< draft-ietf-ipsecme-ipsec-ha-08.txt   draft-ietf-ipsecme-ipsec-ha-09.txt >
Network Working Group Y. Nir Network Working Group Y. Nir
Internet-Draft Check Point Internet-Draft Check Point
Intended status: Informational June 28, 2010 Intended status: Informational July 4, 2010
Expires: December 30, 2010 Expires: January 5, 2011
IPsec Cluster Problem Statement IPsec Cluster Problem Statement
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ipsec-ha-08 draft-ietf-ipsecme-ipsec-ha-09
Abstract Abstract
This document defines terminology, problem statement and requirements This document defines terminology, problem statement and requirements
for implementing IKE and IPsec on clusters. It also describes gaps for implementing IKE and IPsec on clusters. It also describes gaps
in existing standards and their implementation that need to be in existing standards and their implementation that need to be
filled, in order to allow peers to interoperate with clusters from filled, in order to allow peers to interoperate with clusters from
different vendors. An agreed terminology, problem statement and different vendors. An agreed terminology, problem statement and
requirements will allow the IPSECME WG to consider development of requirements will allow IETF working gropus to consider development
IPsec/IKEv2 mechanisms to simplify cluster implementations. of IPsec/IKEv2 mechanisms to simplify cluster implementations.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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3.3. IKE Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. IKE Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Outbound SA Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Outbound SA Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Inbound SA Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Inbound SA Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Missing Synch Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.6. Missing Synch Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.7. Simultaneous use of IKE and IPsec SAs by Different 3.7. Simultaneous use of IKE and IPsec SAs by Different
Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.7.1. Outbound SAs using counter modes . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.7.1. Outbound SAs using counter modes . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.8. Different IP addresses for IKE and IPsec . . . . . . . . . 9 3.8. Different IP addresses for IKE and IPsec . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9. Allocation of SPIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.9. Allocation of SPIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
IKEv2, as described in [RFC4306] and [IKEv2bis], and IPsec, as IKEv2, as described in [RFC4306] and [IKEv2bis], and IPsec, as
described in [RFC4301] and others, allows deployment of VPNs between described in [RFC4301] and others, allows deployment of VPNs between
different sites as well as from VPN clients to protected networks. different sites as well as from VPN clients to protected networks.
As VPNs become increasingly important to the organizations deploying As VPNs become increasingly important to the organizations deploying
them, there is a demand to make IPsec solutions more scalable and them, there is a demand to make IPsec solutions more scalable and
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cluster, this usually happens because of a failure of one of the cluster, this usually happens because of a failure of one of the
members, but certain load-balancing technologies may allow a members, but certain load-balancing technologies may allow a
particular load (such as all the flows associated with a particular particular load (such as all the flows associated with a particular
child SA) to move from one member to another to even out the load, child SA) to move from one member to another to even out the load,
even without any failures. even without any failures.
"Tight Cluster" is a cluster where all the members share an IP "Tight Cluster" is a cluster where all the members share an IP
address. This could be accomplished using configured interfaces with address. This could be accomplished using configured interfaces with
specialized protocols or hardware, such as VRRP, or through the use specialized protocols or hardware, such as VRRP, or through the use
of multicast addresses, but in any case, peers need only be of multicast addresses, but in any case, peers need only be
configured with one IP address in the PAD. configured with one IP address in the Peer Authentication Database.
"Loose Cluster" is a cluster where each member has a different IP "Loose Cluster" is a cluster where each member has a different IP
address. Peers find the correct member using some method such as DNS address. Peers find the correct member using some method such as DNS
queries or the IKEv2 redirect mechanism ([RFC5685]). In some cases, queries or the IKEv2 redirect mechanism ([RFC5685]). In some cases,
a member's IP address(es) may be allocated to another member at a member's IP address(es) may be allocated to another member at
failover. failover.
"Synch Channel" is a communications channel among the cluster "Synch Channel" is a communications channel among the cluster
members, used to transfer state information. The synch channel may members, used to transfer state information. The synch channel may
or may not be IP based, may or may not be encrypted, and may work or may not be IP based, may or may not be encrypted, and may work
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associated IPsec SAs will get dropped. associated IPsec SAs will get dropped.
The above scenario may be rare enough that it is acceptable that on a The above scenario may be rare enough that it is acceptable that on a
configuration with thousands of IKE SAs, a few will need to be configuration with thousands of IKE SAs, a few will need to be
recreated from scratch or using session resumption techniques. recreated from scratch or using session resumption techniques.
However, detecting this may take a long time (several minutes) and However, detecting this may take a long time (several minutes) and
this negates the goal of creating a cluster in the first place. this negates the goal of creating a cluster in the first place.
