< draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-antispoof-05.txt   draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-antispoof-06.txt >
IETF TCPM WG J. Touch IETF TCPM WG J. Touch
Internet Draft USC/ISI Internet Draft USC/ISI
Expires: April 2007 October 22, 2006 Intended status: Informational February 23, 2007
Expires: August 2007
Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks
draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-antispoof-05.txt draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-antispoof-06.txt
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Abstract Abstract
Recent analysis of potential attacks on core Internet infrastructure Recent analysis of potential attacks on core Internet infrastructure
indicates an increased vulnerability of TCP connections to spurious indicates an increased vulnerability of TCP connections to spurious
resets (RSTs), sent with forged IP source addresses (spoofing). TCP resets (RSTs), sent with forged IP source addresses (spoofing). TCP
has always been susceptible to such RST spoofing attacks, which were has always been susceptible to such RST spoofing attacks, which were
indirectly protected by checking that the RST sequence number was indirectly protected by checking that the RST sequence number was
inside the current receive window, as well as via the obfuscation of inside the current receive window, as well as via the obfuscation of
TCP endpoint and port numbers. For pairs of well-known endpoints TCP endpoint and port numbers. For pairs of well-known endpoints
skipping to change at page 2, line 45 skipping to change at page 2, line 49
5. Issues........................................................18 5. Issues........................................................18
5.1. Transport Layer (e.g., TCP)..............................18 5.1. Transport Layer (e.g., TCP)..............................18
5.2. Network Layer (IP).......................................19 5.2. Network Layer (IP).......................................19
5.3. Application Layer........................................21 5.3. Application Layer........................................21
5.4. Link Layer...............................................21 5.4. Link Layer...............................................21
5.5. Issues Discussion........................................22 5.5. Issues Discussion........................................22
6. Security Considerations.......................................22 6. Security Considerations.......................................22
7. IANA Considerations...........................................23 7. IANA Considerations...........................................23
8. Conclusions...................................................23 8. Conclusions...................................................23
9. Acknowledgments...............................................23 9. Acknowledgments...............................................23
10. References...................................................23 10. References...................................................24
10.1. Normative References....................................23 10.1. Normative References....................................24
10.2. Informative References..................................24 10.2. Informative References..................................24
Author's Addresses...............................................27 Author's Addresses...............................................28
Intellectual Property Statement..................................27 Intellectual Property Statement..................................28
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................28 Disclaimer of Validity...........................................28
Copyright Statement..............................................28
Acknowledgment...................................................28
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Analysis of the Internet infrastructure has been recently Analysis of the Internet infrastructure has recently demonstrated a
demonstrated new version of a vulnerability in BGP connections new version of a vulnerability in BGP connections between core
between core routers using an attack based on RST spoofing from off- routers using an attack based on RST spoofing from off-path attackers
path attackers [9][10][45]. This attack has been known for nearly [9][10][47]. This attack has been known for nearly six years [20].
six years [20]. Such connections, typically using TCP, can be Such connections, typically using TCP, can be susceptible to off-path
susceptible to off-path third-party reset (RST) segments with forged third-party reset (RST) segments with forged source addresses
source addresses (spoofed), which terminate the TCP connection. BGP (spoofed), which terminate the TCP connection. BGP routers react to
routers react to a terminated TCP connection in various ways which a terminated TCP connection in various ways which can amplify the
can amplify the impact of an attack, ranging from restarting the impact of an attack, ranging from restarting the connection to
connection to deciding that the other router is unreachable and thus deciding that the other router is unreachable and thus flushing the
flushing the BGP routes [34]. This sort of attack affects other BGP routes [37]. This sort of attack affects other protocols besides
protocols besides BGP, involving any long-lived connection between BGP, involving any long-lived connection between well-known
well-known endpoints. The impact on Internet infrastructure can be endpoints. The impact on the Internet infrastructure can be
substantial (esp. for the BGP case), and warrants immediate substantial (esp. for the BGP case), and warrants immediate
attention. attention.
TCP, like many other protocols, can be susceptible to these off-path TCP, like many other protocols, can be susceptible to these off-path
third-party spoofing attacks. Such attacks rely on the increase of third-party spoofing attacks. Such attacks rely on the increase of
commodity platforms supporting public access to previously privileged commodity platforms supporting public access to previously privileged
resources, such as system-level (i.e., root) access. Given such resources, such as system-level (i.e., root) access. Given such
access, it is trivial for anyone to generate a packet with any header access, it is trivial for anyone to generate a packet with any header
desired. desired.
This, coupled with the lack of sufficient address filtering to drop This, coupled with the lack of sufficient address filtering to drop
such spoofed traffic, can increase the potential for off-path third- such spoofed traffic, can increase the potential for off-path third-
party spoofing attacks [9][10][45]. Proposed solutions include the party spoofing attacks [9][10][47]. Proposed solutions include the
deployment of existing Internet network and transport security as deployment of existing Internet network and transport security as
well as modifications to transport protocols that reduce its well as modifications to transport protocols that reduce its
vulnerability to generated attacks [13][15][20][38][44]. vulnerability to generated attacks [13][15][20][36][46].
One way to defeat spoofing is to validate the segments of a One way to defeat spoofing is to validate the segments of a
connection, either at the transport level or the network level. TCP connection, either at the transport level or the network level. TCP
with MD5 extensions provides this authentication at the transport with MD5 extensions provides this authentication at the transport
level, and IPsec provides authentication at the network level level, and IPsec provides authentication at the network level
[19][20][23][26]. In both cases their deployment overhead may be [20][24][27]. In both cases their deployment overhead may be
prohibitive, e.g., it may not feasible for public services, such as prohibitive, e.g., it may not be feasible for public services, such
web servers, to be configured with the appropriate certificate as web servers, to be configured with the appropriate certificate
authorities of large numbers of peers (for IPsec using IKE), or authorities of large numbers of peers (for IPsec using IKE), or
shared secrets (for IPsec in shared-secret mode, or TCP/MD5), because shared secrets (for IPsec in shared-secret mode, or TCP/MD5), because
many clients may need to be configured rapidly without external many clients may need to be configured rapidly without external
assistance. Services from public web servers connecting to large- assistance. Services located on public web servers connecting to
scale caches to BGP with larger numbers of peers can fall into this large-scale caches to BGP with larger numbers of peers can fall into
category. this category.
The remainder of this document outlines the recent attack scenario in The remainder of this document outlines the recent attack scenario in
detail and describes and compares a variety of solutions, including detail and describes and compares a variety of solutions, including
existing solutions based on TCP/MD5 and IPsec, as well as recently existing solutions based on TCP/MD5 and IPsec, as well as recently
proposed solutions, including modifications to TCP's RST processing proposed solutions, including modifications to TCP's RST processing
[38], modifications to TCP's timestamp processing [32], and [36], modifications to TCP's timestamp processing [34], and
modifications to IPsec and TCP/MD5 keying [43]. This document modifications to IPsec and TCP/MD5 keying [45]. This document
focuses on spoofing of TCP segments, although a discussion of related focuses on spoofing of TCP segments, although a discussion of related
spoofing of ICMP packets based on spoofed TCP contents is also spoofing of ICMP packets based on spoofed TCP contents is also
discussed. discussed.
Note that the description of these attacks is not new; attacks using Note that the description of these attacks is not new; attacks using
RSTs on BGP have been known since 1998, and were the reason for the RSTs on BGP have been known since 1998, and were the reason for the
development of TCP/MD5 [20]. The recent attack scenario was first development of TCP/MD5 [20]. The recent attack scenario was first
documented by Convery at a NANOG meeting in 2003, but that analysis documented by Convery at a NANOG meeting in 2003, but that analysis
assumed the entire sequence space (2^32 packets) needed to be covered assumed the entire sequence space (2^32 packets) needed to be covered
for an attack to succeed [10]. Watson's more detailed analysis for an attack to succeed [10]. Watson's more detailed analysis
discovered that a single packet anywhere in the current window could discovered that a single packet anywhere in the current window could
succeed at an attack [45]. This document adds the observation that succeed at an attack [47]. This document adds the observation that
susceptibility to attack goes as the square of bandwidth, due to the susceptibility to attack goes as the square of bandwidth, due to the
coupling between the linear increase in receive window size and coupling between the linear increase in receive window size and
linear increase in rate a potential attack, as well as comparing the linear increase in rate of a potential attack, as well as comparing
variety of more recent proposals, including modifications to TCP, use the variety of more recent proposals, including modifications to TCP,
of IPsec, and use of TCP/MD5 to resist such attacks. use of IPsec, and use of TCP/MD5 to resist such attacks.
2. Background 2. Background
The recent analysis of potential attacks on BGP has again raised the The recent analysis of potential attacks on BGP has again raised the
issue of TCP's vulnerability to off-path third-party spoofing attacks issue of TCP's vulnerability to off-path third-party spoofing attacks
[9][10][45]. A variety of such attacks have been known for several [9][10][47]. A variety of such attacks have been known for several
years, including sending RSTs, SYNs, and even ACKs in an attempt to years, including sending RSTs, SYNs, and even ACKs in an attempt to
affect an existing connection or to load down servers. These attacks affect an existing connection or to load down servers. These attacks
often combine external knowledge (e.g., to indicate the IP addresses often combine external knowledge (e.g., to indicate the IP addresses
to attack, the destination port number, and sometimes the ISN) with to attack, the destination port number, and sometimes the ISN) with
brute-force capabilities enabled by modern computers and network brute-force capabilities enabled by modern computers and network
bandwidths (e.g., to scan all source ports or an entire window bandwidths (e.g., to scan all source ports or an entire window
space). Overall, such attacks are countered by the use of some form space). Overall, such attacks are countered by the use of some form
of authentication at the network (e.g., IPsec), transport (e.g., SYN of authentication at the network (e.g., IPsec), transport (e.g., SYN
cookies, TCP/MD5), or other layers. TCP already includes a weak form cookies, TCP/MD5), or other layers. TCP already includes a weak form
of such authentication in its check of segment sequence numbers of such authentication in its check of segment sequence numbers
against the current receiver window. Increases in the bandwidth- against the current receiver window. Increases in the bandwidth-
delay product for certain long connections have sufficiently weakened delay product for certain long connections have sufficiently weakened
this type of weak authentication to make reliance on it inadvisable. this type of weak authentication to make reliance on it inadvisable.
