< draft-ietf-netconf-tls-06.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-tls-07.txt >
NETCONF Working Group Mohamad Badra
Internet Draft LIMOS Laboratory
Intended status: Standards Track October 22, 2008
Expires: April 2009
NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS) NETCONF Working Group M. Badra
draft-ietf-netconf-tls-06.txt Internet-Draft CNRS/LIMOS Laboratory
Intended status: Standards Track February 24, 2009
Expires: August 28, 2009
NETCONF Over Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-netconf-tls-07.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Abstract Abstract
The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to
install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices.
This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol to secure NETCONF exchanges. protocol to secure NETCONF exchanges.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions used in this document.........................3 1.1. Conventions Used in this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. NETCONF over TLS...............................................3 2. NETCONF over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Connection Initiation.....................................3 2.1. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Connection Closure........................................4 2.2. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Endpoint Authentication and Identification.....................5 3. Endpoint Authentication and Identification . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Server Identity...........................................5 3.1. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Client Identity...........................................6 3.2. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations........................................6 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations............................................6 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgments................................................7 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References.....................................................7 7. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References......................................7 8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Addresses................................................8 Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statement.....................8 publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1. 06-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.2. 05-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.3. 04-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The NETCONF protocol [RFC4741] defines a mechanism through which a The NETCONF protocol [RFC4741] defines a mechanism through which a
network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented, network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented,
requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection
must provide reliable, sequenced data delivery, integrity and must provide reliable, sequenced data delivery, integrity and
confidentiality and peers authentication. confidentiality and peers authentication.
This document defines "NETCONF over TLS", which includes support for This document defines "NETCONF over TLS", which includes support for
certificate-based mutual authentication and key derivation, utilizing certificate-based mutual authentication and key derivation, utilizing
the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual authentication and key the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual authentication and key
skipping to change at page 3, line 29 skipping to change at page 3, line 29
Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to
refer to the two ends of the TLS connection. The client actively refer to the two ends of the TLS connection. The client actively
opens the TLS connection, and the server passively listens for the opens the TLS connection, and the server passively listens for the
incoming TLS connection. The terms "manager" and "agent" are used to incoming TLS connection. The terms "manager" and "agent" are used to
refer to the two ends of the NETCONF protocol session. The manager refer to the two ends of the NETCONF protocol session. The manager
issues NETCONF remote procedure call (RPC) commands, and the agent issues NETCONF remote procedure call (RPC) commands, and the agent
replies to those commands. When NETCONF is run over TLS using the replies to those commands. When NETCONF is run over TLS using the
mapping defined in this document, the client is always the manager, mapping defined in this document, the client is always the manager,
and the server is always the agent. and the server is always the agent.
1.1. Conventions used in this document 1.1. Conventions Used in this Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. NETCONF over TLS 2. NETCONF over TLS
Since TLS is application protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on Since TLS is application protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on
top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how
NETCONF can be used within a TLS session. NETCONF can be used within a TLS session.
2.1. Connection Initiation 2.1. Connection Initiation
The peer acting as the NETCONF manager MUST also act as the TLS The peer acting as the NETCONF manager MUST also act as the TLS
client. It MUST connect to the server that passively listens for the client. It MUST connect to the server that passively listens for the
incoming TLS connection on the TCP port <IANA-to-be-assigned>. (Note incoming TLS connection on the TCP port <IANA-to-be-assigned>. (Note
to RFC Editor: please replace <IANA-to-be-assigned> with the IANA- to RFC Editor: please replace <IANA-to-be-assigned> with the IANA-
assigned value, and remove this note). It MUST therefore send the assigned value, and remove this note). It MUST therefore send the
TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake TLS ClientHello message to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS
has finished, the client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF handshake has finished, the client and the server MAY begin to
data. In particular, the client will send complete XML documents to exchange NETCONF data. In particular, the client will send complete
the server containing <rpc> elements, and the server will respond XML documents to the server containing <rpc> elements, and the server
with complete XML documents containing <rpc-reply> elements. The will respond with complete XML documents containing <rpc-reply>
client MAY indicate interest in receiving event notifications from a elements. The client MAY indicate interest in receiving event
server by creating a subscription to receive event notifications notifications from a server by creating a subscription to receive
[RFC5277], in which case the server replies to indicate whether the event notifications [RFC5277], in which case the server replies to
subscription request was successful and, if it was successful, begins indicate whether the subscription request was successful and, if it
sending the event notifications to the client as the events occur was successful, begins sending the event notifications to the client
within the system. as the events occur within the system.
