< draft-ietf-sidr-ta-06.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-ta-07.txt >
	SIDR G. Huston		SIDR G. Huston
	Internet-Draft APNIC		Internet-Draft APNIC
	Intended status: Standards Track S. Weiler		Intended status: Standards Track S. Weiler
	Expires: May 12, 2011 SPARTA, Inc.		Expires: October 15, 2011 SPARTA, Inc.
	G. Michaelson		G. Michaelson
	APNIC		APNIC
	S. Kent		S. Kent
	BBN		BBN
	November 8, 2010		April 13, 2011
	Resource Certificate PKI (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator		Resource Certificate PKI (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator
	draft-ietf-sidr-ta-06		draft-ietf-sidr-ta-07
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource		This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource
	Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).		Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 36 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on May 11, 2011.		This Internet-Draft will expire on October 15, 2011.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	skipping to change at page 2, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 19 ¶
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Trust Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Trust Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations . . . . . . 4		2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations . . . . . . 4
	2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource		This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource
	Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [ID.sidr-arch]. This		Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [ID.sidr-arch]. This
	format may be used to distribute trust anchor material using a mix of		format may be used to distribute trust anchor material using a mix of
	out-of-band and online means. Procedures used by relying parties		out-of-band and online means. Procedures used by relying parties
	(RPs) to verify RPKI signed objects SHOULD support this format to		(RPs) to verify RPKI signed objects SHOULD support this format to
	facilitate interoperability between creators of Trust Anchor (TA)		facilitate interoperability between creators of Trust Anchor (TA)
	material and RPs.		material and RPs.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 26 ¶
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.		document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
	2. Trust Anchor Locator		2. Trust Anchor Locator
	2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format		2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format
	This document does not propose a new format for TA material. A TA in		This document does not propose a new format for TA material. A TA in
	the RPKI TA is represented by a self-signed X.509 CA certificate, a		the RPKI is represented by a self-signed X.509 CA certificate, a
	format commonly used in PKIs and widely supported by RP software.		format commonly used in PKIs and widely supported by RP software.
	This document specifies a format for data used to retrieve and verify		This document specifies a format for data used to retrieve and verify
	the authenticity of a TA, in a very simple fashion. That data is		the authenticity of a TA, in a very simple fashion. That data is
	referred to as "Trust Anchor Locator" (TAL).		referred to as "Trust Anchor Locator" (TAL).
	The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the		The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the
	trust anchor to change, without needing to effect re-distribution of		trust anchor to change, without needing to effect re-distribution of
	the trust anchor per se. In the RPKI, certificates contain		the trust anchor per se. In the RPKI, certificates contain
	extensions that represent Internet Number Resources (INRs) [RFC3779].		extensions that represent Internet Number Resources (INRs) [RFC3779].
	The set of INRs associated with an entity likely will change over		The set of INRs associated with an entity likely will change over
	skipping to change at page 4, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 7 ¶
	a PKIX standard [RFC5914]. That standard could be used to represent		a PKIX standard [RFC5914]. That standard could be used to represent
	the TAL, if one defined an rsync URI extension for that data		the TAL, if one defined an rsync URI extension for that data
	structure. However, the TAL format was adopted by RPKI implementors		structure. However, the TAL format was adopted by RPKI implementors
	prior to the PKIX TA work, and the RPKI implementer community has		prior to the PKIX TA work, and the RPKI implementer community has
	elected to utilize the TAL format, rather than define the requisite		elected to utilize the TAL format, rather than define the requisite
	extension. The community also prefers the simplicity of the ASCII		extension. The community also prefers the simplicity of the ASCII
	encoding of the TAL, vs. the binary (ASN.1) encoding for		encoding of the TAL, vs. the binary (ASN.1) encoding for
	TrustAnchorInfo.		TrustAnchorInfo.
	The TAL is an ordered sequence of a rsync URI [RFC5781], and a base		The TAL is an ordered sequence of a rsync URI [RFC5781], and a base
	64-encoded, DER-encoded X.509 [X.509] subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280].		64-encoding with URL and filename safe alphabet [RFC4648], DER-
	The sequence separator is an ASCII line break sequence, namely the CR		encoded X.509 [X.509] subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280]. The sequence
	LF character pair. The CR character is OPTIONAL.		separator is an ASCII line break sequence, namely the CR LF character
			pair. The CR character is OPTIONAL.
	2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations		2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations
	The rsync URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It MUST NOT		The rsync URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It MUST NOT
	reference a directory or any other form of collection of objects.		reference a directory or any other form of collection of objects.
