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Tantsura 13 Nuage Networks 14 N. ten Oever 15 University of Amsterdam 16 March 12, 2019 18 Considerations on Internet Consolidation and the Internet Architecture 19 draft-arkko-iab-internet-consolidation-01 21 Abstract 23 Many of us have held a vision of the Internet as the ultimate 24 distributed platform that allows communication, the provision of 25 services, and competition from any corner of the world. But as the 26 Internet has matured, it seems to also feed the creation of large, 27 centralised entities in many areas. This phenomenon could be looked 28 at from many different angles, but this memo considers the topic from 29 the perspective of how available technology and Internet architecture 30 drives different market directions. 32 Status of This Memo 34 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 35 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 37 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 38 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 39 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 40 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 42 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 43 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 44 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 45 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 47 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 13, 2019. 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 1. Introduction 66 Many of us have held a vision of the Internet as the ultimate 67 distributed platform that allows communication, the provision of 68 services, and competition from any corner of the world. But as the 69 Internet has matured, it seems to also feed the creation of large, 70 centralised entities in many areas. 72 We use the term Internet consolidation to refer to the process of the 73 increasing control over Internet infrastructure and services by a 74 small set of organizations. Such concentration has an obvious effect 75 on traffic flows or whose services and systems are in daily use by 76 large population of Internet users, but it can also create secondary 77 effects, where the abiity to collect information or to affect 78 something is concentrated in the small set of organizations. 80 Consolidation may also affect technology choices and the evolution of 81 the Internet architecture, e.g., large organizations or organizations 82 providing important technology components may have a significant 83 impact on what technology is deployed for large numbers of users or 84 by other organizations. 86 Our first question is whether Internet is indeed consolidating? It 87 certainly appears so, though more quantitative research on this topic 88 would be welcome. It is also possible that there's only a perception 89 of consolidation, as market forces have caused business changes in 90 new areas of business. Arguably, today's consolidation areas seem to 91 be more in the application space than further down in the stack or in 92 the operating systems, as was the case some years ago. The second 93 question is if we're seeing consolidation simply moving to new areas. 95 This phenomenon could be looked at from many different angles, but 96 this memo considers the topic from the perspective of how available 97 technology and Internet architecture drives different market 98 directions. Our third question is if the Internet technology has 99 influenced the consolidation trends in some manner? And conversely, 100 the fourth question asks how is Internet consolidation influencing 101 the development of the Internet infrastructure and architecture? 103 The engineering remit at the IETF is to focus on technology, but of 104 course we also want to understand the implications and externalities 105 of the technical arrangements we design. Technology affects 106 economics and vice versa. The Internet technology community 107 continues to make decisions that have ramifications on Internet 108 systems, just as we are subject to forces that affect them. 110 As technologists, our fourth question is whether there are changes in 111 technology that would help reduce those large-player advantages that 112 are technically-driven. 114 This memo reviews areas where consolidation may be occurring in the 115 Internet, and discusses the potential reasons for this. The memo 116 starts by review other work in this area in Section 2. Section 3 117 discusses consolidation and the reasons behind the creation of larger 118 entities, and Section 4 looks at some actions that might alleviate 119 the situation. 121 If you are interested on this or other architecture-related topics, 122 please subscribe to the IAB architecture-discuss mailing list as one 123 forum for discussion. Similarly, the Internet Society has chosen 124 consolidation as a focus topic for their year 2019 activities. Their 125 report is in [ISOC]. 