< draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt		draft-solinas-ui-suites-01.txt >
	L. Law, NSA		L. Law, NSA
	INTERNET-DRAFT J. Solinas, NSA		INTERNET-DRAFT J. Solinas, NSA
	Expires June 1, 2007 December 1, 2006		Expires July 10, 2007 January 10, 2007
	Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec		Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec
	<draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt>		<draft-solinas-ui-suites-01.txt>
			{{{ RFC Editor: Please replace every occurrence of "RFC xxxx" and
			"[RFCxxxx]" with the RFC number that is assigned to
			draft-kelly-ipsec-ciph-sha2 once it is approved and published. }}}
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any		By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
	applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware		applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
	have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes		have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
	aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.		aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other		Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
	skipping to change at page 1, line 48 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 52 ¶
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Requirements Terminology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		2. Requirements Terminology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	3. New UI Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		3. New UI Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	3.1 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-128" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		3.1 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-128" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	3.2 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-256" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3.2 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-256" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3.3 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-128". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.3 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-128". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.4 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-256". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.4 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-256". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6. References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6.1 Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6.1 Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6.2. Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6.2. Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	RFC 4308 proposes two optional cryptographic user interface suites		RFC 4308 proposes two optional cryptographic user interface suites
	("UI suites") for IPsec. The two suites, VPN-A and VPN-B, represent		("UI suites") for IPsec. The two suites, VPN-A and VPN-B, represent
	commonly used present-day corporate VPN security choices and		commonly used present-day corporate VPN security choices and
	skipping to change at page 2, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 26 ¶
	the IPsec protocols in any way.		the IPsec protocols in any way.
	2. Requirements Terminology		2. Requirements Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
	in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	3. New UI Suites		3. New UI Suites
	Each of the following UI suites provides choices for ESP (see		Each of the following UI suites provides choices for ESP (see
	[RFC-4303]) and for IKEv1 and IKEv2 (see [RFC-2409] and [RFC-4306]).		[RFC4303]) and for IKEv1 and IKEv2 (see [RFC2409] and [RFC4306]).
	The four suites are differentiated by the choice of cryptographic		The four suites are differentiated by the choice of cryptographic
	algorithm strengths and a choice of whether ESP is to provide both		algorithm strengths and a choice of whether ESP is to provide both
	confidentiality and integrity or integrity only. The suite names		confidentiality and integrity or integrity only. The suite names
	are based on the AES mode and AES key length specified for ESP.		are based on the AES mode and AES key length specified for ESP.
	IPsec implementations that use these UI suites SHOULD use the suite		IPsec implementations that use these UI suites SHOULD use the suite
	names listed here. IPsec implementations SHOULD NOT use names		names listed here. IPsec implementations SHOULD NOT use names
	different than those listed here for the suites that are described,		different than those listed here for the suites that are described,
	and MUST NOT use the names listed here for suites that do not match		and MUST NOT use the names listed here for suites that do not match
	these values. These requirements are necessary for interoperability.		these values. These requirements are necessary for interoperability.
	3.1 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-128"		3.1 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-128"
	This suite provides ESP integrity protection and confidentiality		This suite provides ESP integrity protection and confidentiality
	using 128-bit AES-GCM (see [RFC-4106]). This suite or the following		using 128-bit AES-GCM (see [RFC4106]). This suite or the following
	suite should be used when ESP integrity protection and encryption		suite should be used when ESP integrity protection and encryption
	are both needed.		are both needed.
	ESP:		ESP:
	Encryption AES with 128-bit keys and 16 octet ICV in GCM mode		Encryption AES with 128-bit keys and 16 octet ICV in GCM mode
	[RFC-4106]		[RFC4106]
	Integrity NULL		Integrity NULL
	IKEv1:		IKEv1:
	Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode		Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode
	[RFC-3602]		[RFC3602]
	Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFC-2104]		Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFCxxxx]
	Hash SHA-256 [FIPS-180-2]		Hash SHA-256 [FIPS-180-2]
	Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC-4753]		Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
	Group Type ECP		Group Type ECP
	For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST		For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST
	support pre-shared key authentication [RFC-2409] for		support pre-shared key authentication [RFC2409] for
	interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be		interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be
	either pre-shared key [RFC-2409] or ECDSA-256 [RFC-4754].		either pre-shared key [RFC2409] or ECDSA-256 [RFC4754].
