASN.1, formal names are written without spaces, and
separate words in a name are indicated by capitalizing the first separate words in a name are indicated by capitalizing the first
letter of each word except the first word. For example, the name letter of each word except the first word. For example, the name
of a CRL is "certificateRevocationList". of a CRL is "certificateRevocationList".
ACC $ ACC
See: access control center. See: access control center.
access $ access
(I) The ability and means to communicate with or otherwise (I) The ability and means to communicate with or otherwise
interact with a system in order to use system resources to either interact with a system in order to use system resources to either
handle information or gain knowledge of the information the system handle information or gain knowledge of the information the system
contains. contains.
(O) "A specific type of interaction between a subject and an (O) "A specific type of interaction between a subject and an
object that results in the flow of information from one to the object that results in the flow of information from one to the
other." [NCS04] other." [NCS04]
(C) In this Glossary, "access" is intended to cover any ability to
(C) In this glossary, "access" is intended to cover any ability to
communicate with a system, including one-way communication in communicate with a system, including one-way communication in
either direction. In actual practice, however, entities outside a either direction. In actual practice, however, entities outside a
security perimeter that can receive output from the system but security perimeter that can receive output from the system but
cannot provide input or otherwise directly interact with the cannot provide input or otherwise directly interact with the
system, might be treated as not having "access" and, therefore, be system, might be treated as not having "access" and, therefore, be
exempt from security policy requirements, such as the need for a exempt from security policy requirements, such as the need for a
security clearance. security clearance.
access control $ access control
(I) Protection of system resources against unauthorized access; a (I) Protection of system resources against unauthorized access; a
process by which use of system resources is regulated according to process by which use of system resources is regulated according to
a security policy and is permitted by only authorized entities a security policy and is permitted by only authorized entities
(users, programs, processes, or other systems) according to that (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according to that
policy. (Also see: access, access control service.) policy. (See: access, access control service.)
(O) "The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including (O) "The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including
the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized manner." the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized manner."
[I7498 Part 2] [I7498 Part 2]
access control center (ACC) $ access control center (ACC)
(I) A computer containing a database with entries that define a (I) A computer containing a database with entries that define a
security policy for an access control service. security policy for an access control service.
(C) An ACC is sometimes used in conjunction with a key center to (C) An ACC is sometimes used in conjunction with a key center to
implement access control in a key distribution system for implement access control in a key distribution system for
symmetric cryptography. symmetric cryptography.
access control list (ACL) $ access control list (ACL)
(I) A mechanism that implements access control for a system (I) A mechanism that implements access control for a system
resource by enumerating the identities of the system entities that resource by enumerating the identities of the system entities that
are permitted to access the resource. (Compare with: capability.) are permitted to access the resource. (Compare with: capability.)
access control service $ access control service
(I) A security service that protects against a system entity using (I) A security service that protects against a system entity using
a system resource in a way not authorized by the system's security a system resource in a way not authorized by the system's security
policy; in short, protection of system resources against policy; in short, protection of system resources against
unauthorized access. (Also see: access control, discretionary unauthorized access. (See: access control, discretionary access
access control, identity-based security policy, mandatory access control, identity-based security policy, mandatory access control,
control, rule-based security policy.) rule-based security policy.)
(C) This service includes protecting against use of a resource in (C) This service includes protecting against use of a resource in
an unauthorized manner by an entity that is authorized to use the an unauthorized manner by an entity that is authorized to use the
resource in some other manner. resource in some other manner.
access mode $ access mode
(I) A distinct type of data processing operation--such as read, (I) A distinct type of data processing operation--such as read,
write, append, or execute--that potentially can be performed on an write, append, or execute--that potentially can be performed on an
object in a computer system. object in a computer system.
accountability $ accountability
(I) The property of a system (including all of its system (I) The property of a system (including all of its system
resources) that ensures that the actions of a system entity may be resources) that ensures that the actions of a system entity may be
traced uniquely to that entity, which can be held responsible for traced uniquely to that entity, which can be held responsible for
its actions. (Also see: audit service.) its actions. (See: audit service.)
(C) Accountability permits detection and subsequent investigation (C) Accountability permits detection and subsequent investigation
of security breaches. of security breaches.
accreditation $ accredit
(I) An administrative declaration by a designated authority that $ accreditation
an information system is approved to operate in a particular (I) An administrative declaration (usually based on a technical
security configuration with a prescribed set of safeguards. (Also certification of system security mechanisms) by a designated
see: certification.) authority that an information system is approved to operate in a
(C) Accreditation is based on certification of the system's particular security configuration with a prescribed set of
security mechanisms. These terms are used more in the U.S. safeguards. [FP102] (See: certification.)
Department of Defense and other government agencies than in
commercial organizations. However, the concepts apply any place (C) The terms "certification" and "accreditation" are used more in
where managers must deal with and accept responsibility for the U.S. Department of Defense and other government agencies than
security risks, and the American Bar Association is developing in commercial organizations. However, the concepts apply any place
where managers are required to deal with and accept responsibility
for security risks, and the American Bar Association is developing
accreditation criteria specifically for CAs. accreditation criteria specifically for CAs.
ACL $ ACL
See: access control list. See: access control list.
acquirer $ acquirer
(N) SET usage: "The financial institution that establishes an (N) SET usage: "The financial institution that establishes an
account with a merchant and processes payment card authorizations account with a merchant and processes payment card authorizations
and payments." [SET1] and payments." [SET1]
(O) "The institution (or its agent) that acquires from the card (O) "The institution (or its agent) that acquires from the card
acceptor the financial data relating to the transaction and acceptor the financial data relating to the transaction and
initiates that data into an interchange system." [SET2, and ANSI initiates that data into an interchange system." [SET2, ANSI X9.8
X9.8 and X9.24] and X9.24]
active attack $ active attack
See: (secondary definition in) attack. See: (secondary definition in) attack.
active wiretapping $ active wiretapping
See: (secondary definition in) wiretapping. See: (secondary definition in) wiretapping.
add-on security $ add-on security
(I) "The retrofitting of protection mechanisms, implemented by (I) "The retrofitting of protection mechanisms, implemented by
hardware or software, after the [automatic data processing] system hardware or software, after the [automatic data processing] system
has become operational." [FP039] has become operational." [FP039]
administrative security $ administrative security
(I) Management procedures and constraints to prevent unauthorized (I) Management procedures and constraints to prevent unauthorized
access to a system. (Also see: security architecture.) access to a system. (See: security architecture.)
(O) "The management constraints, operational procedures, (O) "The management constraints, operational procedures,
accountability procedures, and supplemental controls established accountability procedures, and supplemental controls established
to provide an acceptable level of protection for sensitive data." to provide an acceptable level of protection for sensitive data."
[FP039] [FP039]
(C) Examples include clear delineation and separation of duties, (C) Examples include clear delineation and separation of duties,
and configuration control. and configuration control.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) $ Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
(N) A future FIPS publication being developed by NIST to succeed (N) A future FIPS publication being developed by NIST to succeed
DES. Intended to specify an unclassified, publicly-disclosed, DES. Intended to specify an unclassified, publicly-disclosed,
symmetric encryption algorithm, available royalty-free worldwide. symmetric encryption algorithm, available royalty-free worldwide.
adversary $ adversary
(I) An entity that attacks, or is a threat to, a system. (I) An entity that attacks, or is a threat to, a system.
aggregation $ Affirm
(I) A circumstance in which a collection of information items must (I) A circumstance in which a collection of information items is
be classified at a higher security level than any of the required to be classified at a higher security level than any of
individual items that comprise it. the individual items that comprise it.
AH $ aggregation
(I) A circumstance in which a collection of information items is
required to be classified at a higher security level than any of
the individual items that comprise it.
$ AH
See: Authentication Header See: Authentication Header
alias $ alias
(I) A name that an entity uses in place of its real name, usually (I) A name that an entity uses in place of its real name, usually
for the purpose of either anonymity or deception. for the purpose of either anonymity or deception.
algorithm $ algorithm
(I) A finite set of step-by-step instructions for a problem- (I) A finite set of step-by-step instructions for a problem-
solving or computation procedure, especially one that can be solving or computation procedure, especially one that can be
implemented by a computer. (Also see: cryptographic algorithm.) implemented by a computer. (See: cryptographic algorithm.)
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) $ American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
(N) A private, not-for-profit association of users, manufacturers, (N) A private, not-for-profit association of users, manufacturers,
and other organizations, that administers U.S. private sector and other organizations, that administers U.S. private sector
voluntary standards. voluntary standards.
(C) ANSI is the sole U.S. representative to the two major non- (C) ANSI is the sole U.S. representative to the two major non-
treaty international standards organizations, ISO and, via the treaty international standards organizations, ISO and, via the
U.S. National Committee (USNC), the International Electrotechnical U.S. National Committee (USNC), the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). Commission (IEC).
anonymous $ anonymous
(I) The condition of having a name that is unknown or concealed. (I) The condition of having a name that is unknown or concealed.
(Compare with: anonymous login.)
(C) An application may require security services that maintain (C) An application may require security services that maintain
anonymity of users or other system entities, perhaps to preserve anonymity of users or other system entities, perhaps to preserve
their privacy or shield them from attack. To hide an entity's real their privacy or shield them from attack. To hide an entity's real
name, an alias may be used. For example, a financial institution name, an alias may be used. For example, a financial institution
may assign an account number. Parties to a transaction can thus may assign an account number. Parties to a transaction can thus
remain relatively anonymous, but can also accept the transaction remain relatively anonymous, but can also accept the transaction
as legitimate. Real names of the parties cannot be easily as legitimate. Real names of the parties cannot be easily
determined by observers of the transaction, but an authorized determined by observers of the transaction, but an authorized
third party may be able to map an alias to a real name, such as by third party may be able to map an alias to a real name, such as by
presenting the institution with a court order. In other presenting the institution with a court order. In other
applications, anonymous entities may be completely untraceable. applications, anonymous entities may be completely untraceable.
archive, archive management $ anonymous login
(I) (1.) Noun: a collection of data that is stored for a (I) An access control feature (or, rather, an access control hole)
in many Internet hosts that enables users to gain access to
general-purpose or public services and resources on a host (such
as allowing any user to transfer data using File Transfer
Protocol) without having a pre-established, user-specific account
(i.e., user name and password).
(C) The user logs in using a special, publicly known user name
(such as "anonymous", "guest", or "ftp") and then either is not
asked for a password or is asked to provide a special, publicly
known password (such as RanonymousS) or provide an arbitrary e-
mail address as password. The user then has access to a set of
publicly accessible system resources. This feature exposes a
system to more threats than when all the users are pre-registered,
trusted entities, and, of course, no individual accountability is
possible.
$ APOP
See: POP3 APOP.
$ archive
$ archive management
(I) (1.) Noun: A collection of data that is stored for a
relatively long period of time for historical and other purposes, relatively long period of time for historical and other purposes,
such as to support audit service, availability service, or system such as to support audit service, availability service, or system
integrity service. (Compare with: backup.) (2.) Verb: to store integrity service. (Compare with: backup.) (2.) Verb: To store
data in such a way. (Compare with: back up.) data in such a way. (Compare with: back up.)
(C) A digital signature may need to be verified many years after (C) A digital signature may need to be verified many years after
the signing occurs. The CA--the one that issued the certificate the signing occurs. The CA--the one that issued the certificate
containing the public key needed to verify that signature--may not containing the public key needed to verify that signature--may not
stay in operation that long. So every CA must provide for long- stay in operation that long. So every CA needs to provide for
term storage of the information needed to verify the signatures of long-term storage of the information needed to verify the
those to whom it issues certificates. signatures of those to whom it issues certificates.
ARPANET $ ARPANET
(N) Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, a pioneer packet- (N) Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, a pioneer packet-
switched network that was built in the early 1970s under contract switched network that was built in the early 1970s under contract
to the U.S. Government led to the development of today's Internet, to the U.S. Government led to the development of today's Internet,
and was decommissioned in June 1990. and was decommissioned in June 1990.
ASN.1 $ ASN.1
See: Abstract Syntax Notation One. See: Abstract Syntax Notation One.
association $ association
(I) A cooperative relationship between system entities, usually (I) A cooperative relationship between system entities, usually
for the purpose of transferring information between them. (Also for the purpose of transferring information between them. (See:
see: security association.) security association.)
assurance $ assurance
(I) An attribute of an information system that provides grounds (I) (1.) An attribute of an information system that provides
for having confidence that the system operates such that the grounds for having confidence that the system operates such that
system security policy is enforced; procedures that ensure a the system security policy is enforced. (2.) A procedure that
system is developed and operated as intended by its security ensures a system is developed and operated as intended by the
policy. system's security policy.
assurance level $ assurance level
(I) Evaluation usage: A specific level on a hierarchical scale (I) Evaluation usage: A specific level on a hierarchical scale
representing successively increased confidence that a target of representing successively increased confidence that a target of
evaluation adequately fulfills the requirements (e.g., see: evaluation adequately fulfills the requirements (e.g., see:
TCSEC). TCSEC).
asymmetric cryptography $ asymmetric cryptography
(I) A modern branch of cryptography in which the algorithms employ (I) A modern branch of cryptography (popularly known as "public-
a key pair (a public key and a private key) and use a different key cryptography") in which the algorithms employ a pair of keys
key of the pair for different steps of the algorithm. (Popularly (a public key and a private key) and use a different component of
known as "public-key cryptography".) the pair for different steps of the algorithm. (See: key pair.)
(C) Asymmetric algorithms have key management advantages over (C) Asymmetric algorithms have key management advantages over
equivalently strong symmetric ones. First, one key of the pair equivalently strong symmetric ones. First, one key of the pair
does not need to be known by anyone but its owner; so it can more does not need to be known by anyone but its owner; so it can more
easily be kept secret. Second, although the other key of the pair easily be kept secret. Second, although the other key of the pair
must be shared by all entities that use the algorithm, that key is shared by all entities that use the algorithm, that key does
does not need to be kept secret from other entities; so the key not need to be kept secret from other, non-using entities; so the
distribution part of key management can be done more easily. key distribution part of key management can be done more easily.
(C) For encryption: In an asymmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., (C) For encryption: In an asymmetric encryption algorithm (e.g.,
see: RSA), when Alice wants to ensure confidentiality for data she see: RSA), when Alice wants to ensure confidentiality for data she
sends to Bob, she encrypts the information with a public key sends to Bob, she encrypts the information with a public key
provided by Bob. Only Bob has the matching private key that is provided by Bob. Only Bob has the matching private key that is
needed to decrypt the data. needed to decrypt the data.
(C) For signature: In an asymmetric digital signature algorithm (C) For signature: In an asymmetric digital signature algorithm
(e.g., see: DSA), when Alice wants to ensure data integrity or (e.g., see: DSA), when Alice wants to ensure data integrity or
provide authentication for data she sends to Bob, she uses her provide authentication for data she sends to Bob, she uses her
private key to sign (create a digital signature from) the data. To private key to sign (create a digital signature from) the data. To
verify the signature, Bob uses the matching public key that Alice verify the signature, Bob uses the matching public key that Alice
has provided. has provided.
(C) For key agreement: In an asymmetric key agreement algorithm (C) For key agreement: In an asymmetric key agreement algorithm
(e.g., see: Diffie-Hellman), Alice and Bob each send their own (e.g., see: Diffie-Hellman), Alice and Bob each send their own
public key to the other person. Then each uses their own private public key to the other person. Then each uses their own private
key and the other's public key to compute the new key value. key and the other's public key to compute the new key value.
attack $ attack
(I) An assault on system security that derives from an intelligent (I) An assault on system security that derives from an intelligent
threat, i.e., an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt threat, i.e., an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt
(especially in the sense of a method or approach) to evade (especially in the sense of a method or approach) to evade
security services and violate the security policy of a system. security services and violate the security policy of a system.
(Also see: penetration, violation, vulnerability.) (See: penetration, violation, vulnerability.)
(C) An "active attack" attempts to alter system resources or - Active vs. passive: An "active attack" attempts to alter system
affect their operation. A "passive attack" attempts to learn or resources or affect their operation. A "passive attack"
make use of information (e.g., see: wiretapping) does not affect attempts to learn or make use of information (e.g., see:
system resources. wiretapping) does not affect system resources.
(C) An "insider attack" (or inside attack) is an attack initiated - Insider vs. outsider: An "inside attack" is an attack initiated
by an entity inside the security perimeter, i.e., by an entity by an entity inside the security perimeter (an "insider"),
that is authorized to access system resources but uses them in a i.e., by an entity that is authorized to access system
way not approved by those who granted the authorization. An resources but uses them in a way not approved by those who
"outsider attack" (or outside attack) is initiated from outside granted the authorization. An "outside attack" is initiated
the perimeter, by an unauthorized or illegitimate user of the from outside the perimeter, by an unauthorized or illegitimate
system. In the Internet, potential outside attackers range from user of the system (an "outsider"). In the Internet, potential
amateur pranksters to organized criminals, international outside attackers range from amateur pranksters to organized
terrorists, and hostile governments. criminals, international terrorists, and hostile governments.
attribute authority (C) The term "attack" relates to some other basic security terms
as shown in the following model:
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - + + - - - - + + - - - - - - - - - - -+
| An Attack: | |Counter- | | A System Resource: |
| i.e., A Threat Action | | measure | | Target of the Attack |
| +----------+ | | | | +-----------------+ |
| | Attacker |<==================||<========= | |
| | i.e., | Passive | | | | | Vulnerability | |
| | A Threat |<=================>||<========> | |
| | Agent | or Active | | | | +-------|||-------+ |
| +----------+ Attack | | | | VVV |
| | | | | Threat Consequences |
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - + + - - - - + + - - - - - - - - - - -+
$ attribute authority
(I) A CA that issues attribute certificates. (I) A CA that issues attribute certificates.
attribute certificate (O) "An authority, trusted by the verifier to delegate privilege,
which issues attribute certificates." [FPDAM]
$ attribute certificate
(I) A digital certificate that binds a set of descriptive data (I) A digital certificate that binds a set of descriptive data
items, other than a public key, either directly to a subject name items, other than a public key, either directly to a subject name
or to the identifier of another certificate that is a public-key or to the identifier of another certificate that is a public-key
certificate. [X509] certificate. [X509]
(O) "A set of attributes of a user together with some other (O) "A set of attributes of a user together with some other
information, rendered unforgeable by the digital signature created information, rendered unforgeable by the digital signature created
using the private key of the CA which issued it." [X509] using the private key of the CA which issued it." [X509]
(O) "A data structure that includes some attribute values and
identification information about the owner of the attribute
certificate, all digitally signed by an Attribute Authority. This
authority's signature serves as the guarantee of the binding
between the attributes and their owner." [FPDAM]
(C) A public-key certificate binds a subject name to a public key (C) A public-key certificate binds a subject name to a public key
value, along with information needed to perform certain value, along with information needed to perform certain
cryptographic functions. Other attributes of a subject, such as a cryptographic functions. Other attributes of a subject, such as a
security clearance, may be certified in a separate kind of digital security clearance, may be certified in a separate kind of digital
certificate, called an attribute certificate. A subject may have certificate, called an attribute certificate. A subject may have
multiple attribute certificates associated with its name or with multiple attribute certificates associated with its name or with
each of its public-key certificates. each of its public-key certificates.
(C) An attribute certificate might be issued to a subject in the (C) An attribute certificate might be issued to a subject in the
following situations: following situations:
skipping to change at page 13, line 26 skipping to change at page 14, line 34
is shorter than that of the related public-key certificate, or is shorter than that of the related public-key certificate, or
when it is desirable not to need to revoke a subject's public when it is desirable not to need to revoke a subject's public
key just to revoke an attribute. key just to revoke an attribute.
- Different authorities: When the authority responsible for the - Different authorities: When the authority responsible for the
attributes is different than the one that issues the public-key attributes is different than the one that issues the public-key
certificate for the subject. (There is no requirement that an certificate for the subject. (There is no requirement that an
attribute certificate be issued by the same CA that issues the attribute certificate be issued by the same CA that issues the
associated public-key certificate.) associated public-key certificate.)
audit service $ audit service
(I) A security service that records information needed to (I) A security service that records information needed to
establish accountability for system events and the actions of establish accountability for system events and the actions of
system entities that cause them. (Also see: security audit.) system entities that cause them. (See: security audit.)
audit trail $ audit trail
See: security audit trail. See: security audit trail.
authentic signature $ authentic signature
(I) A signature (particularly a digital signature) that can be (I) A signature (particularly a digital signature) that can be
trusted because it can be verified. (See: validate vs. verify.) trusted because it can be verified. (See: validate vs. verify.)
authenticate $ AUTH
See: POP3 AUTH.
$ authenticate
(I) Verify (i.e., establish the truth of) an identity claimed by (I) Verify (i.e., establish the truth of) an identity claimed by
or for a system entity. (Also see: authentication.) or for a system entity. (See: authentication.)
(C) This definition is narrower than in general English usage, (C) This definition is narrower than in general English usage,
where this term usually means "to prove genuine"; for example, an where this term usually means "to prove genuine"; for example, an
art expert authenticates a Michelangelo painting. Although we art expert authenticates a Michelangelo painting.
might be tempted to speak similarly of authenticating a digital
signature or digital certificate, Internet Standards Process (D) Although we might be tempted to speak similarly of
documents SHOULD NOT use this term in that way in the context of authenticating a digital signature or digital certificate, ISPDs
asymmetric cryptography. Instead, we "sign" and then "verify" SHOULD NOT use that language in the context of asymmetric
digital signatures, and we "issue" and then "validate" digital cryptography. Instead, we "sign" and then "verify" digital
signatures, and we "issue" and then "validate" digital
certificates. (See: validate vs. verify.) certificates. (See: validate vs. verify.)
authentication $ authentication
(I) The process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a (I) The process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a
system entity. (Also see: authentication exchange, authentication system entity. (See: authentication exchange, authentication
information, data origin authentication, peer entity information, data origin authentication, peer entity
authentication.) authentication.)
(C) An authentication process consists of two steps: (C) An authentication process consists of two steps:
- Identification step: Presenting an identifier to the security - Identification step: Presenting an identifier to the security
system. (Identifiers must be assigned carefully, because system. (Identifiers should be assigned carefully, because
authenticated identities are the basis for other security authenticated identities are the basis for other security
services, such as access control service.) services, such as access control service.)
- Verification step: Presenting or generating authentication - Verification step: Presenting or generating authentication
information that corroborates the binding between the entity information that corroborates the binding between the entity
and the identifier. (Also see: verification.) and the identifier. (See: verification.)
(C) See: ("relationship between data integrity service and (C) See: ("relationship between data integrity service and
authentication services" in) data integrity service. authentication services" in) data integrity service.
authentication code $ authentication code
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is sometimes
because it is sometimes misleading defined as a synonym for misleading defined as a synonym for cryptographic checksum. The
cryptographic checksum. The word "authentication" is misleading word "authentication" is misleading because the mechanism involved
because the mechanism involved usually serves a data integrity usually serves a data integrity function rather than an
function rather than an authentication function. (Also see: authentication function. (See: message authentication code.)
message authentication code.)
Authentication Header (AH) $ Authentication Header (AH)
(I) An Internet IPsec protocol [R2402] designed to provide (I) An Internet IPsec protocol [R2402] designed to provide
connectionless data integrity service and data origin connectionless data integrity service and data origin
authentication service for IP datagrams, and (optionally) to authentication service for IP datagrams, and (optionally) to
provide protection against replay attacks. provide protection against replay attacks.
(C) Replay protection may be selected by the receiver when a (C) Replay protection may be selected by the receiver when a
security association is established. AH authenticates upper-layer security association is established. AH authenticates upper-layer
protocol data units and as much of the IP header as possible. protocol data units and as much of the IP header as possible.
However, some IP header fields may change in transit, and the However, some IP header fields may change in transit, and the
value of these fields, when the packet arrives at the receiver, value of these fields, when the packet arrives at the receiver,
skipping to change at page 15, line 5 skipping to change at page 16, line 12
(C) AH may be used alone, or in combination with the IPsec ESP (C) AH may be used alone, or in combination with the IPsec ESP
protocol, or in a nested fashion with tunneling. Security services protocol, or in a nested fashion with tunneling. Security services
can be provided between a pair of communicating hosts, between a can be provided between a pair of communicating hosts, between a
pair of communicating security gateways, or between a host and a pair of communicating security gateways, or between a host and a
gateway. ESP can provide the same security services as AH, and ESP gateway. ESP can provide the same security services as AH, and ESP
can also provide data confidentiality service. The main difference can also provide data confidentiality service. The main difference
between authentication services provided by ESP and AH is the between authentication services provided by ESP and AH is the
extent of the coverage; ESP does not protect IP header fields extent of the coverage; ESP does not protect IP header fields
unless they are encapsulated by AH. unless they are encapsulated by AH.
authentication exchange $ authentication exchange
(I) A mechanism to verify the identity of an entity by means of (I) A mechanism to verify the identity of an entity by means of
information exchange. information exchange.
(O) "A mechanism intended to ensure the identity of an entity by (O) "A mechanism intended to ensure the identity of an entity by
means of information exchange." [I7498 Part 2] means of information exchange." [I7498 Part 2]
authentication information $ authentication information
(I) Information used to verify an identity claimed by or for an (I) Information used to verify an identity claimed by or for an
entity. (Also see: authentication, credential.) entity. (See: authentication, credential.)
(C) Authentication information may exist as, or be derived from, (C) Authentication information may exist as, or be derived from,
one of the following: one of the following:
- Something the entity knows. (Also see: password). - Something the entity knows. (See: password).
- Something the entity possesses. (Also see: token.) - Something the entity possesses. (See: token.)
- Something the entity is. (Also see: biometric authentication.) - Something the entity is. (See: biometric authentication.)
authentication service $ authentication service
(I) A security service that verifies an identity claimed by or for (I) A security service that verifies an identity claimed by or for
an entity. (Also see: authentication.) an entity. (See: authentication.)
(C) In a network, there are two general forms of authentication (C) In a network, there are two general forms of authentication
service: data origin authentication service and peer entity service: data origin authentication service and peer entity
authentication service. authentication service.
authenticity $ authenticity
(I) The property of being genuine and able to be verified and be (I) The property of being genuine and able to be verified and be
trusted. (Also see: authenticate, authentication, validate vs. trusted. (See: authenticate, authentication, validate vs. verify)
verify)
authority $ authority
See: attribute authority, certification, registration authority (D) "An entity, responsible for the issuance of certificates."
[FPDAM]
authority revocation list (ARL) (C) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for either AA, CA,
RA, ORA, or similar terms, because it may cause confusion.
Instead, if it is necessary to shorten text, use abbreviations
defined in this Glossary.
(C) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this definition for any PKI entity,
because the definition is ambiguous with regard to whether the
entity actually issues certificates (see: attribute authority,
certification authority) or just has responsibility for part of
the processes that precede or follow issuance (see: registration
authority). (See: issue.)
$ authority certificate
(D) "A certificate issued to an authority (e.g. either to a
certification authority or to an attribute authority)." [FPDAM]
(See: authority.)
(C) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term or definition because they are
with regard to which specific types of PKI entities they address.
$ authority revocation list (ARL)
(I) A data structure that enumerates digital certificates that (I) A data structure that enumerates digital certificates that
were issued to certification authorities but have been invalidated were issued to certification authorities but have been invalidated
by their issuer prior to when they were scheduled to expire (see: by their issuer prior to when they were scheduled to expire (see:
certificate expiration). (Also see: X.509 authority revocation certificate expiration). (See: X.509 authority revocation list.)
list.)
authorize, authorization (O) "A revocation list containing a list of public-key
certificates issued to authorities, which are no longer considered
valid by the certificate issuer." [FPDAM]
$ authorize
$ authorization
(I) (1.) To "authorize" means to grant a right or permission to a (I) (1.) To "authorize" means to grant a right or permission to a
system entity to access a system resource. (2.) An "authorization" system entity to access a system resource. (2.) An "authorization"
is a right or a permission that is granted. (Also see: privilege.) is a right or a permission that is granted. (See: privilege.) (3.)
(3.) An "authorization process" is a procedure for granting such An "authorization process" is a procedure for granting such
rights. rights.
(O) SET usage: "The process by which a properly appointed person (O) SET usage: "The process by which a properly appointed person
or persons grants permission to perform some action on behalf of or persons grants permission to perform some action on behalf of
an organization. This process assesses transaction risk, confirms an organization. This process assesses transaction risk, confirms
that a given transaction does not raise the account holder's debt that a given transaction does not raise the account holder's debt
above the account's credit limit, and reserves the specified above the account's credit limit, and reserves the specified
amount of credit. (When a merchant obtains authorization, payment amount of credit. (When a merchant obtains authorization, payment
for the authorized amount is guaranteed--provided, of course, that for the authorized amount is guaranteed--provided, of course, that
the merchant followed the rules associated with the authorization the merchant followed the rules associated with the authorization
process.)" [SET2] process.)" [SET2]
availability $ automated information system
(I) An organized assembly of resources and procedures--i.e.,
computing and communications equipment and services, with their
supporting facilities and personnel--that collect, record,
process, store, transport, retrieve, or display information to
accomplish a specified set of functions.
$ availability
(I) The property of a system or a system resource being accessible (I) The property of a system or a system resource being accessible
and usable upon demand by an authorized system entity, according and usable upon demand by an authorized system entity, according
to performance specifications for the system; i.e., a system is to performance specifications for the system; i.e., a system is
available if it provides services according to the system design available if it provides services according to the system design
whenever users request them. (Also see: critical; denial of whenever users request them. (See: critical, denial of service,
service.) reliability, survivability.)
(O) "The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an (O) "The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an
authorized entity." [I7498 Part 2] authorized entity." [I7498 Part 2]
availability service $ availability service
(I) A security service that protects a system to ensure its (I) A security service that protects a system to ensure its
availability. availability.
(C) This service addresses the security concerns engendered by (C) This service addresses the security concerns raised by denial-
denial-of-service attacks. It depends on proper management and of-service attacks. It depends on proper management and control of
control of system resources, and thus depends on access control system resources, and thus depends on access control service and
service and other security services. other security services.
back door $ back door
(I) A hardware or software mechanism that provides access to a (I) A hardware or software mechanism that (a) provides access to a
system and its resources by other than the usual procedure and, system and its resources by other than the usual procedure, (b)
usually, is not publicly known. (Also see: trap door.) was deliberately left in place by the system's designers or
maintainers, and (c) usually is not publicly known. (See: trap
door.)
(C) For example, a way to access a computer other than through the (C) For example, a way to access a computer other than through the
legitimate login procedure. legitimate login procedure. Such security holes do not necessarily
have malicious intent; e.g., operating systems sometimes are
shipped by the manufacturer with privileged accounts intended for
use by field service technicians or the vendor's maintenance
programmers. (See: trap door.)
back up vs. backup $ back up vs. backup
(I) Noun: "backup": a reserve copy of data that is stored (I) Verb "back up": To store data for the purpose of creating a
separately from the original, for use if the original becomes lost backup copy. (Compare with: archive.)
or damaged. (Compare with: archive. Also see: contingency plan.)
(I) Verb: "back up": to store data in such a way. (Compare with: (I) Noun/adjective "backup": (1.) A reserve copy of data that is
archive.) stored separately from the original, for use if the original
becomes lost or damaged. (Compare with: archive.) (2.) Alternate
means to permit performance of system functions despite a disaster
to system resources. (See: contingency plan.)
$ baggage
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term to describe a data element
except when stated as "SET(trademark) baggage" with the following
meaning:
baggage
(O) SET usage: An "opaque encrypted tuple, which is included in a (O) SET usage: An "opaque encrypted tuple, which is included in a
SET message but appended as external data to the PKCS encapsulated SET message but appended as external data to the PKCS encapsulated
data. This avoids superencryption of the previously encrypted data. This avoids superencryption of the previously encrypted
tuple, but guarantees linkage with the PKCS portion of the tuple, but guarantees linkage with the PKCS portion of the
message." [SET2] message." [SET2]
bandwidth $ bandwidth
(I) Commonly used to mean the capacity of a communication channel (I) Commonly used to mean the capacity of a communication channel
to pass data through the channel in a given amount of time. to pass data through the channel in a given amount of time.
(Usually expressed in bits per second.) (Usually expressed in bits per second.)
bank identification number (BIN) $ bank identification number (BIN)
(I) The digits of a credit card number that identify the issuing (I) The digits of a credit card number that identify the issuing
bank. (Also see: primary account number.) bank. (See: primary account number.)
(O) SET usage: The first six digits of a primary account number. (O) SET usage: The first six digits of a primary account number.
Basic Encoding Rules (BER) $ Basic Encoding Rules (BER)
(I) A standard for representing ASN.1 data types as strings of (I) A standard for representing ASN.1 data types as strings of
octets (eight-bit values) [X690]. (Also see: Distinguished octets (eight-bit values) [X690]. (See: Distinguished Encoding
Encoding Rules.) Rules.)
bastion host $ bastion host
(I) A strongly protected computer that is in a network protected (I) A strongly protected computer that is in a network protected
by a firewall (or is part of a firewall) and is the only host (or by a firewall (or is part of a firewall) and is the only host (or
one of only a few hosts) in the network that can be directly one of only a few hosts) in the network that can be directly
accessed from networks on the other side of the firewall. accessed from networks on the other side of the firewall.
(C) Filtering routers in a firewall typically restrict traffic (C) Filtering routers in a firewall typically restrict traffic
from the outside network to reaching just one host, the bastion from the outside network to reaching just one host, the bastion
host, which usually is part of the firewall. Since only this one host, which usually is part of the firewall. Since only this one
host can be directly attacked, only this one host must be very host can be directly attacked, only this one host needs to be very
strongly protected, so security can be maintained more easily and strongly protected, so security can be maintained more easily and
less expensively. However, to allow legitimate internal and less expensively. However, to allow legitimate internal and
external users to access application resources through the external users to access application resources through the
firewall, higher layer protocols and services need to be relayed firewall, higher layer protocols and services need to be relayed
and forwarded by the bastion host. Some services have forwarding and forwarded by the bastion host. Some services have forwarding
built in (like DNS or SMTP); other services (like TELNET and FTP) built in (like DNS or SMTP); other services (like TELNET and FTP)
require a proxy server on the bastion host. require a proxy server on the bastion host.
BCA $ BCA
See: brand certification authority. See: brand certification authority.
BCI $ BCI
See: brand CRL identifier. See: brand CRL identifier.
Bell-LaPadula Model $ Bell-LaPadula Model
(N) A formal, mathematical, state-transition model of security (N) A formal, mathematical, state-transition model of security
policy for multilevel-secure computer systems, devised by David policy for multilevel-secure computer systems, devised by David
Bell and Leonard LaPadula at The MITRE Corporation in 1973. Bell and Leonard LaPadula at The MITRE Corporation in 1973.
(C) The model separates computer system elements into a set of (C) The model separates computer system elements into a set of
subjects and a set of objects. To determine whether or not a subjects and a set of objects. To determine whether or not a
subject is authorized for a particular access mode on an object, subject is authorized for a particular access mode on an object,
the clearance of the subject is compared to the classification of the clearance of the subject is compared to the classification of
the object. The model defines the notion of a secure state, in the object. The model defines the notion of a "secure state", in
which the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are which the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are
in accordance with a specified security policy. It is proven that in accordance with a specified security policy. It is proven that
each state transition preserves security by moving from secure each state transition preserves security by moving from secure
state to secure state, thereby proving that the system is secure. state to secure state, thereby proving that the system is secure.
(C) In this model, a multilevel-secure system satisfies several (C) In this model, a multilevel-secure system satisfies several
rules, including the following: rules, including the following:
- "Confinement property" (also called "*-property"): A subject - "Confinement property" (also called "*-property", pronounced
has write access to an object only if the clearance of the "star property"): A subject has write access to an object only
subject is dominated by the classification of the object. if classification of the object dominates the clearance of the
subject.
- "Simple security property": A subject has read access to an - "Simple security property": A subject has read access to an
object only if the clearance of the subject dominates the object only if the clearance of the subject dominates the
classification of the object. classification of the object.
- "Tranquillity property": The classification of an object does - "Tranquillity property": The classification of an object does
not change while the object is being processed by the system. not change while the object is being processed by the system.
BER $ BER
See: Basic Encoding Rules. See: Basic Encoding Rules.
BIN $ beyond A1
(O) A level of trust that is beyond the highest level of criteria
specified by the TCSEC. That is, a level of security that is so
high as not be verifiable by currently available formal methods.
$ BIN
See: bank identification number. See: bank identification number.
bind $ bind
(I) To inseparably associate by applying some mechanism, such as (I) To inseparably associate by applying some mechanism, such as
when a CA uses a digital signature to bind together a subject and when a CA uses a digital signature to bind together a subject and
a public key in a public-key certificate. a public key in a public-key certificate.
biometric authentication $ biometric authentication
(I) A method of generating authentication information for a person (I) A method of generating authentication information for a person
by digitizing measurements of a physical characteristic, such as by digitizing measurements of a physical characteristic, such as
fingerprint patterns, hand shape, retina pattern, speech sounds, fingerprint patterns, hand shape, retina pattern, speech sounds,
or handwriting pattern. or handwriting pattern.
bit $ bit
(I) The smallest unit of information storage; a contraction of the (I) The smallest unit of information storage; a contraction of the
term "binary digit"; one of two symbols--"0" (zero) and "1" (one) term "binary digit"; one of two symbols--"0" (zero) and "1" (one)
--that are used to represent binary numbers. --that are used to represent binary numbers.
BLACK $ BLACK
(I) Designation for information system equipment or facilities (I) Designation for information system equipment or facilities
that handle (and for data that contains) only ciphertext (or, that handle (and for data that contains) only ciphertext (or,
depending on the context, only unclassified information), and for depending on the context, only unclassified information), and for
such data itself. This term derives from U.S. Government COMSEC such data itself. This term derives from U.S. Government COMSEC
terminology. (Compare with: RED. Also see: RED/BLACK separation.) terminology. (Compare with: RED. Also see: RED/BLACK separation.)
block cipher $ block cipher
(I) An encryption algorithm that breaks plaintext into fixed-size (I) An encryption algorithm that breaks plaintext into fixed-size
segments and uses the same key to transform each plaintext segment segments and uses the same key to transform each plaintext segment
into a fixed-size segment of ciphertext. (Also see: mode, stream into a fixed-size segment of ciphertext. (See: mode, stream
cipher.) cipher.)
(C) For example, Blowfish, DEA, IDEA, RC2, and SKIPJACK. However, (C) For example, Blowfish, DEA, IDEA, RC2, and SKIPJACK. However,
a block cipher can be adapted to have a different external a block cipher can be adapted to have a different external
interface, such as that of a stream cipher, by using a mode of interface, such as that of a stream cipher, by using a mode of
operation to "package" the basic algorithm. operation to "package" the basic algorithm.
Blowfish $ Blowfish
(N) A symmetric block cipher with variable-length key (32 to 448 (N) A symmetric block cipher with variable-length key (32 to 448
bits) designed in 1993 by Bruce Schneier [Schn] as an unpatented, bits) designed in 1993 by Bruce Schneier [Schn] as an unpatented,
license-free, royalty-free replacement for DES or IDEA. license-free, royalty-free replacement for DES or IDEA.
brand $ brand
(I) A distinctive mark or name that identifies a product or (I) A distinctive mark or name that identifies a product or
business entity. business entity.
(O) SET usage: The name of a payment card. Financial institutions (O) SET usage: The name of a payment card. Financial institutions
and other companies have founded payment card brands, protect and and other companies have founded payment card brands, protect and
advertise the brands, establish and enforce rules for use and advertise the brands, establish and enforce rules for use and
acceptance of their payment cards, and provide networks to acceptance of their payment cards, and provide networks to
interconnect the financial institutions. These brands combine the interconnect the financial institutions. These brands combine the
roles of issuer and acquirer in interactions with cardholders and roles of issuer and acquirer in interactions with cardholders and
merchants. [SET1] merchants. [SET1]
brand certification authority (BCA) $ brand certification authority (BCA)
(O) SET usage: A CA owned by a payment card brand, such as (O) SET usage: A CA owned by a payment card brand, such as
MasterCard, Visa, or American Express. [SET2] (Also see: MasterCard, Visa, or American Express. [SET2] (See: certification
certification hierarchy, SET.) hierarchy, SET.)
brand CRL identifier (BCI) $ brand CRL identifier (BCI)
(O) SET usage: A digitally signed list, issued by the BCA, of the (O) SET usage: A digitally signed list, issued by the BCA, of the
names of CAs for which CRLs must be processed when verifying names of CAs for which CRLs need to be processed when verifying
signatures in SET messages. [SET2] signatures in SET messages. [SET2]
break $ break
(I) Cryptographic usage: To successfully perform cryptanalysis and (I) Cryptographic usage: To successfully perform cryptanalysis and
thus succeed in decrypting data or performing some other thus succeed in decrypting data or performing some other
cryptographic function, without initially having knowledge of the cryptographic function, without initially having knowledge of the
key that the function requires. (This term applies to encrypted key that the function requires. (This term applies to encrypted
data or, more generally, to a cryptographic algorithm or data or, more generally, to a cryptographic algorithm or
cryptographic system.) cryptographic system.)
bridge $ bridge
(I) A computer that is a gateway between two networks (usually two (I) A computer that is a gateway between two networks (usually two
LANs) at OSI layer 2. (Compare with: router.) LANs) at OSI layer 2. (Compare with: router.)
browser $ British Standard 7799
(N) Part 1 is a standard code of practice and provides guidance on
how to secure an information system; Part 2 specifies the
management framework, objectives, and control requirements for
information security management systems [B7799]. The certification
scheme works like ISO 9000. It is in use in the UK, the
Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand and might be proposed as
an ISO standard or adapted to be part of the Common Criteria.
$ browser
(I) An client computer program that can retrieve and display (I) An client computer program that can retrieve and display
information from servers on the World Wide Web. information from servers on the World Wide Web.
(C) For example, Netscape's Navigator and Communicator, and (C) For example, Netscape's Navigator and Communicator, and
Microsoft's Explorer. Microsoft's Explorer.
brute force $ brute force
(I) A cryptanalysis approach or other kind of attack method (I) A cryptanalysis approach or other kind of attack method
involving an exhaustive procedure that tries all possibilities, involving an exhaustive procedure that tries all possibilities,
one-by-one. one-by-one.
(C) For example, for ciphertext where the analyst already knows (C) For example, for ciphertext where the analyst already knows
the decryption algorithm, the brute force approach to finding the the decryption algorithm, a brute force approach to finding the
original plaintext is to decrypt the message with every possible original plaintext is to decrypt the message with every possible
key. key.
byte $ BS7799
(I) A unit of eight bits; also called an "octet", especially in See: British Standard 7799.
OSI standards.
CA $ byte
(I) A fundamental unit of computer storage; the smallest
addressable unit in a computer's architecture. Usually holds one
character of information; and, today, usually means eight bits.
(See: octet.)
(C) Larger than a "bit", but smaller than a "word". Although
usually eight bits today, was other sizes (e.g., six bits, nine
bits) in earlier computer architectures.
$ CA
See: certification authority. See: certification authority.
CA certificate $ CA certificate
(I) "A [digital] certificate for one CA issued by another CA." (I) "A [digital] certificate for one CA issued by another CA."
[X509] [X509]
(C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a (C) That is, a digital certificate whose holder is able to issue
digital certificates. A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a
"basicConstraints" extension containing a "cA" value that "basicConstraints" extension containing a "cA" value that
specifically "indicates whether or not the public key may be used specifically "indicates whether or not the public key may be used
to verify certificate signatures." to verify certificate signatures."
call back $ call back
(I) An authentication technique for terminals that remotely access (I) An authentication technique for terminals that remotely access
a computer via telephone lines; the host system disconnects the a computer via telephone lines; the host system disconnects the
caller and then calls back on a telephone number that was caller and then calls back on a telephone number that was
previously authorized for that terminal. previously authorized for that terminal.
capability $ capability
(I) A token, usually an unforgeable data value (sometimes called a (I) A token, usually an unforgeable data value (sometimes called a
"ticket") that gives the bearer or holder the right to access a "ticket") that gives the bearer or holder the right to access a
system resource. Possession of the token is accepted by a system system resource. Possession of the token is accepted by a system
as proof that the holder has been authorized to access the as proof that the holder has been authorized to access the
resource named or indicated by the token. (Compare with: access resource named or indicated by the token. (Compare with: access
control list.) control list.)
(C) This concept can be implemented as a digital certificate. (C) This concept can be implemented as a digital certificate.
(Also see: attribute certificate.) (See: attribute certificate.)
CAPI $ CAPI
See: "cryptographic application programming interface". See: cryptographic application programming interface.
CAPSTONE chip $ CAPSTONE chip
(N) An integrated circuit (the Mykotronx, Inc. MYK-82) with a Type (N) An integrated circuit (the Mykotronx, Inc. MYK-82) with a Type
II cryptographic processor that implements SKIPJACK, KEA, DSA, II cryptographic processor that implements SKIPJACK, KEA, DSA,
SHA, and basic mathematical functions to support asymmetric SHA, and basic mathematical functions to support asymmetric
cryptography, and includes the key escrow feature of the CLIPPER cryptography, and includes the key escrow feature of the CLIPPER
chip. (Also see: FORTEZZA card.) chip. (See: FORTEZZA card.)
card $ card
See: cryptographic card, FORTEZZA card, payment card, PC card, See: cryptographic card, FORTEZZA card, payment card, PC card,
smart card, token. smart card, token.
card backup $ card backup
See: token backup. See: token backup.
card copy $ card copy
See: token copy. See: token copy.
card restore $ card restore
See: token restore. See: token restore.
cardholder $ cardholder
(I) An entity that has been issued a card. (I) An entity that has been issued a card.
(O) SET usage: "The holder of a valid payment card account and (O) SET usage: "The holder of a valid payment card account and
user of software supporting electronic commerce." [SET2] A user of software supporting electronic commerce." [SET2] A
cardholder is issued a payment card by an issuer. SET ensures that cardholder is issued a payment card by an issuer. SET ensures that
in the cardholder's interactions with merchants, the payment card in the cardholder's interactions with merchants, the payment card
account information remains confidential. [SET1] account information remains confidential. [SET1]
cardholder certificate $ cardholder certificate
(O) SET usage: A digital certificate that is issued to a (O) SET usage: A digital certificate that is issued to a
cardholder upon approval of the cardholder's issuing financial cardholder upon approval of the cardholder's issuing financial
institution and that is transmitted to merchants with purchase institution and that is transmitted to merchants with purchase
requests and encrypted payment instructions, carrying assurance requests and encrypted payment instructions, carrying assurance
that the account number has been validated by the issuing that the account number has been validated by the issuing
financial institution and cannot be altered by a third party. financial institution and cannot be altered by a third party.
[SET1] [SET1]
cardholder certification authority (CCA) $ cardholder certification authority (CCA)
(O) SET usage: A CA responsible for issuing digital certificates (O) SET usage: A CA responsible for issuing digital certificates
to cardholders and operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an to cardholders and operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an
issuer, or another party according to brand rules. A CCA maintains issuer, or another party according to brand rules. A CCA maintains
relationships with card issuers to allow for the verification of relationships with card issuers to allow for the verification of
cardholder accounts. A CCA does not issue a CRL but does cardholder accounts. A CCA does not issue a CRL but does
distribute CRLs issued by root CAs, brand CAs, geopolitical CAs, distribute CRLs issued by root CAs, brand CAs, geopolitical CAs,
and payment gateway CAs. [SET2] and payment gateway CAs. [SET2]
CAST $ CAST
(N) A design procedure for symmetric encryption algorithms, and a (N) A design procedure for symmetric encryption algorithms, and a
resulting family of algorithms, invented by C(arlisle) A(dams) and resulting family of algorithms, invented by C(arlisle) A(dams) and
S(tafford) T(avares). S(tafford) T(avares). [R2612]
category $ category
(I) A grouping of sensitive information items to which a non- (I) A grouping of sensitive information items to which a non-
hierarchical restrictive security label is applied to increase hierarchical restrictive security label is applied to increase
protection of the data. (Also see: compartment.) protection of the data. (See: compartment.)
CAW $ CAW
See: certification authority workstation. See: certification authority workstation.
CBC $ CBC
See: cipher block chaining. See: cipher block chaining.
CCA $ CCA
See: cardholder certification authority. See: cardholder certification authority.
CCITT $ CCITT
(N) Acronym for French translation of International Telephone and (N) Acronym for French translation of International Telephone and
Telegraph Consultative Committee. Now renamed ITU-T. Telegraph Consultative Committee. Now renamed ITU-T.
CERT $ CERT
See: computer emergency response team. See: computer emergency response team.
certificate $ certificate
(I) In common English usage, a document that attests to the truth (I) In common English usage, a document that attests to the truth
of something or the ownership of something. of something or the ownership of something.
(C) Security usage, see: digital certificate, X.509 certificate. (C) Security usage, see: digital certificate, X.509 certificate.
(C) PKI usage, see: public-key certificate. (C) PKI usage, see: public-key certificate.
certificate authority $ certificate authority
(C) This term looks like imprecise use of a term standardized by (D) This term looks like imprecise use of a term standardized by
X.509 and, therefore, Internet Standards documents SHOULD NOT use X.509 and, therefore, ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
this term as a synonym for "certification authority". for "certification authority".
certificate chain $ certificate chain
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it duplicates the
because it duplicates the meaning of a standardized term. Instead, meaning of a standardized term. Instead, use "certification path".
use "certification path".
certificate chain validation $ certificate chain validation
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it duplicates the
because it duplicates the meaning of standardized terms and mixes meaning of standardized terms and mixes concepts in a potentially
concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, use misleading way. Instead, use "certificate validation" or "path
"certificate validation" or "path validation", depending on what validation", depending on what is meant. (See: validate vs.
is meant. (Also see: validate vs. verify.) verify.)
certificate creation $ certificate creation
(I) The act or process by which a CA sets the values of a digital (I) The act or process by which a CA sets the values of a digital
certificate's data fields and signs it. (Also see: issue.) certificate's data fields and signs it. (See: issue.)
certificate expiration $ certificate expiration
(I) The event that occurs when a certificate ceases to be valid (I) The event that occurs when a certificate ceases to be valid
because its assigned lifetime has been exceeded. (Also see: because its assigned lifetime has been exceeded. (See: certificate
certificate revocation, validity period.) revocation, validity period.)
certificate extension $ certificate extension
See: extension. See: extension.
certificate management $ certificate holder
(I) A system entity named as the subject of a digital certificate.
$ certificate management
(I) The functions that a CA may perform during the life cycle of a (I) The functions that a CA may perform during the life cycle of a
digital certificate, including the following: digital certificate, including the following:
- Acquire and verify data items to bind into the certificate. - Acquire and verify data items to bind into the certificate.
- Encode and sign the certificate. - Encode and sign the certificate.
- Store the certificate in a directory or repository. - Store the certificate in a directory or repository.
- Renew, rekey, and update the certificate. - Renew, rekey, and update the certificate.
- Revoke the certificate and issue a CRL. - Revoke the certificate and issue a CRL.
(Also see: archive management, key management, security (See: archive management, key management, security architecture,
architecture, token management, certificate management.) token management, certificate management.)
certificate policy $ certificate policy
(I) "A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a (I) "A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a
certificate to a particular community and/or class of application certificate to a particular community and/or class of application
with common security requirements." [X509] (Compare with: with common security requirements." [X509] (Compare with:
certification practice statement.) certification practice statement.)
(C) A certificate policy can help a certificate user decide (C) A certificate policy can help a certificate user decide
whether a certificate should be trusted in a particular whether a certificate should be trusted in a particular
application. "For example, a particular certificate policy might application. "For example, a particular certificate policy might
indicate applicability of a type of certificate for the indicate applicability of a type of certificate for the
authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the
skipping to change at page 23, line 48 skipping to change at page 26, line 10
(C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a (C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a
"certificatePolicies" extension that lists certificate policies, "certificatePolicies" extension that lists certificate policies,
recognized by the issuing CA, that apply to the certificate and recognized by the issuing CA, that apply to the certificate and
govern its use. Each policy is denoted by an object identifier and govern its use. Each policy is denoted by an object identifier and
may optionally have certificate policy qualifiers. may optionally have certificate policy qualifiers.
(C) SET usage: Every SET certificate specifies at least one (C) SET usage: Every SET certificate specifies at least one
certificate policy, that of the SET root CA. SET uses certificate certificate policy, that of the SET root CA. SET uses certificate
policy qualifiers to point to the actual policy statement and to policy qualifiers to point to the actual policy statement and to
add qualifying policies to the root policy. (Also see: SET add qualifying policies to the root policy. (See: SET qualifier.)
qualifier.)
certificate policy qualifier $ certificate policy qualifier
(I) Information that pertains to a certificate policy and is (I) Information that pertains to a certificate policy and is
included in a "certificatePolicies" extension in a v3 X.509 included in a "certificatePolicies" extension in a v3 X.509
public-key certificate. public-key certificate.
certificate reactivation $ certificate reactivation
(I) The act or process by which a digital certificate, which a CA (I) The act or process by which a digital certificate, which a CA
has designated for revocation but not yet listed on a CRL, is has designated for revocation but not yet listed on a CRL, is
returned to the valid state. returned to the valid state.
certificate rekey $ certificate rekey
(I) The act or process by which an existing public-key certificate (I) The act or process by which an existing public-key certificate
has its public key value changed by issuing a new certificate with has its public key value changed by issuing a new certificate with
a different (usually new) public key. (Also see: certificate a different (usually new) public key. (See: certificate renewal,
renewal, certificate update, rekey.) certificate update, rekey.)
(C) For an X.509 public-key certificate, the essence of rekey is (C) For an X.509 public-key certificate, the essence of rekey is
that the subject stays the same and a new public key is bound to that the subject stays the same and a new public key is bound to
that subject. Other changes are made, and the old certificate is that subject. Other changes are made, and the old certificate is
revoked, only as required by the PKI and CPS in support of the revoked, only as required by the PKI and CPS in support of the
rekey. If changes go beyond that, the process is a "certificate rekey. If changes go beyond that, the process is a "certificate
update". update".
(O) MISSI usage: To rekey a MISSI X.509 public-key certificate (O) MISSI usage: To rekey a MISSI X.509 public-key certificate
means that the issuing authority creates a new certificate that is means that the issuing authority creates a new certificate that is
identical to the old one, except the new one has a new, different identical to the old one, except the new one has a new, different
KEA key; or a new, different DSS key; or new, different KEA and KEA key; or a new, different DSS key; or new, different KEA and
DSS keys. The new certificate also has a different serial number DSS keys. The new certificate also has a different serial number
and may have a different validity period. A new key creation date and may have a different validity period. A new key creation date
and maximum key lifetime period are assigned to each newly and maximum key lifetime period are assigned to each newly
generated key. If a new KEA key is generated, that key is assigned generated key. If a new KEA key is generated, that key is assigned
a new KMID. The old certificate remains valid until it expires, a new KMID. The old certificate remains valid until it expires,
but may not be further renewed, rekeyed, or updated. but may not be further renewed, rekeyed, or updated.
certificate renewal $ certificate renewal
(I) The act or process by which the validity of the data binding (I) The act or process by which the validity of the data binding
asserted by an existing public-key certificate is extended in time asserted by an existing public-key certificate is extended in time
by issuing a new certificate. (Also see: certificate rekey, by issuing a new certificate. (See: certificate rekey, certificate
certificate update.) update.)
(C) For an X.509 public-key certificate, this term means that the (C) For an X.509 public-key certificate, this term means that the
validity period is extended but the binding of the public key to validity period is extended but the binding of the public key to
the subject and to other data items stays the same. The other data the subject and to other data items stays the same. The other data
items are changed, and the old certificate is revoked, only as items are changed, and the old certificate is revoked, only as
required by the PKI and CPS to support the renewal. If changes go required by the PKI and CPS to support the renewal. If changes go
beyond that, the process is a "certificate rekey" or "certificate beyond that, the process is a "certificate rekey" or "certificate
update". update".
certificate request $ certificate request
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it looks like imprecise
because it looks like imprecise use of a term standardized by PKCS use of a term standardized by PKCS #10 and used in PKIX. Instead,
#10 and used in PKIX. Instead, use "certification request". use "certification request".
certificate revocation $ certificate revocation
(I) The event that occurs when a CA declares that a previously (I) The event that occurs when a CA declares that a previously
valid digital certificate issued by that CA has become invalid; valid digital certificate issued by that CA has become invalid;
usually stated with a revocation date. usually stated with a revocation date.
(C) In X.509, a revocation is announced to potential certificate (C) In X.509, a revocation is announced to potential certificate
users by a CRL that mentions the certificate. Revocation and users by a CRL that mentions the certificate. Revocation and
listing on a CRL is only necessary before certificate expiration. listing on a CRL is only necessary before certificate expiration.
certificate revocation list (CRL) $ certificate revocation list (CRL)
(I) A data structure that enumerates digital certificates that (I) A data structure that enumerates digital certificates that
have been invalidated by their issuer prior to when they were have been invalidated by their issuer prior to when they were
scheduled to expire (see: certificate expiration). (Also see: scheduled to expire (see: certificate expiration). (See: X.509
X.509 certificate revocation list.) certificate revocation list.)
certificate revocation tree (O) "A signed list indicating a set of certificates that are no
longer considered valid by the certificate issuer. After a
certificate appears on a CRL, it is deleted from a subsequent CRL
after the certificateUs expiry. CRLs may be used to identify
revoked public-key certificates or attribute certificates and may
represent revocation of certificates issued to authorities or to
users. The term CRL is also commonly used as a generic term
applying to all the different types of revocation lists, including
CRLs, ARLs, ACRLs, etc." [FPDAM]
$ certificate revocation tree
(I) A mechanism for distributing notice of certificate revocations (I) A mechanism for distributing notice of certificate revocations
(as an alternative to issuing a CRL), using a tree of hash results (as an alternative to issuing a CRL), using a tree of hash results
that is signed by the tree's issuer. that is signed by the tree's issuer.
certificate serial number $ certificate serial number
(I) An integer value that is unambiguously associated with a (I) An integer value that (1) is associated with, and may be
digital certificate issued by a CA and that is unique within the carried in, a digital certificate; (2) is assigned to the
domain of that CA. [X509] certificate by the certificate's issuer; and (3) is unique among
all the certificates produced by that issuer.
certificate status responder (O) "An integer value, unique within the issuing CA, which is
unambiguously associated with a certificate issued by that CA.
[X509]
$ certificate status responder
(N) FPKI usage: A trusted on-line server that acts for a CA to (N) FPKI usage: A trusted on-line server that acts for a CA to
provide authenticated certificate status information to provide authenticated certificate status information to
certificate users. [FPKI] certificate users. [FPKI]
certificate update $ certificate update
(I) The act or process by which data items bound in an existing (I) The act or process by which data items bound in an existing
public-key certificate, especially authorizations granted to the public-key certificate, especially authorizations granted to the
subject, are changed by issuing a new certificate. (Also see: subject, are changed by issuing a new certificate. (See:
certificate rekey, certificate renewal.) certificate rekey, certificate renewal.)
(C) For an X.509 public-key certificate, the essence of this (C) For an X.509 public-key certificate, the essence of this
process is that fundamental changes are made in the data that is process is that fundamental changes are made in the data that is
bound to the public key, such that the old certificate usually bound to the public key, such that it is necessary to revoke the
must be revoked. (Otherwise, the process is only a "certificate old certificate. (Otherwise, the process is only a "certificate
rekey" or "certificate renewal".) rekey" or "certificate renewal".)
certificate user $ certificate user
(I) A system entity that depends on the validity of information (I) A system entity that depends on the validity of information
(such as another entity's public key value) provided by a digital (such as another entity's public key value) provided by a digital
certificate. (Also see: relying party.) certificate. (See: relying party.)
(O) "An entity that needs to know, with certainty, the public key (O) "An entity that needs to know, with certainty, the public key
of another entity." [X509] of another entity." [X509]
(C) The system entity may be a human being or an organization, or (C) The system entity may be a human being or an organization, or
a device or process under the control of a human or an a device or process under the control of a human or an
organization. organization.
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for the "subject"
as a synonym for the "subject" of a certificate. of a certificate.
certificate validation $ certificate validation
(I) An act or process by which a certificate user establishes that (I) An act or process by which a certificate user establishes that
the assertions made by a digital certificate can be trusted. (See: the assertions made by a digital certificate can be trusted. (See:
valid certificate. validate vs. verify.) valid certificate, validate vs. verify.)
(O) "The process of ensuring that a certificate is valid including
possibly the construction and processing of a certification path,
and ensuring that all certificates in that path have not expired
or been revoked." [FPDAM]
(C) To validate a certificate, a certificate user checks that the (C) To validate a certificate, a certificate user checks that the
certificate is properly formed and signed and currently in force: certificate is properly formed and signed and currently in force:
- Signature: Employs the issuer's public key to verify the - Signature: Employs the issuer's public key to verify the
digital signature of the CA who issued the certificate in digital signature of the CA who issued the certificate in
question. If the key is obtained from the issuer's own public- question. If the key is obtained from the issuer's own public-
key certificate, that certificate also must be validated. That key certificate, that certificate also should be validated.
validation may lead to yet another certificate to be validated, That validation may lead to yet another certificate to be
and so on. Thus, in general, certificate validation involves validated, and so on. Thus, in general, certificate validation
discovering and validating a certification path. involves discovering and validating a certification path.
- Syntax and semantics: Parses the certificate's syntax and - Syntax and semantics: Parses the certificate's syntax and
interprets its semantics, applying rules specified for and by interprets its semantics, applying rules specified for and by
its data fields, such as for critical extensions in an X.509 its data fields, such as for critical extensions in an X.509
certificate. certificate.
- Currency and revocation: Verifies that the certificate is - Currency and revocation: Verifies that the certificate is
currently in force by checking that the current date and time currently in force by checking that the current date and time
are within the validity period (if that is specified in the are within the validity period (if that is specified in the
certificate) and that the certificate is not listed on a CRL or certificate) and that the certificate is not listed on a CRL or
otherwise announced as in valid. (CRLs themselves require a otherwise announced as in valid. (CRLs themselves require a
similar validation process.) similar validation process.)
certification $ certification
(I) Information system usage: Technical evaluation of an (I) Information system usage: Technical evaluation (usually made
information system's security features and other safeguards in support of an accreditation action) of an information system's
(usually made in support of an accreditation action) to establish security features and other safeguards to establish the extent to
the extent to which the system's design and implementation meet which the system's design and implementation meet specified
specified security requirements. security requirements. [FP102] (See: accreditation.)
(I) Digital certificate usage: The act or process of vouching for
the truth and accuracy of the binding between data items in the
certificate. (See: certify.)
(I) Public key usage: The act or process of vouching for the (I) Public key usage: The act or process of vouching for the
ownership of a public key by issuing a public-key certificate that ownership of a public key by issuing a public-key certificate that
binds the key to the name of the entity that owns the key. (In binds the key to the name of the entity that owns the key. (In
addition to binding a key with a name, a public-key certificate addition to binding a key with a name, a public-key certificate
may bind those items with other restrictive or explanatory data may bind those items with other restrictive or explanatory data
items; e.g., see: X.509 public-key certificate.) items; e.g., see: X.509 public-key certificate.)
(O) SET usage: "The process of ascertaining that a set of (O) SET usage: "The process of ascertaining that a set of
requirements or criteria has been fulfilled and attesting to that requirements or criteria has been fulfilled and attesting to that
fact to others, usually with some written instrument. A system fact to others, usually with some written instrument. A system
that has been inspected and evaluated as fully compliant with the that has been inspected and evaluated as fully compliant with the
SET protocol by duly authorized parties and process would be said SET protocol by duly authorized parties and process would be said
to have been certified compliant." [SET2] to have been certified compliant." [SET2]
certification authority (CA) $ certification authority (CA)
(I) An entity that issues digital certificates (especially X.509 (I) An entity that issues digital certificates (especially X.509
certificates) and vouches for the binding between the data items certificates) and vouches for the binding between the data items
in a certificate. in a certificate.
(O) "An authority trusted by one or more users to create and (O) "An authority trusted by one or more users to create and
assign certificates. Optionally the certification authority may assign certificates. Optionally the certification authority may
create the user's keys." [X509] create the user's keys." [X509]
(C) Certificate users depend on the validity of information (C) Certificate users depend on the validity of information
provided by a certificate. Thus, a CA must be someone that provided by a certificate. Thus, a CA should be someone that
certificate users trust, and usually holds an official position certificate users trust, and usually holds an official position
created and granted power by a government, a corporation, or some created and granted power by a government, a corporation, or some
other organization. A CA is responsible for managing the life other organization. A CA is responsible for managing the life
cycle of certificates (see: certificate management) and, depending cycle of certificates (see: certificate management) and, depending
on the type of certificate and the CPS that applies, may be on the type of certificate and the CPS that applies, may be
responsible for the life cycle of key pairs associated with the responsible for the life cycle of key pairs associated with the
certificates (see: key management). certificates (see: key management).
certification authority workstation (CAW) $ certification authority workstation (CAW)
(I) A computer system that enables a CA to issue digital (I) A computer system that enables a CA to issue digital
certificates and supports other certificate management functions certificates and supports other certificate management functions
as required. as required.
certification hierarchy $ certification hierarchy
(I) A tree-structured (loop-free) topology of relationships among (I) A tree-structured (loop-free) topology of relationships among
CAs and the entities to whom the authorities issue public-key CAs and the entities to whom the authorities issue public-key
certificates. (Also see: hierarchical PKI.) certificates. (See: hierarchical PKI.)
(C) In this structure, one CA is the top CA, the highest level of (C) In this structure, one CA is the top CA, the highest level of
the hierarchy. (Also see: root.) All certificate users base path the hierarchy. (See: root, top CA.) The top CA may issue public-
validations on the top CA's public key. The top CA issues public-
key certificates to one or more additional CAs that form the key certificates to one or more additional CAs that form the
second highest level. Each of these CAs may issue certificates to second highest level. Each of these CAs may issue certificates to
more CAs at the third highest level, and so on. The CAs at the more CAs at the third highest level, and so on. The CAs at the
bottom of the hierarchy issue certificates only to entities that bottom of the hierarchy issue certificates only to entities that
are not CAs (see: end entity). Thus, all certification paths begin are not CAs (see: end entity). Thus, all certification paths begin
at the top CA and descend through one or more levels of other CAs. at the top CA and descend through one or more levels of other CAs.
All certificate users base path validations on the top CA's public
key.
(O) MISSI usage: A MISSI certification hierarchy has three or four (O) MISSI usage: A MISSI certification hierarchy has three or four
levels: levels:
- A CA at the highest level, the top CA, is a "policy approving - A CA at the highest level, the top CA, is a "policy approving
authority". authority".
- A CA at the second-highest level is a "policy creation - A CA at the second-highest level is a "policy creation
authority". authority".
- A CA at the third-highest level is a local authority called a - A CA at the third-highest level is a local authority called a
"certification authority". "certification authority".
skipping to change at page 28, line 22 skipping to change at page 31, line 4
- A CA at the third-highest level is a "certification authority". - A CA at the third-highest level is a "certification authority".
(O) SET usage: A SET certification hierarchy has three or four (O) SET usage: A SET certification hierarchy has three or four
levels: levels:
- The highest level is a "SET root CA". - The highest level is a "SET root CA".
- A CA at the second-highest level is a "brand certification - A CA at the second-highest level is a "brand certification
authority". authority".
- A CA at the third-highest (optional) level is a "geopolitical - A CA at the third-highest (optional) level is a "geopolitical
certification authority". certification authority".
- A CA at the fourth-highest level is a "cardholder CA", a - A CA at the fourth-highest level is a "cardholder CA", a
"merchant CA", or a "payment gateway CA". "merchant CA", or a "payment gateway CA".
certification path $ certification path
(I) An ordered sequence of public-key certificates--or a sequence (I) An ordered sequence of public-key certificates (or a sequence
of public-key certificates followed by one attribute certificate-- of public-key certificates followed by one attribute certificate)
that enables a certificate user to verify the signature on the that enables a certificate user to verify the signature on the
last certificate in the path, and thus enables the user to obtain last certificate in the path, and thus enables the user to obtain
a certified public key--or certified attributes--of the entity a certified public key (or certified attributes) of the entity
that is the subject of that last certificate. (Also see: that is the subject of that last certificate. (See: certificate
certificate validation, valid certificate.) validation, valid certificate.)