127 2. Other Work 129 One of the causes for the current consolidation of the Internet 130 infrastructure can be traced back to some of the assumptions that 131 were made during the commercialization of the Internet in the early 132 1990s [Abbate], even though [RFC1192] already describes some 133 potential issues that could arise. Overall it was expected the 134 combination of commercialization, together with the technical and 135 architectural characteristics of the Internet, such as its modularity 136 and layering principles, would lead to perfect markets, free 137 competition and decentralized structures [LitanRivlin]. 139 But as we know now, this did not happen entirely as expected. Some 140 even argue that 'market concentrations, control and power struggles 141 are categories to adequately describe the fundamental dynamics of the 142 commercial Internet' [DolataSchrape]. While the privatization was 143 supposed to lead to competition and innovation [Cowheyetal] 145 [VanSchewick], some argue that it actually led to the emergence of 146 Internet oligopolies [Mansell] [Smyrnaios]. 148 Current scientific economic thinking harbors two different schools 149 vis a vis efficient markets and monopolies. The school based on Adam 150 Smith argues that unfettered markets tend to concentration of wealth 151 and income, whereas liberal economist believe in efficient markets 152 that stimulate competition. 154 On the other hand, according to Joseph Stiglitz 'many sectors - 155 telecoms, cable TV, digital branches from social media to Internet 156 search, health insurance, pharmaceuticals, agro-business, and many 157 more - cannot be understood through the lens of competition' 158 [Stiglitz]. The considerations of technologists and policy makers at 159 the time of the commercialization and privatization of the Internet 160 infrastructure might have been based on a belief in efficient 161 markets, whereas we are now finding out this might not always be how 162 markets function. 164 It cannot be denied that 'market actors have contributed immensely to 165 the evolution of the Internet in terms of investment, products, 166 services, and infrastructure, and the government's light-handed 167 approach to regulation has given producers and consumers substantial 168 freedom to innovate and to self-regulate with respect to many issues 169 affecting the Internet community in ways that have produced 170 substantial social benefits' [Frischmann]. But the current 171 consolidation in ownership of and control over the Internet 172 infrastructure was not foreseen [Clark], and arguably the loss of 173 decentralized control goes against its design objectives. For 174 instance, [RFC1958] says: 176 This allows for uniform and relatively seamless operations in a 177 competitive, multi-vendor, multi-provider public network. 179 and 181 Heterogeneity is inevitable and must be supported by design. 183 And [RFC3935] says: 185 We embrace technical concepts such as decentralized control, edge- 186 user empowerment and sharing of resources, because those concepts 187 resonate with the core values of the IETF community. 189 3. Factors Driving Consolidation 191 Consolidation is driven by economic factors relating to scale and 192 ability to easily reach a large market of users over the Internet. 193 This kind of setting tends to enable winners to take large market 194 shares, whether those winners came about through the model that 195 liberal economists believe in or the model that Adam Smith believes 196 in. 198 The most visible aspects of this involve well-recognized Internet 199 services. Internet Society's report summarised the market position 200 of popular Internet service brands as follows [ISOC]: 202 o Facebook and Google have been estimated to account for 84% of 203 global digital advertising investment (excluding China). 205 o Amazon is expected to account for 49.1% of all online retail 206 spending in the US. Similarly, Alibaba is estimated to have close 207 to 60% of the e-commerce market in China. 209 o Google alone holds 90% of the global search market, over 60% of 210 web browsers, and has the number 1 (by far) mobile operating 211 system (Android). 213 o Facebook - incorporating Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and 214 Instagram - holds 4 of the world's top 6 social media platforms. 216 But it is important to recognize that the Internet is a complex 217 ecosystem. There are many underlying services whose diversity, or 218 lack thereof, are as important as that of, say, consumer-visible 219 social networks. For instance, the diversity of cloud services, 220 operating systems, browser engines is as important as that as of 221 application stores or the browsers themselves. 223 Of course, the Internet allows plenty of choice both in these and 224 other areas. Too many or too few choices create different kinds of 225 problems. 227 It would be useful to break these general factors and observations 228 down a bit further. In particular, it is useful to distinguish 229 market or economic factors from technical factors. 231 3.1. Economics 233 Scaling benefits are natural for many types of businesses. And many 234 Internet-based businesses can potentially serve a very large customer 235 base, as the cost of replicating and delivering their service to new 236 customers or areas is small. 