2.1. Review of TCP Windows 2.1. Review of TCP Windows
Before proceeding, it is useful to review the terminology and Before proceeding, it is useful to review the terminology and
components of TCP's windowing algorithm. TCP connections have three components of TCP's windowing algorithm. TCP connections have three
kinds of windows [1][33]: kinds of windows [1][35]:
o Send window (SND.WND): the latest send window size. o Send window (SND.WND): the latest send window size.
o Receive window (RCV.WND): the latest advertised receive window o Receive window (RCV.WND): the latest advertised receive window
size. size.
o Congestion window (CWND): the window determined by congestion o Congestion window (CWND): the window determined by congestion
feedback that limits how much of RCV.WND can be in-flight in a feedback that limits how much of RCV.WND can be in-flight in a
round trip time. round trip time.
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the corresponding send and receive socket buffers, and are the corresponding send and receive socket buffers, and are
configurable using socket buffer resizing commands. configurable using socket buffer resizing commands.
CWND determines how much data can be in transit in a round trip time, CWND determines how much data can be in transit in a round trip time,
SND.WND determines how much data the sender is willing to store on SND.WND determines how much data the sender is willing to store on
its side for possible retransmission due to loss, and RCV.WND its side for possible retransmission due to loss, and RCV.WND
determines the ability of the receiver to accommodate that loss and determines the ability of the receiver to accommodate that loss and
reorder received packets. CWND never grows beyond RCV.WND. reorder received packets. CWND never grows beyond RCV.WND.
High bandwidth-delay product networks need CWND to be sufficiently High bandwidth-delay product networks need CWND to be sufficiently
large to accommodate as much data would be in transit in a round trip large to accommodate as much data as can be in transit in a round
time, otherwise their performance will suffer. As a result, it is trip time, otherwise their performance will suffer. As a result, it
recommended that users and various automatic programs increase is recommended that users and various automatic programs increase
RCV.WND to at least the size of bandwidth*delay (the bandwidth-delay RCV.WND to at least the size of bandwidth*delay (the bandwidth-delay
product) [22][35]. product) [23][38].
As the bandwidth-delay product of the network increases, however, As the bandwidth-delay product of the network increases, however,
such increases in the advertised receive window can cause increased such increases in the advertised receive window can cause increased
susceptibility to spoofing attacks, as the remainder of this document susceptibility to spoofing attacks, as the remainder of this document
shows. This assumes, however, that the receive window size (e.g., shows. This assumes, however, that the receive window size (e.g.,
via increased receive socket buffer configuration) is increased with via increased receive socket buffer configuration) is increased with
the increased bandwidth-delay product; if not, then connection the increased bandwidth-delay product; if not, then connection
performance will degrade, but susceptibility to spoofing attacks will performance will degrade, but susceptibility to spoofing attacks will
increase only linearly (with the rate at which the attacker can send increase only linearly (with the rate at which the attacker can send
spoofed packets), not as the square of the bandwidth. Note that spoofed packets), not as the square of the bandwidth. Note that
either increase depends on the receive window itself, and is either increase depends on the receive window itself, and is
independent of the congestion state or amount of data transmitted. independent of the congestion state or amount of data transmitted.
2.2. Recent BGP Attacks Using TCP RSTs 2.2. Recent BGP Attacks Using TCP RSTs
BGP represents a particular vulnerability to spoofing attacks because BGP represents a particular vulnerability to spoofing attacks because
it uses TCP connectivity to infer routability, so losing a TCP it uses TCP connectivity to infer routability, so losing a TCP
connection with a BGP peer can result in the flushing of routes to connection with a BGP peer can result in the flushing of routes to
that peer [34]. that peer [37].
Until six years ago, such connections were assumed difficult to Until six years ago, such connections were assumed difficult to
attack because they were described by a few comparatively obscure attack because they were described by a few comparatively obscure
parameters [20]. Most TCP connections are protected by multiple parameters [20]. Most TCP connections are protected by multiple
levels of obfuscation except at the endpoints of the connection: levels of obfuscation except at the endpoints of the connection:
o Both endpoint addresses are usually not well-known; although server o Both endpoint addresses are usually not well-known; although
addresses are advertised, clients are somewhat anonymous. server addresses are advertised, clients are somewhat anonymous.
o Both port numbers are usually not well-known; the server's usually o Both port numbers are usually not well-known; the server's usually
is advertised (representing the service), but the client's is is advertised (representing the service), but the client's is
typically sufficiently unpredictable to an off-path third-party. typically sufficiently unpredictable to an off-path third-party.
o Valid sequence number space is not well-known. o Valid sequence number space is not well-known.
o Connections are relatively short-lived and valid sequence space o Connections are relatively short-lived and valid sequence space
changes, so any attempt to guess (e.g., by external knowledge or changes, so any attempt to guess (e.g., by external knowledge or
brute force) the above information is unlikely to be useful. brute force) the above information is unlikely to be useful.
BGP represents an exception to the above criteria (though not the BGP represents an exception to the above criteria (though not the
only case). Both endpoints can be well-known, or guessed using hints only case). Both endpoints can be well-known, or guessed using hints
from part of an AS path. The destination port is typically fixed to from part of an AS path. The destination port is typically fixed to
indicate the BGP service. The source port used by a BGP router is indicate the BGP service. The source port used by a BGP router is
sometimes fixed and advertised to enable firewall configuration; even sometimes fixed and advertised to enable firewall configuration; even
when not fixed, there are only approximately 65,000 valid source when not fixed, there are only approximately 65,000 valid source
ports which may be exhaustively attacked. Connections are long- ports which may be exhaustively attacked. Connections are long-
lived, and as noted before some BGP implementations interpret lived, and as noted before some BGP implementations interpret
successive TCP connection failures as routing failures, discarding successive TCP connection failures as routing failures, discarding
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2.3. TCP RST Vulnerability 2.3. TCP RST Vulnerability
TCP has a known vulnerability to third-party spoofed segments. SYN TCP has a known vulnerability to third-party spoofed segments. SYN
flooding consumes server resources in half-open connections, flooding consumes server resources in half-open connections,
affecting the server's ability to open new connections [4][11]. ACK affecting the server's ability to open new connections [4][11]. ACK
spoofing can cause connections to transmit too much data too quickly, spoofing can cause connections to transmit too much data too quickly,
creating network congestion and segment loss, causing connections to creating network congestion and segment loss, causing connections to
slow to a crawl. In the most recent attacks on BGP, RSTs cause slow to a crawl. In the most recent attacks on BGP, RSTs cause
connections to be dropped. As noted earlier, some BGP connections to be dropped. As noted earlier, some BGP
implementations interpret TCP connection termination, or a series of implementations interpret TCP connection termination, or a series of
such failures, as a network failure [34]. This causes routers to such failures, as a network failure [37]. This causes routers to
drop the BGP routing information already exchanged, in addition to drop the BGP routing information already exchanged, in addition to
inhibiting their ongoing exchanges, thus amplifying the impact of the inhibiting their ongoing exchanges, thus amplifying the impact of the
attack. The result can affect routing paths throughout the Internet. attack. The result can affect routing paths throughout the Internet.
The dangerous effects of RSTs on TCP have been known for many years, The dangerous effects of RSTs on TCP have been known for many years,
even when used by the legitimate endpoints of a connection. TCP RSTs even when used by the legitimate endpoints of a connection. TCP RSTs
cause the receiver to drop all connection state; because the source cause the receiver to drop all connection state; because the source
is not required to maintain a TIME_WAIT state, such a RST can cause is not required to maintain a TIME_WAIT state, such a RST can cause
premature reuse of address/port pairs, potentially allowing segments premature reuse of address/port pairs, potentially allowing segments
from a previous connection to contaminate the data of a new from a previous connection to contaminate the data of a new
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index of the next byte to be transmitted or received. For RSTs, this index of the next byte to be transmitted or received. For RSTs, this
is relevant because legitimate RSTs use the next sequence number in is relevant because legitimate RSTs use the next sequence number in
the transmitter window, and the receiver checks that incoming RSTs the transmitter window, and the receiver checks that incoming RSTs
have a sequence number in the expected receive window. Such have a sequence number in the expected receive window. Such
processing is intended to eliminate duplicate segments (somewhat moot processing is intended to eliminate duplicate segments (somewhat moot
for RSTs, though), and to drop RSTs which were part of previous for RSTs, though), and to drop RSTs which were part of previous
connections. connections.
TCP uses two window mechanisms, a primary mechanism which uses a TCP uses two window mechanisms, a primary mechanism which uses a
space of 32 bits, and a secondary mechanism which scales this window space of 32 bits, and a secondary mechanism which scales this window
[22][33]. The valid advertised receive window is a fraction, not to [23][35]. The valid advertised receive window is a fraction, not to
exceed approximately half, of this space, or ~2 billion (2 * 10^9, exceed approximately half, of this space, or ~2 billion (2 * 10^9,
i.e., 2E9 or 2 U.S. billion). Under typical configurations, the i.e., 2E9 or 2 U.S. billion). Under typical configurations, the
majority of TCP connections open to a very small fraction of this majority of TCP connections open to a very small fraction of this
space, e.g., 10,000-60,000(approximately 5-100 segments). This is space, e.g., 10,000-60,000(approximately 5-100 segments). This is
because the advertised receive window typically matches the receive because the advertised receive window typically matches the receive
socket buffer size. It is recommended that this buffer be tuned to socket buffer size. It is recommended that this buffer be tuned to
match the needs of the connection, either manually or by automatic match the needs of the connection, either manually or by automatic
external means [35]. external means [38].