(O) "An ordered sequence of certificates of objects in the [X.500 (O) "An ordered sequence of certificates of objects in the [X.500
Directory Information Tree] which, together with the public key of Directory Information Tree] which, together with the public key of
the initial object in the path, can be processed to obtain that of the initial object in the path, can be processed to obtain that of
the final object in the path." [X509, R2527] the final object in the path." [X509, R2527]
(C) The path is the "list of certificates needed to allow a (C) The path is the "list of certificates needed to allow a
particular user to obtain the public key of another." [X509] The particular user to obtain the public key of another." [X509] The
list is "linked" in the sense that the digital signature of each list is "linked" in the sense that the digital signature of each
certificate (except the first) is verified by the public key certificate (except the first) is verified by the public key
contained in the preceding certificate; i.e., the private key used contained in the preceding certificate; i.e., the private key used
to sign a certificate and the public key contained in the to sign a certificate and the public key contained in the
preceding certificate form a key pair owned by the entity that preceding certificate form a key pair owned by the entity that
signed. signed.
(C) The word "particular", in the X.509 quotation in the previous (C) In the X.509 quotation in the previous "C" paragraph, the word
paragraph, points out that a certification path that can be "particular" points out that a certification path that can be
validated by one certificate user might not be able to be validated by one certificate user might not be able to be
validated by another. (See: certificate validation.) That is validated by another. (See: certificate validation.) That is
because either the first certificate must be a trusted certificate because either the first certificate should be a trusted
(it might be a root certificate) or the signature on the first certificate (it might be a root certificate) or the signature on
certificate must be verified by a trusted key (it might be a root the first certificate should be verified by a trusted key (it
key), and that element of trust is relative to the user. might be a root key), and that such trust is relative to the user.
certification policy $ certification policy
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term. (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term. Instead, use either
Instead, use either "certificate policy" or "certification "certificate policy" or "certification practice statement",
practice statement", depending on what is meant. depending on what is meant.
certification practice statement (CPS) $ certification practice statement (CPS)
(I) "A statement of the practices which a certification authority (I) "A statement of the practices which a certification authority
employs in issuing certificates." [ABA96, R2527] (Compare with: employs in issuing certificates." [ABA96, R2527] (Compare with:
certificate policy.) certificate policy.)
(C) A CPS is a published security policy that can help a (C) A CPS is a published security policy that can help a
certificate user to decide whether a certificate issued by a certificate user to decide whether a certificate issued by a
particular CA can be trusted enough to use in a particular particular CA can be trusted enough to use in a particular
application. A CPS may be (a) a declaration by a CA of the details application. A CPS may be (a) a declaration by a CA of the details
of the system and practices it employs in its certificate of the system and practices it employs in its certificate
management operations, (b) part of a contract between the CA and management operations, (b) part of a contract between the CA and
skipping to change at page 29, line 34 skipping to change at page 32, line 15
types involving multiple documents. [ABA] types involving multiple documents. [ABA]
(C) A CPS is usually more detailed and procedurally oriented than (C) A CPS is usually more detailed and procedurally oriented than
a certificate policy. A CPS applies to a particular CA or CA a certificate policy. A CPS applies to a particular CA or CA
community, while a certificate policy applies across CAs or community, while a certificate policy applies across CAs or
communities. A CA with a single CPS may support multiple communities. A CA with a single CPS may support multiple
certificate policies, which may be used for different application certificate policies, which may be used for different application
purposes or by different user communities. Multiple CAs, each with purposes or by different user communities. Multiple CAs, each with
a different CPS, may support the same certificate policy. [R2527] a different CPS, may support the same certificate policy. [R2527]
certification request $ certification request
(I) A algorithm-independent transaction format, defined by PCKS (I) A algorithm-independent transaction format, defined by PCKS
#10 and used in PKIX, that contains a DN, a public key, and #10 and used in PKIX, that contains a DN, a public key, and
optionally a set of attributes, collectively signed by the entity optionally a set of attributes, collectively signed by the entity
requesting certification, and sent to a CA, which transforms the requesting certification, and sent to a CA, which transforms the
request to an X.509 public-key certificate or another type of request to an X.509 public-key certificate or another type of
certificate. certificate.
certify (a public key) $ certify
(I) To certify a public key means to issue a public-key 1. (I) Issue a digital certificate and thus vouch for the truth,
certificate that vouches for the truth and accuracy of the binding accuracy, and binding between data items in the certificate (e.g.,
between a subject's name or title and a public key. (Also see: see: X.509 public key certificate), such as the identity of the
certificate's subject and the ownership of a public key. (See:
certification.) certification.)
(C) A description of the measures employed by a CA to verify the (C) To "certify a public key" means to issue a public-key
identity of the subject or the ownership of the public key should certificate that vouches for the binding between the certificate's
be included in the CA's CPS. subject and the key.
CFB 2. (I) The act by which a CA employs measures to verify the truth,
accuracy, and binding between data items in a digital certificate.
(C) A description of the measures used for verification should be
included in the CA's CPS.
$ CFB
See: cipher feedback. See: cipher feedback.
Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) $ Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)
(I) A peer entity authentication method for PPP, using a randomly- (I) A peer entity authentication method for PPP, using a randomly-
generated challenge and requiring a matching response that depends generated challenge and requiring a matching response that depends
on a cryptographic hash of the challenge and a secret key. [R1994] on a cryptographic hash of the challenge and a secret key. [R1994]
(Also see: challenge-response, PAP.) (See: challenge-response, PAP.)
challenge-response $ challenge-response
(I) An authentication process that verifies an identity by (I) An authentication process that verifies an identity by
requiring correct authentication information to be provided in requiring correct authentication information to be provided in
response to a challenge. In a computer system, the authentication response to a challenge. In a computer system, the authentication
information is usually a value that must be computed in response information is usually a value that is required to be computed in
to an unpredictable challenge value. response to an unpredictable challenge value.
channel $ Challenge-Response Authentication Mechanism (CRAM)
(I) An information transfer path within a system. (Also see: (I) IMAP4 usage: A mechanism [R2195], intended for use with IMAP4
covert channel.) AUTHENTICATE, by which an IMAP4 client uses a keyed hash [RFC2104]
to authenticate itself to an IMAP4 server. (See: POP3 APOP.)
checksum (C) The server includes a unique timestamp in its ready response
to the client. The client replies with the client's name and the
hash result of applying MD5 to a string formed from concatenating
the timestamp with a shared secret that is known only to the
client and the server.
$ channel
(I) An information transfer path within a system. (See: covert
channel.)
$ checksum
(I) A value that (a) is computed by a function that is dependent (I) A value that (a) is computed by a function that is dependent
on the contents of a data set and (b) is stored or transmitted on the contents of a data set and (b) is stored or transmitted
together with the data, for the purpose of detecting changes in together with the data, for the purpose of detecting changes in
the data. (Also see: cyclic redundancy check, data integrity the data. (See: cyclic redundancy check, data integrity service,
service, error detection code, hash, protected checksum.) error detection code, hash, keyed hash, protected checksum.)
(C) To gain confidence that a data set has not been changed, an (C) To gain confidence that a data set has not been changed, an
entity that later uses the data can compute a checksum and compare entity that later uses the data can compute a checksum and compare
it with the checksum that was stored or transmitted with the data. it with the checksum that was stored or transmitted with the data.
(C) Computer systems and networks employ checksums (and other (C) Computer systems and networks employ checksums (and other
mechanisms) to detect accidental changes in data. However, active mechanisms) to detect accidental changes in data. However, active
wiretapping that changes data could also change an accompanying wiretapping that changes data could also change an accompanying
checksum to match the changed data. Thus, some checksum functions checksum to match the changed data. Thus, some checksum functions
by themselves are not good countermeasures for active attacks. To by themselves are not good countermeasures for active attacks. To
protect against active attacks, the checksum function must be protect against active attacks, the checksum function needs to be
well-chosen (see: cryptographic hash), and the checksum result well-chosen (see: cryptographic hash), and the checksum result
must be protected (see: digital signature, keyed hash). needs to be protected (see: digital signature, keyed hash).
chosen-ciphertext attack $ chosen-ciphertext attack
(I) A cryptanalysis approach in which the analyst tries to (I) A cryptanalysis approach in which the analyst tries to
determine the key from knowledge of plaintext that corresponds to determine the key from knowledge of plaintext that corresponds to
ciphertext selected (dictated) by the analyst. ciphertext selected (dictated) by the analyst.
chosen-plaintext attack $ chosen-plaintext attack
(I) A cryptanalysis approach in which the analyst tries to (I) A cryptanalysis approach in which the analyst tries to
determine the key from knowledge of ciphertext that corresponds to determine the key from knowledge of ciphertext that corresponds to
plaintext selected (dictated) by the analyst. plaintext selected (dictated) by the analyst.
CIK $ CIAC
See: Computer Incident Advisory Capability.
$ CIK
See: cryptographic ignition key. See: cryptographic ignition key.
cipher $ cipher
(I) A cryptographic algorithm for encryption and decryption. (I) A cryptographic algorithm for encryption and decryption.
cipher block chaining (CBC) $ cipher block chaining (CBC)
(I) An block cipher mode that enhances electronic codebook mode by (I) An block cipher mode that enhances electronic codebook mode by
chaining together blocks of ciphertext it produces [FP081]. chaining together blocks of ciphertext it produces [FP081] (See:
[R1829, R2451].)
(C) This mode operates by combining (exclusive OR-ing) the (C) This mode operates by combining (exclusive OR-ing) the
algorithm's ciphertext output block with the next plaintext block algorithm's ciphertext output block with the next plaintext block
to form the next input block for the algorithm. to form the next input block for the algorithm.
cipher feedback (CFB) $ cipher feedback (CFB)
(I) An block cipher mode that enhances electronic code book mode (I) An block cipher mode that enhances electronic code book mode
by chaining together the blocks of ciphertext it produces and by chaining together the blocks of ciphertext it produces and
operating on plaintext segments of variable length less than or operating on plaintext segments of variable length less than or
equal to the block length [FP081]. equal to the block length [FP081].
(C) This mode operates by using the previously generated (C) This mode operates by using the previously generated
ciphertext segment as the algorithm's input (i.e., by "feeding ciphertext segment as the algorithm's input (i.e., by "feeding
back" the ciphertext) to generate an output block, and then back" the ciphertext) to generate an output block, and then
combining (exclusive OR-ing) that output block with the next combining (exclusive OR-ing) that output block with the next
plaintext segment (block length or less) to form the next plaintext segment (block length or less) to form the next
ciphertext segment. ciphertext segment.
ciphertext $ ciphertext
(I) Data that has been transformed by encryption so that its (I) Data that has been transformed by encryption so that its
semantic information content (i.e., its meaning) is no longer semantic information content (i.e., its meaning) is no longer
intelligible or directly available. (Also see: cleartext, intelligible or directly available. (See: cleartext, plaintext.)
plaintext.)
(O) "Data produced through the use of encipherment. The semantic (O) "Data produced through the use of encipherment. The semantic
content of the resulting data is not available." [I7498 Part 2] content of the resulting data is not available." [I7498 Part 2]
ciphertext-only attack $ ciphertext-only attack
(I) A cryptanalysis approach in which the analyst tries to (I) A cryptanalysis approach in which the analyst tries to
determine the key solely from knowledge of intercepted ciphertext determine the key solely from knowledge of intercepted ciphertext
(although the analyst may also know other clues, such as the (although the analyst may also know other clues, such as the
cryptographic algorithm, the language in which the plaintext was cryptographic algorithm, the language in which the plaintext was
written, the subject matter of the plaintext, and some probable written, the subject matter of the plaintext, and some probable
plaintext words.) plaintext words.)
CIPSO $ CIPSO
See: Common IP Security Option. See: Common IP Security Option.
CKL $ CKL
See: compromised key list. See: compromised key list.
class 2, 3, 4, or 5 $ class 2, 3, 4, or 5
(O) U.S. Department of Defense usage: Levels of assurance based on (O) U.S. Department of Defense usage: Levels of assurance based on
risk and value of information to be protected [DOD3]. risk and value of information to be protected [DOD3]:
- Class 2: For handling low-value information (unclassified, not - Class 2: For handling low-value information (unclassified, not
mission-critical, or low monetary value) or protection of mission-critical, or low monetary value) or protection of
system-high information in low- to medium-risk environment. system-high information in low- to medium-risk environment.
- Class 3: For handling medium-value information in low- to - Class 3: For handling medium-value information in low- to
medium-risk environment. Typically requires identification of a medium-risk environment. Typically requires identification of a
system entity as a legal person, rather than merely a member of system entity as a legal person, rather than merely a member of
an organization. an organization.
- Class 4: For handling medium- to high-value information in any - Class 4: For handling medium- to high-value information in any
environment. Typically requires identification of an entity as environment. Typically requires identification of an entity as
a legal person, rather than merely a member of an organization, a legal person, rather than merely a member of an organization,
and a cryptographic hardware token for protection of keying and a cryptographic hardware token for protection of keying
material. material.
- Class 5: For handling high-value information in a high-risk - Class 5: For handling high-value information in a high-risk
environment. environment.
classification, classification level $ classification
(I) A grouping of classified information to which a hierarchical, $ classification level
restrictive security label is applied to increase protection of (I) (1.) A grouping of classified information to which a
the data; or the level of protection that must be applied to that hierarchical, restrictive security label is applied to increase
information. (See: security level.) protection of the data. (2.) The level of protection that is
required to be applied to that information. (See: security level.)
classified $ classified
(I) Refers to information (stored or conveyed, in any form) that (I) Refers to information (stored or conveyed, in any form) that
is formally required by a security policy to receive data is formally required by a security policy to receive data
confidentiality service and to be marked with a security label confidentiality service and to be marked with a security label
(which in some cases might be implicit) to indicate its protected (which in some cases might be implicit) to indicate its protected
status. (Also see: unclassified.) status. (See: unclassified.)
(C) The term is mainly used in government, especially in the (C) The term is mainly used in government, especially in the
military, although the concept underlying the term also applies military, although the concept underlying the term also applies
outside government. In the U.S. Department of Defense, for outside government. In the U.S. Department of Defense, for
example, it means information that has been determined pursuant to example, it means information that has been determined pursuant to
Executive Order 12958 ("Classified National Security Information", Executive Order 12958 ("Classified National Security Information",
13 December 1996) or any predecessor order to require protection 13 December 1996) or any predecessor order to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its
classified status when in documentary form. classified status when in documentary form.
clearance, clearance level $ clean system
(I) A computer system in which the operating system and
application system software and files have just been freshly
installed from trusted software distribution media.
(C) A clean system is not necessarily in a secure state.
$ clearance
$ clearance level
(I) The security level of information to which a security (I) The security level of information to which a security
clearance authorizes a person to have access. clearance authorizes a person to have access.
cleartext $ cleartext
(I) Data in which the semantic information content (i.e., the (I) Data in which the semantic information content (i.e., the
meaning) is intelligible or is directly available. (Compare with: meaning) is intelligible or is directly available. (Compare with:
plaintext.) plaintext.)
(O) "Intelligible data, the semantic content of which is (O) "Intelligible data, the semantic content of which is
available." [I7498 Part 2] available." [I7498 Part 2]
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term loosely as a synonym for
loosely as a synonym for "plaintext", the input to an encryption "plaintext", the input to an encryption operation, because the
operation. That is not an equivalent term, because the plaintext plaintext input to encryption may itself be ciphertext that was
input to encryption may itself be ciphertext that was output from output from another operation. (See: superencryption.)
another operation. (See: superencryption.)
client $ client
(I) A system entity that requests and makes use of a service (I) A system entity that requests and makes use of a service
provided by another system entity, which is called a server. provided by another system entity, which is called a server.
(C) Usually, the requesting entity is a computer process, and it (C) Usually, the requesting entity is a computer process, and it
makes the request on behalf of a human user. In some cases, the makes the request on behalf of a human user. In some cases, the
server may itself be a client of some other server. server may itself be a client of some other server.
CLIPPER chip $ CLIPPER chip
(N) The Mykotronx, Inc. MYK-82, an integrated microcircuit with a (N) The Mykotronx, Inc. MYK-82, an integrated microcircuit with a
cryptographic processor that implements the SKIPJACK encryption cryptographic processor that implements the SKIPJACK encryption
algorithm and supports key escrow. (Also see: CAPSTONE, Escrowed algorithm and supports key escrow. (See: CAPSTONE, Escrowed
Encryption Standard.) Encryption Standard.)
(C) The key escrow scheme involves a SKIPJACK key common to all (C) The key escrow scheme involves a SKIPJACK key common to all
chips, a serial number unique to the chip, and a second SKIPJACK chips, a serial number unique to the chip, and a second SKIPJACK
key that is unique to the chip and unlocks all data encrypted by key that is unique to the chip and unlocks all data encrypted by
the chip. The second key is escrowed as split key components held the chip. The second key is escrowed as split key components held
by NIST and the U.S. Treasury Department. by NIST and the U.S. Treasury Department.
closed security environment $ closed security environment
(O) DoD usage: A system environment that meets both of the (O) DoD usage: A system environment that meets both of the
following conditions: (a) Application developers (including following conditions: (a) Application developers (including
maintainers) have sufficient clearances and authorizations to maintainers) have sufficient clearances and authorizations to
provide an acceptable presumption that they have not introduced provide an acceptable presumption that they have not introduced
malicious logic. (b) Configuration control provides sufficient malicious logic. (b) Configuration control provides sufficient
assurance that system applications and the equipment they run on assurance that system applications and the equipment they run on
are protected against the introduction of malicious logic prior to are protected against the introduction of malicious logic prior to
and during the operation of applications. [NCS04] (Also see: open and during the operation of applications. [NCS04] (See: open
security environment.) security environment.)
color change $ code
(I) noun: A system of symbols used to represent information, which
might originally have some other representation. (See: encode.)
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as synonym for the following:
- Nouns: (1) "cipher" or other forms of "cryptographic
algorithm", (2) "ciphertext".
- Verbs: "encrypt".
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT this word as an abbreviation for the
following terms: authentication code, country code, cyclic
redundancy code, source code, data authentication code, error
detection code, hash code, manipulation detection code, message
authentication code, message integrity code
$ color change
(I) In a system that is being operated in periods processing mode, (I) In a system that is being operated in periods processing mode,
the act of purging all information from one processing period and the act of purging all information from one processing period and
then changing over to the next processing period. then changing over to the next processing period.
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security $ Common Criteria
(N) Also known as "the Common Criteria". An ISO standard for $ Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
evaluating information technology products and systems, such as (N) "The Common Criteria" is an ISO standard for evaluating
operating systems, computer networks, distributed systems, and information technology products and systems, such as operating
applications. It states requirements for security functions and systems, computer networks, distributed systems, and applications.
for assurance measures. It states requirements for security functions and for assurance
measures.
(C) Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, (C) Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
and the United States (NIST and NSA) began developing this and the United States (NIST and NSA) began developing this
standard in 1993, based on the European ITSEC, the Canadian standard in 1993, based on the European ITSEC, the Canadian
Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC), and the Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC), and the
U.S. "Federal Criteria for Information Technology Security" (FC) U.S. "Federal Criteria for Information Technology Security" (FC)
and its precursor, the TCSEC. The U.S. Government intends that and its precursor, the TCSEC. The U.S. Government intends that
this standard will supersede both the TCSEC and FIPS PUB 140-1. this standard will supersede both the TCSEC and FIPS PUB 140-1.
(Also see: NIAP.) (See: NIAP.)
(C) The standard addresses data confidentiality, data integrity, (C) The standard addresses data confidentiality, data integrity,
and availability and may apply to other aspects of security. It and availability and may apply to other aspects of security. It
focuses on threats to information arising from human activities, focuses on threats to information arising from human activities,
malicious or otherwise, but may apply to non-human threats. It malicious or otherwise, but may apply to non-human threats. It
applies to security measures implemented in hardware, firmware, or applies to security measures implemented in hardware, firmware, or
software. It does not apply to (a) administrative security not software. It does not apply to (a) administrative security not
related directly to technical security, (b) technical physical related directly to technical security, (b) technical physical
aspects of security such as electromagnetic emanation control, (c) aspects of security such as electromagnetic emanation control, (c)
evaluation methodology or administrative and legal framework under evaluation methodology or administrative and legal framework under
which the criteria may be applied, (d) procedures for use of which the criteria may be applied, (d) procedures for use of
evaluation results, or (e) assessment of inherent qualities of evaluation results, or (e) assessment of inherent qualities of
cryptographic algorithms. cryptographic algorithms.
(C) Work was done in cooperation with ISO/IEC Joint Technical (C) Work was done in cooperation with ISO/IEC Joint Technical
Committee 1 (Information Technology), Subcommittee 27 (Security Committee 1 (Information Technology), Subcommittee 27 (Security
Techniques), Working Group 3 (Security Criteria). Version 2.0 of Techniques), Working Group 3 (Security Criteria). Version 2.0 of
the Criteria [CCIB] is identical to the Final Committee Draft for the Criteria [CCIB] is equivalent to International Standard 15408.
International Standard 15408 being balloted within ISO and planned
for publication as an ISO International Standard by Spring 1999.
Common IP Security Option (CIPSO)
(I) An Internet Protocol option that was designed by the Trusted
Systems Interoperability Group (TSIG) to carry hierarchic and non-
hierarchic security labels. (Once called "Commercial IP Security
Option"). [CIPSO]
(C) CIPSO enables security attributes to be associated with an IP $ Common IP Security Option (CIPSO)
datagram. These attributes are used to make security decisions at See: (secondary definition in) Internet Protocol Security Option.
the IP layer in the source and destination hosts and in any
trusted gateways along the way.
common name $ common name
(I) A character string that (a) may be a part of the X.500 DN of a (I) A character string that (a) may be a part of the X.500 DN of a
Directory object ("commonName" attribute), (b) is a (possibly Directory object ("commonName" attribute), (b) is a (possibly
ambiguous) name by which the object is commonly known in some ambiguous) name by which the object is commonly known in some
limited scope (such as an organization), and (c) conforms to the limited scope (such as an organization), and (c) conforms to the
naming conventions of the country or culture with which it is naming conventions of the country or culture with which it is
associated. [X520] (Also see: ("subject" and "issuer" in) X.509 associated. [X520] (See: ("subject" and "issuer" in) X.509 public-
public-key certificate.) key certificate.)
(C) For example, "Dr. Albert Einstein", "The United Nations", or (C) For example, "Dr. Albert Einstein", "The United Nations", or
"12-th Floor Laser Printer". "12-th Floor Laser Printer".
communication security (COMSEC) $ communication security (COMSEC)
(I) Measures that implement and assure security services in a (I) Measures that implement and assure security services in a
communication system, particularly those that provide data communication system, particularly those that provide data
confidentiality and data integrity and that authenticate confidentiality and data integrity and that authenticate
communicating entities. communicating entities.
(C) Usually understood to include cryptographic algorithms and key (C) Usually understood to include cryptographic algorithms and key
management methods and processes, devices that implement them, and management methods and processes, devices that implement them, and
the life cycle management of those keys and devices. the life cycle management of those keys and devices.
community string $ community string
(I) A community name in the form of an octet string that serves as (I) A community name in the form of an octet string that serves as
a cleartext password in SNMP version 1 [R1157]. a cleartext password in SNMP version 1 [R1157].
compartment $ compartment
(I) A grouping of sensitive information items that require special (I) A grouping of sensitive information items that require special
access controls beyond those normally provided for the basic access controls beyond those normally provided for the basic
classification level of the information. (Also see: category.) classification level of the information. (See: category.)
(C) The term is usually understood to include the special handling (C) The term is usually understood to include the special handling
procedures to be used for the information. procedures to be used for the information.
compromise $ compromise
See: data compromise, security compromise. See: data compromise, security compromise.
compromised key list (CKL) $ compromised key list (CKL)
(O) MISSI usage: A list that identifies keys for which (O) MISSI usage: A list that identifies keys for which
unauthorized disclosure or alteration may have occurred. (See: unauthorized disclosure or alteration may have occurred. (See:
data compromise.) data compromise.)
COMPUSEC $ COMPUSEC
See: computer security. See: computer security.
computer emergency response team (CERT) $ computer emergency response team (CERT)
(I) An organization that studies computer and network INFOSEC in (I) An organization that studies computer and network INFOSEC in
order to provide incident response services to victims of attacks, order to provide incident response services to victims of attacks,
publish alerts concerning vulnerabilities and threats, and offer publish alerts concerning vulnerabilities and threats, and offer
other information to help improve computer and network security. other information to help improve computer and network security.
(See: CSIRT, security incident.)
(C) For example, the CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie-Mellon (C) For example, the CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie-Mellon
University (sometimes called "the" CERT) and the Computer Incident University (sometimes called "the" CERT) and the Computer Incident
Advisory Capability. Advisory Capability.
Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) $ Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC)
(N) A computer emergency response team in the U.S. Department of (N) A computer emergency response team in the U.S. Department of
Energy. Energy.
computer network $ computer network
(I) A collection of host computers together with the subnetwork or (I) A collection of host computers together with the subnetwork or
internetwork through which they can exchange data. internetwork through which they can exchange data.
(C) This definition is intended to cover systems of all sizes and (C) This definition is intended to cover systems of all sizes and
types, ranging from the complex Internet to a simple system types, ranging from the complex Internet to a simple system
composed of a personal computer dialing in as a remote terminal of composed of a personal computer dialing in as a remote terminal of
another computer. another computer.
computer security (COMPUSEC) $ computer security (COMPUSEC)
(I) Measures that implement and assure security services in a (I) Measures that implement and assure security services in a
computer system, particularly those that assure access control computer system, particularly those that assure access control
service. service.
(C) Usually understood to include functions, features, and (C) Usually understood to include functions, features, and
technical characteristics of computer hardware and software, technical characteristics of computer hardware and software,
especially operating systems. especially operating systems.
computer security object $ computer security incident response team (CSIRT)
(I) An organization "that coordinates and supports the response to
security incidents that involve sites within a defined
constituency." [R2350] (See: CERT, FIRST, security incident.)
(C) To be considered a CSIRT, an organization must do as follows:
- Provide a (secure) channel for receiving reports about
suspected security incidents.
- Provide assistance to members of its constituency in handling
the incidents.
- Disseminate incident-related information to its constituency
and other involved parties.
$ computer security object
(I) The definition or representation of a resource, tool, or (I) The definition or representation of a resource, tool, or
mechanism used to maintain a condition of security in computerized mechanism used to maintain a condition of security in computerized
environments. Includes many elements referred to in standards that environments. Includes many elements referred to in standards that
are either selected or defined by separate user communities. are either selected or defined by separate user communities.
[CSOR] (Also see: object identifier, Computer Security Objects [CSOR] (See: object identifier, Computer Security Objects
Register.) Register.)
Computer Security Objects Register (CSOR) $ Computer Security Objects Register (CSOR)
(N) A service operated by NIST is establishing a catalog for (N) A service operated by NIST is establishing a catalog for
computer security objects to provide stable object definitions computer security objects to provide stable object definitions
identified by unique names. The use of this register will enable identified by unique names. The use of this register will enable
the unambiguous specification of security parameters and the unambiguous specification of security parameters and
algorithms to be used in secure data exchanges. algorithms to be used in secure data exchanges.
(C) The CSOR follows registration guidelines established by the (C) The CSOR follows registration guidelines established by the
international standards community and ANSI. Those guidelines international standards community and ANSI. Those guidelines
establish minimum responsibilities for registration authorities establish minimum responsibilities for registration authorities
and assign the top branches of an international registration and assign the top branches of an international registration
hierarchy. Under that international registration hierarchy the hierarchy. Under that international registration hierarchy the
CSOR is responsible for the allocation of unique identifiers under CSOR is responsible for the allocation of unique identifiers under
the branch: {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) gov(101) the branch: {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) gov(101)
csor(3)}. csor(3)}.
COMSEC $ COMSEC
See: communication security. See: communication security.
confidentiality $ confidentiality
See: data confidentiality. See: data confidentiality.
configuration control $ configuration control
(I) The process of regulating changes to hardware, firmware, (I) The process of regulating changes to hardware, firmware,
software, and documentation throughout the development and software, and documentation throughout the development and
operational life of a system. (Also see: administrative security.) operational life of a system. (See: administrative security.)
(C) Configuration control helps protect against unauthorized or (C) Configuration control helps protect against unauthorized or
malicious alteration of a system and thus provides assurance of malicious alteration of a system and thus provides assurance of
system integrity. (Also see: malicious logic.) system integrity. (See: malicious logic.)
confinement property $ confinement property
See: (secondary definition in) Bell-LaPadula Model. See: (secondary definition in) Bell-LaPadula Model.
connectionless data integrity service $ connectionless data integrity service
(I) A security service that provides data integrity service for an (I) A security service that provides data integrity service for an
individual IP datagram, by detecting modification of the datagram, individual IP datagram, by detecting modification of the datagram,
without regard to the ordering of the datagram in a stream of without regard to the ordering of the datagram in a stream of
datagrams. datagrams.
(C) A connection-oriented data integrity service would be able to (C) A connection-oriented data integrity service would be able to
detect lost or reordered datagrams within a stream of datagrams. detect lost or reordered datagrams within a stream of datagrams.
contingency plan $ contingency plan
(I) A plan for emergency response, backup operations, and post- (I) A plan for emergency response, backup operations, and post-
disaster recovery in a system as part of a security program to disaster recovery in a system as part of a security program to
ensure availability of critical system resources and facilitate ensure availability of critical system resources and facilitate
continuity of operations in a crisis. [NCS04] continuity of operations in a crisis. [NCS04] (See: availability.)
controlled security mode $ controlled security mode
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term. (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term. It was defined in an earlier
It was defined in an earlier version of the U.S. Department of version of the U.S. Department of Defense policy that regulates
Defense policy that regulates system accreditation, but was system accreditation, but was subsumed by "partitioned security
subsumed by "partitioned security mode" in the current version. mode" in the current version. [DOD2]
[DOD2]
(C) The term refers to a mode of operation of an information (C) The term refers to a mode of operation of an information
system, wherein at least some users with access to the system have system, wherein at least some users with access to the system have
neither a security clearance nor a need-to-know for all classified neither a security clearance nor a need-to-know for all classified
material contained in the system; however, separation and control material contained in the system; however, separation and control
of users and classified material on the basis, respectively, of of users and classified material on the basis, respectively, of
clearance and classification level are not essentially under clearance and classification level are not essentially under
operating system control as they are in "multilevel security operating system control as they are in "multilevel security
mode". mode".
(C) This mode was intended to provide an alternative to encourage (C) This mode was intended to encourage ingenuity in meeting the
ingenuity in meeting the security requirements of Defense policy security requirements of Defense policy in ways less restrictive
in manner less restrictive than the dedicated security mode and than dedicated security mode and system high security mode, but at
the system high security mode, but at a level of risk lower than a level of risk lower than that generally associated with the true
that generally associated with the true multilevel security mode. multilevel security mode. This was to be accomplished by
This was to be accomplished by implementation of explicit implementation of explicit augmenting measures to reduce or remove
augmenting measures to reduce or remove a substantial measure of a substantial measure of system software vulnerability together
system software vulnerability together with specific limitation of with specific limitation of the security clearance levels of users
the security clearance levels of users permitted concurrent access permitted concurrent access to the system.
to the system.
cookie $ cookie
(I) access control usage: A synonym for "capability" or "ticket" (I) access control usage: A synonym for "capability" or "ticket"
in an access control system. in an access control system.
(I) IPsec usage: Data exchanged by ISAKMP to prevent certain (I) IPsec usage: Data exchanged by ISAKMP to prevent certain
denial of service attacks at the establishment of a security denial of service attacks at the establishment of a security
association. association.
(I) HTTP usage: Data exchanged between an HTTP server and a (I) HTTP usage: Data exchanged between an HTTP server and a
browser (a client of the server) to store state information on the browser (a client of the server) to store state information on the
client side and retrieve it later for server use. client side and retrieve it later for server use.
skipping to change at page 38, line 24 skipping to change at page 41, line 45
a cookie, which the client retains after the HTTP connection a cookie, which the client retains after the HTTP connection
closes. A server can use this mechanism to maintain persistent closes. A server can use this mechanism to maintain persistent
client-side state information for HTTP-based applications, client-side state information for HTTP-based applications,
retrieving the state information in later connections. A cookie retrieving the state information in later connections. A cookie
includes a description of the range of URLs for which the state is includes a description of the range of URLs for which the state is
valid. Future requests made by the client in that range will also valid. Future requests made by the client in that range will also
send the current value of the cookie to the server. Cookies can be send the current value of the cookie to the server. Cookies can be
used to generate profiles of web usage habits, and thus may used to generate profiles of web usage habits, and thus may
infringe on personal privacy. infringe on personal privacy.
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) $ Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)
(N) UTC is derived from International Atomic Time (TAI) by adding (N) UTC is derived from International Atomic Time (TAI) by adding
a number of leap seconds. The International Bureau of Weights and a number of leap seconds. The International Bureau of Weights and
Measures computes TAI once each month by averaging data from many Measures computes TAI once each month by averaging data from many
laboratories. (Also see: GeneralizedTime, UTCTime.) laboratories. (See: GeneralizedTime, UTCTime.)
copy $ copy
See: card copy. See: card copy.
correctness integrity $ correctness integrity
(I) Accuracy and consistency of the information that data values (I) Accuracy and consistency of the information that data values
represent, rather than of the data itself. Closely related to represent, rather than of the data itself. Closely related to
issues of accountability and error handling. (Also see: data issues of accountability and error handling. (See: data integrity,
integrity, source integrity). source integrity.)
countermeasure $ correctness proof
(I) A mathematical proof of consistency between a specification
for system security and the implementation of that specification.
(See: formal specification.)
$ countermeasure
(I) An action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a (I) An action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a
threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing
it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and
reporting it so that corrective action can be taken. reporting it so that corrective action can be taken.
country code (C) In an Internet protocol, a countermeasure may take the form of
a protocol feature, an element function, or a usage constraint.
$ country code
(I) An identifier that is defined for a nation by ISO. [I3166] (I) An identifier that is defined for a nation by ISO. [I3166]
(C) For each nation, ISO Standard 3166 defines a unique two- (C) For each nation, ISO Standard 3166 defines a unique two-
character alphabetic code, a unique three-character alphabetic character alphabetic code, a unique three-character alphabetic
code, and a 3-digit code. Among the many uses of these codes, the code, and a 3-digit code. Among many uses of these codes, the two-
two-character codes are used as top-level domain names. character codes are used as top-level domain names.
covert channel $ covert channel
(I) A intra-system communication channel that permits two (I) A intra-system channel that permits two cooperating entities,
cooperating entities, without exceeding their access without exceeding their access authorizations, to transfer
authorizations, to transfer information in a way that violates the information in a way that violates the system's security policy.
system's security policy. (See: channel, out of band.)
(O) "A communications channel that allows two cooperating (O) "A communications channel that allows two cooperating
processes to transfer information in a manner that violates the processes to transfer information in a manner that violates the
system's security policy." [NCS04] system's security policy." [NCS04]
(C) The cooperating entities can be either two insiders or an (C) The cooperating entities can be either two insiders or an
insider and an outsider. Of course, an outsider has no access insider and an outsider. Of course, an outsider has no access
authorization at all. Covert channels are system features that are authorization at all. A covert channel is a system feature that
not designed or intended for information transfer. There are two the system architects neither designed nor intended for
kinds: information transfer:
- "Timing channel": A system feature that enable one system - "Timing channel": A system feature that enable one system
entity to signal information to another by modulating its own entity to signal information to another by modulating its own
use of a system resource in such a way as to affect system use of a system resource in such a way as to affect system
response time observed by the second entity. response time observed by the second entity.
- "Storage channel": A system feature that enables one system - "Storage channel": A system feature that enables one system
entity to signal information to another entity by directly or entity to signal information to another entity by directly or
indirectly writing a storage location that is later directly or indirectly writing a storage location that is later directly or
indirectly read by the second entity. indirectly read by the second entity.
CPS $ CPS
See: certification practice statement. See: certification practice statement.
cracker $ cracker
(I) Someone who tries to break the security of, and gain access (I) Someone who tries to break the security of, and gain access
to, someone else's system without being invited to do so. (Also to, someone else's system without being invited to do so. (See:
see: hacker and intruder.) hacker and intruder.)
CRC $ CRAM
See: Challenge-Response Authentication Mechanism.
$ CRC
See: cyclic redundancy check. See: cyclic redundancy check.
credential, credentials $ credential(s)
(I) Data that is transferred or presented to establish either a (I) Data that is transferred or presented to establish either a
claimed identity or the authorizations of a system entity. (Also claimed identity or the authorizations of a system entity. (See:
see: authentication information.) authentication information.)
(O) "Data that is transferred to establish the claimed identity of (O) "Data that is transferred to establish the claimed identity of
an entity." [I7498 Part 2] an entity." [I7498 Part 2]
critical $ critical
1. (I) "Critical" system resource: A condition of a service or 1. (I) "Critical" system resource: A condition of a service or
other system resource such that denial of access to that resource other system resource such that denial of access to that resource
would jeopardize a system user's ability to perform a primary would jeopardize a system user's ability to perform a primary
function or would result in other serious consequences. (Also see: function or would result in other serious consequences. (See:
availability, sensitive.) availability, sensitive.)
2. (C) "Critical" extension: Each extension of an X.509 2. (N) "Critical" extension: Each extension of an X.509
certificate (or CRL) is marked as being either critical or non- certificate (or CRL) is marked as being either critical or non-
critical. If an extension is critical and a certificate user (or critical. If an extension is critical and a certificate user (or
CRL user) does not recognize the extension type or does not CRL user) does not recognize the extension type or does not
implement its semantics, then the user is required to treat the implement its semantics, then the user is required to treat the
certificate (or CRL) as invalid. If an extension is non-critical, certificate (or CRL) as invalid. If an extension is non-critical,
a user that does not recognize or implement that extension type is a user that does not recognize or implement that extension type is
permitted to ignore the extension and process the rest of the permitted to ignore the extension and process the rest of the
certificate (or CRL). certificate (or CRL).
CRL $ CRL
See: certificate revocation list. See: certificate revocation list.
CRL distribution point $ CRL distribution point
See: distribution point. See: distribution point.
CRL extension $ CRL extension
See: extension. See: extension.
cross-certificate $ cross-certificate
See: cross-certification. See: cross-certification.
cross-certification $ cross-certification
(I) The act or process by which two CAs each certify a public key (I) The act or process by which two CAs each certify a public key
of the other, issuing a public-key certificate to that other CA. of the other, issuing a public-key certificate to that other CA.
(C) Cross-certificates enable two certificate users to validate (C) Cross-certificates enable two certificate users to validate
each other's certificate, even when the users are certified under each other's certificate, even when the users are certified under
different certification hierarchies. different certification hierarchies.
cryptanalysis $ cryptanalysis
(I) The mathematical science that deals with analysis of a (I) The mathematical science that deals with analysis of a
cryptographic system in order to gain knowledge needed to break or cryptographic system in order to gain knowledge needed to break or
circumvent the protection that the system is designed to provide. circumvent the protection that the system is designed to provide.
(Also see: cryptology.) (See: cryptology.)
(O) "The analysis of a cryptographic system and/or its inputs and (O) "The analysis of a cryptographic system and/or its inputs and
outputs to derive confidential variables and/or sensitive data outputs to derive confidential variables and/or sensitive data
including cleartext." [I7498 Part 2] including cleartext." [I7498 Part 2]
(C) The "O" definition states the traditional goal of (C) The "O" definition states the traditional goal of
cryptanalysis--convert the ciphertext to plaintext (which usually cryptanalysis--convert the ciphertext to plaintext (which usually
is cleartext) without knowing the key--but that definition applies is cleartext) without knowing the key--but that definition applies
only to encryption systems. Today, the term is used with reference only to encryption systems. Today, the term is used with reference
to all kinds of cryptographic algorithms and key management, and to all kinds of cryptographic algorithms and key management, and
the "I" definition reflects that. In all cases, however, a the "I" definition reflects that. In all cases, however, a
cryptanalyst tries to uncover or reproduce someone else's cryptanalyst tries to uncover or reproduce someone else's
sensitive data, such as cleartext, a key, or an algorithm. The sensitive data, such as cleartext, a key, or an algorithm. The
basic cryptanalytic attacks on encryption systems are ciphertext- basic cryptanalytic attacks on encryption systems are ciphertext-
only, known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, and chosen-ciphertext; only, known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, and chosen-ciphertext;
and these generalize to the other kinds of cryptography. and these generalize to the other kinds of cryptography.
crypto $ crypto
(C) Except as part of certain long-established terms listed in the (D) Except as part of certain long-established terms listed in
glossary, Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this this Glossary, ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this abbreviated term because
abbreviated term because it may be misunderstood. Instead, use it may be misunderstood. Instead, use "cryptography" or
"cryptography" or "cryptographic". "cryptographic".
cryptographic algorithm $ cryptographic algorithm
(I) An algorithm that employs the science of cryptography, (I) An algorithm that employs the science of cryptography,
including encryption algorithms, cryptographic hash algorithms, including encryption algorithms, cryptographic hash algorithms,
digital signature algorithms, and key agreement algorithms. digital signature algorithms, and key agreement algorithms.
cryptographic application programming interface (CAPI) $ cryptographic application programming interface (CAPI)
(I) The source code formats and procedures through which an (I) The source code formats and procedures through which an
application program accesses cryptographic services, which are application program accesses cryptographic services, which are
defined abstractly compared to their actual implementation. For defined abstractly compared to their actual implementation. For
example, see: PKCS #11. example, see: PKCS #11, [R2628].
cryptographic card $ cryptographic card
(I) A cryptographic token in the form of a smart card or a PC (I) A cryptographic token in the form of a smart card or a PC
card. card.
cryptographic component $ cryptographic component
(I) A generic term for any system component that involves (I) A generic term for any system component that involves
cryptography. (Compare with: cryptographic module.) cryptography. (Compare with: cryptographic module.)
cryptographic hash $ cryptographic hash
See: (secondary definition in) hash function. See: (secondary definition in) hash function.
cryptographic ignition key (CIK) $ cryptographic ignition key (CIK)
(I) A physical (usually electronic) token used to store, (I) A physical (usually electronic) token used to store,
transport, and protect cryptographic keys. (Sometimes abbreviated transport, and protect cryptographic keys. (Sometimes abbreviated
as "crypto ignition key"). as "crypto ignition key".)
(C) A typical use is to divide a split key between a CIK and a (C) A typical use is to divide a split key between a CIK and a
cryptographic module, so that the two must be combined to cryptographic module, so that it is necessary to combine the two
regenerate a key-encrypting key and thus activate the module and to regenerate a key-encrypting key and thus activate the module
other keys it contains. and other keys it contains.
cryptographic key $ cryptographic key
(I) Usually shortened to just "key". An input parameter that (I) Usually shortened to just "key". An input parameter that
varies the transformation performed by a cryptographic algorithm. varies the transformation performed by a cryptographic algorithm.
(O) "A sequence of symbols that controls the operations of (O) "A sequence of symbols that controls the operations of
encipherment and decipherment" [I7498 Part 2] encipherment and decipherment." [I7498 Part 2]
(C) If a key value must be kept secret, the sequence of symbols (C) If a key value needs to be kept secret, the sequence of
(usually bits) that comprise it should be random, or at least symbols (usually bits) that comprise it should be random, or at
pseudo-random, because that makes the key hard for an adversary to least pseudo-random, because that makes the key hard for an
guess. (See: cryptanalysis, brute force attack.) adversary to guess. (See: cryptanalysis, brute force attack.)
cryptographic module $ Cryptographic Message Syntax (DMS)
(I) A encapsulation syntax (R2630] for digital signatures, hashes,
and encryption of arbitrary messages.
(C) The syntax was derived from PKCS #7. CMS values are specified
with ASN.1 and use BER encoding. The syntax permits multiple
encapsulation with nesting, permits arbitrary attributes to be
signed along with message content, and supports a variety of
architectures for digital certificate-based key management.
$ cryptographic module
(I) A set of hardware, software, firmware, or some combination (I) A set of hardware, software, firmware, or some combination
thereof that implements cryptographic logic or processes, thereof that implements cryptographic logic or processes,
including cryptographic algorithms, and is contained within the including cryptographic algorithms, and is contained within the
module's cryptographic boundary, which is an explicitly defined module's cryptographic boundary, which is an explicitly defined
contiguous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds of the contiguous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds of the
module. [FP140] module. [FP140]
cryptographic system $ cryptographic system
(I) A set of cryptographic algorithms together with the key (I) A set of cryptographic algorithms together with the key
management processes that support the use of the algorithms in management processes that support the use of the algorithms in
some application context. some application context.
(C) This definition covers a wider range of algorithms than the (C) This definition covers a wider range of algorithms than the
following definition from X.509: following definition from X.509:
(O) "A collection of transformations from plaintext into (O) "A collection of transformations from plaintext into
ciphertext and vice versa [which would exclude digital signature, ciphertext and vice versa [which would exclude digital signature,
cryptographic hash, and key agreement algorithms], the particular cryptographic hash, and key agreement algorithms], the particular
transformation(s) to be used being selected by keys. The transformation(s) to be used being selected by keys. The
transformations are normally defined by a mathematical algorithm." transformations are normally defined by a mathematical algorithm."
[X509] [X509]
cryptographic token $ cryptographic token
(I) A portable, user-controlled, physical device used to store (I) A portable, user-controlled, physical device used to store
cryptographic information and possibly perform cryptographic cryptographic information and possibly perform cryptographic
functions. (Also see: cryptographic card, token.) functions. (See: cryptographic card, token.)
(C) A smart token may implement some set of cryptographic (C) A smart token may implement some set of cryptographic
algorithms and may implement related algorithms and key management algorithms and may implement related algorithms and key management
functions, such as a random number generator. A smart functions, such as a random number generator. A smart
cryptographic token may contain a cryptographic module or may not cryptographic token may contain a cryptographic module or may not
be explicitly designed that way. be explicitly designed that way.
cryptography $ cryptography
(I) The mathematical science that deals with transforming data to (I) The mathematical science that deals with transforming data to
render its meaning unintelligible (i.e., to hide its semantic render its meaning unintelligible (i.e., to hide its semantic
content), prevent its undetected alteration, or prevent its content), prevent its undetected alteration, or prevent its
unauthorized use. If the transformation is reversible, unauthorized use. If the transformation is reversible,
cryptography also deals with restoring encrypted data to cryptography also deals with restoring encrypted data to
intelligible form. (Also see: cryptology. Compare with: intelligible form. (See: cryptology. Compare with: steganography.)
steganography.)
(O) "The discipline which embodies principles, means, and methods (O) "The discipline which embodies principles, means, and methods
for the transformation of data in order to hide its information for the transformation of data in order to hide its information
content, prevent its undetected modification and/or prevent its content, prevent its undetected modification and/or prevent its
unauthorized use. . . . Cryptography determines the methods used unauthorized use. . . . Cryptography determines the methods used
in encipherment and decipherment." [I7498 Part 2] in encipherment and decipherment." [I7498 Part 2]
Cryptoki $ Cryptoki
See: (secondary definition in) PKCS #11. See: (secondary definition in) PKCS #11.
cryptology $ cryptology
(I) The science that includes both cryptography and cryptanalysis, (I) The science that includes both cryptography and cryptanalysis,
and sometimes is said to include steganography. and sometimes is said to include steganography.
cryptonet $ cryptonet
(I) A group of system entities that share a secret cryptographic (I) A group of system entities that share a secret cryptographic
key for a symmetric algorithm. key for a symmetric algorithm.
cryptoperiod $ cryptoperiod
(I) The time span during which a particular key is authorized to (I) The time span during which a particular key is authorized to
be used in a cryptographic system. (Also see: key management.) be used in a cryptographic system. (See: key management.)
(C) A cryptoperiod is usually stated in terms of calendar or clock (C) A cryptoperiod is usually stated in terms of calendar or clock
time, but sometimes is stated in terms of the maximum amount of time, but sometimes is stated in terms of the maximum amount of
data permitted to be processed by a cryptographic algorithm using data permitted to be processed by a cryptographic algorithm using
the key. Specifying a cryptoperiod involves a tradeoff between the the key. Specifying a cryptoperiod involves a tradeoff between the
cost of rekeying and the risk of successful cryptoanalysis. cost of rekeying and the risk of successful cryptoanalysis.
(C) Although we deprecate its prefix, this term is long- (C) Although we deprecate its prefix, this term is long-
established in COMPUSEC usage. (See: crypto) In the context of established in COMPUSEC usage. (See: crypto) In the context of
certificates and public keys, "key lifetime" and "validity period" certificates and public keys, "key lifetime" and "validity period"
are often used instead. are often used instead.
cryptosystem $ cryptosystem
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as an abbreviation for
as an abbreviation for cryptographic system. (For rationale, see: cryptographic system. (For rationale, see: crypto.)
crypto.)
cut-and-paste attack $ CSIRT
See: computer security incident response team.
$ CSOR
See: Computer Security Objects Register.
$ cut-and-paste attack
(I) An active attack on the data integrity of ciphertext, effected (I) An active attack on the data integrity of ciphertext, effected
by replacing sections of ciphertext with other ciphertext, such by replacing sections of ciphertext with other ciphertext, such
that the result appears to decrypt correctly but actually decrypts that the result appears to decrypt correctly but actually decrypts
to plaintext that is forged to the satisfaction of the attacker. to plaintext that is forged to the satisfaction of the attacker.
cyclic redundancy check (CRC) $ cyclic redundancy check (CRC)
(I) Sometimes called "cyclic redundancy code". A type of checksum (I) Sometimes called "cyclic redundancy code". A type of checksum
algorithm that is not a cryptographic hash but is used to algorithm that is not a cryptographic hash but is used to
implement data integrity service where accidental changes to data implement data integrity service where accidental changes to data
are expected. are expected.
DAC $ DAC
See: Data Authentication Code, discretionary access control. See: Data Authentication Code, discretionary access control.
data $ DASS
See: Distributed Authentication Security Service.
$ data
(I) Information in a specific physical representation, usually a (I) Information in a specific physical representation, usually a
sequence of symbols that have meaning; especially a representation sequence of symbols that have meaning; especially a representation
of information that can be processed or produced by a computer. of information that can be processed or produced by a computer.
Data Authentication Algorithm $ Data Authentication Algorithm
(N) A keyed hash function equivalent to DES cipher block chaining (N) A keyed hash function equivalent to DES cipher block chaining
with IV = 0 [A9009]. with IV = 0 [A9009].
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term in an uncapitalized (i.e.,
in an uncapitalized form as a general synonym for other kinds of lower case) form as a general synonym for other kinds of
checksums. checksums.
data authentication code vs. Data Authentication Code (DAC) $ data authentication code vs. Data Authentication Code (DAC)
1. (N) Capitalized: "The Data Authentication Code" refers to a 1. (N) Capitalized: "The Data Authentication Code" refers to a
U.S. Government standard [FP113] for a checksum that is computed U.S. Government standard [FP113] for a checksum that is computed
by the Data Authentication Algorithm. (Also known as the ANSI by the Data Authentication Algorithm. (Also known as the ANSI
standard Message Authentication Code [A9009]). standard Message Authentication Code [A9009].)
2. (C) Not capitalized: Internet Standards Process documents
SHOULD NOT use "data authentication code", because this term mixes
concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, use "checksum",
"error detection code", "hash", "keyed hash", "Message
Authentication Code", or "protected checksum", depending on what
is meant.
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term 2. (D) Not capitalized: ISPDs SHOULD NOT use "data authentication
in an uncapitalized form as a general synonym for other kinds of code" as a general synonym for other kinds of checksums, because
checksums. this term mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead,
use "checksum", "error detection code", "hash", "keyed hash",
"Message Authentication Code", or "protected checksum", depending
on what is meant.
data compromise $ data compromise
(I) A security violation in which information is exposed to (I) A security incident in which information is exposed to
potential unauthorized access, such that unauthorized disclosure, potential unauthorized access, such that unauthorized disclosure,
alteration, or use of the information may have occurred. (See: alteration, or use of the information may have occurred. (See:
compromise.) compromise.)
data confidentiality $ data confidentiality
(I) "The property that information is not made available or (I) "The property that information is not made available or
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes
[i.e., to any unauthorized system entity]." [I7498 Part 2]. (Also [i.e., to any unauthorized system entity]." [I7498 Part 2]. (See:
see: data confidentiality service.) data confidentiality service.)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "privacy",
as a synonym for "privacy", which is a different concept. which is a different concept.
data confidentiality service $ data confidentiality service
(I) A security service that protects data against unauthorized (I) A security service that protects data against unauthorized
disclosure. (Also see: data confidentiality). disclosure. (See: data confidentiality.)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "privacy",
as a synonym for "privacy", which is a different concept. which is a different concept.
Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) $ Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA)
(N) A symmetric (see: symmetric cryptography) block cipher that (N) A symmetric (see: symmetric cryptography) block cipher that
uses a 64-bit key, of which 56 bits are independently chosen and 8 uses a 64-bit key, of which 56 bits are independently chosen and 8
are parity bits. It maps a 64-bit block into another 64-bit block. are parity bits. It maps a 64-bit block into another 64-bit block.
[FP046] [FP046]
(C) This algorithm is usually referred to as "DES". (See: Data (C) This algorithm is usually referred to as "DES". (See: Data
Encryption Standard.) The algorithm has also been adopted in Encryption Standard.) The algorithm has also been adopted in
standards outside the Government (e.g., [A3092]). standards outside the Government (e.g., [A3092]).
data encryption key (DEK) $ data encryption key (DEK)
(I) A cryptographic key that is used to encipher application data. (I) A cryptographic key that is used to encipher application data.
(Also see: key-encrypting key.) (See: key-encrypting key.)
Data Encryption Standard (DES) $ Data Encryption Standard (DES)
(N) A U.S. Government standard [FP046] that specifies the Data (N) A U.S. Government standard [FP046] that specifies the Data
Encryption Algorithm and states policy for using the algorithm to Encryption Algorithm and states policy for using the algorithm to
protect unclassified, sensitive data. (Also see: AES.) protect unclassified, sensitive data. (See: AES.)
data integrity $ data integrity
(I) The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or (I) The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or
lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner. lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner.
(O) "The property that information has not been modified or (O) "The property that information has not been modified or
destroyed in an unauthorized manner." [I7498 Part 2] destroyed in an unauthorized manner." [I7498 Part 2]
(C) Deals with constancy of and confidence in data values, not (C) Deals with constancy of and confidence in data values, not
with the information that the values represent (see: correctness with the information that the values represent (see: correctness
integrity) or the trustworthiness of the source of the values integrity) or the trustworthiness of the source of the values
(see: source integrity). (see: source integrity).
data integrity service $ data integrity service
(I) A security service that protects against unauthorized changes (I) A security service that protects against unauthorized changes
to data, including both intentional change or destruction and to data, including both intentional change or destruction and
accidental change or loss, by ensuring that changes to data are accidental change or loss, by ensuring that changes to data are
detectable. (Also see: data integrity.) detectable. (See: data integrity.)
(C) A data integrity service can only detect a change and report (C) A data integrity service can only detect a change and report
it to an appropriate system entity; changes cannot be prevented it to an appropriate system entity; changes cannot be prevented
unless the system is perfect (error-free) and no malicious user unless the system is perfect (error-free) and no malicious user
has access. However, a system that offers data integrity service has access. However, a system that offers data integrity service
might also attempt to correct and recover from changes. might also attempt to correct and recover from changes.
(C) Relationship between data integrity service and authentication (C) Relationship between data integrity service and authentication
services. Although data integrity service is defined separately services. Although data integrity service is defined separately
from data origin authentication service and peer entity from data origin authentication service and peer entity
authentication service, it is closely related to them. authentication service, it is closely related to them.
Authentication services depend, by definition, on companion data Authentication services depend, by definition, on companion data
integrity services. Data origin authentication service provides integrity services. Data origin authentication service provides
verification that the identity of the original source of a verification that the identity of the original source of a
received data unit is as claimed; there can be no such received data unit is as claimed; there can be no such
verification if the data unit has been altered. Peer entity verification if the data unit has been altered. Peer entity
authentication service provides verification that the identity of authentication service provides verification that the identity of
a peer entity in a current association is as claimed; there can be a peer entity in a current association is as claimed; there can be
no such verification if the claimed identity has been altered. no such verification if the claimed identity has been altered.
data origin authentication $ data origin authentication
(I) "The corroboration that the source of data received is as (I) "The corroboration that the source of data received is as
claimed." [I7498 Part 2] (Also see: authentication.) claimed." [I7498 Part 2] (See: authentication.)
data origin authentication service $ data origin authentication service
(I) A security service that verifies the identity of a system (I) A security service that verifies the identity of a system
entity that is claimed to be the original source of received data. entity that is claimed to be the original source of received data.
(Also see: authentication, authentication service.) (See: authentication, authentication service.)
(C) This service is provided to any system entity that receives or (C) This service is provided to any system entity that receives or
holds the data. Unlike peer entity authentication service, this holds the data. Unlike peer entity authentication service, this
service is independent of any association between the originator service is independent of any association between the originator
and the recipient, and the data in question may have originated at and the recipient, and the data in question may have originated at
any time in the past. any time in the past.
(C) A digital signature mechanism can be used to provide this (C) A digital signature mechanism can be used to provide this
service, because an adversary, who does not know the private key service, because an adversary, who does not know the private key
of the signer, cannot forge the correct signature. However, by of the signer, cannot forge the correct signature. However, by
using the signer's public key, anyone can verify the origin of using the signer's public key, anyone can verify the origin of
correctly signed data. correctly signed data.
(C) This service is usually bundled with connectionless data (C) This service is usually bundled with connectionless data
integrity service. (See: "relationship between data integrity integrity service. (See: "relationship between data integrity
service and authentication services" under data integrity service. service and authentication services" under data integrity service.
data privacy $ data privacy
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it mix concepts in a
because it mix concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, potentially misleading way. Instead, use "data confidentiality" or
use "data confidentiality" or "privacy", depending on what is "privacy", depending on what is meant.
meant.
data security $ data security
(I) The protection of data from disclosure, alteration, (I) The protection of data from disclosure, alteration,
destruction, or loss that either is accidental or is intentional destruction, or loss that either is accidental or is intentional
but unauthorized. but unauthorized.
(C) Both data confidentiality service and data integrity service (C) Both data confidentiality service and data integrity service
are needed to achieve data security. are needed to achieve data security.
DEA $ datagram
(I) "A self-contained, independent entity of data carrying
sufficient information to be routed from the source to the
destination." [R1983]
$ DEA
See: Data Encryption Algorithm. See: Data Encryption Algorithm.
deception $ deception
See: (secondary definition in) threat consequence. See: (secondary definition in) threat consequence.
decipher $ decipher
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "decrypt".
as a synonym for "decrypt". However, see the usage note under However, see the usage note under "encryption".
"encryption".
decipherment $ decipherment
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "decryption",
as a synonym for "decryption", except in special circumstances. except in special circumstances. (See: (usage discussion under)
(See: (usage discussion under) encryption.) encryption.)
decode $ decode
(I) Convert encoded data back to its original form of (I) Convert encoded data back to its original form of
representation. (Compare with: decrypt.) representation. (Compare with: decrypt.)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "decrypt",
as a synonym for "decrypt", because that would mix concepts in a because that would mix concepts in a potentially misleading way.
potentially misleading way.
decrypt $ decrypt
(I) Cryptographically restore ciphertext to the plaintext form it (I) Cryptographically restore ciphertext to the plaintext form it
had before encryption. had before encryption.
decryption $ decryption
See: (secondary definition in) encryption. See: (secondary definition in) encryption.
dedicated security mode $ dedicated security mode
(I) A mode of operation of an information system, wherein all (I) A mode of operation of an information system, wherein all
users have the clearance or authorization, and the need-to-know, users have the clearance or authorization, and the need-to-know,
for all data handled by the system. In this mode, the system may for all data handled by the system. In this mode, the system may
handle either a single classification level or category of handle either a single classification level or category of
information or a range of levels and categories. information or a range of levels and categories.
(C) This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of Defense (C) This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of Defense
policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2], but the term is also policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2], but the term is also
used outside the Defense Department and outside the Government. used outside the Defense Department and outside the Government.
degauss $ default account
(I) Apply a magnetic field to permanently remove, erase, or clear (I) A system login account (user name and password) that has been
data from a magnetic storage medium, such as a tape or disk. predefined in a manufactured system to permit initial access when
[NCS25] the system is first put into service.
DEK (C) Sometimes, the default user name and password are the same in
each copy of the system. In any case, when the system is put into
service, the default password should immediately be changed or the
default account should be disabled.
$ degauss
(N) Apply a magnetic field to permanently remove, erase, or clear
data from a magnetic storage medium, such as a tape or disk
[NCS25]. Reduce magnetic flux density to zero by applying a
reversing magnetic field.
$ degausser
(N) An electrical device that can degauss magnetic storage media.
$ DEK
See: data encryption key. See: data encryption key.
delta CRL $ delta CRL
(I) A partial CRL that only contains entries for X.509 (I) A partial CRL that only contains entries for X.509
certificates that have been revoked since the issuance of a prior, certificates that have been revoked since the issuance of a prior,
base CRL. This method can be used to partition CRLs that become base CRL. This method can be used to partition CRLs that become
too large and unwieldy. too large and unwieldy.
denial of service $ denial of service
(I) The prevention of authorized access to a system resource or (I) The prevention of authorized access to a system resource or
the delaying of system operations and functions. (Also see: the delaying of system operations and functions. (See:
availability, critical (resource of a system).) availability, critical (resource of a system), flooding.)
DES $ DES
See: Data Encryption Standard. See: Data Encryption Standard.
dictionary attack $ dictionary attack
(I) An attack that uses a brute-force approach of successively (I) An attack that uses a brute-force approach of successively
trying all the words in some large, exhaustive list. trying all the words in some large, exhaustive list.
(C) For example, an attack on an authentication service by trying (C) For example, an attack on an authentication service by trying
all possible passwords; or an attack on encryption by encrypting all possible passwords; or an attack on encryption by encrypting
some known plaintext phrase with all possible keys so that the key some known plaintext phrase with all possible keys so that the key
for any given encrypted message containing that phrase may be for any given encrypted message containing that phrase may be
obtained by lookup. obtained by lookup.
Diffie-Hellman $ Diffie-Hellman
(N) A key agreement algorithm published in 1976 by Whitfield (N) A key agreement algorithm published in 1976 by Whitfield
Diffie and Martin Hellman [DH76, R2631]. Diffie and Martin Hellman [DH76, R2631].
(C) Diffie-Hellman does key establishment, not encryption. (C) Diffie-Hellman does key establishment, not encryption.
However, the key that it produces may be used for encryption, for However, the key that it produces may be used for encryption, for
further key management operations, or for any other cryptography. further key management operations, or for any other cryptography.
(C) The difficulty of breaking Diffie-Hellman is considered to be (C) The difficulty of breaking Diffie-Hellman is considered to be
equal to the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms modulo a equal to the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms modulo a
large prime. The algorithm is described in [R2631] and [Schn]. In large prime. The algorithm is described in [R2631] and [Schn]. In
brief, Alice and Bob together pick large integers that satisfy brief, Alice and Bob together pick large integers that satisfy
certain mathematical conditions, and then use the integers to each certain mathematical conditions, and then use the integers to each
separately compute a public-private key pair. They send each other separately compute a public-private key pair. They send each other
their public key. Each person uses their own private key and the their public key. Each person uses their own private key and the
other person's public key to compute a key, k, that, because of other person's public key to compute a key, k, that, because of
the mathematics of the algorithm, is the same for each of them. the mathematics of the algorithm, is the same for each of them.
Passive wiretapping cannot learn the shared k, because k is not Passive wiretapping cannot learn the shared k, because k is not
transmitted, and neither are the private keys needed to compute k. transmitted, and neither are the private keys needed to compute k.
However, without additional mechanisms to authenticate each party However, without additional mechanisms to authenticate each party
to the other, a protocol based on the algorithm may be vulnerable to the other, a protocol based on the algorithm may be vulnerable
to a man-in-the middle attack. to a man-in-the-middle attack.
digest $ digest
See: message digest. See: message digest.
digital certificate $ digital certificate
(I) A certificate document in the form of a digital data set (a (I) A certificate document in the form of a digital data set (a
data object used by a computer) to which is appended a computed data object used by a computer) to which is appended a computed
digital signature value that depends on the data set. (Also see: digital signature value that depends on the data set. (See:
attribute certificate, public-key certificate.) attribute certificate, public-key certificate.)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term to refer to a signed CRL or
to refer to a signed CRL or CKL. Although the recommended CKL. Although the recommended definition can be interpreted to
definition can be interpreted to include those items, the security include those items, the security community does not use the term
community does not use the term with those meanings. with those meanings.
digital certification $ digital certification
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs use this term as a synonym for "certification", unless
as a synonym for "certification", unless the context is not the context is not sufficient to distinguish between digital
sufficient to distinguish between digital certification and certification and another kind of certification, in which case it
another kind of certification, in which case it would be better to would be better to use "public-key certification" or another
use "public-key certification" or another phrase that indicates phrase that indicates what is being certified.
what is being certified.
digital document $ digital document
(I) An electronic data set that represents the information (I) An electronic data set that represents the information
originally written in a document in a different medium (usually originally written in a document in a different medium (usually
paper) or is an analogue of documents of that type. paper) or is an analogue of documents of that type.
digital envelope $ digital envelope
(I) A digital envelope for a recipient is a combination of (a) (I) A digital envelope for a recipient is a combination of (a)
encrypted content data (of any kind) and (b) the content encrypted content data (of any kind) and (b) the content
encryption key in an encrypted form that has been prepared for the encryption key in an encrypted form that has been prepared for the
use of the recipient. use of the recipient.
(C) In Internet Standards Process documents, this term should be (C) In ISPDs, this term should be defined at the point of first
defined at the point of first use because, although the term is use because, although the term is defined in PKCS #7 and used in
defined in PKCS #7 and used in S/MIME, it is not yet widely- S/MIME, it is not yet widely-established.
established.
(C) Digital enveloping is not simply a synonym for implementing (C) Digital enveloping is not simply a synonym for implementing
data confidentiality with encryption; digital enveloping is a data confidentiality with encryption; digital enveloping is a
hybrid encryption scheme to "seal" a message or other data, by hybrid encryption scheme to "seal" a message or other data, by
encrypting the data and sending both it and a protected form of encrypting the data and sending both it and a protected form of
the key to the intended recipient, so that no one other than the the key to the intended recipient, so that no one other than the
intended recipient can "open" the message. In PCKS #7, it means intended recipient can "open" the message. In PCKS #7, it means
first encrypting the data using a symmetric encryption algorithm first encrypting the data using a symmetric encryption algorithm
and a secret key, and then encrypting the secret key using an and a secret key, and then encrypting the secret key using an
asymmetric encryption algorithm and the public key of the intended asymmetric encryption algorithm and the public key of the intended
recipient. In S/MIME, additional methods are defined for recipient. In S/MIME, additional methods are defined for
encrypting the content encryption key. encrypting the content encryption key.
Digital ID(service mark) $ Digital ID(service mark)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "digital
as a synonym for "digital certificate" because (a) it is the certificate" because (a) it is the service mark of commercial
service mark of commercial firm, (b) it unnecessarily duplicates firm, (b) it unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of other, well-
the meaning of other, well-established terms, and (c) a established terms, and (c) a certificate is not always used as
certificate is not always used as authentication information. In authentication information. In some contexts, however, it may be
some contexts, however, it may be useful to explain that the key useful to explain that the key conveyed in a public-key
conveyed in a public-key certificate can be used to verify an certificate can be used to verify an identity and thus the
identity and thus the certificate can be thought of as digital certificate can be thought of as digital identification
identification information. (See: identification information.) information. (See: identification information.)
digital key $ digital key
(C) The adjective "digital" need not be used with "key" or (C) The adjective "digital" need not be used with "key" or
"cryptographic key", unless the context is insufficient to "cryptographic key", unless the context is insufficient to
distinguish the key from another kind of key, such as a metal key distinguish the key from another kind of key, such as a metal key
for a door lock. for a door lock.
digital notary $ digital notary
(I) Analogous to a notary public; provides a trusted date-and-time (I) Analogous to a notary public; provides a trusted date-and-time
stamp for a document that proves the document existed at a point stamp for a document that proves the document existed at a point
in time, and may also verify the signatures on a signed document. in time, and may also verify the signatures on a signed document.
(Also see: notarization.) (See: notarization.)
digital signature $ digital signature
(I) A value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and appended (I) A value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and appended
to a data set in such a way that any recipient of the data can use to a data set in such a way that any recipient of the data can use
the signature to verify the data's origin and integrity. (Also the signature to verify the data's origin and integrity. (See:
see: data origin authentication service, data integrity service.) data origin authentication service, data integrity service,
digitized signature, electronic signature, signer.)