238 However, typically the network effect has an even more pronounced 239 impact. Each additional user adds to the value of the network for 240 all users in a network. In some applications, such as the open web, 241 this value grows for everyone, as the web is a globally connected, 242 interoperable service for anyone with a browser can use. 244 There is an important distinction between different applications of 245 the network effect, however. Consider email as another example; 246 anyone with an account at any email server can use it globally. 247 However, here we have seen much more consolidation into few large 248 email providers, both due to innovative, high-quality services but 249 also because running email services by small entities is becoming 250 difficult; among other things due to spam prevention practices that 251 tend to recognize well only the largest entities. 253 In some other applications, such as social media, the services have a 254 more closed nature. The value of being a customer of one social 255 media service depends highly on how many other customers that 256 particular service has. Hence, the larger the service, the more 257 valuable it is. And the bigger the value difference to the 258 customers, the less practical choice they have in selecting a 259 service. 261 In some cases, these developments also allow asymmetric relationships 262 to form, with the customers having less ability to affect the service 263 than they would perhaps wish. 265 3.2. Interdependencies 267 Entities with a large role in a market place tend to have inertia, of 268 course through having many customers, but also due to their 269 interconnectedness with the rest of the ecosystem. These 270 interconnections can range from business relationships to peering 271 connections, linking, and the use of various infrastructure services 272 from an entity as building blocks in applications. 274 These interconnections make it difficult for a market to move away 275 from a large entity. Indeed, even for an individual it can be a 276 challenge to not use the most commonly used Internet services 277 [Gizmodo]. 279 Optimistic technologists ("digital libertarians") tend to have a 280 beliefs that states have limited ability to regulate the Internet: 281 "The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it" 282 [Gilmore]. However, as argued by [Boyle] states may have multiple 283 ways to influence and monitor the Internet. One of the issues 284 related to consolidation is that it tends to be easier to exert 285 control of few large entities, than a large set of small, distributed 286 players. This concern is particularly acute around intellectual 287 property rights or surveillance capabilities, particularly when 288 extra-territorial requirements are placed on the large entities. 289 These entities cannot avoid comforming to regulation and laws in any 290 of the locations they have presence in. 292 As a result, there's an added angle of interconnectedness with 293 governments. At the same time, this of course also provides an 294 avenue for control of market forces, e.g., in the form of competition 295 law. 297 3.3. Data- and Capital-intensive Services 299 The scaling advantages are only getting larger with the advent of AI- 300 and machine learning -based technologies. 302 The more users a service has, the more data is available for training 303 machine learning models, and the better the service becomes, bringing 304 again more users. This feedback loop and the general capital- 305 intensive nature of the technology (data and processing at scale) 306 makes it likely that the largest companies are ahead in the use of 307 these technologies. 309 One could also take the pessimistic view that many of the ongoing 310 disputes in standards organizations relate to which market actors 311 will ultimately be able to collect the more data from private persons 312 and how. The question isn't as much about the protection of the 313 user's privacy but rather whether one or another industry (or 314 country) will be able to benefit from access to data. 316 3.4. Permissionless Innovation 318 The email vs. social media example also highlights the interesting 319 roles of interoperability and the "permissionless innovation" 320 principle - the idea that a network can be simple but still powerful 321 enough that essentially any application could be built on top of it 322 without needing any special support from anyone else. Permissionless 323 innovation has brought us all the innovative applications that we 324 enjoy today, on top of a highly interoperable underlying network, 325 along with advances in video coding and other techniques used by 326 applications. 328 Paradoxically, if the underlying network is sufficiently powerful, 329 the applications on top can evolve without similar pressures for 330 interoperability, leading to the closed but highly valuable services 331 discussed above. We call this the Permissionless Completeness 332 Problem. 334 3.5. Fundamentals of Communication 336 There are also fundamental issues. For instance, speed of light; 337 low-latency services can fundamentally only be provided through 338 globally distributed data centers. These are often provided built by 339 large organizations, although collaborative and data center or cloud 340 computing service approaches also exist. 