On a low-loss path, the advertised receive window should be On a low-loss path, the advertised receive window should be
configured to match the path bandwidth-delay product, including configured to match the path bandwidth-delay product, including
buffering delays (assume 1 packet/hop) [35]. Many paths in the buffering delays (assume 1 packet/hop) [38]. Many paths in the
Internet have end-to-end bandwidths of under 1 Mbps, latencies under Internet have end-to-end bandwidths of under 1 Mbps, latencies under
100ms, and are under 15 hops, resulting in fairly small advertised 100ms, and are under 15 hops, resulting in fairly small advertised
receive windows as above (under 35,000 bytes). Under these receive windows as above (under 35,000 bytes). Under these
conditions, and further assuming that the initial sequence number is conditions, and further assuming that the initial sequence number is
suitably (pseudo-randomly) chosen, a valid guessed sequence number suitably (pseudo-randomly) chosen, a valid guessed sequence number
would have odds of 1 in 57,000 of falling within the advertised would have odds of 1 in 57,000 of falling within the advertised
receive window. Put differently, a blind (i.e., off-path) attacker receive window. Put differently, a blind (i.e., off-path) attacker
would need to send 57,000 RSTs with suitably spaced sequence number would need to send 57,000 RSTs with suitably spaced sequence number
guesses to successfully reset a connection. At 1 Mbps, 57,000 (40 guesses to successfully reset a connection. At 1 Mbps, 57,000 (40
byte) RSTs would take over 50 minutes to transmit, and, as noted byte) RSTs would take only 20 seconds to transmit, but this presumes
earlier, most current connections are fairly brief by comparison. that both IP addresses and both ports are known. Absent knowledge of
the source port, an off-path spoofer would need to try at least the
entire range of 49152-65535, or 16,384 different ports, resulting in
an attack that would take over 91 hours. Because most TCP
connections are comparatively short-lived, even this moderate
variation in the source port is sufficient for such environments,
although further port randomization may be recommended [29].
Recent use of high bandwidth paths of 10 Gbps and higher result in Recent use of high bandwidth paths of 10 Gbps and higher results in
bandwidth-delay products over 125 MB - approximately 1/10 of TCP's bandwidth-delay products over 125 MB - approximately 1/10 of TCP's
overall maximum advertised receive window size (i.e., assuming the overall maximum advertised receive window size (i.e., assuming the
receive socket buffers are increased as much as possible) excluding receive socket buffers are increased as much as possible) excluding
scale, assuming the receiver allocates sufficient buffering (as scale, assuming the receiver allocates sufficient buffering (as
discussed in Sec. 2). Even under networks that are ten times slower discussed in Sec. 2). Even under networks that are ten times slower
(1 Gbps), the active advertised receive window covers 1/100th of the (1 Gbps), the active advertised receive window covers 1/100th of the
overall window size. At these speeds, it takes only 10-100 packets, overall window size. At these speeds, it takes only 10-100 packets,
or less than 32 microseconds, to correctly guess a valid sequence or less than 32 microseconds, to correctly guess a valid sequence
number and kill a connection. A table of corresponding exposure to number and kill a connection. A table of corresponding exposure to
various amounts of RSTs is shown below, for various line rates, various amounts of RSTs is shown below, for various line rates,
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buffers are set to match a large bandwidth-delay product buffers are set to match a large bandwidth-delay product
4. the attack bandwidth is similar to the end-to-end path bandwidth 4. the attack bandwidth is similar to the end-to-end path bandwidth
Of these assumptions, the last two are more notable. The issue of Of these assumptions, the last two are more notable. The issue of
receive socket buffers was discussed in Sec. 2. Figure 1 summarized receive socket buffers was discussed in Sec. 2. Figure 1 summarized
the time to an successful attack based on large advertised receive the time to an successful attack based on large advertised receive
windows, but many current commercial routers have limits of 128KB for windows, but many current commercial routers have limits of 128KB for
large devices, 32KB for medium, and as little as 4KB for modest ones. large devices, 32KB for medium, and as little as 4KB for modest ones.
Figure 2 shows the time and bandwidths needed to accomplish an attack Figure 2 shows the time and bandwidths needed to accomplish an attack
BGP sessions in the time shown for 100ms latencies; for even short- on BGP sessions in the time shown for 100ms latencies; for even
range network latencies (10ms), these sessions can be still be short-range network latencies (10ms), these sessions can be still be
attacked over short timescales (minutes to hours). attacked over short timescales (minutes to hours).
BW BW*delay RSTs needed Time needed BW BW*delay RSTs needed Time needed
------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------
10 Mbps 0.128 MB 33,555 1 second 10 Mbps 0.128 MB 33,555 1 second
3 Mbps 0.032 MB 134,218 40 seconds 3 Mbps 0.032 MB 134,218 40 seconds
300 Kbps 0.004 MB 1,073,742 1 hour 300 Kbps 0.004 MB 1,073,742 1 hour
Figure 2 Time needed to kill a connection with limited buffers Figure 2 Time needed to kill a connection with limited buffers
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3.1.1. TCP MD5 Authentication 3.1.1. TCP MD5 Authentication
An extension to TCP supporting MD5 authentication was developed in An extension to TCP supporting MD5 authentication was developed in
1998 specifically to authenticate BGP connections (although it can be 1998 specifically to authenticate BGP connections (although it can be
used for any TCP connection) [20]. The extension relies on a pre- used for any TCP connection) [20]. The extension relies on a pre-
shared secret key to authenticate the entire TCP segment, including shared secret key to authenticate the entire TCP segment, including
the data, TCP header, and TCP pseudo-header (certain fields of the IP the data, TCP header, and TCP pseudo-header (certain fields of the IP
header). All segments are protected, including RSTs, to be accepted header). All segments are protected, including RSTs, to be accepted
only when their signature matches. This option, although widely only when their signature matches. This option, although widely
deployed in Internet routers, is considered undeployable for deployed in Internet routers, is considered undeployable for
widespread use because the need for pre-shared keys [3][28]. It widespread use because the need for pre-shared keys [3][30]. It
further is considered computationally expensive for either hosts or further is considered computationally expensive for either hosts or
routers due to the overhead of MD5 [41][42]. routers due to the overhead of MD5 [43][44].
There are also concerns about the use of MD5 due to recent collision- There are also concerns about the use of MD5 due to recent collision-
based attacks [21]. Similar concerns exist for SHA-1, and the IETF based attacks [22]. Similar concerns exist for SHA-1, and the IETF
is currently evaluating how these attacks impact the recommendation is currently evaluating how these attacks impact the recommendation
for using these hashes, both in TCP/MD5 and in the IPsec suite. For for using these hashes, both in TCP/MD5 and in the IPsec suite. For
the purposes of this discussion, the particular algorithm used in the purposes of this discussion, the particular algorithm used in
either protocol suite is not the focus, and there is ongoing work to either protocol suite is not the focus, and there is ongoing work to
allow TCP/MD5 to evolve to a more general TCP security option [6]. allow TCP/MD5 to evolve to a more general TCP security option [6].
3.1.2. TCP RST Window Attenuation 3.1.2. TCP RST Window Attenuation
A recent proposal extends TCP to further constrain received RST to A recent proposal extends TCP to further constrain received RST to
match the expected next sequence number [38]. This restores TCP's match the expected next sequence number [36]. This restores TCP's
resistance to spurious RSTs, effectively limiting the receive window resistance to spurious RSTs, effectively limiting the receive window
for RSTs to a single number. As a result, an attacker would need to for RSTs to a single number. As a result, an attacker would need to
send 2^32 different packets to brute-force guess the sequence number send 2^32 different packets to brute-force guess the sequence number
(worst case, average would be half that); this makes TCP's (worst case, average would be half that); this makes TCP's
vulnerability to attack independent of the size of the receive window vulnerability to attack independent of the size of the receive window
(RCV.WND). The extension further modifies the RST receiver to react (RCV.WND). The extension further modifies the RST receiver to react
to incorrectly-numbered RSTs, by sending a zero-length ACK. If the to incorrectly-numbered RSTs, by sending a zero-length ACK. If the
RST source is legitimate, upon receipt of an ACK the closed source RST source is legitimate, upon receipt of an ACK the closed source
would presumably emit a RST with the sequence number matching the would presumably emit a RST with the sequence number matching the
ACK, correctly resetting the intended recipient. This modification ACK, correctly resetting the intended recipient. This modification
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recommendation - although this can be omitted, allowing timeouts to recommendation - although this can be omitted, allowing timeouts to
suffice. The advantage to this proposal is that it can be deployed suffice. The advantage to this proposal is that it can be deployed
incrementally and has benefit to the endpoint on which it is incrementally and has benefit to the endpoint on which it is
deployed. The other advantage to this proposal is that the window deployed. The other advantage to this proposal is that the window
attenuation described here makes the vulnerability to spoofed RST attenuation described here makes the vulnerability to spoofed RST
packets independent of the size of the receive window. packets independent of the size of the receive window.
A variant of this proposal uses a different value to attenuate the A variant of this proposal uses a different value to attenuate the
window of viable RSTs. It requires RSTs to carry the initial window of viable RSTs. It requires RSTs to carry the initial
sequence number rather than the next expected sequence number, i.e., sequence number rather than the next expected sequence number, i.e.,
the value negotiated on connection establishment [40][46]. This the value negotiated on connection establishment [42][48]. This
proposal has the advantage of using an explicitly negotiated value, proposal has the advantage of using an explicitly negotiated value,
but at the cost of changing the behavior of an unmodified endpoint to but at the cost of changing the behavior of an unmodified endpoint to
a currently valid RST. It would thus be more difficult, without a currently valid RST. It would thus be more difficult, without
additional mechanism, to deploy incrementally. additional mechanism, to deploy incrementally.