(I) "Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a (I) "Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a
data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the
source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery, source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery,
e.g. by the recipient." [I7498 Part 2] e.g. by the recipient." [I7498 Part 2]
(C) Typically, the data set is first input to a hash function, and (C) Typically, the data set is first input to a hash function, and
then the hash result is cryptographically transformed using a then the hash result is cryptographically transformed using a
private key of the signer. The final resulting value is called the private key of the signer. The final resulting value is called the
digital signature of the data set. The signature value is a digital signature of the data set. The signature value is a
protected checksum, because the properties of a cryptographic hash protected checksum, because the properties of a cryptographic hash
ensure that if the data set is changed, the digital signature will ensure that if the data set is changed, the digital signature will
no longer match it. The digital signature is unforgeable because no longer match it. The digital signature is unforgeable because
one cannot be certain of correctly creating or changing the one cannot be certain of correctly creating or changing the
signature without knowing the private key of the supposed signature without knowing the private key of the supposed signer.
signatory.
(C) Some digital signature schemes use an asymmetric encryption (C) Some digital signature schemes use an asymmetric encryption
algorithms (e.g., see: RSA) to transform the hash result. Thus, algorithms (e.g., see: RSA) to transform the hash result. Thus,
when Alice needs to sign a message to send to Bob, she can encrypt when Alice needs to sign a message to send to Bob, she can encrypt
the hash result using her private key. Bob receives both the the hash result using her private key. Bob receives both the
message and the digital signature. Bob decrypts the signature message and the digital signature. Bob decrypts the signature
using Alice's public key and compares the plaintext result to the using Alice's public key and compares the plaintext result to the
hash result that he computes by hashing the message himself. If hash result that he computes by hashing the message himself. If
the values are equal, Bob accepts the message because he is the values are equal, Bob accepts the message because he is
certain that it is from Alice and has arrived unchanged. If the certain that it is from Alice and has arrived unchanged. If the
skipping to change at page 51, line 9 skipping to change at page 54, line 53
signature value, but does not provide a way to recover the hash signature value, but does not provide a way to recover the hash
result from the signature value. In some countries, such a scheme result from the signature value. In some countries, such a scheme
may improve exportability and avoid other legal constraints on may improve exportability and avoid other legal constraints on
usage. Alice sends the signature value to Bob along with both the usage. Alice sends the signature value to Bob along with both the
message and its hash result. The algorithm enables Bob to use message and its hash result. The algorithm enables Bob to use
Alice's public signature key and the signature value to verify the Alice's public signature key and the signature value to verify the
hash result he receives. Then, as before, he compares that hash hash result he receives. Then, as before, he compares that hash
result she sent to the one that he computes by hashing the message result she sent to the one that he computes by hashing the message
himself. himself.
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) $ Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
(N) An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that produces a digital (N) An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that produces a digital
signature in the form of a pair of large numbers. The signature is signature in the form of a pair of large numbers. The signature is
computed using rules and parameters such that the identity of the computed using rules and parameters such that the identity of the
signer and the integrity of the signed data can be verified. (See: signer and the integrity of the signed data can be verified. (See:
Digital Signature Standard.) Digital Signature Standard.)
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) $ Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
(N) The U.S. Government standard [FP186] that specifies the (N) The U.S. Government standard [FP186] that specifies the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), which involves asymmetric Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), which involves asymmetric
cryptography. cryptography.
digital watermarking $ digital watermarking
(I) Computing techniques for inseparably embedding unobtrusive (I) Computing techniques for inseparably embedding unobtrusive
marks or labels as bits in digital data--text, graphics, images, marks or labels as bits in digital data--text, graphics, images,
video, or audio--and for detecting or extracting the marks later. video, or audio--and for detecting or extracting the marks later.
(C) The set of embedded bits (the digital watermark) is sometimes (C) The set of embedded bits (the digital watermark) is sometimes
hidden, usually imperceptible, and always intended to be hidden, usually imperceptible, and always intended to be
unobtrusive. Depending on the particular technique that is used, unobtrusive. Depending on the particular technique that is used,
digital watermarking can assist in proving ownership, controlling digital watermarking can assist in proving ownership, controlling
duplication, tracing distribution, ensuring data integrity, and duplication, tracing distribution, ensuring data integrity, and
performing other functions to protect intellectual property performing other functions to protect intellectual property
rights. [ACM] rights. [ACM]
directory, Directory $ digitized signature
(I) When not capitalized, directory refers generically to a (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because there is no current
database server or other system that provides information--such as consensus on its definition. Although it appears to be used mainly
a digital certificate or CRL--about an entity whose name is known. to refer to various forms of digitized images of handwritten
When capitalized, Directory refers specifically to the X.500 signatures, the term should be avoided because it might be
Directory. confused with "digital signature".
Directory Access Protocol (DAP) $ directory
$ Directory
See: directory vs. Directory.
$ Directory Access Protocol (DAP)
(N) An OSI protocol [X519] for communication between a Directory (N) An OSI protocol [X519] for communication between a Directory
User Agent (a client) and a Directory System Agent (a server). User Agent (a client) and a Directory System Agent (a server).
(Also see: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.) (See: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.)
disaster plan $ directory vs. Directory
(I) A synonym for "contingency plan. 1. (I) Not capitalized: The term "directory" refers generically to
a database server or other system that provides information--such
as a digital certificate or CRL--about an entity whose name is
known.
disclosure (i.e., unauthorized disclosure) 2. (I) Capitalized: "Directory" refers specifically to the X.500
Directory. (See: repository.)
$ disaster plan
(D) A synonym for "contingency plan". In the interest of
consistency, ISPDs SHOULD use "contingency plan" instead of
"disaster plan".
$ disclosure (i.e., unauthorized disclosure)
See: (secondary definition in) threat consequence. See: (secondary definition in) threat consequence.
discretionary access control (DAC) $ discretionary access control (DAC)
(I) An access control service that enforces a security policy (I) An access control service that enforces a security policy
based on the identity of system entities and their authorizations based on the identity of system entities and their authorizations
to access system resources. (Also see: access control list, to access system resources. (See: access control list, identity-
identity-based security policy, mandatory access control.) based security policy, mandatory access control.)
(C) This service is termed "discretionary" because an entity might (C) This service is termed "discretionary" because an entity might
have access rights that permit the entity, by its own volition, to have access rights that permit the entity, by its own volition, to
enable another entity to access some resource. enable another entity to access some resource.
(O) "A means of restricting access to objects based on the (O) "A means of restricting access to objects based on the
identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The
controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a
certain access permission is capable of passing that permission certain access permission is capable of passing that permission
(perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject." [DOD1] (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject." [DOD1]
disruption $ disruption
See: (secondary definition in) threat consequence. See: (secondary definition in) threat consequence.
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) $ Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
(N) A subset of the Basic Encoding Rules, which gives exactly one (N) A subset of the Basic Encoding Rules, which gives exactly one
way to represent any ASN.1 value as an octet string [X690]. way to represent any ASN.1 value as an octet string [X690].
(C) Since there is more than one way to encode ASN.1 in BER, DER (C) Since there is more than one way to encode ASN.1 in BER, DER
is used in applications in which a unique encoding is needed, such is used in applications in which a unique encoding is needed, such
as when a digital signature is computed on an ASN.1 value. as when a digital signature is computed on an ASN.1 value.
distinguished name (DN) $ distinguished name (DN)
(I) An identifier that uniquely represents an object in the X.500 (I) An identifier that uniquely represents an object in the X.500
Directory Information Tree (DIT) [X501]. (Also see: domain name.) Directory Information Tree (DIT) [X501]. (See: domain name.)
(C) A DN is a set of attribute values that identify the path (C) A DN is a set of attribute values that identify the path
leading from the base of the DIT to the object that is named. An leading from the base of the DIT to the object that is named. An
X.509 public-key certificate or CRL contains a DN that identifies X.509 public-key certificate or CRL contains a DN that identifies
its issuer, and an X.509 attribute certificate contains a DN or its issuer, and an X.509 attribute certificate contains a DN or
other form of name that identifies its subject. other form of name that identifies its subject.
distribution point $ Distributed Authentication Security Service (DASS)
(I) An experimental Internet protocol [R1507] that uses
cryptographic mechanisms to provide strong, mutual authentication
services in a distributed environment.
$ distribution point
(I) An X.500 Directory entry or other information source that is (I) An X.500 Directory entry or other information source that is
named in a v3 X.509 public-key certificate extension as a location named in a v3 X.509 public-key certificate extension as a location
from which to obtain a CRL that may list the certificate. from which to obtain a CRL that may list the certificate.
(C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a (C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a
"cRLDistributionPoints" extension that names places to get CRLs on "cRLDistributionPoints" extension that names places to get CRLs on
which the certificate might be listed. A CRL obtained from a which the certificate might be listed. A CRL obtained from a
distribution point may cover either all reasons for which a distribution point may cover either all reasons for which a
certificate might be revoked or only some of that reasons, may be certificate might be revoked or only some of that reasons, may be
issued by either the authority that signed the certificate or some issued by either the authority that signed the certificate or some
other authority, and may contain revocation entries for only a other authority, and may contain revocation entries for only a
subset of the full set of certificates issued by one CA or may subset of the full set of certificates issued by one CA or may
contain revocation entries for multiple CAs. contain revocation entries for multiple CAs.
DN $ DN
See: distinguished name. See: distinguished name.
DNS $ DNS
See: Domain Name System. See: Domain Name System.
domain $ DOI
(I) General security usage: The set of system resources that a See: Domain of Interpretation.
system entity (or set of system entities, perhaps defined by a
security architecture or security policy) has the ability to $ domain
access. (Also see: security perimeter.) (I) General security usage: An environment or context that defines
the set of system resources that a set entities (perhaps defined
by a security policy, or security model, or security architecture)
has the right to access. (See: domain of interpretation, security
perimeter.)
(I) Internet usage: That part of the Internet domain name space (I) Internet usage: That part of the Internet domain name space
tree [R1034] that is at or below the name the specifies the tree [R1034] that is at or below the name the specifies the
domain. A domain is a subdomain of another domain if it is domain. A domain is a subdomain of another domain if it is
contained within that domain. For example, D.C.B.A is a subdomain contained within that domain. For example, D.C.B.A is a subdomain
of C.B.A. (Also see: Domain Name System.) of C.B.A. (See: Domain Name System.)
(I) IPsec usage: An IPsec ISAKMP domain of interpretation (DOI)
defines payload formats, exchange types, and conventions for
naming security-relevant information such as security policies or
cryptographic algorithms and modes. (The DOI concept is based on
work by the TSIG CIPSO Working Group.)
(O) MISSI usage: The domain of a MISSI certification authority is (O) MISSI usage: The domain of a MISSI certification authority is
the set of MISSI users whose certificates are signed by the the set of MISSI users whose certificates are signed by the
authority. authority.
(O) OSI usage: An administrative partition of a complex (O) OSI usage: An administrative partition of a complex
distributed OSI system. distributed OSI system.
domain name $ domain name
(I) The style of identifier--a sequence of case-insensitive ASCII (I) The style of identifier--a sequence of case-insensitive ASCII
labels separated by dots ("bbn.com.")--defined for subtrees in the labels separated by dots ("bbn.com.")--defined for subtrees in the
Internet Domain Name System [R1034] and used in other Internet Internet Domain Name System [R1034] and used in other Internet
identifiers, such as host names ("rosslyn.bbn.com."), mailbox identifiers, such as host names ("rosslyn.bbn.com."), mailbox
names ("rshirey@bbn.com."), and URLs names ("rshirey@bbn.com."), and URLs
("http://www.rosslyn.bbn.com/foo"). (Also see: domain and ("http://www.rosslyn.bbn.com/foo"). (See: domain and distinguished
distinguished name.) name.)
(C) The domain name space of the DNS is a tree structure in which (C) The domain name space of the DNS is a tree structure in which
each node and leaf holds records describing a resource. Each node each node and leaf holds records describing a resource. Each node
has a label. The domain name of a node is the list of labels on has a label. The domain name of a node is the list of labels on
the path from the node to the root of the tree. The labels in a the path from the node to the root of the tree. The labels in a
domain name are printed or read left to right, from the most domain name are printed or read left to right, from the most
specific (lowest, farthest from the root) to the least specific specific (lowest, farthest from the root) to the least specific
(highest, closest to the root). The root's label is the null (highest, closest to the root). The root's label is the null
string, so a complete domain name ends in a dot. The top-level string, so a complete domain name ends in a dot. The top-level
domains, those immediately below the root, include COM, EDU, GOV, domains, those immediately below the root, include COM, EDU, GOV,
INT, MIL, NET, ORG, and two-letter country codes (such as US) from INT, MIL, NET, ORG, and two-letter country codes (such as US) from
ISO-3166. [R1591] ISO-3166. [R1591] (Also see: country code.)
Domain Name System (DNS) $ Domain Name System (DNS)
(I) The main Internet operations database, which is distributed (I) The main Internet operations database, which is distributed
over a collection of servers and used by client software for over a collection of servers and used by client software for
purposes such as translating a domain name-style host name into an purposes such as translating a domain name-style host name into an
IP address (for example, "rosslyn.bbn.com" is "192.1.7.10") and IP address (for example, "rosslyn.bbn.com" is "192.1.7.10") and
locating a host that accepts mail for some mailbox address. locating a host that accepts mail for some mailbox address.
[R1034] [R1034]
(C) The DNS has three major components: (C) The DNS has three major components:
- Domain name space and resource records: Specifications for the - Domain name space and resource records: Specifications for the
skipping to change at page 54, line 28 skipping to change at page 58, line 33
- Name servers: Programs that hold information about a subset of - Name servers: Programs that hold information about a subset of
the tree's structure and data holdings, and also hold pointers the tree's structure and data holdings, and also hold pointers
to other name servers that can provide information from any to other name servers that can provide information from any
part of the tree. part of the tree.
- Resolvers: Programs that extract information from name servers - Resolvers: Programs that extract information from name servers
in response to client requests; typically, system routines in response to client requests; typically, system routines
directly accessible to user programs. directly accessible to user programs.
(C) Extensions to the DNS [R2065] support (a) key distribution for (C) Extensions to the DNS [R2065, R2137] support key distribution
public keys needed for the DNS and for other protocols, (b) data for public keys needed for the DNS and for other protocols, data
origin authentication service and data integrity service for origin authentication service and data integrity service for
resource records, and (c) data origin authentication service for resource records, data origin authentication service for
transactions between resolvers and servers. transactions between resolvers and servers, and access control of
records.
dominate $ domain of interpretation (DOI)
(I) IPsec usage: An IPsec ISAKMP/IKE domain of interpretation
(DOI) defines payload formats, exchange types, and conventions for
naming security-relevant information such as security policies or
cryptographic algorithms and modes.
(C) For example, see [R2407]. The DOI concept is based on work by
the TSIG CIPSO Working Group.
$ dominate
(I) Security level A is said to "dominate" security level B if the (I) Security level A is said to "dominate" security level B if the
hierarchical classification level of A is greater (higher) than or hierarchical classification level of A is greater (higher) than or
equal to that of B and the nonhierarchical categories of A include equal to that of B and the nonhierarchical categories of A include
all of those of B. all of those of B.
dongle $ dongle
(I) A portable, physical, electronic device that is required to be (I) A portable, physical, electronic device that is required to be
attached to a computer to enable a particular software program to attached to a computer to enable a particular software program to
run. (Also see: token.) run. (See: token.)
(C) A dongle is essentially a physical key used for copy (C) A dongle is essentially a physical key used for copy
protection of software, because the program will not run unless a protection of software, because the program will not run unless a
matching dongle is attached. When the software runs, it matching dongle is attached. When the software runs, it
periodically queries the dongle and quits if the dongle does not periodically queries the dongle and quits if the dongle does not
reply with the proper authentication information. Dongles were reply with the proper authentication information. Dongles were
originally constructed as an EPROM to be connected to a serial I/O originally constructed as an EPROM to be connected to a serial I/O
port of a personal computer. port of a personal computer.
downgrade $ downgrade
(I) Reduce the classification level of information in an (I) Reduce the classification level of information in an
authorized manner. authorized manner.
draft RFC $ draft RFC
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term, (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term, because the Request for
because the Request for Comment series is archival in nature and Comment series is archival in nature and does not have a "draft"
does not have a "draft" category. Instead, use "Internet Draft". category. Instead, use "Internet Draft".
DSA $ DSA
See: Digital Signature Algorithm. See: Digital Signature Algorithm.
DSS $ DSS
See: Digital Signature Standard. See: Digital Signature Standard.
dual control $ dual control
(I) A procedure that uses two or more entities (usually persons), (I) A procedure that uses two or more entities (usually persons),
operating in concert, to protect a system resource such that no operating in concert, to protect a system resource such that no
single entity acting alone can access that resource. (Also see: single entity acting alone can access that resource. (See: no-lone
no-lone zone, separation of duties, split knowledge.) zone, separation of duties, split knowledge.)
$ dual signature
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term except when stated as
"SET(trademark) dual signature" with the following meaning:
dual signature
(O) SET usage: A single digital signature that protects two (O) SET usage: A single digital signature that protects two
separate messages by including the hash results for both sets in a separate messages by including the hash results for both sets in a
single encrypted value. [SET2] single encrypted value. [SET2]
(C) Generated by hashing each message separately, concatenating (C) Generated by hashing each message separately, concatenating
the two hash results, and then hashing that value and encrypting the two hash results, and then hashing that value and encrypting
the result with the signer's private key. Done to reduce the the result with the signer's private key. Done to reduce the
number of encryption operations and to allow verification of data number of encryption operations and to allow verification of data
integrity without complete disclosure of the data. integrity without complete disclosure of the data.
EAP $ EAP
See: Extensible Authentication Protocol See: Extensible Authentication Protocol
eavesdropping $ eavesdropping
(I) Passive wiretapping done secretly, i.e., without the knowledge (I) Passive wiretapping done secretly, i.e., without the knowledge
of the originator or the intended recipients of the communication. of the originator or the intended recipients of the communication.
ECB $ ECB
See: electronic codebook. See: electronic codebook.
EDI $ ECDSA
See: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm.
$ economy of mechanism
(I) The principle that security mechanism should be designed to be
as simple as possible, so that it can be correctly implemented and
so that it can be verified that its operation enforces the
security policy. (See: least privilege.)
$ EDI
See: electronic data interchange. See: electronic data interchange.
EDIFACT $ EDIFACT
See: (secondary definition in) electronic data interchange. See: (secondary definition in) electronic data interchange.
EE $ EE
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this abbreviation because of possible
acronym because of possible confusion among "end entity", "end-to- confusion among "end entity", "end-to-end encryption", "escrowed
end encryption", "escrowed encryption standard", and other terms. encryption standard", and other terms.
EES $ EES
See: Escrowed Encryption Standard. See: Escrowed Encryption Standard.
El Gamal algorithm $ El Gamal algorithm
(N) An algorithm for asymmetric cryptography, invented in 1985 by (N) An algorithm for asymmetric cryptography, invented in 1985 by
Taher El Gamal, that is based on the difficulty of calculating Taher El Gamal, that is based on the difficulty of calculating
discrete logarithms and can be used for both encryption and discrete logarithms and can be used for both encryption and
digital signatures. digital signatures.
electronic codebook (ECB) $ electronic codebook (ECB)
(I) An block cipher mode in which a plaintext block is used (I) An block cipher mode in which a plaintext block is used
directly as input to the encryption algorithm and the resultant directly as input to the encryption algorithm and the resultant
output block is used directly as ciphertext [FP081]. output block is used directly as ciphertext [FP081].
electronic commerce $ electronic commerce
(I) General usage: Business conducted through paperless exchanges (I) General usage: Business conducted through paperless exchanges
of information, using electronic data interchange, electronic of information, using electronic data interchange, electronic
funds transfer (EFT), electronic mail, computer bulletin boards, funds transfer (EFT), electronic mail, computer bulletin boards,
facsimile, and other paperless technologies. facsimile, and other paperless technologies.
(O) SET usage: "The exchange of goods and services for payment (O) SET usage: "The exchange of goods and services for payment
between the cardholder and merchant when some or all of the between the cardholder and merchant when some or all of the
transaction is performed via electronic communication." [SET2] transaction is performed via electronic communication." [SET2]
electronic data interchange (EDI) $ electronic data interchange (EDI)
(I) Computer-to-computer exchange, between trading partners, of (I) Computer-to-computer exchange, between trading partners, of
business data in standardized document formats. business data in standardized document formats.
(C) EDI formats have been standardized primarily by ANSI X12 and (C) EDI formats have been standardized primarily by ANSI X12 and
by EDIFACT (EDI for Administration, Commerce, and Transportation), by EDIFACT (EDI for Administration, Commerce, and Transportation),
an international, UN-sponsored standard primarily used in Europe an international, UN-sponsored standard primarily used in Europe
and Asia. These two are aligning to create a single global EDI and Asia. These two are aligning to create a single global EDI
standard. standard.
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) $ electronic signature
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because there is no current
consensus on its definition. (Instead, see: digital signature.)
$ elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
(I) A type of asymmetric cryptography based on mathematics of (I) A type of asymmetric cryptography based on mathematics of
groups defined by the points on a curve. groups defined by the points on a curve.
(C) The most efficient implementation of ECC is claimed to be (C) The most efficient implementation of ECC is claimed to be
stronger per bit of key (against cryptanalysis that uses a brute stronger per bit of key (against cryptanalysis that uses a brute
force attack) than any other known form of asymmetric force attack) than any other known form of asymmetric
cryptography. ECC is based on mathematics different than the kinds cryptography. ECC is based on mathematics different than the kinds
originally used to define the Diffie-Hellman algorithm and the originally used to define the Diffie-Hellman algorithm and the
Digital Signature Algorithm. ECC is based on the mathematics of Digital Signature Algorithm. ECC is based on the mathematics of
groups defined by the points on a curve, where the curve is groups defined by the points on a curve, where the curve is
defined by a quadratic equation in a finite field. ECC can be used defined by a quadratic equation in a finite field. ECC can be used
to define an algorithm for key agreement that is an analog of to define an algorithm for key agreement that is an analog of
Diffie-Hellman and an algorithm for digital signature that is an Diffie-Hellman and an algorithm for digital signature that is an
analog of DSA. analog of DSA. (See: ECDSA.)
emanation $ Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
(N) A standard [A9062] that is the elliptic curve cryptography
analog of the Digital Signature Algorithm.
$ emanation
(I) An signal (electromagnetic, acoustical, or other byproduct) (I) An signal (electromagnetic, acoustical, or other byproduct)
that is emitted by a system (through radiation or conductance) as that is emitted by a system (through radiation or conductance) as
a consequence of its operation, and that may contain information. a consequence of its operation, and that may contain information.
(Also see: TEMPEST.) (See: TEMPEST.)
emanations security (EMSEC) $ emanations security (EMSEC)
(I) Physical constraints to prevent information compromise through (I) Physical constraints to prevent information compromise through
signals emanated by a system, particular the application of signals emanated by a system, particular the application of
TEMPEST technology to block electromagnetic radiation. TEMPEST technology to block electromagnetic radiation.
emergency plan $ emergency plan
(I) A synonym for "contingency plan". (D) A synonym for "contingency plan". In the interest of
consistency, ISPD SHOULD use "contingency plan" instead of
"emergency plan".
EMSEC $ EMSEC
See: emanations security. See: emanations security.
EMV $ EMV
(I) An acronym for "Europay, MasterCard, Visa". Refers to a (I) An acronym for "Europay, MasterCard, Visa". Refers to a
specification for smart cards that are used as payment cards, and specification for smart cards that are used as payment cards, and
for related terminals and applications. [EMV1, EMV2, EMV3] for related terminals and applications. [EMV1, EMV2, EMV3]
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) $ Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
(I) An Internet IPsec protocol [R2406] designed to provide a mix (I) An Internet IPsec protocol [R2406] designed to provide a mix
of security services--especially data confidentiality service--in of security services--especially data confidentiality service--in
the Internet Protocol. (Also see: Authentication Header.) the Internet Protocol. (See: Authentication Header.)
(C) ESP may be used alone, or in combination with the IPsec AH (C) ESP may be used alone, or in combination with the IPsec AH
protocol, or in a nested fashion with tunneling. Security services protocol, or in a nested fashion with tunneling. Security services
can be provided between a pair of communicating hosts, between a can be provided between a pair of communicating hosts, between a
pair of communicating security gateways, or between a host and a pair of communicating security gateways, or between a host and a
gateway. The ESP header is inserted after the IP header and before gateway. The ESP header is inserted after the IP header and before
either the upper layer protocol header (transport mode) or an either the upper layer protocol header (transport mode) or an
encapsulated IP header (tunnel mode). ESP can provide data encapsulated IP header (tunnel mode). ESP can provide data
confidentiality service, data origin authentication service, confidentiality service, data origin authentication service,
connectionless data integrity service, an anti-replay service, and connectionless data integrity service, an anti-replay service, and
limited traffic flow confidentiality. The set of services depends limited traffic flow confidentiality. The set of services depends
on the placement of the implementation and on options selected on the placement of the implementation and on options selected
when the security association is established. when the security association is established.
encipher $ encipher
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "encrypt".
as a synonym for "encrypt". However, see the usage note under However, see the usage note under "encryption".
"encryption".
encipherment $ encipherment
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "encryption",
as a synonym for "encryption", except in special circumstances except in special circumstances that are explained in the usage
that are explained in the usage discussion under "encryption". discussion under "encryption".
encode $ encode
(I) Use a system of symbols to represent information, which might (I) Use a system of symbols to represent information, which might
originally have some other representation. (Also see: decode.) originally have some other representation. (See: decode.)
(C) Examples include Morse code, ASCII, and BER. Internet (C) Examples include Morse code, ASCII, and BER.
Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym
for "encrypt", because encoding is not usually intended to conceal
meaning.
encrypt (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "encrypt",
because encoding is not usually intended to conceal meaning.
$ encrypt
(I) Cryptographically transform data to produce ciphertext. (See: (I) Cryptographically transform data to produce ciphertext. (See:
encryption.) encryption.)
encryption $ encryption
(I) The cryptographic transformation of data (called "plaintext") (I) The cryptographic transformation of data (called "plaintext")
into a form (called "ciphertext") that conceals the data's into a form (called "ciphertext") that conceals the data's
original meaning to prevent it from being known or used. If the original meaning to prevent it from being known or used. If the
transformation is reversible, then corresponding reversal process transformation is reversible, then corresponding reversal process
is called "decryption", which is a transformation that restores is called "decryption", which is a transformation that restores
encrypted data to its original state. (Also see: cryptography.) encrypted data to its original state. (See: cryptography.)
(C) Usage note: For this concept, Internet Standards Process (C) Usage note: For this concept, ISPDs should use the verb "to
documents should use the verb "to encrypt" (and related encrypt" (and related variations: encryption, decrypt, and
variations: encryption, decrypt, and decryption). Because of decryption). Because of cultural biases, however, some
cultural biases, however, some international usage, particularly international usage, particularly ISO and CCITT standards, avoid
ISO and CCITT standards, avoid "to encrypt" and instead use the "to encrypt" and instead use the verb "to encipher" (and related
verb "to encipher" (and related variations: encipherment, variations: encipherment, decipher, decipherment).
decipher, decipherment).
(O) "The cryptographic transformation of data (see: cryptography) (O) "The cryptographic transformation of data (see: cryptography)
to produce ciphertext." [I7498 Part 2] to produce ciphertext." [I7498 Part 2]
(C) Usually, the plaintext input to an encryption operation is (C) Usually, the plaintext input to an encryption operation is
cleartext. But in some cases, the plaintext may be ciphertext that cleartext. But in some cases, the plaintext may be ciphertext that
was output from another encryption operation. (Also see: was output from another encryption operation. (See:
superencryption.) superencryption.)
(C) Encryption and decryption involve a mathematical algorithm for (C) Encryption and decryption involve a mathematical algorithm for
transforming data. In addition to the data to be transformed, the transforming data. In addition to the data to be transformed, the
algorithm has one or more inputs that are control parameters: (a) algorithm has one or more inputs that are control parameters: (a)
a key value that varies the transformation and, in some cases, (b) a key value that varies the transformation and, in some cases, (b)
an initialization value that establishes the starting state of the an initialization value that establishes the starting state of the
algorithm. algorithm.
encryption certificate $ encryption certificate
(I) A public-key certificate that contains a public-key that is (I) A public-key certificate that contains a public key that is
intended to be used for encrypting data, rather than for verifying intended to be used for encrypting data, rather than for verifying
digital signatures or performing other cryptographic functions. digital signatures or performing other cryptographic functions.
C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "keyUsage" C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "keyUsage"
extension which indicates the purpose for which the certified extension that indicates the purpose for which the certified
public key is intended. public key is intended.
end entity $ end entity
(I) A system entity that is the subject of a public-key (I) A system entity that is the subject of a public-key
certificate and that is using, or is permitted and able to use, certificate and that is using, or is permitted and able to use,
the matching private key only for a purpose or purposes other than the matching private key only for a purpose or purposes other than
signing a digital certificate; i.e., an entity that is not a CA. signing a digital certificate; i.e., an entity that is not a CA.
(O) "A certificate subject which uses its public [sic] key for (D) "A certificate subject which uses its public [sic] key for
purposes other than signing certificates." [X509] purposes other than signing certificates." [X509]
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use the X.509 (C) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use the X.509 definition, because it is
definition, because it is misleading and incomplete. First, the misleading and incomplete. First, the X.509 definition should say
X.509 definition should say "private key" rather than "public key" "private key" rather than "public key" because certificates are
because certificates are not usefully signed with a public key. not usefully signed with a public key. Second, the X.509
Second, the X.509 definition is weak regarding whether an end definition is weak regarding whether an end entity may or may not
entity may or may not use the private key to sign a certificate, use the private key to sign a certificate, i.e., whether the
i.e., whether the subject may be a CA. The intent of X.509's subject may be a CA. The intent of X.509's authors was that an end
authors was that an end entity certificate is not valid for use in entity certificate is not valid for use in verifying a signature
verifying a signature on an X.509 certificate or X.509 CRL. Thus, on an X.509 certificate or X.509 CRL. Thus, it would have been
it would have been better for the X.509 definition to have said better for the X.509 definition to have said "only for purposes
"only for purposes other than signing certificates". other than signing certificates".
(C) Despite the problems in the X.509 definition, the term itself (C) Despite the problems in the X.509 definition, the term itself
is useful in describing applications of asymmetric cryptography. is useful in describing applications of asymmetric cryptography.
The way the term is used in X.509 implies that it was meant to be The way the term is used in X.509 implies that it was meant to be
defined, as we have done here, relative to roles that an entity defined, as we have done here, relative to roles that an entity
(which is associated with an OSI end system) is playing or is (which is associated with an OSI end system) is playing or is
permitted to play in applications of asymmetric cryptography other permitted to play in applications of asymmetric cryptography other
than the PKI that supports applications. than the PKI that supports applications.
(C) Whether a subject can play both CA and non-CA roles, with (C) Whether a subject can play both CA and non-CA roles, with
either the same or different certificates, is a matter of policy. either the same or different certificates, is a matter of policy.
(See: certification practice statement.) A v3 X.509 public-key (See: certification practice statement.) A v3 X.509 public-key
certificate may have a "basicConstraints" extension containing a certificate may have a "basicConstraints" extension containing a
"cA" value that specifically "indicates whether or not the public "cA" value that specifically "indicates whether or not the public
key may be used to verify certificate signatures". key may be used to verify certificate signatures".
end system $ end system
(I) An OSI term for a computer that implements all seven layers of (I) An OSI term for a computer that implements all seven layers of
the OSIRM and may attach to a subnetwork. (In the context of the the OSIRM and may attach to a subnetwork. (In the context of the
Internet Protocol Suite, usually called a "host".) Internet Protocol Suite, usually called a "host".)
end-to-end encryption $ end-to-end encryption
(I) Continuous protection of data that flows between two points in (I) Continuous protection of data that flows between two points in
a network, provided by encrypting data when it leaves its source, a network, provided by encrypting data when it leaves its source,
leaving it encrypted while it passes through any intermediate leaving it encrypted while it passes through any intermediate
computers (such as routers), and decrypting only when the data computers (such as routers), and decrypting only when the data
arrives at the intended destination. (Also see: link encryption, arrives at the intended destination. (See: link encryption,
wiretapping.) wiretapping.)
(C) When two points are separated by multiple communication links (C) When two points are separated by multiple communication links
that are connected by one or more intermediate relays, end-to-end that are connected by one or more intermediate relays, end-to-end
encryption enables the source and destination systems to protect encryption enables the source and destination systems to protect
their communications without depending on the intermediate systems their communications without depending on the intermediate systems
to provide the protection. to provide the protection.
end user $ end user
(I) In a PKI or other application of asymmetric cryptography, a (I) General usage: A system entity, usually a human individual,
synonym for "end entity". But the term "end entity" is preferred. that makes of system resources, primarily for application purposes
as opposed to system management purposes.
entity (I) PKI usage: A synonym for "end entity". But the term "end
entity" is preferred.
$ entity
See: system entity. See: system entity.
entrapment $ entrapment
(I) "The deliberate planting of apparent flaws in a system for the (I) "The deliberate planting of apparent flaws in a system for the
purpose of detecting attempted penetrations or confusing an purpose of detecting attempted penetrations or confusing an
intruder about which flaws to exploit." [FP039] intruder about which flaws to exploit." [FP039] (See: honey pot.)
ephemeral key $ ephemeral key
(I) A public key or a private key that is relatively short-lived. (I) A public key or a private key that is relatively short-lived.
error detection code $ error detection code
(I) A checksum designed to detect, but not correct, accidental (I) A checksum designed to detect, but not correct, accidental
(i.e., unintentional) changes in data. (i.e., unintentional) changes in data.
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) $ Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)
(N) A U.S. Government standard [FP185] that specifies use of a (N) A U.S. Government standard [FP185] that specifies use of a
symmetric encryption algorithm (SKIPJACK) and a Law Enforcement symmetric encryption algorithm (SKIPJACK) and a Law Enforcement
Access Field (LEAF) creation method to implement part of a key Access Field (LEAF) creation method to implement part of a key
escrow system that provides for decryption of encrypted escrow system that provides for decryption of encrypted
telecommunications when interception is lawfully authorized. telecommunications when interception is lawfully authorized.
(C) Both SKIPJACK and the LEAF are to be implemented in equipment (C) Both SKIPJACK and the LEAF are to be implemented in equipment
used to encrypt and decrypt unclassified, sensitive used to encrypt and decrypt unclassified, sensitive
telecommunications data. telecommunications data.
ESP $ ESP
See: Encapsulating Security Payload. See: Encapsulating Security Payload.
Estelle $ Estelle
(N) A language (ISO 9074-1989) for formal specification of (N) A language (ISO 9074-1989) for formal specification of
computer network protocols. computer network protocols.
evaluated system $ evaluated products list
(O) General usage: A list of information system equipment items
that have been evaluated against, and found to be compliant with,
at particular set of criteria:
(O) NSA usage: (http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/epl/) The
Evaluated Products List contains items that have been evaluated
against the TCSEC by the NCSC, or against the Common Criteria by
the NCSC or one of its partner agencies in another county. The
List forms Chapter 4 of NSA's "Information Systems Security
Products and Services Catalogue".
$ evaluated system
(I) Refers to a system that has been evaluated against security (I) Refers to a system that has been evaluated against security
criteria such as the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, criteria such as the TCSEC, or the Common Criteria for Information
or the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Technology Security Evaluation.
Evaluation.
expire $ expire
See: certificate expiration. See: certificate expiration.
exposure $ exposure
See: (threat action definition in) threat consequence. See: (secondary definition in) threat consequence.
Extensible Authentication Protocol
$ Extensible Authentication Protocol
(I) A framework that supports multiple, optional authentication (I) A framework that supports multiple, optional authentication
mechanisms for PPP, including cleartext passwords, challenge- mechanisms for PPP, including cleartext passwords, challenge-
response, and arbitrary dialog sequences. [R2284] response, and arbitrary dialog sequences. [R2284]
(C) This protocol is intended for use primarily by a host or (C) This protocol is intended for use primarily by a host or
router that connects to a PPP network server via switched circuits router that connects to a PPP network server via switched circuits
or dial-up lines. or dial-up lines.
extension $ extension
(I) A data item defined for optional inclusion in a v3 X.509 (I) A data item defined for optional inclusion in a v3 X.509
public-key certificate or a v2 X.509 CRL. public-key certificate or a v2 X.509 CRL.
(C) The formats defined in X.509 can be extended to provide (C) The formats defined in X.509 can be extended to provide
methods for associating additional attributes with subjects and methods for associating additional attributes with subjects and
public keys and for managing a certification hierarchy: public keys and for managing a certification hierarchy:
- "Certificate extension": X.509 defines standard extensions that - "Certificate extension": X.509 defines standard extensions that
may be included in v3 certificates to provide additional key may be included in v3 certificates to provide additional key
and security policy information, subject and issuer attributes, and security policy information, subject and issuer attributes,
and certification path constraints. and certification path constraints.
- "CRL extension": X.509 defines extensions that may be included - "CRL extension": X.509 defines extensions that may be included
in v2 CRLs to provide additional issuer key and name in v2 CRLs to provide additional issuer key and name
information, revocation reasons and constraints, and information, revocation reasons and constraints, and
information about distribution points and delta CRLs. information about distribution points and delta CRLs.
- "Private extension": Additional extensions, each named by an - "Private extension": Additional extensions, each named by an
OID, can be locally defined as needed by applications or OID, can be locally defined as needed by applications or
communities. (Also see: PKIX private extension, SET private communities. (See: PKIX private extension, SET private
extensions.) extensions.)
extranet $ extranet
(I) A computer network that an organization uses to carry (I) A computer network that an organization uses to carry
application data traffic between the organization and its business application data traffic between the organization and its business
partners. (Also see: Intranet.) partners. (See: Intranet.)
(C) An extranet can be implemented securely, either on the (C) An extranet can be implemented securely, either on the
Internet or using Internet technology, by constructing it as a Internet or using Internet technology, by constructing the
virtual private network. extranet as a VPN.
failure control $ failure control
(I) A methodology used to provide fail-safe or fail-soft (I) A methodology used to provide fail-safe or fail-soft
termination and recovery of functions and processes when failures termination and recovery of functions and processes when failures
are detected or occur in a system. [FP039] are detected or occur in a system. [FP039]
fail safe $ fail safe
(I) A mode of system termination that automatically leaves system (I) A mode of system termination that automatically leaves system
processes and components in a secure state when a failure occurs processes and components in a secure state when a failure occurs
or is detected in the system. or is detected in the system.
fail soft $ fail soft
(I) Selective termination of affected non-essential system (I) Selective termination of affected non-essential system
functions and processes when a failure occurs or is detected in functions and processes when a failure occurs or is detected in
the system. the system.
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) $ Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
(N) The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS (N) The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS
PUB) series issued by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and PUB) series issued by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology as technical guidelines for U.S. Government Technology as technical guidelines for U.S. Government
procurements of information processing system equipment and procurements of information processing system equipment and
services. [FIPS 39, FP046, FP081, FP140, FP180, FP186, FP185, services. [FP031, FP039, FP046, FP081, FP113, FP140, FP151, FP180,
FP188] FP185, FP186, FP188]
(C) Issued under the provisions of section 111(d) of the Federal (C) Issued under the provisions of section 111(d) of the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 as amended by the Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 as amended by the
Computer Security Act of 1987, Public Law 100-235. Computer Security Act of 1987, Public Law 100-235.
Federal Public-key Infrastructure (FPKI) $ Federal Public-key Infrastructure (FPKI)
(N) A PKI being planned to establish facilities, specifications, (N) A PKI being planned to establish facilities, specifications,
and policies needed by the U.S. Federal Government to use public- and policies needed by the U.S. Federal Government to use public-
key certificates for INFOSEC, COMSEC, and electronic commerce key certificates for INFOSEC, COMSEC, and electronic commerce
involving unclassified but sensitive applications and interactions involving unclassified but sensitive applications and interactions
between Federal agencies as well as with entities of other between Federal agencies as well as with entities of other
branches of the Federal Government, state, and local governments, branches of the Federal Government, state, and local governments,
business, and the public. [FPKI] business, and the public. [FPKI]
Federal Standard 1027 $ Federal Standard 1027
(N) An obsolete document defining emanation, anti-tamper, security (N) An obsolete document defining emanation, anti-tamper, security
fault analysis, and manual key management criteria for DES fault analysis, and manual key management criteria for DES
encryption devices, primary for OSI layer 2. Renamed "FIPS PUB encryption devices, primary for OSI layer 2. Renamed "FIPS PUB
140" when responsibility for protecting unclassified, sensitive 140" when responsibility for protecting unclassified, sensitive
information was transferred from NSA to NIST, and then replaced by information was transferred from NSA to NIST, and then replaced by
FIPS PUB 140-1. FIPS PUB 140-1.
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) $ File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
(I) A TCP-based, application-level, Internet Standard protocol for (I) A TCP-based, application-level, Internet Standard protocol for
moving data files from one computer to another. [R0959] moving data files from one computer to another. [R0959]
filtering router $ filtering router
(I) An internetwork router that selectively prevents the passage (I) An internetwork router that selectively prevents the passage
of data packets according to a security policy. of data packets according to a security policy.
(C) A filtering router may be used as a firewall or part of a (C) A filtering router may be used as a firewall or part of a
firewall. A router usually receives a packet from a network and firewall. A router usually receives a packet from a network and
decides where to forward it on a second network. A filtering decides where to forward it on a second network. A filtering
router does the same, but first decides whether the packet should router does the same, but first decides whether the packet should
be forwarded at all, according to some security policy. The policy be forwarded at all, according to some security policy. The policy
is implemented by rules (packet filters) loaded into the router. is implemented by rules (packet filters) loaded into the router.
The rules mostly involve values of data packet control fields The rules mostly involve values of data packet control fields
(especially IP source and destination addresses and TCP port (especially IP source and destination addresses and TCP port
numbers). numbers). [R2179]
financial institution $ financial institution
(N) "An establishment responsible for facilitating customer- (N) "An establishment responsible for facilitating customer-
initiated transactions or transmission of funds for the extension initiated transactions or transmission of funds for the extension
of credit or the custody, loan, exchange, or issuance of money." of credit or the custody, loan, exchange, or issuance of money."
[SET2] [SET2]
fingerprint $ fingerprint
(I) A pattern of curves formed by the ridges on a fingertip. (Also (I) A pattern of curves formed by the ridges on a fingertip. (See:
see: biometric authentication, thumbprint.) biometric authentication, thumbprint.)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "hash result"
as a synonym for "hash result" because it mixes concepts in a because it mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way.
potentially misleading way.
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term with the following PGP
in the following PGP sense, because it mixes concepts in a definition, because the term and definition mix concepts in a
potentially misleading way and duplicates the meaning of "hash potentially misleading way and duplicate the meaning of "hash
result": result":
(C) PGP usage: A hash result used to authenticate a public key (C) PGP usage: A hash result used to authenticate a public key
(key fingerprint) or other data. [PGP] (key fingerprint) or other data. [PGP]
FIPS $ FIPS
See: Federal Information Processing Standards. See: Federal Information Processing Standards.
FIPS PUB 140-1 $ FIPS PUB 140-1
(N) A U.S. Government standard [FP140] for security requirements (N) A U.S. Government standard [FP140] for security requirements
to be met by a cryptographic module used to protect unclassified to be met by a cryptographic module used to protect unclassified
information in computer and communication systems. (To be information in computer and communication systems. (To be
superseded by the Common Criteria. Also see: Federal Information superseded by the Common Criteria. Also see: Federal Information
Processing Standards.) Processing Standards.)
(C) The standard specifies four increasing levels (from "Level 1" (C) The standard specifies four increasing levels (from "Level 1"
to "Level 4") of requirements to cover a wide range of potential to "Level 4") of requirements to cover a wide range of potential
applications and environments. The requirements address basic applications and environments. The requirements address basic
design and documentation, module interfaces, authorized roles and design and documentation, module interfaces, authorized roles and
services, physical security, software security, operating system services, physical security, software security, operating system
security, key management, cryptographic algorithms, security, key management, cryptographic algorithms,
electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic compatibility electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic compatibility
(EMI/EMC), and self-testing. NIST and the Canadian Communication (EMI/EMC), and self-testing. NIST and the Canadian Communication
Security Establishment jointly certify modules. Security Establishment jointly certify modules.
firewall $ firewall
(I) An internetwork gateway that restricts data communication (I) An internetwork gateway that restricts data communication
traffic to and from a computer network to protect that network's traffic to and from a computer network to protect that network's
system resources against threats from other networks that are system resources against threats from other networks that are
outside the firewall. (Also see: guard.) outside the firewall. (See: guard.)
(C) A firewall typically separates a smaller, secure network (such (C) A firewall typically separates a smaller, secure network (such
as a corporate LAN) from a larger network (such as the Internet). as a corporate LAN) from a larger network (such as the Internet).
Installed at the point where the networks connect, the firewall Installed at the point where the networks connect, the firewall
applies security policy rules to control traffic that flows in and applies security policy rules to control traffic that flows in and
out of the protected network. out of the protected network.
(C) A firewall is not always a single computer. For example, a (C) A firewall is not always a single computer. For example, a
firewall may consist of a pair of filtering routers and one or firewall may consist of a pair of filtering routers and one or
more proxy servers running on one or more bastion hosts, all more proxy servers running on one or more bastion hosts, all
connected to a small, dedicated LAN between the two routers. The connected to a small, dedicated LAN between the two routers. The
external router blocks attacks that use IP to break security (IP external router blocks attacks that use IP to break security (IP
address spoofing, source routing, packet fragments), while proxy address spoofing, source routing, packet fragments), while proxy
servers block attacks that would exploit a vulnerability in a servers block attacks that would exploit a vulnerability in a
higher layer protocol or service. The internal router blocks higher layer protocol or service. The internal router blocks
traffic from leaving the protected network except through the traffic from leaving the protected network except through the
proxy servers. The difficult part is defining criteria by which proxy servers. The difficult part is defining criteria by which
packets are denied passage through the firewall, because a packets are denied passage through the firewall, because a
firewall not only needs to keep intruders out, but usually also firewall not only needs to keep intruders out, but usually also
needs to let authorized users in and out. needs to let authorized users in and out.
firmware $ firmware
(I) Computer programs and data stored in hardware (typically in (I) Computer programs and data stored in hardware (typically in
read-only memory or programmable read-only memory) such that the read-only memory or programmable read-only memory) such that the
programs and data cannot be dynamically written or modified during programs and data cannot be dynamically written or modified during
execution of the programs. (Compare with: hardware, software.) execution of the programs. (Compare with: hardware, software.)
flaw hypothesis methodology $ FIRST
See: Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams.
$ flaw hypothesis methodology
(I) An evaluation or attack technique in which specifications and (I) An evaluation or attack technique in which specifications and
documentation for a system are analyzed to hypothesize flaws in documentation for a system are analyzed to hypothesize flaws in
the system. The list of hypothetical flaws is prioritized on the the system. The list of hypothetical flaws is prioritized on the
basis of the estimated probability that a flaw exists and, basis of the estimated probability that a flaw exists and,
assuming it does, on the ease of exploiting it and the extent of assuming it does, on the ease of exploiting it and the extent of
control or compromise it would provide. The prioritized list is control or compromise it would provide. The prioritized list is
used to direct a penetration test or attack against the system. used to direct a penetration test or attack against the system.
[NCS04] [NCS04]
flooding $ flooding
(I) An attack that attempts to cause a failure in (especially, in (I) An attack that attempts to cause a failure in (especially, in
the security of) a computer system or other data processing entity the security of) a computer system or other data processing entity
by providing more input than the entity can process properly. by providing more input than the entity can process properly.
(See: denial of service.)
formulary $ flow analysis
(I) An analysis performed on a nonprocedural formal system
specification that locates potential flows of information between
system variables. By assigning security levels to the variables,
the analysis can find some types of covert channels.
$ flow control
(I) A procedure or technique to ensure that information transfers
within a system are not made from a higher security level to a
lower security level. (See: covert channel, simple security
property, confinement property.)
$ formal specification
(I) A specification of hardware or software functionality in a
computer-readable language; usually a precise mathematical
description of the behavior of the system with the providing a
correctness proof.
$ formulary
(I) A technique for enabling a decision to grant or deny access to (I) A technique for enabling a decision to grant or deny access to
be made dynamically at the time the access is attempted, rather be made dynamically at the time the access is attempted, rather
than earlier when an access control list or ticket is created. than earlier when an access control list or ticket is created.
FORTEZZA(trademark) $ FORTEZZA(trademark)
(N) A registered trademark of the U.S. National Security Agency (N) A registered trademark of the U.S. National Security Agency
(NSA), used for a family of interoperable security products that (NSA), used for a family of interoperable security products that
implement a NIST/NSA-approved suite of cryptographic algorithms implement a NIST/NSA-approved suite of cryptographic algorithms
for digital signature, hash, encryption, and key exchange. The for digital signature, hash, encryption, and key exchange. The
products include a PC card that contains a CAPSTONE chip, serial products include a PC card that contains a CAPSTONE chip, serial
port modems, server boards, smart cards, and software port modems, server boards, smart cards, and software
implementations. implementations.
forward secrecy $ Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)
(N) An international consortium of CSIRTs that work together to
handle computer security incidents and promote preventive
activities. (See: CSIRT, security incident.)
(C) FIRST was founded in 1990 and, as of September 1999, had
nearly 70 members spanning the globe. It mission includes:
- Provide members with technical information, tools, methods,
assistance, and guidance.
- Coordinate proactive liaison activities and analytical support.
- Encourage development of quality products and services.
- Improve national and international information security for
government, private industry, academia, and the individual.
- Enhance the image and status of the CSIRT community.
$ forward secrecy
See: public-key forward secrecy. See: public-key forward secrecy.
FPKI $ FPKI
See: Federal Public-Key Infrastructure. See: Federal Public-Key Infrastructure.
FTP $ FTP
See: File Transfer Protocol. See: File Transfer Protocol.
gateway $ gateway
(I) A relay mechanism that attaches to two (or more) computer (I) A relay mechanism that attaches to two (or more) computer
networks that have similar functions but dissimilar networks that have similar functions but dissimilar
implementations and that enables host computers on one network to implementations and that enables host computers on one network to
communicate with hosts on the other; an intermediate system that communicate with hosts on the other; an intermediate system that
is the interface between two computer networks. (Also see: bridge, is the interface between two computer networks. (See: bridge,
firewall, guard, internetwork, proxy server, router, and firewall, guard, internetwork, proxy server, router, and
subnetwork.) subnetwork.)
(C) Gateways are conceivable at any OSI layer, but actual gateways (C) Gateways are conceivable at any OSI layer, but actual gateways
operate at OSI layer 3 (see: bridge, router) or OSI layer 7 (see: operate at OSI layer 3 (see: bridge, router) or OSI layer 7 (see:
proxy server). When the two networks differ in the protocol by proxy server). When the two networks differ in the protocol by
which they offer service to hosts, the gateway may translate one which they offer service to hosts, the gateway may translate one
protocol into another or otherwise facilitate interoperation of protocol into another or otherwise facilitate interoperation of
hosts (see: Internet Protocol). hosts (see: Internet Protocol).
GCA $ GCA
See: geopolitical certificate authority. See: geopolitical certificate authority.
GeneralizedTime $ GeneralizedTime
(N) The ASN.1 data type "GeneralizedTime" (specified in ISO 8601) (N) The ASN.1 data type "GeneralizedTime" (specified in ISO 8601)
contains a calendar date (YYYYMMDD) and a time of day, which is contains a calendar date (YYYYMMDD) and a time of day, which is
either (a) the local time, (b) the Coordinated Universal Time, or either (a) the local time, (b) the Coordinated Universal Time, or
(c) both the local time and an offset allowing Coordinated (c) both the local time and an offset allowing Coordinated
Universal Time to be calculated. (Also see: Coordinated Universal Universal Time to be calculated. (See: Coordinated Universal Time,
Time, UTCTime.) UTCTime.)
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) $ Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
(I) An Internet Standard protocol [R1508] that specifies calling (I) An Internet Standard protocol [R2078] that specifies calling
conventions by which an application (typically another conventions by which an application (typically another
communication protocol) can obtain authentication, integrity, and communication protocol) can obtain authentication, integrity, and
confidentiality security services independently of the underlying confidentiality security services independently of the underlying
security mechanisms and technologies, thus allowing the security mechanisms and technologies, thus allowing the
application source code to be ported to different environments. application source code to be ported to different environments.
(C) "A GSS-API caller accepts tokens provided to it by its local (C) "A GSS-API caller accepts tokens provided to it by its local
GSS-API implementation and transfers the tokens to a peer on a GSS-API implementation and transfers the tokens to a peer on a
remote system; that peer passes the received tokens to its local remote system; that peer passes the received tokens to its local
GSS-API implementation for processing. The security services GSS-API implementation for processing. The security services
available through GSS-API in this fashion are implementable (and available through GSS-API in this fashion are implementable (and
have been implemented) over a range of underlying mechanisms based have been implemented) over a range of underlying mechanisms based
on [symmetric] and [asymmetric cryptography]." [R1508] on [symmetric] and [asymmetric cryptography]." [R2078]
geopolitical certificate authority (GCA) $ geopolitical certificate authority (GCA)
(O) SET usage: In a SET certification hierarchy, an optional level (O) SET usage: In a SET certification hierarchy, an optional level
that is certified by a brand certification authority and that may that is certified by a brand certification authority and that may
certify cardholder CAs, merchant CAs, and payment gateway CAs. certify cardholder CAs, merchant CAs, and payment gateway CAs.
Using GCAs enables a brand to distribute responsibility for Using GCAs enables a brand to distribute responsibility for
managing certificates to geographic or political regions, so that managing certificates to geographic or political regions, so that
brand policies can vary between regions as needed. brand policies can vary between regions as needed.
Green Book $ Green Book
(C) Except as an explanatory appositive, Internet Standards (D) Except as an explanatory appositive, ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this
Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for term as a synonym for "Defense Password Management Guideline"
"Defense Password Management Guideline" [CSC2]. Instead, use the [CSC2]. Instead, use the full proper name of the document or, in
full proper name of the document or, in subsequent references, a subsequent references, a conventional abbreviation. (See: Rainbow
conventional abbreviation. (See: Rainbow Series.) Series.)
(C) Usage note: To improve international comprehensibility of (D) Usage note: To improve international comprehensibility of
Internet Standards and the Internet Standards Process [R2026], Internet Standards and the Internet Standards Process, ISPDs
Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use "cute" SHOULD NOT use "cute" synonyms for document titles. No matter how
synonyms for document titles. No matter how popular and clearly popular and clearly understood a nickname may be in one community,
understood a nickname may be in one community, it is likely to it is likely to cause confusion in others. For example, in
cause confusion in others. For example, in addition to the meaning addition to the meaning given above, there are several other
given above, there are several other information system standards information system standards called "the Green Book". The
called "the Green Book. The following are just a few examples: following are just a few examples:
- Any 1992 standard issued by the ITU-T (then CCITT). - Any 1992 standard issued by the ITU-T (then CCITT).
- "PostScript Language Program Design", Adobe Systems, Addison- - "PostScript Language Program Design", Adobe Systems, Addison-
Wesley, 1988. Wesley, 1988.
- IEEE 1003.1 POSIX Operating Systems Interface. - IEEE 1003.1 POSIX Operating Systems Interface.
- "Smalltalk-80: Bits of History, Words of Advice", Glenn - "Smalltalk-80: Bits of History, Words of Advice", Glenn
Krasner, Addison-Wesley, 1983. Krasner, Addison-Wesley, 1983.
- "X/Open Compatibility Guide. - "X/Open Compatibility Guide".
- A particular CD-ROM format developed by Phillips. - A particular CD-ROM format developed by Phillips.
GSS-API $ GRIP
(I) A contraction of "Guidelines and Recommendations for Security
Incident Processing", the name of the IETF working group that
seeks to facilitate consistent handling of security incidents in
the Internet community. (See: security incident.)
(C) Guidelines to be produced by the WG will address technology
vendors, network service providers, and response teams in their
roles assisting organizations in resolving security incidents.
These relationships are functional and can exist within and across
organizational boundaries.
$ GSS-API
See: Generic Security Service Application Program Interface. See: Generic Security Service Application Program Interface.
guard $ guard
(I) A gateway that is interposed between two networks (or (I) A gateway that is interposed between two networks (or
computers, or other information systems) operating at different computers, or other information systems) operating at different
security levels (one is usually higher than the other) and is security levels (one is usually higher than the other) and is
trusted to mediate all information transfers between the two trusted to mediate all information transfers between the two
levels, to either ensure that no sensitive information from the levels, to either ensure that no sensitive information from the
first (higher) level can leak to the second (lower) level, or to first (higher) level can leak to the second (lower) level, or to
protect against destruction of data on the first (higher) level. protect against destruction of data on the first (higher) level.
(Also see: firewall.) (See: firewall.)
GULS $ GULS
(I) Generic Upper Layer Security service element (ISO 11586), a (I) Generic Upper Layer Security service element (ISO 11586), a
five-part standard for the exchange of security information and five-part standard for the exchange of security information and
security-transformation functions that support the integrity and security-transformation functions that support the integrity and
confidentiality of application data. confidentiality of application data.
hacker $ guest login
See: anonymous login.
$ hacker
(I) Someone with a strong interest in computers, who enjoys (I) Someone with a strong interest in computers, who enjoys
learning about them and experimenting with them. (Also see: learning about them and experimenting with them. (See: cracker.)
cracker.)
(C) The recommended definition is the original meaning of the term (C) The recommended definition is the original meaning of the term
(circa 1960), which then had a neutral or positive connotation. (circa 1960), which then had a neutral or positive connotation.
Today, the term is frequently misused, especially by journalists, Today, the term is frequently misused, especially by journalists,
to have the pejorative meaning of cracker. to have the pejorative meaning of cracker.
handle $ handle
(I) Perform processing operations on data, such as receive and (I) (1.) Verb: Perform processing operations on data, such as
transmit, collect and disseminate, create and delete, store and receive and transmit, collect and disseminate, create and delete,
retrieve, read and write, and compare. store and retrieve, read and write, and compare. (2.) A on-line
pseudonym, such as those used by crackers; derived from citizens
band radio usage.
hardware $ hardware
(I) The physical, material components of a computer system. (I) The physical, material components of a computer system.
(Compare with: firmware, software.) (Compare with: firmware, software.)
hardware token $ hardware token
See: token. See: token.
(O) SET usage: "A portable device (for example, smart card, and (O) SET usage: "A portable device (for example, smart card, and
PCMCIA cards) specifically designed to store cryptographic PCMCIA cards) specifically designed to store cryptographic
information and possibly perform cryptographic functions in a information and possibly perform cryptographic functions in a
secure manner." [SET2] secure manner." [SET2]
hash function $ hash code
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "hash result"
because it unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of the other term
and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. A hash result
is not a "code" in the sense defined in this glossary. (See: hash
value, message digest.)
$ hash function
(I) An algorithm that computes a value based on a data set (such (I) An algorithm that computes a value based on a data set (such
as a message or file; usually variable-length; possibly very as a message or file; usually variable-length; possibly very
large), thereby mapping the data set to a smaller data object large), thereby mapping the data set to a smaller data object
(called the hash result) which is usually a fixed-size value. (called the hash result) which is usually a fixed-size value.
(Also see: checksum, keyed hash.) (See: checksum, keyed hash.)
(O) "A (mathematical) function which maps values from a large (O) "A (mathematical) function which maps values from a large
(possibly very large) domain into a smaller range. A 'good' hash (possibly very large) domain into a smaller range. A 'good' hash
function is such that the results of applying the function to a function is such that the results of applying the function to a
(large) set of values in the domain will be evenly distributed (large) set of values in the domain will be evenly distributed
(and apparently at random) over the range." [X509] (and apparently at random) over the range." [X509]
(C) The kind of hash function needed for security applications is (C) The kind of hash function needed for security applications is
a one-way function called a cryptographic hash function, an a one-way function called a cryptographic hash function, an
algorithm for which it is computationally infeasible (because no algorithm for which it is computationally infeasible (because no
attack is significantly more efficient than brute force) to find attack is significantly more efficient than brute force) to find
either (a) a data set that maps to a pre-specified hash result either (a) a data set that maps to a pre-specified hash result
(the "one-way" property) or (b) two data sets that map to the same (the "one-way" property) or (b) two data sets that map to the same
hash result (the "collision-free" property). (Also see: MD2, MD4, hash result (the "collision-free" property). (See: MD2, MD4, MD5,
MD5, SHA-1.) SHA-1.)
(C) A cryptographic hash is "good" in the sense stated above by (C) A cryptographic hash is "good" in the sense stated above by
X.509. Any change to an input data set will, with high X.509. Any change to an input data set will, with high
probability, result in a different hash result, so that the result probability, result in a different hash result, so that the result
of a cryptographic hash makes a good checksum for a data set. of a cryptographic hash makes a good checksum for a data set.
hash result $ hash result
(I) The output of a hash function. (I) The output of a hash function.
(O) "The output produced by a hash function upon processing a (O) "The output produced by a hash function upon processing a
message" (where "message" is broadly defined as "a digital message" (where "message" is broadly defined as "a digital
representation of data"). [ABA] (The recommended definition is representation of data"). [ABA] (The recommended definition is
compatible with this ABA definition, but we avoid the unusual compatible with this ABA definition, but we avoid the unusual
definition of "message".) definition of "message".)
hash value $ hash value
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "hash result"
as a synonym for "hash result" (the output of a hash function) (the output of a hash function) because it might be confused with
because it might be confused with "hashed" value (the input to a "hashed" value (the input to a hash function). (See: hash code,
hash function). message digest.)
hierarchical PKI $ hierarchical PKI
(I) A PKI architecture based on a certification hierarchy. (Also (I) A PKI architecture based on a certification hierarchy. (See:
see: mesh PKI, trust-file PKI.) mesh PKI, trust-file PKI.)
hierarchy management $ hierarchy management
(I) The process of generating configuration data and issuing (I) The process of generating configuration data and issuing
public-key certificates to build and operate a certification public-key certificates to build and operate a certification
hierarchy. hierarchy.
hierarchy of trust $ hierarchy of trust
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "certification
as a synonym for "certification hierarchy" because it mixes hierarchy" because this term mixes concepts in a potentially
concepts in a potentially misleading way and duplicates the misleading way and duplicates the meaning of another, standardized
meaning of another, standardized term. (Also see: trust, web of term. (See: trust, web of trust.)
trust.)
hijack attack $ hijack attack
(I) A form of active wiretapping in which the attacker seizes (I) A form of active wiretapping in which the attacker seizes
control of a previously established communication association. control of a previously established communication association.
(Also see: man-in-the-middle attack, piggyback attack.) (See: man-in-the-middle attack, pagejacking, piggyback attack.)
HMAC $ HMAC
(I) A keyed hash [R2104] that can be based on any interactive (I) A keyed hash [R2104] that can be based on any interactive
cryptographic hash (e.g., MD5 or SHA-1), so that the cryptographic cryptographic hash (e.g., MD5 or SHA-1), so that the cryptographic
strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the selected strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the selected
cryptographic hash. cryptographic hash. (See: [R2202, R2403, R2404].)
(C) Assume that H is a generic cryptographic hash in which a basic (C) Assume that H is a generic cryptographic hash in which a basic
compression function is interated on data blocks of length B compression function is interated on data blocks of length B
bytes. L is the length of the of hash result of H. K is a secret bytes. L is the length of the of hash result of H. K is a secret
key of length L <= K <= B. The values IPAD and OPAD are fixed key of length L <= K <= B. The values IPAD and OPAD are fixed
strings used as inner and outer padding and defined as follows: strings used as inner and outer padding and defined as follows:
IPAD = the byte 0x36 repeated B times, OPAD = the byte 0x5C IPAD = the byte 0x36 repeated B times, OPAD = the byte 0x5C
repeated B times. HMAC is computed by H(K XOR OPAD, H(K XOR IPAD, repeated B times. HMAC is computed by H(K XOR OPAD, H(K XOR IPAD,
inputdata)). inputdata)).
skipping to change at page 69, line 28 skipping to change at page 75, line 20
and for which software is freely and widely available. and for which software is freely and widely available.
- To preserve the original performance of the selected hash - To preserve the original performance of the selected hash
without significant degradation. without significant degradation.
- To use and handle keys in a simple way. - To use and handle keys in a simple way.
- To have a well-understood cryptographic analysis of the - To have a well-understood cryptographic analysis of the
strength of the mechanism based on reasonable assumptions about strength of the mechanism based on reasonable assumptions about
the underlying hash function. the underlying hash function.
- To enable easy replacement of the hash function in case a - To enable easy replacement of the hash function in case a
faster or stronger hash is found or required. faster or stronger hash is found or required.
honey pot $ honey pot
(I) A system (e.g., a web server) or a system resource (e.g., a (I) A system (e.g., a web server) or a system resource (e.g., a
file on a server), that is designed to be attractive to potential file on a server), that is designed to be attractive to potential
crackers and intruders. (Also see: entrapment.) crackers and intruders, like honey is attractive to bears. (See:
entrapment.)
host (D) It is likely that other cultures have different metaphors for
this concept. To ensure international understanding, this term
SHOULD NOT be used unless it is locally accompanied by this
definition. (See: (usage note under) Green Book.)
$ host
(I) A computer that is attached to a communication subnetwork or (I) A computer that is attached to a communication subnetwork or
internetwork and can use services provided by the network to internetwork and can use services provided by the network to
exchange data with other attached systems. (Compare with: end exchange data with other attached systems. (Compare with: end
system.) In the context of the Internet protocol suite, a term for system.) In the context of the Internet protocol suite, a term for
a networked computer that does not forward Internet Protocol a networked computer that does not forward Internet Protocol
packets that are not addressed to the computer itself. (Compare packets that are not addressed to the computer itself. (Compare
with: router.) with: router.)
(C) Derivation: As viewed by its users, a host "entertains" (C) Derivation: As viewed by its users, a host "entertains"
guests, providing application layer services or access to other guests, providing application layer services or access to other
computers attached to the network. Although some traditional computers attached to the network. Although some traditional
peripheral service devices, such as printers, can now be peripheral service devices, such as printers, can now be
independently connected to networks, they are not usually called independently connected to networks, they are not usually called
hosts. hosts.
HTML $ HTML
See: Hypertext Markup Language. See: Hypertext Markup Language.
HTTP $ HTTP
See: Hypertext Transfer Protocol. See: Hypertext Transfer Protocol.
https $ https
(I) When used in the first part of a URL (the part that precedes (I) When used in the first part of a URL (the part that precedes
the colon and that specifies an access scheme or protocol), this the colon and that specifies an access scheme or protocol), this
term specifies the use of HTTP enhanced by a security mechanism, term specifies the use of HTTP enhanced by a security mechanism,
normally SSL. (Compare with: S-HTTP.) normally SSL. (Compare with: S-HTTP.)
hybrid encryption $ hybrid encryption
(I) An application of cryptography that combines two or more (I) An application of cryptography that combines two or more
encryption algorithms, particularly a combination of symmetric and encryption algorithms, particularly a combination of symmetric and
asymmetric encryption (e.g., see: digital envelope). asymmetric encryption (e.g., see: digital envelope).
(C) Asymmetric algorithms require more computation than (C) Asymmetric algorithms require more computation than
equivalently strong symmetric ones. Thus, asymmetric encryption is equivalently strong symmetric ones. Thus, asymmetric encryption is
not normally used for data confidentiality except in distributing not normally used for data confidentiality except in distributing
symmetric keys in applications where the key data is usually short symmetric keys in applications where the key data is usually short
(in terms of bits) compared to the data it protects. For example, (in terms of bits) compared to the data it protects. (For example,
see: MSP, PEM, PGP. see: MSP, PEM, PGP.)
hyperlink $ hyperlink
(I) In hypertext or hypermedia, an information object (such as a (I) In hypertext or hypermedia, an information object (such as a
word, a phrase, or an image; usually highlighted by color or word, a phrase, or an image; usually highlighted by color or
underscoring) that points (indicates how to connect) to related underscoring) that points (indicates how to connect) to related
information that is located elsewhere and can be retrieved by information that is located elsewhere and can be retrieved by
activating the link (such as by selecting the object with a mouse activating the link (such as by selecting the object with a mouse
pointer and clicking). pointer and clicking).
hypermedia $ hypermedia
(I) A generalization of hypertext; any media that contain (I) A generalization of hypertext; any media that contain
hyperlinks, which point to additional material in the same or hyperlinks, which point to additional material in the same or
another data object. another data object.
hypertext $ hypertext
(I) A computer document, or part of a document, that contains (I) A computer document, or part of a document, that contains
hyperlinks to other documents; i.e., text that contains active hyperlinks to other documents; i.e., text that contains active
pointers to other text. Usually written in Hypertext Markup pointers to other text. Usually written in Hypertext Markup
Language and accessed using a web browser. (Also see: hypermedia.) Language and accessed using a web browser. (See: hypermedia.)