3.7. Simultaneous use of IKE and IPsec SAs by Different Members 3.7. Simultaneous use of IKE and IPsec SAs by Different Members
For LS clusters, all active members may need to use the same SAs, For load sharing clusters, all active members may need to use the
both IKE and IPsec. This is an even greater problem than in the case same SAs, both IKE and IPsec. This is an even greater problem than
of HS clusters, because consecutive packets may need to be sent by in the case of hot-standby clusters, because consecutive packets may
different members to the same peer gateway. need to be sent by different members to the same peer gateway.
The solution to the IKE SA issue is up to the application. It's The solution to the IKE SA issue is up to the implementation. It's
possible to create some locking mechanism over the synch channel, or possible to create some locking mechanism over the synch channel, or
else have one member "own" the IKE SA and manage the child SAs for else have one member "own" the IKE SA and manage the child SAs for
all other members. For IPsec, solutions fall into two broad all other members. For IPsec, solutions fall into two broad
categories. categories.
The first is the "sticky" category, where all communications with a The first is the "sticky" category, where all communications with a
single peer, or all communications involving a certain SPD cache single peer, or all communications involving a certain SPD cache
entry go through a single peer. In this case, all packets that match entry go through a single peer. In this case, all packets that match
any particular SA go through the same member, so no synchronization any particular SA go through the same member, so no synchronization
of the replay counter needs to be done. Inbound processing is a of the replay counter needs to be done. Inbound processing is a
"sticky" issue, because the packets have to be processed by the "sticky" issue (no pun intended), because the packets have to be
correct member based on peer and SPI. Another issue is that most processed by the correct member based on peer and SPI, and most load
load balancers will not be able to match the SPIs of the encrypted balancers will not be able to match the SPIs to the correct member,
side to the clear traffic, and so the wrong member may get the the unless stickyness extends to all traffic with a particular peer.
other half of the flow. Another disadvantage of sticky solutions, is that the load tends to
not distribute evenly, especially if one SA covers a significant
portion of IPsec traffic.
The second is the "duplicate" category, where the child SA is The second is the "duplicate" category, where the child SA is
duplicated for each pair of IPsec SAs for each active member. duplicated for each pair of IPsec SAs for each active member.
Different packets for the same peer go through different members, and Different packets for the same peer go through different members, and
get protected using different SAs with the same selectors and get protected using different SAs with the same selectors and
matching the same entries in the SPD cache. This has some matching the same entries in the SPD cache. This has some
shortcomings: shortcomings:
o It requires multiple parallel SAs, which the peer has no use for. o It requires multiple parallel SAs, which the peer has no use for.
Section 2.8 or [RFC4306] specifically allows this, but some Section 2.8 of [RFC4306] specifically allows this, but some
implementation might have a policy against long term maintenance implementation might have a policy against long term maintenance
of redundant SAs. of redundant SAs.
o Different packets that belong to the same flow may be protected by o Different packets that belong to the same flow may be protected by
different SAs, which may seem "weird" to the peer gateway, different SAs, which may seem "weird" to the peer gateway,
especially if it is integrated with some deep inspection especially if it is integrated with some deep inspection
middleware such as a firewall. It is not known whether this will middleware such as a firewall. It is not known whether this will
cause problems with current gateways. It is also impossible to cause problems with current gateways. It is also impossible to
mandate against this, because the definition of "flow" varies from mandate against this, because the definition of "flow" varies from
one implementation to another. one implementation to another.
o Reply packets may arrive with an IPsec SA that is not "matched" to o Reply packets may arrive with an IPsec SA that is not "matched" to
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active member, or even failing over from one member to another need active member, or even failing over from one member to another need
to make sure that they do not generate the same initial vector. See to make sure that they do not generate the same initial vector. See
[COUNTER_MODES] for a discussion of this problem in another context. [COUNTER_MODES] for a discussion of this problem in another context.
3.8. Different IP addresses for IKE and IPsec 3.8. Different IP addresses for IKE and IPsec
In many implementations there are separate IP addresses for the In many implementations there are separate IP addresses for the
cluster, and for each member. While the packets protected by tunnel cluster, and for each member. While the packets protected by tunnel
mode child SAs are encapsulated in IP headers with the cluster IP mode child SAs are encapsulated in IP headers with the cluster IP
address, the IKE packets originate from a specific member, and carry address, the IKE packets originate from a specific member, and carry
that member's IP address. For the peer, this looks weird, as the that member's IP address. This may be done so that IPsec traffic
usual thing is for the IPsec packets to come from the same IP address bypasses the load balancer for greater scalability. For the peer,
as the IKE packets. this looks weird, as the usual thing is for the IPsec packets to come
from the same IP address as the IKE packets. Unmodified peers may
drop such packets.