Another variant of this proposal involves increasing TCP's window Another variant of this proposal involves increasing TCP's window
space, rather than decreasing the valid range for RSTs, i.e., space, rather than decreasing the valid range for RSTs, i.e.,
increasing the sequence space from 32 bits to 64 bits. This has the increasing the sequence space from 32 bits to 64 bits. This has the
equivalent effect - the ratio of the valid sequence numbers for any equivalent effect - the ratio of the valid sequence numbers for any
segment to the overall sequence number space is significantly segment to the overall sequence number space is significantly
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A converse variant of increasing TCP's window space is to decrease A converse variant of increasing TCP's window space is to decrease
the receive window (RCV.WND) explicitly, which would further reduce the receive window (RCV.WND) explicitly, which would further reduce
the effectiveness of spoofed RSTs with random sequence numbers. This the effectiveness of spoofed RSTs with random sequence numbers. This
alternative may reduce the throughput of the connection, if the alternative may reduce the throughput of the connection, if the
advertised receive window is smaller than the bandwidth-delay product advertised receive window is smaller than the bandwidth-delay product
of the connection. of the connection.
3.1.3. TCP Timestamp Authentication 3.1.3. TCP Timestamp Authentication
Another way to authenticate TCP segments is via its timestamp option, Another way to authenticate TCP segments is via its timestamp option,
using the value as a sort of authentication [32]. This requires that using the value as a sort of authentication [34]. This requires that
the receiver TCP discard segments whose timestamp is outside the the receiver TCP discard segments whose timestamp is outside the
accepted window, which is derived from the timestamps of other accepted window, which is derived from the timestamps of other
packets from the same connection. This technique uses an existing packets from the same connection. This technique uses an existing
TCP option, but also requires modified TCP control processing (with TCP option, but also requires modified TCP control processing (with
the same caveats) and may be difficult to deploy incrementally the same caveats) and may be difficult to deploy incrementally
without further modifications. Additionally, the timestamp value may without further modifications. Additionally, the timestamp value may
be easier to guess because it can be derived predictably, either be easier to guess because it can be derived predictably, either
assuming it represents actual time at the host, or by probing the assuming it represents actual time at the host, or by probing the
host using unrelated benign traffic. host using unrelated benign traffic.
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reasonably correlation to local time. These variants of cookies are reasonably correlation to local time. These variants of cookies are
similar in spirit to TCP SYN cookies, again patching a vulnerability similar in spirit to TCP SYN cookies, again patching a vulnerability
to off-path third-party spoofing attacks based on a (fairly weak, to off-path third-party spoofing attacks based on a (fairly weak,
excepting MD5) form of authentication. Another form of cookie is the excepting MD5) form of authentication. Another form of cookie is the
source port itself, which can be randomized but provides only 16 bits source port itself, which can be randomized but provides only 16 bits
of protection (65,000 combinations), which may be exhaustively of protection (65,000 combinations), which may be exhaustively
attacked. This can be combined with destination port randomization attacked. This can be combined with destination port randomization
as well, but that would require a separate coordination mechanism (so as well, but that would require a separate coordination mechanism (so
both parties know which ports to use), which is equivalent to (and as both parties know which ports to use), which is equivalent to (and as
infeasible for large-scale deployments as) exchanging a shared secret infeasible for large-scale deployments as) exchanging a shared secret
[36]. [39].
3.1.5. Other TCP Considerations 3.1.5. Other TCP Considerations
The analysis of the potential for RST spoofing above assumes that the The analysis of the potential for RST spoofing above assumes that the
advertised receive window is opened to the maximum extent suggested advertised receive window is opened to the maximum extent suggested
by the bandwidth-delay product of the end-to-end path, and that the by the bandwidth-delay product of the end-to-end path, and that the
window is opened to an appreciable fraction of the overall sequence window is opened to an appreciable fraction of the overall sequence
number space. As noted earlier, for most common cases, connections number space. As noted earlier, for most common cases, connections
are too brief or over bandwidths too low for such a large window to are too brief or over bandwidths too low for such a large window to
be useful. Expanding TCP's sequence number space is a direct way to be useful. Expanding TCP's sequence number space is a direct way to
further avoid such vulnerability, even for long connections over further avoid such vulnerability, even for long connections over
emerging bandwidths. If either manual tuning or automatic tuning of emerging bandwidths. If either manual tuning or automatic tuning of
the advertised receive window (via receive buffer tuning) is not the advertised receive window (via receive buffer tuning) is not
provided, this is not an issue (although connection performance will provided, this is not an issue (although connection performance will
suffer) [35]. suffer) [38].
It is may be sufficient for the endpoint to limit the advertised It may be sufficient for the endpoint to limit the advertised receive
receive window by deliberately leaving it small. If the receive window by deliberately leaving it small. If the receive socket
socket buffer is limited, e.g., to the ubiquitous default of 64KB, buffer is limited, e.g., to the ubiquitous default of 64KB, the
the advertised receive window will not be as vulnerable even for very advertised receive window will not be as vulnerable even for very
long connections over very high bandwidths. The vulnerability will long connections over very high bandwidths. The vulnerability will
grow linearly with the increased network speed, but not as the grow linearly with the increased network speed, but not as the
square. The consequence is lower sustained throughput, where only square. The consequence is lower sustained throughput, where only
one window's worth of data per round trip time (RTT) is exchanged. one window's worth of data per round trip time (RTT) is exchanged.
This will keep the connection open longer; for long-lived connections This will keep the connection open longer; for long-lived connections
with continuous sourced data, this may continue to present an attack with continuous sourced data, this may continue to present an attack
opportunity, albeit a sparse and slow-moving target. For the most opportunity, albeit a sparse and slow-moving target. For the most
recent case where BGP data is being exchanged between Internet recent case where BGP data is being exchanged between Internet
routers, the data is bursty and the aggregate traffic may be small routers, the data is bursty and the aggregate traffic may be small
(i.e., unlikely to cover a substantial portion of the sequence space, (i.e., unlikely to cover a substantial portion of the sequence space,
even if long-lived), so is smaller advertised receive windows (via even if long-lived), so smaller advertised receive windows (via small
small receiver buffers) may, in some cases, sufficiently address the receiver buffers) may, in some cases, sufficiently address the
immediate problem. This assumes that the routing tables can be immediate problem. This assumes that the routing tables can be
exchanged quickly enough with bandwidth reduced due to the smaller exchanged quickly enough with bandwidth reduced due to the smaller
buffers, or perhaps that the advertised receive window is opened only buffers, or perhaps that the advertised receive window is opened only
during a large burst exchange (e.g., via some other signal between during a large burst exchange (e.g., via some other signal between
the two routers). the two routers).
3.1.6. Other Transport Protocol Solutions 3.1.6. Other Transport Protocol Solutions
Segment authentication has been addressed at the transport layer in Segment authentication has been addressed at the transport layer in
other protocols. Both SCTP and DCCP include cookies for connection other protocols. Both SCTP and DCCP include cookies for connection
establishment and use them to authenticate a variety of other control establishment and use them to authenticate a variety of other control
messages [27][39]. The inclusion of such mechanism at the transport messages [28][41]. The inclusion of such mechanism at the transport
protocol, although emerging as standard practice, complicates the protocol, although emerging as standard practice, complicates the
design and implementation of new protocols [30]. As new attacks are design and implementation of new protocols [32]. As new attacks are
discovered (SYN floods, RSTs, etc.), each protocol must be modified discovered (SYN floods, RSTs, etc.), each protocol must be modified
individually to compensate. A network solution may be more individually to compensate. A network solution may be more
appropriate and efficient. appropriate and efficient.
It should be noted that RST attacks which rely on brute-force are It should be noted that RST attacks which rely on brute-force are
relatively easy for intrusion detection software to detect at the TCP relatively easy for intrusion detection software to detect at the TCP
layer. Any connection that receives a large number of invalid - layer. Any connection that receives a large number of invalid -
outside-window - RSTs might have subsequent RSTs blocked, to defeat outside-window - RSTs might have subsequent RSTs blocked, to defeat
such attacks. This would have the side-effect of blocking legitimate such attacks. This would have the side-effect of blocking legitimate
RSTs to that connection, which might then interfere with cleaning up RSTs to that connection, which might then interfere with cleaning up
the transport state between the endpoint peers. This side-effect, the transport state between the endpoint peers. This side-effect,
coupled with the increased monitoring load, might render such coupled with the increased monitoring load, might render such
solutions undesirable in the general case, but they might usefully be solutions undesirable in the general case, but they might usefully be
applied to special cases, e.g., for BGP for routers. applied to special cases, e.g., for BGP for routers.
3.2. Network Layer (IP) Solutions 3.2. Network Layer (IP) Solutions
There are two primary variants of network layer solutions to There are two primary variants of network layer solutions to
spoofing: address filtering and IPsec. Address filtering is an spoofing: address filtering and IPsec. Address filtering is an
indirect system which relies on other parties to filter packets sent indirect system which relies on other parties to filter packets sent
upstream of an attack, but does not necessarily require participation upstream of an attack, but does not necessarily require participation
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3.2.1. Address filtering 3.2.1. Address filtering
Address filtering is often proposed as an alternative to protocol Address filtering is often proposed as an alternative to protocol
mechanisms to defeat IP source address spoofing [2][13]. Address mechanisms to defeat IP source address spoofing [2][13]. Address
filtering restricts traffic from downstream sources across transit filtering restricts traffic from downstream sources across transit
networks based on the IP source address. A kind of filtering already networks based on the IP source address. A kind of filtering already
occurs at the endpoints of a connection, because attack messages must occurs at the endpoints of a connection, because attack messages must
match the socket pair to succeed; again, note that such attacks match the socket pair to succeed; again, note that such attacks
require knowing the entire socket pair, and are unlikely except in require knowing the entire socket pair, and are unlikely except in
particular cases. This section discusses filtering based on address particular cases. This section discusses filtering based on address
only, typically done at the borders of an AS. only, typically done at the borders of an AS.
