< draft-ietf-smime-ecc-05.txt		draft-ietf-smime-ecc-06.txt >
	INTERNET-DRAFT Simon Blake-Wilson, Certicom Corp		A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.
	draft-ietf-smime-ecc-05.txt Daniel R. L. Brown, Certicom Corp
	Paul Lambert, Cosine Communications
	7 May, 2001 Expires: 6 November, 2001
	Use of ECC Algorithms in CMS
	Status of this Memo
	This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
	all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are
	working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
	its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also
	distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
	months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
	documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
	as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
	progress."
	The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
	The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
	Abstract
	This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography
	(ECC) public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
	(CMS). The ECC algorithms support the creation of digital
	signatures and the exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate
	content. The definition of the algorithm processing is based on
	the ANSI X9.62 standard, developed by the ANSI X9F1 working group,
	and the IEEE 1363 standard and the SEC 1 standard.
	The readers attention is called to the Intellectual Property Rights
	section at the end of this document.
	Table of Contents
	1 Introduction ........................................ 3
	1.1 Requirements terminology ....................... 3
	2 SignedData using ECC ................................ 3
	2.1 SignedData using ECDSA ......................... 3
	2.1.1 Fields of the SignedData ................ 3
	2.1.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 4
	2.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 4
	3 EnvelopedData using ECC ............................. 5
	3.1 EnvelopedData using ECDH ....................... 5
	3.1.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ......... 5
	3.1.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 6
	3.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 6
	3.2 EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV ............... 6
	3.2.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ......... 7
	3.2.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 7
	3.2.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 8
	4 AuthenticatedData using ECC ............ ............ 8
	4.1 AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV ........... 8
	4.1.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ......... 8
	4.1.2 Actions of the sending agent ............ 8
	4.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent .......... 9
	5 Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves .......... 9
	6 Certificates using ECC .............................. 9
	7 SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC ................. 9
	8 ASN.1 Syntax ........................................ 10
	8.1 Algorithm identifiers .......................... 10
	8.2 Other syntax ................................... 11
	9 Summary ............................................. 13
	References ............................................. 13
	Security Considerations ................................ 14
	Intellectual Property Rights ........................... 14
	Acknowledgments ........................................ 15
	Authors' Addresses ..................................... 15
	Full Copyright Statement ............................... 16
	1 Introduction
	The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm
	independent. This specification defines a standard profile for the
	use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in
	the CMS. The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following
	CMS content types:
	- 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
	(ECDSA) to sign content
	- 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
	methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption
	keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content
	encryption
	- 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
	methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
	encrypt MAC keys used for content authentication and integrity
	Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide
	public-key distribution in support of the specified techniques.
	1.1 Requirements terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
	this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119
	[MUST].
	2 SignedData using ECC
	This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
	SignedData format to sign data.
	2.1 SignedData using ECDSA
	This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital
	Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in
	[X9.62]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the
	Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [FIPS 186-2].
	In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the
	following techniques and formats MUST be used.
	2.1.1 Fields of the SignedData
	When using ECDSA with SignedData the fields of SignerInfo are as in
	[CMS], but with the following restrictions:
	digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier sha-1 (see
	Section 8.1) which identifies the SHA-1 hash algorithm.
	signatureAlgorithm contains the algorithm identifier
	ecdsa-with-SHA1 (see Section 8.1) which identifies the ECDSA
	signature algorithm.
	signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of
	a value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 8.2).
	When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the
	certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of
	the ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed
	in Section 6.
	2.1.2 Actions of the sending agent
	When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the
	message digest calculation process and signature generation process
	for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the
	sending agent uses the signature method specified in [X9.62,
	Section 5.3] with the following exceptions:
	- In [X9.62, Section 5.3.1], the integer "e" is instead
	determined by converting the message digest generated
	according to [CMS, Section 5.4] to an integer using the data
	conversion method in [X9.62, Section 4.3.2].
	The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the
	ECDSA-Sig-Value syntax (see Section 8.2) and places it in the
	SignerInfo signature field.
	2.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent
	When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the
	message digest calculation process and signature verification
	process for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify
	SignedData, the receiving agent uses the signature verification
	method specified in [X9.62, Section 5.4] with the following
	exceptions:
	- In [X9.62, Section 5.4.1] the integer "e'" is instead
	determined by converting the message digest generated
	according to [CMS, Section 5.4] to an integer using the data
	conversion method in [X9.62, Section 4.3.2].