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) $ Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)
(I) A platform-independent system of syntax and semantics for (I) A platform-independent system of syntax and semantics for
adding characters to data files (particularly text files) to adding characters to data files (particularly text files) to
represent the data's structure and to point to related data, thus represent the data's structure and to point to related data, thus
creating hypertext for use in the World Wide Web and other creating hypertext for use in the World Wide Web and other
applications. [R1866] applications. [R1866]
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) $ Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
(I) An Internet application-level, client-server protocol used to (I) An application-level, client-server, Internet protocol used to
carry data requests and responses in the World Wide Web [R2068]. carry data requests and responses in the World Wide Web [R2068].
(Also see: hypertext.) (See: hypertext.)
IAB $ IAB
See: Internet Architecture Board. See: Internet Architecture Board.
ICMP flood $ IANA
(I) A denial of service attack that sends a host more Internet See: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.
Control Message Protocol echo request ("ping") packets than the
protocol implementation can handle. (Also see: flooding.)
ICRL $ ICMP
See: Internet Control Message Protocol.
$ ICMP flood
(I) A denial of service attack that sends a host more ICMP echo
request ("ping") packets than the protocol implementation can
handle. (See: flooding, smurf.)
$ ICRL
See: indirect certificate revocation list. See: indirect certificate revocation list.
IDEA $ IDEA
See: International Data Encryption Algorithm. See: International Data Encryption Algorithm.
identification $ identification
(I) An act or process that presents an identifier to a system so (I) An act or process that presents an identifier to a system so
that the system can recognize a system entity and distinguish it that the system can recognize a system entity and distinguish it
from other entities. (Also see: authentication.) from other entities. (See: authentication.)
identity-based security policy $ Identification Protocol
(I) An client-server Internet protocol [R1413] for learning the
identity of a user of a particular TCP connection.
(C) Given a TCP port number pair, the server returns a character
string that identifies the owner of that connection on the
server's system. The protocol is not intended for authorization or
access control. At best, it provides additional auditing
information with respect to TCP.
$ identity-based security policy
(I) "A security policy based on the identities and/or attributes (I) "A security policy based on the identities and/or attributes
of users, a group of users, or entities acting on behalf of the of users, a group of users, or entities acting on behalf of the
users and the resources/objects being accessed." [I7498 Part 2] users and the resources/objects being accessed." [I7498 Part 2]
(Also see: rule-based security policy.) (See: rule-based security policy.)
IEEE $ IEEE
See: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. See: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IEEE 802.10 $ IEEE 802.10
(N) An IEEE committee developing security standards for local area (N) An IEEE committee developing security standards for local area
networks; see: SILS. networks; see: SILS.
IEEE P1363 $ IEEE P1363
(N) An IEEE working group, Standard for Public-Key Cryptography, (N) An IEEE working group, Standard for Public-Key Cryptography,
developing a comprehensive reference standard for asymmetric developing a comprehensive reference standard for asymmetric
cryptography; covering discrete logarithm (e.g., DSA), elliptic cryptography; covering discrete logarithm (e.g., DSA), elliptic
curve, and integer factorization (e.g., RSA); and covering key curve, and integer factorization (e.g., RSA); and covering key
agreement, digital signature, and encryption. agreement, digital signature, and encryption.
IESG $ IESG
See: Internet Engineering Steering Group. See: Internet Engineering Steering Group.
IETF $ IETF
See: Internet Engineering Task Force. See: Internet Engineering Task Force.
IKE $ IKE
See: IPsec Key Exchange. See: IPsec Key Exchange.
in the clear $ IMAP4
(I) Not encrypted. (Also see: cleartext.) See: Internet Message Access Protocol, version 4.
indirect certificate revocation list (ICRL) $ IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE
(I) A IMAP4 "command" (better described as a transaction type, or
a protocol-within-a-protocol) by which an IMAP4 client optionally
proposes a mechanism to an IMAP4 server to authenticate the client
to the server and provide other security services. (See: POP3.)
(C) If the server accepts the proposal, the command is followed by
performing a challenge-response authentication protocol and,
optionally, negotiating a protection mechanism for subsequent POP3
interactions. The security mechanisms used by IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE--
including Kerberos, GSSAPI, and S/Key--are described in [R1731].
$ in the clear
(I) Not encrypted. (See: cleartext.)
$ indirect certificate revocation list (ICRL)
(I) In X.509, a CRL that may contain certificate revocation (I) In X.509, a CRL that may contain certificate revocation
notifications for certificates issued by CAs other than the issuer notifications for certificates issued by CAs other than the issuer
of the list. of the list.
indistinguishability $ indistinguishability
(I) An attribute of an encryption algorithm that is a (I) An attribute of an encryption algorithm that is a
formalization of the notion that the encryption of some string is formalization of the notion that the encryption of some string is
indistinguishable from the encryption of an equal-length string of indistinguishable from the encryption of an equal-length string of
nonsense. nonsense.
(C) Under certain conditions, this notion is equivalent to (C) Under certain conditions, this notion is equivalent to
semantic security. semantic security.
information $ information
(I) Facts and ideas, which can be represented (encoded) as various (I) Facts and ideas, which can be represented (encoded) as various
forms of data. forms of data.
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) $ Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC)
(N) Standard developed for use in the European Union; accommodates (N) Standard developed for use in the European Union; accommodates
a wider range of security assurance and functionality combinations a wider range of security assurance and functionality combinations
than the TCSEC. To be superseded by the Common Criteria. than the TCSEC. Superseded by the Common Criteria. [ITSEC]
INFOSEC $ INFOSEC
(I) Abbreviation for "information security", referring to security (I) Abbreviation for "information security", referring to security
measures that implement and assure security services in computer measures that implement and assure security services in computer
systems (i.e., COMPUSEC) and communication systems (i.e., COMSEC). systems (i.e., COMPUSEC) and communication systems (i.e., COMSEC).
initialization value (IV) $ initialization value (IV)
(I) An input parameter that sets the starting state of a (I) An input parameter that sets the starting state of a
cryptographic algorithm or mode. (Sometimes called "initialization cryptographic algorithm or mode. (Sometimes called "initialization
vector" or "message indicator".) For example, cipher block vector" or "message indicator".)
chaining mode requires an IV.
(C) An IV can be used to introduce cryptographic variance in (C) An IV can be used to introduce cryptographic variance in
addition to that provided by a key (see: salt), and to synchronize addition to that provided by a key (see: salt), and to synchronize
one cryptographic process with another. one cryptographic process with another. For an example of the
latter, cipher block chaining mode requires an IV [R2405].
initialization vector $ initialization vector
(I) A synonym "for initialization value". (D) A synonym for "initialization value". In the interest of
consistency, ISPDs SHOULD use initialization value" instead of
"initialization vector".
insider attack $ insider attack
See: (secondary definition in) attack. See: (secondary definition in) attack.
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) $ Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
(N) The IEEE is a not-for-profit association of more than 330,000 (N) The IEEE is a not-for-profit association of more than 330,000
individual members in 150 countries. The IEEE produces 30 percent individual members in 150 countries. The IEEE produces 30 percent
of the world's published literature in electrical engineering, of the world's published literature in electrical engineering,
computers, and control technology; holds annually more than 300 computers, and control technology; holds annually more than 300
major conferences; and has more than 800 active standards with 700 major conferences; and has more than 800 active standards with 700
under development. (Also see: Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN under development. (See: Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN
Security.) Security.)
integrity $ integrity
See: data integrity, correctness integrity, source integrity, See: data integrity, correctness integrity, source integrity,
system integrity. system integrity.
integrity check $ integrity check
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "cryptographic
as a synonym for "cryptographic hash" or "protected checksum", hash" or "protected checksum", because this term unnecessarily
because it unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of other, well- duplicates the meaning of other, well-established terms.
established terms.
intelligent threat $ intelligent threat
(I) A circumstance in which an adversary has the technical and (I) A circumstance in which an adversary has the technical and
operational capability to detect and exploit a vulnerability and operational capability to detect and exploit a vulnerability and
also has the demonstrated, presumed, or inferred intent to do so. also has the demonstrated, presumed, or inferred intent to do so.
(Also see: threat.) (See: threat.)
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) $ International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)
(N) A patented, symmetric (see: symmetric cryptography) block (N) A patented, symmetric (see: symmetric cryptography) block
cipher that uses a 128-bit key and operates on 64-bit blocks. cipher that uses a 128-bit key and operates on 64-bit blocks.
[Schn] [Schn]
International Standard $ International Standard
See: (secondary definition in) ISO. See: (secondary definition in) ISO.
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) $ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
(N) Rules issued by the U.S. State Department, by authority of the (N) Rules issued by the U.S. State Department, by authority of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778), to control export and Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778), to control export and
import of defense articles and defense services, including import of defense articles and defense services, including
information security systems, such as cryptographic systems, and information security systems, such as cryptographic systems, and
TEMPEST suppression technology. (Also see: Wassenaar Arrangement.) TEMPEST suppression technology. (See: Wassenaar Arrangement.)
internet vs. Internet
1. (I) Not capitalized: The term "internet" is a popular short
synonym for "internetwork".
2. (I) Capitalized: "The Internet" is the single, interconnected,
worldwide system of commercial, government, educational, and other
computer networks that share the protocol suite and the name and
address spaces that are specified by the IAB [R2026].
(C) The suite is called the "Internet Protocol Suite" (IPS), but
also is popularly know as "TCP/IP", because TCP and IP are two of
its fundamental protocols. The IPS makes it possible for users of
any one of the networks in the Internet to communicate with, or
use the services located on, any of the other networks.
(C) The IPS does not have an Internet Standard that defines a $ internet
layered reference model like the OSIRM. However, Internet $ Internet
community documents refer (inconsistently) to these seven layers: See: internet vs. Internet.
application, socket, transport, internetwork, network, data link,
and physical. In this Glossary, Internet layers are referred to by
name to avoid confusing them with OSIRM layers, which are referred
to by number.
Internet Architecture Board (IAB) $ Internet Architecture Board (IAB)
(I) A technical advisory group of the ISOC, chartered by the ISOC (I) A technical advisory group of the ISOC, chartered by the ISOC
Trustees to provide oversight of Internet architecture and Trustees to provide oversight of Internet architecture and
protocols and, in the context of Internet Standards, a body to protocols and, in the context of Internet Standards, a body to
which decisions of the IESG may be appealed. Responsible for which decisions of the IESG may be appealed. Responsible for
approving appointments to the IESG from among nominees submitted approving appointments to the IESG from among nominees submitted
by the IETF nominating committee. [R2026] by the IETF nominating committee. [R2026]
Internet Draft $ Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
(I) Since the early days of the Internet, the IANA has been
chartered by the ISOC and the Federal Network Council to be the
central coordination, allocation, and registration body for
parameters for Internet protocols. Now, a new not-for-profit
organization is being proposed, with an international board of
directors to oversee the operations of the necessary central
coordinating functions of the Internet.
(C) The Internet protocol suite, as defined by the IETF and the
IESG, contains numerous parameters, such as internet addresses,
domain names, autonomous system numbers, protocol numbers, port
numbers, management information base object identifiers, including
private enterprise numbers, and many others. The Internet
community requires that the values used in these parameter fields
be assigned uniquely. The IANA makes those assignments as
requested and maintains a registry of the current values.
$ Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
(I) An Internet Standard protocol [R0792] that is used to report
error conditions during IP datagram processing and to exchange
other information concerning the state of the IP network.
$ Internet Draft
(I) A working document of the IETF, its areas, and its working (I) A working document of the IETF, its areas, and its working
groups. (Other groups may also distribute working documents as groups. (Other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet Drafts.) An Internet Draft is not an archival document Internet Drafts.) An Internet Draft is not an archival document
like an RFC is. Instead, an Internet Draft is a preliminary or like an RFC is. Instead, an Internet Draft is a preliminary or
working document that is valid for a maximum of six months and may working document that is valid for a maximum of six months and may
be updated, replaced, or made obsolete by other documents at any be updated, replaced, or made obsolete by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use an Internet Draft as reference time. It is inappropriate to use an Internet Draft as reference
material or to cite it other than as "work in progress." material or to cite it other than as "work in progress."
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) $ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG)
(I) The part of the ISOC responsible for technical management of (I) The part of the ISOC responsible for technical management of
IETF activities and administration of the Internet Standards IETF activities and administration of the Internet Standards
Process according to procedures approved by the ISOC Trustees. Process according to procedures approved by the ISOC Trustees.
Directly responsible for actions along the "standards track", Directly responsible for actions along the "standards track",
including final approval of specifications as Internet Standards. including final approval of specifications as Internet Standards.
Composed of IETF Area Directors and the IETF chairperson, who also Composed of IETF Area Directors and the IETF chairperson, who also
chairs the IESG. [R2026] chairs the IESG. [R2026]
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) $ Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
(I) A self-organized group of people who make contributions to the (I) A self-organized group of people who make contributions to the
development of Internet technology. The principal body engaged in development of Internet technology. The principal body engaged in
developing Internet Standards, although not itself a part of the developing Internet Standards, although not itself a part of the
ISOC. Composed of Working Groups, which are arranged into Areas ISOC. Composed of Working Groups, which are arranged into Areas
(such as the Security Area), each coordinated by one or more Area (such as the Security Area), each coordinated by one or more Area
Directors. Nominations to the IAB and the IESG are made by a Directors. Nominations to the IAB and the IESG are made by a
committee selected at random from regular IETF meeting attendees committee selected at random from regular IETF meeting attendees
who have volunteered. [R2026] who have volunteered. [R2026, R2323]
Internet Protocol (IP) $ Internet Message Access Protocol, version 4 (IMAP4)
(I) A Internet protocol [R2060] by which a client workstation can
dynamically access a mailbox on a server host to manipulate and
retrieve mail message that the server has received and is holding
for the client. (See: POP3.)
(C) IMAP4 has mechanisms for optionally authenticating a client to
a server and providing other security services. (See: IMAP4
AUTHENTICATE.)
$ Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA)
(I) An X.509-compliant CA that is the top CA of the Internet
certification hierarchy operated under the auspices of the ISOC
[R1422]. (See: (PEM usage under) certification hierarchy.)
$ Internet Protocol (IP)
(I) A TCP/IP protocol that moves datagrams (discrete sets of bits) (I) A TCP/IP protocol that moves datagrams (discrete sets of bits)
from one computer to another across an internetwork but does not from one computer to another across an internetwork but does not
provide reliable delivery, flow control, sequencing, or other end- provide reliable delivery, flow control, sequencing, or other end-
to-end services that TCP provides. (Includes both version 4 to-end services that TCP provides. (Includes both version 4
[R0791] and version 6 [R2460].) (Also see: IP address.) [R0791] and version 6 [R2460].) (See: IP address.)
(C) In the OSIRM, IP would be placed at the top of the layer 3. (C) In the OSIRM, IP would be placed at the top of the layer 3.
Internet Protocol security (IPsec) $ Internet Protocol security (IPsec)
(I) (1.) The name of the IETF working group that is specifying a (I) (1.) The name of the IETF working group that is specifying a
security architecture [R2401] and protocols to provide security security architecture [R2401] and protocols to provide security
services for Internet Protocol traffic. (Implementation is services for Internet Protocol traffic. (Implementation is
optional for IP version 4, mandatory for version 6.) (2.) A optional for IP version 4, mandatory for version 6.) (2.) A
collective name for that architecture and set of protocols. collective name for that architecture and set of protocols. (See:
Internet Protocol Security Option.)
(C) Note that the "s" is lower case. (C) Note that the letters "sec" are lower-case.
(C) The IPsec architecture specifies (a) security protocols (AH (C) The IPsec architecture specifies (a) security protocols (AH
and ESP), (b) security associations (what they are, how they work, and ESP), (b) security associations (what they are, how they work,
how they are managed, and associated processing), (c) key how they are managed, and associated processing), (c) key
management (IKE), and (d) algorithms for authentication, and management (IKE), and (d) algorithms for authentication, and
encryption. The set of security services include access control encryption. The set of security services include access control
service, connectionless data integrity service, data origin service, connectionless data integrity service, data origin
authentication service, protection against replays (detection of authentication service, protection against replays (detection of
the arrival of duplicate datagrams, within a constrained window), the arrival of duplicate datagrams, within a constrained window),
data confidentiality service, and limited traffic flow data confidentiality service, and limited traffic flow
confidentiality. confidentiality.
Internet Protocol Suite $ Internet Protocol Security Option (IPSO)
(I) Refers to one of three types of optional additions to IP
datagrams. ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term without a modifier to
identify which type is meant. (See: IPsec.)
- "DoD Basic Security Option" (IP option type 130): Defined for
use on U.S. Department of Defense common user data networks.
Identifies the U.S. classification level at which the datagram
is to be protected and the protection authorities whose rules
apply to the datagram. [R1108]
A "protection authority" is a National Access Program (e.g.,
GENSER, SIOP-ESI, SCI, NSA, Department of Energy) or Special
Access Program that specifies protection rules for transmission
and processing of the information contained in the datagram.
[R1108]
- "DoD Extended Security Option" (IP option type 133): Permits
additional security labeling information, beyond that present
in the Basic Security Option, to be supplied in the datagram to
meet the needs of registered authorities. [R1108]
- "Common IP Security Option" (CIPSO) (IP option type 134):
Designed by TSIG to carry hierarchic and non-hierarchic
security labels. (Formerly called "Commercial IP Security
Option".) Was published as Internet-Draft [CIPSO]; not advanced
to RFC.
$ Internet protocol suite
See: (secondary definition in) Internet. See: (secondary definition in) Internet.
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) $ Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
(I) An Internet IPsec protocol to negotiate, establish, modify, (I) An Internet IPsec protocol [R2408] to negotiate, establish,
and delete security associations, and to exchange key generation modify, and delete security associations, and to exchange key
and authentication data, independent of the details of any generation and authentication data, independent of the details of
specific key generation technique, key establishment protocol, any specific key generation technique, key establishment protocol,
encryption algorithm, or authentication mechanism. encryption algorithm, or authentication mechanism.
(C) ISAKMP supports negotiation of security associations for (C) ISAKMP supports negotiation of security associations for
protocols at all TCP/IP layers. By centralizing management of protocols at all TCP/IP layers. By centralizing management of
security associations, ISAKMP reduces duplicated functionality security associations, ISAKMP reduces duplicated functionality
within each protocol. ISAKMP can also reduce connection setup within each protocol. ISAKMP can also reduce connection setup
time, by negotiating a whole stack of services at once. Strong time, by negotiating a whole stack of services at once. Strong
authentication must be provided on ISAKMP exchanges, and a digital authentication is required on ISAKMP exchanges, and a digital
signature algorithm based on asymmetric cryptography must be used signature algorithm based on asymmetric cryptography is used
within ISAKMP's authentication component. within ISAKMP's authentication component.
Internet Society (ISOC) $ Internet Society (ISOC)
(I) A professional society concerned with Internet development (I) A professional society concerned with Internet development
(including technical Internet Standards); with how the Internet is (including technical Internet Standards); with how the Internet is
and can be used; and with social, political, and technical issues and can be used; and with social, political, and technical issues
that result. The ISOC Board of Trustees approves appointments to that result. The ISOC Board of Trustees approves appointments to
the IAB from among nominees submitted by the IETF nominating the IAB from among nominees submitted by the IETF nominating
committee. [R2026] committee. [R2026]
Internet Standard $ Internet Standard
(I) A specification, approved by the IESG and published as an RFC, (I) A specification, approved by the IESG and published as an RFC,
that is stable and well-understood, is technically competent, has that is stable and well-understood, is technically competent, has
multiple, independent, and interoperable implementations with multiple, independent, and interoperable implementations with
substantial operational experience, enjoys significant public substantial operational experience, enjoys significant public
support, and is recognizably useful in some or all parts of the support, and is recognizably useful in some or all parts of the
Internet. [R2026] (Also see: RFC) Internet. [R2026] (See: RFC.)
(C) The Internet Standards Process is an activity of the ISOC and (C) The Internet Standards Process is an activity of the ISOC and
is organized and managed by the IAB and the IESG. The process is is organized and managed by the IAB and the IESG. The process is
concerned with all protocols, procedures, and conventions used in concerned with all protocols, procedures, and conventions used in
or by the Internet, whether or not they are part of the Internet or by the Internet, whether or not they are part of the Internet
Protocol Suite. (See: (secondary definition in) Internet). The Protocol Suite. (See: (secondary definition in) Internet.) The
"Internet Standards Track" has three levels of increasing "Internet Standards Track" has three levels of increasing
maturity: Proposed Standard, Draft Standard, and Standard. maturity: Proposed Standard, Draft Standard, and Standard.
(Compare with: (levels in) ISO.) (Compare with: (levels in) ISO.)
internetwork $ Internet Standards Process document (ISPD)
(C) For convenience, this Glossary uses this term to refer to an
RFC or an Internet-Draft that is produced as part of that process.
However, neither the term nor the abbreviation is widely accepted
and, therefore, SHOULD NOT be used in an ISPD unless it is locally
accompanied by a definition equivalent to this one. (See: Internet
Standard.)
$ internet vs. Internet
1. (I) Not capitalized: The term "internet" is a popular short
synonym for "internetwork".
2. (I) Capitalized: "The Internet" is the single, interconnected,
worldwide system of commercial, government, educational, and other
computer networks that share the protocol suite and the name and
address spaces that are specified by the IAB [R2026].
(C) The suite is called the "Internet protocol suite" (IPS), but
also is popularly know as "TCP/IP", because TCP and IP are two of
its fundamental protocols. The IPS makes it possible for users of
any one of the networks in the Internet to communicate with, or
use the services located on, any of the other networks.
(C) Although the Internet does have architectural principles
[R1958], no Internet Standard defines a layered reference model
for the IPS that is similar to the OSIRM. However, Internet
community documents do refer (inconsistently) to layers:
application, socket, transport, internetwork, network, data link,
and physical. In this Glossary, Internet layers are referred to by
name to avoid confusing them with OSIRM layers, which are referred
to by number.
$ internetwork
(I) A system of interconnected networks; a network of networks. (I) A system of interconnected networks; a network of networks.
Usually shortened to "internet". (Also see: internet vs. Usually shortened to "internet". (See: internet vs. Internet.)
Internet.)
(C) An internet is usually built using OSI layer 3 gateways to (C) An internet is usually built using OSI layer 3 gateways to
connect a set of subnetworks. When the subnetworks differ in the connect a set of subnetworks. When the subnetworks differ in the
OSI layer 3 protocol service they provide, the gateways sometimes OSI layer 3 protocol service they provide, the gateways sometimes
implement a uniform internetwork protocol (e.g., IP) that operates implement a uniform internetwork protocol (e.g., IP) that operates
at the top of layer 3 and hides the underlying heterogeneity from at the top of layer 3 and hides the underlying heterogeneity from
hosts that use communication services provided by the internet. hosts that use communication services provided by the internet.
(Also see: router.) (See: router.)
intranet $ intranet
(I) A computer network, especially one based on Internet (I) A computer network, especially one based on Internet
technology, that an organization uses for its own internal, and technology, that an organization uses for its own internal, and
usually private, purposes and that is closed to outsiders. (Also usually private, purposes and that is closed to outsiders. (See:
see: extranet, virtual private network.) extranet, virtual private network.)
intruder $ intruder
(I) An entity that gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system (I) An entity that gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system
(or system resource) without having authorization to do so. (Also (or system resource) without having authorization to do so. (See:
see: cracker.) cracker.)
intrusion $ intrusion
See: security intrusion. See: security intrusion.
intrusion detection $ intrusion detection
(I) A security service that monitors and analyzes system events (I) A security service that monitors and analyzes system events
for the purpose of noticing, and providing real-time or near real- for the purpose of noticing, and providing real-time or near real-
time warning of, attempts to access system resources in an time warning of, attempts to access system resources in an
unauthorized manner. unauthorized manner.
invalidity date $ invalidity date
(N) An X.509 CRL entry extension that "indicates the date at which (N) An X.509 CRL entry extension that "indicates the date at which
it is known or suspected that the [revoked certificate's private it is known or suspected that the [revoked certificate's private
key] was compromised or that the certificate should otherwise be key] was compromised or that the certificate should otherwise be
considered invalid" [X509]. considered invalid" [X509].
(C) This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the CRL (C) This date may be earlier than the revocation date in the CRL
entry, and may even be earlier than the date of issue of earlier entry, and may even be earlier than the date of issue of earlier
CRLs. However, the invalidity date is not, by itself, sufficient CRLs. However, the invalidity date is not, by itself, sufficient
for purposes of non-repudiation service. For example, to for purposes of non-repudiation service. For example, to
fraudulently repudiate a validly-generated signature, a private fraudulently repudiate a validly-generated signature, a private
key holder may falsely claim that the key was compromised some key holder may falsely claim that the key was compromised some
time in the past. time in the past.
IP $ IP
See: Internet Protocol. See: Internet Protocol.
IP address $ IP address
(I) The (internetwork) address assigned to a networked computer (I) The (internetwork) address assigned to a networked computer
for use by the Internet Protocol. for use by the Internet Protocol.
(C) An IP version 4 [R0791] address is written as a series of four (C) An IP version 4 [R0791] address is written as a series of four
8-bit numbers separated by periods. For example, the address of 8-bit numbers separated by periods. For example, the address of
the host named "rosslyn.bbn.com" is 192.1.7.10. For IP version 6 the host named "rosslyn.bbn.com" is 192.1.7.10. For IP version 6
[R2373], the preferred form is x:x:x:x:x:x:x:x, where the "x"s are [R2373], the preferred form is x:x:x:x:x:x:x:x, where the "x"s are
the hexadecimal values of the eight 16-bit parts of the address. the hexadecimal values of the eight 16-bit parts of the address.
For example, FEDC:BA98:7654:3210:FEDC:BA98:7654:3210 and For example, FEDC:BA98:7654:3210:FEDC:BA98:7654:3210 and
1080:0:0:0:8:800:200C:417A. 1080:0:0:0:8:800:200C:417A.
IPRA $ IP Security Option
(I) Internet PCA Registration Authority. An X.509-compliant CA See: Internet Protocol Security Option.
that is the top CA of the Internet certification hierarchy
operated by the Internet Society [R1422].
IPsec $ IPRA
See: Internet Policy Registration Authority.
$ IPsec
See: Internet Protocol security. See: Internet Protocol security.
IPsec Key Exchange (IKE) $ IPSO
See: Internet Protocol Security Option.
$ IPsec Key Exchange (IKE)
(I) An Internet, IPsec, key-establishment protocol [R2409] (partly (I) An Internet, IPsec, key-establishment protocol [R2409] (partly
based on OAKLEY) that is intended for obtaining authenticated based on OAKLEY) that is intended for obtaining authenticated
keying material for use with ISAKMP and for other security keying material for use with ISAKMP and for other security
associations, such as in AH and ESP. associations, such as in AH and ESP.
ISAKMP $ ISAKMP
See: Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol. See: Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol.
ISO $ ISO
(I) International Organization for Standardization, a voluntary, (I) International Organization for Standardization, a voluntary,
non-treaty organization with voting members that are designated non-treaty, non-government organization, established in 1947, with
standards bodies of participating nations and non-voting observer voting members that are designated standards bodies of
organizations. (Also see: ANSI, ITU-T.) participating nations and non-voting observer organizations. (See:
ANSI, ITU-T.)
(C) ISO and the IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide
standardization. (ISO is a class D member of ITU-T.) National
bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in developing
international standards through ISO and IEC technical committees
that deal with particular fields of activity. (ANSI is the U.S.
voting member of ISO.) Other international organizations, (C) Legally, ISO is a Swiss, non-profit, private organization. ISO
governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, and the IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form
also take part. In information technology, ISO and IEC have a the specialized system for worldwide standardization. (ISO is a
joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1. class D member of ITU-T.) National bodies that are members of ISO
or IEC participate in developing international standards through
ISO and IEC technical committees that deal with particular fields
of activity. (ANSI is the U.S. voting member of ISO.) Other
international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in
liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part. In information
technology, ISO and IEC have a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC
JTC 1.
(C) The ISO standards development process has four levels of (C) The ISO standards development process has four levels of
increasing maturity: Working Draft (WD), Committee Draft (CD), increasing maturity: Working Draft (WD), Committee Draft (CD),
Draft International Standard (DIS), and International Standard Draft International Standard (DIS), and International Standard
(IS). DISs adopted by JTC 1 are circulated to national bodies for (IS). DISs adopted by JTC 1 are circulated to national bodies for
voting, and publication as an IS requires approval by at least 75% voting, and publication as an IS requires approval by at least 75%
of the national bodies casting a vote. (Compare with: (levels in) of the national bodies casting a vote. (Compare with: (levels in)
Internet Standard.) Internet Standard.)
ISOC $ ISOC
See: Internet Society. See: Internet Society.
issue (a digital certificate or CRL) $ ISPD
See: Internet Standards Process document.
$ issue (a digital certificate or CRL)
(I) Generate and sign a digital certificate (or CRL) and, usually, (I) Generate and sign a digital certificate (or CRL) and, usually,
distribute it and make it available to potential certificate users distribute it and make it available to potential certificate users
(or CRL users). (Also see: certificate creation.) (or CRL users). (See: certificate creation.)
(C) The ABA Guidelines [ABA] explicitly limit this term to (C) The ABA Guidelines [ABA] explicitly limit this term to
certificate creation, and exclude the act of publishing. In certificate creation, and exclude the act of publishing. In
general usage, however, "issuing" a digital certificate (or CRL) general usage, however, "issuing" a digital certificate (or CRL)
includes not only certificate creation but also making it includes not only certificate creation but also making it
available to potential users, such as by storing it in a available to potential users, such as by storing it in a
repository or other directory or otherwise publishing it. repository or other directory or otherwise publishing it.
issuer $ issuer
1. (I) "Issuer" of a certificate or CRL: The CA that signs a 1. (I) "Issuer" of a certificate or CRL: The CA that signs a
digital certificate or CRL. digital certificate or CRL.
(C) An X.509 certificate always includes the issuer's name. The (C) An X.509 certificate always includes the issuer's name. The
name may include a common name value. name may include a common name value.
2. (N) "Issuer" of a payment card: SET usage: "The financial 2. (N) "Issuer" of a payment card: SET usage: "The financial
institution or its agent that issues the unique primary account institution or its agent that issues the unique primary account
number to the cardholder for the payment card brand." [SET2] number to the cardholder for the payment card brand." [SET2]
(C) The institution that establishes the account for a cardholder (C) The institution that establishes the account for a cardholder
and issues the payment card also guarantees payment for authorized and issues the payment card also guarantees payment for authorized
transactions that use the card in accordance with card brand transactions that use the card in accordance with card brand
regulations and local legislation. [SET1] regulations and local legislation. [SET1]
ITAR $ ITAR
See: International Traffic in Arms Regulations. See: International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
ITSEC $ ITSEC
See: Information Technology System Evaluation Criteria. See: Information Technology System Evaluation Criteria.
ITU-T $ ITU-T
(N) International Telecommunications Union--Telecommunication (N) International Telecommunications Union--Telecommunication
Standardization Sector (formerly "CCITT"), a United Nations treaty Standardization Sector (formerly "CCITT"), a United Nations treaty
organization that is composed mainly of postal, telephone, and organization that is composed mainly of postal, telephone, and
telegraph authorities of the member countries and that publishes telegraph authorities of the member countries and that publishes
standards called "Recommendations". (Also see: X.400, X.500.) standards called "Recommendations". (See: X.400, X.500.)
(C) The Department of State represents the United States. ITU-T (C) The Department of State represents the United States. ITU-T
works on many kinds of communication systems. ITU-T cooperates works on many kinds of communication systems. ITU-T cooperates
with ISO on communication protocol standards, and many with ISO on communication protocol standards, and many
Recommendations in that area are also published as an ISO standard Recommendations in that area are also published as an ISO standard
with and ISO name and number. with and ISO name and number.
IV $ IV
See: initialization value. See: initialization value.
KDC $ KDC
See: Key Distribution Center. See: Key Distribution Center.
KEA $ KEA
See: Key Exchange Algorithm. See: Key Exchange Algorithm.
KEK $ KEK
See: key-encrypting key. See: key-encrypting key.
Kerberos $ Kerberos
(N) A system developed at the Massachusetts Institute of (N) A system developed at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology that depends on passwords and symmetric cryptography Technology that depends on passwords and symmetric cryptography
(DES) to implement a ticket-based, peer entity authentication (DES) to implement a ticket-based, peer entity authentication
service and access control service distributed in a client-server service and access control service distributed in a client-server
network environment. [R1510, Stei] network environment. [R1510, Stei]
(C) Kerberos was developed by Project Athena and is named for the (C) Kerberos was developed by Project Athena and is named for the
three-headed dog guarding Hades. three-headed dog guarding Hades.
key
$ key
See: cryptographic key. See: cryptographic key.
key agreement (algorithm or protocol) $ key agreement (algorithm or protocol)
(I) A key establishment method (especially one involving (I) A key establishment method (especially one involving
asymmetric cryptography) by which two or more entities, without asymmetric cryptography) by which two or more entities, without
prior arrangement except a public exchange of data (such as public prior arrangement except a public exchange of data (such as public
keys), can each compute the same value, i.e., each independently keys), can each compute the same value, i.e., each independently
generate the same secret key, that becomes known to both of them generate the same secret key, that becomes known to both of them
but cannot be computed by other entities. (Compare with: key but cannot be computed by other entities. (Compare with: key
transport. Also see: Diffie-Hellman, Key Exchange Algorithm.) transport. Also see: Diffie-Hellman, Key Exchange Algorithm.)
(O) "A method for negotiating a key value on line without (O) "A method for negotiating a key value on line without
transferring the key, even in an encrypted form, e.g., the Diffie- transferring the key, even in an encrypted form, e.g., the Diffie-
Hellman technique." [X509] Hellman technique." [X509]
(O) "The procedure whereby two different parties generate shared (O) "The procedure whereby two different parties generate shared
symmetric keys such that any of the shared symmetric keys is a symmetric keys such that any of the shared symmetric keys is a
function of the information contributed by all legitimate function of the information contributed by all legitimate
participants, so that no party can predetermine the value of the participants, so that no party can predetermine the value of the
key." [A9042] key." [A9042]
key authentication $ key authentication
(N) "The assurance of the legitimate participants in a key (N) "The assurance of the legitimate participants in a key
agreement that no non-legitimate party possesses the shared agreement that no non-legitimate party possesses the shared
symmetric key." [A9042] symmetric key." [A9042]
key center $ key center
(I) A centralized key distribution process (used in symmetric (I) A centralized key distribution process (used in symmetric
cryptography), usually a separate computer system, that uses key- cryptography), usually a separate computer system, that uses key-
encrypting keys (master keys) to encrypt and distribute session encrypting keys (master keys) to encrypt and distribute session
keys needed in a community of users. keys needed in a community of users.
(C) An ANSI standard [A9017] defines two types of key center: key (C) An ANSI standard [A9017] defines two types of key center: key
distribution center and key translation center. distribution center and key translation center.
key confirmation $ key confirmation
(N) "The assurance of the legitimate participants in a key (N) "The assurance of the legitimate participants in a key
establishment protocol that the intended parties sharing the establishment protocol that the intended parties sharing the
symmetric key actually possess the shared symmetric key." [A9042] symmetric key actually possess the shared symmetric key." [A9042]
key distribution $ key distribution
(I) A process that delivers a cryptographic key from the location (I) A process that delivers a cryptographic key from the location
where it is generated to the locations where it is used in a where it is generated to the locations where it is used in a
cryptographic algorithm. (Also see: key management.) cryptographic algorithm. (See: key management.)
key distribution center (KDC) $ key distribution center (KDC)
(I) A type of key center (used in symmetric cryptography) that (I) A type of key center (used in symmetric cryptography) that
implements a key distribution protocol to provide keys (usually, implements a key distribution protocol to provide keys (usually,
session keys) to two (or more) entities that wish to communicate session keys) to two (or more) entities that wish to communicate
securely. (Also see: key translation center.) securely. (See: key translation center.)
(C) A KDC distributes keys to Alice and Bob, who (a) wish to (C) A KDC distributes keys to Alice and Bob, who (a) wish to
communicate with each other but do not currently share keys, (b) communicate with each other but do not currently share keys, (b)
each share a KEK with the KDC, and (c) may not be able to generate each share a KEK with the KDC, and (c) may not be able to generate
or acquire keys by themselves. Alice requests the keys from the or acquire keys by themselves. Alice requests the keys from the
KDC. The KDC generates or acquires the keys and makes two KDC. The KDC generates or acquires the keys and makes two
identical sets. The KDC encrypts one set in the KEK it shares with identical sets. The KDC encrypts one set in the KEK it shares with
Alice, and sends that encrypted set to Alice. The KDC encrypts the Alice, and sends that encrypted set to Alice. The KDC encrypts the
second set in the KEK it shares with Bob, and either sends that second set in the KEK it shares with Bob, and either sends that
encrypted set to Alice for her to forward to Bob, or sends it encrypted set to Alice for her to forward to Bob, or sends it
directly to Bob (although the latter option is not supported in directly to Bob (although the latter option is not supported in
the ANSI standard [A9017]). the ANSI standard [A9017]).
key-encrypting key (KEK) $ key encapsulation
See: (secondary definition in) key recovery.
$ key-encrypting key (KEK)
(I) A cryptographic key that is used to encrypt other keys, either (I) A cryptographic key that is used to encrypt other keys, either
DEKs or other KEKs, but usually is not used to encrypt application DEKs or other KEKs, but usually is not used to encrypt application
data. data.
key escrow $ key escrow
(I) A system for storing knowledge of a cryptographic key in the See: (secondary definition in) key recovery.
custody of one or more third parties so that the key can be
recovered and used in specified circumstances.
(C) Key escrow can be implemented with various techniques,
including split knowledge. For example, the Escrowed Encryption
Standard entrusts two components of a device-unique split key to
separate escrow agents. The agents provide the components only to
someone legally authorized to conduct electronic surveillance of
telecommunications encrypted by that specific device. The
components are used to reconstruct the device-unique key, and it
is used to obtain the session key needed to decrypt
communications.
key establishment (algorithm or protocol) $ key establishment (algorithm or protocol)
(I) A process that combines the key generation and key (I) A process that combines the key generation and key
distribution steps needed to set up or install a secure distribution steps needed to set up or install a secure
communication association. (Also see: key agreement, key communication association. (See: key agreement, key transport.)
transport.)
(O) "The procedure to share a symmetric key among different (O) "The procedure to share a symmetric key among different
parties by either key agreement or key transport." [A9042] parties by either key agreement or key transport." [A9042]
(C) Key establishment involves either key agreement or key (C) Key establishment involves either key agreement or key
transport. In key transport, one entity does the key generation transport. In key transport, one entity does the key generation
and then securely sends the secret key to the other entity. (Or and then securely sends the secret key to the other entity. (Or
each entity can generate a key and send it to the other entity, each entity can generate a key and send it to the other entity,
where the two keys are combined to form a session key.) For where the two keys are combined to form a session key.) For
example, a message originator can generate a random session key example, a message originator can generate a random session key
skipping to change at page 81, line 47 skipping to change at page 89, line 39
agreement, the session key is not sent from one entity to another. agreement, the session key is not sent from one entity to another.
Instead, both entities, without prior arrangement except a public Instead, both entities, without prior arrangement except a public
exchange of data, each compute the same value; i.e., each exchange of data, each compute the same value; i.e., each
independently generates the same secret value, which cannot be independently generates the same secret value, which cannot be
computed by third parties. For example, a message originator and computed by third parties. For example, a message originator and
the intended recipient can each use their own private key and the the intended recipient can each use their own private key and the
other's public key in the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to compute a other's public key in the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to compute a
shared secret value, which then is used to derive a key to encrypt shared secret value, which then is used to derive a key to encrypt
the message. the message.
Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) $ Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA)
(N) A key agreement algorithm that is similar to the Diffie- (N) A key agreement algorithm that is similar to the Diffie-
Hellman algorithm, uses 1024-bit asymmetric keys, and was Hellman algorithm, uses 1024-bit asymmetric keys, and was
developed and formerly classified at the "Secret" level by NSA. developed and formerly classified at the "Secret" level by NSA.
(Also see: CAPSTONE, CLIPPER, FORTEZZA, SKIPJACK.) (See: CAPSTONE, CLIPPER, FORTEZZA, SKIPJACK.)
(C) On 23 June 1998, the NSA announced that KEA had been (C) On 23 June 1998, the NSA announced that KEA had been
declassified. declassified.
key generator $ key generator
(I) A device or algorithm that uses mathematical rules to (I) A device or algorithm that uses mathematical rules to
deterministically produce a pseudo-random sequence of deterministically produce a pseudo-random sequence of
cryptographic keys. cryptographic keys.
key generation $ key generation
(I) A process that creates the sequence of symbols that comprise a (I) A process that creates the sequence of symbols that comprise a
cryptographic key. (Also see: key management.) cryptographic key. (See: key management.)
key length $ key length
(I) The number of symbols (usually bits) needed to be able to (I) The number of symbols (usually bits) needed to be able to
represent any of the possible values of a cryptographic key. represent any of the possible values of a cryptographic key.
key lifetime $ key lifetime
(N) MISSI usage: An attribute of a MISSI key pair that specifies a (N) MISSI usage: An attribute of a MISSI key pair that specifies a
time span that bounds the validity period of any MISSI X.509 time span that bounds the validity period of any MISSI X.509
public-key certificate that contains the public component of the public-key certificate that contains the public component of the
pair. (Also see: cryptoperiod.) pair. (See: cryptoperiod.)
key management $ key management
(I) The process of handling and controlling cryptographic keys and (I) The process of handling and controlling cryptographic keys and
related material (such as initialization values) during their life related material (such as initialization values) during their life
cycle in a cryptographic system, including ordering, generating, cycle in a cryptographic system, including ordering, generating,
distributing, storing, loading, escrowing, archiving, auditing, distributing, storing, loading, escrowing, archiving, auditing,
and destroying the material. (Also see: key distribution, key and destroying the material. (See: key distribution, key escrow,
escrow, public-key infrastructure.) public-key infrastructure.)
(O) "The generation, storage, distribution, deletion, archiving (O) "The generation, storage, distribution, deletion, archiving
and application of keys in accordance with a security policy." and application of keys in accordance with a security policy."
[I7498 Part 2] [I7498 Part 2]
(O) "The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys (O) "The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys
and other related security parameters (e.g., IVs, counters) during and other related security parameters (e.g., IVs, counters) during
the entire life cycle of the keys, including their generation, the entire life cycle of the keys, including their generation,
storage, distribution, entry and use, deletion or destruction, and storage, distribution, entry and use, deletion or destruction, and
archiving." [FP140] archiving." [FP140]
Key Management Protocol (KMP) $ Key Management Protocol (KMP)
(N) A protocol to establish a shared symmetric key between a pair (N) A protocol to establish a shared symmetric key between a pair
(or a group) of users. (One version of KMP was developed by SDNS, (or a group) of users. (One version of KMP was developed by SDNS,
and another by SILS.) and another by SILS.)
key material identifier (KMID) $ key material identifier (KMID)
(N) MISSI usage: A 64-bit identifier that is assigned to a key (N) MISSI usage: A 64-bit identifier that is assigned to a key
pair when the public key is bound in a MISSI X.509 public-key pair when the public key is bound in a MISSI X.509 public-key
certificate. certificate.
key pair $ key pair
(I) A set of mathematically related keys--a public key and a (I) A set of mathematically related keys--a public key and a
private key--that are used for asymmetric cryptography and are private key--that are used for asymmetric cryptography and are
generated in a way that makes it computationally infeasible to generated in a way that makes it computationally infeasible to
derive the private key from knowledge of the public key (e.g., derive the private key from knowledge of the public key (e.g.,
see: Diffie-Hellman, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman). see: Diffie-Hellman, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman).
(C) A key pair's owner discloses the public key to other system (C) A key pair's owner discloses the public key to other system
entities so they can use the key to encrypt data, verify a digital entities so they can use the key to encrypt data, verify a digital
signature, compute a protected checksum, or generate a key in a signature, compute a protected checksum, or generate a key in a
key agreement algorithm. The matching private key is kept secret key agreement algorithm. The matching private key is kept secret
by the owner, who uses it to decrypt data, generate a digital by the owner, who uses it to decrypt data, generate a digital
signature, verify a protected checksum, or generate a key in a key signature, verify a protected checksum, or generate a key in a key
agreement algorithm. agreement algorithm.
key recovery $ key recovery
(I) A process for learning the value of a cryptographic key that 1. (I) A process for learning the value of a cryptographic key
was previously used to perform some cryptographic operation. (Also that was previously used to perform some cryptographic operation.
see: cryptanalysis, key escrow.) (See: cryptanalysis.)
key space 2. (I) Techniques that provide an intentional alternate (or
secondary) means to access the key used for data confidentiality
service in an encrypted association. [DOD98]
(C) We assume that the encryption mechanism has a primary means of
obtaining the key through a key establishment algorithm or
protocol. For the secondary means, there are two classes of key
recovery techniques--key escrow and key encapsulation:
- "Key escrow": A key recovery technique for storing knowledge of
a cryptographic key or parts thereof in the custody of one or
more third parties called "escrow agents", so that the key can
be recovered and used in specified circumstances.
Key escrow is typically implemented with split knowledge
techniques. For example, the Escrowed Encryption Standard
[FP185] entrusts two components of a device-unique split key to
separate escrow agents. The agents provide the components only
to someone legally authorized to conduct electronic
surveillance of telecommunications encrypted by that specific
device. The components are used to reconstruct the device-
unique key, and it is used to obtain the session key needed to
decrypt communications.
- "Key encapsulation": A key recovery technique for storing
knowledge of a cryptographic key by encrypting it with another
key and ensuring that that only certain third parties called
"recovery agents" can perform the decryption operation to
retrieve the stored key.
Key encapsulation typically allows direct retrieval of the
secret key used to provide data confidentiality.
$ key space
(I) The range of possible values of a cryptographic key; or the (I) The range of possible values of a cryptographic key; or the
number of distinct transformations supported by a particular number of distinct transformations supported by a particular
cryptographic algorithm. cryptographic algorithm. (See: key escrow.)
key translation center $ key translation center
(I) A type of key center (used in a symmetric cryptography) that (I) A type of key center (used in a symmetric cryptography) that
implements a key distribution protocol to convey keys between two implements a key distribution protocol to convey keys between two
(or more) parties who wish to communicate securely. (Also see: key (or more) parties who wish to communicate securely. (See: key
distribution center.) distribution center.)
(C) A key translation center translates keys for future (C) A key translation center translates keys for future
communication between Bob and Alice, who (a) wish to communicate communication between Bob and Alice, who (a) wish to communicate
with each other but do not currently share keys, (b) each share a with each other but do not currently share keys, (b) each share a
KEK with the center, and (c) have the ability (by Alice) to KEK with the center, and (c) have the ability to generate or
generate or acquire keys by themselves. Alice generates or acquire keys by themselves. Alice generates or acquires a set of
acquires a set of keys for communication with Bob. Alice encrypts keys for communication with Bob. Alice encrypts the set in the KEK
the set in the KEK she shares with the center and sends the she shares with the center and sends the encrypted set to the
encrypted set to the center. The center decrypts the set, center. The center decrypts the set, reencrypts the keys in the
reencrypts the keys in the KEK it shares with Bob, and either KEK it shares with Bob, and either sends that encrypted set to
sends that encrypted set to Alice for her to forward to Bob, or Alice for her to forward to Bob, or sends it directly to Bob
sends it directly to Bob (although this direct distribution is not (although this direct distribution is not supported in the ANSI
supported in the ANSI standard [A9017]). standard [A9017]).
key transport (algorithm or protocol) $ key transport (algorithm or protocol)
(I) A key establishment method by which a secret key is generated (I) A key establishment method by which a secret key is generated
by one entity in a communication association and securely sent to by one entity in a communication association and securely sent to
another entity in the association. (Compare with: key agreement.) another entity in the association. (Compare with: key agreement.)
(O) "The procedure to send a symmetric key from one party to other (O) "The procedure to send a symmetric key from one party to other
parties. As a result, all legitimate participants share a common parties. As a result, all legitimate participants share a common
symmetric key in such a way that the symmetric key is determined symmetric key in such a way that the symmetric key is determined
entirely by one party." [A9042] entirely by one party." [A9042]
key update $ key update
(I) Derive a new key from an existing key. (Also see: certificate (I) Derive a new key from an existing key. (See: certificate
rekey.) rekey.)
key validation $ key validation
(N) "The procedure for the receiver of a public key to check that (N) "The procedure for the receiver of a public key to check that
the key conforms to the arithmetic requirements for such a key in the key conforms to the arithmetic requirements for such a key in
order to thwart certain types of attacks." [A9042] order to thwart certain types of attacks." [A9042]
keyed hash $ keyed hash
(I) A cryptographic hash in which the mapping to a hash result is (I) A cryptographic hash in which the mapping to a hash result is
varied by a second input parameter that is a cryptographic key. varied by a second input parameter that is a cryptographic key.
(For example, see [R1828].) (See: checksum.)
(C) If the input data set is changed, a new hash result cannot be (C) If the input data set is changed, a new hash result cannot be
correctly computed without knowledge of the secret key. Thus, the correctly computed without knowledge of the secret key. Thus, the
secret key protects the hash result so it can be used as a secret key protects the hash result so it can be used as a
checksum even when there is a threat of an active attack on the checksum even when there is a threat of an active attack on the
data. data.
(C) There are least two forms of keyed hash: (a) A function based (C) There are least two forms of keyed hash: (a) A function based
on a keyed encryption algorithm. (For example, see: Data on a keyed encryption algorithm. (For example, see: Data
Authentication Code.) (b) A keyless hash that is enhanced by Authentication Code.) (b) A keyless hash that is enhanced by
combining (for example, by concatenating) the input data set combining (for example, by concatenating) the input data set
parameter with a key parameter before mapping to a hash result. parameter with a key parameter before mapping to the hash result.
keying material $ keying material
(I) Data (such as key pairs and initialization values) needed to (I) Data (such as key pairs and initialization values) needed to
establish and maintain a cryptographic security association. establish and maintain a cryptographic security association.
KMID $ KMID
See: key material identifier. See: key material identifier.
known-plaintext attack $ known-plaintext attack
(I) A cryptanalysis approach in which the analyst tries to (I) A cryptanalysis approach in which the analyst tries to
determine the key from knowledge of some plaintext-ciphertext determine the key from knowledge of some plaintext-ciphertext
pairs (although the analyst may also know other clues, such as the pairs (although the analyst may also know other clues, such as the
cryptographic algorithm). cryptographic algorithm).
L2F $ L2F
See: Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol. See: Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol.
L2TP $ L2TP
See: Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol. See: Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol.
Language of Temporal Ordering Specification (LOTOS) $ Language of Temporal Ordering Specification (LOTOS)
(N) A language (ISO 8807-1990) for formal specification of (N) A language (ISO 8807-1990) for formal specification of
computer network protocols; describes the order in which events computer network protocols; describes the order in which events
occur. occur.
label
$ label
See: security label. See: security label.
Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF) $ lattice model
(I) A security model for flow control in a system, based on the
"lattice" that is formed by the finite security levels in a system
and their partial ordering. [Denn] (See: flow control, security
level, security model.)
$ Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF)
(N) A data item that is automatically embedded in data encrypted (N) A data item that is automatically embedded in data encrypted
by devices (e.g., see: CLIPPER chip) that implement the Escrowed by devices (e.g., see: CLIPPER chip) that implement the Escrowed
Encryption Standard. Encryption Standard.
Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol (L2F) $ Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol (L2F)
(N) An Internet protocol (originally developed by Cisco (N) An Internet protocol (originally developed by Cisco
Corporation) that uses tunneling of PPP over IP to create a Corporation) that uses tunneling of PPP over IP to create a
virtual extension of a dial-up link across a network, initiated by virtual extension of a dial-up link across a network, initiated by
the dial-up server and transparent to the dial-up user. (Also see: the dial-up server and transparent to the dial-up user. (See:
L2TP.) L2TP.)
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) $ Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)
(N) An Internet client-server protocol that combines aspects of (N) An Internet client-server protocol that combines aspects of
PPTP and L2F and supports tunneling of PPP over an IP network or PPTP and L2F and supports tunneling of PPP over an IP network or
over frame relay or other switched network. (Also see: virtual over frame relay or other switched network. (See: virtual private
private network.) network.)
(C) PPP can in turn encapsulate any OSI layer 3 protocol. Thus, (C) PPP can in turn encapsulate any OSI layer 3 protocol. Thus,
L2TP does not specify security services; it depends on protocols L2TP does not specify security services; it depends on protocols
layered above and below it to provide any needed security. layered above and below it to provide any needed security.
LDAP $ LDAP
See: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol. See: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.
least privilege $ least privilege
(I) The principle that a security architecture should be designed (I) The principle that a security architecture should be designed
so that each system entity is granted the minimum system resources so that each system entity is granted the minimum system resources
and authorizations that the entity needs to do its work. and authorizations that the entity needs to do its work. (See:
economy of mechanism.)
(C) This principle tends to limit damage that can be caused by an (C) This principle tends to limit damage that can be caused by an
accident, error, or unauthorized act. accident, error, or unauthorized act.
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) $ Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
(N) A client-server protocol that supports basic use of the X.500 (N) A client-server protocol that supports basic use of the X.500
Directory (or other directory servers) without incurring the Directory (or other directory servers) without incurring the
resource requirements of the full Directory Access Protocol (DAP). resource requirements of the full Directory Access Protocol (DAP).
[R1777] [R1777]
(C) Designed for simple management and browser applications that (C) Designed for simple management and browser applications that
provide simple read/write interactive directory service. Supports provide simple read/write interactive directory service. Supports
both simple authentication and strong authentication of the client both simple authentication and strong authentication of the client
to the directory server. to the directory server.
link $ link
(I) Subnetwork usage: A point-to-point communication channel (I) Subnetwork usage: A point-to-point communication channel
connecting two computers, especially one between two subnetwork connecting two computers, especially one between two subnetwork
packet switches that is implemented at OSI layer 2. (See: link packet switches that is implemented at OSI layer 2. (See: link
encryption.) encryption.)
(C) Switches assume that links are logically passive. If a switch (C) Switches assume that links are logically passive. If a switch
at one end of a link sends a sequence of bits, the sequence simply at one end of a link sends a sequence of bits, the sequence simply
arrives at the other end after a finite time, although some bits arrives at the other end after a finite time, although some bits
may have been changed either accidentally (errors) or by active may have been changed either accidentally (errors) or by active
wiretapping. wiretapping.
(I) World Wide Web usage: See: hyperlink. (I) World Wide Web usage: See: hyperlink.
link encryption, link-by-link encryption $ link encryption
$ link-by-link encryption
(I) Stepwise protection of data that flows between two points in a (I) Stepwise protection of data that flows between two points in a
network, provided by encrypting data separately on each network network, provided by encrypting data separately on each network
link--i.e., by encrypting data when it leaves a host or subnetwork link--i.e., by encrypting data when it leaves a host or subnetwork
switch and decrypting when it arrives at the next host or switch. switch and decrypting when it arrives at the next host or switch.
Each link may use a different key or even a different algorithm. Each link may use a different key or even a different algorithm.
(Also see: end-to-end encryption.) [R1455] (See: end-to-end encryption.)
logic bomb $ logic bomb
(I) Malicious logic that activates when specified conditions are (I) Malicious logic that activates when specified conditions are
met and causes denial of service or damage to system resources. met and causes denial of service or damage to system resources.
(Also see: Trojan horse, virus, worm.) (See: Trojan horse, virus, worm.)
LOTOS $ login
(I) The act of a system entity gaining access to a session of
using system resources; usually accomplished by providing a user
name and password to an access control system that authenticates
the user.
(C) Derives from "log" file", a security audit trail that records
security events, such as the beginning of sessions, and who
initiates them.
$ LOTOS
See: Language of Temporal Ordering Specification. See: Language of Temporal Ordering Specification.
MAC $ MAC
See: Message Authentication Code. See: mandatory access control, Message Authentication Code.
malicious logic $ malicious logic
(I) Hardware, software, or firmware that is intentionally included (I) Hardware, software, or firmware that is intentionally included
or inserted in a system for a harmful purpose. (Also see: logic or inserted in a system for a harmful purpose. (See: logic bomb,
bomb, Trojan horse, virus, worm.) Trojan horse, virus, worm.)
malware $ malware
(C) A contraction of "malicious software" (see: malicious logic). (I) A contraction of "malicious software". (See: malicious logic.)
Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term
because it is not listed in most dictionaries and might confuse
international readers.
man-in-the-middle attack (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not listed in
(I) A form of active wiretapping in which the attacker intercepts most dictionaries and could confuse international readers.
and selectively modifies (or even blocks and deletes) communicated
data in order to masquerade as one or more of the entities $ man-in-the-middle
involved in a communication association. (Also see: hijack attack, (I) A form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker
piggyback attack.) intercepts and selectively modifies communicated data in order to
masquerade as one or more of the entities involved in a
communication association. (See: hijack attack, piggyback attack.)
(C) For example, suppose Alice and Bob try to establish a session (C) For example, suppose Alice and Bob try to establish a session
key by using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm without data origin key by using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm without data origin
authentication service. A "man in the middle" could block direct authentication service. A "man in the middle" could block direct
communication between Alice and Bob, masquerade as Alice sending communication between Alice and Bob--and then masquerade as Alice
data to Bob, masquerade as Bob sending data to Alice, establish sending data to Bob, masquerade as Bob sending data to Alice,
separate session keys with each of them, and then function as a establish separate session keys with each of them, and function as
clandestine proxy server between them and capture or modify a clandestine proxy server between them in order to capture or
sensitive information that Alice and Bob think they are sending modify sensitive information that Alice and Bob think they are
only to each other. sending only to each other.
mandatory access control (MAC) $ mandatory access control (MAC)
(I) An access control service that enforces a security policy (I) An access control service that enforces a security policy
based on comparing (a) security labels that indicate how sensitive based on comparing (a) security labels that indicate how sensitive
or critical system resources are with (b) security clearances that or critical system resources are with (b) security clearances that
authorize system entities to access certain resources. (Also see: authorize system entities to access certain resources. (See:
discretionary access control, rule-based security policy.) discretionary access control, rule-based security policy.)
(C) This kind of access control is called "mandatory" because an (C) This kind of access control is called "mandatory" because an
entity that has clearance to access a resource may not, just by entity that has clearance to access a resource may not, just by
its own volition, enable another entity to access that resource. its own volition, enable another entity to access that resource.
(O) "A means of restricting access to objects based on the (O) "A means of restricting access to objects based on the
sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information
contained in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e., contained in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e.,
clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity." clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity."
[DOD1] [DOD1]
manipulation detection code $ manipulation detection code
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "checksum"
as a synonym for "checksum" because the word "manipulation" because the word "manipulation" implies protection against active
implies protection against active attacks, which an ordinary attacks, which an ordinary checksum might not provide. Instead, if
checksum might not provide. Instead, if such protection is such protection is intended, use "protected checksum" or some
intended, refer to protected checksum or some particular type particular type thereof, depending on which is meant. If such
thereof, depending on which is meant. If such protection is not protection is not intended, use "error detection code" or some
intended, refer to error detection code or some specific type of specific type of checksum that is not protected.
checksum that is not protected.
masquerade attack $ masquerade attack
(I) A type of attack in which one system entity illegitimately (I) A type of attack in which one system entity illegitimately
poses as (assumes the identity of) another entity. (Also see: poses as (assumes the identity of) another entity. (See: spoofing
spoofing attack.) attack.)
MCA $ MCA
See: merchant certificate authority. See: merchant certificate authority.
MD2 $ MD2
(N) A cryptographic hash [R1319] that produces a 128-bit hash (N) A cryptographic hash [R1319] that produces a 128-bit hash
result, was designed by Ron Rivest, and is similar to MD4 and MD5 result, was designed by Ron Rivest, and is similar to MD4 and MD5
but slower. (Also see: message digest.) but slower. (See: message digest.)
MD4 $ MD4
(N) A cryptographic hash [R1320] that produces a 128-bit hash (N) A cryptographic hash [R1320] that produces a 128-bit hash
result and was designed by Ron Rivest. (Also see: message digest result and was designed by Ron Rivest. (See: message digest and
and SHA-1.) SHA-1.)
MD5 $ MD5
(N) A cryptographic hash [R1321] that produces a 128-bit hash (N) A cryptographic hash [R1321] that produces a 128-bit hash
result and was designed by Ron Rivest to be an improved version of result and was designed by Ron Rivest to be an improved version of
MD4. MD4.
merchant $ merchant
(O) SET usage: "A seller of goods, services, and/or other (O) SET usage: "A seller of goods, services, and/or other
information who accepts payment for these items electronically." information who accepts payment for these items electronically."
[SET2] A merchant may also provide electronic selling services [SET2] A merchant may also provide electronic selling services
and/or electronic delivery of items for sale. With SET, the and/or electronic delivery of items for sale. With SET, the
merchant can offer its cardholders secure electronic interactions, merchant can offer its cardholders secure electronic interactions,
but a merchant that accepts payment cards must have a relationship but a merchant that accepts payment cards is required to have a
with an acquirer. [SET1, SET2] relationship with an acquirer. [SET1, SET2]
merchant certificate $ merchant certificate
(O) SET usage: A public-key certificate issued to a merchant. (O) SET usage: A public-key certificate issued to a merchant.
Sometimes used to refer to a pair of such certificates where one Sometimes used to refer to a pair of such certificates where one
is for digital signature use and the other is for encryption. is for digital signature use and the other is for encryption.
merchant certification authority (MCA) $ merchant certification authority (MCA)
(O) SET usage: A CA that issues digital certificates to merchants (O) SET usage: A CA that issues digital certificates to merchants
and is operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an acquirer, or and is operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an acquirer, or
another party according to brand rules. Acquirers verify and another party according to brand rules. Acquirers verify and
approve requests for merchant certificates prior to issuance by approve requests for merchant certificates prior to issuance by
the MCA. An MCA does not issue a CRL, but does distribute CRLs the MCA. An MCA does not issue a CRL, but does distribute CRLs
issued by root CAs, brand CAs, geopolitical CAs, and payment issued by root CAs, brand CAs, geopolitical CAs, and payment
gateway CAs. [SET2] gateway CAs. [SET2]
mesh PKI $ mesh PKI
(I) A non-hierarchical PKI architecture in which there are several (I) A non-hierarchical PKI architecture in which there are several
trusted CAs rather than a single root. Each certificate user bases trusted CAs rather than a single root. Each certificate user bases
path validations on the public key of one of the trusted CAs, path validations on the public key of one of the trusted CAs,
usually the one that issued that user's own public-key usually the one that issued that user's own public-key
certificate. Rather than having superior-to-subordinate certificate. Rather than having superior-to-subordinate
relationships between CAs, the relationships are peer-to-peer, and relationships between CAs, the relationships are peer-to-peer, and
CAs issue cross-certificates to each other. (Also see: CAs issue cross-certificates to each other. (See: hierarchical
hierarchical PKI, trust-file PKI.) PKI, trust-file PKI.)
message authentication code vs. Message Authentication Code (MAC) $ message authentication code vs. Message Authentication Code (MAC)
1. (N) Capitalized: "The Message Authentication Code" refers to an 1. (N) Capitalized: "(The) Message Authentication Code" refers to
ANSI standard [A9009] for a checksum that is computed by a keyed an ANSI standard [A9009] for a checksum that is computed by a
hash that is based on DES. (Also known as the U.S. Government keyed hash that is based on DES. (Also known as the U.S.
standard Data Authentication Code [FP113]). Government standard Data Authentication Code [FP113].)
(C) The ANSI standard MAC algorithm is equivalent to cipher block (C) The ANSI standard MAC algorithm is equivalent to cipher block
chaining with IV = 0. MAC is also known as the U.S. Government chaining with IV = 0. MAC is also known as the U.S. Government
standard Data Authentication Code [FP113]. standard Data Authentication Code [FP113].
2. (C) Not capitalized: Internet Standards Process documents 2. (D) Not capitalized: ISPDs SHOULD NOT use "message
SHOULD NOT use "message authentication code", because this term authentication code", because this term mixes concepts in a
mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, use potentially misleading way. Instead, use "checksum", "error
"checksum", "error detection code", "hash", "keyed hash", "Message detection code", "hash", "keyed hash", "Message Authentication
Authentication Code", or "protected checksum", depending on what Code", or "protected checksum", depending on what is meant.
is meant.
(C) The uncapitalized form is often misleadingly used as a synonym (C) The uncapitalized form is often misleadingly used as a synonym
for keyed hash. The word "message" is misleading because it for keyed hash. The word "message" is misleading because it
implies that the mechanism is particularly suitable for or limited implies that the mechanism is particularly suitable for or limited
to electronic mail (see: Message Handling Systems). The word to electronic mail (see: Message Handling Systems). The word
"authentication" is misleading because the mechanism primarily "authentication" is misleading because the mechanism primarily
serves a data integrity function rather than an authentication serves a data integrity function rather than an authentication
function. The word "code" is misleading because it implies that function. The word "code" is misleading because it implies that
either encoding or encryption is involved, or that the term refers either encoding or encryption is involved, or that the term refers
to computer software. to computer software.
message digest $ message digest
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "hash result"
as a synonym for "hash result" because it unnecessarily duplicates because it unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of the other, more
the meaning of the other, more general term and mixes concepts in general term and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way.
a potentially misleading way. (See: cryptographic hash, Message (See: cryptographic hash, Message Handling System.)
Handling System.)
Message Handling Systems ` $ Message Handling Systems `
(I) A ITU-T/ISO system concept, which encompasses the notion of (I) A ITU-T/ISO system concept, which encompasses the notion of
electronic mail but defines more comprehensive OSI systems and electronic mail but defines more comprehensive OSI systems and
services that enable users to exchange messages on a store-and- services that enable users to exchange messages on a store-and-
forward basis. (The ISO equivalent is "Message Oriented Text forward basis. (The ISO equivalent is "Message Oriented Text
Interchange System".) (See: X.400.) Interchange System".) (See: X.400.)
message indicator $ message indicator
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
as a synonym for "initialization value" because it mixes concepts "initialization value" because it mixes concepts in a potentially
in a potentially misleading way. misleading way.
message integrity check, message integrity code $ message integrity check
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use these $ message integrity code
terms because they mix concepts in a potentially misleading way. (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use these terms because they mix concepts in
(The word "message" is misleading because it suggests that the a potentially misleading way. (The word "message" is misleading
mechanism is particularly suitable for or limited to electronic because it suggests that the mechanism is particularly suitable
mail. The word "code" is misleading because it suggests that for or limited to electronic mail. The word "code" is misleading
either encoding or encryption is involved, or that the term refers because it suggests that either encoding or encryption is
to computer software.) Instead, use "checksum", "error detection involved, or that the term refers to computer software.) Instead,
code", "hash", "keyed hash", "Message Authentication Code", or use "checksum", "error detection code", "hash", "keyed hash",
"protected checksum", depending on what is meant. "Message Authentication Code", or "protected checksum", depending
on what is meant.
Message Security Protocol (MSP) $ Message Security Protocol (MSP)
(N) A secure message handling protocol [SDNS7] for use with X.400 (N) A secure message handling protocol [SDNS7] for use with X.400
and Internet mail protocols. Developed by NSA's Secure Data and Internet mail protocols. Developed by NSA's SDNS program and
Network System (SDNS) program and used in the U.S. Defense Message used in the U.S. Defense Message System.
System.
MHS $ MHS
See: message handling system. See: message handling system.
MIME $ MIME
See: Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions. See: Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions.
MIME Object Security Services (MOSS) $ MIME Object Security Services (MOSS)
(I) An Internet protocol [R1848] that applies end-to-end (I) An Internet protocol [R1848] that applies end-to-end
encryption and digital signature to MIME message content, using encryption and digital signature to MIME message content, using
symmetric cryptography for encryption and asymmetric cryptography symmetric cryptography for encryption and asymmetric cryptography
for key distribution and signature. MOSS is based on features and for key distribution and signature. MOSS is based on features and
specifications of PEM. (Also see: S/MIME.) specifications of PEM. (See: S/MIME.)
Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC) $ Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC)
(N) A technical description to provide a basis for interoperation (N) A technical description to provide a basis for interoperation
between PKI components from different vendors; consists primarily between PKI components from different vendors; consists primarily
of a profile of certificate and CRL extensions and a set of of a profile of certificate and CRL extensions and a set of
transactions for PKI operation. [MISPC] transactions for PKI operation. [MISPC]
MISPC $ MISPC
See: Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components. See: Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components.
MISSI $ MISSI
(N) Multilevel Information System Security Initiative, an NSA (N) Multilevel Information System Security Initiative, an NSA
program to encourage development of interoperable, modular program to encourage development of interoperable, modular
products for constructing secure network information systems in products for constructing secure network information systems in
support of a wide variety of Government missions. (Also see: MSP.) support of a wide variety of Government missions. (See: MSP.)
MISSI user $ MISSI user
(O) MISSI usage: A system entity that is the subject of one or (O) MISSI usage: A system entity that is the subject of one or
more MISSI X.509 public-key certificates issued under a MISSI more MISSI X.509 public-key certificates issued under a MISSI
certification hierarchy. (Also see: personality.) certification hierarchy. (See: personality.)
(C) MISSI users include both end users and the authorities that (C) MISSI users include both end users and the authorities that
issue certificates. A MISSI user is usually a person but may be a issue certificates. A MISSI user is usually a person but may be a
machine or other automated process. Some machines must operate machine or other automated process. Some machines are required to
non-stop. To avoid downtime needed to exchange the FORTEZZA cards operate non-stop. To avoid downtime needed to exchange the
of machine operators at shift changes, the machines may be issued FORTEZZA cards of machine operators at shift changes, the machines
their own cards, as if they were persons. may be issued their own cards, as if they were persons.
mode, mode of operation $ mode
$ mode of operation
(I) Encryption usage: A technique for enhancing the effect of a (I) Encryption usage: A technique for enhancing the effect of a
cryptographic algorithm or adapting the algorithm for an cryptographic algorithm or adapting the algorithm for an
application, such as applying a block cipher to a sequence of data application, such as applying a block cipher to a sequence of data
blocks or a data stream. (See: electronic codebook, cipher block blocks or a data stream. (See: electronic codebook, cipher block
chaining, cipher feedback, output feedback.) chaining, cipher feedback, output feedback.)
(I) System operation usage: A type of security policy that states (I) System operation usage: A type of security policy that states
the range of classification levels of information that a system is the range of classification levels of information that a system is
permitted to handle and the range of clearances and authorizations permitted to handle and the range of clearances and authorizations
of users who are permitted to access the system. (See: dedicated of users who are permitted to access the system. (See: dedicated
security mode, multilevel security mode, partitioned security security mode, multilevel security mode, partitioned security
mode, system high security mode.) mode, system high security mode.)
modulus $ modulus
(I) The defining constant in modular arithmetic, and usually a (I) The defining constant in modular arithmetic, and usually a
part of the public key in asymmetric cryptography that is based on part of the public key in asymmetric cryptography that is based on
modular arithmetic. (See: Diffie-Hellman, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman.) modular arithmetic. (See: Diffie-Hellman, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman.)
Morris Worm $ Morris Worm
(I) A worm program written by Robert T. Morris, Jr. that flooded (I) A worm program written by Robert T. Morris, Jr. that flooded
the ARPANET in November, 1988, causing problems for thousands of the ARPANET in November, 1988, causing problems for thousands of
hosts. (Also see: worm.) hosts. (See: worm.)
MOSS $ MOSS
See: MIME Object Security Services. See: MIME Object Security Services.
MSP $ MSP
See: Message Security Protocol. See: Message Security Protocol.
multilevel secure (MLS) $ multilevel secure (MLS)
(I) A class of system that has system resources (particularly (I) A class of system that has system resources (particularly
stored information) at more than one security level (i.e., has stored information) at more than one security level (i.e., has
different types of sensitive resources) and that permits different types of sensitive resources) and that permits
concurrent access by users who differ in security clearance and concurrent access by users who differ in security clearance and
need-to-know, but is able to prevent the users from accessing need-to-know, but is able to prevent the users from accessing
resources for which they lack authorization. resources for which they lack authorization.
multilevel security mode $ multilevel security mode
(I) A mode of operation of an information system, that allows two (I) A mode of operation of an information system, that allows two
or more classification levels of information to be processed or more classification levels of information to be processed
concurrently within the same system when not all users have a concurrently within the same system when not all users have a
clearance or formal access authorization for all data handled by clearance or formal access authorization for all data handled by
the AIS. the AIS.
(C) This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of Defense (C) This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of Defense
policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2], but the term is also policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2], but the term is also
used outside the Defense Department and outside the Government. used outside the Defense Department and outside the Government.
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) $ Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)
(I) An Internet protocol [R2045] that enhances the basic format of (I) An Internet protocol [R2045] that enhances the basic format of
Internet electronic mail messages [R0822] to be able to use Internet electronic mail messages [R0822] to be able to use
character sets other than US-ASCII for textual headers and text character sets other than US-ASCII for textual headers and text
content, and to carry non-textual and multi-part content. (Also content, and to carry non-textual and multi-part content. (See:
see: S/MIME.) S/MIME.)
National Computer Security Center (NCSC) $ mutual suspicion
(I) The state that exists between two interacting system entities
in which neither entity can trust the other to function correction
with regard to some security requirement.
$ National Computer Security Center (NCSC)
(N) A U.S. Department of Defense organization, housed in NSA, that (N) A U.S. Department of Defense organization, housed in NSA, that
has established criteria for, and performed evaluations of, has responsibility for encouraging widespread availability of
computer and network systems that have a trusted computing base. trusted computer systems throughout the Federal Government. It has
(See: Rainbow Series, TCSEC.) established criteria for, and performs evaluations of, computer
and network systems that have a trusted computing base. (See:
Evaluated Products List, Rainbow Series, TCSEC.)
National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) $ National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
(N) An organization created by NIST and NSA to enhance the quality (N) An organization created by NIST and NSA to enhance the quality
of commercial products for information security and increase of commercial products for information security and increase
consumer confidence in those products through objective evaluation consumer confidence in those products through objective evaluation
and testing methods. and testing methods.
(C) NIAP is registered, through the U.S. Department of Defense, as (C) NIAP is registered, through the U.S. Department of Defense, as
a National Performance Review Reinvention Laboratory. NIAP a National Performance Review Reinvention Laboratory. NIAP
functions include the following: functions include the following:
- Developing tests, test methods, and other tools that developers - Developing tests, test methods, and other tools that developers
skipping to change at page 92, line 25 skipping to change at page 101, line 12
programs. programs.
- Using the Common Criteria to develop protection profiles and - Using the Common Criteria to develop protection profiles and
associated test sets for security products and systems. associated test sets for security products and systems.
- Cooperating with the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory - Cooperating with the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program to develop a program to accredit private- Accreditation Program to develop a program to accredit private-
sector laboratories for the testing of information security sector laboratories for the testing of information security
products using the Common Criteria. products using the Common Criteria.
- Working to establish a formal, international mutual recognition - Working to establish a formal, international mutual recognition
scheme for a Common Criteria-based evaluation. scheme for a Common Criteria-based evaluation.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) $ National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
(N) A U.S. Department of Commerce agency that promotes U.S. (N) A U.S. Department of Commerce agency that promotes U.S.
economic growth by working with industry to develop and apply economic growth by working with industry to develop and apply
technology, measurements, and standards, including standards for technology, measurements, and standards. Has primary Government
INFOSEC. (Also see: ANSI, DES, DSA, DSS,, FIPS.) responsibility for INFOSEC standards for unclassified but
sensitive information. (See: ANSI, DES, DSA, DSS, FIPS, NIAP,
NSA.)
National Security Agency (NSA) $ National Security Agency (NSA)
(N) A U.S. Department of Defense intelligence agency that has (N) A U.S. Department of Defense intelligence agency that has
primary Government responsibility for INFOSEC for classified and primary Government responsibility for INFOSEC for classified
sensitive information handled by national security systems. (Also information and for unclassified but sensitive information handled
see: FORTEZZA, KEA, MISSI, SKIPJACK.) by national security systems. (See: FORTEZZA, KEA, MISSI, NIAP,
NIST, SKIPJACK.)
need-to-know $ need-to-know
(I) The necessity for access to, knowledge of, or possession of (I) The necessity for access to, knowledge of, or possession of
specific information required to carry out official duties. specific information required to carry out official duties.
(C) This criterion is used in security procedures that require a (C) This criterion is used in security procedures that require a
custodian of sensitive information, prior to disclosing the custodian of sensitive information, prior to disclosing the
information to someone else, to establish that the intended information to someone else, to establish that the intended
recipient has proper authorization to access the information. recipient has proper authorization to access the information.
network $ network
See: computer network. See: computer network.
NIAP $ NIAP
See: National Information Assurance Partnership. See: National Information Assurance Partnership.
NIST $ NIST
See: National Institute of Standards and Technology. See: National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NLSP $ NLSP
Network Layer Security Protocol. An OSI protocol (IS0 11577) for Network Layer Security Protocol. An OSI protocol (IS0 11577) for
end-to-end encryption services at the top of OSI layer 3. NLSP is end-to-end encryption services at the top of OSI layer 3. NLSP is
derived from an SDNS protocol, SP3, but is much more complex. derived from an SDNS protocol, SP3, but is much more complex.
no-lone zone $ no-lone zone
(I) A room or other space to which no person may have (I) A room or other space to which no person may have
unaccompanied access and that, when occupied, must be occupied by unaccompanied access and that, when occupied, is required to be
two or more appropriately authorized persons. (Also see: dual occupied by two or more appropriately authorized persons. (See:
control.) dual control.)
nonce $ nonce
(I) A random or non-repeating value that is included in data (I) A random or non-repeating value that is included in data
exchanged by a protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing exchanged by a protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing
liveness and thus detecting and protecting against replay attacks. liveness and thus detecting and protecting against replay attacks.
non-critical $ non-critical
See: critical (extension of certificate). See: critical (extension of certificate).
non-repudiation service $ non-repudiation service
(I) A security service that provide protection against false (I) A security service that provide protection against false
denial of involvement in a communication. (Also see: repudiation.) denial of involvement in a communication. (See: repudiation.)
(C) There are two basic kinds of service: (C) Non-repudiation service does not and cannot prevent an entity
from repudiating a communication. Instead, the service provides
evidence that can be stored and later presented to a third party
to resolve disputes that arise if and when a communication is
repudiated by one of the entities involved. There are two basic
kinds of non-repudiation service:
- "Non-repudiation with proof of origin" provides the recipient - "Non-repudiation with proof of origin" provides the recipient
of data with evidence that proves the origin of the data, and of data with evidence that proves the origin of the data, and
thus protects the recipient against an attempt by the thus protects the recipient against an attempt by the
originator to falsely deny sending the data. originator to falsely deny sending the data. This service can
be viewed as a stronger version of an data origin
authentication service, in that it proves authenticity to a
third party.
- "Non-repudiation with proof of receipt" provides the originator - "Non-repudiation with proof of receipt" provides the originator
of data with evidence that proves the data was received as of data with evidence that proves the data was received as
addressed, and thus protects the originator against an attempt addressed, and thus protects the originator against an attempt
by the recipient to falsely deny receiving the data. by the recipient to falsely deny receiving the data.
no-PIN ORA (NORA) (C) Phases of a Non-Repudiation Service: Ford [For94, For97] uses
the term "critical action" to refer to the act of communication
that is the subject of the service:
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- . --------
Phase 1: Phase 2: Phase 3: Phase 4: Phase 5: . Phase 6:
Request Generate Transfer Verify Retain . Resolve
Service Evidence Evidence Evidence Evidence . Dispute
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- . --------
Service Critical Evidence Evidence Archive . Evidence
Request => Action => Stored => Is => Evidence . Is
Is Made Occurs For Later Tested In Case . Verified
and Use | ^ Critical . ^
Evidence v | Action Is . |
Is +-------------------+ Repudiated . |
Generated |Verifiable Evidence|------> ... . ----+
+-------------------+
1. Before the critical action, the service requester asks, either
implicitly or explicitly, to have evidence of the action be
generated.
2. When the critical action occurs, evidence is generated by a
process involving the potential repudiator and possibly also a
trusted third party.
3. The evidence is transferred to the requester, or stored by a
third party, for later use if needed.
4. The entity that holds the evidence tests to be sure that it
will suffice if a dispute arises.
5. The evidence is retained for possible future retrieval and use.
6. In this phase, which occurs only if the critical action is
repudiated, the evidence is retrieved from storage, presented,
and verified to resolve the dispute.
$ no-PIN ORA (NORA)
(O) MISSI usage: An organizational RA that operates in a mode in (O) MISSI usage: An organizational RA that operates in a mode in
which the ORA performs no card management functions and, which the ORA performs no card management functions and,
therefore, does not require knowledge of either the SSO PIN or therefore, does not require knowledge of either the SSO PIN or
user PIN for an end user's FORTEZZA PC card. user PIN for an end user's FORTEZZA PC card.
NORA $ NORA
See: no-PIN ORA. See: no-PIN ORA.
notarization $ notarization
(I) Registration of data under the authority or in the care of a (I) Registration of data under the authority or in the care of a
trusted third party, thus making it possible to provide subsequent trusted third party, thus making it possible to provide subsequent
assurance of the accuracy of characteristics claimed for the data, assurance of the accuracy of characteristics claimed for the data,
such as content, origin, time, and delivery. [I7498 Part 2] (Also such as content, origin, time, and delivery. [I7498 Part 2] (See:
see: digital notary.) digital notary.)
OAKLEY $ NULL encryption algorithm
(I) An Internet IPsec key establishment protocol, based on the (I) An algorithm [R2410] that does nothing to alter plaintext
Diffie-Hellman algorithm and designed to be a compatible component data. It originated because of IPsec ESP, which always specifies
of ISAKMP, that in addition to securely sharing a secret key the use of an encryption algorithm to provide confidentiality. The
between two entities, provides authentication service to ensure NULL encryption algorithm is a convenient way to represent the
the entities of each other's identity, even if the exchange is option of not applying encryption in ESP (or in any other context
attacked by active wiretapping. (Superseded by IPsec Key where this is needed).
Exchange.)
$ OAKLEY
(I) An key establishment protocol [R2412] (proposed for IPsec but
superseded by IPsec Key Exchange) that is based on the Diffie-
Hellman algorithm and designed to be a compatible component of
ISAKMP. In addition to securely sharing a secret key between two
entities, OAKLEY provides authentication service to ensure the
entities of each other's identity, even if the exchange is
attacked by active wiretapping.
(C) Establishes a shared key with an assigned identifier and (C) Establishes a shared key with an assigned identifier and
associated authenticated identities for two parties. Each key is associated authenticated identities for two parties. Each key is
associated with algorithms used for authentication, associated with algorithms used for authentication,
confidentiality, and one-way functions. Related to STS, sharing confidentiality, and one-way functions. Related to STS, sharing
the similarity of authenticating the Diffie-Hellman exponentials the similarity of authenticating the Diffie-Hellman exponentials
and using them for determining a shared session key, and also of and using them for determining a shared session key, and also of
achieving public-key forward secrecy for the shared key. Supports achieving public-key forward secrecy for the shared key. Supports
key updates, incorporation of keys distributed by out-of-band key updates, incorporation of keys distributed by out-of-band
mechanisms, and user-defined abstract group structures for use mechanisms, and user-defined abstract group structures for use
with Diffie-Hellman. with Diffie-Hellman.
object $ object
(I) Trusted computer system modeling usage: A system element that (I) Trusted computer system modeling usage: A system element that
contains or receives information. (Also see: Bell-LaPadula Model, contains or receives information. (See: Bell-LaPadula Model,
trusted computer system.) trusted computer system.)
object identifier (OID) $ object identifier (OID)
(I) An official, globally unique name for a thing, written as a (I) An official, globally unique name for a thing, written as a
sequence of integers formed and assigned as defined in the ASN.1 sequence of integers formed and assigned as defined in the ASN.1
standard and used to reference the thing in abstract standard and used to reference the thing in abstract
specifications and during the negotiation of security services in specifications and during the negotiation of security services in
a protocol. a protocol.
(O) "A value (distinguishable for all other such values) which is (O) "A value (distinguishable from all other such values) which is
associated with an object." [X680] associated with an object." [X680]
(C) Objects named by OIDs are leaves of the object identifier tree (C) Objects named by OIDs are leaves of the object identifier tree
(which is similar to but different from the X.500 Directory (which is similar to but different from the X.500 Directory
Information Tree). Each arc (i.e., each branch of the tree) is Information Tree). Each arc (i.e., each branch of the tree) is
labeled with a non-negative integer. An OID is the sequence of labeled with a non-negative integer. An OID is the sequence of
integers on the path leading from the root of the tree to a named integers on the path leading from the root of the tree to a named
object. object.
(C) The tree has three arcs immediately below the root: {0} for (C) The OID tree has three arcs immediately below the root: {0}
use by ITU-T, {1} for ISO, and {2} for both jointly. Below ITU-T for use by ITU-T, {1} for use by ISO, and {2} for use by both
are four arcs, where {0 0} is for ITU-T recommendations. Below {0 jointly. Below ITU-T are four arcs, where {0 0} is for ITU-T
0} are 26 arcs, one for each series of recommendations starting recommendations. Below {0 0} are 26 arcs, one for each series of
with the letters A to Z, and below these are arcs for each recommendations starting with the letters A to Z, and below these
recommendation. Thus, the OID for ITU-T Recommendation X.509 is {0 are arcs for each recommendation. Thus, the OID for ITU-T
0 24 509}. Below ISO are four arcs, where {1 0 }is for ISO Recommendation X.509 is {0 0 24 509}. Below ISO are four arcs,
standards, and below these are arcs for each ISO standard. Thus, where {1 0 }is for ISO standards, and below these are arcs for
the OID for ISO/IEC 9594-8 (the ISO number for X.509) is {1 0 9594 each ISO standard. Thus, the OID for ISO/IEC 9594-8 (the ISO
8}. number for X.509) is {1 0 9594 8}.
(C) The following are additional examples: ANSI registers (C) The following are additional examples: ANSI registers
organization names below the branch {joint-iso-ccitt(2) organization names below the branch {joint-iso-ccitt(2)
country(16) US(840) organization(1)}. The NIST Computer Security country(16) US(840) organization(1)}. The NIST CSOR records PKI
Object Register records PKI objects below the branch {joint-iso- objects below the branch {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840)
ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) gov(101) csor(3) pki(4)}. The U.S. gov(101) csor(3) pki(4)}. The U.S. Department of Defense registers
Department of Defense registers INFOSEC objects below the branch INFOSEC objects below the branch {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16)
{joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1)}. The OID for
dod(2) infosec(1)}. The OID for the PKIX private extension is the PKIX private extension is defined in an arc below the arc for
defined in an arc below the arc for the PKIX name space, as the PKIX name space, as {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 1 1}.
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 1 1}.
object reuse $ object reuse
(N) "The reassignment and reuse of a storage medium (e.g., page (N) "The reassignment and reuse of a storage medium (e.g., page
frame, disk sector, magnetic tape) that once contained one or more frame, disk sector, magnetic tape) that once contained one or more
[information] objects. To be securely reused and assigned to a new [information] objects. To be securely reused and assigned to a new
subject, storage media must contain no residual data (magnetic subject, storage media must contain no residual data (magnetic
remanence) from the object(s) previously contained in the media." remanence) from the object(s) previously contained in the media."
[NCS04] [NCS04]
OCSP $ OCSP
See: On-line Certificate Status Protocol. See: On-line Certificate Status Protocol.
OFB $ octet
(I) A data unit of eight bits. (See: byte.)
(c) This term is used in networking (especially in OSI standards)
in preference to "byte", because some systems use "byte" for data
storage units of a size other than eight.
$ OFB
See: output feedback. See: output feedback.
ohnosecond ohnosecond
(C) That minuscule fraction of time in which you realize that your (C) That minuscule fraction of time in which you realize that your
private key has been compromised. private key has been compromised.
OID $ OID
See: object identifier. See: object identifier.
On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) $ On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
(I) An Internet protocol used by a client to obtain from a server (I) An Internet protocol used by a client to obtain from a server
the validity status and other information concerning a digital the validity status and other information concerning a digital
certificate. certificate.
(C) In some applications, such as those involving high-value (C) In some applications, such as those involving high-value
commercial transactions, it may be necessary to obtain certificate commercial transactions, it may be necessary to obtain certificate
revocation status that is more timely than is possible with CRLs revocation status that is more timely than is possible with CRLs
or to obtain other kinds of status information. OCSP may be used or to obtain other kinds of status information. OCSP may be used
to determine the current revocation status of a digital to determine the current revocation status of a digital
certificate, in lieu of or as a supplement to checking against a certificate, in lieu of or as a supplement to checking against a
periodic CRL. An OCSP client issues a status request to an OCSP periodic CRL. An OCSP client issues a status request to an OCSP
server and suspends acceptance of the certificate in question server and suspends acceptance of the certificate in question
until the server provides a response. until the server provides a response.
one-time pad $ one-time pad
(I) An encryption algorithm in which the key is a random sequence (I) An encryption algorithm in which the key is a random sequence
of symbols and each symbol is used for encryption only one time-- of symbols and each symbol is used for encryption only one time--
to encrypt only one plaintext symbol to produce only one to encrypt only one plaintext symbol to produce only one
ciphertext symbol--and a copy of the key is used similarly for ciphertext symbol--and a copy of the key is used similarly for
decryption. decryption.
(C) To ensure one-time use, the copy of the key used for (C) To ensure one-time use, the copy of the key used for
encryption is destroyed after use, as is the copy used for encryption is destroyed after use, as is the copy used for
decryption. This is the only encryption algorithm that is truly decryption. This is the only encryption algorithm that is truly
unbreakable, even given unlimited resources for cryptanalysis unbreakable, even given unlimited resources for cryptanalysis
[Schn], but key management costs and synchronization problems make [Schn], but key management costs and synchronization problems make
it impractical except in special situations. it impractical except in special situations.
one-time password, One-Time Password (OTP) $ one-time password
$ One-Time Password (OTP)
1. Not capitalized: A "one-time password" is a simple 1. Not capitalized: A "one-time password" is a simple
authentication technique in which each password is used only once authentication technique in which each password is used only once
as authentication information that verifies an identity. This as authentication information that verifies an identity. This
technique counters the threat of a replay attack that uses technique counters the threat of a replay attack that uses
passwords captured by wiretapping. passwords captured by wiretapping.
2. Capitalized: "One-Time Password" is an Internet protocol that 2. Capitalized: "One-Time Password" is an Internet protocol that
is based on S/KEY and uses a cryptographic hash function to is based on S/KEY and uses a cryptographic hash function to
generate one-time passwords for use as authentication information generate one-time passwords for use as authentication information
in system login and other processes that need protection against in system login and other processes that need protection against
replay attacks. [R1938] replay attacks. [R1938]
one-way encryption $ one-way encryption
(I) Irreversible transformation of plaintext to ciphertext, such (I) Irreversible transformation of plaintext to ciphertext, such
that the plaintext cannot be recovered from the ciphertext by that the plaintext cannot be recovered from the ciphertext by
other than exhaustive procedures even if the cryptographic key is other than exhaustive procedures even if the cryptographic key is
known. (Also see: encryption.) known. (See: encryption.)
one-way function $ one-way function
(I) "A (mathematical) function, f, which is easy to compute, but (I) "A (mathematical) function, f, which is easy to compute, but
which for a general value y in the range, it is computationally which for a general value y in the range, it is computationally
difficult to find a value x in the domain such that f(x) = y. difficult to find a value x in the domain such that f(x) = y.
There may be a few values of y for which finding x is not There may be a few values of y for which finding x is not
computationally difficult." [X509] computationally difficult." [X509]
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "cryptographic
as a synonym for "cryptographic hash". hash".
open security environment $ open security environment
(O) DoD usage: A system environment that meets at least one of the (O) DoD usage: A system environment that meets at least one of the
following conditions: (a) Application developers (including following conditions: (a) Application developers (including
maintainers) do not have sufficient clearance or authorization to maintainers) do not have sufficient clearance or authorization to
provide an acceptable presumption that they have not introduced provide an acceptable presumption that they have not introduced
malicious logic. (b) Configuration control does not provide malicious logic. (b) Configuration control does not provide
sufficient assurance that applications and the equipment are sufficient assurance that applications and the equipment are
protected against the introduction of malicious logic prior to and protected against the introduction of malicious logic prior to and
during the operation of system applications. [NCS04] (Also see: during the operation of system applications. [NCS04] (See: closed
closed security environment.) security environment.)
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model (OSIRM) $ Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model (OSIRM)
(N) A joint ISO/ITU-T standard [I7498 Part 1] for a seven-layer, (N) A joint ISO/ITU-T standard [I7498 Part 1] for a seven-layer,
architectural communication framework for interconnection of architectural communication framework for interconnection of
computers in networks. computers in networks.
(C) OSI-based standards include communication protocols that are (C) OSI-based standards include communication protocols that are
mostly incompatible with the Internet Protocol Suite, but also mostly incompatible with the Internet Protocol Suite, but also
include security models, such as X.509, that are used in the include security models, such as X.509, that are used in the
Internet. Internet.
(C) The OSIRM layers, from highest to lowest, are (7) Application, (C) The OSIRM layers, from highest to lowest, are (7) Application,
(6) Presentation, (5) Session, (4) Transport, (3) Network, (2) (6) Presentation, (5) Session, (4) Transport, (3) Network, (2)
Data Link, and (1) Physical. In this Glossary, these layers are Data Link, and (1) Physical. In this Glossary, these layers are
referred to by number to avoid confusing them with Internet referred to by number to avoid confusing them with Internet
Protocol Suite layers, which are referred to by name. Protocol Suite layers, which are referred to by name.
(C) The OSI layers correspond [original author unknown] to the (C) Some unknown person described how the OSI layers correspond to
seven deadly sins: the seven deadly sins:
7. Wrath: Application is always angry at the mess it sees below 7. Wrath: Application is always angry at the mess it sees below
itself. (Hey! Who is it to be pointing fingers?) itself. (Hey! Who is it to be pointing fingers?)
6. Sloth: Presentation is too lazy to do anything productive by 6. Sloth: Presentation is too lazy to do anything productive by
itself. itself.
5. Lust: Session is always craving and demanding what truly 5. Lust: Session is always craving and demanding what truly
belongs to Application's functionality. belongs to Application's functionality.
4. Avarice: Transport wants all of the end-to-end functionality. 4. Avarice: Transport wants all of the end-to-end functionality.
(Of course, it deserves it, but life isn't fair.) (Of course, it deserves it, but life isn't fair.)
3. Gluttony: (Connection-Oriented) Network is overweight and 3. Gluttony: (Connection-Oriented) Network is overweight and
overbearing after trying too often to eat Transport's lunch. overbearing after trying too often to eat Transport's lunch.
2. Envy: Poor Data Link is always starved for attention. (With 2. Envy: Poor Data Link is always starved for attention. (With
ATM, maybe now it is feeling less neglected.) ATM, maybe now it is feeling less neglected.)
1. Pride: Physical has managed to avoid much of the controversy, 1. Pride: Physical has managed to avoid much of the controversy,
and nearly all of the embarrassment, suffered by the others. and nearly all of the embarrassment, suffered by the others.
(C) John G. Fletcher discovered that the OSI layers also (C) John G. Fletcher described how the OSI layers also correspond
correspond to Snow White's dwarf friends: to Snow White's dwarf friends:
7. Doc: Application acts as if it is in charge, but sometimes 7. Doc: Application acts as if it is in charge, but sometimes
muddles its syntax. muddles its syntax.
6. Sleepy: Presentation is indolent, being guilty of the sin of 6. Sleepy: Presentation is indolent, being guilty of the sin of
Sloth. Sloth.
5. Dopey: Session is confused because its charter is not very 5. Dopey: Session is confused because its charter is not very
clear. clear.
4. Grumpy: Transport is irritated because Network has encroached 4. Grumpy: Transport is irritated because Network has encroached
on Transport's turf. on Transport's turf.
3. Happy: Network smiles for the same reason that Transport is 3. Happy: Network smiles for the same reason that Transport is
irritated. irritated.
2. Sneezy: Data Link makes loud noises in the hope of attracting 2. Sneezy: Data Link makes loud noises in the hope of attracting
attention. attention.
1. Bashful: Physical quietly does it work, unnoticed by the 1. Bashful: Physical quietly does its work, unnoticed by the
others. others.
operations security (OPSEC) $ operational integrity
(I) A synonym for "system integrity"; emphasizes the actual
performance of system functions rather than just the ability to
perform them.
$ operations security (OPSEC)
(I) A process to identify, control, and protect evidence of the (I) A process to identify, control, and protect evidence of the
planning and execution of sensitive activities and operations, and planning and execution of sensitive activities and operations, and
thereby prevent potential adversaries from gaining knowledge of thereby prevent potential adversaries from gaining knowledge of
capabilities and intentions. capabilities and intentions.
OPSEC $ OPSEC
See: operations security. See: operations security.
ORA $ ORA
See: organizational registration authority. See: organizational registration authority.
Orange Book $ Orange Book
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "Trusted
as a synonym for "Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria" Computer System Evaluation Criteria" [CSC001, DOD1]. Instead, use
[CSC001, DOD1]. Instead, use the full proper name of the document the full, proper name of the document or, in subsequent
or, in subsequent references, the conventional abbreviation, references, the conventional abbreviation "TCSEC". (See: (usage
"TCSEC". (See: (usage note under) Green Book.) note under) Green Book.)
organizational certificate $ organizational certificate
(O) MISSI usage: A type of MISSI X.509 public-key certificate that (O) MISSI usage: A type of MISSI X.509 public-key certificate that
is issued to support organizational message handling for the U.S. is issued to support organizational message handling for the U.S.
Government's Defense Message System. Government's Defense Message System.
organizational registration authority (ORA) $ organizational registration authority (ORA)
(I) General usage: An RA for an organization. (I) General usage: An RA for an organization.
(O) MISSI usage: The MISSI implementation of RA. A MISSI end (O) MISSI usage: The MISSI implementation of RA. A MISSI end
entity that assists a PCA, CA, or SCA to register other end entity that assists a PCA, CA, or SCA to register other end
entities, by gathering, verifying, and entering data and entities, by gathering, verifying, and entering data and
forwarding it to the signing authority, and may also assist with forwarding it to the signing authority, and may also assist with
card management functions. An ORA is a local administrative card management functions. An ORA is a local administrative
authority, and the term refers both to the office or role, and to authority, and the term refers both to the office or role, and to
the person who fills that office. An ORA does not sign the person who fills that office. An ORA does not sign
certificates, CRLs, or CKLs. (Also see: no-PIN ORA, SSO-PIN ORA, certificates, CRLs, or CKLs. (See: no-PIN ORA, SSO-PIN ORA, user-
user-PIN ORA.) PIN ORA.)
origin authentication, origin authenticity $ origin authentication
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use these $ origin authenticity
terms because they looks like careless use of an internationally (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use these terms because they look like
standardized term. Instead, use "data origin authentication" or careless use of an internationally standardized term. Instead, use
"data origin authentication service". "data origin authentication" or "data origin authentication
service".
OSI, OSIRM $ OSI
$ OSIRM
See: Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model. See: Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model.
OTP $ OTP
See: One-Time Password. See: One-Time Password.
output feedback (OFB) $ out of band
(I) Transfer of information using a channel that is outside (i.e.,
separate from) the channel that is normally used. (See: covert
channel.)
(C) Out-of-band mechanisms are often used to distribute shared
secrets (e.g., a symmetric key) or other sensitive information
items (e.g., a root key) that are needed to initialize or
otherwise enable the operation of cryptography or other security
mechanisms. (See: key distribution.)
$ output feedback (OFB)
(N) A block cipher mode [FP081] that modifies electronic codebook (N) A block cipher mode [FP081] that modifies electronic codebook
mode to operate on plaintext segments of variable length less than mode to operate on plaintext segments of variable length less than
or equal to the block length. or equal to the block length.
(C) This mode operates by directly using the algorithm's (C) This mode operates by directly using the algorithm's
previously generated output block as the algorithm's next input previously generated output block as the algorithm's next input
block (i.e., by "feeding back" the output block) and combining block (i.e., by "feeding back" the output block) and combining
(exclusive OR-ing) the output block with the next plaintext (exclusive OR-ing) the output block with the next plaintext
segment (of block length or less) to form the next ciphertext segment (of block length or less) to form the next ciphertext
segment. segment.
outsider attack $ outside attack
$ outsider attack
See: (secondary definition in) attack. See: (secondary definition in) attack.
P1363 $ P1363
See: IEEE P1363. See: IEEE P1363.
PAA $ PAA
See: policy approving authority. See: policy approving authority.
packet filter $ packet filter
See: (secondary definition in) filtering router. See: (secondary definition in) filtering router.
PAN $ pagejacking
(I) A contraction (of Web PAGE hiJACKING); a masquerade attack in
which the attacker copies (steals) a home page or other material
from the target server, rehosts the page on a server the attacker
controls, and causes the rehosted page to be indexed by the major
Web search services, thereby diverting browsers from the target
server to the attacker's server.
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not listed in
most dictionaries and might confuse international readers.
$ PAN
See: primary account number. See: primary account number.
PAP $ PAP
See: Password Authentication Protocol. See: Password Authentication Protocol.
partitioned security mode $ partitioned security mode
(N) A mode of operation of an information system, wherein all (N) A mode of operation of an information system, wherein all
users have the clearance, but not necessarily formal access users have the clearance, but not necessarily formal access
authorization and need-to-know, for all information handled by the authorization and need-to-know, for all information handled by the
system. (This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of system. (This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of
Defense policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2].) Defense policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2].)
passive attack $ passive attack
See: (secondary definition in) attack. See: (secondary definition in) attack.
passive wiretapping $ passive wiretapping
See: (secondary definition in) wiretapping. See: (secondary definition in) wiretapping.
password $ password
(I) A secret data value, usually a character string, that is used (I) A secret data value, usually a character string, that is used
as authentication information. (Also see: challenge-response.) as authentication information. (See: challenge-response.)
(C) A password is usually matched with a user identifier that is (C) A password is usually matched with a user identifier that is
explicitly presented in the authentication process, but in some explicitly presented in the authentication process, but in some
cases the identity may be implicit. cases the identity may be implicit.
(C) Using a password as authentication information assumes that (C) Using a password as authentication information assumes that
the password is known only by the system entity whose identity is the password is known only by the system entity whose identity is
being authenticated. Therefore, in a network environment where being authenticated. Therefore, in a network environment where
wiretapping is possible, simple authentication that relies on wiretapping is possible, simple authentication that relies on
transmission of static (repetitively used) passwords as cleartext transmission of static (repetitively used) passwords as cleartext
is inadequate. (Also see: one-time password, strong is inadequate. (See: one-time password, strong authentication.)
authentication.)
Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) $ Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)
(I) A simple authentication mechanism in PPP, in which a user (I) A simple authentication mechanism in PPP, in which a user
identifier and password are transmitted in cleartext. [R1334] identifier and password are transmitted in cleartext. [R1334]
(Also see: CHAP.) (See: CHAP.)
password sniffing $ password sniffing
(I) Passive wiretapping, usually on local area network, to gain (I) Passive wiretapping, usually on local area network, to gain
knowledge of passwords. (See: (usage note in) sniffing.) knowledge of passwords. (See: (usage note in) sniffing.)
path discovery $ path discovery
(I) For a given digital certificate, the process of finding a set (I) For a given digital certificate, the process of finding a set
of public-key certificates that comprise a certification path from of public-key certificates that comprise a certification path from
a trusted key to that digital certificate. a trusted key to that digital certificate.
path validation $ path validation
(I) The process of validating all of the digital certificates in a (I) The process of validating all of the digital certificates in a
certification path and the required relationships between those certification path and the required relationships between those
certificates, thus validating the contents of the last certificate certificates, thus validating the contents of the last certificate
on the path. (Also see: certificate validation.) on the path. (See: certificate validation.)
payment card $ payment card
(N) SET usage: Collectively refers "to credit cards, debit cards, (N) SET usage: Collectively refers "to credit cards, debit cards,
charge cards, and bank cards issued by a financial institution and charge cards, and bank cards issued by a financial institution and
which reflects a relationship between the cardholder and the which reflects a relationship between the cardholder and the
financial institution." [SET2] financial institution." [SET2]
payment gateway $ payment gateway
(O) SET usage: A system operated by an acquirer, or a third party (O) SET usage: A system operated by an acquirer, or a third party
designated by an acquirer, for the purpose of providing electronic designated by an acquirer, for the purpose of providing electronic
commerce services to the merchants in support of the acquirer, and commerce services to the merchants in support of the acquirer, and
which interfaces to the acquirer to support the authorization, which interfaces to the acquirer to support the authorization,
capture, and processing of merchant payment messages, including capture, and processing of merchant payment messages, including
payment instructions from cardholders. [SET1, SET2] payment instructions from cardholders. [SET1, SET2]
payment gateway certification authority (SET PCA) $ payment gateway certification authority (SET PCA)
(O) SET usage: A CA that issues digital certificates to payment (O) SET usage: A CA that issues digital certificates to payment
gateways and is operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an gateways and is operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an
acquirer, or another party according to brand rules. A SET PCA acquirer, or another party according to brand rules. A SET PCA
issues a CRL for compromised payment gateway certificates. [SET2] issues a CRL for compromised payment gateway certificates. [SET2]
(Also see: PCA.) (See: PCA.)
PC card $ PC card
(N) A plug-in peripheral device, originally developed for portable (N) A plug-in peripheral device, originally developed for portable
computers, that provides for functional expansion--such as computers, that provides for functional expansion--such as
removable storage, modems, device interface adapters, and removable storage, modems, device interface adapters, and
cryptographic modules--in an internationally standardized, non- cryptographic modules--in an internationally standardized, non-
proprietary form factor about the size of a credit card. (Also proprietary form factor about the size of a credit card. (See:
see: FORTEZZA, PCMCIA.) FORTEZZA, PCMCIA.)
(C) The PC Card Standard defines a 68-pin interface between the (C) The PC Card Standard defines a 68-pin interface between the
peripheral and the socket and defines three standard sizes, Types peripheral and the socket and defines three standard sizes, Types
I, II and III. All three have the same length and width, roughly I, II and III. All three have the same length and width, roughly
the size of a credit card, but differ in their thickness from 3.3 the size of a credit card, but differ in their thickness from 3.3
to 10.5 mm. to 10.5 mm.
PCA $ PCA
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this acronym without a qualifying
acronym without a qualifying adjective because that would be adjective because that would be ambiguous. (See: Internet policy
ambiguous. (See: Internet policy certification authority, (MISSI) certification authority, (MISSI) policy creation authority, (SET)
policy creation authority, (SET) payment gateway certification payment gateway certification authority.)
authority.)
PCMCIA $ PCMCIA
(N) Personal Computer Memory Card International Association, an (N) Personal Computer Memory Card International Association, an
international group of manufacturers, developers, and vendors, international group of manufacturers, developers, and vendors,
founded in 1989 to standardize plug-in peripheral memory cards for founded in 1989 to standardize plug-in peripheral memory cards for
personal computers and now extended to deal with any technology personal computers and now extended to deal with any technology
that works in the PC Card form factor. that works in the PC Card form factor.
peer entity authentication $ peer entity authentication
(I) "The corroboration that a peer entity in an association is the (I) "The corroboration that a peer entity in an association is the
one claimed." [I7498 Part 2] (Also see: authentication.) one claimed." [I7498 Part 2] (See: authentication.)
peer entity authentication service $ peer entity authentication service
(I) A security service that verifies an identity claimed by or for (I) A security service that verifies an identity claimed by or for
a system entity in an association. (Also see: authentication, a system entity in an association. (See: authentication,
authentication service.) authentication service.)
(C) This service is used at the establishment of, or at times (C) This service is used at the establishment of, or at times
during, an association to confirm the identity of one entity to during, an association to confirm the identity of one entity to
another, thus protecting against a masquerade by the first entity. another, thus protecting against a masquerade by the first entity.
However, unlike data origin authentication service, this service However, unlike data origin authentication service, this service
requires an association to exist between the two entities, and the requires an association to exist between the two entities, and the
corroboration provided by the service is valid only at the current corroboration provided by the service is valid only at the current
time that the service is provided. time that the service is provided.
(C) See: "relationship between data integrity service and (C) See: "relationship between data integrity service and
authentication services" under data integrity service. authentication services" under data integrity service.
PEM $ PEM
See: Privacy Enhanced Mail. See: Privacy Enhanced Mail.
penetration $ penetration
(I) Successful, repeatable, unauthorized access to a protected (I) Successful, repeatable, unauthorized access to a protected
system resource. (Also see: attack, violation.) system resource. (See: attack, violation.)
penetration test $ penetration test
(I) A system test, often part of system certification, in which (I) A system test, often part of system certification, in which
evaluators attempt to circumvent the security features of the evaluators attempt to circumvent the security features of the
system. [NCS04] system. [NCS04]
(C) Penetration testing may be performed under various constraints (C) Penetration testing may be performed under various constraints
and conditions. However, for a TCSEC evaluation, testers are and conditions. However, for a TCSEC evaluation, testers are
assumed to have all system design and implementation assumed to have all system design and implementation
documentation, including source code, manuals, and circuit documentation, including source code, manuals, and circuit
diagrams, and to work under no greater constraints than those diagrams, and to work under no greater constraints than those
applied to ordinary users. applied to ordinary users.
perfect forward secrecy $ perfect forward secrecy
See: (discussion under) public-key forward secrecy. See: (discussion under) public-key forward secrecy.
perimeter $ perimeter
See: security perimeter. See: security perimeter.
periods processing $ periods processing
(I) A mode of system operation in which information of different (I) A mode of system operation in which information of different
sensitivities is processed at distinctly different times by the sensitivities is processed at distinctly different times by the
same system, with the system being properly purged or sanitized same system, with the system being properly purged or sanitized
between periods. (Also see: color change.) between periods. (See: color change.)
permission $ permission
(I) A synonym for "authorization", but "authorization" is (I) A synonym for "authorization", but "authorization" is
preferred in the PKI context. preferred in the PKI context.
personal identification number (PIN) $ personal identification number (PIN)
(I) A character string used as a password to gain access to a (I) A character string used as a password to gain access to a
system resource. (Also see: authentication information.) system resource. (See: authentication information.)
(C) Despite the words "identification" and "number", a PIN seldom (C) Despite the words "identification" and "number", a PIN seldom
serves as a user identifier, and a PIN's characters are not serves as a user identifier, and a PIN's characters are not
necessarily all numeric. A better name for this concept would have necessarily all numeric. A better name for this concept would have
been "personal authentication system string (PASS)". been "personal authentication system string (PASS)".
(C) Retail banking applications commonly use 4-character PINs. (C) Retail banking applications commonly use 4-character PINs.
FORTEZZA PC card's use up to 12 characters for user or SSO PINs. FORTEZZA PC card's use up to 12 characters for user or SSO PINs.
personality, personality label $ personality
$ personality label
(O) MISSI usage: A set of MISSI X.509 public-key certificates that (O) MISSI usage: A set of MISSI X.509 public-key certificates that
have the same subject DN, together with their associated private have the same subject DN, together with their associated private
keys and usage specifications, that is stored on a FORTEZZA PC keys and usage specifications, that is stored on a FORTEZZA PC
card to support a role played by the card's user. card to support a role played by the card's user.
(C) When a card's user selects a personality to use in a FORTEZZA- (C) When a card's user selects a personality to use in a FORTEZZA-
aware application, the data determines behavior traits (the aware application, the data determines behavior traits (the
personality) of the application. A card's user may have multiple personality) of the application. A card's user may have multiple
personalities on the card. Each has a personality label, a user- personalities on the card. Each has a personality label, a user-
friendly character string that applications can display to the friendly character string that applications can display to the
user for selecting or changing the personality to be used. For user for selecting or changing the personality to be used. For
example, a military user's card might contain three personalities: example, a military user's card might contain three personalities:
GENERAL HALFTRACK, COMMANDER FORT SWAMPY, and NEW YEAR'S EVE BALL GENERAL HALFTRACK, COMMANDER FORT SWAMPY, and NEW YEAR'S EVE BALL
CHAIRMAN. Each personality includes one or more certificates of CHAIRMAN. Each personality includes one or more certificates of
different types (such as DSA versus RSA), for different purposes different types (such as DSA versus RSA), for different purposes
(such as digital signature versus encryption), or with different (such as digital signature versus encryption), or with different
authorizations. authorizations.
personnel security $ personnel security
(I) Procedures to ensure that persons who access a system have (I) Procedures to ensure that persons who access a system have
proper authorization, clearance, and need-to-know as required by proper authorization, clearance, and need-to-know as required by
the system's security policy. the system's security policy.
PGP(trademark) $ PGP(trademark)
See: Pretty Good Privacy. See: Pretty Good Privacy.
Photuris $ Photuris
(I) A UDP-based, key establishment protocol for session keys, (I) A UDP-based, key establishment protocol for session keys,
designed for use with the IPsec protocols AH and ESP. Superseded designed for use with the IPsec protocols AH and ESP. Superseded
by IKE. by IKE.
phreak, phreaking $ phreak
(C) A contraction (phone + break) that refers to penetration of a $ phreaking
telephone system or other communication system; also a pun on (I) A contraction (of "telePHone bREAKing"); penetration of a
freak. Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this telephone system or, by extension, of any other communication or
term because the term is not listed in most dictionaries and might information system [Raym].
confuse international readers.
physical security (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not listed in
most dictionaries and might confuse international readers.
$ physical security
(I) Fences, walls, locks, vaults, human guards and guard dogs, (I) Fences, walls, locks, vaults, human guards and guard dogs,
sensors and alarms, and other tangible means of preventing sensors and alarms, and other tangible means of preventing
unauthorized physical access to a system. unauthorized physical access to a system. [FP031, R1455]
piggyback attack $ piggyback attack
(I) A form of active wiretapping in which the attacker gains (I) A form of active wiretapping in which the attacker gains
access to a system via intervals of inactivity in another user's access to a system via intervals of inactivity in another user's
legitimate communication connection. Sometimes called a "between- legitimate communication connection. Sometimes called a "between-
the-lines" attack. (Also see: hijack attack, man-in-the-middle the-lines" attack. (See: hijack attack, man-in-the-middle attack.)
attack.)
PIN $ PIN
See: personal identification number. See: personal identification number.
ping of death $ ping of death
(I) An attack that sends an improperly large Internet Control (I) An attack that sends an improperly large ICMP [R0792] echo
Message Protocol (ICMP) [R0792] echo request packet (a "ping") request packet (a "ping") with the intent of overflowing the input
with the intent of overflowing the input buffers of the buffers of the destination machine and causing it to crash.
destination machine and causing it to crash.
ping sweep $ ping sweep
(I) An attack that sends Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) (I) An attack that sends ICMP [R0792] echo requests ("pings") to
[R0792] echo requests ("pings") to range of IP addresses, with the range of IP addresses, with the goal of finding hosts that can be
goal of finding hosts that can be probed for vulnerabilities. probed for vulnerabilities.
PKCS $ PKCS
See: Public-Key Cryptography Standards. See: Public-Key Cryptography Standards.
PKCS #7 $ PKCS #7
(N) A standard [PKC07, R2315] from the PKCS series; defines a (N) A standard [PKC07, R2315] from the PKCS series; defines a
syntax for data that may have cryptography applied to it, such as syntax for data that may have cryptography applied to it, such as
for digital signatures and digital envelopes. for digital signatures and digital envelopes.
PKCS #10 $ PKCS #10
(N) A standard [PKC10] from the PKCS series; defines a syntax for (N) A standard [PKC10] from the PKCS series; defines a syntax for
requests for public-key certificates. (Also see: certification requests for public-key certificates. (See: certification
request.) request.)
(C) A PKCS #10 request contains a DN and a public key, and may (C) A PKCS #10 request contains a DN and a public key, and may
contain other attributes, and is signed by the entity making the contain other attributes, and is signed by the entity making the
request. The request is sent to a CA, who converts it to an X.509 request. The request is sent to a CA, who converts it to an X.509
public-key certificate (or some other form), and returns it, public-key certificate (or some other form), and returns it,
possibly in PKCS #7 format. possibly in PKCS #7 format.
PKCS #11 $ PKCS #11
(N) A standard [PKC11] from the PKCS series; defines a software (N) A standard [PKC11] from the PKCS series; defines a software
CAPI called Cryptoki (pronounced "crypto-key"; short for CAPI called Cryptoki (pronounced "crypto-key"; short for
"cryptographic token interface") for devices that hold "cryptographic token interface") for devices that hold
cryptographic information and perform cryptographic functions. cryptographic information and perform cryptographic functions.
PKI $ PKI
See: public-key infrastructure. See: public-key infrastructure.
PKIX $ PKIX
(I) (1.) A contraction of "Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)", the (I) (1.) A contraction of "Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)", the
name of the IETF working group that is specifying an architecture name of the IETF working group that is specifying an architecture
and set of protocols needed to support an X.509-based PKI for the and set of protocols needed to support an X.509-based PKI for the
Internet. (2.) A collective name for that architecture and set of Internet. (2.) A collective name for that architecture and set of
protocols. protocols.
(C) The goal of PKIX is to facilitate the use of X.509 public-key (C) The goal of PKIX is to facilitate the use of X.509 public-key
certificates in multiple Internet applications and to promote certificates in multiple Internet applications and to promote
interoperability between different implementations that use those interoperability between different implementations that use those
certificates. The resulting PKI is intended to provide a framework certificates. The resulting PKI is intended to provide a framework
skipping to change at page 105, line 11 skipping to change at page 115, line 24
range of usage environments. PKIX specifies (a) profiles of the v3 range of usage environments. PKIX specifies (a) profiles of the v3
X.509 public-key certificate standards and the v2 X.509 CRL X.509 public-key certificate standards and the v2 X.509 CRL
standards for the Internet, (b) operational protocols used by standards for the Internet, (b) operational protocols used by
relying parties to obtain information such as certificates or relying parties to obtain information such as certificates or
certificate status; (c) management protocols used by system certificate status; (c) management protocols used by system
entities to exchange information needed for proper management of entities to exchange information needed for proper management of
the PKI; and (d) information about certificate policies and CPSs, the PKI; and (d) information about certificate policies and CPSs,
covering the areas of PKI security not directly addressed in the covering the areas of PKI security not directly addressed in the
rest of PKIX. rest of PKIX.
PKIX private extension $ PKIX private extension
(I) PKIX defines a private extension to identify an on-line (I) PKIX defines a private extension to identify an on-line
verification service supporting the issuing CA. verification service supporting the issuing CA.
plaintext $ plaintext
(I) Data that is input to and transformed by an encryption (I) Data that is input to and transformed by an encryption
process, or that is output by a decryption process. process, or that is output by a decryption process.
(C) Usually, the plaintext input to an encryption operation is (C) Usually, the plaintext input to an encryption operation is
cleartext. But in some cases, the input is ciphertext that was cleartext. But in some cases, the input is ciphertext that was
output from another encryption operation. (Also see: output from another encryption operation. (See: superencryption.)
superencryption.)
Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) $ Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)
(I) An Internet protocol [R1661] for encapsulation and full-duplex (I) An Internet protocol [R1661] for encapsulation and full-duplex
transportation of network layer protocol (mainly OSI layer 3) data transportation of network layer protocol (mainly OSI layer 3) data
packets over a link between two peers, and for multiplexing packets over a link between two peers, and for multiplexing
different network layer protocols over the same link. Includes different network layer protocols over the same link. Includes
optional negotiation to select and use a peer entity optional negotiation to select and use a peer entity
authentication protocol to authenticate the peer to each other authentication protocol to authenticate the peer to each other
before they exchange network layer data. (Also see: CHAP, EAP, before they exchange network layer data. (See: CHAP, EAP, PAP.)
PAP.)
Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) $ Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)
(I) An Internet client-server protocol (originally developed by (I) An Internet client-server protocol (originally developed by
Ascend and Microsoft) that enables a dial-up user to create a Ascend and Microsoft) that enables a dial-up user to create a
virtual extension of the dial-up link across a network by virtual extension of the dial-up link across a network by
tunneling PPP over IP. (Also see: L2TP.) tunneling PPP over IP. (See: L2TP.)
(C) PPP can in turn encapsulate any or IPS network layer protocol (C) PPP can in turn encapsulate any or IPS network layer protocol
(or OSI layer 3 protocol). Therefore, PPTP does not specify (or OSI layer 3 protocol). Therefore, PPTP does not specify
security services; it depends on protocols above and below it to security services; it depends on protocols above and below it to
provide any needed security. PPTP makes it possible to divorce the provide any needed security. PPTP makes it possible to divorce the
location of the initial dial-up server (the PPTP Access location of the initial dial-up server (the PPTP Access
Concentrator, the client, which runs on a special-purpose host) Concentrator, the client, which runs on a special-purpose host)
from the location at which the dial-up protocol (PPP) connection from the location at which the dial-up protocol (PPP) connection
is terminated and access to the network is provided (the PPTP is terminated and access to the network is provided (the PPTP
Network Server, which runs on a general-purpose host). Network Server, which runs on a general-purpose host).
policy $ policy
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT this word as (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT this word as an abbreviation for either
an abbreviation for either "security policy" or "certificate "security policy", "certificate policy", or other kinds of policy.
policy"; instead, to avoid misunderstanding, use the full term. Instead, to avoid misunderstanding, use the fully qualified term,
at least at the point of first usage.
policy approving authority (PAA) $ policy approving authority (PAA)
(O) MISSI usage: The top-level signing authority of a MISSI (O) MISSI usage: The top-level signing authority of a MISSI
certification hierarchy. The term refers both that authoritative certification hierarchy. The term refers both that authoritative
office or role, and to the person who fills that office. (Also office or role, and to the person who fills that office. (See:
see: root registry.) root registry.)
(C) A PAA registers MISSI PCAs and signs their X.509 public-key (C) A PAA registers MISSI PCAs and signs their X.509 public-key
certificates. A PAA issues CRLs but does not issue a CKL. A PAA certificates. A PAA issues CRLs but does not issue a CKL. A PAA
may issue cross-certificates to other PAAs. may issue cross-certificates to other PAAs.
policy certification authority (Internet PCA) $ policy certification authority (Internet PCA)
(I) An X.509-compliant CA at the second level of the Internet (I) An X.509-compliant CA at the second level of the Internet
certification hierarchy, under the Internet Policy Registration certification hierarchy, under the Internet Policy Registration
Authority (IPRA). Each PCA operates in accordance with its Authority (IPRA). Each PCA operates in accordance with its
published security policy (see: certification practice statement) published security policy (see: certification practice statement)
and within constraints established by the IPRA for all PCAs. and within constraints established by the IPRA for all PCAs.
[R1422]. (Also see: policy creation authority.) [R1422]. (See: policy creation authority.)
policy creation authority (MISSI PCA) $ policy creation authority (MISSI PCA)
(O) MISSI usage: The second level of a MISSI certification (O) MISSI usage: The second level of a MISSI certification
hierarchy; the administrative root of a security policy domain of hierarchy; the administrative root of a security policy domain of
MISSI users and other, subsidiary authorities. The term refers MISSI users and other, subsidiary authorities. The term refers
both that authoritative office or role, and to the person who both that authoritative office or role, and to the person who
fills that office. (Also see: policy certification authority.) fills that office. (See: policy certification authority.)
(C) A MISSI PCA's certificate is issued by a policy approving (C) A MISSI PCA's certificate is issued by a policy approving
authority. The PCA registers the CAs in its domain, defines their authority. The PCA registers the CAs in its domain, defines their
configurations, and issues their X.509 public-key certificates. configurations, and issues their X.509 public-key certificates.
(The PCA may also issue certificates for SCAs, ORAs, and other end (The PCA may also issue certificates for SCAs, ORAs, and other end
entities, but a PCA does not usually do this.) The PCA entities, but a PCA does not usually do this.) The PCA
periodically issues CRLs and CKLs for its domain. periodically issues CRLs and CKLs for its domain.
policy mapping $ Policy Management Authority
(N) Canadian usage: An organization responsible for the oversight
and policy management of the Government of Canada.
$ policy mapping
(I) "Recognizing that, when a CA in one domain certifies a CA in (I) "Recognizing that, when a CA in one domain certifies a CA in
another domain, a particular certificate policy in the second another domain, a particular certificate policy in the second
domain may be considered by the authority of the first domain to domain may be considered by the authority of the first domain to
be equivalent (but not necessarily identical in all respects) to a be equivalent (but not necessarily identical in all respects) to a
particular certificate policy in the first domain." [X509] particular certificate policy in the first domain." [X509]
port scan $ POP3
See: Post Office Protocol, version 3.
$ POP3 APOP
(I) A "command" (better described as a transaction type, or a
protocol-within-a-protocol) in POP3 [R1939], by which a POP3
client optionally uses a keyed hash (based on MD5) to authenticate
itself to a POP3 server and, depending on the server
implementation, also to protect against replay attacks. (See:
CRAM, POP3 AUTH, IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE.)
(C) The server includes a unique timestamp in its greeting to the
client. The subsequent APOP command sent by the client to the
server contains the client's name and the hash result of applying
MD5 to a string formed from the timestamp and a shared secret that
is known only to the client and the server. APOP was designed as
an alternative to using POP3's USER and PASS (i.e., password)
command pair, in which the client sends a cleartext password to
the server.
$ POP3 AUTH
(I) A "command" [R1734] (better described as a transaction type,
or a protocol-within-a-protocol) in POP3, by which a POP3 client
optionally proposes a mechanism to a POP3 server to authenticate
the client to the server and provide other security services.
(See: POP3 APOP, IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE.)
(C) If the server accepts the proposal, the command is followed by
performing a challenge-response authentication protocol and,
optionally, negotiating a protection mechanism for subsequent POP3
interactions. The security mechanisms used by POP3 AUTH are those
used by IMAP4.
$ port scan
(I) An attack that sends client requests to a range of server port (I) An attack that sends client requests to a range of server port
addresses on a host, with the goal of finding an active port and addresses on a host, with the goal of finding an active port and
exploiting a known vulnerability of that service. exploiting a known vulnerability of that service.
POSIX $ POSIX
(N) Portable Operating System Interface for Computer Environments, (N) Portable Operating System Interface for Computer Environments,
a standard [FP151, IS9945-1] (originally IEEE Standard P1003.1) a standard [FP151, IS9945-1] (originally IEEE Standard P1003.1)
that defines an operating system interface and environment to that defines an operating system interface and environment to
support application portability at the source code level. It is support application portability at the source code level. It is
intended to be used by both application developers and system intended to be used by both application developers and system
implementers. implementers.
(C) P1003.1 supports security functionality like those on most (C) P1003.1 supports security functionality like those on most
UNIX systems, including discretionary access control and UNIX systems, including discretionary access control and
privilege. IEEE Draft Standard P1003.6.1 specifies additional privilege. IEEE Draft Standard P1003.6.1 specifies additional
functionality not provided in the base standard, including (a) functionality not provided in the base standard, including (a)
discretionary access control, (b) audit trail mechanisms, (c) discretionary access control, (b) audit trail mechanisms, (c)
privilege mechanisms, (d) mandatory access control, and (e) privilege mechanisms, (d) mandatory access control, and (e)
information label mechanisms. information label mechanisms.
PPP $ Post Office Protocol, version 3 (POP3)
(I) An Internet protocol [R1939] by which a client workstation can
dynamically access a mailbox on a server host to retrieve mail
messages that the server has received and is holding for the
client. (See: IMAP4.)
(C) POP3 has mechanisms for optionally authenticating a client to
a server and providing other security services. (See: POP3 APOP,
POP3 AUTH.)
$ PPP
See: Point-to-Point Protocol. See: Point-to-Point Protocol.
PPTP $ PPTP
See: Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol. See: Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol.
pre-authorization $ pre-authorization
(I) A capability of a CA that enable certification requests to be (I) A capability of a CA that enable certification requests to be
automatically validated against data provided in advance to the CA automatically validated against data provided in advance to the CA
by an authorizing entity. by an authorizing entity.
Pretty Good Privacy(trademark) (PGP(trademark)) $ Pretty Good Privacy(trademark) (PGP(trademark))
(O) Trademarks of Network Associates, Inc., referring to a (O) Trademarks of Network Associates, Inc., referring to a
computer program and related protocols, that use cryptography to computer program and related protocols, that use cryptography to
provide data security for electronic mail and other applications provide data security for electronic mail and other applications
on the Internet. (Also see: MOSS, PEM, S/MIME.) on the Internet. (See: MOSS, PEM, S/MIME.)
(C) PGP encrypts messages with IDEA in CFB mode; distributes the (C) PGP encrypts messages with IDEA in CFB mode, distributes the
IDEA keys by encrypting them with RSA, and creates digital IDEA keys by encrypting them with RSA, and creates digital
signatures on messages with MD5 and RSA. To establish ownership of signatures on messages with MD5 and RSA. To establish ownership of
public keys, PGP depends on the web of trust. (Compare with: public keys, PGP depends on the web of trust. (Compare with:
Privacy Enhanced Mail.) Privacy Enhanced Mail.)
primary account number (PAN) $ primary account number (PAN)
(O) SET usage: "The assigned number that identifies the card (O) SET usage: "The assigned number that identifies the card
issuer and cardholder. This account number is composed of an issuer and cardholder. This account number is composed of an
issuer identification number (see: bank identification number), an issuer identification number (see: bank identification number), an
individual account number identification, and an accompanying individual account number identification, and an accompanying
check digit as defined by ISO 7812-1985." [SET2, IS7812] check digit as defined by ISO 7812-1985." [SET2, IS7812]
(C) The PAN is embossed, encoded, or both on a magnetic-strip- (C) The PAN is embossed, encoded, or both on a magnetic-strip-
based credit card. The PAN identifies the issuer to which a based credit card. The PAN identifies the issuer to which a
transaction is to be routed and the account to which it is to be transaction is to be routed and the account to which it is to be
applied unless specific instructions indicate otherwise. The applied unless specific instructions indicate otherwise. The
authority that assigns the bank identification number part of the authority that assigns the bank identification number part of the
PAN is the American Bankers Association. PAN is the American Bankers Association.
privacy $ privacy
(I) The right of an entity (normally a person), acting in its own (I) The right of an entity (normally a person), acting in its own
behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with its behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with its
environment, including the degree to which the entity is willing environment, including the degree to which the entity is willing
to share information about itself with others. (Also see: to share information about itself with others. (See: anonymity.)
anonymity.)
(O) "The right of individuals to control or influence what (O) "The right of individuals to control or influence what
information related to them may be collected and stored and by information related to them may be collected and stored and by
whom and to whom that information may be disclosed." [I7498 Part whom and to whom that information may be disclosed." [I7498 Part
2] 2]
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "data
as a synonym for "data confidentiality" or "data confidentiality confidentiality" or "data confidentiality service", which are
service", which are different concepts. Privacy is a reason for different concepts. Privacy is a reason for security rather than a
security rather than a kind of security. For example, a system kind of security. For example, a system that stores personal data
that stores personal data needs to protect the data to prevent needs to protect the data to prevent harm, embarrassment,
harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any person inconvenience, or unfairness to any person about whom data is
about whom data is maintained, and to protect the person's maintained, and to protect the person's privacy. For that reason,
privacy. For that reason, the system may need to provide data the system may need to provide data confidentiality service.
confidentiality service.
Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) $ Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)
(I) An Internet protocol to provide data confidentiality, data (I) An Internet protocol to provide data confidentiality, data
integrity, and data origin authentication for electronic mail. integrity, and data origin authentication for electronic mail.
[R1421, R1422]. (Also see: MOSS, MSP, PGP, S/MIME.) [R1421, R1422]. (See: MOSS, MSP, PGP, S/MIME.)
(C) PEM encrypts messages with DES in CBC mode; provides key (C) PEM encrypts messages with DES in CBC mode; provides key
distribution of DES keys by encrypting them with RSA; and signs distribution of DES keys by encrypting them with RSA; and signs
messages with RSA and either MD2 or MD5. To establish ownership of messages with RSA and either MD2 or MD5. To establish ownership of
public keys, PEM uses a certification hierarchy, with X.509 public keys, PEM uses a certification hierarchy, with X.509
public-key certificates and X.509 CRLs that are signed with RSA public-key certificates and X.509 CRLs that are signed with RSA
and MD2. (Compare with: Pretty Good Privacy.) and MD2. (Compare with: Pretty Good Privacy.)
(C) PEM is designed to be compatible with a wide range of key (C) PEM is designed to be compatible with a wide range of key
management methods, but is limited by specifying security services management methods, but is limited by specifying security services
only for text messages and, like MOSS, has not been widely only for text messages and, like MOSS, has not been widely
implemented in the Internet. implemented in the Internet.
private component $ private component
(I) A synonym for "private key". (I) A synonym for "private key".
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term; (D) In most cases, ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term; to avoid
to avoid confusing readers, use "private key" instead. However, confusing readers, use "private key" instead. However, the term
the term MAY be used when specifically discussing a key pair; MAY be used when specifically discussing a key pair; e.g., "A key
e.g., "A key pair has a public component and a private component." pair has a public component and a private component."
private extension $ private extension
See: (secondary definition in) extension. See: (secondary definition in) extension.
private key $ private key
(I) The secret component of a pair of cryptographic keys used for (I) The secret component of a pair of cryptographic keys used for
asymmetric cryptography. (Also see: key pair, public key.) asymmetric cryptography. (See: key pair, public key.)
(O) "(In a public key cryptosystem) that key of a user's key pair (O) "(In a public key cryptosystem) that key of a user's key pair
which is known only by that user." [X509] which is known only by that user." [X509]
privilege $ privilege
(I) An authorization or set of authorizations to perform security- (I) An authorization or set of authorizations to perform security-
relevant functions, especially in the context of a computer relevant functions, especially in the context of a computer
operating system. operating system.
procedural security $ privilege management infrastructure
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term. (N) "The complete set of processes required to provide an
Instead, use "administrative security". authorization service" [i.e., processes concerned with attribute
certificates]. [FPDAM]
proprietary (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term and its definition because the
definition is vague, and there is no consensus on an alternate
definition.
$ privileged process
(I) An computer process that is authorized (and, therefore,
trusted) to perform some security-relevant functions that ordinary
processes are not. (See: privilege, trusted process.)
$ procedural security
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
"administrative security". Any type of security may involve
procedures; therefore, the term may be misleading. Instead, use
"administrative security", "communication security", "computer
security", "emanations security", "personnel security", "physical
security", or whatever specific type is meant. (See: security
architecture.)
$ proprietary
(I) Refers to information (or other property) that is owned by an (I) Refers to information (or other property) that is owned by an
individual or organization and for which the use is restricted by individual or organization and for which the use is restricted by
that entity. that entity.
protected checksum $ protected checksum
(I) A checksum that is computed for a data set by means that (I) A checksum that is computed for a data set by means that
protect against active attacks that would attempt to change the protect against active attacks that would attempt to change the
checksum to make it match changes made to the data set. (Also see: checksum to make it match changes made to the data set. (See:
digital signature, keyed hash, (discussion under) checksum. digital signature, keyed hash, (discussion under) checksum.
protected distribution system $ protected distribution system
(I) A wireline or fiber-optic system that includes sufficient (I) A wireline or fiber-optic system that includes sufficient
safeguards (acoustic, electric, electromagnetic, and physical) to safeguards (acoustic, electric, electromagnetic, and physical) to
permit its use for unencrypted transmission of (cleartext) data. permit its use for unencrypted transmission of (cleartext) data.
protocol $ protection authority
(I) A set of formats and procedures to implement and control some See: (secondary definition in) Internet Protocol Security Option.
type of data exchange (i.e., data communication) between systems.
(For example, see: Internet Protocol.)
(C) More generally, a series of ordered steps involving computing $ protection ring
(I) One of a hierarchy of privileged operation modes of a system
that gives certain access rights to processes authorized to
operate in that mode.
$ protocol
(I) A set of rules (i.e., formats and procedures) to implement and
control some type of association (e.g., communication) between
systems. (For example, see: Internet Protocol.)