It can also restrict core-to-edge paths to reject traffic that should It can also restrict core-to-edge paths to reject traffic that should
have originated further toward the edge. It cannot restrict traffic have originated further toward the edge. It cannot restrict traffic
from edges lacking filtering through the core to a particular edge. from edges lacking filtering through the core to a particular edge.
As a result, each border router must perform the appropriate As a result, each border router must perform the appropriate
filtering for overall protection to result; failure of any border filtering for overall protection to result; failure of any border
router to filter defeats the protection of all participants inside router to filter defeats the protection of all participants inside
the border, and potentially those outside as well. Address filtering the border, and potentially those outside as well. Address filtering
at the border can protect those inside the border from some kinds of at the border can protect those inside the border from some kinds of
spoofing, i.e., connections among those inside a border, because only spoofing, i.e., connections among those inside a border, because only
interior addresses should originate inside the border. It cannot, interior addresses should originate inside the border. It cannot,
however, protect connections including connections outside the border however, protect connections including connections outside the border
except to restrict where the traffic enters from, e.g., if it except to restrict where the traffic enters from, e.g., if it
expected from one AS and not another. expected from one AS and not another.
As a result, address filtering is not a local solution that can be As a result, address filtering is not a local solution that can be
deployed to protect communicating pairs, but rather relies on a deployed to protect communicating pairs, but rather relies on a
distributed infrastructure of trusted gateways filtering forged distributed infrastructure of trusted gateways filtering forged
traffic where it enters the network. It is not feasible for local, traffic where it enters the network. It is not feasible for local,
incremental deployment, and relies heavily on distributed incremental deployment, but may be applicable to connections among
cooperation. Although useful to reduce the load of spoofed traffic, those inside the protected border in some scenarios. Applying
it is insufficient to protect particular connections from attack filtering can also be useful to reduce the network load of spoofed
[29]. traffic [31].
A more recent variant of address filtering checks the IP TTL field, A more recent variant of address filtering checks the IP TTL field,
relying on the TTL set by the other end of the connection [15]. This relying on the TTL set by the other end of the connection [15]. This
technique has been used to provide filtering for BGP. It assumes the technique has been used to provide filtering for BGP. It assumes the
connection source TTL is set to 255; packets at the receiver are connection source TTL is set to 255; packets at the receiver are
checked for TTL=255, and others are dropped. This restricts traffic checked for TTL=255, and others are dropped. This restricts traffic
to one hop upstream of the receiver (i.e., a BGP router), but those to one hop upstream of the receiver (i.e., a BGP router), but those
hops could include other user programs at those nodes (e.g., the BGP hops could include other user programs at those nodes (e.g., the BGP
router's peer) or any traffic those nodes accept via tunnels - router's peer) or any traffic those nodes accept via tunnels -
because tunnels need not decrement TTLs, notaby for "bump in the because tunnels need not decrement TTLs, notably for "bump in the
wire" (BITW) or BITW-equivalent scenarios [31] (see also Sec. 5.1 of wire" (BITW) or BITW-equivalent scenarios [33] (see also Sec. 5.1 of
[15]). TTL filtering works only where all traffic from the other end [15] and [16]). TTL filtering works only where all traffic from the
of the tunnel is trusted, i.e., where it does not originate or other end of the tunnel is trusted, i.e., where it does not originate
transit spoofed traffic. The use of TTL rather than link or network or transit spoofed traffic. The use of TTL rather than link or
security also assumes an untampered point-to-point link, where no network security also assumes an untampered point-to-point link,
other traffic can be spoofed onto a link. where no other traffic can be spoofed onto a link.
This method of filtering works best where traffic originates one hop This method of filtering works best where traffic originates one hop
away, so that the address filtering is based on the trust of only away, so that the address filtering is based on the trust of only
directly-connected (tunneled or otherwise) nodes. Like conventional directly-connected (tunneled or otherwise) nodes. Like conventional
address filtering, this reduces spoofing traffic in general, but is address filtering, this reduces spoofing traffic in general, but is
not considered a reliable security mechanism because it relies on not considered a reliable security mechanism because it relies on
distributed filtering (e.g., the fact that upstream nodes do not distributed filtering (e.g., the fact that upstream nodes do not
terminate tunnels arbitrarily). terminate tunnels arbitrarily).
3.2.2. IPsec 3.2.2. IPsec
TCP is susceptible to RSTs, but also to other off-path and on-path TCP is susceptible to RSTs, but also to other off-path and on-path
spoofing attacks, including SYN attacks. Other transport protocols, spoofing attacks, including SYN attacks. Other transport protocols,
such as UDP and RTP are equally susceptible. Although emerging such as UDP and RTP are equally susceptible. Although emerging
transport protocols attempt to defeat such attacks at the transport transport protocols attempt to defeat such attacks at the transport
layer, such attacks take advantage of network layer identity layer, such attacks take advantage of network layer identity
spoofing. The packet is coming from an endpoint who is spoofing spoofing. The packet is coming from an endpoint who is spoofing
another endpoint, either upstream or somewhere else in the Internet. another endpoint, either upstream or somewhere else in the Internet.
IPsec was designed specifically to establish and enforce IPsec was designed specifically to establish and enforce
authentication of a packet's source and contents, to most directly authentication of a packet's source and contents, to most directly
and explicitly addresses this security vulnerability. and explicitly address this security vulnerability.
The larger problem with IPsec is that of key distribution and use. The larger problem with IPsec is that of key distribution and use.
IPsec is often cumbersome, and has only recently been supported in IPsec is often cumbersome, and has only recently been supported in
many end-system operating systems. More importantly, it relies on many end-system operating systems. More importantly, it relies on
preshared keys, signed X.509 certificates, or a third-party (e.g., preshared keys, signed X.509 certificates, or a third-party (e.g.,
Kerberos) public key infrastructure to establish and exchange keying Kerberos) public key infrastructure to establish and exchange keying
information (e.g., via IKE). These present challenges when using information (e.g., via IKE). Each of these issues presents
IPsec to secure traffic to a well-known server, whose clients may not challenges when using IPsec to secure traffic to a well-known server,
support IPsec or may not have registered with a previously-known whose clients may not support IPsec or may not have registered with a
certificate authority (CA). previously-known certificate authority (CA).
These keying challenges are being addressed in the IETF in ways that These keying challenges are being addressed in the IETF in ways that
will enable servers secure associations with other parties without will enable servers secure associations with other parties without
advance coordination [43][44]. This can be especially useful for advance coordination [45][46]. This can be especially useful for
publicly-available servers, or for protecting connections to servers publicly-available servers, or for protecting connections to servers
that - for whatever reason - have not, or will not deploy that - for whatever reason - have not, or will not deploy
conventional IPsec certificates (i.e., core Internet BGP routers). conventional IPsec certificates (i.e., core Internet BGP routers).
4. ICMP 4. ICMP
Just as spoofed TCP packets can terminate a connection, so too can Just as spoofed TCP packets can terminate a connection, so too can
spoofed ICMP packets. ICMP can be used to launch a variety of spoofed ICMP packets. ICMP can be used to launch a variety of
attacks on TCP including connection resets, path-MTU attacks, and can attacks on TCP including connection resets, path-MTU attacks, and can
also be used to attack the host with non-TCP 'ping of death' and also be used to attack the host with non-TCP 'ping of death' and
'smurf attacks', etc. [37]. ICMP thus represents a substantial 'smurf attacks', etc. [40]. ICMP thus represents a substantial
threat to TCP, but this is not the focus of this document, although a threat to TCP, but this is not the focus of this document, although a
number of protections are discussed below because some are comparable number of protections are discussed below because some are comparable
to TCP anti-spoofing techniques. Note also that ICMP attacks on TCP to TCP anti-spoofing techniques. Note also that ICMP attacks on TCP
assume that the socket pair is known by the attacker, which is assume that the socket pair is known by the attacker, which is
unlikely except for a subset of services between pairs of widely- unlikely except for a subset of services between pairs of widely-
known endpoints. known endpoints.
TCP headers can be included inside certain ICMP messages [7]. There TCP headers can be included inside certain ICMP messages [7]. There
have been recent suggestions to validate the sequence number of TCP have been recent suggestions to validate the sequence number of TCP
headers when they occur inside ICMP messages [17]. This sequence headers when they occur inside ICMP messages [18]. This sequence
checking is similar to checks that would occur for conventional data checking is similar to checks that would occur for conventional data
packets in TCP, but is being proposed in the spirit of the RST window packets in TCP, but is being proposed in the spirit of the RST window
attenuation described in Section 3.1.2. attenuation described in Section 3.1.2.
Some such checks may be reasonable, especially where they parallel Some such checks may be reasonable, especially where they parallel
the validations already performed by TCP processing, notably where the validations already performed by TCP processing, notably where
they emulate the semantics of such processing. For example, the TCP they emulate the semantics of such processing. For example, the TCP
checksum should be validated (if the entire TCP segment is contained checksum should be validated (if the entire TCP segment is contained
in the ICMP message) before any fields of the TCP header are in the ICMP message) before any fields of the TCP header are
examined, to avoid reacting to corrupted packets. Similarly, if the examined, to avoid reacting to corrupted packets. Similarly, if the
TCP MD5 option is present, its signature should probably be validated TCP MD5 option is present, its signature should probably be validated
before considering the contents of the message. Such validation can before considering the contents of the message. Such validation can
ensure that the packet was not corrupted prior to the ICMP generation ensure that the packet was not corrupted prior to the ICMP generation
(checksum), that the packet was one sent by the source (IPsec or (checksum), that the packet was one sent by the source (IPsec or
TCP/MD5 authenticated), or that the packet was not in the network for TCP/MD5 authenticated), or that the packet was not in the network for
an excess of 2*MSL (valid sequence number). an excess of 2*MSL (valid sequence number).
