< draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-06.txt   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-07.txt >
DNS Extensions working group V.Dolmatov, Ed. DNS Extensions working group V.Dolmatov, Ed.
Internet-Draft Cryptocom Ltd. Internet-Draft Cryptocom Ltd.
Intended status: Standards Track December 12, 2009 Intended status: Standards Track March 06, 2010
Expires: June 12, 2010 Expires: September 06, 2010
Use of GOST signature algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records Use of GOST signature algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
for DNSSEC for DNSSEC
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-06 draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-07
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
skipping to change at page 1, line 32 skipping to change at page 1, line 32
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 12 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 06 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
and restrictions with respect to this document. carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in
Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Abstract Abstract
This document describes how to produce signature and hash using This document describes how to produce signature and hash using
GOST algorithms [DRAFT1, DRAFT2, DRAFT3] for DNSKEY, RRSIG and DS GOST (R 34.10-2001, R 34.11-94) algorithms foor DNSKEY, RRSIG and DS
resource records for use in the Domain Name System Security resource records for use in the Domain Name System Security
Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035). Extensions (DNSSEC).
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries. . 3 2.1. Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries. . 3
2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1 RRSIG RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1 RRSIG RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. DS Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. DS Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
skipping to change at page 2, line 52 skipping to change at page 2, line 52
document extends that list with the signature and hash algorithms document extends that list with the signature and hash algorithms
GOST [GOST3410, GOST3411], GOST [GOST3410, GOST3411],
and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce
RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms. RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms.
Familiarity with DNSSEC and GOST signature and hash Familiarity with DNSSEC and GOST signature and hash
algorithms is assumed in this document. algorithms is assumed in this document.
The term "GOST" is not officially defined, but is usually used to The term "GOST" is not officially defined, but is usually used to
refer to the collection of the Russian cryptographic algorithms refer to the collection of the Russian cryptographic algorithms
GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST R 34.11-94, GOST 28147-89. GOST R 34.10-2001[DRAFT1], GOST R 34.11-94[DRAFT2],
GOST 28147-89[DRAFT3].
Since GOST 28147-89 is not used in DNSSEC, "GOST" will only refer to Since GOST 28147-89 is not used in DNSSEC, "GOST" will only refer to
the GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 in this document. the GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 in this document.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. DNSKEY Resource Records 2. DNSKEY Resource Records
The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
skipping to change at page 3, line 52 skipping to change at page 3, line 52
0x12 0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x23 0x01 0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x12 0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x23 0x01 0x06 0x07 0x2a
0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x1e 0x01 0x03 0x43 0x00 0x04 0x40 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x1e 0x01 0x03 0x43 0x00 0x04 0x40
2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example 2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example
Given a private key with the following value (the value of GostAsn1 Given a private key with the following value (the value of GostAsn1
field is split here into two lines to simplify reading; in the field is split here into two lines to simplify reading; in the
private key file it must be in one line): private key file it must be in one line):
Private-key-format: v1.2 Private-key-format: v1.2
Algorithm: {TBA1} (GOST) Algorithm: {TBA1} (ECC-GOST)
GostAsn1: MEUCAQAwHAYGKoUDAgITMBIGByqFAwICIwEGByqFAwICHgEEIgQgp9c GostAsn1: MEUCAQAwHAYGKoUDAgITMBIGByqFAwICIwEGByqFAwICHgEEIgQgp9c
t2LQaNS1vMKPLEN9zHYjLPNMIQN6QB9vt3AghZFA= t2LQaNS1vMKPLEN9zHYjLPNMIQN6QB9vt3AghZFA=
The following DNSKEY RR stores a DNS zone key for example.net The following DNSKEY RR stores a DNS zone key for example.net
example.net. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 {TBA1} ( example.net. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 {TBA1} (
GtTJjmZKUXV+lHLG/6crB6RCR+EJR51Islpa GtTJjmZKUXV+lHLG/6crB6RCR+EJR51Islpa
6FqfT0MUfKhSn1yAo92+LJ0GDssTiAnj0H0I 6FqfT0MUfKhSn1yAo92+LJ0GDssTiAnj0H0I
9Jrfial/yyc5Og== 9Jrfial/yyc5Og==
) ; key id = 10805 ) ; key id = 10805
skipping to change at page 5, line 4 skipping to change at page 5, line 4
Setting the inception date to 2000-01-01 00:00:00 UTC and the Setting the inception date to 2000-01-01 00:00:00 UTC and the
expiration date to 2030-01-01 00:00:00 UTC, the following signature expiration date to 2030-01-01 00:00:00 UTC, the following signature
should be created (assuming {TBA1}==249 until proper code is should be created (assuming {TBA1}==249 until proper code is
assigned by IANA) assigned by IANA)
www.example.net. 3600 IN RRSIG A {TBA1} 3 3600 20300101000000 ( www.example.net. 3600 IN RRSIG A {TBA1} 3 3600 20300101000000 (
20000101000000 10805 example.net. 20000101000000 10805 example.net.
k3m0r5bm6kFQmcRlHshY3jIj7KL6KTUsPIAp k3m0r5bm6kFQmcRlHshY3jIj7KL6KTUsPIAp
Vy466khKuWEUoVvSkqI+9tvMQySQgZcEmS0W Vy466khKuWEUoVvSkqI+9tvMQySQgZcEmS0W
HRFSm0XS5YST5g== ) HRFSm0XS5YST5g== )
Note: Several GOST signatures calculated for the same message text Note: Several ECC-GOST signatures calculated for the same message text
differ because of using of a random element is used in signature will differ because of using of a random element is used in signature
generation process. generation process.