(C) In particular, a series of ordered steps involving computing
and communication that are performed by two or more system and communication that are performed by two or more system
entities to achieve a joint objective. [A9042] entities to achieve a joint objective. [A9042]
protocol suite $ protocol suite
(I) A complementary collection of communication protocols used in (I) A complementary collection of communication protocols used in
a computer network. (Also see: Internet, OSI.) a computer network. (See: Internet, OSI.)
proxy server $ proxy server
(I) A computer process--often used as, or as part of, a firewall-- (I) A computer process--often used as, or as part of, a firewall--
that relays a protocol between client and server computer systems, that relays a protocol between client and server computer systems,
by appearing to the client to be the server and appearing to the by appearing to the client to be the server and appearing to the
server to be the client. (Also see: SOCKS.) server to be the client. (See: SOCKS.)
(C) In a firewall, a proxy server usually runs on a bastion host, (C) In a firewall, a proxy server usually runs on a bastion host,
which may support proxies for several protocols (e.g., FTP, HTTP, which may support proxies for several protocols (e.g., FTP, HTTP,
and TELNET). Instead of a client in the protected enclave and TELNET). Instead of a client in the protected enclave
connecting directly to an external server, the client connects to connecting directly to an external server, the client connects to
the proxy server which in turn connects to the external server. the proxy server which in turn connects to the external server.
The proxy server waits for a request from inside the firewall, The proxy server waits for a request from inside the firewall,
forwards the request to the remote server outside the firewall, forwards the request to the remote server outside the firewall,
gets the response, then sends the response back to the client. The gets the response, then sends the response back to the client. The
proxy may be transparent to the clients, or they may need to proxy may be transparent to the clients, or they may need to
skipping to change at page 110, line 21 skipping to change at page 121, line 49
to perform caching, high-level logging, and access control. A to perform caching, high-level logging, and access control. A
proxy can provide security service beyond that which is normally proxy can provide security service beyond that which is normally
part of the relayed protocol, such as access control based on peer part of the relayed protocol, such as access control based on peer
entity authentication of clients, or peer entity authentication of entity authentication of clients, or peer entity authentication of
servers when clients do not have that capability. A proxy at OSI servers when clients do not have that capability. A proxy at OSI
layer 7 can also provide finer-grained security service than can a layer 7 can also provide finer-grained security service than can a
filtering router at OSI layer 3. For example, an FTP proxy could filtering router at OSI layer 3. For example, an FTP proxy could
permit transfers out of, but not into, a protected network, or permit transfers out of, but not into, a protected network, or
vice versa. vice versa.
pseudo-random $ pseudo-random
(I) A sequence of values that appears to be random (i.e., (I) A sequence of values that appears to be random (i.e.,
unpredictable) but is actually generated by a deterministic unpredictable) but is actually generated by a deterministic
algorithm. algorithm.
pseudo-random number generator $ pseudo-random number generator
(I) A process used to deterministically generate a series of (I) A process used to deterministically generate a series of
numbers (usually integers) that appear to be random according to numbers (usually integers) that appear to be random according to
certain statistical tests, but actually are pseudo-random. certain statistical tests, but actually are pseudo-random.
(C) Pseudo-random number generators are usually implemented in (C) Pseudo-random number generators are usually implemented in
software. software.
public component $ public component
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "public key"
as a synonym for "public key" except when discussing a key pair. except when discussing a key pair.
public key $ public key
(I) The publicly-disclosable component of a pair of cryptographic (I) The publicly-disclosable component of a pair of cryptographic
keys used for asymmetric cryptography. (Also see: key pair, keys used for asymmetric cryptography. (See: key pair, private
private key.) key.)
(O) "(In a public key cryptosystem) that key of a user's key pair (O) "(In a public key cryptosystem) that key of a user's key pair
which is publicly known." [X509] which is publicly known." [X509]
public-key certificate $ public-key certificate
(I) A digital certificate that binds a system entity's identity to (I) A digital certificate that binds a system entity's identity to
a public key value, and possibly to additional data items; a a public key value, and possibly to additional data items; a
digitally-signed data structure that attests to the ownership of a digitally-signed data structure that attests to the ownership of a
public key. (Also see: X.509 public-key certificate.) public key. (See: X.509 public-key certificate.)
(C) The digital signature on a public-key certificate is (C) The digital signature on a public-key certificate is
unforgeable. Thus, the certificate can be published, such as by unforgeable. Thus, the certificate can be published, such as by
posting it in a directory, without the directory having to protect posting it in a directory, without the directory having to protect
the certificate's data integrity. the certificate's data integrity.
(O) "The public key of a user, together with some other (O) "The public key of a user, together with some other
information, rendered unforgeable by encipherment with the private information, rendered unforgeable by encipherment with the private
key of the certification authority which issued it." [X509] key of the certification authority which issued it." [X509]
public-key cryptography $ public-key cryptography
(I) The popular synonym for "asymmetric cryptography". (I) The popular synonym for "asymmetric cryptography".
Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) $ Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)
(I) A series of specifications published by RSA Laboratories for (I) A series of specifications published by RSA Laboratories for
data structures and algorithm usage for basic applications of data structures and algorithm usage for basic applications of
asymmetric cryptography. (Also see: PKCS #7, PKCS #10, PKCS #11.) asymmetric cryptography. (See: PKCS #7, PKCS #10, PKCS #11.)
(C) The PKCS were begun in 1991 in cooperation with industry and (C) The PKCS were begun in 1991 in cooperation with industry and
academia, originally including Apple, Digital, Lotus, Microsoft, academia, originally including Apple, Digital, Lotus, Microsoft,
Northern Telecom, Sun, and MIT. Today, these specifications are Northern Telecom, Sun, and MIT. Today, these specifications are
widely used, but they are not sanctioned by an official standards widely used, but they are not sanctioned by an official standards
organizations, such as ANSI and ITU-T. RSA Laboratories retains organizations, such as ANSI and ITU-T. RSA Laboratories retains
sole decision-making authority over the PKCS. sole decision-making authority over the PKCS.
public-key forward secrecy (PFS) $ public-key forward secrecy (PFS)
(I) For a key agreement protocol based on asymmetric cryptography, (I) For a key agreement protocol based on asymmetric cryptography,
the property that ensures that a session key derived from a set of the property that ensures that a session key derived from a set of
long-term public and private keys will not be compromised if one long-term public and private keys will not be compromised if one
of the private keys is compromised in the future. of the private keys is compromised in the future.
(C) Some existing RFCs use the term "perfect forward secrecy" but (C) Some existing RFCs use the term "perfect forward secrecy" but
either do not define it or do not define it precisely. While either do not define it or do not define it precisely. While
preparing this glossary, we tried to find a good definition for preparing this Glossary, we tried to find a good definition for
that term, but found this to be a muddled area. Experts did not that term, but found this to be a muddled area. Experts did not
agree. For all practical purposes, the literature defines "perfect agree. For all practical purposes, the literature defines "perfect
forward secrecy" by stating the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. The term forward secrecy" by stating the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. The term
"public-key forward secrecy" (suggested by Hilarie Orman) and the "public-key forward secrecy" (suggested by Hilarie Orman) and the
"I" definition stated for it here were crafted to be compatible "I" definition stated for it here were crafted to be compatible
with current Internet documents, yet be narrow and leave room for with current Internet documents, yet be narrow and leave room for
improved terminology. improved terminology.
(C) Challenge to the Internet security community: We need a (C) Challenge to the Internet security community: We need a
taxonomy--a family of mutually exclusive and collectively taxonomy--a family of mutually exclusive and collectively
skipping to change at page 112, line 26 skipping to change at page 123, line 52
also is the idea that compromise of a single key will compromise also is the idea that compromise of a single key will compromise
only the data protected by the single key. In Internet literature, only the data protected by the single key. In Internet literature,
the focus has been on protection against decryption of back the focus has been on protection against decryption of back
traffic in the event of a compromise of secret key material held traffic in the event of a compromise of secret key material held
by one or both parties to a communication. by one or both parties to a communication.
(C) Forward vs. backward: Experts are unhappy with the word (C) Forward vs. backward: Experts are unhappy with the word
"forward", because compromise of "this" encryption key also is not "forward", because compromise of "this" encryption key also is not
supposed to compromise the "previous" one. In S/KEY, if the key supposed to compromise the "previous" one. In S/KEY, if the key
used at time t is compromised, then all keys used prior to that used at time t is compromised, then all keys used prior to that
are compromised. If the "long-term" key (i.e, the base of the are compromised. If the "long-term" key (i.e., the base of the
hashing scheme) is compromised, then all keys past and future are hashing scheme) is compromised, then all keys past and future are
compromised; thus, you could say that S/KEY has neither forward compromised; thus, you could say that S/KEY has neither forward
nor backward secrecy. nor backward secrecy.
(C) Asymmetric cryptography vs. symmetric: Experts disagree about (C) Asymmetric cryptography vs. symmetric: Experts disagree about
forward secrecy in the context of symmetric cryptographic systems. forward secrecy in the context of symmetric cryptographic systems.
In the absence of asymmetric cryptography, compromise of any long- In the absence of asymmetric cryptography, compromise of any long-
term key seems to compromise any session key derived from the term key seems to compromise any session key derived from the
long-term key. For example, Kerberos isn't forward secret, because long-term key. For example, Kerberos isn't forward secret, because
compromising a client's password (thus compromising the key shared compromising a client's password (thus compromising the key shared
skipping to change at page 112, line 52 skipping to change at page 124, line 26
no difference. Others say that the initial naming was unfortunate no difference. Others say that the initial naming was unfortunate
and suggest dropping the word "perfect". Some suggest using and suggest dropping the word "perfect". Some suggest using
"forward secrecy" for the case where one long-term private key is "forward secrecy" for the case where one long-term private key is
compromised, and adding "perfect" for when both private keys (or, compromised, and adding "perfect" for when both private keys (or,
when the protocol is multi-party, all private keys) are when the protocol is multi-party, all private keys) are
compromised. compromised.
(C) Acknowledgements: Bill Burr, Burt Kaliski, Steve Kent, Paul (C) Acknowledgements: Bill Burr, Burt Kaliski, Steve Kent, Paul
Van Oorschot, Michael Wiener, and, especially, Hilarie Orman Van Oorschot, Michael Wiener, and, especially, Hilarie Orman
contributed ideas to this discussion. contributed ideas to this discussion.
public-key infrastructure (PKI)
$ public-key infrastructure (PKI)
(I) A system of CAs (and, optionally, RAs and other supporting (I) A system of CAs (and, optionally, RAs and other supporting
servers and agents) that perform some set of certificate servers and agents) that perform some set of certificate
management, archive management, key management, and token management, archive management, key management, and token
management functions for a community of users in an application of management functions for a community of users in an application of
asymmetric cryptography. (Also see: hierarchical PKI, mesh PKI, asymmetric cryptography. (See: hierarchical PKI, mesh PKI,
security management infrastructure, trust-file PKI.) security management infrastructure, trust-file PKI.)
(O) PKIX usage: The set of hardware, software, people, policies, (O) PKIX usage: The set of hardware, software, people, policies,
and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and
revoke digital certificates based on asymmetric cryptography. revoke digital certificates based on asymmetric cryptography.
(C) The core PKI functions are to register users and issue their (C) The core PKI functions are to register users and issue their
public-key certificates, revoke certificates when required, and public-key certificates, revoke certificates when required, and
archive data needed to validate certificates at a much later time. archive data needed to validate certificates at a much later time.
Key pairs may be generated by CAs or RAs, but requiring a PKI Key pairs may be generated by CAs or RAs, but requiring a PKI
client to generate its own digital signature key pair helps client to generate its own digital signature key pair helps
maintain system integrity of the cryptographic system, since only maintain system integrity of the cryptographic system, because
the client ever possesses the private key it uses. Also, an then only the client ever possesses the private key it uses. Also,
authority may be established to approve or coordinate CPSs, which an authority may be established to approve or coordinate CPSs,
are security policies under which components of a PKI operate. which are security policies under which components of a PKI
operate.
(C) A number of other servers and agents may support the core PKI, (C) A number of other servers and agents may support the core PKI,
and PKI clients may obtain services from them. The full range of and PKI clients may obtain services from them. The full range of
such services is not yet fully understood and is evolving, but such services is not yet fully understood and is evolving, but
supporting roles may include archive agent, certified delivery supporting roles may include archive agent, certified delivery
agent, confirmation agent, digital notary, directory, key escrow agent, confirmation agent, digital notary, directory, key escrow
agent, key generation agent, naming agent who ensures that issuers agent, key generation agent, naming agent who ensures that issuers
and subjects have unique identifiers within the PKI, repository, and subjects have unique identifiers within the PKI, repository,
ticket-granting agent, and time stamp agent. ticket-granting agent, and time stamp agent.
RA $ RA
See: registration authority. See: registration authority.
RA domains $ RA domains
(I) A capability of a CAW that allows a CA to divide the (I) A capability of a CAW that allows a CA to divide the
responsibility for certificate requests among multiple RAs. responsibility for certificate requests among multiple RAs.
(C) This capability might be used to restrict access to private (C) This capability might be used to restrict access to private
authorization data that is provided with a certificate request; authorization data that is provided with a certificate request;
and distribute the responsibility to review and approve and distribute the responsibility to review and approve
certificate requests in high volume environments among multiple certificate requests in high volume environments among multiple
RAs. RA domains might segregate certificate requests according to RAs. RA domains might segregate certificate requests according to
an attribute of the certificate subject, such as an organizational an attribute of the certificate subject, such as an organizational
unit unit
RADIUS $ RADIUS
See: Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service. See: Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service.
Rainbow Series $ Rainbow Series
(O) A set of more than 30 technical and policy documents with (O) A set of more than 30 technical and policy documents with
colored covers, issued by the National Computer Security Center, colored covers, issued by the NCSC, that discuss in detail the
that discuss in detail the Trusted Computer System Evaluation TCSEC and provide guidance for meeting and applying the criteria.
Criteria and provide guidance for meeting and applying those (See: Green Book, Orange Book, Red Book, Yellow Book.)
requirements. (See: Green Book, Orange Book, Red Book, Yellow
Book.)
random $ random
(I) In essence, random means unpredictable. A sequence of values (I) In essence, random means unpredictable. A sequence of values
is called random if each successive value is obtained merely by is called random if each successive value is obtained merely by
chance and does not depend on the preceding values of the chance and does not depend on the preceding values of the
sequence, and each individual value is called random if each of sequence, and each individual value is called random if each of
the values in the total population of possibilities has equal the values in the total population of possibilities has equal
probability of being selected. (Also see: cryptographic key, probability of being selected. (See: cryptographic key, pseudo-
pseudo-random.) random.)
random number generator $ random number generator
(I) A process used to generate an unpredictable, uniformly (I) A process used to generate an unpredictable, uniformly
distributed series of numbers (usually integers). (Also see: distributed series of numbers (usually integers). (See: pseudo-
pseudo-random, random.) random, random.)
(C) True random number generators are hardware-based devices that (C) True random number generators are hardware-based devices that
depend on the output of a "noisy diode" or other physical depend on the output of a "noisy diode" or other physical
phenomena. [R1750] phenomena. [R1750]
RC2, RC4 $ RBAC
See: Role-Based Access Control.
$ RC2
$ RC4
See: Rivest Cipher #2, Rivest Cipher #4. See: Rivest Cipher #2, Rivest Cipher #4.
realm $ realm
(O) Kerberos usage: The domain of authority of a Kerberos server (O) Kerberos usage: The domain of authority of a Kerberos server
(consisting of an authentication server and a ticket-granting (consisting of an authentication server and a ticket-granting
server), including the Kerberized clients and the Kerberized server), including the Kerberized clients and the Kerberized
application servers application servers
RED $ RED
(I) Designation for information system equipment or facilities (I) Designation for information system equipment or facilities
that handle (and for data that contains) only plaintext (or, that handle (and for data that contains) only plaintext (or,
depending on the context, classified information), and for such depending on the context, classified information), and for such
data itself. This term derives from U.S. Government COMSEC data itself. This term derives from U.S. Government COMSEC
terminology. (Compare with: BLACK. Also see: RED/BLACK terminology. (Compare with: BLACK. Also see: RED/BLACK
separation.) separation.)
Red Book $ Red Book
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "Trusted
as a synonym for "Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Computer System Evaluation Criteria" [NCS05]. Instead, use the Criteria" [NCS05]. Instead, use the full proper name of the
full proper name of the document or, in subsequent references, a document or, in subsequent references, a more conventional
conventional abbreviation. (Also see: TCSEC, Rainbow Series, abbreviation. (See: TCSEC, Rainbow Series, (usage note under)
(usage note under) Green Book). Green Book.)
RED/BLACK separation $ RED/BLACK separation
(I) An architectural concept for cryptographic systems that (I) An architectural concept for cryptographic systems that
strictly separates the parts of a system that handle plaintext strictly separates the parts of a system that handle plaintext
(RED information) from the parts that handle ciphertext (BLACK (RED information) from the parts that handle ciphertext (BLACK
information). This term derives from U.S. Government COMSEC information). This term derives from U.S. Government COMSEC
terminology. (Also see: BLACK, RED.) terminology. (See: BLACK, RED.)
reference monitor concept $ reference monitor
(I) "An access control concept that refers to an abstract machine (I) "An access control concept that refers to an abstract machine
that mediates all accesses to objects by subjects." [NCS04] that mediates all accesses to objects by subjects." [NCS04]
reflection attack (C) A reference monitor should be (1) complete (i.e., it mediates
every access), (2) isolated (i.e., it cannot be modified by other
system entities), and (3) verifiable. (See: security kernel.)
$ reflection attack
(I) A type of replay attack in which transmitted data is sent back (I) A type of replay attack in which transmitted data is sent back
to its originator. to its originator.
register, registration $ register
(I) An administrative act or process whereby a entity's name and $ registration
(I) An administrative act or process whereby an entity's name and
other attributes are established for the first time at a CA, prior other attributes are established for the first time at a CA, prior
to the CA issuing a digital certificate that has the entity's name to the CA issuing a digital certificate that has the entity's name
as the subject. (Also see: registration authority.) as the subject. (See: registration authority.)
(C) Registration can be accomplished either directly, by the CA, (C) Registration can be accomplished either directly, by the CA,
or indirectly, by a separate RA. An entity is presented to the CA or indirectly, by a separate RA. An entity is presented to the CA
or RA, and the authority either records the name(s) claimed for or RA, and the authority either records the name(s) claimed for
the entity or assigns the entity's name(s). The authority also the entity or assigns the entity's name(s). The authority also
determines and records other attributes of the entity that are to determines and records other attributes of the entity that are to
be bound in a certificate (such as a public key or authorizations) be bound in a certificate (such as a public key or authorizations)
or maintained in the authority's database (such as street address or maintained in the authority's database (such as street address
and telephone number). The authority is responsible, possibly and telephone number). The authority is responsible, possibly
assisted by an RA, for authenticating the entity's identity and assisted by an RA, for authenticating the entity's identity and
verifying the correctness of the other attributes, in accordance verifying the correctness of the other attributes, in accordance
with the CA's CPS. with the CA's CPS.
(C) Among the registration issues that a CPS may address are the (C) Among the registration issues that a CPS may address are the
following [R2527]: following [R2527]:
- How a claimed identity and other attributes are verified. - How a claimed identity and other attributes are verified.
- How organization affiliation or representation is verified. - How organization affiliation or representation is verified.
- Permitted forms of names, such as DN, domain name, or IP - What forms of names are permitted, such as X.500 DN, domain
address. name, or IP address.
- Whether names must be meaningful or unique, and within what - Whether names are required to be meaningful or unique, and
domain. within what domain.
- How naming disputes are resolved, including the role of - How naming disputes are resolved, including the role of
trademarks. trademarks.
- Whether certificates are issued to entities that are not - Whether certificates are issued to entities that are not
persons. persons.
- Whether a person must appear before the CA or RA, or can be - Whether a person is required to appear before the CA or RA, or
represented by an agent. can instead be represented by an agent.
- Whether and how an entity proves possession of the private key - Whether and how an entity proves possession of the private key
matching a public key. matching a public key.
registration authority (RA) $ registration authority (RA)
(I) An optional PKI entity (separate from the CAs) that does not (I) An optional PKI entity (separate from the CAs) that does not
sign either digital certificates or CRLs but has responsibility sign either digital certificates or CRLs but has responsibility
for recording or verifying some or all of the information for recording or verifying some or all of the information
(particularly the identities of subjects) needed by a CA to issue (particularly the identities of subjects) needed by a CA to issue
certificates and CRLs and to perform other certificate management certificates and CRLs and to perform other certificate management
functions. (Also see: organizational registration authority, functions. (See: organizational registration authority,
registration.) registration.)
(C) Sometimes, a CA may perform all certificate management (C) Sometimes, a CA may perform all certificate management
functions for all end users for which the CA signs certificates. functions for all end users for which the CA signs certificates.
Other times, such as in a large or geographically dispersed Other times, such as in a large or geographically dispersed
community, it may be necessary or desirable to offload secondary community, it may be necessary or desirable to offload secondary
CA functions and delegate them to an assistant, while the CA CA functions and delegate them to an assistant, while the CA
retains the primary functions (signing certificates and CRLs). The retains the primary functions (signing certificates and CRLs). The
talks that are delegated to an RA by a CA may include personal talks that are delegated to an RA by a CA may include personal
authentication, name assignment, token distribution, revocation authentication, name assignment, token distribution, revocation
reporting, key generation, and archiving. An RA is an optional PKI reporting, key generation, and archiving. An RA is an optional PKI
component, separate from the CA, that is assigned secondary component, separate from the CA, that is assigned secondary
functions. The duties assigned to RAs vary from case to case but functions. The duties assigned to RAs vary from case to case but
may include the following: may include the following:
- Verifying a subject's identity, i.e., performing personal - Verifying a subject's identity, i.e., performing personal
authentication functions. authentication functions.
- Assigning a name to a subject. (Also see: distinguished name.) - Assigning a name to a subject. (See: distinguished name.)
- Verifying that a subject is entitled to have the attributes - Verifying that a subject is entitled to have the attributes
requested for a certificate. requested for a certificate.
- Verifying that a subject possesses the private key that matches - Verifying that a subject possesses the private key that matches
the public key requested for a certificate. the public key requested for a certificate.
- Performing functions beyond mere registration, such as - Performing functions beyond mere registration, such as
generating key pairs, distributing tokens, and handling generating key pairs, distributing tokens, and handling
revocation reports. Such functions may also be assigned to a revocation reports. Such functions may also be assigned to a
PKI element that is separate from both the CA and the RA. PKI element that is separate from both the CA and the RA.
(I) PKIX usage: An optional PKI component, separate from the (I) PKIX usage: An optional PKI component, separate from the
CA(s). The functions which the RA may carry out will vary from CA(s). The functions which the RA may carry out will vary from
case to case but may include personal authentication, token case to case but may include personal authentication, token
distribution, revocation reporting, name assignment, key distribution, revocation reporting, name assignment, key
generation, and archiving of key pairs. [R2510] generation, and archiving of key pairs. [R2510]
(O) SET usage: "An independent third-party organization that (O) SET usage: "An independent third-party organization that
processes payment card applications for multiple payment card processes payment card applications for multiple payment card
brands and forwards applications to the appropriate financial brands and forwards applications to the appropriate financial
institutions." [SET2] institutions." [SET2]
regrade $ regrade
(I) Deliberately change the classification level of information in (I) Deliberately change the classification level of information in
an authorized manner. an authorized manner.
rekey $ rekey
(I) Change the value of a cryptographic key that is being used in (I) Change the value of a cryptographic key that is being used in
an application of a cryptographic system. (See: certificate an application of a cryptographic system. (See: certificate
rekey.) rekey.)
(C) For example, rekey is required at the end of a cryptoperiod or (C) For example, rekey is required at the end of a cryptoperiod or
key lifetime. key lifetime.
relying party $ reliability
(I) The ability of a system to perform a required function under
stated conditions for a specified period of time. (See:
availability, survivability.)
$ relying party
(I) A synonym for "certificate user". Used in a legal context (I) A synonym for "certificate user". Used in a legal context
(see: ABA Guidelines) to mean a recipient of a certificate who (see: ABA Guidelines) to mean a recipient of a certificate who
acts in reliance on that certificate. acts in reliance on that certificate.
Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) $ Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)
(I) An Internet protocol for carrying dial-in users' (I) An Internet protocol for carrying dial-in users'
authentication information and configuration information between a authentication information and configuration information between a
shared, centralized authentication server (the RADIUS server) and shared, centralized authentication server (the RADIUS server) and
a network access server (the RADIUS client) that needs to a network access server (the RADIUS client) that needs to
authenticate the users of its network access ports. [R2138] (Also authenticate the users of its network access ports. [R2138] (See:
see: TACACS.) TACACS.)
(C) A user of the RADIUS client presents authentication (C) A user of the RADIUS client presents authentication
information to the client, and the client passes that information information to the client, and the client passes that information
to the RADIUS server. The server authenticates the client using a to the RADIUS server. The server authenticates the client using a
shared secret value, then checks the user's authentication shared secret value, then checks the user's authentication
information, and finally returns to the client all authorization information, and finally returns to the client all authorization
and configuration information needed by the client to deliver and configuration information needed by the client to deliver
service to the user. service to the user.
renew $ renew
See: certificate renewal. See: certificate renewal.
replay attack $ replay attack
(I) An attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or (I) An attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or
fraudulently repeated, either by the originator or by an adversary fraudulently repeated, either by the originator or by an adversary
who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as part of a who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as part of a
masquerade attack. (Also see: active wiretapping.) masquerade attack. (See: active wiretapping.)
repository $ repository
(I) A server system for storing and distributing digital (I) A system for storing and distributing digital certificates and
certificates and related information (including CRLs, CPSs, and related information (including CRLs, CPSs, and certificate
certificate policies) to certificate users. policies) to certificate users. (See: directory.)
(O) "A trustworthy system for storing and retrieving certificates (O) "A trustworthy system for storing and retrieving certificates
or other information relevant to certificates." [ABA] or other information relevant to certificates." [ABA]
(C) A certificate is published to those who might need it by (C) A certificate is published to those who might need it by
putting it in a repository. The repository usually is a publicly putting it in a repository. The repository usually is a publicly
accessible, on-line server. In the Federal Public-key accessible, on-line server. In the Federal Public-key
Infrastructure, for example, the expected repository is a Infrastructure, for example, the expected repository is a
directory that uses LDAP, but also may be the X.500 Directory that directory that uses LDAP, but also may be the X.500 Directory that
uses DAP, or an HTTP server, or an FTP server that permits uses DAP, or an HTTP server, or an FTP server that permits
anonymous login. anonymous login.
repudiation $ repudiation
(I) Denial by a system entity that was involved in an association (I) Denial by a system entity that was involved in an association
(especially an association that transfers information) of having (especially an association that transfers information) of having
participated in the relationship. (Also see: accountability, non- participated in the relationship. (See: accountability, non-
repudiation service.) repudiation service.)
(O) "Denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of (O) "Denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of
having participated in all or part of the communication." [I7498 having participated in all or part of the communication." [I7498
Part 2] Part 2]
Request for Comment (RFC) $ Request for Comment (RFC)
(I) One of the documents in the archival series that is the (I) One of the documents in the archival series that is the
official channel for Internet Standards documents and other official channel for ISPDs and other publications of the Internet
publications of the Internet Engineering Steering Group, the Engineering Steering Group, the Internet Architecture Board, and
Internet Architecture Board, and the Internet community in the Internet community in general. [R1543]
general. [R1543]
(C) This term does not mean the same as "Internet Standard". (C) This term does not mean the same as "Internet Standard".
residual risk $ residual risk
(I) The risk that remains after countermeasures have been applied. (I) The risk that remains after countermeasures have been applied.
restore $ restore
See: card restore. See: card restore.
revocation $ revocation
See: certificate revocation. See: certificate revocation.
revocation date $ revocation date
(N) In an X.509 CRL entry, a date-time field that states when the (N) In an X.509 CRL entry, a date-time field that states when the
certificate revocation occurred, i.e., when the CA declared the certificate revocation occurred, i.e., when the CA declared the
digital certificate to be invalid. (Also see: invalidity date.) digital certificate to be invalid. (See: invalidity date.)
(C) The revocation date may not resolve some disputes because, in (C) The revocation date may not resolve some disputes because, in
the worst case, all signatures made during the validity period of the worst case, all signatures made during the validity period of
the certificate may have to be considered invalid. However, it may the certificate may have to be considered invalid. However, it may
be desirable to treat a digital signature as valid even though the be desirable to treat a digital signature as valid even though the
private key used to sign was compromised after the signing. If private key used to sign was compromised after the signing. If
more is known about when the compromise actually occurred, a more is known about when the compromise actually occurred, a
second date-time, an "invalidity date", can be included in an second date-time, an "invalidity date", can be included in an
extension of the CRL entry. extension of the CRL entry.
revocation list $ revocation list
See: certificate revocation list. See: certificate revocation list.
revoke $ revoke
See: certificate revocation. See: certificate revocation.
RFC $ RFC
See: Request for Comment. See: Request for Comment.
risk $ risk
(I) An expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a (I) An expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a
particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability with a particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability with a
particular harmful result. particular harmful result.
(O) SET usage: "The possibility of loss because of one or more (O) SET usage: "The possibility of loss because of one or more
threats to information (not to be confused with financial or threats to information (not to be confused with financial or
business risk)." [SET2] business risk)." [SET2]
risk analysis, risk assessment $ risk analysis
$ risk assessment
(I) A process that systematically identifies valuable system (I) A process that systematically identifies valuable system
resources and threats to those resources, quantifies loss resources and threats to those resources, quantifies loss
exposures based on estimated frequencies and costs of occurrence, exposures (i.e., loss potential) based on estimated frequencies
and (optionally) recommends how to allocate resources to and costs of occurrence, and (optionally) recommends how to
countermeasures to minimize total exposure. allocate resources to countermeasures so as to minimize total
exposure.
(C) The analysis lists risks in order of cost and criticality, (C) The analysis lists risks in order of cost and criticality,
thereby determining where countermeasures should be applied first. thereby determining where countermeasures should be applied first.
It is usually financially and technically infeasible to counteract It is usually financially and technically infeasible to counteract
all aspects of risk, and so some residual risk will remain, even all aspects of risk, and so some residual risk will remain, even
after all available countermeasures have been deployed. after all available countermeasures have been deployed. [FP031,
R2196]
risk management $ risk management
(I) The process of identifying, controlling, and eliminating or (I) The process of identifying, controlling, and eliminating or
minimizing uncertain events that may affect system resources. minimizing uncertain events that may affect system resources.
(Also see: risk analysis.) (See: risk analysis.)
Rivest Cipher #2 (RC2) $ Rivest Cipher #2 (RC2)
(N) A proprietary, variable-key-length block cipher invented by (N) A proprietary, variable-key-length block cipher invented by
Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security, Inc. (now a wholly-owned Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security, Inc. (now a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Security Dynamics, Inc.). subsidiary of Security Dynamics, Inc.).
Rivest Cipher #4 (RC4) $ Rivest Cipher #4 (RC4)
(N) A proprietary, variable-key-length stream cipher invented by (N) A proprietary, variable-key-length stream cipher invented by
Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security, Inc. (now a wholly-owned Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security, Inc. (now a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Security Dynamics, Inc.). subsidiary of Security Dynamics, Inc.).
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) $ Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
(N) An algorithm for asymmetric cryptography, invented in 1977 by (N) An algorithm for asymmetric cryptography, invented in 1977 by
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman [RSA78]. Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman [RSA78].
(C) RSA uses exponentiation modulo the product of two large prime (C) RSA uses exponentiation modulo the product of two large prime
numbers. The difficulty of breaking RSA is believed to be numbers. The difficulty of breaking RSA is believed to be
equivalent to the difficulty of factoring integers that are the equivalent to the difficulty of factoring integers that are the
product of two large prime numbers of approximately equal size. product of two large prime numbers of approximately equal size.
(C) To create an RSA key pair, randomly choose two large prime (C) To create an RSA key pair, randomly choose two large prime
numbers, p and q, and compute the modulus, n = pq. Randomly choose numbers, p and q, and compute the modulus, n = pq. Randomly choose
skipping to change at page 120, line 10 skipping to change at page 131, line 43
relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1). Choose another number d, the relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1). Choose another number d, the
private exponent, such that ed-1 evenly divides (p-1)(q-1). The private exponent, such that ed-1 evenly divides (p-1)(q-1). The
public key is the set of numbers (n,e), and the private key is the public key is the set of numbers (n,e), and the private key is the
set (n,d). set (n,d).
(C) It is assumed to be difficult to compute the private key (n,d) (C) It is assumed to be difficult to compute the private key (n,d)
from the public key (n,e). However, if n can be factored into p from the public key (n,e). However, if n can be factored into p
and q, then the private key d can be computed easily. Thus, RSA and q, then the private key d can be computed easily. Thus, RSA
security depends on the assumption that it is computationally security depends on the assumption that it is computationally
difficult to factor a number that is the product of two large difficult to factor a number that is the product of two large
prime numbers. (Of course, p and q must be treated as part of the prime numbers. (Of course, p and q are treated as part of the
private key, or else destroyed after computing n.) private key, or else destroyed after computing n.)
(C) For encryption of a message, m, to be sent to Bob, Alice uses (C) For encryption of a message, m, to be sent to Bob, Alice uses
Bob's public key (n,e) to compute m**e (mod n) = c. She sends c to Bob's public key (n,e) to compute m**e (mod n) = c. She sends c to
Bob. Bob computes c**d (mod n) = m. Only Bob knows d, so only Bob Bob. Bob computes c**d (mod n) = m. Only Bob knows d, so only Bob
can compute c**d (mod n) = m to recover m. can compute c**d (mod n) = m to recover m.
(C) To provide data origin authentication of a message, m, to be (C) To provide data origin authentication of a message, m, to be
sent to Bob, Alice computes m**d (mod n) = s, where (d,n) is sent to Bob, Alice computes m**d (mod n) = s, where (d,n) is
Alice's private key. She sends m and s to Bob. To recover the Alice's private key. She sends m and s to Bob. To recover the
skipping to change at page 120, line 34 skipping to change at page 132, line 15
(C) To ensure data integrity in addition to data origin (C) To ensure data integrity in addition to data origin
authentication requires extra computation steps in which Alice and authentication requires extra computation steps in which Alice and
Bob use a cryptographic hash function h (as explained for digital Bob use a cryptographic hash function h (as explained for digital
signature). Alice computes the hash value h(m) = v, and then signature). Alice computes the hash value h(m) = v, and then
encrypts v with her private key to get s. She sends m and s. Bob encrypts v with her private key to get s. She sends m and s. Bob
receives m' and s', either of which might have been changed from receives m' and s', either of which might have been changed from
the m and s that Alice sent. To test this, he decrypts s' with the m and s that Alice sent. To test this, he decrypts s' with
Alice's public key to get v'. He then computes h(m') = v". If v' Alice's public key to get v'. He then computes h(m') = v". If v'
equals v", Bob is assured that m' is the same m that Alice sent. equals v", Bob is assured that m' is the same m that Alice sent.
role-based access control $ role-based access control (RBAC)
(I) A form of identity-based access control where the system (I) A form of identity-based access control where the system
entities that are identified and controlled are functional entities that are identified and controlled are functional
positions in an organization or process. positions in an organization or process.
root $ root
(I) A CA that is directly trusted by an end entity. Acquiring the (I) A CA that is directly trusted by an end entity. Acquiring the
value of a root CA's public key requires an out-of-band procedure. value of a root CA's public key requires an out-of-band procedure.
(I) Hierarchical PKI usage: The CA that is the highest level (most (I) Hierarchical PKI usage: The CA that is the highest level (most
trusted) CA in a certification hierarchy; i.e., the authority upon trusted) CA in a certification hierarchy; i.e., the authority upon
whose public key all certificate users base their trust. (Also whose public key all certificate users base their trust. (See: top
see: top CA.) CA.)
(C) In a hierarchical PKI, a root issues public-key certificates (C) In a hierarchical PKI, a root issues public-key certificates
to one or more additional CAs that form the second highest level. to one or more additional CAs that form the second highest level.
Each of these CAs may issue certificates to more CAs at the third Each of these CAs may issue certificates to more CAs at the third
highest level, and so on. To initialize operation of a highest level, and so on. To initialize operation of a
hierarchical PKI, the root's initial public key must be securely hierarchical PKI, the root's initial public key is securely
distributed to all certificate users in a way that does not depend distributed to all certificate users in a way that does not depend
on the PKI's certification relationships. The root's public key on the PKI's certification relationships. The root's public key
may be distributed simply as a numerical value, but typically is may be distributed simply as a numerical value, but typically is
distributed in a self-signed certificate in which the root is the distributed in a self-signed certificate in which the root is the
subject. The root's certificate is signed by the root itself subject. The root's certificate is signed by the root itself
because there is no higher authority in a certification hierarchy. because there is no higher authority in a certification hierarchy.
The root's certificate is then the first certificate in every The root's certificate is then the first certificate in every
certification path. certification path.
(O) MISSI usage: A name previously used for a MISSI Policy (O) MISSI usage: A name previously used for a MISSI Policy
Creation Authority, which is not a root as defined above for Creation Authority, which is not a root as defined above for
general usage, but is a CA at the second level of the MISSI general usage, but is a CA at the second level of the MISSI
hierarchy, immediately subordinate to a MISSI root called a Policy hierarchy, immediately subordinate to a MISSI root called a Policy
Approving Authority. Approving Authority.
(O) UNIX usage: A system user account (also called "superuser") (O) UNIX usage: A system user account (also called "superuser")
that has all privileges (including all security-related that has all privileges (including all security-related
privileges) and thus can manage the system and its other user privileges) and thus can manage the system and its other user
accounts. accounts.
root certificate $ root certificate
(I) A certificate for which the subject is a root.
(I) Hierarchical PKI usage: The self-signed public-key certificate (I) Hierarchical PKI usage: The self-signed public-key certificate
at the top of a certification hierarchy. (Also see: root.) at the top of a certification hierarchy.
root registry $ root key
(I) A public key for which the matching private key is held by a
root.
$ root registry
(O) MISSI usage: A name previously used for a MISSI policy (O) MISSI usage: A name previously used for a MISSI policy
approving authority. approving authority.
router $ router
(I) A computer that is a gateway between two networks at OSI layer (I) A computer that is a gateway between two networks at OSI layer
3 and that relays and directs data packets through that 3 and that relays and directs data packets through that
internetwork. The most common form of router operates on IP internetwork. The most common form of router operates on IP
packets. (Also see: bridge.) packets. (See: bridge.)
(I) Internet usage: In the context of the Internet protocol suite, (I) Internet usage: In the context of the Internet protocol suite,
a networked computer that forwards Internet Protocol packets that a networked computer that forwards Internet Protocol packets that
are not addressed to the computer itself. (Compare with: host.) are not addressed to the computer itself. (Compare with: host.)
RSA $ RSA
See: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman. See: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman.
rule-based security policy $ rule-based security policy
(I) "A security policy based on global rules imposed for all (I) "A security policy based on global rules imposed for all
users. These rules usually rely on comparison of the sensitivity users. These rules usually rely on comparison of the sensitivity
of the resource being accessed and the possession of corresponding of the resource being accessed and the possession of corresponding
attributes of users, a group of users, or entities acting on attributes of users, a group of users, or entities acting on
behalf of users." [I7498 Part 2] (Also see: identity-based behalf of users." [I7498 Part 2] (See: identity-based security
security policy.) policy.)
safety $ safety
(I) The property of a system being free from risk of causing harm (I) The property of a system being free from risk of causing harm
to system entities and outside entities. to system entities and outside entities.
SAID $ SAID
See: security association identifier. See: security association identifier.
salt $ salt
(I) A random value that is concatenated with a password before (I) A random value that is concatenated with a password before
applying the one-way encryption function used to protect passwords applying the one-way encryption function used to protect passwords
that are stored in the database of an access control system. (Also that are stored in the database of an access control system. (See:
see: initialization value.) initialization value.)
(C) Salt protects a password-based access control system against a (C) Salt protects a password-based access control system against a
dictionary attack. dictionary attack.
sanitize $ sanitize
(I) Delete sensitive data from a file, a device, or a system; or (I) Delete sensitive data from a file, a device, or a system; or
modify the data so as to be able to downgrade its classification modify data so as to be able to downgrade its classification
level. level.
SCA $ SASL
See: Simple Authentication and Security Layer.
$ SCA
See: subordinate certification authority. See: subordinate certification authority.
scavenging $ scavenging
See: (secondary threat action definition in) threat consequence. See: (secondary threat action definition in) threat consequence.
screening router
$ screening router
(I) A synonym for "filtering router". (I) A synonym for "filtering router".
SDE $ SDE
See: Secure Data Exchange. See: Secure Data Exchange.
SDNS $ SDNS
See: Secure Data Network System. See: Secure Data Network System.
seal $ seal
(C) To use cryptography to provide data integrity service for a (D) To use cryptography to provide data integrity service for a
data set. (Also see: checksum, sign, wrap.) Internet Standards data set. (See: checksum, sign, wrap.)
Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term; instead, use a term
that is specific with regard to the mechanism(s) used.
secrecy, secret (C) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this definition; instead, use language
that is more specific with regard to the mechanism(s) used.
$ secrecy
$ secret
(I) The condition of information being protected from being known (I) The condition of information being protected from being known
by any system entities except those who are intended to know it; by any system entities except those who are intended to know it;
an item of information that is so protected. an item of information that is so protected.
(C) This term applies to symmetric keys, private keys, and (C) This term applies to symmetric keys, private keys, and
passwords. passwords.
secret-key cryptography $ secret-key cryptography
(I) A synonym for "symmetric cryptography". (I) A synonym for "symmetric cryptography".
Secure Data Exchange (SDE) $ Secure Data Exchange (SDE)
(N) A local area network security protocol defined by the IEEE (N) A local area network security protocol defined by the IEEE
802.10 standard. 802.10 standard.
Secure Data Network System (SDNS) $ Secure Data Network System (SDNS)
(N) An NSA program that developed security a for electronic mail (N) An NSA program that developed security a for electronic mail
(Message Security Protocol), OSI layer 3 (SP3), OSI layer 4 (SP4), (Message Security Protocol), OSI layer 3 (SP3), OSI layer 4 (SP4),
and key management (KMP). and key management (KMP).
Secure Hash Standard (SHS) $ Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
(N) The U.S. Government standard [FP180] that specifies the Secure (N) The U.S. Government standard [FP180] that specifies the Secure
Hash Algorithm (SHA-1), a cryptographic hash function that Hash Algorithm (SHA-1), a cryptographic hash function that
produces a 160-bit output (hash result) for input data of any produces a 160-bit output (hash result) for input data of any
length < 2**64 bits. length < 2**64 bits.
Secure-HTTP (S-HTTP) $ Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (Secure-HTTP, S-HTTP)
(O) A protocol for HTTP security, proposed by CommerceNet, a (I) A Internet protocol for providing client-server security
coalition of businesses interested in developing the Internet for services for HTTP communications. (Compare with: https.)
commercial uses. (Compare with: https.)
Secure/MIME (S/MIME) (C) S-HTTP was originally specified by CommerceNet, a coalition of
businesses interested in developing the Internet for commercial
uses. Several message formats may be incorporated into S-HTTP
clients and servers, particularly CMS and MOSS. S-HTTP supports
choice of security policies, key management mechanisms, and
cryptographic algorithms through option negotiation between
parties for each transaction. S-HTTP supports both asymmetric and
symmetric key operation modes. S-HTTP attempts to avoid presuming
a particular trust model, but it attempts to facilitate multiply-
rooted hierarchical trust and anticipates that principals may have
many public key certificates.
$ Secure/MIME (S/MIME)
(I) Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, an Internet (I) Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, an Internet
protocol developed by an industry consortium led by RSA Data protocol developed by an industry consortium led by RSA Data
Security, Inc. (which is now a subsidiary of Security Dynamics Security, Inc. (which is now a subsidiary of Security Dynamics
Technologies, Inc.). [R2633] Technologies, Inc.). [R2633]
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) $ Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
(N) An Internet protocol (originally developed by Netscape (N) An Internet protocol (originally developed by Netscape
Communications, Inc.) that uses connection-oriented end-to-end Communications, Inc.) that uses connection-oriented end-to-end
encryption to provide data confidentiality service and data encryption to provide data confidentiality service and data
integrity service for traffic between a client (often a web integrity service for traffic between a client (often a web
browser) and a server, and that can optionally provide peer entity browser) and a server, and that can optionally provide peer entity
authentication between the client and the server. (Also see: authentication between the client and the server. (See: Transport
Transport Layer Security.) Layer Security.)
(C) SSL is layered below HTTP (other Internet applications, such (C) SSL is layered below HTTP (other Internet applications, such
as FTP, would be better served by IPsec) and above a reliable as FTP, would be better served by IPsec) and above a reliable
transport protocol (TCP). SSL is independent of the application it transport protocol (TCP). SSL is independent of the application it
encapsulates, and a higher level protocol can layer on top of SSL encapsulates, and a higher level protocol can layer on top of SSL
transparently. SSL itself has two layers: (a) SSL's lower layer, transparently. SSL itself has two layers: (a) SSL's lower layer,
the SSL Record Protocol, is layered on top of the transport the SSL Record Protocol, is layered on top of the transport
protocol and encapsulates higher level protocols. One such protocol and encapsulates higher level protocols. One such
encapsulated protocol is SSL Handshake Protocol. (b) SSL's upper encapsulated protocol is SSL Handshake Protocol. (b) SSL's upper
layer provides asymmetric cryptography for server authentication layer provides asymmetric cryptography for server authentication
(verifying the server's identity to the client) and optional (verifying the server's identity to the client) and optional
client authentication (verifying the client's identity to the client authentication (verifying the client's identity to the
server), and also enables them to negotiate a symmetric encryption server), and also enables them to negotiate a symmetric encryption
algorithm and secret session key (to use for data confidentiality) algorithm and secret session key (to use for data confidentiality)
before the application protocol transmits or receives data. A before the application protocol transmits or receives data. A
keyed hash provides data integrity service for encapsulated data. keyed hash provides data integrity service for encapsulated data.
secure state $ secure state
(I) A system condition in which no subject can access any object (I) A system condition in which no subject can access any object
in an unauthorized manner. in an unauthorized manner. (See: (secondary definition in) Bell-
LaPadula Model, clean system.)
security $ security
(I) The property of system resources being free from unauthorized (I) (1.) Measures taken to protect a system. (2.) The condition of
access and from unauthorized or accidental change, destruction, or a system that results from the establishment and maintenance of
loss. measures to protect the system. (3.) The condition of system
resources being free from unauthorized access and from
unauthorized or accidental change, destruction, or loss.
security architecture $ security architecture
(I) A plan and set of principles that describe (a) the security (I) A plan and set of principles that describe (a) the security
services that a system must provide to meet the needs of its services that a system is required to provide to meet the needs of
users, (b) the system elements needed to implement the services, its users, (b) the system elements required to implement the
and (c) the performance levels needed in the elements to deal with services, and (c) the performance levels required in the elements
the threat environment. to deal with the threat environment. (See: (discussion under)
security policy.)
(C) A security architecture is the result of applying the system (C) A security architecture is the result of applying the system
engineering process. A complete system security architecture engineering process. A complete system security architecture
includes communication security, computer security, emanations includes administrative security, communication security, computer
security, personnel security, physical security, and security, emanations security, personnel security, and physical
administrative security. A complete security architecture must security (e.g., see: [R2179]). A complete security architecture
deal with both intentional, intelligent threats and accidental needs to deal with both intentional, intelligent threats and
kinds of threats. accidental kinds of threats.
security association $ security association
(I) A relationship defined between two or more entities to enable (I) A relationship defined between two or more entities to enable
them to protect data they exchange. The relationship is used to them to protect data they exchange. The relationship is used to
negotiate characteristics of protection mechanisms, but does not negotiate characteristics of protection mechanisms, but does not
include the mechanisms themselves. (Also see: association.) include the mechanisms themselves. (See: association.)
(C) A security association describes how entities will use (C) A security association describes how entities will use
security services. The relationship is represented by a set of security services. The relationship is represented by a set of
information that is shared between the entities and that must be information that is shared between the entities and is agreed upon
agreed upon and considered a contract between them. and considered a contract between them.
(O) IPsec usage. A simplex (uni-directional) logical connection (O) IPsec usage. A simplex (uni-directional) logical connection
created for security purposes and implemented with either AH or created for security purposes and implemented with either AH or
ESP (but not both), which provide security services to data ESP (but not both), which provide security services to data
carried by a connection. The security services offered by a carried by a connection. The security services offered by a
security association depend on the protocol selected, the IPsec security association depend on the protocol selected, the IPsec
mode (transport or tunnel), the endpoints, and the election of mode (transport or tunnel), the endpoints, and the election of
optional services within the protocol. A security association is optional services within the protocol. A security association is
identified by a triple consisting of a destination IP address, a identified by a triple consisting of a destination IP address, a
protocol (AH or ESP) identifier, and a Security Parameter Index. protocol (AH or ESP) identifier, and a Security Parameter Index.
security association identifier (SAID) $ security association identifier (SAID)
(I) A data field in a security protocol (such as NLSP or SDE), (I) A data field in a security protocol (such as NLSP or SDE),
used to identify the security association to which a protocol data used to identify the security association to which a protocol data
unit is bound. The SAID value is usually used to select a key to unit is bound. The SAID value is usually used to select a key to
use for decryption or authentication at the destination. (Also use for decryption or authentication at the destination. (See:
see: Security Parameter Index.) Security Parameter Index.)
security audit $ security audit
(I) An independent review and examination of a system's records (I) An independent review and examination of a system's records
and activities to determine the adequacy of system controls, and activities to determine the adequacy of system controls,
ensure compliance with established security policy and procedures, ensure compliance with established security policy and procedures,
detect breaches in security services, and recommend any changes detect breaches in security services, and recommend any changes
that are indicated for countermeasures. [I7498 Part 2, NCS01] that are indicated for countermeasures. [I7498 Part 2, NCS01]
(C) The basic audit objective is to establish accountability for (C) The basic audit objective is to establish accountability for
system entities that initiate or participate in security-relevant system entities that initiate or participate in security-relevant
events and actions. Thus, means are needed to generate and record events and actions. Thus, means are needed to generate and record
a security audit trail and to review and analyze the audit trail a security audit trail and to review and analyze the audit trail
to discover and investigate attacks and security compromises. to discover and investigate attacks and security compromises.
security audit trail $ security audit trail
(I) A chronological record of system activities that is sufficient (I) A chronological record of system activities that is sufficient
to enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence of to enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence of
environments and activities surrounding or leading to an environments and activities surrounding or leading to an
operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction
from inception to final results. [NCS04] (Also see: security from inception to final results. [NCS04] (See: security audit.)
audit.)
security clearance $ security class
(D) A synonym for "security level". In the interest of
consistency, ISPDs SHOULD use "security level" instead of
"security class".
$ security clearance
(I) A determination that a person is eligible, under the standards (I) A determination that a person is eligible, under the standards
of a specific security policy, for authorization to access of a specific security policy, for authorization to access
sensitive information or other system resources. (Also see: sensitive information or other system resources. (See: clearance
clearance level.) level.)
security compromise $ security compromise
(I) A security violation in which a system resource is exposed, or (I) A security violation in which a system resource is exposed, or
is potentially exposed, to unauthorized access. (See: data is potentially exposed, to unauthorized access. (See: data
compromise, violation.) compromise, violation.)
security event $ security environment
(I) The set of external entities, procedures, and conditions that
affect secure development, operation, and maintenance of a system.
$ security event
(I) A occurrence in a system that is relevant to the security of (I) A occurrence in a system that is relevant to the security of
the system. the system.
(C) The term includes both events that are security incidents and (C) The term includes both events that are security incidents and
those that are not. In a CA workstation, for example, a list of those that are not. In a CA workstation, for example, a list of
security events might include the following: security events might include the following:
- Performing a cryptographic operation, e.g., signing a digital - Performing a cryptographic operation, e.g., signing a digital
certificate or CRL. certificate or CRL.
- Performing a cryptographic card operation: creation, insertion, - Performing a cryptographic card operation: creation, insertion,
skipping to change at page 126, line 6 skipping to change at page 138, line 16
renewal, revocation, or update. renewal, revocation, or update.
- Posting information to an X.500 Directory. - Posting information to an X.500 Directory.
- Receiving a key compromise notification. - Receiving a key compromise notification.
- Receiving an improper certification request. - Receiving an improper certification request.
- Detecting an alarm condition reported by a cryptographic - Detecting an alarm condition reported by a cryptographic
module. module.
- Logging the operator in or out. - Logging the operator in or out.
- Failing a built-in hardware self-test or a software system - Failing a built-in hardware self-test or a software system
integrity check. integrity check.
security fault analysis $ security fault analysis
(I) A security analysis, usually performed on hardware at a gate (I) A security analysis, usually performed on hardware at a logic
level, to determine the security properties of a device when a gate level, gate-by-gate, to determine the security properties of
hardware fault is encountered. a device when a hardware fault is encountered.
security gateway $ security gateway
(I) A gateway that separates trusted (or relatively more trusted) (I) A gateway that separates trusted (or relatively more trusted)
hosts on the internal network side from untrusted (or less hosts on the internal network side from untrusted (or less
trusted) hosts on the external network side. (Also see: firewall trusted) hosts on the external network side. (See: firewall and
and guard.) guard.)
(O) IPsec usage: "An intermediate system that implements IPsec (O) IPsec usage: "An intermediate system that implements IPsec
protocols." [R2401] Normally, AH or ESP is implemented to serve a protocols." [R2401] Normally, AH or ESP is implemented to serve a
set of internal hosts, providing security services for the hosts set of internal hosts, providing security services for the hosts
when they communicate with other, external hosts or gateways that when they communicate with other, external hosts or gateways that
also implement IPsec. also implement IPsec.
security incident $ security incident
(I) A system event that involves a security violation. (Also see: (I) A security event that involves a security violation. (See:
security event.) CERT, GRIP, security event, security violation.)
security intrusion (C) In other words, a security-relevant event in a system in which
the system's security policy is disobeyed or otherwise breached.
(O) "Any adverse event which compromises some aspect of computer
or network security." [R2350]
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this "O" definition because (a) a
security incident may occur without actually being harmful (i.e.,
adverse) and (b) this Glossary defines "compromise" more narrowly
in relation to unauthorized access.
$ security intrusion
(I) A security event, or a combination of multiple security (I) A security event, or a combination of multiple security
events, that constitutes a security incident in which an intruder events, that constitutes a security incident in which an intruder
gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system (or system gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system (or system
resource) without having authorization to do so. resource) without having authorization to do so.
security kernel $ security kernel
(I) "The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a trusted (I) "The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a trusted
computing base that implement the reference monitor concept. It computing base that implement the reference monitor concept. It
must mediate all accesses, be protected from modification, and be must mediate all accesses, be protected from modification, and be
verifiable as correct." [NCS04] verifiable as correct." [NCS04] (See: reference monitor.)
security label (C) That is, a security kernel is an implementation of a reference
monitor for a given hardware base.
$ security label
(I) A marking that is bound to a system resource and that names or (I) A marking that is bound to a system resource and that names or
designates the security-relevant attributes of that resource. designates the security-relevant attributes of that resource.
[I7498 Part 2] [I7498 Part 2, R1457]
(C) The recommended definition is usefully broad, but usually the (C) The recommended definition is usefully broad, but usually the
term is understood more narrowly as a marking that represents the term is understood more narrowly as a marking that represents the
security level of an information object, i.e., a marking that security level of an information object, i.e., a marking that
indicates how sensitive an information object is. [NCS04] indicates how sensitive an information object is. [NCS04]
(C) System security mechanisms interpret security labels according (C) System security mechanisms interpret security labels according
to applicable security policy to determine how to control access to applicable security policy to determine how to control access
to the associated information, otherwise constrain its handling, to the associated information, otherwise constrain its handling,
and affix appropriate security markings to visible (printed and and affix appropriate security markings to visible (printed and
displayed) images thereof. [FP188] displayed) images thereof. [FP188]
security level $ security level
(I) The combination of a hierarchical classification level and a (I) The combination of a hierarchical classification level and a
set of non-hierarchical category designations that represents how set of non-hierarchical category designations that represents how
sensitive information is. (Also see: dominate.) sensitive information is. (See: dominate, lattice model.)
security management infrastructure (SMI) $ security management infrastructure (SMI)
(I) System elements and activities that support security policy by (I) System elements and activities that support security policy by
monitoring and controlling security services and mechanisms, monitoring and controlling security services and mechanisms,
distributing security information, and reporting security events. distributing security information, and reporting security events.
The associated functions are as follows [I7498-4]: The associated functions are as follows [I7498-4]:
- Controlling (granting or restricting) access to system - Controlling (granting or restricting) access to system
resources: This includes verifying authorizations and resources: This includes verifying authorizations and
identities, controlling access to sensitive security data, and identities, controlling access to sensitive security data, and
modifying access priorities and procedures in the event of modifying access priorities and procedures in the event of
attacks. attacks.
- Retrieving (gathering) and archiving (storing) security - Retrieving (gathering) and archiving (storing) security
information: This includes logging security events and information: This includes logging security events and
analyzing the log, monitoring and profiling usage, and analyzing the log, monitoring and profiling usage, and
reporting security violations. reporting security violations.
- Managing and controlling the encryption process: This includes - Managing and controlling the encryption process: This includes
performing the functions of key management and reporting on key performing the functions of key management and reporting on key
management problems. (Also see: public-key infrastructure.) management problems. (See: public-key infrastructure.)
security mechanism $ security mechanism
(I) A process (or a device incorporating such a process) that can (I) A process (or a device incorporating such a process) that can
be used in a system to implement a security service that is be used in a system to implement a security service that is
provided by the system. provided by or within the system. (See: (discussion under)
security policy.)
(C) Some examples of security mechanisms are encryption, digital (C) Some examples of security mechanisms are encryption, digital
signature, authentication exchange, and traffic padding. signature, authentication exchange, and traffic padding.
security parameters index (SPI) $ security model
(I) A schematic description of a set of entities and relationships
by which a specified set of security services are provided by or
within a system. (See: (discussion under) security policy.)
(C) An example is the Bell-LaPadula Model.
$ security parameters index (SPI)
(I) IPsec usage: The type of security association identifier used (I) IPsec usage: The type of security association identifier used
in IPsec protocols. A 32-bit value used to distinguish among in IPsec protocols. A 32-bit value used to distinguish among
different security associations terminating at the same different security associations terminating at the same
destination (IP address) and using the same IPsec security destination (IP address) and using the same IPsec security
protocol (AH or ESP). Carried in AH and ESP to enable the protocol (AH or ESP). Carried in AH and ESP to enable the
receiving system to determine under which security association to receiving system to determine under which security association to
process a received packet. process a received packet.
security perimeter $ security perimeter
(I) The boundary of the domain in which a security policy or (I) The boundary of the domain in which a security policy or
security architecture applies; i.e., the boundary of the space in security architecture applies; i.e., the boundary of the space in
which security services are implemented to protect system which security services protect system resources.
resources.
security policy $ security policy
(I) A set of rules and practices that regulate how a system (or (I) A set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a
organization) provides security services to protect sensitive and system or organization provides security services to protect
critical system resources. (Also see: discretionary access sensitive and critical system resources. (See: identity-based
control, identity-based security policy, mandatory access control, security policy, rule-based security policy, security
rule-based security policy.) architecture, security mechanism, security model.)
(O) "The set of rules laid down by the security authority (O) "The set of rules laid down by the security authority
governing the use and provision of security services and governing the use and provision of security services and
facilities." [X509] facilities." [X509]
Security Protocol 3 (SP3) (C) Ravi Sandhu notes (as shown in the following diagram) that
security policy is one of four layers of the security engineering
process. Each provides a different view of security, ranging from
what security services are needed to how services are implemented.
What Security Services Should Be Provided?
^
| + - - - - - - - - - - - +
| | Security Policy |
| + - - - - - - - - - - - + |A "top-level specification"
| | Security Model | |is generally understood to
| + - - - - - - - - - - - + <- |be at a level below "model"
| | Security Architecture | |but above "architecture".
| + - - - - - - - - - - - +
| | Security Mechanism |
| + - - - - - - - - - - - +
v
How Are Security Services Implemented?
$ Security Protocol 3 (SP3)
(O) A protocol [SDNS3] developed by SDNS to provide connectionless (O) A protocol [SDNS3] developed by SDNS to provide connectionless
data security at the top of OSI layer 3. (Also see: NLSP.) data security at the top of OSI layer 3. (See: NLSP.)
Security Protocol 4 (SP4) $ Security Protocol 4 (SP4)
(O) A protocol [SDNS4] developed by SDNS to provide either (O) A protocol [SDNS4] developed by SDNS to provide either
connectionless or end-to-end connection-oriented data security at connectionless or end-to-end connection-oriented data security at
the bottom of OSI layer 4. (Also see: TLSP.) the bottom of OSI layer 4. (See: TLSP.)
security-relevant event $ security-relevant event
See: security event. See: security event.
security service $ security service
(I) A processing or communication service that is provided by a (I) A processing or communication service that is provided by a
system to give a specific kind of protection to system resources. system to give a specific kind of protection to system resources.
(Also see: access control service, audit service, availability (See: access control service, audit service, availability service,
service, data confidentiality service, data integrity service, data confidentiality service, data integrity service, data origin
data origin authentication service, non-repudiation service, peer authentication service, non-repudiation service, peer entity
entity authentication service, system integrity service.) authentication service, system integrity service.)
(O) "A service, provided by a layer of communicating open systems, (O) "A service, provided by a layer of communicating open systems,
which ensures adequate security of the systems or the data which ensures adequate security of the systems or the data
transfers." [I7498 Part 2] transfers." [I7498 Part 2]
(C) Security services implement security policies, and are (C) Security services implement security policies, and are
implemented by security mechanisms. implemented by security mechanisms.
security token $ security situation
(I) ISAKMP usage: The set of all security-relevant information
(e.g., network addresses, security classifications, manner of
operation--normal or emergency) that is needed to decide the
security services that are required to protect the association
that is being negotiated.
$ security token
See: token. See: token.
security violation $ security violation
(I) An act or event that disregards or breaks security policy. (I) An act or event that disobeys or otherwise breaches security
(Also see: compromise, penetration.) policy. (See: compromise, penetration, security incident.)
self-signed certificate $ self-signed certificate
(I) A public-key certificate for which the public key bound by the (I) A public-key certificate for which the public key bound by the
certificate and the private key used to sign the certificate are certificate and the private key used to sign the certificate are
components of the same key pair, which belongs to the signer. components of the same key pair, which belongs to the signer.
(C) In a self-signed X.509 public-key certificate, the issuer's DN (C) In a self-signed X.509 public-key certificate, the issuer's DN
is the same as the subject's DN. is the same as the subject's DN.
semantic security $ semantic security
(I) An attribute of a encryption algorithm that is a formalization (I) An attribute of a encryption algorithm that is a formalization
of the notion that the algorithm not only hides the plaintext but of the notion that the algorithm not only hides the plaintext but
also reveals no partial information about the plaintext. Whatever also reveals no partial information about the plaintext. Whatever
is efficiently computable about the plaintext when given the is efficiently computable about the plaintext when given the
ciphertext, is also efficiently computable without the ciphertext. ciphertext, is also efficiently computable without the ciphertext.
(Also see: indistinguishability.) (See: indistinguishability.)
sensitive (information) $ sensitive (information)
(I) Information is sensitive if disclosure, alteration, (I) Information is sensitive if disclosure, alteration,
destruction, or loss of the information would adversely affect the destruction, or loss of the information would adversely affect the
interests or business of its owner or user. (Also see: critical.) interests or business of its owner or user. (See: critical.)
separation of duties $ separation of duties
(I) The practice of dividing the steps in a system function among (I) The practice of dividing the steps in a system function among
different individuals, so as to keep a single individual from different individuals, so as to keep a single individual from
subverting the process. (Also see: dual control, administrative subverting the process. (See: dual control, administrative
security.) security.)
serial number $ serial number
See: certificate serial number. See: certificate serial number.
server $ server
(I) A system entity that provides a service in response to (I) A system entity that provides a service in response to
requests from other system entities called clients. requests from other system entities called clients.
session key $ session key
(I) In the context of symmetric encryption, a key that is (I) In the context of symmetric encryption, a key that is
temporary or is used for a relatively short period of time. (Also temporary or is used for a relatively short period of time. (See:
see: key distribution center, master key.) key distribution center, master key.)
(C) Usually, a session key is used for a defined period of (C) Usually, a session key is used for a defined period of
communication between two computers, such as for the duration of a communication between two computers, such as for the duration of a
single connection or transaction set, or the key is used in an single connection or transaction set, or the key is used in an
application that protects relatively large amounts of data and application that protects relatively large amounts of data and,
must be rekeyed frequently. therefore, needs to be rekeyed frequently.
SET $ SET
See: SET Secure Electronic Transaction(trademark). See: SET Secure Electronic Transaction(trademark).
SET private extension $ SET private extension
(O) One of the private extensions for X.509 that are defined by (O) One of the private extensions for X.509 that are defined by
SET to carry information about a hashed root key, certificate SET to carry information about a hashed root key, certificate
types, merchant data, cardholder certificate requirements, types, merchant data, cardholder certificate requirements,
encryption support for tunneling, or message support for payment encryption support for tunneling, or message support for payment
instructions. instructions.
SET qualifier $ SET qualifier
(O) A certificate policy qualifier that provides information about (O) A certificate policy qualifier that provides information about
the location and content of a SET certificate policy. the location and content of a SET certificate policy.
(C) In addition to the policies and qualifiers inherited from its (C) In addition to the policies and qualifiers inherited from its
own certificate, each CA in the SET certification hierarchy may own certificate, each CA in the SET certification hierarchy may
add one qualifying statement to the root policy when the CA issues add one qualifying statement to the root policy when the CA issues
a certificate. The additional qualifier is a certificate policy a certificate. The additional qualifier is a certificate policy
for that CA. Each policy in a SET certificate may have these for that CA. Each policy in a SET certificate may have these
qualifiers: qualifiers:
- A URL where a copy of the policy statement may be found. - A URL where a copy of the policy statement may be found.
- An electronic mail address where a copy of the policy statement - An electronic mail address where a copy of the policy statement
may be found. may be found.
- A hash result of the policy statement, computed using the - A hash result of the policy statement, computed using the
indicated algorithm. indicated algorithm.
- A statement declaring any disclaimers associated with the - A statement declaring any disclaimers associated with the
issuing of the certificate. issuing of the certificate.
SET Secure Electronic Transaction(trademark) or SET(trademark) $ SET Secure Electronic Transaction(trademark) or SET(trademark)
(N) A protocol developed jointly by MasterCard International and (N) A protocol developed jointly by MasterCard International and
Visa International and published as an open standard to provide Visa International and published as an open standard to provide
confidentiality of transaction information, payment integrity, and confidentiality of transaction information, payment integrity, and
authentication of transaction participants for payment card authentication of transaction participants for payment card
transactions over unsecured networks, such as the Internet. [SET] transactions over unsecured networks, such as the Internet. [SET]
(Also see: acquirer, brand, cardholder, dual signature, electronic (See: acquirer, brand, cardholder, dual signature, electronic
commerce, issuer, merchant, payment gateway, third party.) commerce, issuer, merchant, payment gateway, third party.)
(C) This term and acronym are trademarks of SETCo. MasterCard and (C) This term and acronym are trademarks of SETCo. MasterCard and
Visa announced the standard on February 1, 1996. On December 19, Visa announced the standard on February 1, 1996. On December 19,
1997, MasterCard and Visa formed SET Secure Electronic Transaction 1997, MasterCard and Visa formed SET Secure Electronic Transaction
LLC (commonly referred to as "SETCo") to implement the SET 1.0 LLC (commonly referred to as "SETCo") to implement the SET 1.0
specification. A memorandum of understanding also has been signed specification. A memorandum of understanding also has been signed
that will eventually add American Express and JCB Credit Card that will eventually add American Express and JCB Credit Card
Company as co-owners of SETCo. Company as co-owners of SETCo.
SETCo $ SETCo
See: (secondary definition in) SET Secure Electronic Transaction. See: (secondary definition in) SET Secure Electronic Transaction.
SHA-1 $ SHA-1
See: Secure Hash Standard. See: Secure Hash Standard.
shared secret $ shared secret
(I) A synonym for "keying material" or "cryptographic key". (I) A synonym for "keying material" or "cryptographic key".