	In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the
	integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the
	received message.
	3 EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms
	This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
	EnvelopedData format.
	3.1 EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH
	This section describes how to use ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
	Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData.
	Ephemeral-static ECDH is specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363].
	Ephemeral-static ECDH is the the elliptic curve analog of the
	ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm specified
	jointly in the documents [CMS, Section 12.3.1.1] and [CMS-DH].
	In an implementation that uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData with key
	agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be used.
	3.1.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
	When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
	KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as in [CMS], but with the following
	restrictions:
	originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The
	originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
	object identifier (see Section 8.1) with NULL parameters. The
	originatorKey publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding of a
	value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), which
	represents the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key.
	keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the
	dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme object identifier (see Section
	8.1) if standard ECDH primitive is used, or the
	dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme object identifier (see
	Section 8.1) if the cofactor ECDH primitive is used. The
	parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The
	KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm identifier that indicates the
	symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the
	KEK.
	3.1.2 Actions of the sending agent
	When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending
	agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain
	parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending
	agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
	KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
	"SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
	Section 8.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment
	and the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve
	Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.1]. As a
	result the sending agent obtains:
	- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of
	the type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit
	string and placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator
	field, and
	- a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the pairwise
	key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
	3.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent
	When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
	agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
	encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer
	"keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm.
	The receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the
	bit string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, which an value of the
	type ECPoint (see Section 8.2) encapsulated as a bit string. The
	receiving agent performs the key agreement operation of the
	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section
	6.1]. As a result the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit
	string "K" which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to
	unwrap the CEK.
	3.2 EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV
	This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
	(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData. ECMQV is
	specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363]. Like the KEA algorithm
	[CMS-KEA], 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key
	pair, a static key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair
	of the receiving agent. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that
	it can be used with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.
	In an implementation that uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData
	with key agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be
	used.
	3.2.1 Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
	When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData the fields of
	KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are:
	originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender.
	It SHOULD be the one of the alternatives issuerAndSerialNumber
	or subjectKeyIdentifier and point to one of the sending agent's
	certificates.
	ukm MUST be present. The ukm field MUST contain an octet string
	which is the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see
	Section 8.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
	algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object
	identifier (see Section 8.1) with NULL parameters field. The
	MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST
	contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section
	8.2) representing sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. The
	MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, SHOULD contain
	an octet string of additional user keying material of the
	sending agent.
	keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme
	algorithm identifier (see Section 8.1), with parameters field
	KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
	encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
	generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm.
	3.2.2 Actions of the sending agent
	When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
	obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters,
	(e.g. from the recipient's certificate) and checks that the domain
	parameters are the same. The sending agent then determines an
	integer "keydatalen", which is the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric
	key-size in bits, and also a bit string "SharedInfo", which is the
	DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2). The sending
	agent then performs the key deployment and key agreement operations
	of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.2].
	As a result the sending agent obtains
	- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of
	type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string,
	placed in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
	publicKey field (see Section 8.2), and
	- a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the pairwise
	key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
	The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an AuthenticatedData
	for greater efficiency.
	3.2.3 Actions of the receiving agent
	When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
	determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding
	of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer
	"keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm.
	The receiving agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC
	public keys of the originator, from the originator and ukm fields
	as described in Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key
	identified in the rid field and checks that the domain parameters
	are the same. The receiving agent then performs the key agreement
	operation of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme [SEC1, Section 6.2]. As
	a result the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K"
	which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.
	4 AuthenticatedData using ECC
	This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
	AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
	and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For
	example, the sending agent might not want the message to be
	authenticated when forwarded.)
	4.1 AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV
	This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
	(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is
	specified in [SEC1]. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it
	can be used with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.
	4.1.1 Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
	The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
	same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
	KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
	4.1.2 Actions of the sending agent
	The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData
	with 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.
	The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for
	greater efficiency.
	Note: if there are multiple recipients then an attack is possible
	where one recipient modifies the content without other recipients
	noticing [BON]. A sending agent who is concerned with such an
	attack SHOULD use a separate AuthenticatedData for each recipient.
	4.1.3 Actions of the receiving agent
	The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData
	with 1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
	Note: see Note in Section 4.1.2.
