< draft-ietf-openpgp-mime-07.txt		draft-ietf-openpgp-mime-08.txt >
			A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.
	Network Working Group M. Elkins		RFC 3156
	draft-ietf-openpgp-mime-07.txt Network Associates, Inc.
	Obsoletes: 2015 D. Del Torto
	CryptoRights Foundation
	R. Levien
	University of California at Berkeley
	T. Roessler
	July 2001
	MIME Security with OpenPGP
	Status of this Memo
	This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
	all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
	other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
	Drafts.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
	The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
	Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2001. All Rights Reserved.
	Abstract
	This document describes how the OpenPGP Message Format [1] can be
	used to provide privacy and authentication using the Multipurpose
	Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) security content types described in
	RFC 1847 [2].
	This draft is being discussed on the "ietf-openpgp" mailing list. To
	join the list, send a message to <ietf-openpgp-request@imc.org> with
	the single word "subscribe" in the subject. An archive of the
	working group's list is located at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp>.
	1. Introduction
	Work on integrating PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) with MIME [3]
	(including the since withdrawn "application/pgp" content type) prior
	to RFC 2015 suffered from a number of problems, the most significant
	of which is the inability to recover signed message bodies without
	parsing data structures specific to PGP. RFC 2015 makes use of the
	elegant solution proposed in RFC 1847, which defines security
	multipart formats for MIME. The security multiparts clearly separate
	the signed message body from the signature, and have a number of
	other desirable properties. This document revises RFC 2015 to adopt
	the integration of PGP and MIME to the needs which emerged during the
	work on the OpenPGP specification.
	This document defines three content types for implementing security
	and privacy with OpenPGP: "application/pgp-encrypted",
	"application/pgp-signature" and "application/pgp-keys".
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
	2. OpenPGP data formats
	OpenPGP implementations can generate either ASCII armor (described in
	[1]) or 8-bit binary output when encrypting data, generating a
	digital signature, or extracting public key data. The ASCII armor
	output is the REQUIRED method for data transfer. This allows those
	users who do not have the means to interpret the formats described in
	this document to be able to extract and use the OpenPGP information
	in the message.
	When the amount of data to be transmitted requires that it be sent in
	many parts, the MIME message/partial mechanism SHOULD be used rather
	than the multi-part ASCII armor OpenPGP format.
	3. Content-Transfer-Encoding restrictions
	Multipart/signed and multipart/encrypted are to be treated by agents
	as opaque, meaning that the data is not to be altered in any way [2],
	[7]. However, many existing mail gateways will detect if the next hop
	does not support MIME or 8-bit data and perform conversion to either
	Quoted-Printable or Base64. This presents serious problems for
	multipart/signed, in particular, where the signature is invalidated
	when such an operation occurs. For this reason all data signed
	according to this protocol MUST be constrained to 7 bits (8-bit data
	MUST be encoded using either Quoted-Printable or Base64). Note that
	this also includes the case where a signed object is also encrypted
	(see section 6). This restriction will increase the likelihood that
	the signature will be valid upon receipt.
	Additionally, implementations MUST make sure that no trailing
	whitespace is present after the MIME encoding has been applied.
	Note: In most cases, trailing whitespace can either be removed, or
	protected by applying an appropriate content-transfer-encoding.
	However, special care must be taken when any header lines - either
	in MIME entity headers, or in embedded RFC 822 headers - are
	present which only consist of whitespace: Such lines must be
	removed entirely, since replacing them by empty lines would turn
	them into header delimiters, and change the semantics of the
	message. The restrictions on whitespace are necessary in order to
	make the hash calculated invariant under the text and binary mode
	signature mechanisms provided by OpenPGP [1]. Also, they help to
	avoid compatibility problems with PGP implementations which
	predate the OpenPGP specification.
	Note: If any line begins with the string "From ", it is strongly
	suggested that either the Quoted-Printable or Base64 MIME encoding
	be applied. If Quoted-Printable is used, at least one of the
	characters in the string should be encoded using the hexadecimal
	coding rule. This is because many mail transfer and delivery
	agents treat "From " (the word "from" followed immediately by a
	space character) as the start of a new message and thus insert a
	right angle-bracket (>) in front of any line beginning with "From
	" to distinguish this case, invalidating the signature.