342 A similar issue has arisen in recent years around large-scale denial- 343 of-service attacks, and how various entities can deal with them. 344 While the largest attacks affect all players (see, for instance, the 345 Dyn attacks in October 2016), it is also true that large cloud- and 346 content delivery providers can better deal with such attacks due to 347 their scale. This is one reason that attracts many network services 348 to such providers. 350 3.6. Technology Factors 352 One of the key questions is whether we are seeing developments that 353 are driven by economic factors or whether fundamental reasons or lack 354 available technology drives particular models. For instance, 355 centralised solutions might desirable due to business incentives, or 356 they might be necessary because there is no distributed, 357 collaborative solution. 359 For instance, some technical issues have historically not been easy 360 to solve, such as e-mail spam, which has led to reliance on non- 361 technical solutions. Today, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 362 run your own mail services, essentially forcing many organizations 363 and individuals to employ larger providers. The issues relate 364 directly to size of entities; no one can afford to disconnect from 365 the largest providers. But as a small entity, there is little 366 leverage to convince peer entities or various supporting white/ 367 blacklist entities to deal with you properly. 369 Many Internet services are based on gathering data about users, and 370 using that data for, for instance, targeted advertisements. More 371 data from more users makes it possible to run a service more 372 accurately or with better results; here again scale brings 373 advantages. 375 Another trend is that more and more content is becoming available 376 locally, from a content delivery or provider function directly on 377 your own ISP's network. We predict that eventually most content will 378 be delivered this way, reducing the role that global IP connections 379 across the Internet play. By some metrics this has already happened; 380 what practical - positive or negative - impacts might this have on 381 the Internet technology? 382 There are also security tradeoffs. Large entities are generally 383 better equipped to move to more recent and more secure technology. 384 For instance, the Domain Name System (DNS) shows signs of ageing but 385 due to the legacy of deployed systems, has changed very slowly. 386 Newer technology developed at the IETF enables DNS queries to be 387 performed confidentially, but its deployment is happening mostly in 388 browsers that use global DNS resolver services, such as Cloudflare's 389 1.1.1.1 or Google's 8.8.8.8. This results in faster evolution and 390 better security for end users. 392 However, if one steps back and considers the overall security effects 393 of these developments, the resulting effects can be different. While 394 the security of the actual protocol exchanges improves with the 395 introduction of this new technology, at the same time this implies a 396 move from using a worldwide distributed set of DNS resolvers into, 397 again, more centralised global resolvers. While these resolvers are 398 very well maintained (and a great service), they are potentially 399 high-value targets for pervasive monitoring and Denial-of-Service 400 (DoS) attacks. In 2016, for example, DoS attacks were launched 401 against Dyn, one of the largest DNS providers, leading to some 402 outages. 404 4. Call to Action 406 Are there assumptions about the Internet architecture that no longer 407 hold in a world where larger, more centralised entities provide big 408 parts of the Internet service? If the world changes, the Internet 409 and its technology/architecture may have to match those changes. 411 It appears that level the playing field for new entrants or small 412 players brings potential benefits. Are there technical solutions 413 that are missing today? 415 Of course, it may well be that technology improvements are hard to 416 come by. Nevertheless, recognizing the risks of consolidation in 417 both current and proposed future technologies is the first step in 418 proactively avoiding those risks where possible. 420 Assuming that one does not wish for regulation, technologies that 421 support distributed architectures, open source implementations of 422 currently centralised network functions, or help increase user's 423 control can be beneficial. Federation, for example, would help 424 enable distributed services in situations where smaller entities 425 would like to collaborate. 427 Similarly, in an asymmetric power balance between users and services, 428 tools that enable the user to control what information is provided to 429 a particular service can be very helpful. Some such tools exist, for 430 instance, in the privacy and tracking-prevention modes of popular 431 browsers but why are these modes not the default, and could we 432 develop them further? 