ICMP presents a particular challenge because some messages can reset ICMP presents a particular challenge because some messages can reset
a connection more easily - with less validation - than even some a connection more easily - with less validation - than even some
spoofed TCP segments. One other proposed alternative is to change spoofed TCP segments. One other proposed alternative is to change
TCP's reaction to ICMPs after a connection is established; that may TCP's reaction to ICMPs after a connection is established; that may
leave TCP susceptible during connection establishment and modifies leave TCP susceptible during connection establishment and modifies
TCP's reaction to certain valid network events [18]. This considers TCP's reaction to certain valid network events [19]. This considers
the context-sensitivity of ICMP messages, as does IPsec in some the context-sensitivity of ICMP messages, as does IPsec in some
tunneled configurations, but the recommendations are ambiguous tunneled configurations, but the recommendations are ambiguous
regarding such filtering [26]. regarding such filtering [27].
Ultimately, requiring TCP ICMP messages to be 'in window' may be Ultimately, requiring TCP ICMP messages to be 'in window' may be
insufficient protection, as this document shows for spoofed data. insufficient protection, as this document shows for spoofed data.
ICMP packets can be authenticated when originating at known, trusted ICMP packets can be authenticated when originating at known, trusted
endpoints, such as endpoints of connections or routers in known endpoints, such as endpoints of connections or routers in known
domains with pre-existing IPsec associations. Unfortunately, they domains with pre-existing IPsec associations. Unfortunately, they
also can originate at other places in the network. In addition, some also can originate at other places in the network. In addition, some
networks filter all ICMP packets because validation may not be networks filter all ICMP packets because validation may not be
possible, especially because they can be injected from anywhere in a possible, especially because they can be injected from anywhere in a
network, and so cannot be easily and locally address filtered [26]. network, and so cannot be easily and locally address filtered [27].
As a result, they are not addressed separately in the issues or As a result, they are not addressed separately in the issues or
security considerations of this document further. security considerations of this document further.
5. Issues 5. Issues
There are a number of existing and proposed solutions addressing the There are a number of existing and proposed solutions addressing the
vulnerability of transport protocols in general (and TCP in specific) vulnerability of transport protocols in general (and TCP in specific)
to off-path third-party spoofing attacks. As shown, these operate at to off-path third-party spoofing attacks. As shown, these operate at
the transport or network layer. Transport solutions require separate the transport or network layer. Transport solutions require separate
modification of each transport protocol, addressing network identity modification of each transport protocol, addressing network identity
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As noted earlier, transport layer solutions require separate As noted earlier, transport layer solutions require separate
modification of all transport protocols to include authentication. modification of all transport protocols to include authentication.
Not all transport protocols support negotiated endpoint state (e.g., Not all transport protocols support negotiated endpoint state (e.g.,
UDP), and legacy protocols have been notoriously difficult to safely UDP), and legacy protocols have been notoriously difficult to safely
augment. Not all authentication solutions are created equal either, augment. Not all authentication solutions are created equal either,
and relying on a variety of transport solutions exposes end-systems and relying on a variety of transport solutions exposes end-systems
to increased potential for incorrectly specified or implemented to increased potential for incorrectly specified or implemented
solutions. Transport authentication has often been developed piece- solutions. Transport authentication has often been developed piece-
wise, in response to specific attacks, e.g., SYN cookies and RST wise, in response to specific attacks, e.g., SYN cookies and RST
window attenuation [4][38]. window attenuation [4][36].
Transport layer solutions are not only per-protocol, but often per- Transport layer solutions are not only per-protocol, but often per-
connection. This has both advantages and drawbacks. One advantage connection. This has both advantages and drawbacks. One advantage
to transport layer solutions is that they can protect the transport to transport layer solutions is that they can protect the transport
protocol when lower layers have failed, e.g., due to bugs in protocol when lower layers have failed, e.g., due to bugs in
implementation. TCP already includes a variety of packet validation implementation. TCP already includes a variety of packet validation
mechanisms to protect in these cases, e.g., checking that RSTs are mechanisms to protect in these cases, e.g., checking that RSTs are
in-window. More strict checks can increase the protections provided, in-window. More strict checks can increase the protections provided,
e.g., to protect against misaddressed RSTs that end up in-window (via e.g., to protect against misaddressed RSTs that end up in-window (via
TCPsecure) or to protect against connection interruption due to RSTs, TCPsecure) or to protect against connection interruption due to RSTs,
SYNs, or data injection from misaddressed packets (TCP/MD5) [38]. SYNs, or data injection from misaddressed packets (TCP/MD5) [36].
Another advantage is that transport layer protections can be more Another advantage is that transport layer protections can be more
specifically limited to a particular connection. Because each specifically limited to a particular connection. Because each
connection negotiates its state separately, that state can be more connection negotiates its state separately, that state can be more
specifically tied to that connection. This is both an advantage and specifically tied to that connection. This is both an advantage and
a drawback. It can make it easier to tie security to an individual a drawback. It can make it easier to tie security to an individual
connection, although in practice a shared secret or certificate will connection, although in practice a shared secret or certificate will
generally be shared across multiple connections. generally be shared across multiple connections.
As a drawback, each transport connection needs to negotiate and As a drawback, each transport connection needs to negotiate and
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packets it emits. Such a network level solution protects all packets it emits. Such a network level solution protects all
transport protocols as a result, including both legacy and emerging transport protocols as a result, including both legacy and emerging
protocols, and reduces the complexity of these protocols as well. A protocols, and reduces the complexity of these protocols as well. A
shared solution also reduces protocol overhead, and decouples the shared solution also reduces protocol overhead, and decouples the
management (and refreshing) of authentication state from that of management (and refreshing) of authentication state from that of
individual transport connections. Finally, a network layer solution individual transport connections. Finally, a network layer solution
protects not only the transport layer but the network layer as well, protects not only the transport layer but the network layer as well,
e.g., from IGMP, and some kinds of ICMP (Sec. 4), spoofing attacks. e.g., from IGMP, and some kinds of ICMP (Sec. 4), spoofing attacks.
The IETF Proposed Standard protocol for network layer authentication The IETF Proposed Standard protocol for network layer authentication
is IPsec [26]. IPsec specifies the overall architecture, including is IPsec [27]. IPsec specifies the overall architecture, including
header authentication (AH) [24] and encapsulation (ESP) modes [25]. header authentication (AH) [25] and encapsulation (ESP) modes [26].
AH authenticates both the IP header and IP data, whereas ESP AH authenticates both the IP header and IP data, whereas ESP
authenticates only the IP data (e.g., transport header and payload). authenticates only the IP data (e.g., transport header and payload).
AH is deprecated since ESP is more efficient and the Security AH is being phased out since ESP is more efficient and the Security
Parameters Index (SPI) includes sufficient information to verify the Parameters Index (SPI) includes sufficient information to verify the
IP header anyway. These two modes describe the security applied to IP header anyway [27]. These two modes describe the security applied
individual packets within the IPsec system; key exchange and to individual packets within the IPsec system; key exchange and
management is performed either out-of-band (via pre-shared keys) or management is performed either out-of-band (via pre-shared keys) or
by an automated key exchange protocol IKE [19][23]. by an automated key exchange protocol IKE [24].
IPsec already provides authentication of an IP header and its data IPsec already provides authentication of an IP header and its data
contents sufficient to defeat both on-path and off-path third-party contents sufficient to defeat both on-path and off-path third-party
spoofing attacks. IKE can configure authentication between two spoofing attacks. IKE can configure authentication between two
endpoints on a per-endpoint, per-protocol, or per-connection basis, endpoints on a per-endpoint, per-protocol, or per-connection basis,
as desired. IKE also can perform automatic periodic re-keying, as desired. IKE also can perform automatic periodic re-keying,
further defeating crypto-analysis based on snooping (clandestine data further defeating crypto-analysis based on snooping (clandestine data
collection). The use of IPsec is already commonly strongly collection). The use of IPsec is already commonly strongly
recommended for protected infrastructure. recommended for protected infrastructure.
Existing IPsec is not appropriate for many deployments. It is Existing IPsec is not appropriate for many deployments. It is
computationally intensive both in key management and individual computationally intensive both in key management and individual
packet authentication [41]. This computational overhead can be packet authentication [43]. This computational overhead can be
prohibitive, and so often requires additional hardware, especially in prohibitive, and so often requires additional hardware, especially in
commercial routers. As importantly, IKE is not anonymous; keys can commercial routers. As importantly, IKE is not anonymous; keys can
be exchanged between parties only if they trust each others' X.509 be exchanged between parties only if they trust each others' X.509
certificates, trust some other third-party to help with key certificates, trust some other third-party to help with key
generation (e.g., Kerberos), or pre-share a key. These certificates generation (e.g., Kerberos), or pre-share a key. These certificates
provide identification (the other party knows who you are) only where provide identification (the other party knows who you are) only where
the certificates themselves are signed by certificate authorities the certificates themselves are signed by certificate authorities
(CAs) that both parties already trust. To a large extent, the CAs (CAs) that both parties already trust. To a large extent, the CAs
themselves are the pre-shared keys which help IKE establish security themselves are the pre-shared keys which help IKE establish security
association keys, which are then used in the authentication association keys, which are then used in the authentication
algorithms. algorithms.
Alternative mechanisms are under development to address this Alternative mechanisms are under development to address this
limitation, to allow publicly-accessible servers to secure limitation, to allow publicly-accessible servers to secure
connections to clients not known in advance, or to allow unilateral connections to clients not known in advance, or to allow unilateral
relaxation of identity validation so that the remaining protections relaxation of identity validation so that the remaining protections
of IPsec to be available [43][44]. In particular, these mechanisms of IPsec can be made available [45][46]. In particular, these
can prevent a client (but without knowing who that client is) from mechanisms can prevent a client (but without knowing who that client
being affected by spoofing from other clients, even when the is) from being affected by spoofing from other clients, even when the
attackers are on the same communications path. attackers are on the same communications path.