	Data that is ONLY to be encrypted is allowed to contain 8-bit
	characters and trailing whitespace and therefore need not undergo the
	convertion to a 7bit format, and the stripping of whitespace.
	Implementor's note: It cannot be stressed enough that applications
	using this standard follow MIME's suggestion that you "be
	conservative in what you generate, and liberal in what you
	accept." In this particular case it means it would be wise for an
	implementation to accept messages with any content-transfer-
	encoding, but restrict generation to the 7-bit format required by
	this memo. This will allow future compatibility in the event the
	Internet SMTP framework becomes 8-bit friendly.
	4. OpenPGP encrypted data
	Before OpenPGP encryption, the data is written in MIME canonical
	format (body and headers).
	OpenPGP encrypted data is denoted by the "multipart/encrypted"
	content type, described in [2], and MUST have a "protocol" parameter
	value of "application/pgp-encrypted". Note that the value of the
	parameter MUST be enclosed in quotes.
	The multipart/encrypted MIME body MUST consist of exactly two body
	parts, the first with content type "application/pgp-encrypted". This
	body contains the control information. A message complying with this
	standard MUST contain a "Version: 1" field in this body. Since the
	OpenPGP packet format contains all other information necessary for
	decrypting, no other information is required here.
	The second MIME body part MUST contain the actual encrypted data. It
	MUST be labeled with a content type of "application/octet-stream".
	Example message:
	From: Michael Elkins <elkins@aero.org>
	To: Michael Elkins <elkins@aero.org>
	Mime-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary=foo;
	protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"
	--foo
	Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
	Version: 1
	--foo
	Content-Type: application/octet-stream
	-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
	Version: 2.6.2
	hIwDY32hYGCE8MkBA/wOu7d45aUxF4Q0RKJprD3v5Z9K1YcRJ2fve87lMlDlx4Oj
	eW4GDdBfLbJE7VUpp13N19GL8e/AqbyyjHH4aS0YoTk10QQ9nnRvjY8nZL3MPXSZ
	g9VGQxFeGqzykzmykU6A26MSMexR4ApeeON6xzZWfo+0yOqAq6lb46wsvldZ96YA
	AABH78hyX7YX4uT1tNCWEIIBoqqvCeIMpp7UQ2IzBrXg6GtukS8NxbukLeamqVW3
	1yt21DYOjuLzcMNe/JNsD9vDVCvOOG3OCi8=
	=zzaA
	-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
	--foo--
	5. OpenPGP signed data
	OpenPGP signed messages are denoted by the "multipart/signed" content
	type, described in [2], with a "protocol" parameter which MUST have a
	value of "application/pgp-signature" (MUST be quoted).
	The "micalg" parameter for the "application/pgp-signature" protocol
	MUST contain exactly one hash-symbol of the format "pgp-<hash-
	identifier>", where <hash-identifier> identifies the Message
	Integrity Check (MIC) algorithm used to generate the signature.
	Hash-symbols are constructed from the text names registered in [1] or
	according to the mechanism defined in that document by converting the
	text name to lower case and prefixing it with the four characters
	"pgp-".
	Currently defined values are "pgp-md5", "pgp-sha1", "pgp-ripemd160",
	"pgp-md2", "pgp-tiger192", and "pgp-haval-5-160".
	The multipart/signed body MUST consist of exactly two parts. The
	first part contains the signed data in MIME canonical format,
	including a set of appropriate content headers describing the data.
	The second body MUST contain the OpenPGP digital signature. It MUST
	be labeled with a content type of "application/pgp-signature".
	Note: Implementations can either generate "signatures of a
	canonical text document" or "signatures of a binary document", as
	defined in [1]. The restrictions on the signed material put forth
	in section 3 and in this section will make sure that the various
	MIC algorithm variants specified in [1] and [5] will all produce
	the same result.
	When the OpenPGP digital signature is generated:
	(1) The data to be signed MUST first be converted to its content-
	type specific canonical form. For text/plain, this means
	conversion to an appropriate character set and conversion of
	line endings to the canonical <CR><LF> sequence.