	IKEv2:		IKEv2:
	Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode		Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode
	[RFC-3602]		[RFC3602]
	Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFC-2104]		Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFCxxxx]
	Integrity HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFC-2104]		Integrity HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFCxxxx]
	Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC-4753]		Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
	Authentication ECDSA-256 [RFC-4754]		Authentication ECDSA-256 [RFC4754]
	Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)		Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)
	MUST be supported by both parties in this suite. The initiator of		MUST be supported by both parties in this suite.
	this exchange MAY include a new Diffie-Hellman key; if it is
	included, it MUST be of type 256-bit random ECP. If the initiator
	of the exchange includes a Diffie-Hellman key, the responder MUST
	include a Diffie-Hellman key, and it MUST be of type 256-bit random
	ECP.
	3.2 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-256"		3.2 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-256"
	This suite provides ESP integrity protection and confidentiality		This suite provides ESP integrity protection and confidentiality
	using 256-bit AES-GCM (see [RFC-4106]). This suite or the preceding		using 256-bit AES-GCM (see [RFC4106]). This suite or the preceding
	suite should be used when ESP integrity protection and encryption		suite should be used when ESP integrity protection and encryption
	are both needed.		are both needed.
	ESP:		ESP:
	Encryption AES with 256-bit keys and 16 octet ICV in GCM mode		Encryption AES with 256-bit keys and 16 octet ICV in GCM mode
	[RFC-4106]		[RFC4106]
	Integrity NULL		Integrity NULL
	IKEv1:		IKEv1:
	Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode		Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode
	[RFC-3602]		[RFC3602]
	Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFC-2104]		Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFCxxxx]
	Hash SHA-384 [FIPS-180-2]		Hash SHA-384 [FIPS-180-2]
	Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC-4753]		Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
	Group Type ECP		Group Type ECP
	For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST		For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST
	support pre-shared key authentication [RFC-2409] for		support pre-shared key authentication [RFC2409] for
	interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be		interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be
	either pre-shared key [RFC-2409] or ECDSA-384 [RFC-4754].		either pre-shared key [RFC2409] or ECDSA-384 [RFC4754].
	IKEv2:		IKEv2:
	Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode		Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode
	[RFC-3602]		[RFC3602]
	Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFC-2104]		Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFCxxxx]
	Integrity HMAC-SHA-384-128 [RFC-2104]		Integrity HMAC-SHA-384-192 [RFCxxxx]
	Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC-4753]		Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
	Authentication ECDSA-384 [RFC-4754]		Authentication ECDSA-384 [RFC4754]
	Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)		Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)
	MUST be supported by both parties in this suite. The initiator of		MUST be supported by both parties in this suite.
	this exchange MAY include a new Diffie-Hellman key; if it is
	included, it MUST be of type 384-bit random ECP. If the initiator
	of the exchange includes a Diffie-Hellman key, the responder MUST
	include a Diffie-Hellman key, and it MUST be of type 384-bit random
	ECP.
	3.3 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-128"		3.3 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-128"
	This suite provides ESP integrity protection using 128-bit AES-GMAC		This suite provides ESP integrity protection using 128-bit AES-GMAC
	(see [RFC-4543]) but does not provide confidentiality. This suite		(see [RFC4543]) but does not provide confidentiality. This suite
	or the following suite should be used only when there is no need for		or the following suite should be used only when there is no need for
	ESP encryption.		ESP encryption.
	ESP:		ESP:
	Encryption NULL		Encryption NULL
	Integrity AES with 128-bit keys in GMAC mode [RFC-4543]		Integrity AES with 128-bit keys in GMAC mode [RFC4543]
	IKEv1:		IKEv1:
	Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode		Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode
	[RFC-3602]		[RFC3602]
	Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFC-2104]		Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFCxxxx]
	Hash SHA-256 [FIPS-180-2]		Hash SHA-256 [FIPS-180-2]
	Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC-4753]		Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
	Group Type ECP		Group Type ECP
	For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST		For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST
	support pre-shared key authentication [RFC-2409] for		support pre-shared key authentication [RFC2409] for
	interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be		interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be
	either pre-shared key [RFC-2409] or ECDSA-256 [RFC-4754].		either pre-shared key [RFC2409] or ECDSA-256 [RFC4754].