4. DS Resource Records 4. DS Resource Records
GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm is denoted in DS RRs by the digest GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm is denoted in DS RRs by the digest
type {TBA2}.The wire format of a digest value is compatible with type {TBA2}.The wire format of a digest value is compatible with
RFC4490 [RFC4490], that is digest is in little-endian representation. RFC4490 [RFC4490], that is digest is in little-endian representation.
The digest MUST always be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters The digest MUST always be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters
identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357]. identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
skipping to change at page 5, line 55 skipping to change at page 5, line 55
5.3. Digest Sizes 5.3. Digest Sizes
According to the GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3411], the size of a GOST According to the GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3411], the size of a GOST
digest is 256 bits. digest is 256 bits.
6. Implementation Considerations 6. Implementation Considerations
6.1. Support for GOST signatures 6.1. Support for GOST signatures
DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG and DNSSEC aware implementations MAY be able to support RRSIG and
DNSKEY resource records created with the GOST algorithms as DNSKEY resource records created with the GOST algorithms as
defined in this document. defined in this document.
6.2. Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence 6.2. Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence
Any DNSSEC-GOST implementation is required to have either NSEC or Any DNSSEC-GOST implementation MUST support both NSEC[RFC4035] and
NSEC3 support. NSEC3 [RFC5155]
6.3 Byte order 6.3 Byte order
Due to the fact that all existing industry implementations of GOST Due to the fact that all existing industry implementations of GOST
cryptographic libraries are returning GOST blobs in little-endian cryptographic libraries are returning GOST blobs without
format and in order to avoid the necessity for DNSSEC developers transformation from little-endian format and in order to avoid the
to handle different cryptographic algorithms differently, it was necessity for DNSSEC developers to handle different cryptographic
chosen to send these blobs on the wire "as is" without algorithms differently, it was chosen to send these blobs on the
transformation of endianness. wire "as is" without transformation of endianness.
7. Security considerations 7. Security considerations
Currently, the cryptographic resistance of the GOST 34.10-2001 Currently, the cryptographic resistance of the GOST 34.10-2001
digital signature algorithm is estimated as 2**128 operations digital signature algorithm is estimated as 2**128 operations
of multiple elliptic curve point computations on prime modulus of multiple elliptic curve point computations on prime modulus
of order 2**256. of order 2**256.
Currently, the cryptographic resistance of GOST 34.11-94 hash Currently, the cryptographic resistance of GOST 34.11-94 hash
algorithm is estimated as 2**128 operations of computations of a algorithm is estimated as 2**128 operations of computations of a
step hash function. (There is known method to reduce this step hash function. (There is known method to reduce this
estimate to 2**105 operations, but it demands padding the estimate to 2**105 operations, but it demands padding the
colliding message with 1024 random bit blocks each of 256 bit colliding message with 1024 random bit blocks each of 256 bit
length, thus it cannot be used in any practical implementation). length, thus it cannot be used in any practical implementation).
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document updates the IANA registry "DNS Security Algorithm This document updates the IANA registry "DNS Security Algorithm
Numbers [RFC4034]" Numbers" [RFC4034]
(http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers). (http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers).
The following entries are added to the registry: The following entries are added to the registry:
Zone Trans. Zone Trans.
Value Algorithm Mnemonic Signing Sec. References Status Value Algorithm Mnemonic Signing Sec. References Status
{TBA1} GOST R 34.10-2001 GOST Y * (this memo) OPTIONAL {TBA1} GOST R 34.10-2001 ECC-GOST Y * (this memo) OPTIONAL
This document updates the RFC 4034 Digest Types assignment This document updates the RFC 4034 Digest Types assignment
(section A.2)by adding the value and status for the GOST R 34.11-94 (section A.2)by adding the value and status for the GOST R 34.11-94
algorithm: algorithm:
Value Algorithm Status Value Algorithm Status
{TBA2} GOST R 34.11-94 OPTIONAL {TBA2} GOST R 34.11-94 OPTIONAL
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
skipping to change at page 8, line 5 skipping to change at page 8, line 5
GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R 34.10-2001 GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R 34.10-2001
Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 4490, May 2006. RFC 4490, May 2006.
[RFC4491] S. Leontiev and D. Shefanovski, "Using the GOST [RFC4491] S. Leontiev and D. Shefanovski, "Using the GOST
R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491, Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491,
May 2006. May 2006.
[RFC5155] B. Laurie, G. Sisson, R. Arends and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, February 2008.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[RFC4509] Hardaker W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer [RFC4509] Hardaker W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006. (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
[DRAFT1] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S., [DRAFT1] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S.,
"GOST R 34.10-2001 digital signature algorithm" "GOST R 34.10-2001 digital signature algorithm"
draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost34102001-07, 12.12.09 draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost34102001-08, 12.12.09
work in progress. work in progress.
[DRAFT2] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S., [DRAFT2] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S.,
"GOST R 34.11-94 Hash function algorithm" "GOST R 34.11-94 Hash function algorithm"
draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost341194-06, 12.12.09 draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost341194-07, 12.12.09
work in progress. work in progress.
[DRAFT3] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Emelyanova I., [DRAFT3] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Emelyanova I.,
"GOST 28147-89 encryption, decryption and MAC algorithms" "GOST 28147-89 encryption, decryption and MAC algorithms"
draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost2814789-06, 12.12.09 draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost2814789-08, 12.12.09
work in progress. work in progress.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Vasily Dolmatov, Ed. Vasily Dolmatov, Ed.
Cryptocom Ltd. Cryptocom Ltd.
Kedrova 14, bld.2 Kedrova 14, bld.2
Moscow, 117218, Russian Federation Moscow, 117218, Russian Federation
EMail: dol@cryptocom.ru EMail: dol@cryptocom.ru
 End of changes. 18 change blocks. 
28 lines changed or deleted 37 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/