	(2) An appropriate Content-Transfer-Encoding is then applied; see
	section 3. In particular, line endings in the encoded data MUST
	use the canonical <CR><LF> sequence where appropriate (note that
	the canonical line ending may or may not be present on the last
	line of encoded data and MUST NOT be included in the signature
	if absent).
	(3) MIME content headers are then added to the body, each ending
	with the canonical <CR><LF> sequence.
	(4) As described in section 3 of this document, any trailing
	whitespace MUST then be removed from the signed material.
	(5) As described in [2], the digital signature MUST be calculated
	over both the data to be signed and its set of content headers.
	(6) The signature MUST be generated detached from the signed data so
	that the process does not alter the signed data in any way.
	Note: The accepted OpenPGP convention is for signed data to end
	with a <CR><LF> sequence. Note that the <CR><LF> sequence
	immediately preceding a MIME boundary delimiter line is considered
	to be part of the delimiter in [3], 5.1. Thus, it is not part of
	the signed data preceding the delimiter line. An implementation
	which elects to adhere to the OpenPGP convention has to make sure
	it inserts a <CR><LF> pair on the last line of the data to be
	signed and transmitted (signed message and transmitted message
	MUST be identical).
	Example message:
	From: Michael Elkins <elkins@aero.org>
	To: Michael Elkins <elkins@aero.org>
	Mime-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary=bar; micalg=pgp-md5;
	protocol="application/pgp-signature"
	--bar
	& Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
	& Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
	&
	& =A1Hola!
	&
	& Did you know that talking to yourself is a sign of senility?
	&
	& It's generally a good idea to encode lines that begin with
	& From=20because some mail transport agents will insert a greater-
	& than (>) sign, thus invalidating the signature.
	&
	& Also, in some cases it might be desirable to encode any =20
	& trailing whitespace that occurs on lines in order to ensure =20
	& that the message signature is not invalidated when passing =20
	& a gateway that modifies such whitespace (like BITNET). =20
	&
	& me
	--bar
	Content-Type: application/pgp-signature
	-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
	Version: 2.6.2
	iQCVAwUBMJrRF2N9oWBghPDJAQE9UQQAtl7LuRVndBjrk4EqYBIb3h5QXIX/LC//
	jJV5bNvkZIGPIcEmI5iFd9boEgvpirHtIREEqLQRkYNoBActFBZmh9GC3C041WGq
	uMbrbxc+nIs1TIKlA08rVi9ig/2Yh7LFrK5Ein57U/W72vgSxLhe/zhdfolT9Brn
	HOxEa44b+EI=
	=ndaj
	-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
	--bar--
	The "&"s in the previous example indicate the portion of the data
	over which the signature was calculated.
	Upon receipt of a signed message, an application MUST:
	(1) Convert line endings to the canonical <CR><LF> sequence before
	the signature can be verified. This is necessary since the
	local MTA may have converted to a local end of line convention.
	(2) Pass both the signed data and its associated content headers
	along with the OpenPGP signature to the signature verification
	service.
	6. Encrypted and Signed Data
	Sometimes it is desirable to both digitally sign and then encrypt a
	message to be sent. This protocol allows for two methods of
	accomplishing this task.
	6.1. RFC 1847 Encapsulation
	In [2], it is stated that the data is first signed as a
	multipart/signature body, and then encrypted to form the final
	multipart/encrypted body. This is most useful for standard MIME-
	compliant message forwarding.
	Example:
	Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
	protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"; boundary=foo
	--foo
	Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
	Version: 1
	--foo
	Content-Type: application/octet-stream
	-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
	& Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-md5
	& protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary=bar
	&
	& --bar
	& Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
	&
	& This message was first signed, and then encrypted.
	&
	& --bar
	& Content-Type: application/pgp-signature
	&
	& -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
	& Version: 2.6.2
	&
	& iQCVAwUBMJrRF2N9oWBghPDJAQE9UQQAtl7LuRVndBjrk4EqYBIb3h5QXIX/LC//
	& jJV5bNvkZIGPIcEmI5iFd9boEgvpirHtIREEqLQRkYNoBActFBZmh9GC3C041WGq
	& uMbrbxc+nIs1TIKlA08rVi9ig/2Yh7LFrK5Ein57U/W72vgSxLhe/zhdfolT9Brn
	& HOxEa44b+EI=
	& =ndaj
	& -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
	&
	& --bar--
	-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
	--foo--
	(The text preceded by '&' indicates that it is really encrypted, but
	presented as text for clarity.)