All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is
possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS
record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS
records. records.
Current NETCONF messages don't include a message's length. This This document uses the same delimiter sequence ("]]>]]>") defined in
document uses consequently the same delimiter sequence defined in [RFC4742], which MUST be sent by both the client and the server after
[RFC4742] and therefore the special character sequence, ]]>]]>, to each XML document in the NETCONF exchange. Since this character
delimit XML documents. sequence can legally appear in plain XML in attribute values,
comments, and processing instructions, implementations of this
document MUST ensure that this character sequence is never part of a
NETCONF message.
Implementation of the protocol specified in this document MAY Implementation of the protocol specified in this document MAY
implement any TLS cipher suite that provides certificate-based mutual implement any TLS cipher suite that provides certificate-based mutual
authentication [RFC5246]. authentication [RFC5246].
Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to
support the mandatory to implement cipher suite, which is support the mandatory to implement cipher suite, which is
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. This document is assumed to apply to TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. This document is assumed to apply to
future versions of TLS, in which case the mandatory to implement future versions of TLS, in which case the mandatory to implement
cipher suite for the implemented version MUST be supported. cipher suite for the implemented version MUST be supported.
2.2. Connection Closure 2.2. Connection Closure
A TLS client (NETCONF manager) MUST close the associated TLS A TLS client (NETCONF manager) MUST close the associated TLS
connection if the connection is not expected to issues any NETCONF connection if the connection is not expected to issue any NETCONF RPC
RPC commands later. It MUST send a TLS close_notify alert before commands later. It MUST send a TLS close_notify alert before closing
closing the connection. The TLS client MAY choose to not wait for the connection. The TLS client MAY choose to not wait for the TLS
the TLS server (NETCONF agent) close_notify alert and simply close server (NETCONF agent) close_notify alert and simply close the
the connection, thus generating an incomplete close on the TLS server connection, thus generating an incomplete close on the TLS server
side. Once the TLS server gets a close_notify from the TLS client, side. Once the TLS server gets a close_notify from the TLS client,
it MUST reply with a close_notify unless it becomes aware that the it MUST reply with a close_notify unless it becomes aware that the
connection has already been closed by the TLS client (e.g., the connection has already been closed by the TLS client (e.g., the
closure was indicated by TCP). closure was indicated by TCP).
When no data is received from a connection for a long time (where the When no data is received from a connection for a long time (where the
application decides what "long" means), a NETCONF peer MAY close the application decides what "long" means), a NETCONF peer MAY close the
connection. The NETCONF peer MUST attempt to initiate an exchange of connection. The NETCONF peer MUST attempt to initiate an exchange of
close_notify alerts with the other NETCONF peer before closing the close_notify alerts with the other NETCONF peer before closing the
connection. The close_notify's sender that is unprepared to receive connection. The close_notify's sender that is unprepared to receive
any more data MAY close the connection after sending the close_notify any more data MAY close the connection after sending the close_notify
alert, thus generating an incomplete close on the close_notify's alert, thus generating an incomplete close on the close_notify's
receiver side. receiver side.
3. Endpoint Authentication and Identification 3. Endpoint Authentication and Identification
3.1. Server Identity 3.1. Server Identity
During the TLS negotiation, the client MUST carefully examine the During the TLS negotiation, the client MUST carefully examine the
certificate presented by the server to determine if it meets their certificate presented by the server to determine if it meets their
expectations. Particularly, the client MUST check its understanding expectations. Particularly, the client MUST check its understanding
of the server hostname against the server's identity as presented in of the server hostname against the server's identity as presented in
the server Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle the server Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks. attacks.
Matching is performed according to the rules below (following the Matching is performed according to the rules below (following the
example of [RFC4642]): example of [RFC4642]):
- The client MUST use the server hostname it used to open the o The client MUST use the server hostname it used to open the
connection (or the hostname specified in TLS "server_name" connection (or the hostname specified in TLS "server_name"
extension [RFC4366]) as the value to compare against the server extension [RFC5246]) as the value to compare against the server
name as expressed in the server certificate. The client MUST name as expressed in the server certificate. The client MUST NOT
NOT use any form of the server hostname derived from an use any form of the server hostname derived from an insecure
insecure remote source (e.g., insecure DNS lookup). CNAME remote source (e.g., insecure DNS lookup). CNAME canonicalization
canonicalization is not done. is not done.