S-HTTP $ S-HTTP
See: Secure HTTP. See: Secure HTTP.
sign $ sign
(I) Create a digital signature for a data set. (I) Create a digital signature for a data set.
signature $ signature
See: digital signature. See: digital signature, electronic signature.
signer $ signer
(I) A human being or an organization entity that creates a digital (N) A human being or an organization entity that creates a digital
signature for a data set. [ABA] signature for a data set. [ABA]
SILS $ SILS
See: Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security. See: Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security.
simple authentication $ simple authentication
(I) An authentication process that uses a password as the (I) An authentication process that uses a password as the
information that verifies an identity claimed for an entity. (Also information that verifies an identity claimed for an entity. (See:
see: strong authentication.) strong authentication.)
(O) "Authentication by means of simple password arrangements." (O) "Authentication by means of simple password arrangements."
[X509] [X509]
Simple Key-management for Internet Protocols (SKIP) $ Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)
(I) A specification [R2222] for adding authentication service to
connection-based protocols. To use SASL, a protocol includes a
command for authenticating a user to a server and for optionally
negotiating protection of subsequent protocol interactions. The
command names a registered security mechanism. SASL mechanisms
include Kerberos, GSSAPI, S/KEY, and others. Some protocols that
use SASL are IMAP4 and POP3.
$ Simple Key-management for Internet Protocols (SKIP)
(I) A key distribution protocol that uses hybrid encryption to (I) A key distribution protocol that uses hybrid encryption to
convey session keys that are used to encrypt data in IP packets. convey session keys that are used to encrypt data in IP packets.
(C) SKIP uses the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (or could use another (C) SKIP uses the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (or could use another
key agreement algorithm) to generate a key-encrypting key for use key agreement algorithm) to generate a key-encrypting key for use
between two entities. A session key is used with a symmetric between two entities. A session key is used with a symmetric
algorithm to encrypt data in one or more IP packets that are to be algorithm to encrypt data in one or more IP packets that are to be
sent from one of the entities to the other. The KEK is used with a sent from one of the entities to the other. The KEK is used with a
symmetric algorithm to encrypt the session key, and the encrypted symmetric algorithm to encrypt the session key, and the encrypted
session key is placed in a SKIP header that is added to each IP session key is placed in a SKIP header that is added to each IP
packet that is encrypted with that session key. packet that is encrypted with that session key.
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) $ Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
(I) A TCP-based, application-level, Internet Standard protocol for (I) A TCP-based, application-level, Internet Standard protocol for
moving electronic mail messages from one computer to another. moving electronic mail messages from one computer to another.
[R0821]. [R0821].
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) $ Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
(I) A TCP-based, application-level, Internet Standard protocol for (I) A TCP-based, application-level, Internet Standard protocol for
conveying management information between managers and agents. conveying management information between managers and agents.
[R2570, R2574]. [R2570, R2574].
simple security property
$ simple security property
See: (secondary definition in) Bell-LaPadula Model. See: (secondary definition in) Bell-LaPadula Model.
single sign-on $ single sign-on
(I) A system that enables a user to access multiple computer (I) A system that enables a user to access multiple computer
platforms (usually a set of hosts on the same network) or platforms (usually a set of hosts on the same network) or
application systems after being authenticated just one time. (Also application systems after being authenticated just one time. (See:
see: Kerberos.) Kerberos.)
(C) Typically, a user logs in just once, and then is transparently (C) Typically, a user logs in just once, and then is transparently
granted access to a variety of permitted resources with no further granted access to a variety of permitted resources with no further
login being required until after the user logs out. Such a system login being required until after the user logs out. Such a system
has the advantages of being user friendly and enabling has the advantages of being user friendly and enabling
authentication to be managed consistently across an entire authentication to be managed consistently across an entire
enterprise, and has the disadvantage of requiring all hosts to enterprise, and has the disadvantage of requiring all hosts to
trust the same authentication mechanism. trust the same authentication mechanism.
signature certificate $ signature certificate
(I) A public-key certificate that contains a public key that is (I) A public-key certificate that contains a public key that is
intended to be used for verifying digital signatures, rather than intended to be used for verifying digital signatures, rather than
for encrypting data or performing other cryptographic functions. for encrypting data or performing other cryptographic functions.
(C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "keyUsage" (C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a "keyUsage"
extension which indicates the purpose for which the certified extension which indicates the purpose for which the certified
public key is intended. public key is intended.
S/Key $ situation
See: security situation.
$ S/Key
(I) A system that uses a cryptographic hash function to generate a (I) A system that uses a cryptographic hash function to generate a
sequence of 64-bit, one-time passwords for remote user login. sequence of 64-bit, one-time passwords for remote user login.
[R1760]. [R1760].
(C) The client generates a one-time password by applying MD4, a (C) The client generates a one-time password by applying MD4, a
cryptographic hash function, to the user's secret key multiple cryptographic hash function, to the user's secret key multiple
times. For each successive authentication of the user, the number times. For each successive authentication of the user, the number
of hash applications is reduced by one. (Thus, an intruder using of hash applications is reduced by one. (Thus, an intruder using
wiretapping cannot compute a valid password from knowledge of one wiretapping cannot compute a valid password from knowledge of one
previously used.) The server verifies a password by hashing the previously used.) The server verifies a password by hashing the
currently presented password (or initialization value) one time currently presented password (or initialization value) one time
and comparing the hash result with the previously presented and comparing the hash result with the previously presented
password. password.
SKIP $ SKIP
See: Simple Key-management for IP. See: Simple Key-management for IP.
SKIPJACK $ SKIPJACK
(O) A Type II block cipher with a block size of 64 bits and a key (O) A Type II block cipher with a block size of 64 bits and a key
size of 80 bits, that was developed by NSA and formerly classified size of 80 bits, that was developed by NSA and formerly classified
at the "Secret" level. (Also see: CAPSTONE, CLIPPER, FORTEZZA, Key at the "Secret" level. (See: CAPSTONE, CLIPPER, FORTEZZA, Key
Exchange Algorithm.) Exchange Algorithm.)
(C) On 23 June 1998, the U.S. National Security Agency announced (C) On 23 June 1998, NSA announced that SKIPJACK had been
that SKIPJACK had been declassified. declassified.
slot $ slot
(O) MISSI usage: One of the FORTEZZA PC card storage areas that (O) MISSI usage: One of the FORTEZZA PC card storage areas that
are each able to hold an X.509 certificate and information are each able to hold an X.509 certificate and additional data
associated with the certificate. that is associated with the certificate, such as the matching
private key.
smart card $ smart card
(I) A credit-card sized device containing one or more integrated (I) A credit-card sized device containing one or more integrated
circuit chips, which perform the functions of a computer's circuit chips, which perform the functions of a computer's
microprocessor, memory, and input/output interface. (Also see: PC microprocessor, memory, and input/output interface. (See: PC
card.) card.)
(C) Sometimes this term is used rather strictly to mean a card (C) Sometimes this term is used rather strictly to mean a card
that closely conforms to the dimensions and appearance of the kind that closely conforms to the dimensions and appearance of the kind
of plastic credit card issued by banks and merchants. At other of plastic credit card issued by banks and merchants. At other
times, the term is used loosely to include cards that are large, times, the term is used loosely to include cards that are large,
especially cards that are much thicker, such as PC cards. especially cards that are much thicker, such as PC cards.
(C) A "smart token" is a device that conforms to the definition of (C) A "smart token" is a device that conforms to the definition of
smart card, except that it is not have standard credit dimensions, smart card, except that it is not have standard credit dimensions,
but is packaged in some other form convenient to be carried on but is packaged in some other form convenient to be carried on
one's person, such as a dog tag or door key shape. one's person, such as a dog tag or door key shape.
smart token $ smart token
See: (secondary definition in) smart card. See: (secondary definition in) smart card.
SMI $ SMI
See: security management infrastructure. See: security management infrastructure.
S/MIME $ S/MIME
See: Secure/MIME. See: Secure/MIME.
SMTP $ SMTP
See: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. See: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.
sniffing $ smurf
(C) A synonym for "passive wiretapping". (Also see: password (I) Software that mounts a denial-of-service attack ("smurfing")
sniffing.) by exploiting IP broadcast addressing and ICMP ping packets to
cause flooding. (See: flood, ICMP flood.)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not listed in
because it unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of a term that is most dictionaries and might confuse international readers.
better established. (Also see: (usage note under) Green Book.
SNMP (C) A smurf program builds a network packet that appears to
originate from another address, that of the "victim", either a
host or an IP router. The packet contains an ICMP ping message
that is addressed to an IP broadcast address, i.e., to all IP
addresses in a given network. The echo responses to the ping
message return to the victim's address. The goal of smurfing may
be either to deny service at a particular host or to flood all or
part of an IP network.
$ sniffing
(C) A synonym for "passive wiretapping". (See: password sniffing.)
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it unnecessarily
duplicates the meaning of a term that is better established. (See:
(usage note under) Green Book.
$ SNMP
See: Simple Network Management Protocol. See: Simple Network Management Protocol.
social engineering
(C) A euphemism for non-technical or low-technology means--such as $ social engineering
(I) A euphemism for non-technical or low-technology means--such as
lies, impersonation, tricks, bribes, blackmail, and threats--used lies, impersonation, tricks, bribes, blackmail, and threats--used
to attack and gain access to information systems. (Also see: to attack information systems. (See: masquerade attack.)
masquerade attack.) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD
NOT use this term; instead, use a term that is specific with
regard to the means of attack.
SOCKS (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is vague; instead,
use a term that is specific with regard to the means of attack.
$ SOCKS
(I) A protocol [R1928] that provides a generalized proxy server (I) A protocol [R1928] that provides a generalized proxy server
that enables client-server applications--such as TELNET, FTP, and that enables client-server applications--such as TELNET, FTP, and
HTTP; running over either TCP or UDP--to use the services of a HTTP; running over either TCP or UDP--to use the services of a
firewall. firewall.
(C) SOCKS is layered under the application layer and above the (C) SOCKS is layered under the application layer and above the
transport layer. When a client inside a firewall wishes to transport layer. When a client inside a firewall wishes to
establish a connection to an object that is reachable only through establish a connection to an object that is reachable only through
the firewall, it uses TCP to connect to the SOCKS server, the firewall, it uses TCP to connect to the SOCKS server,
negotiates with the server for the authentication method to be negotiates with the server for the authentication method to be
used, authenticates with the chosen method, then sends a relay used, authenticates with the chosen method, then sends a relay
request. The SOCKS server evaluates the request, typically based request. The SOCKS server evaluates the request, typically based
on source and destination addresses, and either establishes the on source and destination addresses, and either establishes the
appropriate connection or denies it. appropriate connection or denies it.
software $ soft TEMPEST
(O) The use of software techniques to reduce the radio frequency
information leakage from computer displays and keyboards. [Kuhn]
(See: TEMPEST.)
$ software
(I) Computer programs (which are stored in and executed by (I) Computer programs (which are stored in and executed by
computer hardware) and associated data (which is stored in the computer hardware) and associated data (which is stored in the
hardware) that may be dynamically written or modified during hardware) that may be dynamically written or modified during
execution. (Compare with: firmware, hardware.) execution. (Compare with: firmware, hardware.)
SORA $ SORA
See: SSO-PIN ORA. See: SSO-PIN ORA.
source integrity $ source integrity
(I) The degree of confidence that can be placed in information (I) The degree of confidence that can be placed in information
based on the trustworthiness of its sources. (Also see: based on the trustworthiness of its sources. (See: integrity.)
integrity.)
SP3 $ SP3
See: Security Protocol 3. See: Security Protocol 3.
SP4 $ SP4
See: Security Protocol 4. See: Security Protocol 4.
spam $ spam
(I) (1.) Verb: to indiscriminately send unsolicited, unwanted, (I) (1.) Verb: To indiscriminately send unsolicited, unwanted,
irrelevant, or inappropriate messages, especially commercial irrelevant, or inappropriate messages, especially commercial
advertising in mass quantities. (2.) Noun: electronic "junk mail". advertising in mass quantities. (2.) Noun: electronic "junk mail".
[R2635]
(C) This term must not be written in upper-case letters, because (D) This term SHOULD NOT be written in upper-case letters, because
SPAM(trademark) is a trademark of Hormel Foods Corporation. Hormel SPAM(trademark) is a trademark of Hormel Foods Corporation. Hormel
says, "We do not object to use of this slang term [spam] to says, "We do not object to use of this slang term [spam] to
describe [unsolicited commercial email (UCE)], although we do describe [unsolicited commercial email (UCE)], although we do
object to the use of our product image in association with that object to the use of our product image in association with that
term. Also, if the term is to be used, it should be used in all term. Also, if the term is to be used, it should be used in all
lower-case letters to distinguish it from our trademark SPAM, lower-case letters to distinguish it from our trademark SPAM,
which should be used with all uppercase letters." which should be used with all uppercase letters."
(C) In sufficient volume, spam can cause denial of service. (Also (C) In sufficient volume, spam can cause denial of service. (See:
see: flooding.) According to the SPAM Web site, the term was flooding.) According to the SPAM Web site, the term was adopted as
adopted as a result of the Monty Python skit in which a group of a result of the Monty Python skit in which a group of Vikings sang
Vikings sang a chorus of 'SPAM, SPAM, SPAM . . .' in an increasing a chorus of 'SPAM, SPAM, SPAM . . .' in an increasing crescendo,
crescendo, drowning out other conversation. Hence, the analogy drowning out other conversation. Hence, the analogy applied
applied because UCE was drowning out normal discourse on the because UCE was drowning out normal discourse on the Internet.
Internet.
SPC $ SPC
See: software publisher certificate. See: software publisher certificate.
SPI $ SPI
See: Security Parameters Index. See: Security Parameters Index.
split key $ split key
(I) A cryptographic key that is divided into two or more separate (I) A cryptographic key that is divided into two or more separate
data items that individually convey no knowledge of the whole key data items that individually convey no knowledge of the whole key
that results from combining the items. (Also see: dual control, that results from combining the items. (See: dual control, split
split knowledge.) knowledge.)
split knowledge $ split knowledge
(I) A security technique in which two or more entities separately (I) A security technique in which two or more entities separately
hold data items that individually convey no knowledge of the hold data items that individually convey no knowledge of the
information that results from combining the items. (Also see: dual information that results from combining the items. (See: dual
control, split key.) control, split key.)
(O) "A condition under which two or more entities separately have (O) "A condition under which two or more entities separately have
key components which individually convey no knowledge of the key components which individually convey no knowledge of the
plaintext key which will be produced when the key components are plaintext key which will be produced when the key components are
combined in the cryptographic module." [FP140] combined in the cryptographic module." [FP140]
spoofing attack $ spoofing attack
(I) A synonym for "masquerade attack". (I) A synonym for "masquerade attack".
SSL $ SSH
(I) A protocol for secure remote login and other secure network
services over an insecure network.
(C) Consists of three major components:
- Transport layer protocol provides server authentication,
confidentiality, and integrity. It may optionally also provide
compression. The transport layer will typically be run over a
TCP/IP connection, but might also be used on top of any other
reliable data stream.
- User authentication protocol authenticates the client-side user
to the server. It runs over the transport layer protocol.
- Connection protocol multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into
several logical channels. It runs over the user authentication
protocol.
$ SSL
See: Secure Sockets Layer, Standard Security Label. See: Secure Sockets Layer, Standard Security Label.
SSO $ SSO
See: system security officer. See: system security officer.
SSO PIN $ SSO PIN
(O) MISSI usage: One of two personal identification numbers that (O) MISSI usage: One of two personal identification numbers that
control access to the functions and stored data of a FORTEZZA PC control access to the functions and stored data of a FORTEZZA PC
card. Knowledge of the SSO PIN enables the card user to perform card. Knowledge of the SSO PIN enables the card user to perform
the FORTEZZA functions intended for use by an end user and also the FORTEZZA functions intended for use by an end user and also
the functions intended for use by a MISSI certification authority. the functions intended for use by a MISSI certification authority.
(Also see: user PIN.) (See: user PIN.)
SSO-PIN ORA (SORA) $ SSO-PIN ORA (SORA)
(O) MISSI usage: A MISSI organizational RA that operates in a mode (O) MISSI usage: A MISSI organizational RA that operates in a mode
in which the ORA performs all card management functions and, in which the ORA performs all card management functions and,
therefore, requires knowledge of the SSO PIN for an end user's therefore, requires knowledge of the SSO PIN for an end user's
FORTEZZA PC card. FORTEZZA PC card.
Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security (SILS) $ Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security (SILS)
(N) (1.) The IEEE 802.10 standards committee. (2.) A developing (N) (1.) The IEEE 802.10 standards committee. (2.) A developing
set of IEEE standards, which has eight parts: (a) Model, including set of IEEE standards, which has eight parts: (a) Model, including
security management, (b) Secure Data Exchange protocol, (c) Key security management, (b) Secure Data Exchange protocol, (c) Key
Management, (d) [has been incorporated in (a)], (e) SDE Over Management, (d) [has been incorporated in (a)], (e) SDE Over
Ethernet 2.0, (f) SDE Sublayer Management, (g) SDE Security Ethernet 2.0, (f) SDE Sublayer Management, (g) SDE Security
Labels, and (h) SDE PICS Conformance. Parts b, e, f, g, and h are Labels, and (h) SDE PICS Conformance. Parts b, e, f, g, and h are
incorporated in IEEE Standard 802.10-1998. incorporated in IEEE Standard 802.10-1998.
Star Trek attack $ star property
(I) See: "confinement property" under Bell-LaPadula Model.
$ Star Trek attack
(C) An attack that penetrates your system where no attack has ever (C) An attack that penetrates your system where no attack has ever
gone before. gone before.
steganography $ steganography
(I) Methods of hiding the existence of a message or other data. (I) Methods of hiding the existence of a message or other data.
This is different than cryptography, which hides the meaning in a This is different than cryptography, which hides the meaning in a
message but does not hide the message itself. (Also see: message but does not hide the message itself. (See: cryptology.)
cryptology.)
(C) An example of a steganographic method is "invisible" ink. (C) An example of a steganographic method is "invisible" ink.
(Also see: digital watermark.) (See: digital watermark.)
storage channel $ storage channel
See: (secondary definition in) covert channel. See: (secondary definition in) covert channel.
stream cipher $ stream cipher
(I) An encryption algorithm that breaks plaintext into a stream of (I) An encryption algorithm that breaks plaintext into a stream of
successive bits (or characters) and encrypts the n-th plaintext successive bits (or characters) and encrypts the n-th plaintext
bit with the n-th element of a parallel key stream, thus bit with the n-th element of a parallel key stream, thus
converting the plaintext bit stream into a ciphertext bit stream. converting the plaintext bit stream into a ciphertext bit stream.
[Schn] (Compare with: block cipher.) [Schn] (Compare with: block cipher.)
strong authentication $ strong authentication
(I) An authentication process that uses cryptography--particularly (I) An authentication process that uses cryptography--particularly
public-key certificates--to verify the identity claimed for an public-key certificates--to verify the identity claimed for an
entity. (Also see: X.509.) entity. (See: X.509.)
(O) "Authentication by means of cryptographically derived (O) "Authentication by means of cryptographically derived
credentials." [X509] credentials." [X509]
subject $ subject
1. (I) In a computer system: A system entity that causes 1. (I) In a computer system: A system entity that causes
information to flow among objects or changes the system state; information to flow among objects or changes the system state;
technically, a process-domain pair. (Also see: Bell-LaPadula technically, a process-domain pair. (See: Bell-LaPadula Model.)
Model.)
2. (I) Of a certificate: The entity name that is bound to the data 2. (I) Of a certificate: The entity name that is bound to the data
items in a digital certificate, and particularly a name that is items in a digital certificate, and particularly a name that is
bound to a key value in a public-key certificate. bound to a key value in a public-key certificate.
subnetwork $ subnetwork
(N) An OSI term for a system of packet relays and connecting links (N) An OSI term for a system of packet relays and connecting links
that implement the lower three protocol layers of the OSIRM to that implement the lower three protocol layers of the OSIRM to
provide a communication service that interconnects attached end provide a communication service that interconnects attached end
systems. Usually the switches operate at OSI layer 3 and are all systems. Usually the switches operate at OSI layer 3 and are all
of the same type (e.g., all X.25 packet switches, or all interface of the same type (e.g., all X.25 packet switches, or all interface
units in an IEEE 802.3 LAN). (Also see: gateway, internet, units in an IEEE 802.3 LAN). (See: gateway, internet, router.)
router.)
subordinate certification authority (SCA) $ subordinate certification authority (SCA)
(I) A CA whose public-key certificate is issued by another (I) A CA whose public-key certificate is issued by another
(superior) CA. (superior) CA.
(O) MISSI usage: The fourth-highest (bottom) level of a MISSI (O) MISSI usage: The fourth-highest (bottom) level of a MISSI
certification hierarchy; a MISSI certification authority whose certification hierarchy; a MISSI certification authority whose
public-key certificate is signed by a MISSI CA rather than by a public-key certificate is signed by a MISSI CA rather than by a
MISSI PCA. A MISSI SCA is the administrative authority for a MISSI PCA. A MISSI SCA is the administrative authority for a
subunit of an organization, established when it is desirable to subunit of an organization, established when it is desirable to
organizationally distribute or decentralize the CA service. The organizationally distribute or decentralize the CA service. The
term refers both to that authoritative office or role, and to the term refers both to that authoritative office or role, and to the
person who fills that office A MISSI SCA registers end users and person who fills that office A MISSI SCA registers end users and
issues their certificates and may also register ORAs, but may not issues their certificates and may also register ORAs, but may not
register other CAs. An SCA periodically issues a CRL. register other CAs. An SCA periodically issues a CRL.
subordinate distinguished name $ subordinate distinguished name
(I) An X.500 DN is subordinate to another if it begins with a set (I) An X.500 DN is subordinate to another if it begins with a set
of attributes that is the same as the entire second DN except for of attributes that is the same as the entire second DN except for
the terminal attribute of the second DN (which is usually the name the terminal attribute of the second DN (which is usually the name
of a CA). For example, the DN <C=FooLand, O=Gov, OU=Treasurer, of a CA). For example, the DN <C=FooLand, O=Gov, OU=Treasurer,
CN=DukePinchpenny> is subordinate to the DN <C=FooLand, O=Gov, CN=DukePinchpenny> is subordinate to the DN <C=FooLand, O=Gov,
CN=KingFooCA>. CN=KingFooCA>.
superencryption $ superencryption
(I) An encryption operation for which the plaintext input to be (I) An encryption operation for which the plaintext input to be
transformed is the ciphertext output of a previous encryption transformed is the ciphertext output of a previous encryption
operation. operation.
symmetric cryptography $ survivability
(I) The ability of a system to remain in operation or existence
despite adverse conditions, including both natural occurrences,
accidental actions, and attacks on the system. (See: availability,
reliability.)
$ symmetric cryptography
(I) A branch of cryptography involving algorithms that use the (I) A branch of cryptography involving algorithms that use the
same key for two different steps of the algorithm (such as same key for two different steps of the algorithm (such as
encryption and decryption, or signature creation and signature encryption and decryption, or signature creation and signature
verification). verification).
(C) Symmetric cryptography has been used for thousands of years (C) Symmetric cryptography has been used for thousands of years
[Kahn]. A modern example of is the U.S. Government's Data [Kahn]. A modern example of is the U.S. Government's Data
Encryption Standard. Symmetric cryptography is sometimes called Encryption Standard. Symmetric cryptography is sometimes called
"secret-key cryptography" (also see: public-key cryptography) "secret-key cryptography" (also see: public-key cryptography)
because the entities that share the key, such as the originator because the entities that share the key, such as the originator
and the recipient of a message, must keep the key secret. For and the recipient of a message, need to keep the key secret. For
example, when Alice wants to ensure confidentiality for data she example, when Alice wants to ensure confidentiality for data she
sends to Bob, she encrypts the data with a secret key, and Bob sends to Bob, she encrypts the data with a secret key, and Bob
uses the same key to decrypt. Keeping the shared key secret uses the same key to decrypt. Keeping the shared key secret
entails both cost and risk when the key must be distributed to entails both cost and risk when the key is distributed to both
both Alice and Bob. Thus, symmetric cryptography has a key Alice and Bob. Thus, symmetric cryptography has a key management
management disadvantage compared to asymmetric cryptography. (Also disadvantage compared to asymmetric cryptography. (See: key
see: key agreement). agreement.)
symmetric key $ symmetric key
(I) A cryptographic key that is used in a symmetric cryptographic (I) A cryptographic key that is used in a symmetric cryptographic
algorithm. algorithm.
SYN flood $ SYN flood
(I) A denial of service attack that sends a host more TCP SYN (I) A denial of service attack that sends a host more TCP SYN
packets (request to synchronize sequence numbers, used when packets (request to synchronize sequence numbers, used when
opening a connection) than the protocol implementation can handle. opening a connection) than the protocol implementation can handle.
(Also see: flooding.) (See: flooding.)
system entity $ system
(I) An active element of a system--an automated process, a person, (C) In this Glossary, the term is mainly used as an abbreviation
or a group of persons--that incorporates some specific set of for "automated information system".
capabilities.
system high $ system entity
(I) An active element of a system--an automated process, a
subsystem, a person or group of persons--that incorporates some
specific set of capabilities.
$ system high
(I) The highest security level supported by a system at a (I) The highest security level supported by a system at a
particular time or in a particular environment. particular time or in a particular environment.
system high security mode $ system high security mode
(I) A mode of operation of an information system, wherein all (I) A mode of operation of an information system, wherein all
users having access to the system possess a security clearance or users having access to the system possess a security clearance or
authorization, but not necessarily a need-to-know, for all data authorization, but not necessarily a need-to-know, for all data
handled by the system. handled by the system.
(C) This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of Defense (C) This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of Defense
policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2], but the term is policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2], but the term is
widely used outside the Defense Department and outside the widely used outside the Defense Department and outside the
Government. Government.
system integrity $ system integrity
(I) "The quality that a system has when it performs its intended (I) "The quality that a system has when it can perform its
function in a unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or intended function in a unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or
inadvertent unauthorized manipulation." [NCS04] (Also see: system inadvertent unauthorized manipulation." [NCS04] (See: system
integrity service.) integrity service.)
system integrity service $ system integrity service
(I) A security service that protects system resources in a (I) A security service that protects system resources in a
verifiable manner against unauthorized or accidental change, loss, verifiable manner against unauthorized or accidental change, loss,
or destruction. (Also see: system integrity.) or destruction. (See: system integrity.)
system low $ system low
(I) The lowest security level supported by a system at a (I) The lowest security level supported by a system at a
particular time or in a particular environment. particular time or in a particular environment.
system resource $ system resource
(I) Data contained in a system; or a service provided by a system; (I) Data contained in an information system; or a service provided
or a system capability, such as processing power or communication by a system; or a system capability, such as processing power or
bandwidth; or an item of system equipment (i.e., a system communication bandwidth; or an item of system equipment (i.e., a
component--hardware, firmware, software, or documentation); or a system component--hardware, firmware, software, or documentation);
facility that houses system operations and equipment. or a facility that houses system operations and equipment.
system verification $ system verification
See: (secondary definition in) verification. See: (secondary definition in) verification.
TACACS, TACACS+ $ TACACS
$ TACACS+
See: Terminal Access Controller (TAC) Access Control System. See: Terminal Access Controller (TAC) Access Control System.
tamper $ tamper
(I) Make an unauthorized modification in a system that alters the (I) Make an unauthorized modification in a system that alters the
system's functioning in a way that degrades the security services system's functioning in a way that degrades the security services
that the system was intended to provide. that the system was intended to provide.
TCB $ TCB
See: trusted computing base. See: trusted computing base.
TCP $ TCP
See: Transmission Control Protocol. See: Transmission Control Protocol.
TCP/IP $ TCP/IP
(I) A synonym for "Internet Protocol Suite", in which the (I) A synonym for "Internet Protocol Suite", in which the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP) Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP)
are important parts. are important parts.
TCSEC $ TCSEC
See: Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. See: Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria.
TELNET $ TELNET
(I) A TCP-based, application-level, Internet Standard protocol for (I) A TCP-based, application-level, Internet Standard protocol for
remote login from one host to another. [R0854] remote login from one host to another. [R0854]
TEMPEST $ TEMPEST
(O) A nickname for specifications and standards for limiting the (O) A nickname for specifications and standards for limiting the
strength of electromagnetic emanations from electrical and strength of electromagnetic emanations from electrical and
electronic equipment and thus reducing vulnerability to electronic equipment and thus reducing vulnerability to
eavesdropping. This term originated in the U.S. Department of eavesdropping. This term originated in the U.S. Department of
Defense. Defense. (See: emanation security, soft tempest.)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for
as a synonym for "emanations security". "electromagnetic emanations security".
Terminal Access Controller (TAC) Access Control System (TACACS) $ Terminal Access Controller (TAC) Access Control System (TACACS)
(I) A UDP-based authentication and access control protocol [R1492] (I) A UDP-based authentication and access control protocol [R1492]
in which a network access server receives an identifier and in which a network access server receives an identifier and
password from a remote terminal and passes them to a separate password from a remote terminal and passes them to a separate
authentication server for verification. Originally developed for authentication server for verification. Originally developed for
ARPANET and now evolved for use in commercial equipment: ARPANET and now evolved for use in commercial equipment:
- "XTACACS": The name of Cisco Corporation's implementation, - "XTACACS": The name of Cisco Corporation's implementation,
which enhances and extends the original TACACS. which enhances and extends the original TACACS.
- "TACACS+": A TCP-based protocol that improves on TACACS and - "TACACS+": A TCP-based protocol that improves on TACACS and
XTACACS by separating the functions of authentication, XTACACS by separating the functions of authentication,
authorization, and accounting and by encrypting all traffic authorization, and accounting and by encrypting all traffic
between the network access server and authentication server. It between the network access server and authentication server. It
is extensible to allow any authentication mechanism to be used is extensible to allow any authentication mechanism to be used
with TACACS+ clients. with TACACS+ clients.
(C) TACACS can provide service not only for network access servers (C) TACACS can provide service not only for network access servers
but also routers and other networked computing devices via one or but also routers and other networked computing devices via one or
more centralized authentication servers. more centralized authentication servers.
threat $ TESS
See: The Exponential Encryption System.
$ The Exponential Encryption System (TESS)
(I) A system of separate by cooperation cryptographic mechanisms
and functions for the secure authenticated exchange of
cryptographic keys, the generation of digital signatures, and the
distribution of public keys. TESS employs asymmetric cryptography,
based on discrete exponentiation, and a structure of self-
certified public keys. [R1824]
$ threat
(I) A potential for violation of security, which exists when there (I) A potential for violation of security, which exists when there
is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach
security and cause harm. (Also see: attack, threat action, threat security and cause harm. (See: attack, threat action, threat
consequence.) consequence.)
threat action (C) That is, a threat is a possible danger that might exploit a
(I) An assault on system security. (Also see: attack, threat, vulnerability. A threat can be either "intentional" (i.e.,
threat consequence.) intelligent; e.g., an individual cracker or a criminal
organization) or "accidental" (e.g., the possibility of a computer
malfunctioning, or the possibility of an "act of God" such as an
earthquake, a fire, or a tornado).
(C) A complete security architecture must deal with both (C) In some contexts, the term is used narrowly to refer only to
intentional acts (i.e. attacks) and accidental events [FIPS31]. intelligent threats; for example:
threat consequence (N) U. S. Government usage: The technical and operational
capability of a hostile entity to detect, exploit, or subvert
friendly information systems and the demonstrated, presumed, or
inferred intent of that entity to conduct such activity.
$ threat action
(I) An assault on system security. (See: attack, threat, threat
consequence.)
(C) A complete security architecture deals with both intentional
acts (i.e. attacks) and accidental events [FIPS31]. Various kinds
of threat actions are defined as subentries under "threat
consequence".
$ threat analysis
(I) An analysis of the probability of occurrences and consequences
of damaging actions to a system.
$ threat consequence
(I) A security violation that results from a threat action. (I) A security violation that results from a threat action.
Includes disclosure, deception, disruption, and usurpation. (Also Includes disclosure, deception, disruption, and usurpation. (See:
see: attack, threat, threat action.) attack, threat, threat action.)
(C) The following subentries describe the types of threat actions (C) The following subentries describe four kinds of threat
that cause each threat consequence. Threat actions that are consequences, and also list and describe the kinds of threat
actions that cause each consequence. Threat actions that are
accidental events are marked by "*". accidental events are marked by "*".
1. "(Unauthorized) Disclosure" (a threat consequence): A 1. "(Unauthorized) Disclosure" (a threat consequence): A
circumstance or event whereby an entity gains access to data circumstance or event whereby an entity gains access to data
for which the entity is not authorized (Also see: data for which the entity is not authorized. (See: data
confidentiality.) The following threat actions can cause confidentiality.) The following threat actions can cause
unauthorized disclosure: unauthorized disclosure:
A. "Exposure": An action whereby sensitive data is directly A. "Exposure": A threat action whereby sensitive data is
released to an unauthorized entity. This includes: directly released to an unauthorized entity. This includes:
a. "Deliberate Exposure: Intentional release of sensitive a. "Deliberate Exposure: Intentional release of sensitive
data to an unauthorized entity. data to an unauthorized entity.
b. "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system b. "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system
to acquire unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. to gain unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
c* "Human error": Human action or inaction that c* "Human error": Human action or inaction that
unintentionally results in an entity receiving unintentionally results in an entity gaining unauthorized
unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. knowledge of sensitive data.
d* "Hardware/software error". System failure that results in d* "Hardware/software error". System failure that results in
an entity receiving unauthorized knowledge of sensitive an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive
data. data.
B. "Interception": An action whereby an unauthorized entity B. "Interception": A threat action whereby an unauthorized
directly accesses sensitive data traveling between entity directly accesses sensitive data traveling between
authorized sources and destinations. This includes: authorized sources and destinations. This includes:
a. "Theft": Gaining access to sensitive data by stealing a a. "Theft": Gaining access to sensitive data by stealing a
shipment of a physical medium, such as a magnetic tape or shipment of a physical medium, such as a magnetic tape or
disk, that holds the data. disk, that holds the data.
b. "Wiretapping (passive): Monitoring and recording data b. "Wiretapping (passive): Monitoring and recording data
that is flowing between two points in a communication that is flowing between two points in a communication
system. (Also see: wiretapping.) system. (See: wiretapping.)
c. "Emanations analysis": Gaining direct knowledge of c. "Emanations analysis": Gaining direct knowledge of
communicated data by monitoring and resolving a signal communicated data by monitoring and resolving a signal
that is emitted by a system and that contains the data that is emitted by a system and that contains the data
but is not intended to communicate the data. (Also see: but is not intended to communicate the data. (See:
emanation.) emanation.)
C. "Inference": An action whereby an unauthorized entity C. "Inference": A threat action whereby an unauthorized entity
indirectly accesses sensitive data (but not necessarily the indirectly accesses sensitive data (but not necessarily the
data contained in the communication) by reasoning from data contained in the communication) by reasoning from
characteristics or byproducts of communications. This characteristics or byproducts of communications. This
includes: includes:
a. Traffic analysis: Gaining knowledge of data by observing a. Traffic analysis: Gaining knowledge of data by observing
the characteristics of communications that carry the the characteristics of communications that carry the
data. (Also see: (main glossary entry for) traffic data. (See: (main Glossary entry for) traffic analysis.)
analysis.)
b. "Signals analysis": Gaining indirect knowledge of b. "Signals analysis": Gaining indirect knowledge of
communicated data by monitoring and analyzing a signal communicated data by monitoring and analyzing a signal
that is emitted by a system and that contains the data that is emitted by a system and that contains the data
but is not intended to communicate the data. (Also see: but is not intended to communicate the data. (See:
emanation.) emanation.)
D. "Intrusion": A threat consequence; an action whereby an D. "Intrusion": A threat action whereby an unauthorized entity
unauthorized entity gains access to sensitive data by gains access to sensitive data by circumventing a system's
circumventing a system's security protections. This security protections. This includes:
includes:
a. "Trespass": Gaining unauthorized physical access to a. "Trespass": Gaining unauthorized physical access to
sensitive data by circumventing a system's protections. sensitive data by circumventing a system's protections.
b. "Penetration": Gaining unauthorized logical access to b. "Penetration": Gaining unauthorized logical access to
sensitive data by circumventing a system's protections. sensitive data by circumventing a system's protections.
c. "Reverse engineering": Acquiring sensitive data by c. "Reverse engineering": Acquiring sensitive data by
disassembling, and analyzing the design, of a system disassembling, and analyzing the design, of a system
component. component.
d. Cryptanalysis: Transforming encrypted data into plaintext d. Cryptanalysis: Transforming encrypted data into plaintext
without having prior knowledge of variables or algorithms without having prior knowledge of variables or algorithms
used in the encipherment process. (Also see: (main used in the encipherment process. (See: (main Glossary
glossary entry for) cryptanalysis.) entry for) cryptanalysis.)
2. "Deception" (a threat consequence): A circumstance or event 2. "Deception" (a threat consequence): A circumstance or event
that may result in an authorized entity receiving false data that may result in an authorized entity receiving false data
and believing it to be true. The following threat actions can and believing it to be true. The following threat actions can
cause deception: cause deception:
A. "Masquerade": An action whereby an unauthorized entity gains A. "Masquerade": A threat action whereby an unauthorized entity
access to a system or performs a malicious act by posing as gains access to a system or performs a malicious act by
an authorized entity.(Also see: (main glossary entry for) posing as an authorized entity.(See: (main Glossary entry
masquerade attack.) for) masquerade attack.)
a. "Spoof": Attempt by an unauthorized entity to gain access a. "Spoof": Attempt by an unauthorized entity to gain access
to a system by posing as an authorized user. to a system by posing as an authorized user.
b. "Malicious logic": In context of masquerade, any b. "Malicious logic": In context of masquerade, any
hardware, firmware, or software (e.g., Trojan horse) that hardware, firmware, or software (e.g., Trojan horse) that
appears to perform a useful or desirable function, but appears to perform a useful or desirable function, but
actually gains unauthorized access to system resources or actually gains unauthorized access to system resources or
tricks a user into executing other malicious logic. (Also tricks a user into executing other malicious logic. (See:
see: (main glossary entry for) malicious logic.) (main Glossary entry for) malicious logic.)
B. "Falsification": Action whereby false data deceives an B. "Falsification": A threat action whereby false data deceives
authorized entity. (Also see: active wiretapping.) an authorized entity. (See: active wiretapping.)
a. "Substitution": Altering or replacing valid data with a. "Substitution": Altering or replacing valid data with
false data that serves to deceive an authorized entity. false data that serves to deceive an authorized entity.
b. "Insertion": Introducing or adding valid data with false b. "Insertion": Introducing or adding valid data with false
data that serves to deceive an authorized entity. data that serves to deceive an authorized entity.
C. "Repudiation": Action whereby an entity deceives another by C. "Repudiation": Action whereby an entity deceives another by
falsely denying responsibility for an act. (Also see: non- falsely denying responsibility for an act. (See: non-
repudiation service, (main glossary entry for) repudiation.) repudiation service, (main Glossary entry for) repudiation.)
a. "False denial of origin": Action whereby the originator a. "False denial of origin": A threat action whereby the
of data denies responsibility for its generation. originator of data denies responsibility for its
generation.
b. "False denial of receipt": Action whereby the recipient b. "False denial of receipt": A threat action whereby the
of data denies receiving and possessing the data. recipient of data denies receiving and possessing the
data.
3. "Disruption" (a threat consequence): A circumstance or event 3. "Disruption" (a threat consequence): A circumstance or event
that interrupts or prevents the correct option of system that interrupts or prevents the correct operation of system
services and functions. (Also see: denial of service.) The services and functions. (See: denial of service.) The following
following threat actions that can cause disruption: threat actions that can cause disruption:
A. "Incapacitation": Action that prevents or interrupts system A. "Incapacitation": A threat action that prevents or
operation by disabling a system component. interrupts system operation by disabling a system component.
a. "Malicious logic": In context of disabling, any hardware, a. "Malicious logic": In context of incapacitation, any
firmware, or software (e.g., logic bomb) intentionally hardware, firmware, or software (e.g., logic bomb)
introduced into a system to destroy system functions or intentionally introduced into a system to destroy system
resources. (Also see: (main glossary entry for) malicious functions or resources. (See: (main Glossary entry for)
logic.) malicious logic.)
b. "Physical destruction": Deliberate destruction of a b. "Physical destruction": Deliberate destruction of a
system component to interrupt or prevent system system component to interrupt or prevent system
operation. operation.
c* "Human error": Action or inaction that disables a system c* "Human error": Action or inaction that disables a system
component. component.
d* "Hardware or software error": Error that causes failure d* "Hardware or software error": Error that causes failure
of a system component and leads to disruption of system of a system component and leads to disruption of system
operation. operation.
e* "Natural catastrophe": Any "act of God" (e.g., fire, e* "Natural disaster": Any "act of God" (e.g., fire, flood,
flood, wind, or earthquake) that disables a system earthquake, lightning, or wind) that disables a system
component. component. [FP031 section 2]
B. "Corruption": Action that undesirably alters system B. "Corruption": A threat action that undesirably alters system
operation by adversely modifying system functions or data. operation by adversely modifying system functions or data.
a. "Tamper": In context of corruption, deliberate alteration a. "Tamper": In context of corruption, deliberate alteration
of a system's logic, data, or control information to of a system's logic, data, or control information to
interrupt or prevent correct operation of system interrupt or prevent correct operation of system
functions. functions.
b. "Malicious logic": In context of corruption, any b. "Malicious logic": In context of corruption, any
hardware, firmware, or software (e.g., a computer virus) hardware, firmware, or software (e.g., a computer virus)
intentionally introduced into a system to modify system intentionally introduced into a system to modify system
functions or data. (Also see: (main glossary entry for) functions or data. (See: (main Glossary entry for)
malicious logic.) malicious logic.)
c* "Human error": Human action or inaction that results in c* "Human error": Human action or inaction that results in
the alteration of system functions or data. the alteration of system functions or data.
d* "Hardware or software error": Error that results in the d* "Hardware or software error": Error that results in the
alteration of system functions or data. alteration of system functions or data.
e* "Natural catastrophe": Any "act of God" (e.g., power e* "Natural disaster": Any "act of God" (e.g., power surge
surge caused by lightning) that alters system functions caused by lightning) that alters system functions or
or data. data. [FP031 section 2]
C. "Obstruction": Action that interrupts delivery of system C. "Obstruction": A threat action that interrupts delivery of
services by hindering system operations. system services by hindering system operations.
a. "Interference": Action that disrupts system operations by a. "Interference": Disruption of system operations by
blocking communications or user data or control blocking communications or user data or control
information. information.
b. "Overload": Actions that hinders system operation by b. "Overload": Hindrance of system operation by placing
placing excess burden on the performance capabilities of excess burden on the performance capabilities of a system
a system component. (Also see: flooding.) component. (See: flooding.)
4. "Usurpation" (a threat consequence): A circumstance or event 4. "Usurpation" (a threat consequence): A circumstance or event
that results in control of system services or functions by an that results in control of system services or functions by an
unauthorized entity. The following threat actions can cause unauthorized entity. The following threat actions can cause
usurpation: usurpation:
A. "Misappropriation": Action whereby an entity assumes A. "Misappropriation": A threat action whereby an entity
unauthorized logical or physical control of a system assumes unauthorized logical or physical control of a system
resource. resource.
a. "Theft of service": Unauthorized use of service by an a. "Theft of service": Unauthorized use of service by an
entity. entity.
b. "Theft of functionality": Unauthorized acquisition of b. "Theft of functionality": Unauthorized acquisition of
actual hardware, software, or firmware of a system actual hardware, software, or firmware of a system
component. component.
c. "Theft of data": Unauthorized acquisition and use of c. "Theft of data": Unauthorized acquisition and use of
data. data.
B. "Misuse": Action that causes a system component to perform a B. "Misuse": A threat action that causes a system component to
function or service that is detrimental to system security. perform a function or service that is detrimental to system
security.
a. "Tamper": In context of misuse, deliberate alteration of a. "Tamper": In context of misuse, deliberate alteration of
a system's logic, data, or control information to cause a system's logic, data, or control information to cause
the system to perform unauthorized functions or services. the system to perform unauthorized functions or services.
b. "Malicious logic": In context of misuse, any hardware, b. "Malicious logic": In context of misuse, any hardware,
software, or firmware intentionally introduced into a software, or firmware intentionally introduced into a
system to perform or control execution of an unauthorized system to perform or control execution of an unauthorized
function or service. function or service.
c. "Violation of permissions": Action by an entity that c. "Violation of permissions": Action by an entity that
exceeds the entity's system privileges by executing an exceeds the entity's system privileges by executing an
unauthorized function. unauthorized function.
thumbprint $ thumbprint
(I) A pattern of curves formed by the ridges on the tip of a (I) A pattern of curves formed by the ridges on the tip of a
thumb. (Also see: biometric authentication, fingerprint.) thumb. (See: biometric authentication, fingerprint.)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "hash result"
as a synonym for "hash result" because it mixes concepts in a because that meaning concepts in a potentially misleading way.
potentially misleading way.
ticket $ ticket
(I) A synonym for "capability". (I) A synonym for "capability".
(C) A ticket is usually granted by a centralized access control (C) A ticket is usually granted by a centralized access control
server (ticket-granting agent) to authorize access to a system server (ticket-granting agent) to authorize access to a system
resource for a limited time. Tickets have been implemented with resource for a limited time. Tickets have been implemented with
symmetric cryptography (see: Kerberos), but can also be symmetric cryptography (see: Kerberos), but can also be
implemented as attribute certificates using asymmetric implemented as attribute certificates using asymmetric
cryptography. In effect, an RA that does not issue digital cryptography. In effect, an RA that does not issue digital
certificates itself, but vouches for the identity of prospective certificates itself, but vouches for the identity of prospective
certificate holders to a CA, is a ticket-granting agent. [FPKI] certificate holders to a CA, is a ticket-granting agent. [FPKI]
timing channel $ timing channel
See: (secondary definition in) covert channel. See: (secondary definition in) covert channel.
TLS $ TLS
See: Transport Layer Security. (Also see: TLSP.) See: Transport Layer Security. (See: TLSP.)
TLSP $ TLSP
See: Transport Layer Security Protocol. (Also see: TLS.) See: Transport Layer Security Protocol. (See: TLS.)
token $ token
1. (I) General usage: An object that is used to control access and 1. (I) General usage: An object that is used to control access and
is passed between cooperating entities in a protocol that is passed between cooperating entities in a protocol that
synchronizes use of a shared resource. Usually, the entity that synchronizes use of a shared resource. Usually, the entity that
currently holds the token has exclusive access to the resource. currently holds the token has exclusive access to the resource.
2. (I) Authentication usage: A data object or a portable, user- 2. (I) Authentication usage: A data object or a portable, user-
controlled, physical device used to verify an identity in an controlled, physical device used to verify an identity in an
authentication process. (Also see: authentication information, authentication process. (See: authentication information, dongle.)
dongle.)
3. (I) Cryptographic usage: See: cryptographic token. 3. (I) Cryptographic usage: See: cryptographic token.
token backup $ token backup
(I) A token management operation that stores sufficient (I) A token management operation that stores sufficient
information in a database (e.g., in a CAW) to recreate or restore information in a database (e.g., in a CAW) to recreate or restore
a security token (e.g., a smart card) if it is lost or damaged. a security token (e.g., a smart card) if it is lost or damaged.
token copy $ token copy
(I) A token management operation that copies all the personality (I) A token management operation that copies all the personality
information from one security token to another. However, unlike in information from one security token to another. However, unlike in
card restore, the second card is initialized with its own, card restore, the second card is initialized with its own,
different local security values such as PINs and card storage different local security values such as PINs and card storage
keys. keys.
token management $ token management
(I) The process of initializing security tokens (e.g., see: smart (I) The process of initializing security tokens (e.g., see: smart
card), loading data into the tokens, and controlling the tokens card), loading data into the tokens, and controlling the tokens
during their life cycle. May include performing key management and during their life cycle. May include performing key management and
certificate management functions; generating and installing PINs; certificate management functions; generating and installing PINs;
loading user personality data; performing card backup, card copy, loading user personality data; performing card backup, card copy,
and card restore operations; and updating firmware. and card restore operations; and updating firmware.
token restore $ token restore
(I) A token management operation that loads a token with data for (I) A token management operation that loads a token with data for
the purpose of recreating (duplicating) the contents previously the purpose of recreating (duplicating) the contents previously
held by that or another token. held by that or another token.
token storage key $ token storage key
(I) A cryptography key used to protect data that is stored on a (I) A cryptography key used to protect data that is stored on a
security token. security token.
top CA $ top CA
(I) A CA that is the highest level (i.e., is the most trusted CA) (I) A CA that is the highest level (i.e., is the most trusted CA)
in a certification hierarchy. (Also see: root.) in a certification hierarchy. (See: root.)
top-level specification $ top-level specification
(I) "A non-procedural description of system behavior at the most (I) "A non-procedural description of system behavior at the most
abstract level; typically a functional specification that omits abstract level; typically a functional specification that omits
all implementation details." [NCS04] all implementation details." [NCS04] (See: (discussion under)
security policy.)
traffic analysis (C) A top-level specification may be descriptive or formal:
- "Descriptive top-level specification": One that is written in a
natural language like English or an informal design notation.
- "Formal top-level specification": One that is written in a
formal mathematical language to allow theorems to be proven
showing that the specification correctly implements a set of
formal requirements or a formal security model. (See: correctness
proof.)
$ traffic analysis
(I) Inference of information from observable characteristics of (I) Inference of information from observable characteristics of
data flow(s), even when the data is encrypted or otherwise not data flow(s), even when the data is encrypted or otherwise not
directly available. Such characteristics include the identities directly available. Such characteristics include the identities
and locations of the source(s) and destination(s), and the and locations of the source(s) and destination(s), and the
presence, amount, frequency, and duration of occurrence. (Also presence, amount, frequency, and duration of occurrence. (See:
see: wiretapping.) wiretapping.)
(O) "The inference of information from observation of traffic (O) "The inference of information from observation of traffic
flows (presence, absence, amount, direction, and frequency)." flows (presence, absence, amount, direction, and frequency)."
[I7498 Part 2] [I7498 Part 2]
traffic flow confidentiality $ traffic flow confidentiality
(I) A data confidentiality service to protect against traffic (I) A data confidentiality service to protect against traffic
analysis. analysis.
(O) "A confidentiality service to protect against traffic (O) "A confidentiality service to protect against traffic
analysis." [I7498 Part 2] analysis." [I7498 Part 2]
traffic padding $ traffic padding
(I) "The generation of spurious instances of communication, (I) "The generation of spurious instances of communication,
spurious data units, and/or spurious data within data units." spurious data units, and/or spurious data within data units."
[I7498 Part 2] [I7498 Part 2]
tranquillity property $ tranquillity property
See: (secondary definition in) Bell-LaPadula Model. See: (secondary definition in) Bell-LaPadula Model.
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) $ Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
(I) An Internet protocol [R0793] that reliably delivers a sequence (I) An Internet Standard protocol [R0793] that reliably delivers a
of datagrams (discrete sets of bits) from one computer to another sequence of datagrams (discrete sets of bits) from one computer to
in a computer network. another in a computer network.
(C) TCP is designed to fit into a layered hierarchy of protocols (C) TCP is designed to fit into a layered hierarchy of protocols
that support internetwork applications. TCP assumes it can obtain that support internetwork applications. TCP assumes it can obtain
a simple, potentially unreliable datagram service (such as the a simple, potentially unreliable datagram service (such as the
Internet Protocol) from the lower level protocols. Internet Protocol) from the lower level protocols.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) $ Transport Layer Security (TLS)
(I) TLS Version 1.0 is an Internet protocol based-on and very (I) TLS Version 1.0 is an Internet protocol based-on and very
similar to SSL Version 3.0. (Compare with: TLSP.) similar to SSL Version 3.0. (Compare with: TLSP.)
(C) The TLS protocol is misnamed, because it operates well above (C) The TLS protocol is misnamed, because it operates well above
OSI layer 4. OSI layer 4.
Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLSP) $ Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLSP)
(I) An end-to-end encryption (ISO 10736) protocol that provides (I) An end-to-end encryption (ISO 10736) protocol that provides
security services at the bottom of OSI layer 4, i.e., directly security services at the bottom of OSI layer 4, i.e., directly
above OSI layer 3. (Compare with: TLS.) above OSI layer 3. (Compare with: TLS.)
(C) TLSP evolved directly from the SP4 protocol of SDNS. (C) TLSP evolved directly from the SP4 protocol of SDNS.
transport mode vs. tunnel mode $ transport mode vs. tunnel mode
(I) IPsec usage: Two ways to apply IPsec protocols (AH and ESP) to (I) IPsec usage: Two ways to apply IPsec protocols (AH and ESP) to
protect communications: protect communications:
- "Transport mode": The protection applies mainly to the packets - "Transport mode": The protection applies mainly to the packets
of upper layer protocols, the ones that are carried above IP. of upper layer protocols, the ones that are carried above IP.
- "Tunnel mode": The protection applies to tunneled IP packets. - "Tunnel mode": The protection applies to tunneled IP packets.
(C) A transport mode security association is always between two (C) A transport mode security association is always between two
hosts. A tunnel mode security association is one that is applied hosts. A tunnel mode security association is one that is applied
to an IP tunnel, but the each end may be either a host or a to an IP tunnel, but the each end may be either a host or a
gateway; and, whenever either end of a security association is a gateway; and, whenever either end of a security association is a
security gateway, the association must be in tunnel mode. security gateway, the association is required to be in tunnel
mode.
trap door $ trap door
(I) A hidden computer flaw known to an intruder, or hidden (I) A hidden computer flaw known to an intruder, or hidden
computer mechanism (usually software) installed by an intruder, computer mechanism (usually software) installed by an intruder,
who can activate the mechanism to gain access to the computer who can activate the mechanism to gain access to the computer
without being blocked by security mechanisms. (Also see: back without being blocked by security mechanisms. (See: back door,
door, Trojan horse.) Trojan horse.)
triple DES $ triple DES
(I) An block cipher, based on DES, that transforms each 64-bit (I) An block cipher, based on DES, that transforms each 64-bit
plaintext block by applying the Data Encryption Algorithm three plaintext block by applying the Data Encryption Algorithm three
successive times, using either two or three different keys, for an successive times, using either two or three different keys, for an
effective key length of 112 or 168 bits. [ANSI X9.52] (Also see: key length of 112 or 168 bits. [A9052] (See: DES.)
DES.)
(C) IPsec usage: The specific encryption algorithm proposed for (C) IPsec usage: The algorithm variation proposed for ESP uses a
ESP uses a 168-bit key, consisting of three independent 56-bit 168-bit key, consisting of three independent 56-bit quantities
quantities used by the Data Encryption Algorithm, and a 64-bit used by the Data Encryption Algorithm, and a 64-bit initialization
initialization vector. Each datagram contains an IV to ensure that vector. Each datagram contains an IV to ensure that each received
each received datagram can be decrypted, even if other datagrams datagram can be decrypted, even if other datagrams are dropped or
are dropped or datagrams are reordered in transit. [R1851] datagrams are reordered in transit. [R1851]
triple-wrapped $ triple-wrapped
(I) S/MIME usage: Data that has been signed with a digital (I) S/MIME usage: Data that has been signed with a digital
signature, and then encrypted, and then signed again. [R2634] signature, and then encrypted, and then signed again. [R2634]
Trojan horse $ Trojan horse
(I) A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but (I) A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but
also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades
security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate
authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program. authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program.
trust $ trust
(I) Information system usage: Refers to the extent to which 1. (I) Information system usage: The extent to which someone who
someone who relies on a system can have confidence that the system relies on a system can have confidence that the system meets its
meets its specifications; i.e., that the system does what it specifications, i.e., that the system does what it claims to do
claims to do and does not perform unwanted functions. (Also see: and does not perform unwanted functions. (See: trust level.)
trust level.)
(C) trusted vs. trustworthy: In discussing a system or system (C) "trusted vs. trustworthy": In discussing a system or system
process or object, this glossary (and industry usage) prefers the process or object, this Glossary (and industry usage) prefers the
term "trusted" to describe a system that operates as expected, term "trusted" to describe a system that operates as expected,
according to design and policy. When the trust can also be according to design and policy. When the trust can also be
guaranteed in some convincing way, such as through formal analysis guaranteed in some convincing way, such as through formal analysis
or code review, the system is termed "trustworthy"; this differs or code review, the system is termed "trustworthy"; this differs
from the ABA Guidelines definition (see: trustworthy system). from the ABA Guidelines definition (see: trustworthy system).
(I) PKI usage: Describes the relationship between an certificate 2. (I) PKI usage: A relationship between a certificate user and a
user and a CA; a certificate user must trust that the CA creates CA in which the user acts according to the assumption that the CA
only valid digital certificates. creates only valid digital certificates.
trust chain (O) "Generally, an entity can be said to 'trust' a second entity
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term when it (the first entity) makes the assumption that the second
as a synonym for "certification path" because it mixes concepts entity will behave exactly as the first entity expects. This trust
(see: trust) in a potentially misleading way. may apply only for some specific function. The key role of trust
in [X.509] is to describe the relationship between an entity and a
[certification] authority; an entity shall be certain that it can
trust the certification authority to create only valid and
reliable certificates." [X509]
trust-file PKI $ trust chain
(D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "certification
path" because it mixes concepts (see: trust) in a potentially
misleading way.
$ trust-file PKI
(I) A non-hierarchical PKI in which a each certificate user has a (I) A non-hierarchical PKI in which a each certificate user has a
local file (used by application software) of public-key local file (used by application software) of public-key
certificates that the user trusts as starting points (see: root) certificates that the user trusts as starting points (see: root)
for certification paths. (Also see: hierarchical PKI, mesh PKI, for certification paths. (See: hierarchical PKI, mesh PKI, web of
web of trust.) trust.)
(C) For example, popular browsers are distributed with an initial (C) For example, popular browsers are distributed with an initial
file of trusted certificates, which often are self-signed file of trusted certificates, which often are self-signed
certificates. Users can add certificates to the file or delete certificates. Users can add certificates to the file or delete
from it. The file may be directly managed by the user, or the from it. The file may be directly managed by the user, or the
user's organization may manage it from a centralized server. user's organization may manage it from a centralized server.
trust hierarchy $ trust hierarchy
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "certification
as a synonym for "certification hierarchy" because it mixes hierarchy" because this term mixes concepts (see: trust) in a
concepts (see: trust) in a potentially misleading way and potentially misleading way and duplicates the meaning of another,
duplicates the meaning of another, standardized term. (Also see: standardized term. (See: web of trust.)
web of trust.)
trust level $ trust level
(I) A characterization of a standard of security protection to be (I) A characterization of a standard of security protection to be
met by a computer system. met by a computer system.
(C) The "Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria" defines (C) The TCSEC defines eight trust levels. From the lowest to the
eight trust levels. From the lowest to the highest, they are D, highest, they are D, C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, and A1. A trust level is
C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, and A1. A trust level is based not only on the based not only on the presence of security mechanisms but also on
presence of security mechanisms but also on the use of systems the use of systems engineering discipline to properly structure
engineering discipline to properly structure the system and on the system and on implementation analysis to ensure that the
implementation analysis to ensure that the system provides the system provides the appropriate degree of trust.
appropriate degree of trust.
trusted $ trusted
See: (discussion under) trust. See: (discussion under) trust.
trusted certificate $ trusted certificate
(I) A certificate that is trusted a priori by a certificate user, (I) A certificate that is trusted a priori by a certificate user,
such as a public-key certificate that can be used to provide the such as a public-key certificate that can be used to provide the
first public key in a certification path. first public key in a certification path.
(C) A trusted public-key certificate might be the root certificate (C) A trusted public-key certificate might be the root certificate
in a hierarchical PKI, or the certificate of the CA that issued in a hierarchical PKI, or the certificate of the CA that issued
the user's own certificate in a mesh PKI, or any certificate the user's own certificate in a mesh PKI, or any certificate
accepted by the user in a trust-file PKI. accepted by the user in a trust-file PKI.
trusted computer system $ trusted computer system
(I) "A system that employs sufficient hardware and software (I) "A system that employs sufficient hardware and software
assurance measures to allow its use for simultaneous processing of assurance measures to allow its use for simultaneous processing of
a range of sensitive or classified information." [NCS04] (Also a range of sensitive or classified information." [NCS04] (See:
see: (discussion under) trust.) (discussion under) trust.)
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) $ Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)
(N) A standard for evaluating the security provided by operating (N) A standard for evaluating the security provided by operating
systems [CSC001, DOD1]. Informally referred to as the "Orange systems [CSC001, DOD1]. Informally called the "Orange Book"
Book" because of the color of its cover; first document in the because of the color of its cover; first document in the Rainbow
Rainbow Series. (See: (usage note under) Green Book, Orange Book, Series. (See: (usage note under) Green Book, Orange Book, trust
trust level.) level.)
(C) To be superseded by the Common Criteria. (C) To be superseded by the Common Criteria.
trusted computing base (TCB) $ trusted computing base (TCB)
(I) "The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer (I) "The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer
system, including hardware, firmware, and software, the system, including hardware, firmware, and software, the
combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security
policy." [NCS04] (Also see: (discussion of "trusted" under) policy." [NCS04] (See: (discussion of "trusted" under) trust.)
trust.)
trusted key $ trusted distribution
(I) "A trusted method for distributing the TCB hardware, software,
and firmware components, both originals and updates, that provides
methods for protecting the TCB for modification during
distribution and for detection of any changes to the TCB that may
occur." [NCS04]
$ trusted key
(I) A public key that is trusted a priori by a user, such as a key (I) A public key that is trusted a priori by a user, such as a key
that can be used as the first public key in a certification path. that can be used as the first public key in a certification path.
(C) A trusted public key can be (a) the root key in a hierarchical (C) A trusted public key can be (a) the root key in a hierarchical
PKI, (b) the key of the CA that issued the user's own certificate PKI, (b) the key of the CA that issued the user's own certificate
in a mesh PKI, or (c) any key accepted by the user in a trust-file in a mesh PKI, or (c) any key accepted by the user in a trust-file
PKI. PKI.
trusted path $ trusted path
(I) COMPUSEC usage: A mechanism by which a computer system user (I) COMPUSEC usage: A mechanism by which a computer system user
can communicate directly and reliably with the trusted computing can communicate directly and reliably with the trusted computing
base (TCB) and that can only be activated by the user or the TCB base (TCB) and that can only be activated by the user or the TCB
and cannot be imitated by untrusted software within the computer. and cannot be imitated by untrusted software within the computer.
[NCS04] [NCS04]
(I) COMSEC usage: A mechanism by which a person or process can (I) COMSEC usage: A mechanism by which a person or process can
communicate directly with a cryptographic module and that can only communicate directly with a cryptographic module and that can only
be activated by the person, process, or module, and cannot be be activated by the person, process, or module, and cannot be
imitated by untrusted software within the module. [FP140] imitated by untrusted software within the module. [FP140]
trusted process $ trusted process
(I) A system process that has privileges that enable it to affect (I) A system process that has privileges that enable it to affect
the state of system security and that can, therefore, through the state of system security and that can, therefore, through
incorrect or malicious execution, violate the system's security incorrect or malicious execution, violate the system's security
policy. (Also see: (discussion of "trusted" under) trust.) policy. (See: privileged process, (discussion of "trusted" under)
trust.)
trusted subnetwork $ trusted subnetwork
(I) A subnetwork containing hosts and routers that trust each (I) A subnetwork containing hosts and routers that trust each
other not to engage in active or passive attacks. (There also is other not to engage in active or passive attacks. (There also is
an assumption that the underlying communication channel--for an assumption that the underlying communication channel--for
example, a LAN--is not being attacked by other means.) example, a LAN--is not being attacked by other means.)
trusted system $ trusted system
See: (discussion under) trust, trusted computer system, See: (discussion under) trust, trusted computer system,
trustworthy system. trustworthy system.
Trusted Systems Interoperability Group (TSIG) $ Trusted Systems Interoperability Group (TSIG)
(N) A forum of computer vendors, system integrators, and users (N) A forum of computer vendors, system integrators, and users
devoted to promoting interoperability of trusted computer systems. devoted to promoting interoperability of trusted computer systems.
TSIG meetings are open to all persons who are working in the TSIG meetings are open to all persons who are working in the
INFOSEC area. INFOSEC area.
trustworthy system $ trustworthy system
(O) ABA usage: "Computer hardware, software, and procedures that: (O) ABA usage: "Computer hardware, software, and procedures that:
(a) are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; (b) provide a (a) are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; (b) provide a
reasonably reliable level of availability, reliability, and reasonably reliable level of availability, reliability, and
correct operation; (c) are reasonably suited to performing their correct operation; (c) are reasonably suited to performing their
intended functions; and (d) adhere to generally accepted security intended functions; and (d) adhere to generally accepted security
principles." [ABA] This differs somewhat from other industry usage principles." [ABA] This differs somewhat from other industry usage
(see: (discussion of "trusted vs. trustworthy" under) trust). (see: (discussion of "trusted vs. trustworthy" under) trust).
TSIG $ TSIG
See: Trusted System Interoperability Group. See: Trusted System Interoperability Group.
tunnel, tunneling $ tunnel
(I) A communication channel created in a computer network by (I) A communication channel created in a computer network by
encapsulating (carrying, layering) a communication protocol's data encapsulating (carrying, layering; i.e., "tunneling") a
packets in (on top of) a second protocol that normally would be communication protocol's data packets in (on top of) a second
carried above, or at the same layer as, the first one. (Also see: protocol that normally would be carried above, or at the same
L2TP, VPN.) layer as, the first one. (See: L2TP, VPN.)
(C) Tunneling can involve almost any OSI or TCP/IP protocol (C) Tunneling can involve almost any OSI or TCP/IP protocol
layers; for example, a TCP connection between two hosts could layers; for example, a TCP connection between two hosts could
conceivably be tunneled through email messages across the conceivably be tunneled through email messages across the
Internet. Usually, a tunnel is a logical point-to-point link-- Internet. Usually, a tunnel is a logical point-to-point link--
i.e., an OSI layer 2 connection--created by encapsulating the i.e., an OSI layer 2 connection--created by encapsulating the
layer 2 protocol in a n protocol (such as TCP), or in a OSI layer layer 2 protocol in a n protocol (such as TCP), or in a OSI layer
3 internetwork protocol (such as IP), or in another layer 2 3 internetwork protocol (such as IP), or in another layer 2
protocol. Often, encapsulation is accomplished with an protocol. Often, encapsulation is accomplished with an
intermediate protocol (a tunneling protocol), such as L2TP, intermediate protocol (a tunneling protocol), such as L2TP,
layered between the tunneled layer 2 protocol and the layered between the tunneled layer 2 protocol and the
encapsulating protocol. encapsulating protocol.
(C) Tunneling can move data between computers that use a protocol (C) Tunneling can move data between computers that use a protocol
not supported by the network connecting them. Tunneling also can not supported by the network connecting them. Tunneling also can
enable a computer network to use the services of a second network enable a computer network to use the services of a second network
as though the second network were a set of point-to-point links as though the second network were a set of point-to-point links
between the first network's nodes. (Also see: virtual private between the first network's nodes. (See: virtual private network.)
network).
(O) SET usage: The name of a SET private extension that indicates (O) SET usage: The name of a SET private extension that indicates
whether the CA or the payment gateway supports passing encrypted whether the CA or the payment gateway supports passing encrypted
messages to the cardholder through the merchant. If so, the messages to the cardholder through the merchant. If so, the
extension lists OIDs of symmetric encryption algorithms that are extension lists OIDs of symmetric encryption algorithms that are
supported. supported.
tunnel mode $ tunnel mode
(I) IPsec usage: See: transport mode. (I) IPsec usage: See: transport mode vs. tunnel mode.
two-person control $ two-person control
(I) The close surveillance and control of a system, process, or (I) The close surveillance and control of a system, process, or
materials (especially with regard to cryptography) at all times by materials (especially with regard to cryptography) at all times by
a minimum of two appropriately authorized persons, each capable of a minimum of two appropriately authorized persons, each capable of
detecting incorrect and unauthorized procedures with respect to detecting incorrect and unauthorized procedures with respect to
the tasks to be performed and each familiar with established the tasks to be performed and each familiar with established
security requirements. (Also see: dual control, no-lone zone.) security requirements. (See: dual control, no-lone zone.)
Type I cryptography $ Type I cryptography
(O) A cryptographic algorithm or device approved by the U.S. (O) A cryptographic algorithm or device approved by the U.S.
National Security Agency for protecting classified information. National Security Agency for protecting classified information.
