< draft-ietf-ospf-auth-trailer-ospfv3-10.txt   draft-ietf-ospf-auth-trailer-ospfv3-11.txt >
OSPF Working Group M. Bhatia OSPF Working Group M. Bhatia
Internet-Draft Alcatel-Lucent Internet-Draft Alcatel-Lucent
Intended status: Standards Track V. Manral Intended status: Standards Track V. Manral
Expires: May 18, 2012 Hewlett Packard Expires: May 24, 2012 Hewlett Packard
A. Lindem A. Lindem
Ericsson Ericsson
Nov 15, 2011 Nov 21, 2011
Supporting Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3 Supporting Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3
draft-ietf-ospf-auth-trailer-ospfv3-10 draft-ietf-ospf-auth-trailer-ospfv3-11
Abstract Abstract
Currently OSPFv3 uses IPsec as the only mechanism for authenticating Currently OSPFv3 uses IPsec as the only mechanism for authenticating
protocol packets. This behavior is different from authentication protocol packets. This behavior is different from authentication
mechanisms present in other routing protocols (OSPFv2, IS-IS, RIPng). mechanisms present in other routing protocols (OSPFv2, IS-IS, RIPng).
In some environments, it has been found that IPsec is difficult to In some environments, it has been found that IPsec is difficult to
configure and maintain, and cannot be used. This document proposes configure and maintain, and cannot be used. This document proposes
an alternative mechanism to authenticate OSPFv3 protocol packets so an alternative mechanism to authenticate OSPFv3 protocol packets so
that OSPFv3 does not depend upon only IPsec for authentication. that OSPFv3 does not depend upon only IPsec for authentication.
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 39
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 18, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 24, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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o Cryptographic Sequence Number o Cryptographic Sequence Number
64-bit strictly increasing sequence number that is used to guard 64-bit strictly increasing sequence number that is used to guard
against replay attacks. The 64-bit sequence number MUST be against replay attacks. The 64-bit sequence number MUST be
incremented for every OSPFv3 packet sent by the OSPFv3 router. incremented for every OSPFv3 packet sent by the OSPFv3 router.
Upon reception, the sequence number MUST be greater than the Upon reception, the sequence number MUST be greater than the
sequence number in the last OSPFv3 packet accepted from the sequence number in the last OSPFv3 packet accepted from the
sending OSPFv3 neighbor. Otherwise, the OSPFv3 packet is sending OSPFv3 neighbor. Otherwise, the OSPFv3 packet is
considered a replayed packet and dropped. considered a replayed packet and dropped.
OSPFv3 routers implementing this specification SHOULD use OSPFv3 routers implementing this specification MUST use available
available mechanisms to preserve the sequence number's strictly mechanisms to preserve the sequence number's strictly increasing
increasing property for the deployed life of the OSPFv3 router property for the deployed life of the OSPFv3 router (including
(including cold restarts). One mechanism for accomplishing this cold restarts). One mechanism for accomplishing this would be to
would be to use the high order 32 bits of the sequence number as a use the high order 32 bits of the sequence number as a wrap/boot
wrap/boot count that is incremented anytime the OSPFv3 router count that is incremented anytime the OSPFv3 router loses its
loses its sequence number state. Sequence number wrap is sequence number state. Sequence number wrap is described in
described in Section 4.1.1. Section 4.1.1.
o Authentication Data o Authentication Data
Variable data that is carrying the digest for the protocol packet Variable data that is carrying the digest for the protocol packet
and optional LLS block. and optional LLS block.
4.1.1. Sequence Number Wrap 4.1.1. Sequence Number Wrap
When incrementing the sequence number for each transmitted OSPFv3 When incrementing the sequence number for each transmitted OSPFv3
packet, the sequence number should be treated as an unsigned 64-bit packet, the sequence number should be treated as an unsigned 64-bit
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