IPsec, although widely available both in commercial routers and IPsec, although widely available both in commercial routers and
commodity end-systems, is not often used except between parties that commodity end-systems, is not often used except between parties that
already have a preexisting relationship (employee/employer, between already have a preexisting relationship (employee/employer, between
two ISPs, etc.). Servers to anonymous clients (e.g., customer/ two ISPs, etc.). Servers to anonymous clients (e.g., customer/
business) or more open services (e.g., BGP, where routers may have business) or more open services (e.g., BGP, where routers may have
large numbers of peers) are unmanageable, due to the breadth and flux large numbers of peers) are unmanageable, due to the breadth and flux
of CAs. New endpoints cannot establish IPsec associations with such of CAs. New endpoints cannot establish IPsec associations with such
servers unless their own certificate is signed by a CA already servers unless their own certificate is signed by a CA already
trusted by the server. Different servers - even within the same trusted by the server. Different servers - even within the same
overall system (e.g., BGP) - often cannot or will not trust overall system (e.g., BGP) - often cannot or will not trust
overlapping subsets of CAs in general. overlapping subsets of CAs in general.
5.3. Application Layer 5.3. Application Layer
skipping to change at page 22, line 36 skipping to change at page 22, line 36
spoofing attacks. For spoofing, the primary issue is whether packets spoofing attacks. For spoofing, the primary issue is whether packets
are coming from the same party the server can reach. Only the IP are coming from the same party the server can reach. Only the IP
header is fundamentally in question, so securing the entire packet header is fundamentally in question, so securing the entire packet
(1) is computational overkill. It is sufficient to authenticate the (1) is computational overkill. It is sufficient to authenticate the
other party as "a party you have exchanged packets with", rather than other party as "a party you have exchanged packets with", rather than
establishing their trusted identity ("Bill" vs. "Bob") as in (2). establishing their trusted identity ("Bill" vs. "Bob") as in (2).
Finally, many cookie systems use clear-text (unencrypted), fixed Finally, many cookie systems use clear-text (unencrypted), fixed
cookie values, providing reasonable (1 in 2^{cookie-size}) protection cookie values, providing reasonable (1 in 2^{cookie-size}) protection
against off-path third-party spoof attacks, but not addressing on- against off-path third-party spoof attacks, but not addressing on-
path attacks at all. Such potential solutions are discussed in the path attacks at all. Such potential solutions are discussed in the
BTNS documents [5][43][44]. Note also that NULL Encryption in IPsec BTNS documents [5][45][46]. Note also that NULL Encryption in IPsec
applies a variant of this cookie, where the SPI is the cookie, and no applies a variant of this cookie, where the SPI is the cookie, and no
further encryption is applied [16]. further encryption is applied [17].
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This entire document focuses on increasing the security of transport This entire document focuses on increasing the security of transport
protocols and their resistance to spoofing attacks. Security is protocols and their resistance to spoofing attacks. Security is
addressed throughout. addressed throughout.
This document describes a number of techniques for defeating spoofing This document describes a number of techniques for defeating spoofing
attacks. Those relying on clear-text cookies, either explicit or attacks. Those relying on clear-text cookies, either explicit or
implicit (e.g., window sequence attenuation) do not protect from on- implicit (e.g., window sequence attenuation) do not protect from on-
skipping to change at page 23, line 16 skipping to change at page 23, line 16
The security of various levels of the protocol stack is addressed. The security of various levels of the protocol stack is addressed.
Spoofing attacks are fundamentally identity masquerading, so we Spoofing attacks are fundamentally identity masquerading, so we
believe the most appropriate solutions defeat these at the network believe the most appropriate solutions defeat these at the network
layer, where end-to-end identity lies. Some transport protocols layer, where end-to-end identity lies. Some transport protocols
subsume endpoint identity information from the network layer (e.g., subsume endpoint identity information from the network layer (e.g.,
TCP pseudo-headers), whereas others establish per-connection identity TCP pseudo-headers), whereas others establish per-connection identity
based on exchanged nonces (e.g., SCTP). It is reasonable, if not based on exchanged nonces (e.g., SCTP). It is reasonable, if not
recommended, to address security at all layers of the protocol stack. recommended, to address security at all layers of the protocol stack.
Note that NATs and other middleboxes complicate the design and
deployment of techniques to defeat spoofing attacks. Devices such as
these, that modify IP and/or TCP headers in-transit, generate traffic
equivalent to a spoofing attack, and thus should be inhibited by
antispoofing mechanisms. Details of these middlebox-related problems
are out of scope for this document, but issues thereof are addressed
in RFCs and emerging Internet Drafts that discuss the interactions
between such devices and the Internet architecture, e.g., [21].
Fortunately, many of the most critical TCP-based connections, in
particular supporting routing protocols like BGP, do not traverse
such middleboxes, and are not affected by this limitation.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations in this document. There are no IANA considerations in this document.
This section should be removed by the RFC-Editor upon publication as This section should be removed by the RFC-Editor upon publication as
an RFC. an RFC.
8. Conclusions 8. Conclusions
This document describes the details of the recent BGP spoofing This document describes the details of the recent BGP spoofing
attacks involving spurious RSTs which could be used to shutdown TCP attacks involving spurious RSTs which could be used to shutdown TCP
connections. It summarizes and discusses a variety of current and connections. It summarizes and discusses a variety of current and
proposed solutions at various protocol layers. proposed solutions at various protocol layers.
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
This document was inspired by discussions in the TCPM WG This document was inspired by discussions in the TCPM WG
<http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tcpm-charter.html> about the <http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tcpm-charter.html> about the
recent spoofed RST attacks on BGP routers, including R. Stewart's recent spoofed RST attacks on BGP routers, including R. Stewart's
draft (which is now edited by M. Dalal) [38][40]. The analysis of draft (whose author list has since evolved) [36][42]. The analysis
the attack issues, alternate solutions, and the anonymous security of the attack issues, alternate solutions, and the anonymous security
proposed solutions were the result of discussions on that list as proposed solutions were the result of discussions on that list as
well as with USC/ISI's T. Faber, A. Falk, G. Finn, and Y. Wang. R. well as with USC/ISI's T. Faber, A. Falk, G. Finn, and Y. Wang. R.
Atkinson suggested the UDP variant of TCP/MD5, P. Goyette suggested Atkinson suggested the UDP variant of TCP/MD5, P. Goyette suggested
using the ISN to seed TCP/MD5, and L. Wood suggested using the ISN to using the ISN to seed TCP/MD5, and L. Wood suggested using the ISN to
validate RSTs. Other improvements are due to the input of various validate RSTs. Other improvements are due to the input of various
members of the IETF's TCPM WG, notably detailed feedback from F. Gont members of the IETF's TCPM WG, notably detailed feedback from F.
and P. Savola. Gont, P. Savola, and A. Hoenes.
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
None. None.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[1] Allman, M., V. Paxson, W. Stephens, "TCP Congestion Control," [1] Allman, M., V. Paxson, and W. Stephens, "TCP Congestion
RFC 2581, Apr. 1999. Control", RFC 2581 (Proposed Standard), Apr. 1999.
[2] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed [2] Baker, F., and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks," RFC 3704 / BCP 84, Mar. 2004. Networks", RFC 3704 / BCP 84, Mar. 2004.
[3] Bellovin, S. and A. Zinin, "Standards Maturity Variance [3] Bellovin, S., and A. Zinin, "Standards Maturity Variance
Regarding the TCP MD5 Signature Option (RFC 2385) and the BGP-4 Regarding the TCP MD5 Signature Option (RFC 2385) and the BGP-4
Specification," RFC 4278 (Informational), Jan. 2006. Specification", RFC 4278 (Informational), Jan. 2006.
[4] Bernstein, D., "SYN cookies - http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html", [4] Bernstein, D., "SYN cookies", http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html,
1997. 1997.
[5] Better Than Nothing Security [BTNS] WG web pages, [5] Better Than Nothing Security [BTNS] WG web pages,
http://www.postel.org/anonsec http://www.postel.org/anonsec
[6] Bonica, R., et al., "Authentication for TCP-based Routing and [6] Bonica, R., B. Weis, S. Viswanathan, A. Lange, and O. Wheeler,
Management Protocols," draft-bonica-tcp-auth-05, (work in "Authentication for TCP-based Routing and Management
progress), Jul. 2006. Protocols", draft-bonica-tcp-auth-06 (work in progress), Feb.
2007.
[7] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communication [7] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communication
Layers," RFC 1122, Oct. 1989. Layers", RFC 1122 / STD 3, Oct. 1989.
[8] Braden, R., "TIME-WAIT Assassination Hazards in TCP", RFC 1337, [8] Braden, R., "TIME-WAIT Assassination Hazards in TCP", RFC 1337
May 1992. (Informational), May 1992.
[9] CERT alert: "Technical Cyber Security Alert TA04-111A: [9] CERT alert: "Technical Cyber Security Alert TA04-111A:
Vulnerabilities in TCP -- Vulnerabilities in TCP",
http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA04-111A.html", April 20 http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA04-111A.html, April 20
2004. 2004.
[10] Convery, S. and M. Franz, "BGP Vulnerability Testing: [10] Convery, S., and M. Franz, "BGP Vulnerability Testing:
Separating Fact from FUD", 2003, Separating Fact from FUD", 2003,
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/franz.pdf http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/franz.pdf
[11] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations," [11] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations",
draft-ietf-tcpm-syn-flood-00.txt (work in progress), Jul. 2006. draft-ietf-tcpm-syn-flood-01.txt (work in progress), Dec. 2006.
[12] Faber, T., J. Touch, and W. Yue, "The TIME-WAIT state in TCP [12] Faber, T., J. Touch, and W. Yue, "The TIME-WAIT state in TCP
and Its Effect on Busy Servers", Proc. Infocom 1999 pp. 1573- and Its Effect on Busy Servers", Proc. Infocom 1999, pp. 1573-
1583, Mar. 1999. 1583, Mar. 1999.
