< draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-mib-15.txt		draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-mib-16.txt >
	Network Working Group D. Joyal (Editor)		Network Working Group D. Joyal (Editor)
	Internet Draft Nortel		Internet Draft Nortel
	Intended status: Standards Track V. Manral (Editor)		Intended status: Standards Track V. Manral (Editor)
	Expires: December 25, 2009 IP Infusion		Expires: January 17, 2010 IP Infusion
	June 23, 2009		July 16, 2009
	Management Information Base for OSPFv3		Management Information Base for OSPFv3
	draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-mib-15.txt		draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-mib-16.txt
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with		This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with
	the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that		Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
	other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-		other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
	Drafts.		Drafts.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 33 ¶
	months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents		months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
	at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as		at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
	reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at		The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.		http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
	The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at		The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.		http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 25, 2009.		This Internet-Draft will expire on January 17, 2010.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
	publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-		publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-
	info). Please review these documents carefully, as they describe		info). Please review these documents carefully, as they describe
	skipping to change at page 8, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 39 ¶
	InterfaceIndex		InterfaceIndex
	FROM IF-MIB		FROM IF-MIB
	InetAddressType, InetAddress, InetAddressPrefixLength,		InetAddressType, InetAddress, InetAddressPrefixLength,
	InetAddressIPv6		InetAddressIPv6
	FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB		FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB
	Metric, BigMetric, Status,		Metric, BigMetric, Status,
	HelloRange, DesignatedRouterPriority		HelloRange, DesignatedRouterPriority
	FROM OSPF-MIB;		FROM OSPF-MIB;
	ospfv3MIB MODULE-IDENTITY		ospfv3MIB MODULE-IDENTITY
	LAST-UPDATED "200906231200Z"		LAST-UPDATED "200907161200Z"
	ORGANIZATION "IETF OSPF Working Group"		ORGANIZATION "IETF OSPF Working Group"
	CONTACT-INFO		CONTACT-INFO
	"WG E-Mail: ospf@ietf.org		"WG E-Mail: ospf@ietf.org
	WG Chairs: Acee Lindem		WG Chairs: Acee Lindem
	acee@redback.com		acee@redback.com
	Abhay Roy		Abhay Roy
	akr@cisco.com		akr@cisco.com
	Editors: Dan Joyal		Editors: Dan Joyal
	skipping to change at page 9, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 18 ¶
	vishwas@ipinfusion.com"		vishwas@ipinfusion.com"
	DESCRIPTION		DESCRIPTION
	"The MIB module for OSPF version 3.		"The MIB module for OSPF version 3.
	Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2009).		Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2009).
	This version of this MIB module is part of		This version of this MIB module is part of
	RFC xxxx; see the RFC itself for full legal		RFC xxxx; see the RFC itself for full legal
	notices."		notices."
	REVISION "200906231200Z"		REVISION "200907161200Z"
	DESCRIPTION -- RFC Editor assigns RFC xxxx		DESCRIPTION -- RFC Editor assigns RFC xxxx
	"Initial version, published as RFC xxxx"		"Initial version, published as RFC xxxx"
	-- RFC Ed.: replace xxxx with actual RFC number & remove this note		-- RFC Ed.: replace xxxx with actual RFC number & remove this note
	::= { mib-2 YYY }		::= { mib-2 YYY }
	-- RFC Ed.: replace YYY with IANA-assigned number & remove this note		-- RFC Ed.: replace YYY with IANA-assigned number & remove this note
	-- Textual conventions		-- Textual conventions
	Ospfv3UpToRefreshIntervalTC ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION		Ospfv3UpToRefreshIntervalTC ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
	skipping to change at page 82, line 54 ¶		skipping to change at page 82, line 54 ¶
	END		END
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB module		There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB module
	with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. Such		with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. Such
	objects may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network		objects may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
	environments. The support for SET operations in a non-secure		environments. The support for SET operations in a non-secure
	environment without proper protection can have a negative effect on		environment without proper protection can have a negative effect on
	network operations. Improper manipulation of the objects represented		network operations. Improper manipulation of the objects represented
	by this MIB may result in disruption of network connectivity by		by this MIB module may result in disruption of network connectivity
	administratively disabling the entire OSPFv3 entity or individual		by administratively disabling the entire OSPFv3 entity or individual
	interfaces, by deleting configured neighbors, by reducing the limit		interfaces, by deleting configured neighbors, by reducing the limit
	on External LSAs, by changing ASBR status, by manipulating route		on External LSAs, by changing ASBR status, by manipulating route
	aggregation, by manipulating interface and route metrics, by changing		aggregation, by manipulating interface and route metrics, by changing
	hello interval or dead interval, or by changing interface type.		hello interval or dead interval, or by changing interface type.
	Remote monitoring can be defeated by disabling of SNMP notifications.		Remote monitoring can be defeated by disabling of SNMP notifications.
	Performance can be impacted by increasing the limit on External LSAs		Performance can be impacted by increasing the limit on External LSAs
	or changing DR/BDR priority.		or changing DR/BDR priority.
	Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a		Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a
	MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or		MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
	vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to		vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to
	control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly		control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly
	to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over		to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over
	the network via SNMP. Unauthorized access to readable objects in this		the network via SNMP. Unauthorized access to readable objects in this
	MIB allows the discovery of the network topology and operating		MIB module allows the discovery of the network topology and operating
	parameters which can be used to target further attacks on the network		parameters which can be used to target further attacks on the network
	or to gain a competitive business advantage.		or to gain a competitive business advantage.
	SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.		SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
	Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPsec),		Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPsec),
	even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is		even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is
	allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects		allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects
	in this MIB module.		in this MIB module.
	It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as		It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as
	skipping to change at page 85, line 16 ¶		skipping to change at page 85, line 16 ¶
	[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., Wijnen, B.,		[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., Wijnen, B.,
	"An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management		"An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
	Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", RFC 3411,		Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", RFC 3411,
	December 2002.		December 2002.
	[RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P., Stewart, B.,		[RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P., Stewart, B.,
	"Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications",		"Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications",
	RFC 3413, December 2002.		RFC 3413, December 2002.
	[RFC3414] Blumenthal, U., Wijnen, B., "User-based Security Model
	(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
	Protocol (SNMPv3)", RFC 3414, December 2002.
	[RFC3415] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., McCloghrie, K.,
	"View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the
	Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 3415,
	December 2002.
	11. Contributors' Addresses		11. Contributors' Addresses
	Jacek Kwiatkowski		Jacek Kwiatkowski
	Intel Technology Poland		Intel Technology Poland
	ul. Slowackiego 173		ul. Slowackiego 173
	80-298 Gdansk, Poland		80-298 Gdansk, Poland
	Email: jacek.kwiatkowski@intel.com		Email: jacek.kwiatkowski@intel.com
	Sebastian Zwolinski		Sebastian Zwolinski
	Intel Technology Poland		Intel Technology Poland
End of changes. 8 change blocks.
	18 lines changed or deleted		9 lines changed or added
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