- If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the o If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the
certificate, it MUST be used as the source of the server's certificate, it MUST be used as the source of the server's
identity. identity.
- Matching is case-insensitive. o Matching is case-insensitive.
- A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the leftmost name o A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the leftmost name
component in the certificate. For example, *.example.com would component in the certificate. For example, *.example.com would
match a.example.com, foo.example.com, etc., but would not match match a.example.com, foo.example.com, etc., but would not match
example.com. example.com.
- If the certificate contains multiple names (e.g., more than one o If the certificate contains multiple names (e.g., more than one
dNSName field), then a match with any one of the fields is dNSName field), then a match with any one of the fields is
considered acceptable. considered acceptable.
If the match fails, the client MUST either ask for explicit user If the match fails, the client MUST either ask for explicit user
confirmation or terminate the connection and indicate the server's confirmation or terminate the connection and indicate the server's
identity is suspect. identity is suspect.
Additionally, clients MUST verify the binding between the identity of Additionally, clients MUST verify the binding between the identity of
the servers to which they connect and the public keys presented by the servers to which they connect and the public keys presented by
those servers. Clients SHOULD implement the algorithm in Section 6 those servers. Clients SHOULD implement the algorithm in Section 6
of [RFC5280] for general certificate validation, but MAY supplement of [RFC5280] for general certificate validation, but MAY supplement
that algorithm with other validation methods that achieve equivalent that algorithm with other validation methods that achieve equivalent
levels of verification (such as comparing the server certificate levels of verification (such as comparing the server certificate
against a local store of already-verified certificates and identity against a local store of already-verified certificates and identity
bindings). bindings).
If the client has external information as to the expected identity of If the client has external information as to the expected identity of
the server, the hostname check MAY be omitted. the server, the hostname check MAY be omitted.
3.2. Client Identity 3.2. Client Identity
Typically, the server has no external knowledge of what the client's The server may have no external knowledge on client's identity and
identity ought to be and so checks (other than that the client has a identity checks might not be possible (unless the client has a
certificate chain rooted in an appropriate CA) are not possible. If certificate chain rooted in an appropriate CA). If a server has
a server has such knowledge (typically from some source external to knowledge on client's identity (typically from some source external
NETCONF or TLS) it MUST check the identity as described above. to NETCONF or TLS) it MUST check the identity as described above.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246] apply here The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246] and
as well. [RFC4741] apply here as well.
This document in its current version doesn't support third party This document in its current version does not support third party
authentication due to the fact that TLS doesn't specify this way of authentication due to the fact that TLS does not specify this way of
authentication and that NETCONF depends on the transport protocol for authentication and that NETCONF depends on the transport protocol for
the authentication service. If third party authentication is needed, the authentication service. If third party authentication is needed,
BEEP or SSH transport can be used. BEEP or SSH transport can be used.
5. IANA Considerations An attacker might be able to inject arbitrary NETCONF messages via
some application that does not carefully check exchanged messages or
deliberately insert the delimiter sequence in a NETCONF message to
create a DoS attack. Hence, applications and NETCONF APIs MUST
ensure that the delimiter sequence defined in Section 2.1 never
appears in NETCONF messages; otherwise, those messages can be
dropped, garbled or mis-interpreted. If the delimiter sequence is
found in a NETCONF message by the sender side, a robust
implementation of this document should warn the user that illegal
characters have been discovered. If the delimiter sequence is found
in a NETCONF message by the receiver side (including any XML
attribute values, XML comments or processing instructions) a robust
implementation of this document must silently discard the message
without further processing and then stop the NETCONF session.
Finally, this document does not introduce any new security
considerations compared to [RFC4742].
5. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to assign a TCP port number in the "Registered Port IANA is requested to assign a TCP port number in the "Registered Port
Numbers" range with the name "netconf-tls". This port will be the Numbers" range with the name "netconf-tls". This port will be the
default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in this document. default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in this document.