[13] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Ingress Filtering: [13] Ferguson, P., and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Address Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Address
Spoofing," RFC 2827 / BCP 38, May 2000. Spoofing", RFC 2827 / BCP 38, May 2000.
[14] Floyd, S., "Inappropriate TCP Resets Considered Harmful", BCP [14] Floyd, S., "Inappropriate TCP Resets Considered Harmful", BCP
60, RFC 3360, Aug. 2002. 60, RFC 3360 / BCP 60, Aug. 2002.
[15] Gill, V., J. Heasley, and D. Meyer, "The Generalized TTL [15] Gill, V., J. Heasley, and D. Meyer, "The Generalized TTL
Security Mechanism (GTSM)," RFC 3682 (Experimental), Feb. 2004. Security Mechanism (GTSM)", RFC 3682 (Experimental), Feb. 2004.
[16] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its [16] Gill, V., J. Heasley, D. Meyer, P. Savola, Ed., and C.
Use With IPsec", RFC 2410 (Standards Track), Nov. 1998. Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM)"
draft-ietf-rtgwg-rfc3682bis-09.txt (work in progress), Jan.
2007.
[17] Gont, F., "ICMP attacks against TCP," draft-gont-tcpm-icmp- [17] Glenn, R., and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its
attacks-05.txt, (expired work in progress), Oct. 2005. Use With IPsec", RFC 2410 (Proposed Standard), Nov. 1998.
[18] Gont, F., "TCP's Reaction to Soft Errors," draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp- [18] Gont, F., "ICMP attacks against TCP", draft-ietf-tcpm-icmp-
soft-errors-02.txt, (work in progress), Oct. 2006. attacks-01.txt (work in progress), Oct. 2006.
[19] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", [19] Gont, F., "TCP's Reaction to Soft Errors", draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-
RFC 2409 (Standards Track), Nov. 1998. soft-errors-03.txt (work in progress), Jan. 2007.
[20] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 [20] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Signature Option", RFC 2385 (Standards Track), Aug. 1998. Signature Option", RFC 2385 (Proposed Standard), Aug. 1998.
[21] Housley, R., Post to IETF Discussion mailing list regarding his [21] Holdrege, M., and P. Srisuresh, "Protocol Complications with
the IP Network Address Translator", RFC 3027 (Informational),
Jan. 2001.
[22] Housley, R., Post to IETF Discussion mailing list regarding his
IETF 64 Security Area presentation, IETF 64 Security Area presentation,
ID=7.0.0.10.2.20051124135914.00f50558@vigilsec.com, Nov. 24, ID=7.0.0.10.2.20051124135914.00f50558@vigilsec.com, Nov. 24,
2005, http://www1.ietf.org/mail- 2005, http://www1.ietf.org/mail-
archive/ietf/Current/maillist.html archive/ietf/Current/maillist.html
[22] Jacobson, V., B. Braden, and D. Borman, "TCP Extensions for [23] Jacobson, V., B. Braden, and D. Borman, "TCP Extensions for
High Performance", RFC 1323, May 1992. High Performance", RFC 1323 (Proposed Standard), May 1992.
[23] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 4306 [24] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 4306
(Standards Track), Dec. 2005. (Proposed Standard), Dec. 2005.
[24] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302 (Standards [25] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302 (Proposed
Track), Dec. 2005. Standard), Dec. 2005.
[25] Kent, S, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303 [26] Kent, S, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303
(Standards Track), Dec. 2005. (Proposed Standard), Dec. 2005.
[26] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet [27] Kent, S., and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC 4301, Dec. 2005. Protocol", RFC 4301 (Proposed Standard), Dec. 2005.
[27] Kohler, E., M. Handley, and S. Floyd, "Datagram Congestion [28] Kohler, E., M. Handley, and S. Floyd, "Datagram Congestion
Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340 (Proposed Standard), Dec. Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340 (Proposed Standard), Dec.
2005. 2005.
[28] Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5 [29] Larsen, M., and F. Gont, "Port Randomization", draft-larsen-
Signature Option," RFC 3562 (Informational), July 2003. tsvwg-port-randomization-01.txt (work in progress), Feb. 2007.
[29] Moore, D., G. Voelker, and S. Savage, "Inferring Internet [30] Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5
Denial-of-Service Activity," Proc. Usenix Security Symposium, Signature Option", RFC 3562 (Informational), July 2003.
[31] Moore, D., G. Voelker, and S. Savage, "Inferring Internet
Denial-of-Service Activity", Proc. Usenix Security Symposium,
Aug. 2001. Aug. 2001.
[30] O'Malley, S. and L. Peterson, "TCP Extensions Considered [32] O'Malley, S., and L. Peterson, "TCP Extensions Considered
Harmful", RFC 1263, October 1991. Harmful", RFC 1263 (Informational), October 1991.
[31] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP," RFC 2003 (Standards [33] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003 (Proposed
Track), Oct. 1996. Standard), Oct. 1996.
[32] Poon, K., "Use of TCP timestamp option to defend against blind [34] Poon, K., "Use of TCP timestamp option to defend against blind
spoofing attack," draft-poon-tcp-tstamp-mod-01 (expired work in spoofing attack", draft-poon-tcp-tstamp-mod-01.txt (expired
progress), Oct. 2004. work in progress), Oct. 2004.
[33] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol," RFC 793 / STD 7, [35] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", RFC 793 / STD 7,
Sep. 1981. Sep. 1981.
[34] Rekhter, Y. and T. Li, (eds.), "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 [36] Ramaiah, A., R. Stewart, and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
(BGP-4)," RFC 1771 (Standards Track), Mar. 1995. Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", draft-ietf-tcpm-
tcpsecure-06.txt (work in progress), Nov. 2006.
[35] Semke, J., J. Mahdavi, M. Mathis, "Automatic TCP Buffer [37] Rekhter, Y., T. Li, and S. Hares (eds.), "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271 (Draft Standard), Jan. 2006.
[38] Semke, J., J. Mahdavi, and M. Mathis, "Automatic TCP Buffer
Tuning", ACM SIGCOMM '98/ Computer Communication Review, volume Tuning", ACM SIGCOMM '98/ Computer Communication Review, volume
28, number 4, Oct. 1998. 28, number 4, Oct. 1998.
[36] Shepard, T., "Reassign Port Number option for TCP," draft- [39] Shepard, T., "Reassign Port Number option for TCP", draft-
sheard-tcp-reassign-port-number-00.txt (expired work in shepard-tcp-reassign-port-number-00.txt (expired work in
progress), Jul. 2004. progress), Jul. 2004.
[37] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2," draft- [40] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", draft-
shirey-secgloss-v2-07.txt (work in progress), Sep. 2006. shirey-secgloss-v2-08.txt (work in progress), Nov. 2006.
[38] Stewart, R. and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind
In-Window Attacks", draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-05 (work in
progress), Jun. 2006.
[39] Stewart, R., Q. Xie, K. Morneault, C. Sharp, H. Schwarzbauer, [41] Stewart, R., Q. Xie, K. Morneault, C. Sharp, H. Schwarzbauer,
T. Taylor, I. Rytina, M. Kalla, L. Zhang, and V. Paxson, T. Taylor, I. Rytina, M. Kalla, L. Zhang, and V. Paxson,
"Stream Control Transmission Protocol," RFC 2960 (Standards "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 2960 (Proposed
Track), Oct. 2000. Standard), Oct. 2000.
[40] TCPM: IETF TCPM Working Group and mailing list, [42] TCPM: IETF TCPM Working Group and mailing list,
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tcpm-charter.html. http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tcpm-charter.html.
[41] Touch, J., "Report on MD5 Performance," RFC 1810 [43] Touch, J., "Report on MD5 Performance", RFC 1810
(Informational), Jun. 1995. (Informational), Jun. 1995.
[42] Touch, J., "Performance Analysis of MD5," Proc. Sigcomm 1995 [44] Touch, J., "Performance Analysis of MD5", Proc. Sigcomm 1995,
pp. 77-86, Mar. 1999. pp. 77-86, Mar. 1999.
[43] Touch, J., "ANONsec: Anonymous Security to Defend Against [45] Touch, J., "ANONsec: Anonymous Security to Defend Against
Spoofing Attacks," draft-touch-anonsec-00 (expired work in Spoofing Attacks", draft-touch-anonsec-00.txt (expired work in
progress), May 2004. progress), May 2004.
[44] Touch, J., D. Black, and Y. Wang, "Problem and Applicability [46] Touch, J., D. Black, and Y. Wang, "Problem and Applicability
Statement for Better Than Nothing Security (BTNS)," Statement for Better Than Nothing Security (BTNS)",
draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-04 (work in progress), Sep. draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-05.txt (work in progress), Feb.
2006. 2007.
[45] Watson, P., "Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset attacks," [47] Watson, P., "Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset attacks",
Presentation at 2004 CanSecWest. Presentation at 2004 CanSecWest.
http://www.cansecwest.com/archives.html http://www.cansecwest.com/archives.html
[46] Wood, L., Post to TCPM mailing list regarding use of ISN in [48] Wood, L., Post to TCPM mailing list regarding use of ISN in
RSTs, ID=Pine.GSO.4.50.0404232249570.5889- RSTs, ID=Pine.GSO.4.50.0404232249570.5889-
100000@argos.ee.surrey.ac.uk, Apr. 23, 2004. 100000@argos.ee.surrey.ac.uk, Apr. 23, 2004.
http://www1.ietf.org/mail- http://www1.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/tcpm/current/msg00213.html archive/web/tcpm/current/msg00213.html
Author's Addresses Author's Addresses
Joe Touch Joe Touch
USC/ISI USC/ISI
4676 Admiralty Way 4676 Admiralty Way
skipping to change at page 28, line 24 skipping to change at page 28, line 46
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org. ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Disclaimer of Validity Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
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INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society. Internet Society.
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