434 It is also surprising that in the age of software-defined everything, 435 we can program almost anything else except the globally provided, 436 packaged services. Opening up interfaces would allow the building of 437 additional, innovative services, and better match with users' needs. 439 Silver bullets are rare, of course. Internet service markets 440 sometimes fragment rather than cooperate through federation. And the 441 asymmetric power balances are easiest changed with data that is in 442 your control, but it is much harder to change when someone else holds 443 it. Nevertheless, the exploration of solutions to ensure the 444 Internet is kept open for new innovations and in the control of users 445 is very important. 447 o What IETF topics that should be pursued to address some of the 448 issues around consolidation? Some of the topics for consideration 449 are discussed in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2. 451 o Are there open source efforts that should be pursued or kept being 452 pursued to ensure that a diversity of operators and networks can 453 use a particular technology? This is further discussed in 454 {{opensource]]. 456 o What measurements relating to the developments centralization or 457 consolidation should be pursued? And what other research, such as 458 distributed Internet architectures, should be driven forward? 459 Some potential topics are discussed in Section 4.4. 461 4.1. Open Interfaces 463 Standards and open source efforts continue to build many open 464 interfaces and APIs that allow systems interoperability and tailoring 465 of services. In some cases, however, the availability of open 466 interfaces definitions and software has not lead to the realization 467 of actual interfaces in this open manner. For instance, different 468 instant messaging systems have had a technical ability to be 469 interoperable with other systems, just like e-mail is interoperable 470 across systems, but have chosen to be disconnected. 472 Work in determining what open interfaces can provide benefits to 473 users as well be successfully deployed in the Internet ecosystem 474 would of course be useful. 476 4.2. Specific Standardization Choices 478 Sometimes the issue is not the availability of interfaces as such, 479 but rather fundamental architectural choices with regards to how 480 Internet systems should be built. 482 Often this relates to how centralized or distributed deployments are 483 targeted. And even if a distributed, broad deployment model is 484 targeted, he expectations may not match reality when economies of 485 scale, DDoS resilience, market consolidation, or other factors have 486 come into play. These factors can result in the deployed reality 487 being highly concentrated. 489 This is a serious issue for the Internet, as concentrated, 490 centralized deployment models present risks to user choice, privacy, 491 and future protocol evolution. On occasion, the differences to 492 expectations can be immediate, but can also occur much later. 494 Some examples of these issue include current work in DNS where we may 495 see concentration through the use of globally available common 496 resolver services, which evolve rapidly and can offer better 497 security. But the concentration of these queries into few services 498 creates new security and privacy concerns. 500 Another example is email, which started out as many providers running 501 in a largely uncoordinated fashion, but which has since then seen 502 significant market consolidation and a need for coordination to 503 defend against attacks such as spam. The coordination and 504 centralized defense mechanisms scale better for large entities, which 505 has fueled additional consolidation. 507 Awareness of these issues while working on standards would be useful, 508 so that the issues can be taken into account and appropriately 509 mitigated. To begin with, those of us Interested in the broader 510 questions about Internet development and Internet researchers are 511 needed to identify some of the effects that new technology 512 developments may pose. 514 4.3. Open Source 516 Many key Internet infrastructure services (e.g., DNS servers), end- 517 user applications (e.g., browsers) and technology components (e.g., 518 operating systems or protocol implementations) are commonly 519 implemented using open source solutions. 521 This is often true even if there's a large entity that is in charge 522 of large fraction of development and deployment for a particular 523 technology. This is a good thing, as it ensures that others have a 524 fair chance of changing the technology in question, should the large 525 entity drive their use of the technology in some direction that does 526 not benefit the users. For instance, users and other organizations 527 have traditionally been able to either run their own browser versions 528 or provided extensions that suit their needs better than the default 529 system. 531 As a result, continuing to have this ecosystem is important safety 532 valve and competition opportunity. 534 4.4. Research Challenges 536 There are number of different research directions for which further 537 work would be useful. 