	6.2. Combined method
	The OpenPGP packet format [1] describes a method for signing and
	encrypting data in a single OpenPGP message. This method is allowed
	in order to reduce processing overhead and increase compatibility
	with non-MIME implementations of OpenPGP. The resulting data is
	formatted as a "multipart/encrypted" object as described in Section
	4.
	Messages which are encrypted and signed in this combined fashion are
	REQUIRED to follow the same canonicalization rules as
	multipart/signed objects.
	It is explicitly allowed for an agent to decrypt a combined message
	and rewrite it as a multipart/signed object using the signature data
	embedded in the encrypted version.
	7. Distribution of OpenPGP public keys
	Content-Type: application/pgp-keys
	Required parameters: none
	Optional parameters: none
	A MIME body part of the content type "application/pgp-keys" contains
	ASCII-armored transferable Public Key Packets as defined in [1],
	section 10.1.
	8. Security Considerations
	Signatures of a canonical text document as defined in [1] ignore
	trailing white space in signed material. Implementations which
	choose to use signatures of canonical text documents will not be able
	to detect the addition of whitespace in transit.
	See [3], [4] for more information on the security considerations
	concerning the underlying protocols.
	9. IANA Considerations
	This document defines three media types: "application/pgp-encrypted",
	"application/pgp-signature" and "application/pgp-keys". The following
	sections specify the IANA registrations for these types.
	9.1. Registration of the application/pgp-encrypted media type
	MIME media type name: application
	MIME subtype name: pgp-encrypted
	Required parameters: none
	Optional parameters: none
	Encoding considerations:
	Currently this media type always consists of a single 7bit text
	string.
	Security considerations:
	See Section 8 and RFC 2440 Section 13.
	Interoperability considerations: none
	Published specification:
	This document.
	Additional information:
	Magic number(s): none
	File extension(s): none
	Macintosh File Type Code(s): none
	Person & email address to contact for further information:
	Michael Elkins
	Email: me@cs.hmc.edu
	Intended usage: common
	Author/Change controller:
	Michael Elkins
	Email: me@cs.hmc.edu
	9.2. Registration of the application/pgp-signature media type
	MIME media type name: application
	MIME subtype name: pgp-signature
	Required parameters: none
	Optional parameters: none
	Encoding considerations:
	The content of this media type always consists of 7bit text.
	Security considerations:
	See Section 8 and RFC 2440 Section 13.
	Interoperability considerations: none
	Published specification:
	RFC 2440 and this document.
	Additional information:
	Magic number(s): none
	File extension(s): asc
	Macintosh File Type Code(s): pgDS
	Person & email address to contact for further information:
	Michael Elkins
	Email: me@cs.hmc.edu
	Intended usage: common
	Author/Change controller:
	Michael Elkins
	Email: me@cs.hmc.edu
	9.3. Registration of the application/pgp-keys media type
	MIME media type name: application
	MIME subtype name: pgp-keys
	Required parameters: none
	Optional parameters: none
	Encoding considerations:
	The content of this media type always consists of 7bit text.
	Security considerations:
	See Section 8 and RFC 2440 Section 13.
	Interoperability considerations: none
	Published specification:
	RFC 2440 and this document.
	Additional information:
	Magic number(s): none
	File extension(s): asc
	Macintosh File Type Code(s): pgPR
	Person & email address to contact for further information:
	Michael Elkins
	Email: me@cs.hmc.edu
	Intended usage: common
	Author/Change controller:
	Michael Elkins
	Email: me@cs.hmc.edu
	10. Notes
	"PGP" and "Pretty Good Privacy" are registered trademarks of Network
	Associates, Inc.
	11. Acknowledgements
	This draft document relies on the work of the IETF's OpenPGP Working
	Group's definitions of the OpenPGP Message Format. The OpenPGP
	message format is currently described in RFC 2440 [1].