One obvious solution is to use some fancy capability of the IKE host One obvious solution is to use some fancy capability of the IKE host
to change things so that IKE packets also come out of the cluster IP to change things so that IKE packets also come out of the cluster IP
address. This can be achieved through NAT or through assigning address. This can be achieved through NAT or through assigning
multiple addresses to interfaces. This is not, however, possible for multiple addresses to interfaces. This is not, however, possible for
all implementations. all implementations, and will not reduce load on the balancer.
[ARORA] discusses this problem in greater depth, and proposes another [ARORA] discusses this problem in greater depth, and proposes another
solution, that does involve protocol changes. solution, that does involve protocol changes.
3.9. Allocation of SPIs 3.9. Allocation of SPIs
The SPI associated with each child SA, and with each IKE SA, MUST be The SPI associated with each child SA, and with each IKE SA, MUST be
unique relative to the peer of the SA. Thus, in the context of a unique relative to the peer of the SA. Thus, in the context of a
cluster, each cluster member MUST generate SPIs in a fashion that cluster, each cluster member MUST generate SPIs in a fashion that
avoids collisions (with other cluster members) for these SPI values. avoids collisions (with other cluster members) for these SPI values.
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Moreover, thought must be given to the synching requirements of any Moreover, thought must be given to the synching requirements of any
protocol extension, to make sure that it does not create an protocol extension, to make sure that it does not create an
opportunity for denial of service attacks on the cluster. opportunity for denial of service attacks on the cluster.
As mentioned in Section 3.5, allowing an inbound child SA to fail As mentioned in Section 3.5, allowing an inbound child SA to fail
over to another member has the effect of disabling replay counter over to another member has the effect of disabling replay counter
protection for a short time. Though the threat is arguably low, it protection for a short time. Though the threat is arguably low, it
is a policy decision whether this is acceptable. is a policy decision whether this is acceptable.
Section 3.7 describes the problem of the two directions of a flow
being protected by two SAs which are not part of a matched pair, or
even not being processed by the same cluster member. This is not a
security problem as far as IPsec is concerned, because IPsec has
policy at the IP, protocol and port level only. However, many IPsec
implementations are integrated with stateful firewalls, which need to
see both sides of a flow. Such implementations may have to forward
packets to other members for the firewall to properly inspect the
traffic.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
This document is the collective work, and includes contribution from This document is the collective work, and includes contribution from
many people who participate in the IPsecME working group. many people who participate in the IPsecME working group.
The editor would particularly like to acknowledge the extensive The editor would particularly like to acknowledge the extensive
contribution of the following people (in alphabetical order): contribution of the following people (in alphabetical order):
Jitender Arora, Jean-Michel Combes, Dan Harkins, David Harrington,
Jitender Arora, Jean-Michel Combes, Dan Harkins, Steve Kent, Tero Steve Kent, Tero Kivinen, Alexey Melnikov, Yaron Sheffer, Melinda
Kivinen, Yaron Sheffer, Melinda Shore, and Rodney Van Meter. Shore, and Rodney Van Meter.
7. Change Log 7. Change Log
NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: REMOVE THIS SECTION BEFORE PUBLICATION NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: REMOVE THIS SECTION BEFORE PUBLICATION
Version 00 was identical to draft-nir-ipsecme-ipsecha-ps-00, re-spun Version 00 was identical to draft-nir-ipsecme-ipsecha-ps-00, re-spun
as an WG document. as an WG document.
Version 01 included closing issues 177, 178 and 180, with updates to Version 01 included closing issues 177, 178 and 180, with updates to
terminology, and added discussion of inbound SAs and the CTR issue. terminology, and added discussion of inbound SAs and the CTR issue.
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Version 03 fixes some ID-nits, and adds the problem presented by Version 03 fixes some ID-nits, and adds the problem presented by
Jitender Arora in [ARORA]. Jitender Arora in [ARORA].
Version 04 fixes a spelling mistake, moves the scope discussion to a Version 04 fixes a spelling mistake, moves the scope discussion to a
subsection of its own (Section 3.1), and adds a short discussion of subsection of its own (Section 3.1), and adds a short discussion of
the duplicate SPI problem, presented by Jean-Michel Combes. the duplicate SPI problem, presented by Jean-Michel Combes.
Versions 05, 06 and 07 just corrected nits and notation Versions 05, 06 and 07 just corrected nits and notation
Versions 08 and 09 include suggestions from the IETF last call.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
 End of changes. 16 change blocks. 
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