	The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate that		The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate that
	conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [ID.sidr-res-certs]. This		conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [ID.sidr-res-certs]. This
	certificate is the trust anchor in certification path discovery		certificate is the trust anchor in certification path discovery
	[RFC4158] and validation [RFC5280][RFC3779].		[RFC4158] and validation [RFC5280][RFC3779].
	skipping to change at page 4, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 43 ¶
	The public key used to verify the trust anchor MUST be the same as		The public key used to verify the trust anchor MUST be the same as
	the subjectPublicKeyInfo in the CA certificate and in the TAL.		the subjectPublicKeyInfo in the CA certificate and in the TAL.
	The trust anchor MUST contain a stable key. This key MUST NOT change		The trust anchor MUST contain a stable key. This key MUST NOT change
	when the certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR		when the certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR
	extension(s), when the certificate is renewed prior to expiration or		extension(s), when the certificate is renewed prior to expiration or
	for any reason other than a key change.		for any reason other than a key change.
	Because the public key in the TAL and the trust anchor MUST be		Because the public key in the TAL and the trust anchor MUST be
	stable, this motivates operation of that CA in an off-line mode.		stable, this motivates operation of that CA in an off-line mode.
	Thusthe entity that issues the trust anchor SHOULD issue a		Thus the entity that issues the trust anchor SHOULD issue a
	subordinate CA certificate that contains the same INRs (via the use		subordinate CA certificate that contains the same INRs (via the use
	of the "inherit" option in the INR extensions of the subordinate		of the "inherit" option in the INR extensions of the subordinate
	certificate). This allows the entity that issues the trust anchor to		certificate). This allows the entity that issues the trust anchor to
	keep the corresponding private key of this certificate off-line,		keep the corresponding private key of this certificate off-line,
	while issuing all relevant child certificates under the immediate		while issuing all relevant child certificates under the immediate
	subordinate CA. This measure also allows the CRL issued by that		subordinate CA. This measure also allows the CRL issued by that
	entity to be used revoke the subordinate (CA) certificate in the		entity to be used to revoke the subordinate (CA) certificate in the
	event of suspected key compromise of this potentially more vulnerable		event of suspected key compromise of this potentially more vulnerable
	online operational key pair.		online operational key pair.
	The trust anchor MUST be published at a stable URI. When the trust		The trust anchor MUST be published at a stable URI. When the trust
	anchor is re-issued for any reason, the replacement CA certificate		anchor is re-issued for any reason, the replacement CA certificate
	MUST be accessible using the same URI.		MUST be accessible using the same URI.
	Becuase the trust anchor is a self-signed certificate, there is no		Becuase the trust anchor is a self-signed certificate, there is no
	corresponding Certificate Revocation List that can be used to revoke		corresponding Certificate Revocation List that can be used to revoke
	it, nor is there a manifest [ID.sidr-rpki-manifests] that lists this		it, nor is there a manifest [ID.sidr-rpki-manifests] that lists this
	skipping to change at page 5, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 45 ¶
	1. Retrieve the object referenced by the URI contained in the TAL.		1. Retrieve the object referenced by the URI contained in the TAL.
	2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI		2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI
	CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in		CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in
	[ID.sidr-res-certs].		[ID.sidr-res-certs].
	3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in		3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in
	the retrieved object.		the retrieved object.
	4. Perform other checks, as deem appropriate (locally), to ensure		4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure
	that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self-		that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self-
	signed CA certificate to be a trust anchor, relating to the		signed CA certificate to be a trust anchor, relating to the
	validity oof attestations made in the context of the RPKI		validity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI
	(relating to all resources described in the INR extension of this		(relating to all resources described in the INR extension of this
	certificate).		certificate).
	An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of TAL that it		An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of TAL that it
	is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a re-		is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a re-
	synchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an		synchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an
	RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the		RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the
	locally cached copy of the retrieved trust anchor referenced by the		locally cached copy of the retrieved trust anchor referenced by the
	TAL.		TAL.
	skipping to change at page 6, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 4 ¶
	6. Acknowledgments		6. Acknowledgments
	This approach to TA material was originally described by Robert		This approach to TA material was originally described by Robert
	Kisteleki.		Kisteleki.
	The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy		The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy
	Bush, who assisted with earlier versions of this document and with		Bush, who assisted with earlier versions of this document and with
	helpful review comments.		helpful review comments.
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[ID.sidr-res-certs]		[ID.sidr-res-certs]
	Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for		Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
	X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Work in progress:		X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Work in progress:
	Internet Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17.txt,		Internet Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17.txt,
	September 2009.		September 2009.
	[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP		[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
	Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.		Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
			[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
			Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
	[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI		[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
	Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.		Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
	[X.509] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory -		[X.509] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
	Authentication Framework", 2000.		Authentication Framework", 2000.
End of changes. 15 change blocks.
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