	5 Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves
	Implementations of this specification MUST implement either
	SignedData with ECDSA or EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
	Implementations of this specification SHOULD implement both
	SignedData with ECDSA and EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
	Implementations MAY implement the other techniques specified, such
	as AuthenticatedData and 1-Pass ECMQV.
	Furthermore, in order to encourage interoperability,
	implementations SHOULD use the elliptic curve domain parameters
	specified by ANSI [X9.62], NIST [FIPS-186-2] and SECG [SEC2].
	6 Certificates using ECC
	Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with
	this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of
	ECC algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in
	[PKI-ALG]. More details can be found in [SEC3].
	7 SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC
	A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports
	one or more of the ECC algorithms in this document by using the
	SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG, Section 2.5.2].
	The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDSA
	signature algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field
	containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 with NULL
	parameters. The DER encoding is:
	30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00
	The SMIMECapability capabilityID object identifiers for the
	supported key agreement algorithms in this document are
	dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
	dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme, and
	mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme. For each of these SMIMECapability
	SEQUENCEs the parameters field is present and indicates the
	supported key-encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm
	algorithm identifier. The DER encodings that indicate capability
	of the three key agreement algorithms with CMS Triple-DES key wrap
	are:
	30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02 30 0f 06
	0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00
	for ephemeral-static ECDH,
	30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03 30 0f 06
	0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00
	for ephemeral-static ECDH with cofactor method, and
	30 1c 06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10 30 0f 06
	0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00
	for ECMQV.
	8 ASN.1 Syntax
	The ASN.1 syntax that is used in this document is gathered together
	in this section for reference purposes.
	8.1 Algorithm identifiers
	The algorithm identifiers used in this document are taken from
	[X9.62], [SEC1] and [SEC2].
	The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used
	in this document:
	sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }
	The following object identifier is used in this document to
	indicate an elliptic curve public key:
	id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 }
	where
	ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
	10045 }
	When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an
	algorithm identifier, the associated parameters contain NULL.
	The following object identifier indicates the digital signature
	algorithm used in this document:
	ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 signatures(4)
	1 }
	When the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA1 is used within an
	algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field contains
	NULL.
	The following object identifiers indicate the key agreement
	algorithms used in this document:
	dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
	x9-63-scheme 2}
	dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
	x9-63-scheme 3}
	mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
	x9-63-scheme 16}
	where
	x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
	x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
	When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
	identifier, the associated parameters field contains the CMS
	KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.
	8.2 Other syntax
	The following additional syntax is used here.
	When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded
	using the type:
	ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
	r INTEGER,
	s INTEGER }
	ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [X9.62]. Within CMS,
	ECDSA-Sig-Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field
	of SignedData.
	When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData,
	ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using the type
	ECPoint.
	ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
	When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData, the
	sending agent's ephemeral public key and additional keying material
	are encoded using the type:
	MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
	ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
	addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL }
	The ECPoint syntax in used to represent the ephemeral public key
	and placed in the ephemeralPublicKey field. The additional user
	keying material is place in the addedukm field. Then the
	MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within in a
	ukm field of EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData.
	When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData,
	the key-encryption keys are derived by using the type:
	ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
	keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
	entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
	suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING }
	The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows:
	keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption
	algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and NULL parameters.
	entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material
	supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the
	entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with
	ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string
	addedukm (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial).
	suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits,
	represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH]. (E.g. for 3DES
	it would be 00 00 00 c0.)
	Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to
	the key derivation function, as specified in [SEC1, Section 3.6.1].
	Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified
	in [CMS-DH]. Here a counter value is not included in the keyInfo
	field because the key derivation function specified in [SEC1,
	Section 3.6.1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided.
	9 Summary
	This document specifies how to use ECC algorithms with the S/MIME
	CMS. Use of ECC algorithm within CMS can result in reduced
	processing requirements for S/MIME agents, and reduced bandwidth
	for CMS messages.
	References
	[X9.62] ANSI X9.62-1998, "Public Key Cryptography For The
	Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve
	Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", American
	National Standards Institute, 1999.
	[PKI-ALG] L. Bassham, R. Housley and W. Polk, "Algorithms and
	Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and CRL profile", PKIX
	Working Group Internet-Draft, November 2000.
	[BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC",
	Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000,
	Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University
	of Waterloo, 2000. Paper version available from
	http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps
	[MUST] S. Bradner, "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[FIPS-180] FIPS 180-1, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute
	of Standards and Technology, April 17, 1995.