Type II cryptography $ Type II cryptography
(O) A cryptographic algorithm or device approved by the U.S. (O) A cryptographic algorithm or device approved by the U.S.
National Security Agency for protecting sensitive unclassified National Security Agency for protecting sensitive unclassified
information in systems (as specified in section 2315 of Title 10 information in systems (as specified in section 2315 of Title 10
United States Code, or section 3502(2) of Title 44, United States United States Code, or section 3502(2) of Title 44, United States
Code.) Code.)
Type III cryptography $ Type III cryptography
(O) A cryptographic algorithm or device approved as a Federal (O) A cryptographic algorithm or device approved as a Federal
Information Processing Standard. Information Processing Standard.
UDP $ UDP
See: User Datagram Protocol. See: User Datagram Protocol.
unclassified $ unclassified
(I) Not classified. (I) Not classified.
unencrypted $ unencrypted
(I) Not encrypted. (I) Not encrypted.
unforgeable $ unforgeable
(I) Cryptographic usage: The property of a cryptographic data (I) Cryptographic usage: The property of a cryptographic data
structure--i.e., a data structure that is computed using one more structure (i.e., a data structure that is computed using one more
cryptographic functions--that makes it computationally infeasible cryptographic functions) that makes it computationally infeasible
to construct (i.e., compute) an unauthorized but correct value of to construct (i.e., compute) an unauthorized but correct value of
the structure without having knowledge of one of more keys (e.g., the structure without having knowledge of one of more keys. (E.g.,
see: digital certificate). see: digital certificate.)
(C) This definition is narrower than general English usage, in (C) This definition is narrower than general English usage, in
which "unforgeable" means unable to be fraudulently created or which "unforgeable" means unable to be fraudulently created or
duplicated. In that broader sense, anyone can forge a digital duplicated. In that broader sense, anyone can forge a digital
certificate containing any set of data items whatsoever by certificate containing any set of data items whatsoever by
generating the to-be-signed certificate and signing it with any generating the to-be-signed certificate and signing it with any
private key whatsoever. But for PKI purposes, the forged data private key whatsoever. But for PKI purposes, the forged data
structure is invalid if it is not signed with the true private key structure is invalid if it is not signed with the true private key
of the claimed issuer; thus, the forgery will be detected when a of the claimed issuer; thus, the forgery will be detected when a
certificate user attempts to verify the certificate signature certificate user uses the true public key of the claimed issuer to
using the true public key of the claimed issuer. verify the signature.
uniform resource identifier (URI) $ uniform resource identifier (URI)
(I) A type of formatted identifier that encapsulates the name of (I) A type of formatted identifier that encapsulates the name of
an Internet object, and labels it with an identification of the an Internet object, and labels it with an identification of the
name space, thus producing a member of the universal set of names name space, thus producing a member of the universal set of names
in registered name spaces and of addresses referring to registered in registered name spaces and of addresses referring to registered
protocols or name spaces. [R1630] protocols or name spaces. [R1630]
(C) URIs are used in HTML to identify the target of hyperlinks. in (C) URIs are used in HTML to identify the target of hyperlinks. in
common practice, URIs include uniform resource locators [R2368] common practice, URIs include uniform resource locators [R2368]
and relative URLs. [R1808]. and relative URLs. [R1808].
uniform resource locator (URL) $ uniform resource locator (URL)
(I) A type of formatted identifier that describes the access (I) A type of formatted identifier that describes the access
method and location of an information resource object on the method and location of an information resource object on the
Internet. [R1738] Internet. [R1738]
(C) A URL is a URI that provides explicit instructions on how to (C) A URL is a URI that provides explicit instructions on how to
access the named object. For example, access the named object. For example,
"ftp://bbnarchive.bbn.com/foo/bar/picture/cambridge.zip" is a URL. "ftp://bbnarchive.bbn.com/foo/bar/picture/cambridge.zip" is a URL.
The part before the colon specifies the access scheme or protocol, The part before the colon specifies the access scheme or protocol,
and the part after the colon is interpreted according to that and the part after the colon is interpreted according to that
access method. Usually, two slashes after the colon indicate the access method. Usually, two slashes after the colon indicate the
host name of a server (written as a domain name). In an FTP or host name of a server (written as a domain name). In an FTP or
HTTP URL, the host name is followed by a path name of a file on HTTP URL, the host name is followed by a path name of a file on
the server. The last (optional) part of a URL may be either a the server. The last (optional) part of a URL may be either a
fragment identifier that indicates a position in the file, or a fragment identifier that indicates a position in the file, or a
query string. query string.
uniform resource name (URN) $ uniform resource name (URN)
(I) A URI that has an institutional commitment to persistence and (I) A URI that has an institutional commitment to persistence and
availability. availability.
UORA $ untrusted process
(I) A system process that is not able to affect the state of
system security through incorrect or malicious operation, usually
because its operation is confined by a security kernel. (See:
trusted process.)
$ UORA
See: user-PIN ORA. See: user-PIN ORA.
update $ update
See: certificate update and key update. See: certificate update and key update.
URI $ URI
See: uniform resource identifier. See: uniform resource identifier.
URL $ URL
See: uniform resource locator. See: uniform resource locator.
URN $ URN
See: uniform resource name. See: uniform resource name.
user $ user
(I) A person (or organization entity) or an automated process (I) A person (or organization entity) or an automated process
(usually acting on behalf of a person that accesses a system, (usually acting on behalf of a person) that accesses a system,
whether authorized to do or not. whether authorized to do so or not.
(C) Because this term can be understood in many ways, any Internet (C) Because this term can be understood in many ways, any ISPD
Standards Process document that uses it SHOULD provide an explicit that uses it SHOULD provide an explicit definition. [R2504]
definition.
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) $ User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
(I) An Internet Standard [R0768] protocol that provides a datagram (I) An Internet Standard [R0768] protocol that provides a datagram
mode of packet-switched computer communication in an internetwork. mode of packet-switched computer communication in an internetwork.
(C) UDP assumes that IP is the underlying protocol. UDP enables (C) UDP assumes that IP is the underlying protocol. UDP enables
application programs to send transaction-oriented data to other application programs to send transaction-oriented data to other
programs with minimal protocol mechanism. UDP does not provide programs with minimal protocol mechanism. UDP does not provide
reliable delivery, flow control, sequencing, or other end-to-end reliable delivery, flow control, sequencing, or other end-to-end
services that TCP provides. services that TCP provides.
user identifier $ user identifier
(I) A character string or symbol that is used in a system to (I) A character string or symbol that is used in a system to
uniquely name a specific user or group of users. uniquely name a specific user or group of users.
(C) Often verified by a password in an authentication process. (C) Often verified by a password in an authentication process.
user PIN $ user PIN
(O) MISSI usage: One of two personal identification numbers that (O) MISSI usage: One of two personal identification numbers that
control access to the functions and stored data of a FORTEZZA PC control access to the functions and stored data of a FORTEZZA PC
card. Knowledge of the user PIN enables the card user to perform card. Knowledge of the user PIN enables the card user to perform
the FORTEZZA functions that are intended for use by an end user. the FORTEZZA functions that are intended for use by an end user.
(Also see: SSO PIN.) (See: SSO PIN.)
user-PIN ORA (UORA) $ user-PIN ORA (UORA)
(O) A MISSI organizational RA that operates in a mode in which the (O) A MISSI organizational RA that operates in a mode in which the
ORA performs only the subset of card management functions that are ORA performs only the subset of card management functions that are
possible with knowledge of the user PIN for a FORTEZZA PC card. possible with knowledge of the user PIN for a FORTEZZA PC card.
(Also see: no-PIN ORA, SSO-PIN ORA.) (See: no-PIN ORA, SSO-PIN ORA.)
usurpation $ usurpation
See: (secondary definition in) threat consequence. See: (secondary definition in) threat consequence.
UTCTime $ UTCTime
(N) The ASN.1 data type "UTCTime" contains a calendar date (N) The ASN.1 data type "UTCTime" contains a calendar date
(YYMMDD) and a time to a precision of either one minute (HHMM) or (YYMMDD) and a time to a precision of either one minute (HHMM) or
one second (HHMMSS), where the time is either (a) Coordinated one second (HHMMSS), where the time is either (a) Coordinated
Universal Time or (b) the local time followed by an offset that Universal Time or (b) the local time followed by an offset that
enables Coordinated Universal Time to be calculated. Note: UTCTime enables Coordinated Universal Time to be calculated. Note: UTCTime
has the Year 2000 problem. (Also see: Coordinated Universal Time, has the Year 2000 problem. (See: Coordinated Universal Time,
GeneralizedTime.) GeneralizedTime.)
v1 certificate $ v1 certificate
(C) Refers to either an X.509 public-key certificate in its (C) Ambiguously refers to either an X.509 public-key certificate
version 1 format, or an X.509 attribute certificate in its version in its version 1 format, or an X.509 attribute certificate in its
1 format. However, many people who use this term are not aware version 1 format. However, many people who use this term are not
that X.509 specifies attribute certificates that do not contain a aware that X.509 specifies attribute certificates that do not
public key. IETF Standards Process documents MAY use this term as contain a public key. ISPDs MAY use this term as an abbreviation
an abbreviation for "version 1 X.509 public-key certificate", but for "version 1 X.509 public-key certificate", but only after using
only after using the full term at the first instance. Internet the full term at the first instance.
Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term as an
abbreviation to mean "version 1 X.509 attribute certificate".
v1 CRL (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as an abbreviation to mean
"version 1 X.509 attribute certificate".
$ v1 CRL
(I) A synonym for and "X.509 CRL" in version 1 format. (I) A synonym for and "X.509 CRL" in version 1 format.
v2 certificate $ v2 certificate
(I) A synonym for an "X.509 public-key certificate" in version 2 (I) A synonym for an "X.509 public-key certificate" in version 2
format. format.
v2 CRL $ v2 CRL
(I) A synonym for an "X.509 CRL" in version 2 format. (I) A synonym for an "X.509 CRL" in version 2 format.
v3 certificate $ v3 certificate
(I) A synonym for an "X.509 public-key certificate" in version 3 (I) A synonym for an "X.509 public-key certificate" in version 3
format. format.
valid certificate $ valid certificate
(I) A digital certificate for which the binding of the data items (I) A digital certificate for which the binding of the data items
can be trusted; one that can be validated successfully. (See: can be trusted; one that can be validated successfully. (See:
validate vs. verify.) validate vs. verify.)
valid signature $ valid signature
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term; (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term; instead, use "authentic
instead, use "authentic signature". This Glossary recommends signature". This Glossary recommends saying "validate the
saying "validate the certificate" and "verify the signature" (see: certificate" and "verify the signature" (see: validate vs.
validate vs. verify); therefore, it would be inconsistent to say verify); therefore, it would be inconsistent to say that a
that a signature is "valid". signature is "valid".
validate vs. verify $ validate vs. verify
(C) The PKI community uses words inconsistently when describing (C) The PKI community uses words inconsistently when describing
what a certificate user does to make certain that a digital what a certificate user does to make certain that a digital
certificate can be trusted. Usually, we say "verify the signature" certificate can be trusted. Usually, we say "verify the signature"
but say "validate the certificate"; i.e., we "verify" atomic but say "validate the certificate"; i.e., we "verify" atomic
truths but "validate" data structures, relationships, and systems truths but "validate" data structures, relationships, and systems
that are composed of or depend on verified items. Too often, that are composed of or depend on verified items. Too often,
however, verify and validate are used interchangeably. however, verify and validate are used interchangeably.
Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD follow these two rules ISPDs SHOULD follow the following two rules to ensure consistency
to ensure consistency and to align Internet security terminology and align Internet security terminology with ordinary English:
with general English usage:
Rule 1: Use "validate" when referring to a process intended to - Rule 1: Use "validate" when referring to a process intended to
establish the soundness or correctness of a construct, like a establish the soundness or correctness of a construct, like a
public-key certificate or a certification path. public-key certificate or a certification path.
- Rule 2: Use "verify" when referring to a process intended to
test or prove the truth or accuracy of a fact or value.
The rationale for Rule 1 is that "valid" derives from a word that The rationale for Rule 1 is that "valid" derives from a word that
means "strong" in Latin. Thus, to validate means to make sure that means "strong" in Latin. Thus, to validate means to make sure that
a construction is sound. A certificate user validates a public-key a construction is sound. A certificate user validates a public-key
certificate to establish trust in the binding that the certificate certificate to establish trust in the binding that the certificate
asserts between an identity and a key. (To validate can also mean asserts between an identity and a key. (To validate can also mean
to officially approve something; thus NIST validates cryptographic to officially approve something; thus NIST validates cryptographic
modules for conformance with FIPS PUB 140-1.) modules for conformance with FIPS PUB 140-1.)
Rule 2: Use "verify" when referring to a process intended to test The rationale for Rule 2 is that "verify" derives from a word that
or prove the truth or accuracy of a fact or value. means "true" in Latin. Thus, to verify means to prove the truth of
an assertion by examining evidence or performing tests. To verify
The rationale for Rule is as follows: "Verify" derives from a word an identity, an authentication process examines identification
that means "true" in Latin. thus, to verify means to prove the information that is presented or generated. To validate a
truth of an assertion by examining evidence or performing tests. certificate, a certificate user verifies the digital signature on
To verify an identity, an authentication process must examine the certificate by performing calculations; verifies that the
identification information that is presented or generated. To current time is within the certificate's validity period; and may
validate a certificate, a certificate user must verify the digital need to validate a certification path involving additional
signature on the certificate by performing calculations; must certificates.
verify that the current time is within the certificate's validity
period; and may need to validate a certification path involving
additional certificates.
validation $ validation
See: validate vs. verify. See: validate vs. verify.
validity period $ validity period
(I) A data item in a digital certificate that specifies the time (I) A data item in a digital certificate that specifies the time
period for which the binding between data items (especially period for which the binding between data items (especially
between the subject name and the public key value in a public-key between the subject name and the public key value in a public-key
certificate) is valid, except if the certificate appears on a CRL certificate) is valid, except if the certificate appears on a CRL
or the key appears on a CKL. or the key appears on a CKL.
value-added network (VAN) $ value-added network (VAN)
(I) A computer network or subnetwork (which is usually a (I) A computer network or subnetwork (which is usually a
commercial enterprise) that transmits, receives, and stores EDI commercial enterprise) that transmits, receives, and stores EDI
transactions on behalf of its customers. transactions on behalf of its customers.
(C) A VAN may also provide additional services, ranging from EDI (C) A VAN may also provide additional services, ranging from EDI
format translation, to EDI-to-FAX conversion, to integrated format translation, to EDI-to-FAX conversion, to integrated
business systems. business systems.
VAN $ VAN
See: value-added network. See: value-added network.
verification $ verification
1. System verification: The process of comparing two levels of 1. System verification: The process of comparing two levels of
system specification for proper correspondence, such as comparing system specification for proper correspondence, such as comparing
a security policy with a top-level specification, a top-level a security policy with a top-level specification, a top-level
specification with source code, or source code with object code. specification with source code, or source code with object code.
[NCS04] [NCS04]
2. Identification verification: Presenting information to 2. Identification verification: Presenting information to
establish the truth of a claimed identity. establish the truth of a claimed identity.
verify $ verify
See: validate vs. verify. See: validate vs. verify.
violation $ violation
See: security violation. See: security violation.
virtual private network (VPN) $ virtual private network (VPN)
(I) A restricted-use, logical (i.e., artificial or simulated) (I) A restricted-use, logical (i.e., artificial or simulated)
computer network that is constructed from the system resources of computer network that is constructed from the system resources of
a relatively public, physical (i.e., real) network (such as the a relatively public, physical (i.e., real) network (such as the
Internet), often by using encryption (located at hosts or Internet), often by using encryption (located at hosts or
gateways), and often by tunneling links of the virtual network gateways), and often by tunneling links of the virtual network
across the real network. across the real network.
(C) For example, if a corporation has LANs at several different (C) For example, if a corporation has LANs at several different
sites, each connected to the Internet by a firewall, the sites, each connected to the Internet by a firewall, the
corporation could create a VPN by using encrypted tunnels to corporation could create a VPN by using encrypted tunnels to
connect from firewall to firewall across the Internet and not connect from firewall to firewall across the Internet and not
allowing any other traffic through the firewalls. A VPN is allowing any other traffic through the firewalls. A VPN is
generally less expensive to build and operate than a dedicated generally less expensive to build and operate than a dedicated
real network, because the virtual network shares the cost of real network, because the virtual network shares the cost of
system resources with other users of the real network. system resources with other users of the real network.
virus $ virus
(I) A hidden, self-replicating section of computer software, (I) A hidden, self-replicating section of computer software,
usually malicious logic, that propagates by infecting--i.e., usually malicious logic, that propagates by infecting--i.e.,
inserting a copy of itself into and becoming part of--another inserting a copy of itself into and becoming part of--another
program. A virus cannot run by itself; it requires that its host program. A virus cannot run by itself; it requires that its host
program be run to make it active. program be run to make it active.
VPN $ VPN
See: virtual private network. See: virtual private network.
vulnerability $ vulnerability
(I) A flaw or weakness in a system's design, implementation, or (I) A flaw or weakness in a system's design, implementation, or
operation that could be exploited to violate the system's security operation and management that could be exploited to violate the
policy. system's security policy.
(C) Most systems have vulnerabilities of some sort, but this does (C) Most systems have vulnerabilities of some sort, but this does
not mean that the systems are too flawed to use. Not every threat not mean that the systems are too flawed to use. Not every threat
results in an attack, and not every attack succeeds. Success results in an attack, and not every attack succeeds. Success
depends on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of attacks, depends on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of attacks,
and the effectiveness of any countermeasures in use. If the and the effectiveness of any countermeasures in use. If the
attacks needed to exploit a vulnerability are very difficult to attacks needed to exploit a vulnerability are very difficult to
carry out, then the vulnerability may be tolerable. If the carry out, then the vulnerability may be tolerable. If the
perceived benefit to an attacker is small, then even an easily perceived benefit to an attacker is small, then even an easily
exploited vulnerability may be tolerable. However, if the attacks exploited vulnerability may be tolerable. However, if the attacks
are well understood and easily made, and if the vulnerable system are well understood and easily made, and if the vulnerable system
is employed by a wide range of users, then it is likely that there is employed by a wide range of users, then it is likely that there
will be enough benefit for someone to make an attack. will be enough benefit for someone to make an attack.
W3 $ W3
See: World Wide Web. See: World Wide Web.
war dialer $ war dialer
(I) A computer program that automatically dials a series of (I) A computer program that automatically dials a series of
telephone numbers to find lines connected to computer systems, and telephone numbers to find lines connected to computer systems, and
catalogs those numbers so that a cracker can try to break into the catalogs those numbers so that a cracker can try to break into the
systems. systems.
Wassenaar Arrangement $ Wassenaar Arrangement
(N) The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional (N) The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a global, multilateral Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a global, multilateral
agreement approved by 33 countries in July 1996 to contribute to agreement approved by 33 countries in July 1996 to contribute to
regional and international security and stability, by promoting regional and international security and stability, by promoting
information exchange concerning, and greater responsibility in information exchange concerning, and greater responsibility in
transfers, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. (Also see: transfers, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. (See:
International Traffic in Arms Regulations.) International Traffic in Arms Regulations.)
(C) The Arrangement began operations in September 1996. The (C) The Arrangement began operations in September 1996. The
participating countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, participating countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and
United States. Participants meet on a regular basis in Vienna, United States. Participants meet on a regular basis in Vienna,
where the Arrangement has a headquarters where the Arrangement has its headquarters.
Participating countries seek through their national policies to Participating countries seek through their national policies to
ensure that transfers do not contribute to the development or ensure that transfers do not contribute to the development or
enhancement of military capabilities that undermine the goals of enhancement of military capabilities that undermine the goals of
the arrangement, and are not diverted to support such the arrangement, and are not diverted to support such
capabilities. The countries maintain effective export controls for capabilities. The countries maintain effective export controls for
items on the agreed lists, which are reviewed periodically to items on the agreed lists, which are reviewed periodically to
account for technological developments and experience gained. account for technological developments and experience gained.
Through transparency and exchange of views and information, Through transparency and exchange of views and information,
suppliers of arms and dual-use items can develop common suppliers of arms and dual-use items can develop common
skipping to change at page 158, line 47 skipping to change at page 173, line 51
combat these risks. Members provide semi-annual notification of combat these risks. Members provide semi-annual notification of
arms transfers, covering seven categories derived from the UN arms transfers, covering seven categories derived from the UN
Register of Conventional Arms. Members also report transfers or Register of Conventional Arms. Members also report transfers or
denials of transfers of certain controlled dual-use items. denials of transfers of certain controlled dual-use items.
However, the decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is However, the decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is
the sole responsibility of each participating country. All the sole responsibility of each participating country. All
measures undertaken with respect to the arrangement will be in measures undertaken with respect to the arrangement will be in
accordance with national legislation and policies and will be accordance with national legislation and policies and will be
implemented on the basis of national discretion. implemented on the basis of national discretion.
watermarking $ watermarking
See: digital watermarking. See: digital watermarking.
web vs. Web $ web vs. Web
1. (I) Capitalized: Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD 1. (I) Capitalized: ISPDs SHOULD capitalize "the Web" when using
capitalize "the Web" when using the term (usually as a noun) to the term (usually as a noun) to refer specifically to the World
refer specifically to the World Wide Web. (Similarly, see: Wide Web. (Similarly, see: internet vs. Internet.)
internet vs. Internet.)
2. (C) Not capitalized: Internet Standards Process document SHOULD 2. (C) Not capitalized: ISPD SHOULD NOT capitalize "web" when
NOT capitalize "web" when using the term (usually as an adjective) using the term (usually as an adjective) to refer generically to
to refer generically to technology--such as web browsers, web technology--such as web browsers, web servers, HTTP, and HTML--
servers, HTTP, and HTML--that is used in the Web or similar that is used in the Web or similar networks.
networks.
(C) IETF documents SHOULD spell out "World Wide Web" fully at the (C) IETF documents SHOULD spell out "World Wide Web" fully at the
first instance of usage and SHOULD Use "Web" and "web" especially first instance of usage and SHOULD Use "Web" and "web" especially
carefully where confusion with the PGP web of trust is possible. carefully where confusion with the PGP web of trust is possible.
web of trust $ web of trust
(O) PGP usage: A trust-file PKI technique used in PGP for building (O) PGP usage: A trust-file PKI technique used in PGP for building
a file of validated public keys by making personal judgments about a file of validated public keys by making personal judgments about
being able to trust certain people to be holding properly being able to trust certain people to be holding properly
certified keys of other people. (Compare with: certification certified keys of other people. (Compare with: certification
hierarchy, mesh PKI.) hierarchy, mesh PKI.)
web server $ web server
(I) A software process that runs on a host computer connected to (I) A software process that runs on a host computer connected to
the Internet to respond to HTTP requests for documents from client the Internet to respond to HTTP requests for documents from client
web browsers. web browsers.
wiretapping $ wiretapping
(I) An attack that intercepts and accesses data flowing between (I) An attack that intercepts and accesses data flowing between
two points in a communication system. two points in a communication system.
(C) Although the term originally referred to making a mechanical (C) Although the term originally referred to making a mechanical
connection to an electrical conductor, it is now used to refer to connection to an electrical conductor, it is now used to refer to
reading information from any sort of medium used for a link, or reading information from any sort of medium used for a link, or
even from a gateway or a subnetwork switch.) even from a gateway or a subnetwork switch.)
(C) "Active wiretapping" (see: active attack) attempts to alter (C) "Active wiretapping" (see: active attack) attempts to alter
the data or otherwise affect the flow; "passive wiretapping" (see: the data or otherwise affect the flow; "passive wiretapping" (see:
passive attack) only attempts to observe and gain knowledge of the passive attack) only attempts to observe and gain knowledge of the
data. (Also see: end-to-end encryption.) data. (See: end-to-end encryption.)
work factor $ work factor
(I) General security usage: The estimated amount of effort or time (I) General security usage: The estimated amount of effort or time
that can be expected to be expended by a potential intruder to that can be expected to be expended by a potential intruder to
penetrate a system, or defeat a particular countermeasure, when penetrate a system, or defeat a particular countermeasure, when
using specified amounts of expertise and resources. using specified amounts of expertise and resources.
(I) Cryptography usage: The estimated amount of computing time and (I) Cryptography usage: The estimated amount of computing time and
power needed to break a cryptographic system. power needed to break a cryptographic system.
World Wide Web ("the Web", WWW, W3) $ World Wide Web ("the Web", WWW, W3)
(N) The global, hypermedia-based collection of information and (N) The global, hypermedia-based collection of information and
services that is available on Internet servers and is accessed by services that is available on Internet servers and is accessed by
browsers using Hypertext Transfer Protocol and other information browsers using Hypertext Transfer Protocol and other information
retrieval mechanisms. (Also see: web vs. Web.) retrieval mechanisms. (See: web vs. Web, [R2084].)
worm $ worm
(I) A computer program that can run independently, can propagate a (I) A computer program that can run independently, can propagate a
complete working version of itself onto other hosts on a network, complete working version of itself onto other hosts on a network,
and may consume computer resources destructively. (Also see: and may consume computer resources destructively. (See: Morris
Morris Worm, virus.) Worm, virus.)
wrap $ wrap
(C) To use cryptography to provide data confidentiality service (I) To use cryptography to provide data confidentiality service
for a data set. (Also see: encrypt, seal.) Internet Standards for a data set. (See: encrypt, seal.)
Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term because it duplicates
the meaning of a standard term. Instead, use "encrypt" or use a
term that is specific to the mechanism used.
WWW (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term with this definition because it
duplicates the meaning of other, standard terms. Instead, use
"encrypt" or use a term that is specific with regard to the
mechanism used.
$ WWW
See: World Wide Web. See: World Wide Web.
X.400 $ X.400
(N) An ITU-T Recommendation [X400] that is one part of a joint (N) An ITU-T Recommendation [X400] that is one part of a joint
ITU-T/ISO multi-part standard (X.400-X.421) that defines the ITU-T/ISO multi-part standard (X.400-X.421) that defines the
Message Handling Systems. (The ISO equivalent is IS 10021, parts Message Handling Systems. (The ISO equivalent is IS 10021, parts
1-7.) (See: Message Handling Systems.) 1-7.) (See: Message Handling Systems.)
X.500, X.500 Directory $ X.500
$ X.500 Directory
(N) An ITU-T Recommendation [X500] that is one part of a joint (N) An ITU-T Recommendation [X500] that is one part of a joint
ITU-T/ISO multi-part standard that defines the X.500 Directory, a ITU-T/ISO multi-part standard that defines the X.500 Directory, a
conceptual collection of systems that provide distributed conceptual collection of systems that provide distributed
directory capabilities for OSI entities, processes, applications, directory capabilities for OSI entities, processes, applications,
and services. (The ISO equivalent is IS 9594-1 and related and services. (The ISO equivalent is IS 9594-1 and related
standards, IS 9594-x.) (Also see: X.509.) standards, IS 9594-x.) (See: directory vs. Directory, X.509.)
(C) The X.500 Directory is structured as a tree (the Directory (C) The X.500 Directory is structured as a tree (the Directory
Information Tree), and information is stored in directory entries. Information Tree), and information is stored in directory entries.
Each entry is a collection of information about one object, and Each entry is a collection of information about one object, and
each object has a unique DN. An entry is composed of attributes, each object has a unique DN. An entry is composed of attributes,
each with a type and one or more values. For example, if a PKI each with a type and one or more values. For example, if a PKI
uses the Directory to distribute certificates, then an X.509 uses the Directory to distribute certificates, then an X.509
public-key certificate of an end user is normally stored as a public-key certificate of an end user is normally stored as a
value of an attribute of type "userCertificate" in the Directory value of an attribute of type "userCertificate" in the Directory
entry that has the DN that is the subject of the certificate. entry that has the DN that is the subject of the certificate.
X.509 $ X.509
(N) An ITU-T Recommendation [X509] that is one part of a joint (N) An ITU-T Recommendation [X509] that is one part of a joint
ITU-T/ISO multi-part standard (see: X.500). X.509 defines a ITU-T/ISO multi-part standard (see: X.500). X.509 defines a
framework to provide and support data origin authentication and framework to provide and support data origin authentication and
peer entity authentication, including formats for X.509 public-key peer entity authentication, including formats for X.509 public-key
certificates, X.509 attribute certificates, and X.509 CRLs. (The certificates, X.509 attribute certificates, and X.509 CRLs. (The
ISO equivalent is IS 9498-4.) (Also see: X.500.) ISO equivalent is IS 9498-4.) (See: X.500.)
(C) X.509 describes two levels of authentication: simple (C) X.509 describes two levels of authentication: simple
authentication based on a password, and strong authentication authentication based on a password, and strong authentication
based on a public-key certificate. (Also see: X.509 public-key based on a public-key certificate. (See: X.509 public-key
certificate.) certificate.)
X.509 attribute certificate $ X.509 attribute certificate
(N) An attribute certificate in the version 1 (v1) format defined (N) An attribute certificate in the version 1 (v1) format defined
by X.509. (The v1 designation for an X.509 attribute certificate by X.509. (The v1 designation for an X.509 attribute certificate
is disjoint from the v1 designation for an X.509 public-key is disjoint from the v1 designation for an X.509 public-key
certificate, and from the v1 designation for an X.509 CRL.) certificate, and from the v1 designation for an X.509 CRL.)
(C) An X.509 attribute certificate has a subject field, but the (C) An X.509 attribute certificate has a subject field, but the
attribute certificate is a separate data structure from that attribute certificate is a separate data structure from that
subject's public-key certificate. A subject may have multiple subject's public-key certificate. A subject may have multiple
attribute certificates associated with each of its public-key attribute certificates associated with each of its public-key
certificates, and an attribute certificate may be issued by a certificates, and an attribute certificate may be issued by a
skipping to change at page 161, line 42 skipping to change at page 176, line 43
4. signature OID of algorithm that signed the cert. 4. signature OID of algorithm that signed the cert.
5. serialNumber Certificate serial number; 5. serialNumber Certificate serial number;
an integer assigned by the issuer. an integer assigned by the issuer.
6. attCertValidityPeriod Validity period; a pair of UTCTime 6. attCertValidityPeriod Validity period; a pair of UTCTime
values: "not before" and "not after". values: "not before" and "not after".
7. attributes Sequence of attributes describing the 7. attributes Sequence of attributes describing the
subject. subject.
8. issuerUniqueId Optional, when a DN is not sufficient. 8. issuerUniqueId Optional, when a DN is not sufficient.
9. extensions Optional. 9. extensions Optional.
X.509 authority revocation list $ X.509 authority revocation list
(N) An ARL in one of the formats defined by X.509--version 1 (v1) (N) An ARL in one of the formats defined by X.509--version 1 (v1)
or version 2 (v2). A specialized kind of certificate revocation or version 2 (v2). A specialized kind of certificate revocation
list. list.
X.509 certificate $ X.509 certificate
(N) Either an X.509 public-key certificate or an X.509 attribute (N) Either an X.509 public-key certificate or an X.509 attribute
certificate. certificate.
(C) This glossary uses the term with the precise meaning (C) This Glossary uses the term with the precise meaning
recommended here. However, some who use the term may not be aware recommended here. However, some who use the term may not be aware
that X.509 specifies attribute certificates that do not contain a that X.509 specifies attribute certificates that do not contain a
public key. Even among those who are aware, this term is commonly public key. Even among those who are aware, this term is commonly
used as an abbreviation to mean "X.509 public-key certificate". used as an abbreviation to mean "X.509 public-key certificate".
Internet Standards Process documents MAY use the term as an ISPDs MAY use the term as an abbreviation for "X.509 public-key
abbreviation for "X.509 public-key certificate", but only after certificate", but only after using the full term at the first
using the full term at the first instance. Internet Standards instance.
Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term as an abbreviation to
mean "X.509 attribute certificate".
X.509 certificate revocation list (CRL) (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as an abbreviation to mean
"X.509 attribute certificate".
$ X.509 certificate revocation list (CRL)
(N) A CRL in one of the formats defined by X.509--version 1 (v1) (N) A CRL in one of the formats defined by X.509--version 1 (v1)
or version 2 (v2). (The v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 CRL or version 2 (v2). (The v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 CRL
are disjoint from the v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 public- are disjoint from the v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 public-
key certificate, and from the v1 designation for an X.509 key certificate, and from the v1 designation for an X.509
attribute certificate.) attribute certificate.)
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT refer to an (C) ISPDs SHOULD NOT refer to an X.509 CRL as a digital
X.509 CRL as a digital certificate, but note that it does meet certificate, but note that an X.509 CRL does meet this Glossary's
this Glossary's definition of that term. Like a digital definition of "digital certificate". Like a digital certificate,
certificate, an X.509 CRL makes an assertion and is signed by a an X.509 CRL makes an assertion and is signed by a CA. But instead
CA. But instead of binding a key or other attributes to a subject, of binding a key or other attributes to a subject, an X.509 CRL
an X.509 CRL asserts that certain previously-issued X.509 asserts that certain previously-issued X.509 certificates have
certificates have been revoked (see: certificate revocation). been revoked (see: certificate revocation).
(R) An X.509 CRL contains a sequence of data items and has a (R) An X.509 CRL contains a sequence of data items and has a
digital signature computed on that sequence. In addition to the digital signature computed on that sequence. In addition to the
signature, both v1 and v2 contain items 2 through 6b listed below. signature, both v1 and v2 contain items 2 through 6b listed below.
Version 2 may optionally contain items 1, 6b, and 7. Version 2 may optionally contain items 1, 6b, and 7.
1. version Optional. If present, identifies v2. 1. version Optional. If present, identifies v2.
2. signature OID of the algorithm that signed CRL. 2. signature OID of the algorithm that signed CRL.
3. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed). 3. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed).
4. thisUpdate A UTCTime value. 4. thisUpdate A UTCTime value.
5. nextUpdate A UTCTime value..br 5. nextUpdate A UTCTime value..br
6. revokedCertificates 3-tuples of 6a, 6b, and (optional) 6c: 6. revokedCertificates 3-tuples of 6a, 6b, and (optional) 6c:
6a. userCertificate A certificate's serial number. 6a. userCertificate A certificate's serial number.
6b. revocationDate UTCTime value for the revocation date. 6b. revocationDate UTCTime value for the revocation date.
6c. crlEntryExtensions Optional. 6c. crlEntryExtensions Optional.
7. crlExtensions Optional. 7. crlExtensions Optional.
X.509 public-key certificate $ X.509 public-key certificate
(N) A public-key certificate in one of the formats defined by (N) A public-key certificate in one of the formats defined by
X.509--version 1 (v1), version 2 (v2), or version 3 (v3). (The v1 X.509--version 1 (v1), version 2 (v2), or version 3 (v3). (The v1
and v2 designations for an X.509 public-key certificate are and v2 designations for an X.509 public-key certificate are
disjoint from the v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 CRL, and disjoint from the v1 and v2 designations for an X.509 CRL, and
from the v1 designation for an X.509 attribute certificate.) from the v1 designation for an X.509 attribute certificate.)
(C) An X.509 public-key certificate contains a sequence of data (C) An X.509 public-key certificate contains a sequence of data
items and has a digital signature computed on that sequence. In items and has a digital signature computed on that sequence. In
addition to the signature, all three versions contain items 1 addition to the signature, all three versions contain items 1
through 7 listed below. Only v2 and v3 certificates may also through 7 listed below. Only v2 and v3 certificates may also
skipping to change at page 163, line 19 skipping to change at page 178, line 19
sign the certificate. sign the certificate.
4. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed). 4. issuer DN of the issuer (the CA who signed).
5. validity Validity period; a pair of UTCTime 5. validity Validity period; a pair of UTCTime
values: "not before" and "not after". values: "not before" and "not after".
6. subject DN of entity who owns the public key. 6. subject DN of entity who owns the public key.
7. subjectPublicKeyInfo Public key value and algorithm OID. 7. subjectPublicKeyInfo Public key value and algorithm OID.
8. issuerUniqueIdentifier Defined for v2, v3; optional. 8. issuerUniqueIdentifier Defined for v2, v3; optional.
9. subjectUniqueIdentifier Defined for v2, v2; optional. 9. subjectUniqueIdentifier Defined for v2, v2; optional.
10. extensions Defined only for v3; optional. 10. extensions Defined only for v3; optional.
XTACACS $ XTACACS
See: (secondary definition in) Terminal Access Controller (TAC) See: (secondary definition in) Terminal Access Controller (TAC)
Access Control System. Access Control System.
Yellow Book $ Yellow Book
(C) Internet Standards Process documents SHOULD NOT use this term (D) ISPDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for "Computer
as a synonym for "Computer Security Requirements: Guidance for Security Requirements: Guidance for Applying the Department of
Applying the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific
Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments" [CSC3]. Instead, use Environments" [CSC3]. Instead, use the full proper name of the
the full proper name of the document or, in subsequent references, document or, in subsequent references, a conventional
a conventional abbreviation. (See: (usage note under) Green Book, abbreviation. (See: (usage note under) Green Book, Rainbow
Rainbow Series). Series.)
zeroize $ zeroize
(I) Use erasure or other means to render stored data--particularly (I) Use erasure or other means to render stored data--particularly
a key stored in a cryptographic module or other device--unusable a key stored in a cryptographic module or other device--unusable
and unrecoverable. and unrecoverable.
(O) Erase electronically stored data by altering the contents of (O) Erase electronically stored data by altering the contents of
the data storage so as to prevent the recovery of the data. the data storage so as to prevent the recovery of the data.
[FP140] [FP140]
4. References 4. References
skipping to change at page 164, line 34 skipping to change at page 179, line 34
[A9017] ---, "Financial Institution Key Management (Wholesale)", [A9017] ---, "Financial Institution Key Management (Wholesale)",
X9.17, 4 Apr 1985. [Defines procedures for the manual and X9.17, 4 Apr 1985. [Defines procedures for the manual and
automated management of keying material and uses DES to automated management of keying material and uses DES to
provide key management for a variety of operational provide key management for a variety of operational
environments.] environments.]
[A9042] ---, "Public key Cryptography for the Financial Service [A9042] ---, "Public key Cryptography for the Financial Service
Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Diffie-Hellman Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Diffie-Hellman
and MQV Algorithms", X9.42, 29 Jan 1999. and MQV Algorithms", X9.42, 29 Jan 1999.
[A9052] ---, "Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation",
X9.52-1998, ANSI approval 9 Nov 1998.
[A9062] ---, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)", X9.62-1998, ANSI approval 7 Jan 1999.
[B7799] British Standards Institution, "Information Security
Management, Part 1: Code of Practice for Information
Security Management", BS 7799-1:1999.
---, ---, "Part 2: Specification for Information Security
Management Systems", BS 7799-2:1999.
[CCIB] Common Criteria Implementation Board, "Common Criteria for [CCIB] Common Criteria Implementation Board, "Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model", ver. 2.0, CCIB-98-026, May Introduction and General Model", ver. 2.0, CCIB-98-026, May
1998. 1998.
[CIPSO] Trusted Systems Interoperability Working Group, "Common IP [CIPSO] Trusted Systems Interoperability Working Group, "Common IP
Security Option", ver. 2.3, 9 Mar 1993. Security Option", ver. 2.3, 9 Mar 1993.
[CSC1] [U.S.]Department of Defense Computer Security Center, [CSC1] [U.S.]Department of Defense Computer Security Center,
"Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation "Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation
skipping to change at page 165, line 7 skipping to change at page 180, line 19
[CSC3] ---, "Computer Security Requirements: Guidance for Applying [CSC3] ---, "Computer Security Requirements: Guidance for Applying
the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria in Specific Environments", CSC-STD-003-85, 25 Jun Criteria in Specific Environments", CSC-STD-003-85, 25 Jun
1985. 1985.
[CSOR] U.S. Department of Commerce, "General Procedures for [CSOR] U.S. Department of Commerce, "General Procedures for
Registering Computer Security Objects", National Institute Registering Computer Security Objects", National Institute
of Standards Interagency Report 5308, Dec 1993. of Standards Interagency Report 5308, Dec 1993.
[Denn] D. E. Denning, "A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow",
in "Communications of the ACM", vol. 19, no. 5, May 1976,
pp. 236-243.
[DH76] W. Diffie and M. H. Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography" [DH76] W. Diffie and M. H. Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography"
in "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory", vol. IT-22, in "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory", vol. IT-22,
no. 6, Nov 1976, pp. 644-654. no. 6, Nov 1976, pp. 644-654.
[DOD1] U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Trusted [DOD1] U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria", DoD 5200.28-STD, 26 Computer System Evaluation Criteria", DoD 5200.28-STD, 26
Dec 1985. (Supersedes [CSC1].) Dec 1985. (Supersedes [CSC1].)
[DOD2] ---, Directive 5200.28, "Security Requirements for Automated [DOD2] ---, Directive 5200.28, "Security Requirements for Automated
Information Systems (AISs)", 21 Mar 1988. Information Systems (AISs)", 21 Mar 1988.
[DOD3] ---, "X.509 Certificate Policy", ver. 2, Mar 1999. [DOD3] ---, "X.509 Certificate Policy", ver. 2, Mar 1999.
[DOD98] ---, "NSA Key Recovery Assessment Criteria", 8 Jun 1998.
[EMV1] Europay International S.A., MasterCard International [EMV1] Europay International S.A., MasterCard International
Incorporated, and Visa International Service Association, Incorporated, and Visa International Service Association,
"EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment "EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Payment
Systems", ver. 3.1.1, 31 May 1998. Systems", ver. 3.1.1, 31 May 1998.
[EMV2] ---, "EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Terminal Specification [EMV2] ---, "EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Terminal Specification
for Payment Systems", ver. 3.1.1, 31 May 1998. for Payment Systems", ver. 3.1.1, 31 May 1998.
[EMV3] ---, EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Application [EMV3] ---, EMV '96 Integrated Circuit Card Application
Specification for Payment Systems", ver. 3.1.1, 31 May 1998. Specification for Payment Systems", ver. 3.1.1, 31 May 1998.
[FP039] U.S. Department of Commerce, "Glossary for Computer Systems [For94] W. Ford, "Computer Communications Security: Principles,
Security", Federal Information Processing Standards Standard Protocols and Techniques", ISBN 0-13-799453-2,
Publication (FIPS PUB) 39, 15 Feb 1976. 1994.
[For97] W. Ford and M. Baum, "Secure Electronic Commerce: Building
the Infrastructure for Digital Signatures and Encryption",
ISBN 0-13-476342-4, 1994.
[FP031] U.S. Department of Commerce, "Guidelines for Automatic Data
Processing Physical Security and Risk Management", Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 31,
Jun 1974.
[FP039] ---, "Glossary for Computer Systems Security", Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 39,
15 Feb 1976.
[FP046] ---, "Data Encryption Standard (DES)", FIPS PUB 46-2, 30 Dec [FP046] ---, "Data Encryption Standard (DES)", FIPS PUB 46-2, 30 Dec
1993. 1993.
[FP081] ---, "DES Modes of Operation", FIPS PUB 81, 2 Dec 1980. [FP081] ---, "DES Modes of Operation", FIPS PUB 81, 2 Dec 1980.
[FP102] ---, "Guideline for Computer Security Certification and
Accreditation", FIPS PUB 102, 27 Sep 1983.
[FP113] ---, "Computer Data Authentication", FIPS PUB 113, 30 May [FP113] ---, "Computer Data Authentication", FIPS PUB 113, 30 May
1985. 1985.
[FP140] ---, "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", FIPS [FP140] ---, "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", FIPS
PUB 140-1, 11 Jan 1994. PUB 140-1, 11 Jan 1994.
[FP151] ---, "Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX)--System [FP151] ---, "Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX)--System
Application Program Interface [C Language]", FIPS PUB 151-2, Application Program Interface [C Language]", FIPS PUB 151-2,
12 May 1993 12 May 1993
skipping to change at page 166, line 11 skipping to change at page 181, line 43
[FP185] ---, "Escrowed Encryption Standard", FIPS PUB 185, 9 Feb [FP185] ---, "Escrowed Encryption Standard", FIPS PUB 185, 9 Feb
1994. 1994.
[FP186] ---, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186, 19 May [FP186] ---, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186, 19 May
1994. 1994.
[FP188] ---, "Standard Security Label for Information Transfer", FIPS [FP188] ---, "Standard Security Label for Information Transfer", FIPS
PUB 188, 6 Sep 1994. PUB 188, 6 Sep 1994.
[FPKI] ---, "Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Technical [FPDAM] Collaborative ITU and ISO/IEC meeting on the Directory,
Specifications: Part A--Technical Concept of Operations", "Final Proposed Draft Amendment on Certificate Extensions",
National Institute of Standards, 4 Sep 1998. April 1999. (This draft proposes changes to [X.509].)
[FPKI] U.S. Department of Commerce, "Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Technical Specifications: Part A--Technical Concept of
Operations", National Institute of Standards, 4 Sep 1998.
[I3166] International Standards Organization, "Codes for the [I3166] International Standards Organization, "Codes for the
Representation of Names of countries and Their Subdivisions Representation of Names of countries and Their Subdivisions
--Part 1: Country Codes", ISO 3166-1:1997. --Part 1: Country Codes", ISO 3166-1:1997.
---, --- "Part 2: Country Subdivision Codes", ISO/DIS 3166-2. ---, --- "Part 2: Country Subdivision Codes", ISO/DIS 3166-2.
---, --- "Part 3: Codes for formerly Used Names of ---, --- "Part 3: Codes for formerly Used Names of
Countries", ISO/DIS 3166-3. Countries", ISO/DIS 3166-3.
[I7498] ---, "Information Processing Systems--Open Systems [I7498] ---, "Information Processing Systems--Open Systems
Interconnection Reference Model--[Part 1:] Basic Reference Interconnection Reference Model--[Part 1:] Basic Reference
Model", ISO/IEC 7498-1. (AKA ITU-T Recommendation X.200.) Model", ISO/IEC 7498-1. (Equivalent to ITU-T Recommendation
X.200.)
---, "Information Processing Systems--Open Systems ---, --- "Part 2: Security Architecture", ISO/IEC 7499-2.
Interconnection Reference Model--Basic Reference Model--Part
2: Security Architecture", ISO/IEC 7499-2.
---, "Information Processing Systems--Open Systems ---, --- "Part 4: Management Framework", ISO/IEC 7498-4.
Interconnection Mode--Basic Reference ModelQPart 4:
Management Framework", ISO/IEC 7498-4.
[I7812] ---, "Identification cards--Identification of issuers--Part [I7812] ---, "Identification cards--Identification of issuers--Part
1: Numbering system, ISO/IEC 7812-1:1993, and Identification 1: Numbering system, ISO/IEC 7812-1:1993, and Identification
cards--Identification of issuers--Part 2: Application and cards--Identification of issuers--Part 2: Application and
registration procedures", ISO/IEC 7812-2:1993. registration procedures", ISO/IEC 7812-2:1993.
[I9945] "Portable Operating System Interface for Computer [I9945] "Portable Operating System Interface for Computer
Environments", ISO/IEC 9945-1: 1990. Environments", ISO/IEC 9945-1: 1990.
[ITSEC] "Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC):
Harmonised Criteria of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom", ver. 1.2, U.K. Department of Trade and
Industry, Jun 1991.
[Kahn] David Kahn, "The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing", [Kahn] David Kahn, "The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing",
The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967.
[Kuhn] Markus G. Kuhn and Ross J. Anderson, "Soft Tempest: Hidden
Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations", in
David Aucsmith, ed., "Information Hiding, Second
International Workshop, IH'98", Portland, Oregon, USA, 15-17
Apr 1998, LNCS 1525, Springer-Verlag, ISBN 3-540-65386-4,
pp. 124-142.
[MISPC] U.S. Department of Commerce, "Minimum Interoperability [MISPC] U.S. Department of Commerce, "Minimum Interoperability
Specification for PKI Components (MISPC), Version 1", Specification for PKI Components (MISPC), Version 1",
National Institute of Standards Special Publication 800-15, National Institute of Standards Special Publication 800-15,
Sep 1997. Sep 1997.
[NCS01] National Computer Security Center, "A Guide to Understanding [NCS01] National Computer Security Center, "A Guide to Understanding
Audit in Trusted Systems", NCSC-TG-001, 1 Jun 1988. (Part of Audit in Trusted Systems", NCSC-TG-001, 1 Jun 1988. (Part of
the Rainbow Series.) the Rainbow Series.)
[NCS04] ---, "Glossary of Computer Security Terms", NCSC-TG-004, ver. [NCS04] ---, "Glossary of Computer Security Terms", NCSC-TG-004, ver.
1, 21 Oct 1988. (Part of the Rainbow Series.) 1, 21 Oct 1988. (Part of the Rainbow Series.)
[NCS05] ---, "Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer [NCS05] ---, "Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria", NCSC-TG-005, ver. 1, 31 Jul System Evaluation Criteria", NCSC-TG-005, ver. 1, 31 Jul
1987. (Part of the Rainbow Series.) 1987. (Part of the Rainbow Series.)
skipping to change at page 167, line 23 skipping to change at page 183, line 16
Information Systems", NCSC-TG-025, ver. 2, Sep 1991. (Part Information Systems", NCSC-TG-025, ver. 2, Sep 1991. (Part
of the Rainbow Series.) of the Rainbow Series.)
[PGP] Simson Garfinkel, "PGP: Pretty Good Privacy", O'Reilly & [PGP] Simson Garfinkel, "PGP: Pretty Good Privacy", O'Reilly &
Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, California, 1995. Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, California, 1995.
[PKCS] Burton S. Kaliski, Jr., "An Overview of the PKCS Standards", [PKCS] Burton S. Kaliski, Jr., "An Overview of the PKCS Standards",
RSA Data Security, Inc., 3 Jun 1991. RSA Data Security, Inc., 3 Jun 1991.
[PKC07] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax [PKC07] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
Standard", Version 1.5, RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 1 Standard", ver. 1.5, RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 1 Nov
Nov 1993. 1993.
[PKC10] ---, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard", [PKC10] ---, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard", ver.
Version 1.0, RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 1 Nov 1993 1.0, RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 1 Nov 1993
[PKC11] ---, "PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard", ver. [PKC11] ---, "PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard", ver.
1.0, 28 Apr 1995. 1.0, 28 Apr 1995.
[R0768] J. Postel, "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, 28 Aug [R0768] J. Postel, "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, 28 Aug
1980. 1980.
[R0791] ---, "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1 Sep 1981. [R0791] ---, "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1 Sep 1981.
[R0792] ---, "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, Sep [R0792] ---, "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, Sep
1981. 1981. [See: RFC 1885.]
[R0793] ---, ed., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793, [R0793] ---, ed., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793,
Sep 1981. Sep 1981.
[R0821] ---, "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", STD 10, RFC 821, Aug [R0821] ---, "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", STD 10, RFC 821, Aug
1982. 1982.
[R0822] D. H. Crocker, "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text [R0822] D. H. Crocker, "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text
Messages", STD 11, RFC 822, 13 Aug 1982. Messages", STD 11, RFC 822, 13 Aug 1982.
skipping to change at page 168, line 26 skipping to change at page 184, line 19
1992. 1992.
[R1320] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1320, Apr [R1320] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1320, Apr
1992. 1992.
[R1321] ---, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, Apr 1992. [R1321] ---, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, Apr 1992.
[R1334] B. Lloyd, W. Simpson, "PPP Authentication Protocols", RFC [R1334] B. Lloyd, W. Simpson, "PPP Authentication Protocols", RFC
1334, Oct 1992. 1334, Oct 1992.
[R1413] M. St. Johns, "Identification Protocol", RFC 1413, Feb 1993.
[R1421] J. Linn, "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail, [R1421] J. Linn, "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail,
Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures", Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures",
RFC 1421, Feb 1993. RFC 1421, Feb 1993.
[R1422] S. Kent, "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail, [R1422] S. Kent, "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail,
Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management", RFC 1422, Feb Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management", RFC 1422, Feb
1993. 1993.
[R1508] J. Linn, "Generic Security Service Application Program [R1455] D. Eastlake, III, "Physical Link Security Type of Service",
Interface", RFC 1508, Sep 1993. RFC 1455, May 1993.
[R1457] R. Housley, "Security Label Framework for the Internet", RFC
1457, May 1993.
[R1492] C. Finseth, "An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes Called
TACACS", RFC 1492, Jul 1993.
[R1507] C. Kaufman, "DASS: Distributed Authentication Security
Service", RFC 1507, Sep 1993.
[R1510] J. Kohl and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication [R1510] J. Kohl and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication
Service (V5)", RFC 1510, Sep 1993 Service (V5)", RFC 1510, Sep 1993
[R1591] ---, "Domain Name System Structure and Delegation", Mar 1994. [R1591] ---, "Domain Name System Structure and Delegation", Mar 1994.
[R1630] T. Berners-Lee, "Universal Resource Identifiers in WWW", RFC [R1630] T. Berners-Lee, "Universal Resource Identifiers in WWW", RFC
1630, June 1994. 1630, Jun 1994.
[R1731] J. Myers, "IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms", RFC 1731, Dec
1994.
[R1734] ---, "POP3 AUTHentication Command", RFC 1734, Dec, 1994.
[R1738] ---, L. Masinter, and M. McCahill, ed's., "Uniform Resource [R1738] ---, L. Masinter, and M. McCahill, ed's., "Uniform Resource
Locators (URL)", RFC 1738, Dec 1994. Locators (URL)", RFC 1738, Dec 1994.
[R1750] D. Eastlake, 3rd, S. Crocker, and J. Schiller, "Randomness [R1750] D. Eastlake, 3rd, S. Crocker, and J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", Dec 1994. Recommendations for Security", Dec 1994.
[R1777] W. Yeong, T. Howes, and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory [R1777] W. Yeong, T. Howes, and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol", Mar 1995 Access Protocol", Mar 1995
[R1808] R. Fielding, "Relative Uniform Resource Locators", RFC 1808, [R1808] R. Fielding, "Relative Uniform Resource Locators", RFC 1808,
Jun 1995 Jun 1995
[R1824] H. Danisch, "The Exponential Security System TESS: An
Identity-Based Cryptographic Protocol for Authenticated Key-
Exchange (E.I.S.S.-Report 1995/4)", RFC 1824, Aug 1995.
[R1828] P. Metzger and W. Simpson, "IP Authentication using Keyed
MD5", RFC 1828, Aug 1995.
[R1829] P. Karn, P. Metzger, and W. Simpson, "The ESP DES-CBC
Transform", RFC 1829, Aug 1995.
[R1848] S. Crocker, N. Freed, J. Galvin, and S. Murphy, "MIME Object [R1848] S. Crocker, N. Freed, J. Galvin, and S. Murphy, "MIME Object
Security Services", RFC 1848, Oct 1995. Security Services", RFC 1848, Oct 1995.
[R1851] P. Karn, P. Metzger, and W. Simpson, "The ESP Triple DES [R1851] P. Karn, P. Metzger, and W. Simpson, "The ESP Triple DES
Transform", RFC 1851, Sep 1995. Transform", RFC 1851, Sep 1995.
[R1866] T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Markup Language--2.0", RFC 1866, [R1866] T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Markup Language--2.0", RFC 1866,
Nov 1995. Nov 1995.
[R1885] A. Conta and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification", RFC 1885, Dec 1995.
[R1928] M. Leech, M. Ganis, Y. Lee, R. Kuris, D. Koblas, and L. [R1928] M. Leech, M. Ganis, Y. Lee, R. Kuris, D. Koblas, and L.
Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC 1928, Mar 1996. Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC 1928, Mar 1996.
[R1938] N. Haller and C. Metzion, "A One-Time Password System", RFC [R1938] N. Haller and C. Metzion, "A One-Time Password System", RFC
1938, May 1996. 1938, May 1996.
[R1939] J. Myers and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", RFC
1939, May 1996.
[R1958] B. Carpenter, ed., "Architectural Principles of the
Internet", RFC 1958, Jun 1996.
[R1983] G. Malkin, ed., "Internet Users' Glossary", RFC 1983, FYI 18, [R1983] G. Malkin, ed., "Internet Users' Glossary", RFC 1983, FYI 18,
Aug 1996. Aug 1996.
[R1994] W. Simpson, "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol [R1994] W. Simpson, "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP)", RFC 1994, Aug 1996. (CHAP)", RFC 1994, Aug 1996.
[R2023] J. Postel and J. Reynolds, "Instructions to RFC Authors", RFC [R2023] J. Postel and J. Reynolds, "Instructions to RFC Authors", RFC
2023, Oct 1997. 2023, Oct 1997.
[R2026] S. Bradner, "The Internet Standards Process--Revision 3", [R2026] S. Bradner, "The Internet Standards Process--Revision 3",
BCP009, RFC 2026, Mar 1994. BCP009, RFC 2026, Mar 1994.
[R2045] N. Freed and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [R2045] N. Freed and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, Nov 1996. Bodies", RFC 2045, Nov 1996.
[R2460] S. Deering, R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) [R2060] M. Crispin, "Internet Message Access Protocol--Version 4
Specification", RFC 2460, Dec 1998. Revision 1", RFC 2060, Dec 1996.
[R2065] D. Eastlake, 3rd, "Domain Name System Security Extensions", [R2065] D. Eastlake, 3rd, "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
RFC 2065, Jan 1997. RFC 2065, Jan 1997.
[R2068] R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, T. Berners-Lee, [R2068] R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, T. Berners-Lee,
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol--HTTP/1.1", RFC 2068, Jan 1997. "Hypertext Transfer Protocol--HTTP/1.1", RFC 2068, Jan 1997.
[R2078] J. Linn, "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface, Version 2", RFC 2078, Jan 1997.
[R2084] G. Bossert, S. Cooper, and W. Drummond, "Considerations for
Web Transaction Security", RFC 2084, Jan 1997.
[R2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing [R2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Feb 1997. for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Feb 1997.
[R2137] D. Eastlake, 3rd, "Secure Domain Name System Dynamic Update",
RFC 2137, Apr 1997.
[R2179] A. Gwinn, "Network Security For Trade Shows", RFC 2179, Jul
1997.
[R2195] J. Klensin, R. Catoe, and P. Krumviede, "IMAP/POP AUTHorize
Extension for Simple Challenge/Response", RFC 2195, Sep
1997.
[R2196] B. Fraser, "Site Security Handbook", RFC 2196, Sep 1997.
[R2202] P. Cheng and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-
SHA-1", RFC 2202, Sep. 1997.
[R2222] J. Myers, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)",
RFC 2222, Oct 1997.
[R2284] L. Blunk and J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication [R2284] L. Blunk and J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, Mar 1998. Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, Mar 1998.
[R2315] B. Kaliski, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax, Version [R2315] B. Kaliski, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax, Version
1.5", RFC 2315, Mar 1998. 1.5", RFC 2315, Mar 1998.
[R2323] A. Ramos, "IETF Identification and Security Guidelines", RFC
2323, 1 Apr 1998. [Intended for humorous entertainment
("please laugh loud and hard"); does not contain serious
security information.]
[R2350] N. Brownlee and E. Guttman, "Expectations for Computer
Security Incident Response", RFC 2350, Jun 1998.
[R2373] R. Hinden and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing [R2373] R. Hinden and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 2373. Architecture", RFC 2373.
[R2401] S. Kent and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the [R2401] S. Kent and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, Nov 1998. Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, Nov 1998.
[R2402] S. Kent and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC [R2402] S. Kent and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC
2402, Nov 1998. 2402, Nov 1998.
[R2403] C. Madson and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP
and AH", RFC 2403, Nov 1998.
[R2404] C. Madson and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP
and AH", RFC 2404, Nov 1998.
[R2405] C. Madson and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm
With Explicit IV", RFC 2405, Nov 1998.
[R2406] S. Kent and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload [R2406] S. Kent and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 2406, Nov 1998. (ESP)", RFC 2406, Nov 1998.
[R2407] D. Piper, "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, Nov 1998.
[R2408] D. Maughan, M. Schertler, M. Schneider, and J. Turner,
"Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
(ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, Nov 1998.
[R2409] D. Harkins and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", [R2409] D. Harkins and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, Nov 1998. RFC 2409, Nov 1998.
[R2410] R. Glenn and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its
Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, Nov 1998.
[R2412] H. Orman, "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol", RFC 2412,
Nov 1998.
[R2451] R. Pereira and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
Algorithms", RFC 2451, Nov 1998.
[R2460] S. Deering, R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification", RFC 2460, Dec 1998.
[R2504] E. Guttman, L. Leong, and G. Malkin, "Users' Security
Handbook", RFC 2504, Feb 1999.
[R2510] C. Adams and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key [R2510] C. Adams and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", RFC 2510, Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", RFC 2510,
Mar 1999. Mar 1999.
[R2527] S. Chokhani and W. Ford, "Internet X.509 Public Key [R2527] S. Chokhani and W. Ford, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure, Certificate Policy and Certification Infrastructure, Certificate Policy and Certification
Practices Framework", RFC 2527, Mar 1999. Practices Framework", RFC 2527, Mar 1999.
[R2570] J. Case, R. Mundy, D. Partain, B. Stewart, " Introduction to [R2570] J. Case, R. Mundy, D. Partain, B. Stewart, "Introduction to
Version 3 of the Internet-Standard Network Management Version 3 of the Internet-Standard Network Management
Framework", RFC 2570, Apr 1999. Framework", RFC 2570, Apr 1999.
[R2574] U. Blumenthal and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model (USM) [R2574] U. Blumenthal and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model (USM)
for Version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol for Version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMPv3)", RFC 2574, Apr 1999. (SNMPv3)", RFC 2574, Apr 1999.
[R2612] C. Adams and J. Gilchrist, "The CAST-256 Encryption
Algorithm", RFC 2612, Jun 1999.
[R2628] V. Smyslov, "Simple Cryptographic Program Interface", RFC
2628, Jun 1999.
[R2630] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630, Jun
1999.
[R2631] E. Rescorla, "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", RFC 2631, [R2631] E. Rescorla, "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", RFC 2631,
June 1999 Jun 1999
[R2633] B. Ramsdell, ed., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification", [R2633] B. Ramsdell, ed., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
RFC 2633, June 1999 RFC 2633, Jun 1999
[R2634] P. Hoffman, ed., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME", RFC [R2634] P. Hoffman, ed., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME", RFC
2634, June 1999 2634, Jun 1999
[Schn] Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography", John Wiley & Sons, [R2635] S. Hambridge and A. Lunde, "Don't Spew: A Set of Guidelines
Inc., New York, 1994. for Mass Unsolicited Mailings and Postings", RFC 2635, Jun
1999.
[Raym] E. S. Raymond, ed., "The On-Line Hacker Jargon File", ver.
4.0.0, 24 JUL 1996. (See: http://www.tuxedo.org/jargon/ for
the latest version. Also, ver. 3.0.0 is available as "The
New Hacker's Dictionary", 2nd edition, MIT Press, Sep 1993,
ISBN 0-262-18154-1.)
[Schn] B. Schneier, "Applied Cryptography", John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
New York, 1994.
[SDNS3] National Security Agency, "Secure Data Network Systems, [SDNS3] National Security Agency, "Secure Data Network Systems,
Security Protocol 3 (SP3)", document SDN.301, Revision 1.5, Security Protocol 3 (SP3)", document SDN.301, Revision 1.5,
15 May 1989. 15 May 1989.
[SDNS4] ---, ---, "Security Protocol 4 (SP4)", document SDN.401, [SDNS4] ---, ---, "Security Protocol 4 (SP4)", document SDN.401,
Revision 1.2, 12 Jul 1988. Revision 1.2, 12 Jul 1988.
[SDNS7] ---, ---, "Secure data Network System, Message Security [SDNS7] ---, ---, "Secure data Network System, Message Security
Protocol (MSP)", document SDN.701, Revision 4.0, 7 June Protocol (MSP)", document SDN.701, Revision 4.0, 7 Jun 1996,
1996, with Corrections to Message Security Protocol, with Corrections to Message Security Protocol, SDN.701, Rev
SDN.701, Rev 4.0", 96-06-07, 30 Aug, 1996. 4.0", 96-06-07, 30 Aug, 1996.
[SET1] MasterCard and Visa, "SET Secure Electronic Transaction [SET1] MasterCard and Visa, "SET Secure Electronic Transaction
Specification, Book 1: Business Description", ver. 1.0, 31 Specification, Book 1: Business Description", ver. 1.0, 31
May 1997. May 1997.
[SET2] ---, "SET Secure Electronic Transaction Specification, Book [SET2] ---, "SET Secure Electronic Transaction Specification, Book
2: Programmer's Guide", ver. 1.0, 31 May 1997. 2: Programmer's Guide", ver. 1.0, 31 May 1997.
[Stei] J. Steiner, C. Neuman, and J. Schiller, "Kerberos: An [Stei] J. Steiner, C. Neuman, and J. Schiller, "Kerberos: An
Authentication Service for Open Network Systems" in "Usenix Authentication Service for Open Network Systems" in "Usenix
Conference Proceedings", Feb 1988. Conference Proceedings", Feb 1988.
[X400] International Telecommunications Union--Telecommunication [X400] International Telecommunications Union--Telecommunication
Standardization Sector (formerly "CCITT"), Recommendation Standardization Sector (formerly "CCITT"), Recommendation
X.400, "Message Handling Services: Message Handling System X.400, "Message Handling Services: Message Handling System
and Service Overview". and Service Overview".
[X500] ---, Recommendation X.500, "Information Technology--Open [X500] ---, Recommendation X.500, "Information Technology--Open
Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Overview of Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Overview of
Concepts, Models, and Services". (AKA ISO 9594-1.) Concepts, Models, and Services". (Equivalent to ISO 9594-1.)
[X501] ---, Recommendation X.501, "Information Technology--Open [X501] ---, Recommendation X.501, "Information Technology--Open
Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Models". Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Models".
[X509] ---, Recommendation X.509, "Information Technology--Open [X509] ---, Recommendation X.509, "Information Technology--Open
Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Authentication Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Authentication
Framework". (AKA ISO 9594-8.) Framework". (AKA ISO 9594-8.)
[X519] ---, Recommendation X.519, "Information Technology--Open [X519] ---, Recommendation X.519, "Information Technology--Open
Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Protocol Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Protocol
Specifications". Specifications".
[X520] ---, Recommendation X.520, "Information Technology--Open [X520] ---, Recommendation X.520, "Information Technology--Open
Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Selected Attribute Systems Interconnection--The Directory: Selected Attribute
Types". Types".
[X680] ---, Recommendation X.680, "Information Technology--Abstract [X680] ---, Recommendation X.680, "Information Technology--Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)--Specification of Basic Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)--Specification of Basic
Notation", 15 Nov 1994. (AKA ISO/IEC 8824-1.) Notation", 15 Nov 1994. (Equivalent to ISO/IEC 8824-1.)
[X690] ---, Recommendation X.690, "Information Technology--ASN.1 [X690] ---, Recommendation X.690, "Information Technology--ASN.1
Encoding Rules--Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Encoding Rules--Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding
Rules (DER)", 15 Nov 1994. (AKA ISO/IEC 8825-1.) Rules (DER)", 15 Nov 1994. (Equivalent to ISO/IEC 8825-1.)
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The focus of this document is security terminology, but this document The focus of this document is security terminology, but this document
does not discuss security issues in the sense of describing or does not discuss security issues in the sense of describing or
analyzing threats to, vulnerabilities of, or countermeasures to analyzing threats to, vulnerabilities of, or countermeasures to
protect, any specific Internet Standard protocol. protect, any specific Internet Standard protocol.
6. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgments
Pat Cain, Mike Kong, and Charles Lynn provided meticulous comments on Pat Cain, Mike Kong, and Charles Lynn provided meticulous comments on
an initial version of this document. an initial version of this document.
7. Author's Address 7. Author's Address
Please address all comments to: Please address all comments to:
Robert W. Shirey Robert W. Shirey
Security Practice Center GTE / BBN Technologies
GTE Internetworking, Mail Stop 30/12B2 Suite 1200, Mail Stop 30/12B2
1300 Seventeenth Street North, Suite 1200 1300 Seventeenth Street North,
Arlington, VA 22209-3801 USA Arlington, VA 22209-3801 USA
Phone: +1 (703) 284-4641 Phone: +1 (703) 284-4641
Fax: +1 (703) 284-2766 Fax: +1 (703) 284-2766
Email: rshirey@bbn.com Email: rshirey@bbn.com
8. Expiration Date 8. Expiration Date
This Internet Draft expires on 3 February 2000. This Internet Draft expires on 17 April 2000.
 End of changes. 1473 change blocks. 
2493 lines changed or deleted 3613 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/