	Special thanks are due: to Philip Zimmermann for his original and
	ongoing work on PGP; to Charles Breed, Jon Callas and Dave Del Torto
	for originally proposing the formation of the OpenPGP Working Group;
	and to Steve Schoenfeld for helpful feedback during the draft
	process. The authors would also like to thank the engineers at Pretty
	Good Privacy, Inc (now Network Associates, Inc), including Colin
	Plumb, Hal Finney, Jon Callas, Mark Elrod, Mark Weaver and Lloyd
	Chambers, for their technical commentary.
	Additional thanks are due to Jeff Schiller and Derek Atkins for their
	continuing support of strong cryptography and PGP freeware at MIT; to
	Rodney Thayer of Sable Technology; to John Noerenberg, Steve Dorner
	and Laurence Lundblade of the Eudora team at QUALCOMM, Inc; to Bodo
	Moeller for proposing the approach followed with respect to trailing
	whitespace; to John Gilmore, Hugh Daniel and Fred Ringel (at
	Rivertown) and Ian Bell (at Turnpike) for their timely critical
	commentary; and to the international members of the IETF's OpenPGP
	mailing list, including William Geiger, Lutz Donnerhacke and Kazu
	Yamamoto. The idea to use multipart/mixed with multipart/signed has
	been attributed to James Galvin. Finally, our gratitude is due to the
	many members of the "Cypherpunks," "Coderpunks" and "pgp-users"
	<http://cryptorights.org/pgp-users> mailing lists and the many users
	of PGP worldwide for helping keep the path to privacy open.
	12. Addresses of the Authors and OpenPGP Working Group Chair
	The OpenPGP working group can be contacted via the current chair:
	John W. Noerenberg II
	Qualcomm, Inc.
	5775 Morehouse Dr.
	San Diego CA 92121 USA
	Tel: +1 619 658 3510
	Email: jwn2@qualcomm.com
	The principal authors of this draft are:
	Dave Del Torto
	CryptoRights Foundation
	80 Alviso Street, Mailstop: CRF
	San Francisco CA 94127 USA
	Tel: +1.415.334.5533, vm: #2
	Email: ddt@cryptorights.org, ddt@openpgp.net
	Michael Elkins
	Network Associates, Inc.
	3415 S. Sepulveda Blvd Suite 700
	Los Angeles CA 90034 USA
	Tel: +1.310.737.1663
	Fax: +1.310.737.1755
	Email: Michael_Elkins@nai.com, me@cs.hmc.edu
	Raph Levien
	University of California at Berkeley
	579 Soda Hall
	Berkeley CA 94720 USA
	Tel: +1.510.642.6509
	Email: raph@acm.org
	Thomas Roessler
	Nordstrasse 99
	D-53111 Bonn
	Germany
	Tel: +49-228-638007
	Email: roessler@does-not-exist.org
	References
	[1] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Thayer, R., "OpenPGP		Title: MIME Security with OpenPGP
	Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.		Author(s): M. Elkins, D. Del Torto, R. Levien, T. Roessler
			Status: Standards Track
			Date: August 2001
			Mailbox: ddt@cryptorights.org, raph@acm.org,
			roessler@does-not-exist.org
			Pages: 15
			Characters: 26809
			Updates: RFC 2015
	[2] Galvin, J., Murphy, G., Crocker, S., and N. Freed, "Security		I-D Tag: draft-ietf-openpgp-mime-08.txt
	Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and Multipart/Encrypted",
	RFC 1847, October 1995.
	[3] Freed, N., Borenstein, N., "Multipurpose Internet Mail		URL: ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3156.txt
	Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, November
	1996
	[4] Galvin, J., Murphy, G., Crocker, S., and N. Freed, "MIME Object		This document describes how the OpenPGP Message Format can be
	Security Services", RFC 1848, October 1995.		used to provide privacy and authentication using the Multipurpose
			Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) security content types described in
			RFC 1847.
	[5] Atkins, D., Stallings, W., and P. Zimmermann, "PGP Message		This document is a product of the An Open Specification for Pretty
	Exchange Formats", RFC 1991, August 1996.		Good Privacy Working Group of the IETF.
	[6] Elkins, M., "MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)", RFC		This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.
	2015, October 1996.
	[7] Freed, N., "Gateways and MIME Security Multiparts", RFC 2480,		This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for
	January 1999.		the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
			for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the
			"Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the
			standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution
			of this memo is unlimited.
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