539 The first is about measurements; is the Internet indeed 540 consolidating, and if so, by how much, and in what aspects? Also, 541 where are Internet's traffic flows concentrating, and how is this 542 changing over time? 544 There are also questions about the trends and their relationships to 545 technology: Has Internet technology influenced the consolidation 546 trends in some manner? And conversely, how Internet consolidation 547 influences the development of the Internet infrastructure and 548 architecture? 550 Finally, research on topics that would likely yield results that 551 increase the diversity and de-centralization in the Internet would 552 obviously be welcome. This can include any de-centralized 553 technologies, but in particular distributed Internet architecture is 554 an Interesting topic. 556 5. Contributors 558 Much of the text in this memo is from a blog article written by Jari 559 Arkko, Mark Nottingham, Christian Huitema, Martin Thomson, and Brian 560 Trammell for the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), and from a blog 561 article written by Jari Arkko and Brian Trammell APNIC and RIPE. 562 Some parts of the text have also come from a future workshop 563 description developed in the IAB, primarily by Christian Huitema and 564 Ted Hardie. 566 6. Acknowledgements 568 The authors would like to thank IAB members, Geoff Huston, Amelia 569 Andersdotter, Gonzalo Camarillo, Mirjam Kuehne, Robert Mitchell, Olaf 570 Kolkman, and many others for interesting discussions in this problem 571 space. 573 7. Informative References 575 [Abbate] Abbate, J., "Inventing the Internet", MIT Press , 2000, 576 . 578 [Boyle] "Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and 579 Hardwired Censors", Duke Law School, 580 https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/ 581 faculty_scholarship/619/ , 1997. 583 [Clark] Clark, D., "The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet 584 Protocols", In Symposium Proceedings on Communications 585 Architectures and Protocols, 106-114. SIGCOMM '88. New 586 York, NY, USA, ACM https://doi.org/10.1145/52324.52336 , 587 1988. 589 [Cowheyetal] 590 Cowhey, P., Aronson, J., and J. Richards, "Shaping the 591 Architecture of the US Information and Communication 592 Technology Architecture: A Political Economic Analysis", 593 Review of Policy Research 26 (1-2), pp. 105-125. , 2009. 595 [DolataSchrape] 596 Dolata, U. and J. Schrape, "Collectivity and Power on the 597 Internet: A Sociological Perspective", Springer 598 International Publishing. Page 85. , 2018, 599 . 601 [Frischmann] 602 Frischmann, B., "Privatization and Commercialization of 603 the Internet Infrastructure", Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 604 2, pp. 1-25. , 2001. 606 [Gilmore] "First Nation in Cyberspace", TIME International (see 607 http://kirste.userpage.fu-berlin.de/outerspace/ 608 internet-article.html) , December 1993. 610 [Gizmodo] "I Cut The 'Big Five' Tech Giants From My Life. It Was 611 Hell", Gizmodo, https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2019/02/i-cut- 612 the-big-five-tech-giants-from-my-life-it-was-hell/ , 613 February 2019. 615 [ISOC] "Consolidation in the Internet economy", Internet Society, 616 https://future.internetsociety.org/2019/ , 2019. 618 [LitanRivlin] 619 Litan, R. and A. Rivlin, "Projecting the Economic Impact 620 of the Internet", American Economic Review 91 (2), pp. 621 313-317 , 2001. 623 [Mansell] Mansell, R. and M. Javary, "Emerging Internet Oligopolies: 624 A Political Economy Analysis", In Miller, Edythe S.and 625 Samuels, Warren J., (eds.) An Institutionalist Approach to 626 Public Utilities Regulation. Michigan State University 627 Press, East Lansing, Michigan, pp. 162-201. ISBN 628 9780870136245 , 2002, . 631 [RFC1192] Kahin, B., "Commercialization of the Internet summary 632 report", RFC 1192, DOI 10.17487/RFC1192, November 1990, 633 . 635 [RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the 636 Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996, 637 . 639 [RFC3935] Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF", 640 BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004, 641 . 643 [Smyrnaios] 644 Smyrnaios, N., "Internet Oligopoly: The Corporate Takeover 645 of Our Digital World", Emerald Publishing Ltd. , 2018. 647 [Stiglitz] 648 Stiglitz, J., "Joseph Stiglitz: Are markets efficient, or 649 do they tend towards monopoly? The verdict is in", 2016, 650 . 654 [VanSchewick] 655 van Schewick, B., "Internet Architecture and Innovation", 656 MIT Press , 2012. 658 Authors' Addresses 660 Jari Arkko 661 Ericsson 663 Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net 664 Brian Trammell 665 ETH Zurich 667 Email: ietf@trammell.ch 669 Mark Nottingham 670 Fastly 672 Email: mnot@mnot.net 674 Christian Huitema 675 Private Octopus Inc. 677 Email: huitema@huitema.net 679 Martin Thomson 680 Mozilla 682 Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com 684 Jeff Tantsura 685 Nuage Networks 687 Email: jefftant.ietf@gmail.com 689 Niels ten Oever 690 University of Amsterdam 692 Email: mail@nielstenoever.net