< draft-turner-sha0-sha1-seccon-04.txt		draft-turner-sha0-sha1-seccon-05.txt >
	skipping to change at page 1, line 14 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 14 ¶
	Internet-Draft L. Chen		Internet-Draft L. Chen
	Intended Status: Informational NIST		Intended Status: Informational NIST
	Expires: August 3, 2011 S. Turner		Expires: August 3, 2011 S. Turner
	IECA		IECA
	P. Hoffman		P. Hoffman
	VPN Consortium		VPN Consortium
	February 3, 2011		February 3, 2011
	Security Considerations for the		Security Considerations for the
	SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithms		SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithms
	draft-turner-sha0-sha1-seccon-04		draft-turner-sha0-sha1-seccon-05
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document includes security considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-		This document includes security considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-
	1 message digest algorithm.		1 message digest algorithm.
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	skipping to change at page 5, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 22 ¶
	to ensure that selected hash algorithms provide sufficient security.		to ensure that selected hash algorithms provide sufficient security.
	At the time of publication, SHA-256 [SHS] is the most commonly		At the time of publication, SHA-256 [SHS] is the most commonly
	specified alternative. The known (reduced round) attacks on the		specified alternative. The known (reduced round) attacks on the
	collision resistance of SHA-256 indicate a significant security		collision resistance of SHA-256 indicate a significant security
	margin, and the longer message digest provides increased strength.]		margin, and the longer message digest provides increased strength.]
	Nearly all IETF protocols that use signatures assume existing public		Nearly all IETF protocols that use signatures assume existing public
	key infrastructures, and SHA-1 is still used in signatures nearly		key infrastructures, and SHA-1 is still used in signatures nearly
	everywhere. Therefore, it is unwise to strictly prohibit the use of		everywhere. Therefore, it is unwise to strictly prohibit the use of
	SHA-1 in signature algorithms. Protocols that permit the use of SHA-1		SHA-1 in signature algorithms. Protocols that permit the use of SHA-1
	based digital signatures as an option should strong consider		based digital signatures as an option should strongly consider
	referencing this document in the security considerations.		referencing this document in the security considerations.
	A protocol designer might want to consider the use of SHA-1 with		A protocol designer might want to consider the use of SHA-1 with
	randomized hashing such as is specified in [SP800-107]. Note that		randomized hashing such as is specified in [SP800-107]. Note that
	randomized hashing expands the size of signatures and requires		randomized hashing expands the size of signatures and requires
	protocols to carry material that is not needed today. HMAC-SHA-1		protocols to carry material that is not needed today. HMAC-SHA-1
	remains secure and is the preferred keyed-hash algorithm for IETF		remains secure and is the preferred keyed-hash algorithm for IETF
	protocol design.		protocol design.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
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