	IKEv2:		IKEv2:
	Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode		Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode
	[RFC-3602]		[RFC3602]
	Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFC-2104]		Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFCxxxx]
	Integrity HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFC-2104]		Integrity HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFCxxxx]
	Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC-4753]		Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
	Authentication ECDSA-256 [RFC-4754]		Authentication ECDSA-256 [RFC4754]
	Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)		Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)
	MUST be supported by both parties in this suite. The initiator of		MUST be supported by both parties in this suite.
	this exchange MAY include a new Diffie-Hellman key; if it is
	included, it MUST be of type 256-bit random ECP. If the initiator
	of the exchange includes a Diffie-Hellman key, the responder MUST
	include a Diffie-Hellman key, and it MUST be of type 256-bit random
	ECP.
	3.4 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-256"		3.4 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-256"
	This suite provides ESP integrity protection using 256-bit AES-GMAC		This suite provides ESP integrity protection using 256-bit AES-GMAC
	(see [RFC-4543]) but does not provide confidentiality. This suite		(see [RFC4543]) but does not provide confidentiality. This suite
	or the preceding suite should be used only when there is no need for		or the preceding suite should be used only when there is no need for
	ESP encryption.		ESP encryption.
	ESP:		ESP:
	Encryption NULL		Encryption NULL
	Integrity AES with 256-bit keys in GMAC mode [RFC-4543]		Integrity AES with 256-bit keys in GMAC mode [RFC4543]
	IKEv1:		IKEv1:
	Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode		Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode
	[RFC-3602]		[RFC3602]
	Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFC-2104]		Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFCxxxx]
	Hash SHA-384 [FIPS-180-2]		Hash SHA-384 [FIPS-180-2]
	Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC-4753]		Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
	Group Type ECP		Group Type ECP
	For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST		For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST
	support pre-shared key authentication [RFC-2409] for		support pre-shared key authentication [RFC2409] for
	interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be		interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be
	either pre-shared key [RFC-2409] or ECDSA-384 [RFC-4754].		either pre-shared key [RFC2409] or ECDSA-384 [RFC4754].
	IKEv2:		IKEv2:
	Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode		Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode
	[RFC-3602]		[RFC3602]
	Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFC-2104]		Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFCxxxx]
	Integrity HMAC-SHA-384-128 [RFC-2104]		Integrity HMAC-SHA-384-192 [RFCxxxx]
	Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC-4753]		Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
	Authentication ECDSA-384 [RFC-4754]		Authentication ECDSA-384 [RFC4754]
	Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)		Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)
	MUST be supported by both parties in this suite. The initiator of		MUST be supported by both parties in this suite.
	this exchange MAY include a new Diffie-Hellman key; if it is
	included, it MUST be of type 384-bit random ECP. If the initiator
	of the exchange includes a Diffie-Hellman key, the responder MUST
	include a Diffie-Hellman key, and it MUST be of type 384-bit random
	ECP.
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	This document inherits all of the security considerations of the		This document inherits all of the security considerations of the
	IPsec, IKEv1, and IKEv2 documents. See [CNSSP-15] for guidance on		IPsec, IKEv1, and IKEv2 documents. See [CNSSP-15] for guidance on
	the use of AES in these suites for the protection of U.S. Government		the use of AES in these suites for the protection of U.S. Government
	information.		information.
	Some of the security options specified in these suites may be found		Some of the security options specified in these suites may be found
	in the future to have properties significantly weaker than those that		in the future to have properties significantly weaker than those that
	skipping to change at page 6, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 26 ¶
	Identifier Defined in		Identifier Defined in
	Suite-B-GCM-128 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt		Suite-B-GCM-128 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt
	Suite-B-GCM-256 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt		Suite-B-GCM-256 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt
	Suite-B-GMAC-128 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt		Suite-B-GMAC-128 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt
	Suite-B-GMAC-256 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt		Suite-B-GMAC-256 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt
	6. References		6. References
	6.1 Normative		6.1 Normative
	[FIPS-180-2] FIPS 180-2, "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of		[FIPS-180-2] FIPS 180-2 with change notice, "Secure Hash Standard",
	Standards and Technology, 2002.		National Institute of Standards and Technology, February 2004.