Registration Contact: Mohamad Badra, badra@isima.fr. Registration Contact: Mohamad Badra, badra@isima.fr.
Transport Protocol: TCP. Transport Protocol: TCP.
Port Number: TBA-by-IANA (if possible, please assign 6513). Port Number: TBA-by-IANA (if possible, please assign 6513).
Broadcast, Multicast or Anycast: No. Broadcast, Multicast or Anycast: No.
Port Name: netconf-tls. Port Name: netconf-tls.
Service Name: netconf. Service Name: netconf.
Reference: draft-ietf-netconf-tls-05. Reference: draft-ietf-netconf-tls-07.
6. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgements
A significant amount of the text in Section 3 was lifted from A significant amount of the text in Section 3 was lifted from
[RFC4642]. [RFC4642].
The author would like to acknowledge David Harrington, Miao Fuyou, The author would like to acknowledge David Harrington, Miao Fuyou,
Eric Rescorla, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Simon Josefsson, Olivier Eric Rescorla, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Simon Josefsson, Olivier
Coupelon, Alfred Hoenes and the NETCONF mailing list members for Coupelon, Alfred Hoenes and the NETCONF mailing list members for
their comments on the document. The author appreciates also Bert their comments on the document. The author appreciates also Bert
Wijnen, Mehmet Ersue and Dan Romascanu for their efforts on issues Wijnen, Mehmet Ersue and Dan Romascanu for their efforts on issues
resolving discussion, and Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk resolving discussion, and Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen and Tim Polk
for the thorough review of this document. for the thorough review of this document.
7. References 7. Contributor's Address
7.1. Normative References Ibrahim Hajjeh
Ineovation
France
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate E-mail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J., 8. Normative References
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions",
RFC 4366, April 2006.
[RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., Newman, C., "Using Transport [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer Protocol Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
(NNTP)", RFC 4642, October 2006
[RFC4741] Enns, R., "NETCONF Configuration Protocol", RFC 4741, [RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using
December 2006. Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer
Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, October 2006.
[RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF [RFC4741] Enns, R., "NETCONF Configuration Protocol", RFC 4741,
Configuration Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 4742, December 2006.
December 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
(TLS) Protocol 1.2", RFC5246, August 2008. Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742,
December 2006.
[RFC5277] Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event Notifications", [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
RFC 5277, July 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5277] Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Notifications", RFC 5277, July 2008.
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
Author's Addresses [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
Mohamad Badra Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
LIMOS Laboratory - UMR6158, CNRS
France
Email: badra@isima.fr A.1. 06-07
Contributors New trust boilerplate introduced.
Ibrahim Hajjeh Section 2.1: reworded the text related to the delimiter sequence and
INEOVATION highlighted that implementations MUST ensure that delimiter sequence
France is never part of a NETCONF message.
Email: Ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.com Section 2.2: Obselete RFC4366 is replaced with RFC5246.
Full Copyright Statement Section 2.2: s/to issues any NETCONF commands/to issue any NETCONF
commands/
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Section 3.2: "Typically, the server has no external knowledge" is
replaced with "The server may have no external knowledge"
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions Section 4 : text added to the Security Considerations section to
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors describe security threads and to give recommendations on the sender
retain all their rights. and receiver behaviour in case they detect the delimiter sequence in
between a NETCONF message.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an A.2. 05-06
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property Statement Section 5 (IANA Considerations Section): "Anycast" is replaced with
"No".
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any A.3. 04-05
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any Removed any text related to PSK based authentication.
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any Revised to TLS with certificate-based mutual authentication.
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgment Removed Cipher Suite Requirements section which was redundant with
TLS.
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF Added small clarifications to the "Introduction" and "Endpoint
Administrative Support Activity (IASA). Authentication and Identification" sections.
Section 2.1: Included mandatory to implement cipher suites that
track future versions of the TLS.
Section 2.2: Revised the connection closure session with regards to
TLS 1.2.
Section 5: Revised to help IANA with the port assignment.
Section 8: Removed RFC4086 and RFC4279 from the reference section
Author's Address
Mohamad Badra
CNRS/LIMOS Laboratory
Campus de cezeaux, Bat. ISIMA
Aubiere, 63170
Fance
Email: badra@isima.fr
 End of changes. 59 change blocks. 
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