< draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-08.txt		draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-09.txt >
	Network Working Group R. Housley		Network Working Group R. Housley
	Internet Draft Vigil Security		Internet Draft Vigil Security
	February 2007 B. Aboba		February 2007 B. Aboba
	Expires in six months Microsoft		Expires in six months Microsoft
	Guidance for AAA Key Management		Guidance for AAA Key Management
	<draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-08.txt>		<draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-09.txt>
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any		By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
	applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware		applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
	have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes		have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
	aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.		aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that		Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
	skipping to change at page 11, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 21 ¶
	authorization checking prevents an elevation of privilege		authorization checking prevents an elevation of privilege
	attack, and it ensures that an unauthorized authenticator is		attack, and it ensures that an unauthorized authenticator is
	detected.		detected.
	Authorizations SHOULD be synchronized between the peer, NAS,		Authorizations SHOULD be synchronized between the peer, NAS,
	and backend authentication server. Once the AAA key management		and backend authentication server. Once the AAA key management
	protocol exchanges are complete, all of these parties should		protocol exchanges are complete, all of these parties should
	hold a common view of the authorizations associated the other		hold a common view of the authorizations associated the other
	parties.		parties.
			In addition to authenticating all parties, key management
			protocols need to demonstrate that the parties are authorized
			to possess keying material. Note that proof of possession of
			keying material does not necessarily prove authorization to
			hold that keying material. For example, within an IEEE
			802.11i, the 4-way handshake demonstrates that both the peer
			and authenticator possess the same EAP keying material.
			However, by itself, this possession proof does not demonstrate
			that the authenticator was authorized by the backend
			authentication server to possess that keying material. As
			noted in RFC 3579 in section 4.3.7, where AAA proxies are
			present, it is possible for one authenticator to impersonate
			another, unless each link in the AAA chain implements checks
			against impersonation. Even with these checks in place, an
			authenticator may still claim different identities to the peer
			and the backend authentication server. As described in RFC
			3748 in section 7.15, channel binding is required to enable the
			peer to verify that the authenticator claim of identity is both
			consistent and correct.
	Keying material confidentiality and integrity		Keying material confidentiality and integrity
	While preserving algorithm independence, confidentiality and		While preserving algorithm independence, confidentiality and
	integrity of all keying material MUST be maintained.		integrity of all keying material MUST be maintained.
	Confirm ciphersuite selection		Confirm ciphersuite selection
	The selection of the "best" ciphersuite SHOULD be securely		The selection of the "best" ciphersuite SHOULD be securely
	confirmed. The mechanism SHOULD detect attempted roll back		confirmed. The mechanism SHOULD detect attempted roll back
	attacks.		attacks.
End of changes. 2 change blocks.
	1 lines changed or deleted		21 lines changed or added
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