	[IANA-Suites] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Cryptographic		[IANA-Suites] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Cryptographic
	Suites for IKEv1, IKEv2, and IPsec", January 5, 2006.		Suites for IKEv1, IKEv2, and IPsec", January 5, 2006.
	(http://www.iana.org/assignments/crypto-suites)		(http://www.iana.org/assignments/crypto-suites)
	[RFC-2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC-2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange		[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
	(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.		(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
	[RFC-3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher		[RFC3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
	Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602, September 2003.		Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602, September 2003.
	[RFC-4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode		[RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
	(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4106,		(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4106,
	June 2005.		June 2005.
	[RFC-4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",		[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
	RFC 4303, December 2005.		RFC 4303, December 2005.
	[RFC-4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",		[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
	RFC 4306, December 2005.		RFC 4306, December 2005.
	[RFC-4308] Hoffman, P., "Cryptographic Suites for IPsec", RFC 4308,		[RFC4308] Hoffman, P., "Cryptographic Suites for IPsec", RFC 4308,
	December 2005.		December 2005.
	[RFC-4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message		[RFC4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
	Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543, May		Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543, May
	2006.		2006.
	[RFC-4753] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2",		[RFC4753] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2",
	RFC-4753, November 2006.		RFC 4753, November 2006.
	[RFC-4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using		[RFC4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using
	ECDSA", RFC-4754, November 2006.		ECDSA", RFC 4754, November 2006.
			[RFCxxxx] Kelly, S., and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256,
			HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 With IPsec", RFC xxxx, 2007.
	6.2 Informative		6.2 Informative
	[AES] U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards		[AES] U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards
	and Technology, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197,		and Technology, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197,
	November 2001. (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html)		November 2001. (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html)
	[CNSSP-15] Committee on National Security Systems, "National Policy on		[CNSSP-15] Committee on National Security Systems, "National Policy on
	the Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect		the Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect
	National Security Systems and National Security Information", June		National Security Systems and National Security Information", June
	2003. (http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/cnssp_15_fs.pdf)		2003. (http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/cnssp_15_fs.pdf)
	[IANA-IKEv1] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Internet Key		[IANA-IKEv1] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Internet Key
	Exchange (IKE) Attributes, 5 Jun 2006.		Exchange (IKE) Attributes, 5 Jun 2006.
	(http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipsec-registry)		(http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipsec-registry)
	[IANA-IKEv2] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, IKEv2 Parameters, 26		[IANA-IKEv2] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, IKEv2 Parameters, 26
	September 2006.		September 2006.
	(http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters)		(http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters)
	[RFC-4634] D. Eastlake 3rd and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms		[RFC4634] D. Eastlake 3rd and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
	(SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, July 2006.		(SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, July 2006.
	[SuiteB] U.S. National Security Agency, "Fact Sheet NSA Suite B		[SuiteB] U.S. National Security Agency, "Fact Sheet NSA Suite B
	Cryptography", July 2005.		Cryptography", July 2005.
	(http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/crypto_Suite_b.cfm?MenuID=10.2.7)		(http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/crypto_Suite_b.cfm?MenuID=10.2.7)
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Laurie E. Law		Laurie E. Law
	National Information Assurance Research Laboratory		National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
	skipping to change at page 8, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 49 ¶
	[SuiteB] U.S. National Security Agency, "Fact Sheet NSA Suite B		[SuiteB] U.S. National Security Agency, "Fact Sheet NSA Suite B
	Cryptography", July 2005.		Cryptography", July 2005.
	(http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/crypto_Suite_b.cfm?MenuID=10.2.7)		(http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/crypto_Suite_b.cfm?MenuID=10.2.7)
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Laurie E. Law		Laurie E. Law
	National Information Assurance Research Laboratory		National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
	National Security Agency		National Security Agency
	EMail: lelaw@orion.ncsc.mil		EMail: lelaw@orion.ncsc.mil
	Jerome A. Solinas		Jerome A. Solinas
	National Information Assurance Research Laboratory		National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
	National Security Agency		National Security Agency
	EMail: jasolin@orion.ncsc.mil		EMail: jasolin@orion.ncsc.mil
	Comments are solicited and should be addressed to the authors.
	Full Copyright Statement		Full Copyright Statement
	Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).		Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2007).
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	skipping to change at page 9, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 45 ¶
	such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this		such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
	specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at		specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
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