	[FIPS-186-2] FIPS 186-2, "Digital Signature Standard", National
	Institute of Standards and Technology, 15 February
	2000.
	[PKI] W. Ford, R. Housley, W. Polk and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
	Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL
	Profile", PKIX Working Group Internet-Draft, January
	2001.
	[CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
	June 1999.
	[IEEE1363] IEEE P1363, "Standard Specifications for Public Key
	Cryptography", Institute of Electrical and Electronics
	Engineers, 2000.
	[K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerabilty", Posting to ANSI X9F1
	and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998.
	[LMQSV] L. Law, A. Menezes, M. Qu, J. Solinas and S. Vanstone,
	"An efficient protocol for authenticated key agreement",
	Technical report CORR 98-05, University of Waterloo,
	1998.
	[CMS-KEA] J. Pawling, "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC
	2876, July 2000.
	[MSG] B. Ramsdell, "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
	RFC 2633, June 1999.
	[CMS-DH] E. Rescorla, "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
	RFC 2631, June 1999.
	[SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for
	Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
	[SEC2] SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
	Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
	Security Considerations
	This specification is based on [CMS], [X9.62] and [SEC1] and the
	appropriate security considerations of those documents apply.
	In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData should be aware of
	the concerns expressed in [BON] when using AuthenticatedData to
	send messages to more than one recipient. Also, users of MQV
	should be aware of the vulnerability in [K].
	When 256, 384, and 512 bit hash functions succeed SHA-1 in future
	revisions of [FIPS], [FIPS-186-2], [X9.62] and [SEC1], then they
	can similarly succeed SHA-1 in a future revision of this document.
	Intellectual Property Rights
	The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed
	in regard to the specification contained in this document. For
	more information, consult the online list of claimed rights
	(http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html).
	The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
	intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
	pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
	this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
	might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
	has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
	IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
	standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
	claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances
	of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made
	to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
	proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification
	can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
	Acknowledgments
	The methods described in this document are based on work done by		RFC 3278
	the ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their
	thanks to ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to
	thank Peter de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical
	comments of Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions.
	Authors' Addresses		Title: Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
			Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
			Author(s): S. Blake-Wilson, D. Brown, P. Lambert
			Status: Informational
			Date: April 2002
			Mailbox: sblakewi@certicom.com, dbrown@certicom.com,
			plambert@sprintmail.com
			Pages: 16
			Characters: 33779
			Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso: None
	Simon Blake-Wilson		I-D Tag: draft-ietf-smime-ecc-06.txt
	Certicom Corp
	5520 Explorer Drive #400
	Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
	e-mail: sblakewi@certicom.com		URL: ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3278.txt
	Daniel R. L. Brown		This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography
	Certicom Corp		(ECC) public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
	5520 Explorer Drive #400		(CMS). The ECC algorithms support the creation of digital
	Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1		signatures and the exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate
			content. The definition of the algorithm processing is based on
			the ANSI X9.62 standard, developed by the ANSI X9F1 working group,
			the IEEE 1363 standard, and the SEC 1 standard.
	e-mail: dbrown@certicom.com		The readers attention is called to the Intellectual Property Rights
			section at the end of this document.
	Paul Lambert		This document is a product of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group
	Director of Security Applications		of the IETF.
	CoSine Communications
	1200 Bridge Parkway
	Redwood City, CA, 94065
	http://www.cosinecom.com
	e-mail: plambert@cosinecom.com		This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
			not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
			memo is unlimited.
	Full Copyright Statement		This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list.
			Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list
			should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@IETF.ORG. Requests to be
			added to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should
			be sent to RFC-DIST-REQUEST@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.
	Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.		Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending
			an EMAIL message to rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG with the message body
			help: ways_to_get_rfcs. For example:
	This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to		To: rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG
	others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain		Subject: getting rfcs
	it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied,
	published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction
	of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this
	paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works.
	However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such
	as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet
	Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the
	purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the
	procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process
	must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages
	other than English.
	The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be		help: ways_to_get_rfcs
	revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
	This document and the information contained herein is provided on		Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
	an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET		author of the RFC in question, or to RFC-Manager@RFC-EDITOR.ORG. Unless
	ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR		specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
	IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF		unlimited distribution.echo
	THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED		Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to
	WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.		RFC-EDITOR@RFC-EDITOR.ORG. Please consult RFC 2223, Instructions to RFC
			Authors, for further information.
End of changes. 14 change blocks.
	705 lines changed or deleted		39 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/